AI
Saturday, June 25, 2005 6:11:03 PM
This man is the new Iran president, he just made India’s job a lot tougher
C. RAJA MOHAN
Posted online: Sunday, June 26, 2005 at 0203 hours IST
NEW DELHI, JUNE 25: Ahmadinejad is 48, he invokes the Revolution, makes Washington nervous, is praised by hardline Islamic groups from across the world. New Delhi’s tightrope between the new Tehran and a friendly US
As New Delhi prepares to send the customary message of congratulations to the hardline conservative president-elect in Tehran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, its backroom boys will pore over the unpredictable consequences of the political tsunami unleashed by the elections in Iran.
Rapprochement with Iran in the mid-1990s has been a major accomplishment of India’s foreign policy. The blossoming partnership between Delhi and Tehran is bound to come under diplomatic stress if the newly energised forces of Iranian conservatism drift into a confrontation with Washington.
India’s stakes in Iran are high. It is a major supplier of oil and natural gas to India. Iran has emerged as India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia and beyond to Europe. And above all, it’s our neighbour’s neighbour to the west.
Iran’s geopolitical location allows it to influence the developments in the Subcontinent, Central Asia, Persian Gulf and the Middle East. Its confrontation with the US could profoundly affect the stability of all these regions and India’s wide-ranging interests there.
Until now, India has managed to keep its engagement with the United States and Iran separate.
Yet the questions of the India-Pakistan-Iran pipeline, Delhi’s limited defence exchanges with Tehran, and India’s attitude towards Iran’s nuclear programme have already become issues of concern to the United States.
They could get a lot worse in the coming days and utterly complicate India’s balancing act between the United States and Iran.
The outgoing President Mohammad Khatami—who quoted from western philosophers, talked of dialogue among civilisations, and tried to steer his nation towards a new path—had created a seeming basis for reconciliation between Iran and the West.
Khatami’s moderate foreign policy also opened the door for a wider acceptance of Iran in the non-Western world as well as among its Arab neighbours. The domestic basis of that policy appears to have collapsed in these elections.
If Ahmadinejad, who promises to restore the spirit of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, returns Iran to a radical foreign policy, there will be trouble all around.
For those in the Bush Administration who advocate regime change in Tehran, the triumph of the revolutionary ardour in these elections will be further proof that Iran, in its present form, has no redemption.
Parts of the US establishment and most European governments have argued against Bush Administration’s plans to confront Iran.
They had insisted that a “constructive engagement” will encourage Iran to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons, end opposition to the Middle East peace process, and dissociate itself from the radical Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Hamas in Palestine.
Unless Ahmadinejad begins to downplay his nuclear rhetoric and suggestions of a confrontationist foreign policy, western arguments for a “constructive engagement” with Iran will have little credibility in Washington.
Prejudging Ahmadinejad, who is serving as the
mayor of Tehran, would be wrong. At 48, he is relatively young and capable of political adaptation.
The well-known Iranian trait of pragmatism, the gigantic economic challenges at home and the strategic consequences of confronting America could well induce Ahmadinejad to accept moderate policies once he takes charge in August.
As it has happened elsewhere and often, conservative political tendencies are better placed to handle difficult negotiations on national security issues.
Also, his election means that with no challenge to the supreme authority of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the top gun of Iranian clerical rule, the dual lines of authority in Iran have been removed.
A hard-ball negotiation between the “ultra-conservatives” Tehran and the “neo-conservatives” in Washington need not be as outlandish a prospect as it seems.
In any event, before making a definitive assessment of the new realities in Iran, Delhi must initiate an early diplomatic and political contact with the new leadership in Tehran.
http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=73338
C. RAJA MOHAN
Posted online: Sunday, June 26, 2005 at 0203 hours IST
NEW DELHI, JUNE 25: Ahmadinejad is 48, he invokes the Revolution, makes Washington nervous, is praised by hardline Islamic groups from across the world. New Delhi’s tightrope between the new Tehran and a friendly US
As New Delhi prepares to send the customary message of congratulations to the hardline conservative president-elect in Tehran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, its backroom boys will pore over the unpredictable consequences of the political tsunami unleashed by the elections in Iran.
Rapprochement with Iran in the mid-1990s has been a major accomplishment of India’s foreign policy. The blossoming partnership between Delhi and Tehran is bound to come under diplomatic stress if the newly energised forces of Iranian conservatism drift into a confrontation with Washington.
India’s stakes in Iran are high. It is a major supplier of oil and natural gas to India. Iran has emerged as India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia and beyond to Europe. And above all, it’s our neighbour’s neighbour to the west.
Iran’s geopolitical location allows it to influence the developments in the Subcontinent, Central Asia, Persian Gulf and the Middle East. Its confrontation with the US could profoundly affect the stability of all these regions and India’s wide-ranging interests there.
Until now, India has managed to keep its engagement with the United States and Iran separate.
Yet the questions of the India-Pakistan-Iran pipeline, Delhi’s limited defence exchanges with Tehran, and India’s attitude towards Iran’s nuclear programme have already become issues of concern to the United States.
They could get a lot worse in the coming days and utterly complicate India’s balancing act between the United States and Iran.
The outgoing President Mohammad Khatami—who quoted from western philosophers, talked of dialogue among civilisations, and tried to steer his nation towards a new path—had created a seeming basis for reconciliation between Iran and the West.
Khatami’s moderate foreign policy also opened the door for a wider acceptance of Iran in the non-Western world as well as among its Arab neighbours. The domestic basis of that policy appears to have collapsed in these elections.
If Ahmadinejad, who promises to restore the spirit of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, returns Iran to a radical foreign policy, there will be trouble all around.
For those in the Bush Administration who advocate regime change in Tehran, the triumph of the revolutionary ardour in these elections will be further proof that Iran, in its present form, has no redemption.
Parts of the US establishment and most European governments have argued against Bush Administration’s plans to confront Iran.
They had insisted that a “constructive engagement” will encourage Iran to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons, end opposition to the Middle East peace process, and dissociate itself from the radical Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Hamas in Palestine.
Unless Ahmadinejad begins to downplay his nuclear rhetoric and suggestions of a confrontationist foreign policy, western arguments for a “constructive engagement” with Iran will have little credibility in Washington.
Prejudging Ahmadinejad, who is serving as the
mayor of Tehran, would be wrong. At 48, he is relatively young and capable of political adaptation.
The well-known Iranian trait of pragmatism, the gigantic economic challenges at home and the strategic consequences of confronting America could well induce Ahmadinejad to accept moderate policies once he takes charge in August.
As it has happened elsewhere and often, conservative political tendencies are better placed to handle difficult negotiations on national security issues.
Also, his election means that with no challenge to the supreme authority of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the top gun of Iranian clerical rule, the dual lines of authority in Iran have been removed.
A hard-ball negotiation between the “ultra-conservatives” Tehran and the “neo-conservatives” in Washington need not be as outlandish a prospect as it seems.
In any event, before making a definitive assessment of the new realities in Iran, Delhi must initiate an early diplomatic and political contact with the new leadership in Tehran.
http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=73338
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