Tuesday, March 18, 2008 3:42:01 PM
Radiation Detection Testing Underway at Two Foreign Sea Ports
Release Date: April 11, 2007
Money to be made
PDGT WAKE UP LOL
Interesting read -
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1176319613900.shtm
For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
Contact: 202-282-8010
NNSA Public Affairs, 202-586-7371
The departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Energy (DOE) announced today that operational testing is underway in Honduras and Pakistan to strengthen global supply chain security by scanning shipping containers for nuclear or radiological materials before they are allowed to depart for the United States. The tests represent the initial phase of the Secure Freight Initiative announced Dec. 7, 2006, which involves the deployment of nuclear detection devices to six foreign ports.
“Terrorists and criminals use global shipping networks, and we are deploying multiple layers of advanced technology to counter their tactics,” said Homeland Security Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson. “Secure Freight creates a global nuclear detection network with shippers, carriers and foreign allies, to head off the worst possible form of attack, a nuclear or dirty bomb on our soil. We are deeply grateful to the governments of Honduras and Pakistan, as well as our other Secure Freight Initiative partners, for their strong leadership on this effort.”
“As we continue our partnership with DHS and our international allies, we continue to strengthen our national security. It is through this important work at foreign ports that we improve the overall security of the global maritime shipping network and hinder terrorists from smuggling in a nuclear device or dangerous material into a U.S. port,” said Thomas D'Agostino, DOE National Nuclear Security Administration acting head. “By teaming up with DHS in this important effort, NNSA is helping to bring our extensive overseas nuclear security and detection expertise to strengthen a key layer of our national defense.”
Secure Freight Initiative testing in Puerto Cortes, Honduras, started on April 2, 2007. Tests in Port Qasim, Pakistan, the first port to participate in Secure Freight Initiative, began in March of this year. Four other Secure Freight Initiative ports are expected to initiate tests this year. They are: Southampton in the United Kingdom; Salalah in Oman; Port of Singapore; and the Gamman Terminal at Port Busan in Korea.
Data gathered from overseas scanning of U.S. bound containers will be transmitted in near real-time to U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officers working in overseas ports and to the National Targeting Center. The data will be combined with other risk assessment information to improve analysis, targeting and scrutiny of high-risk containers. All alarms from radiation detection equipment will be resolved locally, and protocols are being developed with host governments that may include instructing carriers not to load a container until the risk is fully resolved.
DHS and DOE, through its National Nuclear Security Administration, will contribute roughly $60 million to the Secure Freight Initiative for the installation of radiation detection devices and communications infrastructure that transmit data back to the United States. DOE will invest approximately $4 million in Puerto Cortes for detection devices and an integrated communications system that links new assets with existing equipment.
###
This page was last modified on April 11, 2007
Home Contact Us Site Map Privacy
Secure Freight Initiative: Vision and Operations Overview
Release Date: December 7, 2006
For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
Contact: 202-282-8010
I. Our Vision: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Energy (DOE), in cooperation with maritime industry and foreign government partners, are launching Phase I of the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) to deploy a globally integrated network of radiation detection and container imaging equipment to be operated in seaports worldwide. Our purpose is to prevent terrorists from using nuclear or other radiological materials to attack the global maritime supply chain or using cargo containers to bring the resources for such an attack to the United States.
Our plan is to deploy next-generation tools and integrated systems, along with other proven technologies, to scan maritime container cargo. Phase I of the Secure Freight Initiative will leverage the DOE Megaports Initiative, DHS Container Security Initiative, DHS domestic nuclear detection program, and recent test deployments of relevant technology.
Containers arriving at participating seaports overseas will be scanned with both non-intrusive radiographic imaging and passive radiation detection equipment placed at terminal arrival gates. Optical scanning technology will be used to identify containers and classify them by destination. Relay cargo — containers being moved from one ship to another — would also be inspected with such technology, as adapted in consultation with operators for the transshipment environment. The inspection tools will include the use of enhanced radiological detection technology, which DHS will also begin deploying domestically within the next year.
