Foreign Correspondence

[Amaunet]

Shadows across the Bosphorous
By M K Bhadrakumar

Jun 10, 2005

By a curious coincidence, May 29, when the vehement rejection of the proposed European constitution in the referendum in France became known in Turkey, was the 552nd anniversary of the conquest of the Byzantine capital of Constantinople (present-day Istanbul) by Fathi Sultan Mehmet. That event in 1453 marked the Ottoman entry into "Europe". The French "no" vote - followed by the Dutch one - could well presage difficulty for Turkey's "re-entry" into Europe.

Large swathes of territories straddling Eurasia - Ukraine, Moldova, the Balkans and Caucasus - face similar predicaments. The post-Velvet Revolution regimes in Ukraine and Georgia come under stress. The EU should have spearheaded their painful "integration" into the Western world. Their induction into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is predicated on an EU underpinning of some sort. Their ability to disengage from Russia significantly depends on their "EU option".

The Balkans and Black Sea regions - Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia - face uncertainty in varying degrees as regards their prospects of gaining entry into the EU. The broken parts of former Yugoslavia may begin to drift if they are deprived of the dream of a possible EU membership. Meanwhile, the EU itself is poised somewhat awkwardly in the Balkans - a guide, guardian and philosopher, certainly, but not yet an assured long-term benefactor.

The impact on the geopolitics of the region remains to be seen. Will the Balkan question reappear? Unresolved issues of ethnicity, blood feuds, pogroms, religious extremism and sub-nationalism lurk below the surface. To prevent a breakdown, what sort of interim ties could the EU offer? Will the drive toward making the Black Sea an American lake be sustainable without the region's comprehensive integration?

For Turkey, the French referendum result came as a double shock within the week. German Chancellor Gerhard Shroeder's announcement of early elections was already a matter of disquiet. The prospect of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) headed by Angela Merkel winning the German election worries Turkey. Last October, she proposed that all that Turkey could aspire to was a "privileged partnership" with Europe that allowed increased economic cooperation but would leave Turkey outside the EU, looking in. Last Thursday, she repeated that the EU "cannot simply return to business as usual" but must reconsider its plans for Turkey. CDU foreign affairs spokesman Friedbert Pfluger elaborated: "Europe is in crisis" because of an "overstretching" of EU's political capacities, and that a CDU-led government would seek a temporary halt to EU enlargement, in particular by seeking the option of a privileged partnership with Turkey.

The Gallic opinion is equally set against Turkey's EU membership. "The two most important factors behind the French reaction are perhaps Europe's economic stagnation and its ever-rising unemployment ... The Europeans have started to see both Brussels and the enlargement process as a threat to their own welfare," Faik Oztrak wrote in the Turkish newspaper Milliyet.

Even ardent supporters of EU membership somberly take note that the ground beneath their feet has shifted. Prominent Turkish commentator Sami Kohen wrote, "Now the EU will turn inwards, and take care of its own problems, but while dealing with these problems, it will slow down the enlargement process ... there is [also] a phobia against Turkey." While Turkish intellectuals rationalize, popular perception is one of injured pride - that Turkey faces deep-rooted European cultural prejudices.

Professor Samuel Huntington (author of The Clash of Civilizations) plunged deep into these searing Turkish debates by stating in Istanbul last week, "Turkey's history, culture, religion and economy are so different from those of the EU that its chances of being accepted into the EU are virtually non-existent." According to the Harvard professor, Turkey should either aspire to lead the Islamic world, or focus on nationalism. He added that if Turkey opted for the latter path, it should concentrate on its security and development, without being distracted by EU ambitions or the Islamic world.

But the choices are not that straightforward. The EU means different things to different layers of Turkish society. For the influential, flashy corporate world in Istanbul with well-established transnational ties with European business and industry, EU membership is a natural progression in life. But for the intelligentsia or the established political elite that grew up in the shadows of "Ataturkism", if the EU is appealing it is for a different reason - EU membership is Turkey's tryst with destiny, as Mustafa Kemal, modern-day Turkey's founding father, had charted out Turkey's farewell to its entanglement with the Muslim world.

The "pro-EU" impetus in Turkey's secular course is acceptable to the Turkish military, too, but as the self-appointed guardians of the Turkish state, the military would be cautious about excessive surrender of Turkish sovereignty to Brussels. Thus, the French and Dutch votes as regards their antipathy toward a centralized Europe under a Brussels-based bureaucracy would, arguably, be a matter of quiet satisfaction for the Turkish military.

