Foreign Correspondence

[Amaunet]

An Assessment of the Franco-German Axis and the United States"

This does not touch upon the lead France and Germany have taken in aligning somewhat with China.

-Am


27 April 2005

A fter the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, many observers and politicians around the globe expressed the view that the Franco-German axis is soon destined to be a new "power pole," capable of rivaling the United States and other great powers. According to this vision, the European Union is nothing else but the extension of Franco-German political, economic and military hegemony over the rest of the old continent's nation-states.

Since the March 2003 U.S.-led intervention of Iraq did not get the support of Paris or Berlin, there is widespread belief that this continental European axis is systematically at odds with Washington's fundamental geopolitical aspirations. This belief is not accurate. History shows that Paris and Berlin are sometimes opposed to American foreign policy, but other times they are among its main supporters. Moreover, the Franco-German relationship is itself complicated and the axis is certainly not monolithic. As French citizens are next to vote for the E.U. Constitutional Treaty at the end of May, it's time to assess the real geopolitical value of the Franco-German combine and its relationship with the United States.

Assessing this relationship in light of recent events, an accurate analysis of a Franco-German common stance in front of Washington's geopolitical moves shows some important nuances. After the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington D.C. in September 2001, France and Germany joined together in backing the October 2001 U.S.-led military operations against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan but also in opposing the Bush administration's March 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Apart from these major events, other important developments saw significant differences in French and German stances. For instance, in 2004, Berlin was the only E.U. country that did not reprimand Russian President Vladimir Putin for his centralization policy in Russia -- acting autonomously and not consistently with Brussels' common foreign policy. France took a more drastic pro-U.S. stance in Lebanon, urging Syria to end its military and intelligence influence in that country because Paris still cultivates hopes of exercising decisive influence in Beirut. France has not fully backed Germany in its recent pro-Russian turn (a turn largely due to oil and gas deals). Berlin, however, still maintains good relations with Damascus, although discretely.

In order to understand the complexity of the Paris-Berlin-Washington relationship after September 11, it is important to analyze each state's interests and concerns in the context of the post-bipolar international system.

France's Geopolitical Ambitions

France is not enthusiastic about the present unipolar phase of international politics. Paris has lost a lot of its capacity to maneuver after the fall of the Soviet Union, and the key French foreign policy discourse from the mid-1990s is multipolarity. As former French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin clearly explained, Paris has developed a sophisticated view on multipolarity. The defense of the U.N. Security Council and of multilateral approaches is strategic for France because U.S. unilateralism is likely to reduce Paris' influence in world affairs due to the non-existence of a counter-balancing power in front of the United States.

The French classical view of the political and economic integration of Europe is therefore only comprehensible in the broader context of a "balanced multipolar world" advocated by former French President Francois Mitterrand's and President Jacques Chirac's administrations since 1989. For instance, France never aimed to oust N.A.T.O. from Europe; Paris' goal was instead to rapidly create a credible European common security and defense policy together with a European monetary union in order to reinforce a French and European role in the transatlantic relationship -- obviously together with a strong French lead, although expressed in a communitarian and supranational fashion -- and subsequently in world affairs.

In order for these goals to be achieved, it would have been necessary for the U.S. to accept a stronger political and geopolitical European role. But in the winter of 1995-96, Chirac failed to upgrade the Franco-American relationship because even if France accepted her reintegration into N.A.T.O.'s commandment, Washington didn't allow a European to become head of Allied Forces Southern Europe. N.A.T.O., and not the Western European Union (as Paris hoped in the early 90s), is nowadays at the heart of the European security architecture, as can be read in the E.U. Constitutional Treaty, whereas a common European defense, although existing, only has limited, regional projection power.

This evolution largely coincides with American, and not French, wishes and expectations. At a time of being the unrivalled superpower, it is not in Washington's interests to share power with potentially competing states. However, France took part in the U.S. and N.A.T.O.-led war against a traditional Serbian ally in 1999, and the Franco-American "rift" then seemed to be on its way to reconciliation.

Germany's Security and Strategic Doctrine

Germany had in fact another view of the Franco-German axis and of transatlantic relations. Berlin's security doctrine has traditionally (at least since 1949) been based upon two pillars: a European one, for which the Franco-German cooperation was vital, and a German-American one. This two-fold security architecture has often made Germany a mediator between Atlanticism (traditionally advocated by the U.K. and the Netherlands) and the idea of "Europe-puissance," or a European superpower, elaborated by former French President Charles De Gaulle and his successors. A real Franco-German security concept is therefore missing since it could only descend from a unique geopolitical vision.

