Foreign Correspondence

[Amaunet]

Al-Sadr's Success a Product of Washington's Policies

23 June, 2004

From the early days of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, insurgents launched guerrilla-style attacks against U.S.-led forces. In these first weeks of the insurgency, the Iraqi population offered marginal support to the guerrilla movement, since it was new and unknown. As the occupation wore on, the insurgents gained more support due to the popular anger held by much of Iraq's population over the instability brought by U.S.-led forces. Nevertheless, the insurgency still lacked a central unifying figure for disenfranchised and marginalized Iraqis to gravitate towards. This vacuum has now been partially filled by the young Shi'a leader, Moqtada al-Sadr.

Al-Sadr, who is said to be about 31 years old, is the son of respected Shi'a cleric Mohamed Sadeq al-Sadr, who was assassinated by Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party in 1999 due to his outspoken criticism of its policies. The rest of al-Sadr's family -- including his two older brothers and a well-known uncle -- were also murdered by Ba'ath Party operatives.

Despite his family connections, al-Sadr never quite had the popularity or respect required to make him an important leader. His power resonated from his private militia known as the Mehdi Army. Shortly after the invasion, al-Sadr and his militia recognized the power vacuum that had been created and quickly went into action by supplying food and essential supplies to Iraqis suffering the hardships of war.

But it was his public, charismatic and outspoken defiance of the U.S.-led occupation that earned him the most support. Up until al-Sadr's blunt criticism of U.S. policies, none of Iraq's other prominent leaders would risk speaking out against Washington. Fearing that such action would cause the U.S. to silence them, or marginalize them from power, these leaders remained relatively neutral, deciding that the best way to achieve their interests was through cooperation and sacrifice with Washington.

Al-Sadr, on the other hand, dismissed such concern with a wave of his hand, calling his militia into action and engaging in open warfare with U.S.-led forces. His outspoken rhetoric can be summed up in a statement released on his website after he launched his uprising: "If our patience is exhausted, we will turn into powerful volcanoes of anger that will not leave any of the infidel occupier's soldiers safe." The size and dedication of al-Sadr's militia caught U.S. military leaders off-guard, and al-Sadr managed to bring an unacceptable level of casualties to U.S.-led forces, raising domestic alarm back in the United States.

Al-Sadr's intransigence continued, and the failure of Washington to appropriately isolate him among the Iraqi population made it difficult to stunt his growing power. His bold actions spoke to the popular anger held by many Iraqis over the failure of the U.S. to stabilize Iraq. After his April uprising, al-Sadr's popularity quickly surged, making it unwise for U.S. forces to eliminate him from the power equation.

Indeed, now al-Sadr represents a whole movement, and he has the sympathy of a large swath of the Iraqi population. For example, in May the Coalition Provisional Authority conducted a poll of Iraqis' attitudes toward al-Sadr. They found that 81 percent of those surveyed looked more favorably upon al-Sadr after his uprising than they did before.

This has made him politically untouchable, which explains why the U.S. has been negotiating with him rather than assassinating or arresting him. Furthermore, the failure of other prominent Shi'a leaders, such as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, to condemn al-Sadr has also worked to his advantage.

Now, after earning the necessary amount of popularity to turn him into a major actor in Iraqi politics, al-Sadr has said he will call his militia home and instead join the political process. "Each of the individuals of the Mehdi Army, the loyalists who made sacrifices … should return to their governorates to do their duty," ordered a statement released by al-Sadr.

It is likely that al-Sadr's decision to enter the Iraqi political process will bear fruit since he is presently one of the most popular figures in Iraq. Because of this, Washington has been forced to sit on its hands for the moment and accept his political gestures even though he is still technically wanted on murder charges. Indeed, Washington earlier vowed to "capture or kill" al-Sadr, but his popularity has forced the Bush administration to modify its threats, now saying that al-Sadr's fate will be decided by the new interim government.

Al-Sadr's success at turning himself into a force that must be contended with has brought impressive results. He now has instant credibility in Iraqi politics, which can be seen by the open invitation delivered to him to attend the July political conference to select a national council that will advise Iraq's interim government.

Fuad Maasum, the chairman of the committee in charge of organizing the conference, assured, "Moqtada al-Sadr has begun to transform his militia into a political organization, which is considered a positive step and his movement has roots in the country."

How far national leaders have been willing to go to accommodate al-Sadr is evident in the fact that they are already ignoring a decree just passed in Baghdad. The anti-militia decree prevents individuals from entering the political process unless they have been out of their militia for three years. Al-Sadr, who does not fit this profile, is being invited anyway, simply because not inviting him would keep him marginalized, which would lead him to continue his violent resistance against U.S.-led forces.

Therefore, ironically, al-Sadr is a threat to Washington's goals in Iraq, yet his power was indirectly delivered to him by that same force he is fighting against. Washington's attempts to marginalize and eliminate al-Sadr have taken too long, and any future action toward this end seriously risks turning him into a martyr that could ignite a powder keg of popular Shi'a resistance against U.S.-led forces.

Report Drafted By:
Erich Marquardt



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