But for the silent majority in the Anatolian heartlands, EU membership means something entirely different. They share neither the corporate world's passion for neo-liberalism nor the intelligentsia's cultivated attraction to European "enlightenment". They are devoutly Muslim and are deeply rooted in Turkey's Islamic heritage. For them, EU membership offers neither apparels of "prestige" (which they do not need, given their sense of belonging to their traditions and culture) nor the prospect of a "European home" in an intellectual or emotive sense (with which they have no real interest in claiming affinities), but simply, plainly, the EU is a means of improving their quality of life and standard of living.

Furthermore, the stark existential choices as Huntington made out for the country's political elite and intelligentsia aside, cutting across Turkish society, EU membership was also a democracy project, given the pervasive public disenchantment with the functioning of democracy in Turkey. (In the parliamentary elections in 2002, the Turkish public resorted to wholesale rejection of the established political elite.) Turkey is undertaking an extraordinary reform program in terms of fulfilling the criteria for EU membership. There is the potential risk of reform losing steam in the face of a quiet despondency that the EU is shifting its goal post for Turkey. Despite the affirmation that Turkey needed reform - EU or no EU - it is unclear whether an intrinsic commitment to reform is indeed inherent to the order of priority of the political elite.

Turkey's orientations would have regional implications. It cannot be otherwise as Turkey is far too important a power. But Turkey is in a tough neighborhood too - that includes one nuclear power, or allegedly two in the not-too-distant future (Israel and Iran). Some of Turkey's neighbors would wish that Ankara did not take seriously Huntington's advice to become a regional power. Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Evripidis Stylianidis said, "If Turkey feels rejected by Europe, it might return to its past wish to become a regional power. This might have a negative impact on Turkish-Greek relations." Teheran, Damascus, Yerevan, Baghdad or Nicosia, too, will keenly watch.

As the French referendum results were becoming known, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw phoned his Turkish counterpart to convey Britain's continued support for Turkey. (No such calls came from Paris, Berlin or The Hague.)

It so happened that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed on a US$10 billion standby credit for Turkey. As the IMF put it, "Turkey's economic performance is at its strongest in a generation." The first tranche of $837 million was promptly disbursed. The IMF also agreed to the postponement of Turkey's debt repayment of nearly $4 billion in 2006. For the first time since Turkey's intervention in Northern Cyprus in 1974, a US Congressional delegation visited the region last week. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan is currently visiting Washington on President George W Bush's invitation. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice counseled Europe to "include" Turkey. These are meaningful gestures.

But US-Turkey relations are delicately poised. The ascent of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq remains a grave issue. Turkey's frustrations over a US-Kurdish axis boil over from time to time - adding to the vast reservoir of "anti-Americanism" in public opinion. Yet, the US would like Turkey, an important NATO ally, to play certain defined roles in American regional policy. Ankara would draw a careful line between where American interests ended and its interests began. Besides, it is far from clear whether there is total unanimity about relations with the US in the Turkish opinion.

Over-identification with American regional policy could even be an outright liability for Turkey - in Central Asia or the Middle East, for instance. Turkey would have to make up its mind whether its historical preserve over the Black Sea could be reconcilable with US policy to make it an exclusive American sphere of influence. All parties realize the high importance of controlling the vital transportation route that the Black Sea is fast becoming, for the Caspian oil flowing into the European market. Also, Turkey has been patiently harmonizing with the EU's regional policy - and the EU does not view former Soviet republics ("Turkestan") or the Middle East with missionary zeal. Moreover, Turkey's cooperation with Russia and China is expanding rapidly.

Equally so, Turkey has been reticent about the US's Middle East initiative and unresponsive to American promptings to project itself as a role model in the Muslim world. Turkey realizes the complexity of its historical legacy with the Muslim world, borne out of its tumultuous Ottoman history. Besides, the Islamic world is becoming increasingly crowded with state and non-state actors - Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood, Jemaah Islamiyah, the ubiquitous al-Qaeda, etc. After almost a century's aloofness, Turkey would have to "fit in". And an overarching question always remains: what is it that the Islamic world can offer Turkey that Turkey lacks?

Turkey's options are thus ultimately narrowing - though that alone does not quell its angst. A sense of unease prevails that Turkey will have to keep looking for a place within Europe, but settle for a vastly different EU than it may have sought.

M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GF10Ak01.html