AI
Sunday, October 17, 2004 10:48:00 PM
Russia's Slippery Foothold in Abkhazia
18 October 2004
On October 3, presidential elections were held in Abkhazia, a mini-state on the Black Sea that broke away from Georgia in 1993, after a war of independence that cost several thousand lives and created at least a quarter million Georgian refugees (more than half the region's population) through ethnic cleansing. The first contested elections in Abkhazia since it achieved de facto independence (the mini-state is not recognized by any foreign government), they were meant to enhance Abkhazia's international credibility. Instead, the elections have thrown the mini-state into political confrontation and temporary paralysis in the wake of a nearly even split of votes between the two leading candidates -- Moscow-backed Raul Khajimba and businessman Sergei Bagapsh.
With a small population of which ethnic Abkhazians are the third largest group after Russians and Armenians, and suffering from economic sanctions and a Georgian blockade, the mini-state has depended for its existence on Russian economic support and military protection in the form of "peacekeepers" from the Confederation of Independent States. The United Nations also monitors the stand-off, but Russia plays the decisive role in maintaining the status quo, pending the restart of stalled negotiations between Abkhazia and Georgia, which seeks support from the Euro-American alliance, which backs Georgian claims to sovereignty over Abkhazia.
Abkhazia has strategic importance for all of the interests involved in its fate. Fearing extermination as an ethnic group with its own territory, the Abkhazians are determined to do anything possible to preserve their tenuous hold on independence. The pro-Western Georgian regime of President Mikhail Saakashvili, which must attempt to satisfy nationalist sentiment, is equally committed to bringing Abkhazia under Tbilisi's control and repatriating Georgian refugees. The Euro-American alliance wants to contain instability in the Transcaucasus so that oil supplies from the Caspian Sea are secure as they flow through Georgia, which is at the center of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. The West is also interested in thwarting attempts by Russia to reassert influence in the Transcaucasus, which it lost after the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia, in contrast, is using Abkhazia as a means to gain a foothold in the Transcaucasus and check Euro-American bids for hegemony in the region.
Within this pattern of conflicting interests, Russia is the only actor in the position to alter the status quo decisively -- Moscow can choose to deepen its support of Abkhazia, even to the point of recognizing its independence officially, or it can move toward a settlement that would restore Georgian sovereignty over the mini-state in return for a greater share of influence in the Transcaucasus. From the geostrategic perspective, Abkhazia is a test of Russian power -- all the other actors are locked in their positions by virtue of their perceived interests relative to the regional balance of power, whereas the course of action that would maximize Russian power is an open issue that divides Moscow's security establishment.
Russia's Shaky Foothold
The international status of Abkhazia was determined officially by a 1999 declaration at the Istanbul summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed by Russia, the United States and European powers, that affirmed "strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia" and branded earlier presidential elections in Abkhazia as "unacceptable and illegitimate." Although Moscow has abided by the declaration to the extent that it has maintained a public stance in favor of a negotiated settlement that would restore some form of Georgian sovereignty, its actions on the ground have supported the mini-state's independence.
Moscow's "two-track policy" worked effectively to prolong the status quo until Georgia's 2004 "Rose Revolution" that brought Saakashvili's pro-Western and nationalist regime to power. Tbilisi's posture of calling for a diplomatic settlement that would grant Abkhazia "generous autonomy" and simultaneously threatening force against the mini-state if it did not meet Georgian demands has caused rethinking in Moscow.
It is undisputed that Sukhumi is a client of Moscow. Approximately three-quarters of Abkhazia's residents have Russian citizenship and passports, the mini-state uses the ruble rather than the Georgian lari as its currency, Russian investments and Russian tourists to its Black Sea beaches (400,000 in the past year) are essential to its faltering economy, and Moscow provides pensions to many Abkhazians. With more than half its population unemployed and endemic crime as a result, the Sukhumi regime would collapse without Moscow's economic support and military presence.
The question for Moscow now is what to do with its preponderant influence in Abkhazia. That question becomes relevant because Tbilisi's tilt toward the West has altered the balance of power in the Transcaucasus, disadvantaging Russian interests. The more assertive that Tbilisi becomes, the more pressure Moscow is under to move Abkhazia out of its state of limbo. The Euro-American alliance, which wants the conflict resolved diplomatically in Georgia's favor, is a restraining influence that forestalls military action by Tbilisi, but it also emboldens Tbilisi to count on its demands eventually being met.
