Foreign Correspondence

[StephanieVanbryce]

AM .. Where are you ? please come back ! I am demanding it ! I need you to make sense of this ! Puluuuusee .. come back ..

"Lebanon Loses its Buffer"
18 February 2005

The assassination of former long time Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on February 14 opens a new chapter in Lebanon's slide toward instability that began on October 20, 2004 when Hariri unexpectedly resigned over a Syrian-inspired move to extend the term of President Emile Lahoud. Since then, Lebanon has been in the throes of what observers call a "political crisis," as the country's political class has become polarized over the presence of 15,000 Syrian troops in the country and the scheduling of parliamentary elections that are supposed to take place in the coming spring.

Lebanon's current phase of political history begins with the signing of the Ta'if Accord in 1989 that ended the country's 15-year civil war and ushered in a period of reconstruction, economic renewal and relative political stability. The war resulted from the breakdown of Lebanon's delicately balanced and religiously diverse society under the pressure of an influx of Palestinian refugees and an ensuing military conflict between the country's neighbor Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.), which had headquartered in Lebanon after being expelled from Jordan in 1967.

Created after World War I, when the League of Nations mandated the five provinces of the Ottoman Empire that compose the country to France, Lebanon has a preponderantly Arab population that is split into a dizzying array of religious communities, including Shi'a Muslims (40 percent), Sunni Muslims (20 percent), Maronite Christians (16 percent), Druzes (six percent), and smaller proportions of Alawite Muslims and Greek and Armenian Christians. During the colonial period, which lasted into World War II, France favored the Christians, who at that time composed slightly more than half of the country's population, and set up a system of communal representation, in which the president was a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of the National Assembly a Shi'a Muslim. The legislature and state bureaucracy were also staffed proportionally according to religious confession. The confessional system of representation, which was intended to be temporary, persisted after independence and was restored in a modified form by the Ta'if Accord. Estimates put Lebanon's population at 3.8 million; there are no reliable figures since there has been no national census since 1932, preserving the fiction of Christian-Muslim parity.

Traditionally the most cosmopolitan country in the Arab world, Lebanon has reclaimed its role as a regional financial and trading center through its post-war reconstruction, yet its social cohesion remains fragile. The civil war, which was ultimately tamped down by Syrian military occupation, revealed deep communal conflict between Christians seeking to maintain their power in the face of an unfavorable population balance and Muslims eager to institutionalize their majority status. The tendency toward polarization is blunted by the diversity within each side of the great religious divide, but that has resulted in severe fragmentation during periods of instability.

Given the constraints imposed by confessional representation, Lebanese politics are not articulated through Western-style political parties, but through shifting blocs composed of local notables based in religious communities. The system functions effectively when competing blocs organize representatives from each of the major religious groups so that political competition takes place over trans-communal issues rather than spiraling downward into communal conflict, as occurred during the civil war. In order to avoid breakdown into hostile fragmentation, Lebanon's political system requires bridging figures who transcend communalism and have the negotiating skills and credibility necessary to make and maintain the deals that allow the country's major confessional groups to coexist in peace. Hariri was the major bridging figure in Lebanese politics throughout the post-civil war period and his assassination portends the possible collapse of the country's tenuous social contract.

Hariri's Role as Political Pivot and Buffer

Since the end of the civil war, Lebanon has been in great part a de facto protectorate of the Ba'athist regime in Damascus, whose military presence in the country has prevented a renewal of violent conflict, but has also guaranteed Damascus' decisive influence in Lebanese politics. Throughout the time in which Syria has functioned as Lebanon's power broker, making sure that Beirut's leadership acquiesced in Damascus' interests, Hariri was the only politician with sufficient stature to allow Beirut to achieve a considerable degree of autonomy in domestic policy by maintaining a high level of popularity across confessional groups, skillfully negotiating winning coalitions among blocs and placating Damascus just enough to keep it at bay.

Hariri was able to accomplish his difficult balancing act through the combination of his immense wealth, which made him independent of any sectoral interest, and his commitment to functioning as a bridge builder, which enabled him to serve as a buffer between communities, and between the Lebanese political system and Damascus, as he pivoted among blocs.

The son of a poor Sunni family from the southern city of Sidon, Hariri left Lebanon after dropping out of college for financial reasons and migrated to Saudi Arabia, where, after holding several jobs, he entered the construction business, became a personal friend of King Fahd, received dual Saudi Arabian citizenship and made billions of dollars through varied enterprises. One of the richest men in the Arab world, Hariri used his wealth to enter Lebanese politics, providing all of the funds for the 1989 conference in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia that ended the civil war. Afterwards, he volunteered equipment from his construction company to clear out the rubble left from the war and was elected to serve in the National Assembly. In 1992, Hariri assumed the post of prime minister, holding that position five times as he maneuvered through the maze of Lebanese politics, using resignation as a tactic and then re-emerging as a coalition builder with wide popular backing.