Sensor and image data gathered regarding containers inbound to the United States will be encrypted and transmitted near real-time to the National Targeting Center operated by DHS's Customs and Border Protection. There, these data will be combined with other available risk assessment data, such as currently required manifest submissions, to improve risk scoring and targeting of high-risk containers for further scrutiny overseas.
If the scanning data indicate concerns, the specific container will be inspected further, based upon appropriate response protocols established with the host government authorities. Participating host governments would have immediate access to all scanning data collected, including any scans conducted on non-U.S. bound containers. All alarms from the radiation detection equipment for any container will be resolved locally. For containers bound for the United States, this can include requesting the host government to open and inspect the container's contents or instructing carriers under existing regulations not to load the container until the risk is fully resolved. Any specific images or scanning data shared with private sector operators will be appropriately protected and restricted.
Our ultimate vision is to create a globally networked array of detection equipment that will be configured to enable real-time streaming of container images and radiological detection data to other countries engaged in maritime trade. This government-to-government data sharing will support stronger and more internationally harmonized risk reduction for global freight movement.
DHS and the DOE acknowledge the important role that will be played by terminal operating companies, ocean carriers and host governments. For Secure Freight to succeed, it must balance enhanced container security with an imperative to facilitate efficient global trade. Our private sector partners will provide indispensable operational experience needed to help strike the appropriate balance.
II. Initial Deployment. DHS and DOE will partner with international terminal operators, ocean carriers and host governments to deploy the equipment utilized in Phase I implementation. We expect to begin operations in this initial Phase of the program in approximately six foreign ports within eighteen months. Based on the lessons learned from the first Phase, a second Phase, with more extensive deployments, will follow.
Founding members of the Secure Freight Initiative include maritime terminal operators and ocean carriers who have pledged to support this effort at facilities they operate overseas. It is anticipated that the governments and ports participating in the initial deployment Phase will be drawn from those currently active in DHS's Container Security Initiative and/or DOE's Megaports Initiative.
III. Secure Freight Program Overview. The overall Secure Freight Initiative will have two core elements, the first of which is described here. In addition, DHS is actively preparing a complementary Secure Freight Initiative: a next-generation risk scoring capability to fuse certain existing, but not currently collected, data associated with a container's movement. Taken as a whole, the two-pronged Secure Freight Initiative will significantly strengthen maritime security and global non-proliferation efforts. Furthermore, its richer pool of container risk data will support more efficient recovery from any attack that might occur.
IV. Partnership Responsibilities. Our purpose in signing this document is to define what we want to accomplish and to lay out a path that immediately puts us to work on achieving these goals. The undersigned parties have mutually embraced the vision and operating framework described in this document.
A. U.S. Government. DHS will take the lead for this initiative, in partnership with DOE and the Department of State (DOS). Specifically:
DHS will establish a Secure Freight Program Office, headed by a director reporting directly to the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, to manage the program.
DHS, DOE and DOS will seek effective cooperation with host nations.
DHS and DOE will — at approximately six Phase 1 ports — collectively acquire and deploy passive radiation detection equipment, active non-intrusive imaging systems, and optical character recognition technology to identify containers and classify them by destination prior to loading. Operational details regarding these deployments will, in each case, be established through formal operating agreements among the relevant parties.
DHS will undertake to create a network system whereby Secure Freight scanning inspection data only for containers inbound to the United States will be isolated and transmitted to Customs and Border Protection's data center for analysis.
DHS will analyze the resulting data for the presence or suspected presence of threat materials and report any such concerns to the appropriate host government officials immediately.
DHS will provide terminal operators and ocean carriers appropriate and timely information to facilitate threat resolution.
DHS, DOE and DOS will work with host governments to establish protocols that ensure all radiation alarms are swiftly resolved by the host government at the port of detection.