Moscow decision makers are, in general, divided into factions that still hold out for some accommodation with the West and others that believe that Russia needs to go it alone and rebuild its spheres of influence wherever possible. The debate is complicated by the contradiction between Russia's appeal to its sovereignty in Chechnya and its de facto opposition to Georgia's similar claims. The two-track policy toward Sukhumi is an example of how the broad division of Russia's political class on the country's strategic doctrine often results in compromises and stalemating positions. Tbilisi's pro-Western orientation has provided opportunities for Moscow hardliners to gain some leverage over their opponents and to press their "neo-imperialist" vision of Russia's strategic future.
Evidence of increasing power for Moscow's hardliners is the opening up in September of direct rail traffic between Russia and Abkhazia. The move was met with charges from Tbilisi that Moscow was attempting to "annex" the mini-state. Moscow replied that Tbilisi's assertive position threatened to ignite a general war in the Caucasus. Russian President Vladimir Putin made it plain that neither economic nor military pressure would resolve the problem of Abkhazia and blessed the rail link. Moscow's stand is that the rail link will improve trade in the Caucasus, which skirts the sovereignty question.
In addition to weakening the economic blockade of Abkhazia significantly, Moscow also approved of the presidential elections there, against the position of the United States and European powers that they were illegitimate. Successful competitive elections would have enhanced Sukhumi's claims to legitimacy, open the way to the possibility of formal recognition, or at least some associated status for the mini-state with Russia or with the alliance of Moscow and Belarus. As it turned out, the elections ended in confusion and indecision, marking a setback, though not a defeat, for Moscow's hardliners.
Abkhazia's Elections
Abkhazia's continued close relations with and dependence on Russia was not an issue in the recent presidential elections. The population of Abkhazia that remained after the expulsion and flight of its Georgian majority has been firmly in favor of outright union with Russia, some kind of formal association with it or regularized independence under Russian protection. That consensus is rooted in the preference of the ethnic Russian and Armenian segments of the population for Russia over Georgia, and most of all, an ethnic Abkhaz resistance to Georgian rule that is based on historical experience.
Although Georgian and Abkhazian claims are traced by their advocates through competing histories dating back to the Middle Ages, the proximate situation triggering the present conflict was the change in Abkhazia's status in the Soviet Union under Stalin's regime in 1931 from an autonomous republic in its own right to an autonomous republic of Georgia. Under Stalinist rule, Georgians were encouraged to settle in Abkhazia, and Abkhazian culture, which had only acquired a written alphabet in the late nineteenth century, was downgraded. When the Soviet Union broke apart in 1991, Georgian nationalists led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia took control of the new state, proclaiming a "Georgia for the Georgians" policy. Fearing ethnic extinction or at least subjection, the Abkhazians resisted, resulting in the 1992-1993 war of independence, won by Abkhazia with the help of fighters from related Caucasian peoples -- notably the Chechens -- and support from Moscow.
With the Russian-Chechen conflict intensifying, the Chechens tilted toward Georgia, leaving Abkhazia with only Moscow's de facto backing. All five candidates in the recent election pledged loyalty to Moscow, reflecting the anti-Georgian consensus in the mini-state. Their only differences, if any, hinged on vague distinctions between the kind and degree of "independence" that Abkhazia should enjoy.
The election was primarily fought over economic issues, revolving around the power of different factions in economic institutions. The two leading candidates represented different factions, with Khajimba leading the existing power structure and Bagapsh calling for "reform," which he promised would not affect existing property relations. This division, which had less to do with policy than personnel, made Khajimba the clear favorite, because he had been the only candidate to be granted a meeting with Putin, including a photo opportunity. Khajimba, an ex-K.G.B. agent and prime minister of Abkhazia under the outgoing regime of Vladislav Ardzinba -- who had governed the region from the Soviet era -- was seen as Moscow's man and he was given campaign support by Moscow political operatives.
