Foreign Correspondence

[Amaunet]

The Erosion of Political Institutions in Turkmenistan

Washington is interested in Turkmenistan primarily because of its proximity to Afghanistan and Iran. Niyazov allowed humanitarian supplies to flow through the country to Afghanistan during the U.S. war against the Taliban regime, and permitted U.S. airplanes to refuel there. Washington would also like to see Turkmenistan's gas diverted from Russian channels to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline through the Caucasus and to a projected pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan. Washington's influence in Ashgabat is relatively weak; U.S.-based oil companies are not active in Turkmenistan and Niyazov has been cool about the Caucasus route.

This reiterates Bush’s resolve to control all oil and is a primary reason why Putin has been forced to circle the wagons.
#msg-4823870

-Am

The Erosion of Political Institutions in Turkmenistan
30 December 2004

On December 19, parliamentary elections were held in Turkmenistan, a Central Asian republic bordered by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to the north, Afghanistan and Iran to the south, and the Caspian Sea to the west.

The elections did not awaken significant international interest, because President Saparmurat Niyazov's Democratic Party was the only party to participate in them. Along with North Korea, Turkmenistan has the only remaining Stalinist regime in the world, complete with a cult of personality. Niyazov has named himself "Turkmenbashi," "Father of all Turkmens."

The significance of the elections came in the fact that although the Central Election Commission announced a 76.88 percent turnout, international journalists reported that polling stations were nearly empty and that election officials ended up carrying ballot boxes door to door in order to get people to vote. Those who did show up received gifts if they were new voters or elderly, including copies of the Rukhmana, Niyazov's book of "spiritual wisdom," which is required reading in Turkmenistan's schools, a subject on driver's license examinations and is deemed by the state and its leaders to be a "sacred" text, second only to the Quran.

The low turnout represents the passive resistance of a demoralized population. Niyazov has sufficient coercive and administrative power to remain in control of the state apparatus, but he has not been able to mobilize the soft power of persuasion that generates loyalty. Ironically, Niyazov's deepest wish is to wield soft power -- he styles himself as a philosopher and a sage, and his Rukhmana is everywhere in Turkmenistan. He portrays himself as an ideal father, generous and lenient with his charges, and at their service.

The reality is different -- documented human rights violations, forced resettlement of ethnic minorities, rigid press censorship, high unemployment, a drug epidemic among the youth, widespread corruption, a declining educational system based on the Rukhmana, vast symbolic building projects (including an ice palace in the desert), isolation of the country from the rest of the world, collapsing public health (including reported cases of plague), and a political system in which no opposition to the government is tolerated.

A Stalinist regime that cannot get its people to the polls for a show election is obviously unstable. Niyazov's control is not currently in question, but, after he is gone, Turkmenistan faces the possibility of becoming a failed state.

Turkmenistan's Geostrategic Significance

Turkmenistan, which has a population of 5 million and is 90 percent uninhabited desert, would have no global importance, except for the human rights community, were it not for its energy reserves (the fifth largest natural gas deposits in the world) and its strategic importance in the struggle with Islamic revolution.

A part of the former Soviet Union, Turkmenistan became independent in 1991, but remained dependent on Russia as the channel for its gas exports. A member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the country is a component of Moscow's design of recapturing control over its "near abroad." More importantly, Russia relies on Turkmenistan to help it fulfill energy supply contracts.

Washington is interested in Turkmenistan primarily because of its proximity to Afghanistan and Iran. Niyazov allowed humanitarian supplies to flow through the country to Afghanistan during the U.S. war against the Taliban regime, and permitted U.S. airplanes to refuel there. Washington would also like to see Turkmenistan's gas diverted from Russian channels to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline through the Caucasus and to a projected pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan. Washington's influence in Ashgabat is relatively weak; U.S.-based oil companies are not active in Turkmenistan and Niyazov has been cool about the Caucasus route.

Niyazov has responded to the external pressures and constraints on his regime by declaring a policy of "positive neutrality," according to which Ashgabat will not align itself formally with any major power bloc, but will take advantage of opportunities presented by any side. In practice, positive neutrality has meant the relative isolation of Turkmenistan from the rest of the world -- a strategy that seems to be calculated primarily to perpetuate Niyazov's rule.

As a result of Niyazov's isolationism, Turkmenistan has failed to develop economically. From 80-90 percent of its economy remains in the hands of the state, and private business is subject to administrative obstacles and arbitrary interference. Foreign investment, including in the energy sector, has consequently lagged. Australian analyst Michael Blackman summarizes the judgment of the investor community: "Vague property rights and unclear laws mean that there is little protection for foreign investors, either from each other or from corrupt officials."

Despite Niyazov's fervently romantic nationalist ideology, Turkmenistan's society continues to be structured by a dominance of clan affiliation over national identity among the 80 percent majority of Sunni Muslim ethnic Turkmens. The clan system is overlaid by the corrupt state bureaucracy, creating divided loyalties and a support base that maintains Niyazov in power -- the only chance for someone to gain an economic foothold is to get a job with the state.

As is the case in all modern dictatorships, Niyazov relies on a large internal security and military apparatus that is treated more favorably than the rest of the population. He has also exploited Turkmenistan's energy riches to make gasoline and electricity virtually free and domestic travel available at nominal cost. The mixture of repression and welfare has allowed Niyazov to retain his power despite Turkmenistan's poverty and resulting social problems.

