Foreign Correspondence

[Amaunet]

Israel and the Kurds

see also:
#msg-3515579
#msg-3507761
#msg-3407039
#msg-3465824
#msg-3423259

Behind the daily instability in Iraq lie significant longer-term processes that may impact on the political agenda. The increasing involvement of Israel in Iraq, mentioned in an earlier column in this series, is one of these (see “The intelligence of al-Qaida”, 24 June 2004).

The recent attention on this issue has highlighted the development of closer links between the US military and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), especially the Americans’ procurement of specialist Israeli equipment developed for use against the Palestinians, and the IDF’s sharing their experience of urban warfare (see “From Fallujah to Palestine”, 24 April 2004).

In pursuing these links, US military planners believed that any relevant experience or equipment that might limit US casualties was greatly welcome. They did not appreciate that news of Israeli involvement would have a cumulative impact in Iraq and the wider region - confirming the widely-held view that the US occupation of Iraq was part of an overall Israeli-American policy to redraw the political map of the Middle East.

It is now apparent, with the confirmation that the Israelis are directly training Kurdish military forces in north-east Iraq that Israel’s influence in the region is extensive. The view from Israel is that the US occupation of Iraq is likely to lead to long-term disorder and it is in Israel’s strategic interest to improve the security position of the Iraqi Kurds.

From an Israeli strategic calculation, this move serves four purposes. First, a militarily strong Kurdish entity will resist any threat posed either by any Iraqi civil war or by paramilitary violence from Ba’athist or al-Qaida forces. The Iraqi Kurds have effective militias and could readily solicit Israeli support in the event of their abandonment by the United States.

Second, Israel’s intimacy with Iraq’s Kurds allows it proximate influence in an area bordering the one country it regards as an even greater threat than Iraq – Iran. Israel remains concerned at Iran's nuclear ambitions and would readily pre-empt them if the United States showed any reluctance to do so. The distance of Iran from Israel makes such pre-emption very difficult to undertake; the use of air bases in Kurdish Iraq would overcome that limitation.

Third, Israeli involvement with the Iraqi Kurds gives it the opportunity to cultivate its presence within Kurdish communities in Syria and Iran. In Syria, the Sharon administration would welcome any aid to Kurdish anti-Assad elements, while links with Kurdish Iran could provide Israel with improved intelligence on Iran's nuclear plans.

Fourth, a long-held Israeli dream is to create an economic link between oil-rich Kurdish Iraq and Israel itself, with the ultimate aim of a Mosul-Haifa oil pipeline through pliant Jordan.

Thus, from an Israeli perspective recent developments in Iraq are positive, especially as they show little sign of facilitating Israel’s real worry: a strong independent federal democracy in Iraq. This is also good news for the pro-Israeli neo-conservative elements in Washington.

From Iranian and Arab regional viewpoints, things look very different. For Iran, increasing Israeli involvement on its border will tend to strengthen the more hardline theocratic elements, and is likely to encourage Iran to intensify its efforts to acquire a nuclear deterrent. It may also increase Iranian attempts to influence events among Iraq’s Shia community.

For Arab public opinion, the Israeli-Kurdish link in Iraq confirms with even greater force its view that the pattern of recent developments is at root an Israeli-American plan to dominate the region, with the Arab world’s oil resources a key prize.

What of the al-Qaida consortium in all this? In addition to the 145,000 American troops projected to remain in Iraq for years to come, it is now presented with direct Israeli activity as well. It is difficult to imagine a greater “gift” in terms of future recruitment to its cause.

http://www.opendemocracy.net/themes/article-2-2000.jsp