DHS and DOE will evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency and overall success of the Phase 1 deployments in collaboration with terminal operators, ocean carriers, host governments and other stakeholders prior to the development of Phase 2 deployments.
B. Private Sector Partners. The maritime terminal operating companies, ocean carriers, and others signing below will support Phase I deployment of the Secure Freight Initiative. Subject to the terms of mutually agreeable operating agreements with DHS for Phase I, which will include the right to terminate participation by any party with 30 days written notice, participating terminal operators will:
Designate and make available international terminal facilities for initial deployments, in coordination with local governments and consistent with this operational framework and all applicable laws.
Develop procedures, in coordination with U.S. and host governments, for efficient, timely, and effective processing.
Facilitate container movements necessary for screening, bearing in mind the unique characteristics and resulting potential costs of transshipment ports.
Assign and support training of appropriate personnel.
Limit operational access to security-sensitive data and operations to authorized personnel only.
Cooperate in research, development and deployment efforts towards adaptable, scaleable and flexible systems to inspect maritime containers, consistent withSecure Freight's Phase I, described herein.
Secure Freight Initiative: A Coalition of Terminal Operators, Ocean Carriers, and Shippers Committed to Supply Chain Security
Ocean Carriers
Charles Diorio
Director of Government Affairs - World Shipping Council
William F. Rooney
Managing Director, American Headquarters - Hanjin Shipping
Eric Lawton Mensing
President, APL Maritime/VP Government Affairs APL Ltd.
Eugene K. Pentimonti
Senior Vice President, Government Relations - Maersk Inc.
Shippers
Barry O'Brien
Director, Global Trade and Customs - Hasbro Inc.
Leigh Arnold Schmid
Vice President, Limited Brands
William Tenney
Group Manager, Business Intelligence & International Supply Chain Security – Target
Scott P. Boylan
Senior Counsel, Director of Government Relations - GE Security
Theo W. Fletcher
Vice President, Import Compliance & Supply Chain Security – IBM
Robert Lee Culpepper
Vice President, Federal Government Relations - Wal Mart Stores, Inc.
Bryan W. Jacobs
Director, Government Relations -The Home Depot
Terminal Operators
Tony A. Scioscia
President, APM Terminals North America, Inc.
Michael Moore
Executive Vice President, DP World
Eric Lawton Mensing
President, APL Maritime/VP Government Affairs APL Ltd.
Gary D. Gilbert
Senior Vice President, Hutchison Port Holdings
###
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1165943729650.shtm
DHS will test radiation detectors on West Coast
By Josh Martin, Managing Editor
Published November 20th, 2007
The Department of Homeland Security has selected two West Coast ports to test implementation of a new nuclear detection regime. The program, to be managed by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, will provide maritime radiation detection capabilities for state and local authorities in Washington’s Puget Sound and California’s San Diego areas.
Known as the West Coast Maritime Radiation Detection Project, the three-year pilot program involves the development of a radiation detection architecture that reduces the risk of radiological and nuclear threats that could be transported illegally on recreational or small commercial vessels.
The pilot program, which is already underway in Puget Sound, will be conducted in close coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection.
The program marks the first major effort by the Department of Homeland Security to monitor small craft. According to a DHS spokesperson, small vessels include any watercraft that is less than 300 tons, including commercial fishing and recreational boats, yachts, tow boats and uninspected passenger ships.
Large commercial ships and yachts are already subject to checks under the 2002 Maritime Transportation Security Act. DNDO and other government agencies also have had for a long time nuclear and radiological detection systems installed at major container shipping facilities in several American ports, including Oakland, Los Angeles, Charleston and New York.
Earlier attempts to launch a program to inspect and monitor small craft in the Great Lakes region had prompted withering scorn from local elected officials who charged that such DHS inspections were, as one put it, "excessive, expensive and intrusive."