Neither Washington nor Moscow has seen fit to challenge Niyazov, despite Turkmenistan's latent instability. Each one has its own strategic interests and Niyazov has been careful not to threaten them. Although Washington has criticized Ashgabat's human rights violations, including torture, the arrests of the families of dissidents, forced relocation and imprisonment in psychiatric hospitals, it has taken no action toward sanctions, because it is intent on keeping Niyazov's support in the "war on terrorism." Although Moscow was ruffled by Niyazov's revocation of dual citizenship for Turkmenistan's Russian minority and consequent travel restrictions, it has continued to pursue gas deals with Ashgabat.

Attempts by the human rights community to have Washington declare Turkmenistan a "state of concern" and by Russian nationalists to convince Moscow to impose sanctions on Ashgabat have not received positive responses. Niyazov has neither the capability nor the will to obtain weapons of mass destruction, is opposed to radical Islamism and is eager to sell his country's gas to support subsidized domestic energy, his security apparatus and his building projects. For the present, that is sufficient for the interested powers, despite possible longer term problems.

The Long Term Erosion of Turkmenistan's Political System

Although political strategies and policies are generally determined everywhere by group interest and power, in personalized dictatorships the leaders' idiosyncrasies can have a decisive impact. In the case of Turkmenistan, Niyazov's personality, which is marked by megalomania and self-delusion, has severely inhibited the development of stable political institutions.

Following the pattern of all would-be totalitarian regimes, Niyazov's ideology is at extreme variance with actual conditions. Having ruled Turkmenistan since 1985, when the country was still a Soviet republic, and having been nominated by parliament as president for life in 1999, Niyazov transformed himself into an ultra-nationalist after independence and became the nation's self-appointed spiritual guide, identifying himself with the Turkmen majority.

Niyazov's nationalist ideology is a variation on classical fascism, specifically a form of national socialism based on a hierarchy of sacrifice among what he defines as the three components of human existence -- life, Motherland and Allah: "Life is sacrificed to Motherland, and Motherland is in hands of the Allah." Despite the formal supremacy of Allah, effective dominance is given to Motherland as the mediating term: "Motherland holds everything dear -- both on earth and in subsoil, because there is life on earth and the realm of heaven in the 'other world.' Both life and faith can exist when there is Motherland."

Niyazov exhorts Turkmens to devote themselves to Motherland, of which he is the voice. As their father, he tells Turkmens to remain in the country with him and not to take flight -- there is "nowhere to run," because Motherland "exists not only around you but also inside of you."

The root of Niyazov's political isolationism is psychological. Orphaned as a child, he replaced family with collective and eventually identified himself with and as the father figure. In his May 7, 2004 address to Turkmenistan's Youth Organization -- "Only Motherland is Valued Above Life" -- Niyazov made a telling comment: "The most pleasant and pure feeling is to live with a sense of being part of Motherland, because exactly this feeling spares from loneliness." The lonely orphan has projected his condition on to the entire people. He wants them to be with him and to love, need and adore him. If they do not wish to stay after he has made his appeal, he will make it difficult or impossible for them to leave.

Niyazov's quest for devotion has led to a degradation of Turkmenistan's educational system, in which basic skills and technical training have been sacrificed to studies of his Rukhmana, which codifies his collectivist philosophy and ethics. Analysts agree that the current youth generation might not be able to run the country because they will lack the skills necessary to do so. Since the gap between ideology and reality is so great, there is a possibility that after Niyazov is gone, Turkmenistan will subside into clan conflict complicated by attempts of the state apparatus to preserve its standing.

The long term effects of a degraded educational system have been compounded by the consequences of Niyazov's paranoia since an unsuccessful assassination attempt on him on November 25, 2002. In addition to a crackdown on internal dissent leading to human rights violations and the flight into exile of critics within his administration, Niyazov intensified his practice of firing officials after short terms in their positions. According to analysts, this practice has led to the effective destruction of a coherent political class in Ashgabat and an increase in corruption, because officials are insecure about their futures.

Opinion is divided about whether Niyazov's policies and practices are motivated by his psychological insecurities or by a sense of the tactics that he needs to use to maintain control. Both motivations are probably in play, as they have been in other personalized dictators, for whom visionary self-inflation and self-delusion have gone hand in hand with ruthless application of the tactics of gaining and keeping power. Lenin, Hitler, Stalin and, more recently, Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein come to mind. Milosevic and Hussein also had traumatic childhoods, identified with the nation and evinced a split between visionary delusion and tactical realism.

Conclusion

Turkmenistan fell under a personalized dictatorship because its political institutions had been imposed during the Soviet period and had never been integrated with the underlying social structure, creating a power vacuum that a power-driven and emotionally needy individual could fill after independence. All the familiar socially destructive conditions of fascism have followed, leaving the country with an uncertain future.

Interested powers that are unwilling to act at present will have to cope with the fall-out when the Turkmenbashi no longer presides in Ashgabat. The parliamentary elections for which the people stayed home are a symptom and symbol of the crisis to come in Turkmenistan.

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

http://www.pinr.com/