Khajimba's opponent Bagapsh had also been an official in the Soviet regime and was currently head of the national energy company. He had formed a coalition of opposition groups, including the following of Alexander Ankvab, a popular ex-interior minister of Abkhazia, who had been excluded from candidacy on a technicality.
The election was far closer than analysts expected and was marred by charges of ballot rigging and intimidation, especially in the Gali district, which has a large Georgian population, among which are repatriated refugees. After a week of confusion and a revote in Gali, which the leading candidates agreed to, although it violated the mini-state's constitution, the Central Electoral Commission declared Bagapsh the winner with 50.08 percent of the vote, triggering the resignation of three of its members, a suit by Khajimba challenging the election's validity and Ardzinba's refusal to countenance its results. The fate of the election is now in the hands of Abkhazia's Supreme Court.
Analysts attribute Moscow's failure to have its candidate score a clear-cut victory to heavy-handed campaign tactics by Khajimba's Russian operatives, especially a pop concert on the eve of the elation, which many voters considered a crude attempt to pander to them for support. As the situation stands, however, Moscow has not lost much ground from the election fiasco. Both Bagapsh and Khajimba remain pro-Moscow and, although each warns that the other is flirting with civil war, Abkhazian dependence on Russia and unity against Georgia will probably contain any fratricidal tendencies. At most, the hardliners in Moscow have lost the aura of legitimacy that they wanted for the mini-state, and they still even might gain that if the judicial system successfully resolves the electoral conflict.
Conclusion
In light of Euro-American reluctance to do any more than urge a negotiated resolution to the Abkhazia problem that asserts Georgian sovereignty, while refraining from backing that position militarily or economically, Moscow is free to experiment with a neo-imperialist policy in the Transcaucasus, attempting to keep Chechnya in Russia and Georgia out of Abkhazia.
At the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on October 11, Russian delegate Alexander Fomenko argued that Abkhazia was not historically part of Georgia, but was a "gift" from Stalin, echoing the Abkhazian "historical argument" for independence. Moscow's more assertive posture toward the West is a sign that it is beginning to dig in for a protracted confrontation in the Caucasus that will test its will and the resolve of the West.
Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.
http://www.pinr.com/
18 October 2004
On October 3, presidential elections were held in Abkhazia, a mini-state on the Black Sea that broke away from Georgia in 1993, after a war of independence that cost several thousand lives and created at least a quarter million Georgian refugees (more than half the region's population) through ethnic cleansing. The first contested elections in Abkhazia since it achieved de facto independence (the mini-state is not recognized by any foreign government), they were meant to enhance Abkhazia's international credibility. Instead, the elections have thrown the mini-state into political confrontation and temporary paralysis in the wake of a nearly even split of votes between the two leading candidates -- Moscow-backed Raul Khajimba and businessman Sergei Bagapsh.
With a small population of which ethnic Abkhazians are the third largest group after Russians and Armenians, and suffering from economic sanctions and a Georgian blockade, the mini-state has depended for its existence on Russian economic support and military protection in the form of "peacekeepers" from the Confederation of Independent States. The United Nations also monitors the stand-off, but Russia plays the decisive role in maintaining the status quo, pending the restart of stalled negotiations between Abkhazia and Georgia, which seeks support from the Euro-American alliance, which backs Georgian claims to sovereignty over Abkhazia.
Abkhazia has strategic importance for all of the interests involved in its fate. Fearing extermination as an ethnic group with its own territory, the Abkhazians are determined to do anything possible to preserve their tenuous hold on independence. The pro-Western Georgian regime of President Mikhail Saakashvili, which must attempt to satisfy nationalist sentiment, is equally committed to bringing Abkhazia under Tbilisi's control and repatriating Georgian refugees. The Euro-American alliance wants to contain instability in the Transcaucasus so that oil supplies from the Caspian Sea are secure as they flow through Georgia, which is at the center of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. The West is also interested in thwarting attempts by Russia to reassert influence in the Transcaucasus, which it lost after the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia, in contrast, is using Abkhazia as a means to gain a foothold in the Transcaucasus and check Euro-American bids for hegemony in the region.