DNDO Director Vayl Oxford, responding in part to those complaints, pointed out that DHS must consider all threats to citizens and property. "The West Coast Maritime pilot program addresses a potential threat pathway in the maritime domain," he said. "This project reflects the priority that the department has placed on balancing risk against all potential threats."
DNDO anticipates investing roughly $10 million in the West Coast pilot program. The two designated ports will leverage existing federal grant funding to support small vessel radiation detection programs and the procurement of recommended equipment.
This represents a small fraction of the $2 billion DHS has invested in radiation detection systems, most of which have concentrated on containerized freight and airplane monitoring.
However, DNDO expects that this pilot program, if successful, will be expanded to many other ports and marinas around the country.
DNDO expects to deploy non-intrusive, passive detection sensors, such as human-portable radiation detection equipment, mobile sensors and fixed position detectors as part of the Maritime Radiation Detection Project. The goal of the program is to evaluate their efficacy and begin to facilitate the use of such radiation detection equipment by local authorities and maritime partners as part of their routine operations.
DNDO also will be working with maritime partners and local authorities in both areas to assess the geographic configurations of the ports to maximize detection and interdiction opportunities. Additional analyses for local partners will include a baseline survey of the existing radiological and nuclear detection architecture, a gap and risk assessment, and associated recommended actions to be developed in conjunction with maritime stakeholders. Maritime stakeholders will also receive guidance from DNDO on operational protocols, training, and exercises that support small vessel radiation detection capabilities.
However, critics point out that DNDO and the Transportation Security Administration have had mixed success in procuring effective radiation detection equipment. For example, when senior DHS officials recently gathered in Los Angeles to demonstrate yet another new, expensive machine that supposedly can detect nuclear material hidden in shipping containers, they boasted that the device was 95 percent accurate. However, independent appraisals were far less glowing. A government investigation by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the same machines were actually only 45 percent accurate on average (some accuracy ratings were as low as 17 percent). For marina operators and small craft owners, there may be greater concern over what substances can trigger a false positive, raising alarms that could prompt emergency response, complete with police and possible federal agents on heightened alert.
Efforts are now underway to develop a universal code to improve the accuracy of radiation detectors like those that will be tested in the Maritime Radiation Detection Project. Under an Academic Research Initiative grant recently awarded to a team of researchers at the University of California – Berkeley, sponsored by the National Science Foundation and DHS, a five-member team of scientists are examining ways to reduce the false positive incident rates in the next generation of detection technology.
The program, which could run five years and cost $7.1 million, has its work cut out for it. Common substances that can set off radiation detectors include camera lenses, vegetable produce and kitty litter.
Conducting inspections in marinas has also troubled local and national security officials, concerned that resulting congestion could itself raise safety concerns.
"The best time to interdict nuclear materials is at sea, or well removed from our borders," Bill Dunlop of the National Security Office explained.
DHS has also stressed conducting radiation monitoring and testing overseas. Earlier this year, the departments of homeland security and energy launched a test program in Honduras and Pakistan to strengthen global supply chain security by scanning shipping containers for nuclear or radiological materials before they are allowed to depart for the United States. The tests represent the initial phase of the Secure Freight Initiative announced Dec. 7, 2006, which involves the deployment of nuclear detection devices to six foreign ports. Secure Freight Initiative testing in Puerto Cortes, Honduras, started on April 2, 2007. Tests in Port Qasim, Pakistan, the first port to participate in Secure Freight Initiative, began last March. Four other Secure Freight Initiative ports are expected to initiate tests before year-end. They are Southampton in the United Kingdom; Salalah in Oman; Port of Singapore; and the Gamman Terminal at Port Busan in Korea. Members of Congress would prefer overseas inspections because they would eliminate potential disruptions (and voter ire) in their local constituencies.