As prime minister, Hariri reinforced his stature by engineering Lebanon's reconstruction through the private company Solidere, of which he was the major shareholder, and by using his international business and political connections to attract foreign investment and revive the tourist industry. Although he was criticized by opponents for profiting from reconstruction through Solidere and for driving Lebanon into debt, he was widely credited for playing an indispensable role in renewing the country's economy and preserving social peace.

With the country's economy reviving and sectarian militia disbanded -- except for the Syrian and Iranian supported Shi'a Hezbollah, which has continued its confrontation with Israel in the south -- the major issue in Lebanese politics became the Syrian military presence in the country and Damascus' role as its power broker. Although the division over whether Syria should remain or withdraw cuts across confessional boundaries, opposition to Damascus is concentrated in the Christian and Druze communities, and pro-Damascus sentiment in the Shi'a and, until recently, Sunni communities. In negotiating the domestic conflict over the Syrian presence, Hariri managed to be an effective buffer, pivoting towards Damascus and away from it, until the autumn of 2004, when Damascus engineered a constitutional amendment granting Hariri's arch political rival Lahoud a three-year extension of his presidential term, in order to head off presidential elections that might have resulted in a presidency less favorable to the Syrian presence.

As the constitutional crisis loomed, Paris and Washington moved in the United Nations Security Council to push through Resolution 1559, which called upon Damascus to withdraw its troops from Lebanon, and for Beirut to disband non-state militia and permit free elections. Washington had already imposed economic sanctions on Damascus in 2003, was pressuring Damascus to police its border with Iraq and withdraw its support of Hezbollah, and ultimately desired regime change in Syria. Paris' support for the Resolution seemed to be based on a desire to mend fences with Washington after their dispute over the U.S. intervention in Iraq. The result of the pressure exerted by Paris and Washington for Lebanese politics was to strengthen the resolve of the anti-Syrian opposition.

After the Lebanese National Assembly approved the constitutional amendment on September 3 -- a day after the passage of Resolution 1559 in the Security Council -- Hariri attempted to form a new government, but was unable to do so and resigned as prime minister on October 20, saying that he would stay on the sidelines and wait and see if Damascus could retain its control over Lebanon in the face of international pressure and domestic conflict. A pro-Syrian government led by Omar Karami was installed under the conditions of an opposition boycott and the abstention of Hariri's bloc, setting the stage for unbuffered polarization.

Since the constitutional crisis, Lebanese politics have been taken up with arranging elections for the National Assembly in spring 2005 (no date has yet been set). During this time, Hariri pivoted toward the opposition and was accused by pro-Syrian forces of having engineered Resolution 1559. Now a divisive figure, no longer able to play the role of buffer, Hariri was widely deemed the "silent leader" of the opposition -- the strains within and the pressures from without the Lebanese political system had become too great for him to manage, although it was widely assumed that he would make yet another bid for the prime minister's office if results of the parliamentary elections were favorable.

The significance of Hariri's pivot toward the opposition was the possibility that it could decisively shift the balance of power in Lebanese politics toward the anti-Damascus opposition by allying his Sunni base with it and isolating the Shi'a. Were that to happen, Damascus' influence in Lebanon would be diminished, perhaps to the point that it would have to pull out, and the Franco-American combination would gain leverage and have the possibility of prying Beirut into the Western sphere of influence, weakening and further isolating Syria's Ba'athist regime. As it presently stands, Hariri's assassination has already provoked attacks on Syrian workers and businesses in Sidon, indicating that his death might only hasten the process of realignment. Even more serious for Damascus, a mass march of hundreds of thousands of Lebanese mourners around Hariri's funeral on February 17 attracted participants from all of the country's confessional groups and took on an anti-Syrian tone with banners reading "Syria Out."

Reaction to Hariri's Assassination

Although an Islamic revolutionary group -- Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria -- claimed to have carried out Hariri's assassination on account of his Saudi ties, its claim was not deemed credible by interested parties, which used his death as an opportunity to press their own agendas -- all of them deplored the deed, expressed fears of a return to civil war and urged the Lebanese people to show solidarity, but there the similarities ended.

The government declared a three-day mourning period and placed the army on high alert, promising to hunt down the perpetrators and bring them to justice. In contrast, the opposition, meeting at Hariri's Beirut residence, blamed Damascus for the crime -- if not for actually committing it, which they implied it had, then for allowing it to happen. The opposition called for Damascus to withdraw its forces from Lebanon, for an international investigation of the assassination to be held, and for a three-day general strike to be mounted. Some even suggested that Lebanon be placed under "international receivership." Maronite Christian leader Michel Aoun, who had fled into exile in Paris after he refused to accept the Ta'if Accord and who still retains support in his community, promised to return to Lebanon for the parliamentary elections and expressed hope that the assassination would spur the exit of Syrian forces from the country: "If they are capable of eliminating political leaders, they are capable of influencing election results. The Syrians must be reined in." Druze leader Walid Jumblatt was even more blunt, accusing the Lebanese government of being "a regime of terrorists."

