AI
Thursday, October 28, 2004 9:50:23 AM
Defense pact to expand India's Sri Lanka role
By Sudha Ramachandran
The increased cooperation with regard to naval surveillance that is likely under the proposed defense pact would be a check on Tiger activity in the seas. A retired Indian diplomat told Asia Times Online that "for Colombo, it would be a step towards choking off Tiger transport of weaponry from overseas; for India, it would help neutralize the threat of maritime terrorism posed by the LTTE." It could also provide India access to Lankan seas and ports "and enable India to project its force more effectively in the Indian Ocean".
-Am
BANGALORE - India and Sri Lanka are in the final stages of concluding a bilateral defense cooperation agreement. The proposed pact, which is expected to be signed by the end of the year, could see India's role in the island nation increase significantly.
The pact has been under discussion for the past year. Talks were put on hold for a while after the change of government in both countries. But with the new governments in both countries keen on carrying forward the pact, things started moving quickly over the past couple of months.
Last week, officials from the two countries met in Colombo to finalize the draft agreement. According to a Sri Lankan Defense Ministry press release, officials discussed military training, exchange of military intelligence and information, maritime surveillance to prevent illegal activities affecting both countries, official visits and bilateral meetings at different levels, participation in training programs and joint military exercises. India is likely to sell Sri Lanka advanced light helicopters, small arms and ammunitions, artillery pieces, special clothing, and other items.
The proposed pact has been described as "general in nature, falling in the category of a standard bilateral, a kind of agreement which India has with many other countries," officials said. According to officials, "It formalizes existing cooperation and provides a framework for cooperation in the future."
Sources in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs say in private that the pact is "far-reaching" and "historic", a "milestone in India-Sri Lanka relations" that could see India "return as a player in the Sri Lankan conflict in a major way".
In July 1987, India and Sri Lanka signed an agreement aimed at politically resolving the ethnic conflict in the island but which eventually led to India deploying its troops in the northeast of Sri Lanka. From October 1987 until March 1990, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was engaged in military operations against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a bloody counter-insurgency operation that cost the Indian forces almost 1,200 lives.
The IPKF experience in Sri Lanka and the rather arbitrary manner in which the then Lankan government called on India to pull out its troops plunged India-Sri Lanka relations to an all-time low. The events of 1987-90 cast a long shadow on India's policy toward Sri Lanka, the LTTE and the ethnic conflict, contributing to India adopting a "hands-off approach" towards the Lankan crisis thereafter. In May 1991, former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by the LTTE. A year later, India became the first country to ban the LTTE.
While India's relations with Sri Lanka slowly warmed with Chandrika Kumaratunga becoming the Sri Lankan president in 1994, its role in the ethnic crisis remained low profile. Even when it seemed that the Jaffna Peninsula might fall to the LTTE in 2000, New Delhi refused to come to the assistance of the Sri Lankan military, preferring to limit its help to humanitarian assistance. On the economic front, bilateral relations have deepened substantially in recent years.
But its "hands-off policy" notwithstanding, India has been very much involved in the Lankan quest for a solution to the ethnic crisis. Norwegian mediators as well as the Lankan government have been keeping India briefed on developments related to the peace process. And far from being a neutral observer of the peace process, India has been quietly supportive of the government by not demanding extradition of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakaran, the prime figure accused of masterminding the Rajiv Gandhi assassination, and at the same time keeping the pressure on the LTTE by keeping in place the ban on the organization. Training of Lankan soldiers has been going on. Besides, the two countries have been cooperating in naval surveillance of the waters around the Jaffna Peninsula, keeping an eye on LTTE attempts to ferry arms and fuel into the peninsula.
This overtly aloof, quietly supportive role India has been playing is now poised to change with the defense pact. India's role is likely to become more assertive and overt in its military support to the Lankan government.