But with domestic port and ship inspections inevitable, the Maritime Radiation Detection Project offers a way to develop a less intrusive and more accurate inspection regime.
http://gsnmagazine.live.netconcepts.com/cms/features/news-analysis/183.html
Release Date: April 11, 2007
Money to be made
PDGT WAKE UP LOL
Interesting read -
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1176319613900.shtm
For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
Contact: 202-282-8010
NNSA Public Affairs, 202-586-7371
The departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Energy (DOE) announced today that operational testing is underway in Honduras and Pakistan to strengthen global supply chain security by scanning shipping containers for nuclear or radiological materials before they are allowed to depart for the United States. The tests represent the initial phase of the Secure Freight Initiative announced Dec. 7, 2006, which involves the deployment of nuclear detection devices to six foreign ports.
“Terrorists and criminals use global shipping networks, and we are deploying multiple layers of advanced technology to counter their tactics,” said Homeland Security Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson. “Secure Freight creates a global nuclear detection network with shippers, carriers and foreign allies, to head off the worst possible form of attack, a nuclear or dirty bomb on our soil. We are deeply grateful to the governments of Honduras and Pakistan, as well as our other Secure Freight Initiative partners, for their strong leadership on this effort.”
“As we continue our partnership with DHS and our international allies, we continue to strengthen our national security. It is through this important work at foreign ports that we improve the overall security of the global maritime shipping network and hinder terrorists from smuggling in a nuclear device or dangerous material into a U.S. port,” said Thomas D'Agostino, DOE National Nuclear Security Administration acting head. “By teaming up with DHS in this important effort, NNSA is helping to bring our extensive overseas nuclear security and detection expertise to strengthen a key layer of our national defense.”
Secure Freight Initiative testing in Puerto Cortes, Honduras, started on April 2, 2007. Tests in Port Qasim, Pakistan, the first port to participate in Secure Freight Initiative, began in March of this year. Four other Secure Freight Initiative ports are expected to initiate tests this year. They are: Southampton in the United Kingdom; Salalah in Oman; Port of Singapore; and the Gamman Terminal at Port Busan in Korea.
Data gathered from overseas scanning of U.S. bound containers will be transmitted in near real-time to U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officers working in overseas ports and to the National Targeting Center. The data will be combined with other risk assessment information to improve analysis, targeting and scrutiny of high-risk containers. All alarms from radiation detection equipment will be resolved locally, and protocols are being developed with host governments that may include instructing carriers not to load a container until the risk is fully resolved.
DHS and DOE, through its National Nuclear Security Administration, will contribute roughly $60 million to the Secure Freight Initiative for the installation of radiation detection devices and communications infrastructure that transmit data back to the United States. DOE will invest approximately $4 million in Puerto Cortes for detection devices and an integrated communications system that links new assets with existing equipment.
###
This page was last modified on April 11, 2007
Home Contact Us Site Map Privacy
Secure Freight Initiative: Vision and Operations Overview
Release Date: December 7, 2006
For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
Contact: 202-282-8010
I. Our Vision: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Energy (DOE), in cooperation with maritime industry and foreign government partners, are launching Phase I of the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) to deploy a globally integrated network of radiation detection and container imaging equipment to be operated in seaports worldwide. Our purpose is to prevent terrorists from using nuclear or other radiological materials to attack the global maritime supply chain or using cargo containers to bring the resources for such an attack to the United States.
Our plan is to deploy next-generation tools and integrated systems, along with other proven technologies, to scan maritime container cargo. Phase I of the Secure Freight Initiative will leverage the DOE Megaports Initiative, DHS Container Security Initiative, DHS domestic nuclear detection program, and recent test deployments of relevant technology.
Containers arriving at participating seaports overseas will be scanned with both non-intrusive radiographic imaging and passive radiation detection equipment placed at terminal arrival gates. Optical scanning technology will be used to identify containers and classify them by destination. Relay cargo — containers being moved from one ship to another — would also be inspected with such technology, as adapted in consultation with operators for the transshipment environment. The inspection tools will include the use of enhanced radiological detection technology, which DHS will also begin deploying domestically within the next year.
