AI
Jets and politics in the Persian Gulf
see also: #msg-3136614
August 27, 2004
By Pirouz Mojtahedzadeh and Kaveh L Afrasiabi
Politics and the aircraft business have never been strangers, but in July they proved to be linked in a big way when the national airlines of the United Arab Emirates and Turkey announced that together they had invested about US$10 billion to buy European-made Airbus aircraft. To avoid feud and crying foul by the rival US Boeing, they invested less than half that amount buying jets from the United States.
Word of the contract for the French-based aircraft maker came as Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan completed an official three-day visit to France, where he had lobbied political and business leaders to support Turkey's entry into the European Union.
Turkish Airlines announced subsequently on July 21 that it would buy 36 planes worth $3 billion from Airbus and fewer than half that amount from Boeing.
France is playing an especially important role in determining whether Turkey will be allowed to begin membership negotiations with the EU because it appeared to be the sole European heavyweight deeply divided on the question. Yet the aircraft purchase for political favor could not have been more obvious. Crucial talks on the issue are scheduled for December.
Less conspicuous, however, was the UAE's business deal with the Europeans a day earlier to purchase Airbus in return for a joint EU-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) declaration in late May of support for Abu Dhabi's position on the issue of its claims on three Iranian-held islands in the Persian Gulf.
Website theestimate.com describes the importance of the islands as such: "One reason is the strategic location of the islands astride the shipping lanes through the Strait of Hormuz; this potential military value overlays and enhances other incentives, such as the question of offshore oil in the islands' territorial limits and the prestige element of dynastic claims, which have been part of almost all Gulf boundary disputes."
It was reported on July 20 that Etihad Airways, the national airline of the UAE, had selected Airbus's wide-body long-range aircraft and the new-generation double-deck Airbus A380 for its future growth. The Abu Dhabi-based full-service airline has signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to purchase 24 Airbus aircraft, including four of the revolutionary A380s, four ultra-long-range A340-500s, four A340-600s and 12 A330-200s, the most efficient wide-body twin.
The airline has also taken options to purchase 12 additional aircraft, the types of which will be defined in due course. The total value of the agreement is in excess of $7 billion. The airline had spent about $3 billion buying Boeing to keep Airbus's US rival happy.
There had been no mention of negotiations for and agreement on the purchase of these aircraft having taken place simultaneously when the negotiations between EU ministers and GCC officials resulted in the announcement of their joint declaration of May 19. Yet as these negotiations were conducted and an understanding reached through the joint EU-GCC commission for commerce, little doubt remains as to the connection between the two. In addition, the GCC, however, had promised to offer free-trade zones to the EU in the Persian Gulf region. The UAE has been trying to politicize and internationalize the issue of its claims on the said islands for a long time.
As in the way the Arabs began to refer to the Palestinian lands occupied by Israel as the "Occupied Arabic Lands" to make the issue a cause celebre at the Arab world level, Abu Dhabi too has been referring to the islands of Tunbs and Abu Musa as the "Occupied Arab Islands" to turn the issue of its claims on these islands into a cause celebre at the Middle East level as a symbol of Arab national resistance to Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf. Abu Dhabi has had some success in this regard and the Arab-Iranian cooperation for peace in the region has been negatively affected in recent months.
In fact, the recent agreement or understanding with the EU took place through negotiations by the GCC (members include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman, in addition to the UAE). The Iranians for their part, however, deny that there is any dispute on Iran's ownership of these islands. They further argue that the islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa were returned to Iran on November 30, 1971, through legal processes, including the signing of an MoU, before the state of the UAE was created.
They argue that according to international regulations no state can defy the agreements that had come into being before its creation, unless such agreements had been officially declared null and void by the newly created state. Not only did the UAE not declare the arrangements arrived at by Iran and Britain (acting as the government of the emirates of Sharjah and Ras al-Kheimah at the time) on the return of the three islands, but also the Supreme Council of the Union decided in its meeting of May 12, 1992, that foreign obligations of the member emirates prior to the formation of the union of Arab Emirates will be the obligations of the union itself.
Moreover, in the circular of October 27, 1992, distributed among the representatives of United Nations member states, Abu Dhabi asked Iran to adhere to the terms of its November 1971 MoU with Sharjah. Hence laying claims on islands returned to Iran before the formation of the UAE, through legal processes acceptable to the UAE, cannot be legally admissible.
Moreover, they argue that in the meeting of May 12, 1992, of the Supreme Council of the UAE, the emir of Sharjah, who was Iran's original partner in the 1971 MoU, refused to pass his emirate's authority over the issue of Abu Musa Island to the UAE leaders and left the meeting.
Hence the UAE leadership's action in assuming authority for the case of Abu Musa Island in that meeting, in the absence of the ruler of Sharjah and without his consent, renders any claim by Abu Dhabi on that island not in complete harmony with the legality of the issue.
