Foreign Correspondence

[Amaunet]

Iran who is apparently picking up the same bad vibrations that I am getting is keen to expand their influence in Georgia where their ally Russia exerts considerable authority. However, I doubt if both Russia and Iran can override the control the United States has over Georgia.

-Am

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said on May 16 that Tehran “is ready to take more serious steps in frames of bilateral ties with Tbilisi in order to bolster peace and security in the region.”

Irna news agency reported that Iranian official hailed peaceful resolution of Adjara crisis and expressed support for Georgia’s territorial integrity.http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=6946


Will Russian Investment Win Georgia's Heart?
Tuesday, May 11, 2004. Page 8.

By Irakly Areshidze

Aslan Abashidze's long reign in the Georgian province of Adzharia was made possible by the continuous support of Moscow, which skillfully wielded the dictator to influence the political process in Georgia. President Vladimir Putin, who declined to back Abashidze against a rising tide of opposition, was therefore primarily responsible for bringing 13 years of tyranny in the Black Sea province to a peaceful end last week. Yet, by convincing Abashidze to resign, Putin has forfeited one of his most effective levers for altering the course of Georgia's domestic affairs.

The United States also helped Georgia to resolve the conflict by backing President Mikheil Saakashvili's demand for the restoration of Georgian sovereignty in Adzharia. By repeatedly calling for a peaceful solution to the conflict, Washington also helped to prevent the use of military force. During the actual crisis last week, however, senior U.S. officials were distracted by the prisoner abuse scandal in Iraq and paid scant attention to events in Georgia. The U.S. role in securing Abashidze's resignation should therefore not be overestimated.

Russia's leading role in resolving the crisis in Adzharia was similar to its role during the Rose Revolution last year. The administration of U.S. President George W. Bush actively promoted democratic elections in Georgia. This gave Saakashvili a strong impetus to launch popular demonstrations against fraud committed by the government during parliamentary elections last November.

When the opposition stormed parliament three weeks later, however, the situation was managed not by Washington, but by Moscow. Igor Ivanov, then foreign minister, arrived in Tbilisi to mediate between President Eduard Shevardnadze and Saakashvili, while the United States remained on the sidelines. Thus Ivanov served as midwife during the difficult birth of a new Georgian regime, even though the opposition was widely seen as pro-American.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia has been a focal point of the Russian-U.S. rivalry in the Caspian region. Moscow has consistently worked to weaken the Georgian state by stalling on troop withdrawal, aiding separatist regimes in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (so-called Southern Ossetia), fomenting a potential conflict in Dzhavakheti (a region largely populated by ethnic Armenians), and by supporting Abashidze. Moscow's goal has been to make Georgia dependent on Russia for its survival, as it has done with Belarus and Moldova.

For years the United States countered Russia's efforts, initially by pushing for the rapid construction of pipelines through Georgia to carry Caspian Sea oil and gas. Under George W. Bush, the United States took a more active role, launching a program to help Georgia upgrade its armed forces. Following the Prague summit in 2002, when NATO invited seven new members to join the alliance, Republicans in Washington began to insist that Georgia -- and the Caucasus as a whole -- be considered as a priority for future expansion. Their efforts will likely begin to bear fruit next month at the NATO summit in Istanbul.

Georgia now stands at a historic crossroads. It has the potential, along with Turkey and a democratic Iraq, to serve as a conduit for the advancement of U.S. interests in Central Asia and the Middle East, the region that will likely dominate U.S. foreign engagement for the first half of this century. For this to happen, Saakashvili's government must pursue real political and economic reforms, the United States must continue to support Georgia during its period of transition, and the Bush administration must at least partially implement its vision for the greater Middle East. Georgia would need to become an economically strong and politically stable member of NATO, much like the Baltic states, before it could realize its full potential in this scenario.

Such developments would be incompatible with Moscow's own policy in the Caucasus, of course. Analysts in Tbilisi are therefore debating whether Putin actually acknowledges Russia's defeat in the battle for the Caucasus and wants to build a new relationship with Georgia, or if he has merely changed his tactics in an effort to retain Georgia within Russia's sphere of influence.

At first glance, the events of last November and last week suggest that the United States and Russia have reached a compromise on Georgia, under which Washington would take the leading role in matters of strategic importance while Moscow would play a constructive but more limited role. The agreement on ending the U.S.-Russian rivalry in the Caucasus, reached by Bush and Putin during the Moscow summit in May 2002 appears to be working.

This optimistic appraisal may be premature, however. Saakashvili was hugely indebted to Putin for his rise to power, and Putin's removal of Abashidze has doubled that debt. Putin will undoubtedly use this newly gained influence to pursue Russia's traditional goals, though he may be changing his tactics.

A number of recent developments suggest that Moscow is now focused on keeping Tbilisi under its thumb by means of private sector investment into key sectors of the Georgian economy. Last year, Unified Energy Systems took control of electricity distribution in Tbilisi. Gazprom now seeks a similar monopoly in gas delivery. Neither move is motivated exclusively by profit. When Saakashvili visited Moscow in February, top Russian businessmen expressed a strong interest in pursuing ventures in various sectors of the Georgian economy. Given Putin's influence on the oligarchs, the Tbilisi media interpreted this interest as a sign that the Russian government is encouraging business to get involved in Georgia.

Investment in Georgia remains a risk, and more so recently as many foreign businesses have come under pressure from the authorities. Washington is therefore incapable of matching "private," politically driven Russian investment in the country.

In the meantime, Russian businesses could quickly dominate the weak Georgian economy with a relatively small injection of capital. It seems logical to assume that by taking control of the Georgian economy, Moscow hopes to influence the country's domestic and foreign policy. It is rumored that Russian money is behind the launch of a new television station in Tbilisi. If true, this would be the first clear sign of a Russian business in Georgia designed to serve a political purpose.

It is far from certain that this strategy will enable Moscow to stop Georgia from pursuing NATO membership and a closer relationship with the United States. So long as Washington keeps up the pressure on Moscow to remove its military bases from Georgia in a timely manner, continues to help strengthen the Georgian army and ensures that Georgia does not enter into a framework agreement with its northern neighbor, Russian investment in Georgia could indirectly advance U.S. interests in the country. Such investment will bolster the Georgian economy and improve living conditions. And a strong Georgia will be a more attractive ally for the United States and NATO.

Then again, a strong Georgia would also benefit Russia, plagued as it is by security concerns on its southern flank.


Irakly Areshidze, a political analyst and elections strategist based in Washington and Tbilisi, contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.


http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2004/05/11/006.html