Sensor and image data gathered regarding containers inbound to the United States will be encrypted and transmitted near real-time to the National Targeting Center operated by DHS's Customs and Border Protection. There, these data will be combined with other available risk assessment data, such as currently required manifest submissions, to improve risk scoring and targeting of high-risk containers for further scrutiny overseas.
If the scanning data indicate concerns, the specific container will be inspected further, based upon appropriate response protocols established with the host government authorities. Participating host governments would have immediate access to all scanning data collected, including any scans conducted on non-U.S. bound containers. All alarms from the radiation detection equipment for any container will be resolved locally. For containers bound for the United States, this can include requesting the host government to open and inspect the container's contents or instructing carriers under existing regulations not to load the container until the risk is fully resolved. Any specific images or scanning data shared with private sector operators will be appropriately protected and restricted.
Our ultimate vision is to create a globally networked array of detection equipment that will be configured to enable real-time streaming of container images and radiological detection data to other countries engaged in maritime trade. This government-to-government data sharing will support stronger and more internationally harmonized risk reduction for global freight movement.
DHS and the DOE acknowledge the important role that will be played by terminal operating companies, ocean carriers and host governments. For Secure Freight to succeed, it must balance enhanced container security with an imperative to facilitate efficient global trade. Our private sector partners will provide indispensable operational experience needed to help strike the appropriate balance.
II. Initial Deployment. DHS and DOE will partner with international terminal operators, ocean carriers and host governments to deploy the equipment utilized in Phase I implementation. We expect to begin operations in this initial Phase of the program in approximately six foreign ports within eighteen months. Based on the lessons learned from the first Phase, a second Phase, with more extensive deployments, will follow.
Founding members of the Secure Freight Initiative include maritime terminal operators and ocean carriers who have pledged to support this effort at facilities they operate overseas. It is anticipated that the governments and ports participating in the initial deployment Phase will be drawn from those currently active in DHS's Container Security Initiative and/or DOE's Megaports Initiative.
III. Secure Freight Program Overview. The overall Secure Freight Initiative will have two core elements, the first of which is described here. In addition, DHS is actively preparing a complementary Secure Freight Initiative: a next-generation risk scoring capability to fuse certain existing, but not currently collected, data associated with a container's movement. Taken as a whole, the two-pronged Secure Freight Initiative will significantly strengthen maritime security and global non-proliferation efforts. Furthermore, its richer pool of container risk data will support more efficient recovery from any attack that might occur.
IV. Partnership Responsibilities. Our purpose in signing this document is to define what we want to accomplish and to lay out a path that immediately puts us to work on achieving these goals. The undersigned parties have mutually embraced the vision and operating framework described in this document.
A. U.S. Government. DHS will take the lead for this initiative, in partnership with DOE and the Department of State (DOS). Specifically:
DHS will establish a Secure Freight Program Office, headed by a director reporting directly to the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, to manage the program.
DHS, DOE and DOS will seek effective cooperation with host nations.
DHS and DOE will — at approximately six Phase 1 ports — collectively acquire and deploy passive radiation detection equipment, active non-intrusive imaging systems, and optical character recognition technology to identify containers and classify them by destination prior to loading. Operational details regarding these deployments will, in each case, be established through formal operating agreements among the relevant parties.
DHS will undertake to create a network system whereby Secure Freight scanning inspection data only for containers inbound to the United States will be isolated and transmitted to Customs and Border Protection's data center for analysis.
DHS will analyze the resulting data for the presence or suspected presence of threat materials and report any such concerns to the appropriate host government officials immediately.
DHS will provide terminal operators and ocean carriers appropriate and timely information to facilitate threat resolution.
DHS, DOE and DOS will work with host governments to establish protocols that ensure all radiation alarms are swiftly resolved by the host government at the port of detection.
DHS and DOE will evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency and overall success of the Phase 1 deployments in collaboration with terminal operators, ocean carriers, host governments and other stakeholders prior to the development of Phase 2 deployments.
