Foreign Correspondence

[Amaunet]

Putin's election surprise?
Posted August 10, 2004
By PETER LAVELLE

MOSCOW-- The Kremlin has denied it, Washington would surely like it, and pundits continue to speculate: Will Russia deploy up to 40,000 troops by year-end to help stabilize Iraq's grave security environment?

Such a decision would, of course, be interpreted as a campaign gift to George Bush from his friend Vladimir Putin as well as a devastating blow to John Kerry's presidential bid -- a large Russian contingency in Iraq would finally give meaning to the concept "coalition forces." However, such a masterly political stroke would be fraught with problems for both the United States and Russia.

On July 16, the U.S. intelligence site Stratfor.com claimed Washington and the Kremlin had cut a deal that would see as many as 40,000 Russian troops serving in Iraq as peacekeepers by year-end. Four days later, Russia's Foreign Ministry flatly denied any deal. Nonetheless, the idea of a strong Russian military presence in Iraq continues to intrigue many. A strong U.S.-Russia commitment to stabilize Iraq is something seen as a "total political solution" for both countries.

George Bush, in a tough re-election campaign, could claim, with Russian support, that "coalition forces" had wide international support -- significantly deflating presidential candidate Kerry's claim otherwise. For Putin's Kremlin -- recently assigned to the doghouse by Western media because of the Yukos affair, the crackdown on domestic media and heartless social reforms -- sending troops to Iraq has considerable upside.

A large foreign military operation fighting international terrorism alongside the United States would return Russia's sense of being a major power in the world -- and the possibility a much stronger role in what was the Soviet Union.

On the face of it, 40,000 Russian troops deployed in Iraq would appear to solve many problems and issues for the men sitting in the White House and the Kremlin. However, like most ideas considered "total political solutions," things become very complicated when examining the details.

For 40,000 troops, what does the Kremlin really want in return? Prior to the invasion of Iraq, Russian oil companies had large and long-term oil contacts in Iraq. Russia's oil giant Lukoil would very much like those contracts returned to it -- and not only as a subcontractor. Russia also would like to be in a position of strength concerning the development of oil pipelines in the region.

For troops, the Kremlin essentially wants to be anointed leader of the petroleum-producing world and be allowed to determine the destiny of what it calls its "near abroad." With much of the world's old reserves in or close to high-risk security regions, this may be acceptable to the United States at present.

However, there is also downside for Russia. The war in Iraq is very unpopular among Russians. State-controlled television has covered the war in a way that is openly anti-American. Clearly, as media are tightly controlled, the Kremlin could attempt a volte-face, claiming Russian troops sent to Iraq would be fighting the same kind of Islamist fundamentalist battle Russia is fighting within its own borders. However, the Kremlin's official line on its war against terrorism at home is received with a great deal of skepticism.

Additionally, the Soviet Union was a friend of Iraq, and Russia adamantly opposed the invasion of Iraq last year. Is the Kremlin angling for Russian troops to be treated any different from other foreign military personnel in Iraq? Russia still has modicum of popularity among the Iraqi people because it has been against the war and unwilling to involve itself militarily. With troops deployed, Russian military personnel should not expect to be given any quarter -- no different from other foreign troops fighting there.

What Russia's military thinks of a possible deployment is not entirely clear. However, if troops were sent to Iraq, would Russian generals be made to answer to their American counterparts? Probably no other event would put old Cold War prejudices and distrust to rest. There is a problem though: Most of the Russia's military establishment remains very Soviet in outlook. Taking orders from a recent foe may to be hard to accept.

For the Bush White House, delivering greater control of the world's petroleum market to Russia is probably not too hard to swallow for the moment. After all, a military alliance in Iraq could produce a strong bilateral energy alliance in which Western oil giants would be invited, by Putin personally, to partake in Russia's oil patch.

But surely the Bush administration desires an effective and modern Russian military force in Iraq to counter the intense resistance to the occupation, not just the symbolic presence of troops. Is Russia prepared to deliver? Russia's military and security forces have a lot of experience fighting counterinsurgency operations -- know-how that has demonstrated little success over the past decade.

On balance, a Russian military presence in Iraq is far from a "total political solution" for the White House or the Kremlin. The details of such a deal could create more differences than interests in the longer term. If Russia is given the leading voice in petroleum markets, what is a fair price for producers and consumers? Russia needs continued high prices to complete its reform agenda. Both Russia and the United States fight wars differently. Is the United States prepared to defend Russian military practices employed in Chechnya today to be used in Iraq? There are many other dangling and unanswered questions.

Lastly, Putin's pre-election surprise for Bush could backfire: What if Kerry is elected in November? That would be the biggest surprise for Putin. Would any and all deals made with the Bush people be put on hold or even annulled? That would a "total political disaster" for Putin.

Peter Lavelle is an independent Moscow-based analyst and the author of the electronic newsletter on Russia "Untimely Thoughts" untimely-thoughts.com.


http://www.insightmag.com/news/2004/07/19/World/Putins.Election.Surprise-702087.shtml.