Foreign Correspondence

[Amaunet]

Georgia: Out of Control in South Ossetia?


Posted on Sunday, August 01 @ 09:00:00 EDT by CDeliso

For the past two months, or, since the forced exodus of Aslan Abashidze from his fiefdom in Adjara on the Black Sea, the Georgian government has shifted its attention to the breakaway region of South Ossetia, northwest of Tbilisi and bordering on Russia. As if trying to capitalize on the momentum garnered from the unqualified victory in Adjara, President “Mikhail the Builder” Saakashvili continues to step up the pressure on South Ossetia’s Russian-backed government. This has had predictable consequences, though the long-term ramifications remain unclear.

An eight-hour gun battle on Thursday night resulted in five fighters wounded, three Georgians and two on the Ossetian side. A Russian TV reporter cited by RFE/RL stated that the battle was fought between paramilitaries “…defending the outskirts of the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali” from Georgians of the village of Tamarasheni.

Heavy fire continued on Friday morning and again on Saturday night, with both sides blaming the other for provoking the situation, reported Reuters. According to Russian Major-General Svyatoslav Nabzdorov, “…they [the Georgians] are deliberately provoking everything. They want to show that the peacekeepers cannot manage the situation.”

Georgians claim that a school, a kindergarten and several houses have been destroyed in Tamarasheni. This came following Russian reports that Georgians had shelled residential areas of Tskhinvali in preceding days.

The Georgian government called for a peaceful settlement to the dispute on Thursday, but this has been made more difficult by recent event, as the casualties have been increasing since then. Today it was announced that six Ossetians had been killed and two Georgian policemen wounded in Saturday night’s shooting.

Ossetia (see small Economist map here) is a frenetically-shaped mountainous landmass straddling two states. In the Georgian bit, the capital city (Tskhinvali) is however not at all central but practically on the border with Georgia proper. This fact of itself no doubt tends to increase tensions. It also means that the Ossetians are well-fortified on the “front lines” of what the Economist calls “…a smuggling racket with a patch of land attached.”

The major-general’s words may have some truth to them. On Saturday Moscow denounced a Georgian proposal- apparently supported by the United States- to increase the existing OSCE monitoring patrol that works the Ossetian border. Russia has considered the OSCE to be a biased, Georgia-friendly Western body that helps the West keep an eye on Russia through its presence. This was alluded to in a Russian Foreign Ministry statement which averred that, “…unbiased assessment of the situation is essential and not the increase of number of observers.”

In September 2002, a memorable incident arose when OSCE observers together with a small contingent of Georgian soldiers providing protection were taken prisoner by a dozen armed Chechens who had taken refuge on the Georgian side of the border, near the tiny mountain village of Shatili.

The Chechens deliberated on whether to kill them or let them go, finally deciding in favor of the latter, but with the following caveat: “we will free you, but on condition you do not tell the Russians about our camp for the next 48 hours, so we have time to clear out. Otherwise, we know very well where your little base is, and we will destroy it,” one of the monitors involved told us.

Quite sensibly, the OSCE folk kept up their part of the bargain, which infuriated Moscow to no end and resulted in a raft of accusations that Tbilisi and the OSCE were collaborating against Russia and allowing Chechens free access to Georgian territory. Yet anyone who had seen just how susceptible the unarmed monitors were in their flimsy, jury-rigged station, atop one of the highest mountains in the world and a mere helicopter’s ride from civilization, would understand that their choice had less to do with helping the Chechens than with saving their own skin. Nevertheless, it set a precedent and confirmed pre-existing public opinion in Russia.

Yet Russia too is a member of the OSCE and it would be decidedly uncouth for anyone- whether Russian soldiers or Ossetia’s paramilitaries- to fire on the unarmed, innocuous representatives of such a benign institution (heh, heh) as the OSCE. Thus the Georgian strategy becomes easy to understand. According to the Civil Georgia report,

“…particularly Tbilisi wants the OSCE to monitor the Roki pass, which links breakaway South Ossetia with Russia’s North Ossetian Republic. Tbilisi blames Russia for providing arms to the breakaway region via Roki pass. Tbilisi also wants OSCE observers to monitor the Java district of the breakaway region, which serves as a stronghold for the separatist forces.”

For its part, the US sounded quite pleased with the idea, with Ambassador to the OSCE Stephan Minikes telling the Permanent Council in its July 29 meeting in Vienna that the “…United States strongly supports the work of the OSCE Mission in Georgia, as well as the Georgian government's proposal to expand the mission's mandate so it can ‘continue to play an even more active and productive role in the settlement process.’”

Also on Saturday, Saakashvili declared that South Ossetia “…will never be a part of Russia” and that the “problem” will be solved before the expiration of his five-year term in 2008.

And indeed, some Georgians remain optimistic. Saakashvili came to power partially on the promise to reunite the country, and a crucial part of his base- the university-aged and “NGO-aged” youth who were able to wed their energy, idealism and impatience with Western riches and catapult Saakashvili to power. Young Georgians we interviewed recently expressed unbridled optimism regarding the prospects for the future: “yes, we will certainly get Ossetia back- and then hopefully Abkhazia,” said one cheery young woman.

This reference to the oldest and sharpest thorn in Georgia’s side- the eastern region that broke away following a bloody, Russian-backed civil war in the 1990’s- sits uncomfortably with Georgians old enough to remember the conflict and cautious enough to resist such enthusiasm. “It is too much to expect Abkhazia back,” said one 30-something political analyst, “when it is not at all clear about what will happen in Ossetia… these young people mean well, but I fear the government is playing on their immaturity and idealism to manipulate with them.”

And also, as the Economist points out, the question of desirability in real estate also plays a factor here in distinguishing between the two regions: unlike mountainous, smuggling-afflicted Ossetia, Abkhazia is “…a lush stretch of Black Sea coast, which Russian soldiers and politicians dearly love.”

Journalists trying to research the situation have gotten into trouble of late. Two Georgian reporters for Eurasianet.org were held prisoner by Ossetian paramilitaries back in June, and threatened repeatedly before finally being released. One wonders if reporters from a Georgian media body or one less powerful than the Soros-backed Eurasianet.org would have been so lucky.

Given the current fluid situation, tensions could well boil over. But it does seem that it is largely in Tbilisi’s power to either exacerbate or cool the situation. In other words, the question remains as to whether Ossetia is out of control- or, perhaps, suspiciously well within the control of officials whose final goals may require more bloodshed.




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