National interests and perceptions, however, still matter. Paris and Berlin actually forged a new strategic partnership in 1963, with the Treaty of Elysée, not because they pursued an idealistic vision of a new integrated and supranational Europe, but because of their vital national interests. For France, Germany was, and in many respects still is, the main security concern. After 1945, Paris was worried by U.S. plans of reindustrializing and rearming West Germany to better counter the Soviet Union as the Cold War broke out in 1947. A united and integrated Europe, therefore, was the only viable solution to realize both West Germany's readmission in Western politics and her strict political and military control by France, the U.K., the U.S. and the other European states. For former German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (and later for former Chancellor Helmut Kohl), a Europeanization of Germany was the inevitable step to grant Bonn's resurgence as a European power and to ensure a future reunification.

The German anti-war stance in 2002-2003 was -- at least in part -- caused by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's electoral needs. With the German pacifist movement still relevant for the vote, Schroeder was able to use the international crisis to gain sympathies from the anti-war movement, hence prevailing over his Christian-Democrat adversaries.

Schroeder has nonetheless discretely helped American operations in Kuwait, in the context of Iraqi Freedom, by sending GSG-9 counterterrorism squads and highly skilled anti-mine personnel. Berlin has certainly stood with France (and Russia) insisting that the U.S. war against Ba'athist Iraq wasn't justified, using the official reason that Saddam's weapons of mass destruction and his determination to use them have proved false. Nevertheless, Germany has used softer words than France in expressing dissent.

In fact, Berlin started a multi-faced strategy aimed at reinforcing its sovereignty while at the same time emerging as the most important E.U. nation-state. This strategy consists of three main actions. German-American relations have been at the top of Schroeder's priorities in 2003-2004, when the Social-Democrat chancellor pushed for a transatlantic reconciliation by promoting the new German-American Partnership in the 21st Century that some French observers interpret as a possible German-American condominium on Europe. The second pillar of this strategy has been a constant advance in key-E.U. bureaucracy positions, where at least a German official is nowadays always present among the most influential decision maker. Last, but not least, Berlin is seeking out Moscow in order to forge a "strategic partnership" (German technology and investment in exchange of Russian fossil energy) with the goal, in Schroeder's view, to become less and less dependant upon Middle Eastern oil, which is likely to upset the U.S.

This new German activism -- probably also helped by the U.S. decision to move troops eastwards (Poland, Bulgaria, Romania) after 50 years -- has worried some of the finest "connoisseurs" of German foreign policy. European concerns of a German resurgence and of possible neo-hegemonic ambitions still find their place in E.U. chancelleries, whether justified or not. Moreover, the German economy's poor performance in recent years and Berlin's unhappiness with the E.U. Stability and Growth Pact cause fears of a German wave of "euro-skepticism."

This is even more true since 2004, when consensus upon further European integration dropped dramatically in E.U. founder states like France, Italy and the Netherlands. Governments can't fully admit their malaise with the European Union due to numerous years of financial sacrifices made to safely enter the Euro-zone, but a serious crisis is looming after 2004's big enlargement -- an evolution that seems to have reduced "old Europe's" influence over Central and Eastern Europe.

Conclusion

Germany and France are both unhappy with recent evolutions of the European integration process, but they're reacting to it in different and sometimes contradictory ways. France still perceives Germany as a necessary structural ally to project her power worldwide and to build "Europe-puissance." But as time goes by, German foreign policy is less and less conditioned by the 20th century's disastrous totalitarian experience -- thus making the Franco-German axis less central in Berlin's geopolitical view. Paris and Berlin experienced in the 1990s that their goal of a credible common security and defense policy is only viable when they both have good relationships with London and Washington, and that American influence in the old continent does not necessarily decline as the E.U. proceeds in its integration.

Therefore, it's very likely that both Paris and Berlin will try in the coming years to modify the E.U. Stability and Growth Pact to their advantage -- although many less influential countries oppose such aims for they fear a Franco-German domination of the E.U. architecture. If Paris and Berlin succeed, a real European common foreign policy could become even more complicated, as pro-sovereignty movements could grow stronger in the two states. Their relationship with the United States will probably continue to be non-linear. A common Franco-German stance facing Washington's future decision will sometimes appear, but bilateral policies with the U.S. won't lose their crucial role.

Report Drafted By:
Federico Bordonaro




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