Marine surveillance is one area in which India and Sri Lanka will work together. The two countries are separated by a mere 22 miles of shallow waters at its closest point, and for years the Tigers have treated the Indian state of Tamil Nadu as their rear base, turning to it for supplies and sanctuary. Although India has dismantled much of this support infrastructure in Tamil Nadu, the entry of Tigers into the state cannot be stopped completely as Tigers posing as fisherman can get through.
Professor V Suryanarayan, an Indian expert on Sri Lankan affairs, points to the "emergence of the 'Sea Tigers' [the LTTE's naval wing] as a credible fighting force in India's maritime neighborhood". In an op-ed article in The Hindu, he draws attention to the objectives of the Sea Tigers, their impressive military capacity and the dangers posed by maritime terrorism to India.
The LTTE has been claiming "rights" in the seas along the coast of the northeast. Their 2003 proposal for an LTTE-dominated interim self-government in the northeast envisaged control over the marine and offshore resources of the "adjacent [to the northeast] seas and the power to regulate access thereto". Implicit in this, according the Sea Tigers, is a de facto naval status and a maritime boundary dividing Sri Lankan territorial waters that would leave the LTTE in charge on one side of Sri Lanka's international boundary line with India. Suryanarayan warns that in case Colombo were "to accept these proposals, two-thirds of Sri Lanka's coastline will come under Tiger control".
Suryanarayan warns that "if effective steps are not taken, the LTTE will expand its geographic space as well as range of operations, posing a threat to South Asian security." India, he writes, "should work with the objective of neutralizing the Sea Tigers at the earliest opportunity."
The increased cooperation with regard to naval surveillance that is likely under the proposed defense pact would be a check on Tiger activity in the seas. A retired Indian diplomat told Asia Times Online that "for Colombo, it would be a step towards choking off Tiger transport of weaponry from overseas; for India, it would help neutralize the threat of maritime terrorism posed by the LTTE." It could also provide India access to Lankan seas and ports "and enable India to project its force more effectively in the Indian Ocean".
The draft pact will now move for approval by the political leadership in the two countries. Since it was Sri Lanka's opposition United National Party that mooted the pact proposal last year when it was in power, its objections to the defense agreement will be muted. The Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), a Sinhalese nationalist party that was at the forefront of the violent anti-India campaign in the 1987-90 period and is now part of the ruling coalition, has changed track on the issue of Indian involvement in Sri Lanka. Earlier this year, JVP leader Somawamse Amarasinghe "warmly embraced the proposed defense pact" between India and Sri Lanka and had said the defense pact "should be made an important aspect of our [Sri Lanka's] foreign policy". The JVP is virulently anti-LTTE.
It is from the LTTE that the pact will face the most ferocious opposition. The Tigers had warned earlier this year that the defense agreement with India could damage the already fragile ceasefire between them and the government. Unlike the previous government, which was anxious to keep the truce alive at any cost, the present Lankan government is unlikely to feel as inhibited by the possible LTTE response - a withdrawal from the ceasefire.
In India, opposition to the pact is likely to come from within the government. The Dravida Munethra Kazhagam (DMK) and the Marumalarchi DMK are sympathetic to the LTTE. Indian officials seem confident that they will be able to overcome resistance from these two Tamil nationalist parties once the strategic goals are explained. A critical issue that will determine how the Tamil parties respond would be what provisions the pact makes for India's response to a military emergency in Sri Lanka. The Tamil parties will have to be convinced that Delhi's military co-operation with Colombo does not undermine Sri Lankan Tamil interests - a tough task.
The India-Sri Lanka defense pact is the first of its kind in the region, the proposal a Colombo initiative. Delhi will be looking to others in the region to follow Colombo's lead.
