Foreign Correspondence

[Amaunet]

Intelligence Brief: Bolivia

14 June 2005
Over the week of June 6, Bolivia passed through a sharp uptick in its ongoing cycle of political instability that is rooted in the overlapping regional, ethnic and class divisions of the Andean country.

After a month of mounting mass protests throughout Bolivia, including large demonstrations and road blockades, President Carlos Mesa's offer to resign on June 6 set off four days of intensified direct action in the streets and a flurry of desperate efforts within the country's political institutions to find at least a patchwork solution to the crisis and hold off the civil war that Mesa had warned was looming.

The issues at the heart of Bolivia's severe domestic conflict run so deep that any compromise on them by the contending social groups will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. The wave of direct action was initiated by a diverse coalition of the poor indigenous peasantry of the country's northern and western highlands; indigenous migrants to El Alto, the mushrooming suburb of Bolivia's political capital La Paz; coca growers led by the country's most charismatic politician Evo Morales; mine workers who have traditionally been Bolivia's core left-revolutionary force; public workers, especially teachers, discontented with their meager salaries; and students. [See: "Cycle of Instability in the Andes: Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru"]

Despite their varied interests, the anti-establishment coalition united on a common program dominated by the demand that Bolivia's potentially lucrative oil and gas industry be renationalized. The protestors also called for the formation of a constitutional assembly to rewrite the country's fundamental law to enhance the rights of indigenous groups that comprise a majority of Bolivia's population of nearly nine million, and for Mesa's resignation.

On the other side of the divide were the major groups in Bolivia's southern and eastern lowlands, centered in the province and city of Santa Cruz. The population of those regions has a lower indigenous composition and is relatively prosperous due to favorable conditions for agriculture and the presence of the coveted gas reserves.

As unfavorable to Mesa as was the coalition of protestors, the elites of the south and east, and their middle class allies, had been threatening for several months to declare autonomy from the central government or even to secede from the country. In stark opposition to the protestors, they demanded that the hydrocarbons industry remain private. They also favored a constitutional assembly, desiring a new fundamental law that would grant more autonomy to Bolivia's provinces and would provide for the direct election of provincial governors. Although the autonomist forces did not mount mass demonstrations -- as they had done in the past -- they formed self-defense committees to resist any incursions by their opponents.

Dynamics of the Crisis

Mesa, one of Bolivia's few centrist leaders, had assumed the presidency in 2003 after a similar period of civil disorder resulted in the fall of the previous right-oriented administration. Upon taking office, he attempted to be a reconciler, ordering the armed forces and police to refrain from using deadly force against protestors, and attempting to persuade the country's opposing social forces to reach a compromise on the issues dividing them. As time went on, it became clear that Mesa did not have the political clout to conciliate successfully.

Facing a sharply divided Congress and mounting protests over the lack of movement on core issues, Mesa offered to resign in March 2005, but was given a vote of confidence by Congress, based on a calculation by the left, led by Morales' Movement Toward Socialism bloc, that conditions were not yet favorable for its victory. In an attempt to appease rising sentiment for nationalization of the hydrocarbons industry, Congress passed a law in May raising taxes on private energy companies that discouraged foreign investment, but did not have the intended result of blunting the demands for nationalization. When he tendered his resignation offer again on June 6, Mesa had lost his support and Bolivia's political class was forced to find a satisfactory replacement for him.

The next in line constitutionally to succeed Mesa was Hormando Vaca Diez, the president of Bolivia's Senate who was unacceptable to the dissident coalition because he represents Santa Cruz and shares the interests of its elites. Nonetheless, Vaca Diez was prepared to assume the country's presidency and moved congressional deliberations to Sucre, Bolivia's ceremonial capital, when demonstrators overwhelmed La Paz and, according to Vaca Diez, made it impossible for Congress to convene there.

As the protestors followed Congress to Sucre and a miner was killed by police, Mesa warned that Bolivia was on the brink of civil war and the country's military, through Admiral Luis Aranda Granados, announced that it was prepared to intervene in the crisis if Congress did not "respect the will of the people."

Faced with clear indications that he would lack support and legitimacy if he assumed the presidency, Vaca Diez backed down, as did the next in line after him -- the leader of the House of Representatives -- paving the way for Eduardo Rodriguez, chief justice of Bolivia's Supreme Court, to become president. Rodriguez said that his major task would be to prepare for presidential elections to be held no later than December 2005. With the crisis temporarily defused, Morales called upon his supporters to lift their blockades and the overt conflict had subsided by June 10.

The Bottom Line

With Washington-backed Mesa out of the picture and a caretaker administration in power, Bolivia's day of reckoning has been deferred, but its underlying social conflict remains unresolved. The removal of Mesa has emboldened the left and has provoked a corresponding defensive backlash on the right. Fresh elections are unlikely to produce a reconciler, with the highest probability being an increase in power for the left, which will harden the drive for autonomy in the south and east. Expect continued instability in Bolivia that will slow development of its energy sector and possibly lead to a left-populist regime, spurring bids for secession by its opponents.

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein



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