B. Private Sector Partners. The maritime terminal operating companies, ocean carriers, and others signing below will support Phase I deployment of the Secure Freight Initiative. Subject to the terms of mutually agreeable operating agreements with DHS for Phase I, which will include the right to terminate participation by any party with 30 days written notice, participating terminal operators will:
Designate and make available international terminal facilities for initial deployments, in coordination with local governments and consistent with this operational framework and all applicable laws.
Develop procedures, in coordination with U.S. and host governments, for efficient, timely, and effective processing.
Facilitate container movements necessary for screening, bearing in mind the unique characteristics and resulting potential costs of transshipment ports.
Assign and support training of appropriate personnel.
Limit operational access to security-sensitive data and operations to authorized personnel only.
Cooperate in research, development and deployment efforts towards adaptable, scaleable and flexible systems to inspect maritime containers, consistent withSecure Freight's Phase I, described herein.
Secure Freight Initiative: A Coalition of Terminal Operators, Ocean Carriers, and Shippers Committed to Supply Chain Security
Ocean Carriers
Charles Diorio
Director of Government Affairs - World Shipping Council
William F. Rooney
Managing Director, American Headquarters - Hanjin Shipping
Eric Lawton Mensing
President, APL Maritime/VP Government Affairs APL Ltd.
Eugene K. Pentimonti
Senior Vice President, Government Relations - Maersk Inc.
Shippers
Barry O'Brien
Director, Global Trade and Customs - Hasbro Inc.
Leigh Arnold Schmid
Vice President, Limited Brands
William Tenney
Group Manager, Business Intelligence & International Supply Chain Security – Target
Scott P. Boylan
Senior Counsel, Director of Government Relations - GE Security
Theo W. Fletcher
Vice President, Import Compliance & Supply Chain Security – IBM
Robert Lee Culpepper
Vice President, Federal Government Relations - Wal Mart Stores, Inc.
Bryan W. Jacobs
Director, Government Relations -The Home Depot
Terminal Operators
Tony A. Scioscia
President, APM Terminals North America, Inc.
Michael Moore
Executive Vice President, DP World
Eric Lawton Mensing
President, APL Maritime/VP Government Affairs APL Ltd.
Gary D. Gilbert
Senior Vice President, Hutchison Port Holdings
###
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1165943729650.shtm
DHS will test radiation detectors on West Coast
By Josh Martin, Managing Editor
Published November 20th, 2007
The Department of Homeland Security has selected two West Coast ports to test implementation of a new nuclear detection regime. The program, to be managed by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, will provide maritime radiation detection capabilities for state and local authorities in Washington’s Puget Sound and California’s San Diego areas.
Known as the West Coast Maritime Radiation Detection Project, the three-year pilot program involves the development of a radiation detection architecture that reduces the risk of radiological and nuclear threats that could be transported illegally on recreational or small commercial vessels.
The pilot program, which is already underway in Puget Sound, will be conducted in close coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection.
The program marks the first major effort by the Department of Homeland Security to monitor small craft. According to a DHS spokesperson, small vessels include any watercraft that is less than 300 tons, including commercial fishing and recreational boats, yachts, tow boats and uninspected passenger ships.
Large commercial ships and yachts are already subject to checks under the 2002 Maritime Transportation Security Act. DNDO and other government agencies also have had for a long time nuclear and radiological detection systems installed at major container shipping facilities in several American ports, including Oakland, Los Angeles, Charleston and New York.
Earlier attempts to launch a program to inspect and monitor small craft in the Great Lakes region had prompted withering scorn from local elected officials who charged that such DHS inspections were, as one put it, "excessive, expensive and intrusive."
DNDO Director Vayl Oxford, responding in part to those complaints, pointed out that DHS must consider all threats to citizens and property. "The West Coast Maritime pilot program addresses a potential threat pathway in the maritime domain," he said. "This project reflects the priority that the department has placed on balancing risk against all potential threats."