Washington and Paris joined the opposition in placing their focus on Damascus, but were more restrained. Endorsing one of the opposition's demands, Paris urged an international investigation into the assassination. Washington did not directly accuse Damascus of the crime, but said through White House press secretary Scott McClellan that it was "a terrible reminder that the Lebanese people must be able to pursue their aspirations and determine their own political future free from violence and intimidation and free from Syrian occupation." Washington followed up on its statement by recalling U.S. ambassador to Syria Margaret Scobey for "consultations." The responses of Paris and Washington reflected their continuing cooperation on trying to eliminate the Syrian presence in Lebanon -- during her visit to Europe in February, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had conferred with French President Jacques Chirac on further action against Damascus in the U.N.

As would be expected, Damascus took an opposite line to that of its adversaries, blaming them indirectly for the assassination. Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara urged Lebanese to "reject foreign interference," and Information Minister Mahdi Dakhlallah said that the crime was perpetrated by the "enemies of Lebanon" and had occurred at a time when pressure was being exerted on "Lebanon and Syria aimed at achieving the aggressive goals of Israel." Rejecting calls for an international investigation, al-Shara stated that "Lebanese authorities will carry out an investigation to determine which party was behind this act." That position was quickly affirmed by Beirut, which rejected an international investigation on the grounds that it would be a violation of Lebanon's sovereignty.

Conclusion

Having lost its buffer and pivot, Lebanon is now faced with the prospect of descending into another cycle of inter-communal conflict. Despite the swell of popular support for Hariri at his burial services, reaction to his assassination shows that the deep divisions in Lebanese society that surfaced in the civil war had never healed but had simply been held in check by war weariness, the process of reconstruction, Hariri's skillful deal making and the Syrian military presence. With reconstruction basically accomplished, the bridge builder gone and the Syrian presence a destabilizing factor, all that prevents factional breakdown is general fear of a return to violent conflict and a possible crystallization of public opinion against Damascus.

The major external players in the struggle over Lebanon's future -- Washington and Damascus -- face the problem of pressing their conflicting interests without precipitating a Lebanese civil war. Washington, which desires regime change in Damascus, is not yet ready to pursue military action that would place Lebanon under "international receivership" and drive Damascus out of the country. Its past failures to stabilize Lebanon through direct intervention will make it shy of repeating the process, as will its commitments in Iraq and its need to attend to other world trouble spots. Washington is likely, instead, to continue leaguing with France through the Security Council, where its ambitions will probably be compromised -- as they were in September 2004 -- by opposition from Beijing and Moscow.

Damascus, whose position in Lebanon has been weakened by the defection of Hariri's Sunni base in the aftermath of its attempt to retrench by engineering the extension of Lahoud's term, is faced with the prospect of losing its status as power broker and encountering active resistance to its military presence. Were Damascus to attempt to crack down on a resurgent opposition, it would risk growing support among major international players for Washington's agenda and might be drawn into a costly and uncertain military quagmire. Yet if it concedes its influence, it will open up a power vacuum in Lebanon that is likely to be filled by forces hostile to its interests, and its Ba'athist regime will lose credibility at home. The announcement on February 17 that Tehran and Damascus will form a "united front" against Washington reflects a desire by both capitals to circle their wagons. Syrian Prime Minister Mohammad Naji Otari said, after meeting with Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref, that "the challenges we face in Syria and Iran require us to be in one front."

In its confrontation with Damascus, Washington has the luxury of treading cautiously, as it did when it downplayed the announcement of the Tehran Damascus "united front." Damascus, in contrast, has unwittingly pushed itself into a corner -- it appeared during the 2004 constitutional crisis that Damascus would get away with its power play, but it did not count on the consequences of a decisive pivot by Hariri toward the opposition. Now it can only hope that parliamentary elections in Lebanon -- if they are held -- will not swing the balance of power in Lebanese politics firmly against it.

Analysts in the Middle East speculate that Hariri's assassination might have been inspired by Damascus itself, by rogue elements in its intelligence apparatus, or by anti-Hariri forces from one of Lebanon's confessional communities. If the perpetrators are credibly identified, the present tensions might be more sharply defined and shift the balance of power toward one of the contending sides, but knowing who the culprits were will not change the basic polarized situation. Lebanon had lost its buffer and pivot before Hariri's assassination; his death only makes obvious Lebanon's failure to heal.

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

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