Within this pattern of conflicting interests, Russia is the only actor in the position to alter the status quo decisively -- Moscow can choose to deepen its support of Abkhazia, even to the point of recognizing its independence officially, or it can move toward a settlement that would restore Georgian sovereignty over the mini-state in return for a greater share of influence in the Transcaucasus. From the geostrategic perspective, Abkhazia is a test of Russian power -- all the other actors are locked in their positions by virtue of their perceived interests relative to the regional balance of power, whereas the course of action that would maximize Russian power is an open issue that divides Moscow's security establishment.
Russia's Shaky Foothold
The international status of Abkhazia was determined officially by a 1999 declaration at the Istanbul summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed by Russia, the United States and European powers, that affirmed "strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia" and branded earlier presidential elections in Abkhazia as "unacceptable and illegitimate." Although Moscow has abided by the declaration to the extent that it has maintained a public stance in favor of a negotiated settlement that would restore some form of Georgian sovereignty, its actions on the ground have supported the mini-state's independence.
Moscow's "two-track policy" worked effectively to prolong the status quo until Georgia's 2004 "Rose Revolution" that brought Saakashvili's pro-Western and nationalist regime to power. Tbilisi's posture of calling for a diplomatic settlement that would grant Abkhazia "generous autonomy" and simultaneously threatening force against the mini-state if it did not meet Georgian demands has caused rethinking in Moscow.
It is undisputed that Sukhumi is a client of Moscow. Approximately three-quarters of Abkhazia's residents have Russian citizenship and passports, the mini-state uses the ruble rather than the Georgian lari as its currency, Russian investments and Russian tourists to its Black Sea beaches (400,000 in the past year) are essential to its faltering economy, and Moscow provides pensions to many Abkhazians. With more than half its population unemployed and endemic crime as a result, the Sukhumi regime would collapse without Moscow's economic support and military presence.
The question for Moscow now is what to do with its preponderant influence in Abkhazia. That question becomes relevant because Tbilisi's tilt toward the West has altered the balance of power in the Transcaucasus, disadvantaging Russian interests. The more assertive that Tbilisi becomes, the more pressure Moscow is under to move Abkhazia out of its state of limbo. The Euro-American alliance, which wants the conflict resolved diplomatically in Georgia's favor, is a restraining influence that forestalls military action by Tbilisi, but it also emboldens Tbilisi to count on its demands eventually being met.
Moscow decision makers are, in general, divided into factions that still hold out for some accommodation with the West and others that believe that Russia needs to go it alone and rebuild its spheres of influence wherever possible. The debate is complicated by the contradiction between Russia's appeal to its sovereignty in Chechnya and its de facto opposition to Georgia's similar claims. The two-track policy toward Sukhumi is an example of how the broad division of Russia's political class on the country's strategic doctrine often results in compromises and stalemating positions. Tbilisi's pro-Western orientation has provided opportunities for Moscow hardliners to gain some leverage over their opponents and to press their "neo-imperialist" vision of Russia's strategic future.
Evidence of increasing power for Moscow's hardliners is the opening up in September of direct rail traffic between Russia and Abkhazia. The move was met with charges from Tbilisi that Moscow was attempting to "annex" the mini-state. Moscow replied that Tbilisi's assertive position threatened to ignite a general war in the Caucasus. Russian President Vladimir Putin made it plain that neither economic nor military pressure would resolve the problem of Abkhazia and blessed the rail link. Moscow's stand is that the rail link will improve trade in the Caucasus, which skirts the sovereignty question.
In addition to weakening the economic blockade of Abkhazia significantly, Moscow also approved of the presidential elections there, against the position of the United States and European powers that they were illegitimate. Successful competitive elections would have enhanced Sukhumi's claims to legitimacy, open the way to the possibility of formal recognition, or at least some associated status for the mini-state with Russia or with the alliance of Moscow and Belarus. As it turned out, the elections ended in confusion and indecision, marking a setback, though not a defeat, for Moscow's hardliners.
Abkhazia's Elections
Abkhazia's continued close relations with and dependence on Russia was not an issue in the recent presidential elections. The population of Abkhazia that remained after the expulsion and flight of its Georgian majority has been firmly in favor of outright union with Russia, some kind of formal association with it or regularized independence under Russian protection. That consensus is rooted in the preference of the ethnic Russian and Armenian segments of the population for Russia over Georgia, and most of all, an ethnic Abkhaz resistance to Georgian rule that is based on historical experience.
