The case involved use of patented compounds as research to decide which drugs to test and ultimately seek FDA approval on. The lower court held that the statute did not protect use of patented compounds in unsuccessful experiments that did not lead to an NDA. The court rejected that and held:
The statutory text does not require such a result. Congress did not limit ß271(e)(1)ís safe harbor to the development of information for inclusion in a submission to the FDA; nor did it create an exemption applicable only to the research relevant to filing an ANDA for approval of a generic drug. Rather, it exempted from infringement all uses of patented compounds ìreasonably relatedî to the process of developing information for submission under any federal law regulating the manufacture, use, or distribution of drugs. See Eli Lilly, 496 U. S., at 674. We decline to read the ìreasonable relationî requirement so narrowly as to render ß271(e)(1)ís stated protection of activities leading to FDA approval for all drugs illusory. Properly construed, ß271(e)(1) leaves adequate space for experimentation and failure on the road to regulatory approval: At least where a drugmaker has a reasonable basis for believing that a patented compound may work, through a particular biological process, to produce a particular physiological effect, and uses the compound in research that, if successful, would be appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA, that use is ìreasonably relatedî to the ìdevelopment and submission of information under . . . Federal law.î ß271(e)(1)
This is not particularly relevant to the MNTA situation, but I think the case is useful as background.
The court also declined to address whether narrower construction of the statute is appropriate for patented "research tools":
footnote 7 The Court of Appeals also suggested that a limited construction of ß271(e)(1) is necessary to avoid depriving so-called ìresearch toolsî of the complete value of their patents. Respondents have never argued the RGD peptides were used at Scripps as research tools, and it is apparent from the record that they were not. See 331 F. 3d, at 878 (Newman, J., dissenting) (ìUse of an existing tool in oneís research is quite different from study of the tool itselfî). We therefore need notó and do notóexpress a view about whether, or to what extent, ß271(e)(1) exempts from infringement the use of ìresearch toolsî in the development of information for the regulatory process