Foreign Correspondence

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Baiting the Bear

Frequently described as "expansionist," current Russian foreign policy is in fact anything but; it is purely defensive, aimed at the preservation of at least a minimal sphere of influence within Russia's historical heartland.

-Am


Friday, December 17, 2004. Page 10.

By Eric Kraus

Even a cursory look at history shows that the breakup of major empires has not usually been a peaceful, beneficent process. The Soviet Union is perhaps the single great exception to this rule -- an empire which declared itself defunct and voluntarily disbanded -- neither compelled by the external pressure of crushing military defeat nor devastated by internal revolution. In their haste to put an end to the Soviet nightmare, Russia's leaders may have neglected to secure the country's legitimate interests.

Recognizing that the Soviet Union could not win the Cold War, Mikhail Gorbachev saw an opportunity for radical reform within the existing political structures; yet these reforms -- clumsy, unpopular, both too little and too late -- simply hastened the implosion of the empire. In the ensuing chaos, the impetuous and brilliantly opportunistic Boris Yeltsin saw his chance to strike a crippling blow against his old enemies in the Communist Party. In view of their precarious political situations, both Gorbachev and especially Yeltsin desperately sought Western alliances. Given the imperative of smashing the Communist juggernaut before it could regroup, as well as their admirable wish to put an end to Soviet imperialism, both men showed an almost childlike trust in the good faith of the West.


Perhaps unfortunately, rather than negotiating guarantees for Russia's right to live peaceably within secure and defensible borders, they countenanced not just the abandonment of its imperial ambitions, but also the trampling of its very legitimate security concerns. Both men believed they had firm reassurances regarding the limits of NATO's military penetration into the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Yet perhaps the temptation for the West to take advantage of Russian weakness and passivity simply proved too great. Russia now increasingly finds itself surrounded by a potentially hostile military alliance. Certainly, in situations such as Serbia where there has been a sharp divergence between Russian and Western interests, NATO's repeated promises to take Russian interests into account have proved fraudulent.

Frequently described as "expansionist," current Russian foreign policy is in fact anything but; it is purely defensive, aimed at the preservation of at least a minimal sphere of influence within Russia's historical heartland. From a historical standpoint, this is eminently comprehensible. Russia has been repeatedly invaded and devastated by Western armies: Twice in the last century, the western half of the country was reduced to rubble, and each time, it struggled to reconstruct in the face of a hostile West. Indeed, since the Crimean War, the main thrust of Russian foreign policy has been to establish buffers against foreign incursions.

The Cold War was fought largely via proxy. Much like the unfortunate Guatemalans and Argentines who spent decades living in terror of U.S.-trained death squads, or the several million Southeast Asian peasants slaughtered in what must be counted a singular approach to the preservation of their freedom, East Europeans paid a terrible price for the Soviets' attempt to export their version of paradise.

In the end, the Soviet system was indeed bankrupt -- but it was dismantled from within before it could come crashing down upon Western Europe. In this, the West has been incredibly lucky. Nevertheless, there remains an opportunity to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory -- certainly there are those who now seem determined not to let the opportunity pass.

Whereas Russia willingly countenanced the loss of countries that had been integrated into the Soviet Union by force, Ukraine is a different issue. The Russian state was born in 13th-century Kiev, and the eastern part of Ukraine is ethnically, linguistically and culturally part of greater Russia. Furthermore, were Ukraine to join NATO, Russian borders would become indefensible -- Russia's greatest nightmare.

It is, of course, not sufficient for a country to have legitimate interests -- they must be advanced with dexterity and skill. The appallingly mishandled Ukrainian elections represent a failure of Russian diplomacy -- the choice between East and West need never have been posed in such stark terms. While there was gross political manipulation by both sides, the Russians lost the media war. The East European tail has wagged the European dog as the ex-satellites attempt to cripple their old enemy -- understandable, given their wretched postwar histories, but distinctly unhelpful for building a stable world.

There now is little doubt that Western interests will emerge triumphant. Whether they take this as an opportunity to build bridges while respecting Russia's historic interests, or instead seek to establish a puppet state to contain Russia, will largely determine the future of Eurasia -- and a threatened, cornered bear is a dangerous beast indeed.

Triumphant in the Cold War, some Western commentators have developed an irritating propensity toward self-congratulation. The totally illegal U.S. invasion of Iraq -- based on forged evidence and brute force -- demonstrates the painful reality that international relations remain based upon power; the era of imperium is not over -- its justifications have simply been revised.

The best security remains the ability to inflict unacceptable pain on any potential aggressor. It is thus hardly surprising that Russia is rebuilding her nuclear deterrent, rushing to develop a new class of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of penetrating missile defenses.

Fortunately, less devastating policy levers abound. Unlike its amateurish political diplomacy, Russian economic diplomacy has rung up a series of impressive successes. Unified Energy Systems is consolidating ownership of the energy industry throughout the CIS and is now seeking to build bridges with Iran. Gazprom -- sitting atop the world's largest gas reserves and now seeking to build a world-class oil business -- is a key player in global energy, courted by East and West alike.

Russia is the world's second-largest arms exporter. Currently planning its first joint war games with China since the 1950s, Russia is simultaneously building strategic alliances with India, Iran and Venezuela. Like the Europeans, it takes an increasingly jaundiced view of American unilateralism. Even in Ukraine, Russian oligarchic interests are likely to outbid outgoing Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma's cronies in the privatization of state assets. The European Union is struggling to integrate its new members, and with the Turks already waiting in line, will be unable to welcome 50 million impoverished European peasants within our lifetime. President Vladimir Putin's irony was palpable when he recently invited them to do just that.

When Putin assumed the presidency, Russia was still recovering from the lost decade of the '90s and desperately needed time to rebuild. Deeply indebted, politically unstable and impoverished, Russia was pervaded by depression, insecurity and humiliation. Its transformation over the past five years has been little short of miraculous. For all the warts -- corruption, poverty, pollution and demographic decline -- Russia is an increasingly self-assured and prosperous place. It is absurd to imagine that a stronger and more self-confident Russia should continue to kowtow to the West.

The breaking point is within view, but there is time to step back from the brink. For Europe to have any positive influence upon local political developments, the dialogue must be transformed into one between equals. While well-intentioned Western economic advice was largely responsible for the catastrophic outcome of the '90s, the example of a friendly, prosperous and stable European Union could still prove of huge political benefit to the Westernizing elements within the Russian elite. The Western powers have grown accustomed to dealing with a weak and passive Russia. It is time they adjusted to the new realities.


Eric Kraus is chief strategist for Sovlink Securities, Moscow. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.


http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2004/12/17/006.html