Pirouz Mojtahedzadeh is professor of geopolitics at Tarbiat Modares University in Tehran and director of Eurosevic Foundation in London. Kaveh L Afrasiabi is a political scientist and author of books and articles on Iran's foreign policy.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FH27Ak01.html
see also: #msg-3136614
August 27, 2004
By Pirouz Mojtahedzadeh and Kaveh L Afrasiabi
Politics and the aircraft business have never been strangers, but in July they proved to be linked in a big way when the national airlines of the United Arab Emirates and Turkey announced that together they had invested about US$10 billion to buy European-made Airbus aircraft. To avoid feud and crying foul by the rival US Boeing, they invested less than half that amount buying jets from the United States.
Word of the contract for the French-based aircraft maker came as Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan completed an official three-day visit to France, where he had lobbied political and business leaders to support Turkey's entry into the European Union.
Turkish Airlines announced subsequently on July 21 that it would buy 36 planes worth $3 billion from Airbus and fewer than half that amount from Boeing.
France is playing an especially important role in determining whether Turkey will be allowed to begin membership negotiations with the EU because it appeared to be the sole European heavyweight deeply divided on the question. Yet the aircraft purchase for political favor could not have been more obvious. Crucial talks on the issue are scheduled for December.
Less conspicuous, however, was the UAE's business deal with the Europeans a day earlier to purchase Airbus in return for a joint EU-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) declaration in late May of support for Abu Dhabi's position on the issue of its claims on three Iranian-held islands in the Persian Gulf.
Website theestimate.com describes the importance of the islands as such: "One reason is the strategic location of the islands astride the shipping lanes through the Strait of Hormuz; this potential military value overlays and enhances other incentives, such as the question of offshore oil in the islands' territorial limits and the prestige element of dynastic claims, which have been part of almost all Gulf boundary disputes."
It was reported on July 20 that Etihad Airways, the national airline of the UAE, had selected Airbus's wide-body long-range aircraft and the new-generation double-deck Airbus A380 for its future growth. The Abu Dhabi-based full-service airline has signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to purchase 24 Airbus aircraft, including four of the revolutionary A380s, four ultra-long-range A340-500s, four A340-600s and 12 A330-200s, the most efficient wide-body twin.
The airline has also taken options to purchase 12 additional aircraft, the types of which will be defined in due course. The total value of the agreement is in excess of $7 billion. The airline had spent about $3 billion buying Boeing to keep Airbus's US rival happy.
There had been no mention of negotiations for and agreement on the purchase of these aircraft having taken place simultaneously when the negotiations between EU ministers and GCC officials resulted in the announcement of their joint declaration of May 19. Yet as these negotiations were conducted and an understanding reached through the joint EU-GCC commission for commerce, little doubt remains as to the connection between the two. In addition, the GCC, however, had promised to offer free-trade zones to the EU in the Persian Gulf region. The UAE has been trying to politicize and internationalize the issue of its claims on the said islands for a long time.
As in the way the Arabs began to refer to the Palestinian lands occupied by Israel as the "Occupied Arabic Lands" to make the issue a cause celebre at the Arab world level, Abu Dhabi too has been referring to the islands of Tunbs and Abu Musa as the "Occupied Arab Islands" to turn the issue of its claims on these islands into a cause celebre at the Middle East level as a symbol of Arab national resistance to Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf. Abu Dhabi has had some success in this regard and the Arab-Iranian cooperation for peace in the region has been negatively affected in recent months.
In fact, the recent agreement or understanding with the EU took place through negotiations by the GCC (members include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman, in addition to the UAE). The Iranians for their part, however, deny that there is any dispute on Iran's ownership of these islands. They further argue that the islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa were returned to Iran on November 30, 1971, through legal processes, including the signing of an MoU, before the state of the UAE was created.
They argue that according to international regulations no state can defy the agreements that had come into being before its creation, unless such agreements had been officially declared null and void by the newly created state. Not only did the UAE not declare the arrangements arrived at by Iran and Britain (acting as the government of the emirates of Sharjah and Ras al-Kheimah at the time) on the return of the three islands, but also the Supreme Council of the Union decided in its meeting of May 12, 1992, that foreign obligations of the member emirates prior to the formation of the union of Arab Emirates will be the obligations of the union itself.
Moreover, in the circular of October 27, 1992, distributed among the representatives of United Nations member states, Abu Dhabi asked Iran to adhere to the terms of its November 1971 MoU with Sharjah. Hence laying claims on islands returned to Iran before the formation of the UAE, through legal processes acceptable to the UAE, cannot be legally admissible.
Moreover, they argue that in the meeting of May 12, 1992, of the Supreme Council of the UAE, the emir of Sharjah, who was Iran's original partner in the 1971 MoU, refused to pass his emirate's authority over the issue of Abu Musa Island to the UAE leaders and left the meeting.
Hence the UAE leadership's action in assuming authority for the case of Abu Musa Island in that meeting, in the absence of the ruler of Sharjah and without his consent, renders any claim by Abu Dhabi on that island not in complete harmony with the legality of the issue.
Pirouz Mojtahedzadeh is professor of geopolitics at Tarbiat Modares University in Tehran and director of Eurosevic Foundation in London. Kaveh L Afrasiabi is a political scientist and author of books and articles on Iran's foreign policy.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FH27Ak01.html
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