DNDO anticipates investing roughly $10 million in the West Coast pilot program. The two designated ports will leverage existing federal grant funding to support small vessel radiation detection programs and the procurement of recommended equipment.
This represents a small fraction of the $2 billion DHS has invested in radiation detection systems, most of which have concentrated on containerized freight and airplane monitoring.
However, DNDO expects that this pilot program, if successful, will be expanded to many other ports and marinas around the country.
DNDO expects to deploy non-intrusive, passive detection sensors, such as human-portable radiation detection equipment, mobile sensors and fixed position detectors as part of the Maritime Radiation Detection Project. The goal of the program is to evaluate their efficacy and begin to facilitate the use of such radiation detection equipment by local authorities and maritime partners as part of their routine operations.
DNDO also will be working with maritime partners and local authorities in both areas to assess the geographic configurations of the ports to maximize detection and interdiction opportunities. Additional analyses for local partners will include a baseline survey of the existing radiological and nuclear detection architecture, a gap and risk assessment, and associated recommended actions to be developed in conjunction with maritime stakeholders. Maritime stakeholders will also receive guidance from DNDO on operational protocols, training, and exercises that support small vessel radiation detection capabilities.
However, critics point out that DNDO and the Transportation Security Administration have had mixed success in procuring effective radiation detection equipment. For example, when senior DHS officials recently gathered in Los Angeles to demonstrate yet another new, expensive machine that supposedly can detect nuclear material hidden in shipping containers, they boasted that the device was 95 percent accurate. However, independent appraisals were far less glowing. A government investigation by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the same machines were actually only 45 percent accurate on average (some accuracy ratings were as low as 17 percent). For marina operators and small craft owners, there may be greater concern over what substances can trigger a false positive, raising alarms that could prompt emergency response, complete with police and possible federal agents on heightened alert.
Efforts are now underway to develop a universal code to improve the accuracy of radiation detectors like those that will be tested in the Maritime Radiation Detection Project. Under an Academic Research Initiative grant recently awarded to a team of researchers at the University of California – Berkeley, sponsored by the National Science Foundation and DHS, a five-member team of scientists are examining ways to reduce the false positive incident rates in the next generation of detection technology.
The program, which could run five years and cost $7.1 million, has its work cut out for it. Common substances that can set off radiation detectors include camera lenses, vegetable produce and kitty litter.
Conducting inspections in marinas has also troubled local and national security officials, concerned that resulting congestion could itself raise safety concerns.
"The best time to interdict nuclear materials is at sea, or well removed from our borders," Bill Dunlop of the National Security Office explained.
DHS has also stressed conducting radiation monitoring and testing overseas. Earlier this year, the departments of homeland security and energy launched a test program in Honduras and Pakistan to strengthen global supply chain security by scanning shipping containers for nuclear or radiological materials before they are allowed to depart for the United States. The tests represent the initial phase of the Secure Freight Initiative announced Dec. 7, 2006, which involves the deployment of nuclear detection devices to six foreign ports. Secure Freight Initiative testing in Puerto Cortes, Honduras, started on April 2, 2007. Tests in Port Qasim, Pakistan, the first port to participate in Secure Freight Initiative, began last March. Four other Secure Freight Initiative ports are expected to initiate tests before year-end. They are Southampton in the United Kingdom; Salalah in Oman; Port of Singapore; and the Gamman Terminal at Port Busan in Korea. Members of Congress would prefer overseas inspections because they would eliminate potential disruptions (and voter ire) in their local constituencies.
But with domestic port and ship inspections inevitable, the Maritime Radiation Detection Project offers a way to develop a less intrusive and more accurate inspection regime.
http://gsnmagazine.live.netconcepts.com/cms/features/news-analysis/183.html
ALL POST ARE IMO - AT THE TIME OF POSTING
Do your own DD.
News/ Info is always changing -
What is New is Old real fast
GL
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