Although Georgian and Abkhazian claims are traced by their advocates through competing histories dating back to the Middle Ages, the proximate situation triggering the present conflict was the change in Abkhazia's status in the Soviet Union under Stalin's regime in 1931 from an autonomous republic in its own right to an autonomous republic of Georgia. Under Stalinist rule, Georgians were encouraged to settle in Abkhazia, and Abkhazian culture, which had only acquired a written alphabet in the late nineteenth century, was downgraded. When the Soviet Union broke apart in 1991, Georgian nationalists led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia took control of the new state, proclaiming a "Georgia for the Georgians" policy. Fearing ethnic extinction or at least subjection, the Abkhazians resisted, resulting in the 1992-1993 war of independence, won by Abkhazia with the help of fighters from related Caucasian peoples -- notably the Chechens -- and support from Moscow.
With the Russian-Chechen conflict intensifying, the Chechens tilted toward Georgia, leaving Abkhazia with only Moscow's de facto backing. All five candidates in the recent election pledged loyalty to Moscow, reflecting the anti-Georgian consensus in the mini-state. Their only differences, if any, hinged on vague distinctions between the kind and degree of "independence" that Abkhazia should enjoy.
The election was primarily fought over economic issues, revolving around the power of different factions in economic institutions. The two leading candidates represented different factions, with Khajimba leading the existing power structure and Bagapsh calling for "reform," which he promised would not affect existing property relations. This division, which had less to do with policy than personnel, made Khajimba the clear favorite, because he had been the only candidate to be granted a meeting with Putin, including a photo opportunity. Khajimba, an ex-K.G.B. agent and prime minister of Abkhazia under the outgoing regime of Vladislav Ardzinba -- who had governed the region from the Soviet era -- was seen as Moscow's man and he was given campaign support by Moscow political operatives.
Khajimba's opponent Bagapsh had also been an official in the Soviet regime and was currently head of the national energy company. He had formed a coalition of opposition groups, including the following of Alexander Ankvab, a popular ex-interior minister of Abkhazia, who had been excluded from candidacy on a technicality.
The election was far closer than analysts expected and was marred by charges of ballot rigging and intimidation, especially in the Gali district, which has a large Georgian population, among which are repatriated refugees. After a week of confusion and a revote in Gali, which the leading candidates agreed to, although it violated the mini-state's constitution, the Central Electoral Commission declared Bagapsh the winner with 50.08 percent of the vote, triggering the resignation of three of its members, a suit by Khajimba challenging the election's validity and Ardzinba's refusal to countenance its results. The fate of the election is now in the hands of Abkhazia's Supreme Court.
Analysts attribute Moscow's failure to have its candidate score a clear-cut victory to heavy-handed campaign tactics by Khajimba's Russian operatives, especially a pop concert on the eve of the elation, which many voters considered a crude attempt to pander to them for support. As the situation stands, however, Moscow has not lost much ground from the election fiasco. Both Bagapsh and Khajimba remain pro-Moscow and, although each warns that the other is flirting with civil war, Abkhazian dependence on Russia and unity against Georgia will probably contain any fratricidal tendencies. At most, the hardliners in Moscow have lost the aura of legitimacy that they wanted for the mini-state, and they still even might gain that if the judicial system successfully resolves the electoral conflict.
Conclusion
In light of Euro-American reluctance to do any more than urge a negotiated resolution to the Abkhazia problem that asserts Georgian sovereignty, while refraining from backing that position militarily or economically, Moscow is free to experiment with a neo-imperialist policy in the Transcaucasus, attempting to keep Chechnya in Russia and Georgia out of Abkhazia.
At the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on October 11, Russian delegate Alexander Fomenko argued that Abkhazia was not historically part of Georgia, but was a "gift" from Stalin, echoing the Abkhazian "historical argument" for independence. Moscow's more assertive posture toward the West is a sign that it is beginning to dig in for a protracted confrontation in the Caucasus that will test its will and the resolve of the West.
Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.
http://www.pinr.com/
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