Sudha Ramachandran is an independent researcher/writer based in Bangalore, India. She has a doctoral degree from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, in New Delhi. Her areas of interest include terrorism, conflict zones and gender and conflict. Formerly an assistant editor at the Deccan Herald (Bangalore) she now teaches at the Asian College of Journalism, Chennai.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FJ27Df02.html
By Sudha Ramachandran
The increased cooperation with regard to naval surveillance that is likely under the proposed defense pact would be a check on Tiger activity in the seas. A retired Indian diplomat told Asia Times Online that "for Colombo, it would be a step towards choking off Tiger transport of weaponry from overseas; for India, it would help neutralize the threat of maritime terrorism posed by the LTTE." It could also provide India access to Lankan seas and ports "and enable India to project its force more effectively in the Indian Ocean".
-Am
BANGALORE - India and Sri Lanka are in the final stages of concluding a bilateral defense cooperation agreement. The proposed pact, which is expected to be signed by the end of the year, could see India's role in the island nation increase significantly.
The pact has been under discussion for the past year. Talks were put on hold for a while after the change of government in both countries. But with the new governments in both countries keen on carrying forward the pact, things started moving quickly over the past couple of months.
Last week, officials from the two countries met in Colombo to finalize the draft agreement. According to a Sri Lankan Defense Ministry press release, officials discussed military training, exchange of military intelligence and information, maritime surveillance to prevent illegal activities affecting both countries, official visits and bilateral meetings at different levels, participation in training programs and joint military exercises. India is likely to sell Sri Lanka advanced light helicopters, small arms and ammunitions, artillery pieces, special clothing, and other items.
The proposed pact has been described as "general in nature, falling in the category of a standard bilateral, a kind of agreement which India has with many other countries," officials said. According to officials, "It formalizes existing cooperation and provides a framework for cooperation in the future."
Sources in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs say in private that the pact is "far-reaching" and "historic", a "milestone in India-Sri Lanka relations" that could see India "return as a player in the Sri Lankan conflict in a major way".
In July 1987, India and Sri Lanka signed an agreement aimed at politically resolving the ethnic conflict in the island but which eventually led to India deploying its troops in the northeast of Sri Lanka. From October 1987 until March 1990, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was engaged in military operations against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a bloody counter-insurgency operation that cost the Indian forces almost 1,200 lives.
The IPKF experience in Sri Lanka and the rather arbitrary manner in which the then Lankan government called on India to pull out its troops plunged India-Sri Lanka relations to an all-time low. The events of 1987-90 cast a long shadow on India's policy toward Sri Lanka, the LTTE and the ethnic conflict, contributing to India adopting a "hands-off approach" towards the Lankan crisis thereafter. In May 1991, former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by the LTTE. A year later, India became the first country to ban the LTTE.
While India's relations with Sri Lanka slowly warmed with Chandrika Kumaratunga becoming the Sri Lankan president in 1994, its role in the ethnic crisis remained low profile. Even when it seemed that the Jaffna Peninsula might fall to the LTTE in 2000, New Delhi refused to come to the assistance of the Sri Lankan military, preferring to limit its help to humanitarian assistance. On the economic front, bilateral relations have deepened substantially in recent years.
But its "hands-off policy" notwithstanding, India has been very much involved in the Lankan quest for a solution to the ethnic crisis. Norwegian mediators as well as the Lankan government have been keeping India briefed on developments related to the peace process. And far from being a neutral observer of the peace process, India has been quietly supportive of the government by not demanding extradition of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakaran, the prime figure accused of masterminding the Rajiv Gandhi assassination, and at the same time keeping the pressure on the LTTE by keeping in place the ban on the organization. Training of Lankan soldiers has been going on. Besides, the two countries have been cooperating in naval surveillance of the waters around the Jaffna Peninsula, keeping an eye on LTTE attempts to ferry arms and fuel into the peninsula.
This overtly aloof, quietly supportive role India has been playing is now poised to change with the defense pact. India's role is likely to become more assertive and overt in its military support to the Lankan government.
