Zeev's Turnips Talk Politics (ZTTP)

[Alex G]

Forewarned

Posted by billmon, June 28, 2005
http://billmon.org/archives/001948.html

One of the most telling moments in Field Marshal von Rumsfeld's appearance on Meet the Press last Sunday came when Tim Russert asked him if he had warned the president before the Iraq invasion that the U.S. might face a "robust" insurgency afterwards:

RUSSERT: Was a robust insurgency on your list that you gave the president?

RUMSFELD: I don't remember whether that was on there, but certainly it was discussed -- the possibility that you could have dead-enders who would fight.

Given everything that's happened since Rummy drew up his list, you'd think the presence or absence of that particular warning would be stamped in his memory -- or better yet, engraved in his ass with a power drill by his boss, the Commander in Chief. But we all know the Cheney administration doesn't work that way.

I think it's probably safe to assume that the answer to Russert's question is no. Or, if the insurgency threat was on Rummy's little list, it was probably number 11, right behind: "Soldiers may be injured by rose petals hitting them in the eyeballs."

Anyone who watched, or read the transcripts of, Rumfeld's press briefings in the days and weeks following the fall of Baghdad should remember his casual contempt for the "dead enders" and "stragglers" who were already starting to make trouble in the Sunni triangle.

To hear Rummy tell it, they were just a nuisance factor -- a continuation of the looting and violence that swept through Baghdad following it's conquest:

QUESTION: Are you seeing in Iraq organized guerilla resistance that might be directed by Saddam Hussein?

RUMSFELD: It’s hard to tell. You see, different people in the U.S. community have different views on that, and there’s no one who thinks that it’s a well organized, nationally-directed campaign . . . My impression is that generally the looting and the criminal element is generally at a very low level -- it exists just like it does in cities all across Europe or the United States. There is some level of crime and misconduct.

Hell, for months Rummy and the rest of the gang refused to use or even accept the term "guerrilla warfare," even as the number of daily attacks rose into the double digits. Clearly, the gang didn't have a clue what it was up against -- or at least, it sure didn't act like it did.

Someday, this could become a focal point for historians trying to understand how America stumbled so blindly into the Iraq fiasco -- as well as for all the conspiracy theorists who will refuse to accept that the world's most powerful military machine failed to recognize the risk of irregular warfare, and had no contingency plan for fighting it once it began.

But there already is one thing we can say for certain: Rumsfeld and the gang were warned of the risk -- clearly and unequivocally -- before the invasion.

One of the most detailed alarms was sounded by the Army War College, which published this report http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/reconirq/reconirq.pdf , Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario, in February of 2003 -- a month before the invasion.

It is a document that some of our meat-headed media windbags would be well advised to read -- even if they have to move their lips while they're doing it. As I noted back in June of '03, the report predicted virtually every major obstacle and crisis the coalition has faced in Iraq since the invasion. And its warnings about the danger of insurrection were particularly prescient:

The longer a U.S. occupation of Iraq continues, the more danger exists that elements of the Iraqi population will become impatient and take violent measures to hasten the departure of U.S. forces . . .

A small number of terrorists could reasonably choose to attack U.S. forces in the hope that they can incite an action- reaction cycle that will enhance their cause and increase their numbers . . .

Ongoing media attention to suicide bombing suggests that any future Iraqi terrorist leaders could have this tactic at the forefront of their minds . . .

An exit strategy will require the establishment of
political stability, which will be difficult to achieve given Iraq’s fragmented population, weak political institutions, and propensity for rule by violence . . .


If anything, the War College report was too optimistic, predicting that a post-invasion occupation force might have up to a year before Iraqi hostility triggered an armed uprising. Then again, if the April 2004 siege of Fallujah is regarded as the moment when the insurgency "went critical," the War College's forecast could be considered right on the mark.

It wasn't the only indication of a looming fiasco. Even as the statues of Saddam were being pulled down in Baghdad, the Army and the U.S. Joint Forces Command were conducting an extensive round of high-level war games -- Unified Quest 2003 -- designed to test four different scenarios for the war on terrorism. One of them was the invasion and occupation of a mythical Southeast Asian country with a large and well-armed Islamic separatist movement.

An article in the May 27, 2003 edition of the Wall Street Journal described what happened next:

U.S. forces swooped in quickly. They appeared to drive the enemy from the capital within days and then mounted attacks on rebel strongholds elsewhere.

As soon as U.S. troops left the capital, however, the rebels there -- many of whom had simply taken off their uniforms and melded into the city of five million -- re-emerged to storm the parliament, the government television station and the airport. When U.S. forces counterattacked, these guerrillas once again slipped into the shadows.

"We were never able to set up the conditions to make these disaffected people fewer in number. We won and then we found we owned this nightmarish place," says retired Vice Adm. Lyle Bien, who played commander of U.S. forces in Asia.

Was the Secretary of Defense ever briefed on the War College report? Were any of the members of his neocon inner circle? Were they made aware of the results of Unified Quest 2003? If so, did they take any steps -- either before or after the invasion -- to prepare for large-scale counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations in Iraq? If not, why not?

I think we can guess the answers to those questions. Which is a good thing, since they obviously aren't ones the GOP-controlled House and Senate ever plan to ask -- not in public anyway. Our media chowderheads also can't be bothered to be so specific, allowing Rummy and his cardiac-impaired (and brain damaged) sidekick to continue bullshitting their way through the talk shows. And the president? He'll drop a fresh load on us tonight when he and his military props take the stage at Ft. Bragg. (D'ya think he'll wear his flight suit?)

But lies and evasions are weapons that only work on the home front -- and these days maybe not even there. They clearly don't impress the insurgents/terrorists, who know weakness when they hear it.

For an honest assessment, we have to go back to the guys who weren't deluded enough to think the occupation of a large, heavily armed Islamic country would be a Sunday picnic:

The [Unified Quest] experience left a few, such as Adm. Bien, believing that the best course of action would have been not intervening at all. "We're developing a force that makes it almost too easy to intervene," says Adm. Bien. "I am concerned about America pounding herself out."

I guess we can consider ourselves warned.


Posted by billmon at 01:35 AM