In 1948, it was more "moral right", the nascent state did not have a chance. In 1956 it was hutzpah, and in 1967 it was a combination of might and an ineffective uneducated opponent without leadership from its officers (except the Jordanian Legion which was as tough as it was in 1948, a real threat). In 1973, it was not might, it was "back to the sea" and "survival", and finally a supplier of arms (the US) which did everything it could to resupply depleted reserves. It was close.... But yes, might is very important, that is why Roosevelt coned the phrase, "speak softly, but carry a big sick".
The Israeli are in a pickle jar, the Arab can try again and again, the Israeli do not want to force them into unconditional surrender every time they attack (and the UN won't let them either), but what is the UN going to do if Israel is overrun by Arab armies?Absolutely nothing. That is why I believe there must be a consequence everytime the Arab armies try and are defeated in their attempt to eradicate the state of Israel, thus, he Golan heights, maybe return a portion, but not all, the loss a consequence of Syria's aggression, the same with with the best back, return some, but not all, and the longer no peace is in place the lesser is left. Without visibility of consequences to your action, you repeat them. Germany will never get back Alsace Loraine or East Prussia or for that mater Silesia. Japan should not get back the Sakhalin islands either.
Zeev
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