Marine surveillance is one area in which India and Sri Lanka will work together. The two countries are separated by a mere 22 miles of shallow waters at its closest point, and for years the Tigers have treated the Indian state of Tamil Nadu as their rear base, turning to it for supplies and sanctuary. Although India has dismantled much of this support infrastructure in Tamil Nadu, the entry of Tigers into the state cannot be stopped completely as Tigers posing as fisherman can get through.
Professor V Suryanarayan, an Indian expert on Sri Lankan affairs, points to the "emergence of the 'Sea Tigers' [the LTTE's naval wing] as a credible fighting force in India's maritime neighborhood". In an op-ed article in The Hindu, he draws attention to the objectives of the Sea Tigers, their impressive military capacity and the dangers posed by maritime terrorism to India.
The LTTE has been claiming "rights" in the seas along the coast of the northeast. Their 2003 proposal for an LTTE-dominated interim self-government in the northeast envisaged control over the marine and offshore resources of the "adjacent [to the northeast] seas and the power to regulate access thereto". Implicit in this, according the Sea Tigers, is a de facto naval status and a maritime boundary dividing Sri Lankan territorial waters that would leave the LTTE in charge on one side of Sri Lanka's international boundary line with India. Suryanarayan warns that in case Colombo were "to accept these proposals, two-thirds of Sri Lanka's coastline will come under Tiger control".
Suryanarayan warns that "if effective steps are not taken, the LTTE will expand its geographic space as well as range of operations, posing a threat to South Asian security." India, he writes, "should work with the objective of neutralizing the Sea Tigers at the earliest opportunity."
The increased cooperation with regard to naval surveillance that is likely under the proposed defense pact would be a check on Tiger activity in the seas. A retired Indian diplomat told Asia Times Online that "for Colombo, it would be a step towards choking off Tiger transport of weaponry from overseas; for India, it would help neutralize the threat of maritime terrorism posed by the LTTE." It could also provide India access to Lankan seas and ports "and enable India to project its force more effectively in the Indian Ocean".
The draft pact will now move for approval by the political leadership in the two countries. Since it was Sri Lanka's opposition United National Party that mooted the pact proposal last year when it was in power, its objections to the defense agreement will be muted. The Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), a Sinhalese nationalist party that was at the forefront of the violent anti-India campaign in the 1987-90 period and is now part of the ruling coalition, has changed track on the issue of Indian involvement in Sri Lanka. Earlier this year, JVP leader Somawamse Amarasinghe "warmly embraced the proposed defense pact" between India and Sri Lanka and had said the defense pact "should be made an important aspect of our [Sri Lanka's] foreign policy". The JVP is virulently anti-LTTE.
It is from the LTTE that the pact will face the most ferocious opposition. The Tigers had warned earlier this year that the defense agreement with India could damage the already fragile ceasefire between them and the government. Unlike the previous government, which was anxious to keep the truce alive at any cost, the present Lankan government is unlikely to feel as inhibited by the possible LTTE response - a withdrawal from the ceasefire.
In India, opposition to the pact is likely to come from within the government. The Dravida Munethra Kazhagam (DMK) and the Marumalarchi DMK are sympathetic to the LTTE. Indian officials seem confident that they will be able to overcome resistance from these two Tamil nationalist parties once the strategic goals are explained. A critical issue that will determine how the Tamil parties respond would be what provisions the pact makes for India's response to a military emergency in Sri Lanka. The Tamil parties will have to be convinced that Delhi's military co-operation with Colombo does not undermine Sri Lankan Tamil interests - a tough task.
The India-Sri Lanka defense pact is the first of its kind in the region, the proposal a Colombo initiative. Delhi will be looking to others in the region to follow Colombo's lead.
Sudha Ramachandran is an independent researcher/writer based in Bangalore, India. She has a doctoral degree from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, in New Delhi. Her areas of interest include terrorism, conflict zones and gender and conflict. Formerly an assistant editor at the Deccan Herald (Bangalore) she now teaches at the Asian College of Journalism, Chennai.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FJ27Df02.html
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