American Fusion Inc (AMFN)

[tdbowieknife]

It's very obvious AMFN is a scam. Nothing from these cons but smoke and mirrors... Regulators don’t try to prove the tech is fake... they force the issuer to prove it’s real. As investors should have been doing all along. Asking for Hawkins for proof rather than pump bait.

The time will come when regulators demand the underlying technical evidence. Examiners start with a simple request.

“Provide the data supporting the claims.”

For Texatron, that means they would demand things like this...

plasma temperature measurements
confinement time data
fusion reaction diagnostics
neutron/charged-particle counts
engineering drawings
test logs
prototype photos
independent lab validation
regulatory filings (NRC, DOE, state radiation authorities)

None of this exists.
The moment the issuer cannot produce it, the claims become unsubstantiated promotional statements, a violation on its own.

Every independent real fusion expert will say the same thing and regulators do not need to be physicists... They use subject-matter experts (DOE, NRC, national labs, university plasma physicists) to answer one question: “Are these claims physically plausible?”

Texatron claims:

aneutronic D–He³ fusion
no neutron shielding
no high-temperature materials
no bremsstrahlung losses
no confinement disclosures
commercial deployment
Check for a prototype
FINRA will ask:

“Where is the device? Show it to us.”

They will request:

site visit
photos
serial numbers
facility lease
equipment invoices
safety logs
radiation monitoring logs

Texatron has:

no facility
no reactor
no equipment
no NRC filings
no radiation logs

This is fatal.

Verify regulatory filings...
A fusion reactor, even a prototype leaves a regulatory trail.

They will check:

NRC licensing database
state radiation control offices
DOE fusion program records
environmental filings
utility interconnection filings

Texatron has zero.

If the issuer claimed, “we applied for licenses,” and they did... They will try to verify.

If no application exists, that becomes material misrepresentation and I have already proven that claim false with links for you all to see for yourself.


Examples of state-licensed (not NRC-licensed) fusion R&D:




No Federal NRC or Agreement State nuclear licenses exist for RNWF or Kepler Fusion Technologies.

https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams


Nothing for Texas either...

An Agreement State license (if the device is below federal thresholds)

Kepler has neither.

https://www.dshs.texas.gov/texas-radiation-control

This means they cannot legally build, test, or operate a fusion prototype anywhere in the U.S.
They cannot legally possess tritium or other regulated isotopes.
They cannot legally operate radiation-producing equipment.

They also don't even have a (Source Materials License). Let alone a Nuclear Operators License.

https://www.nrc.gov/sites/default/files/doc_library/cdn/legacy/reading-rm/adams/docket40.pdf

Or a (Special Nuclear Materials License)

https://www.nrc.gov/sites/default/files/doc_library/cdn/legacy/reading-rm/adams/docket40.pdf

https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/help-reference#ListofLicenses


Big difference between what they PR and note in the Form 10... PR's say they we have a working 5MW prototype. Form 10 makes NO mention of that. They actually say they Don't have one, and have a million miles to go, and need to spend a shit ton of money to try, and that there are ALL kinds of things that could go wrong and NOT work! And... NO mention they applied for any licensing. Everything I posted is correct. Hawkins is a BIG FAT LIAR!! Lol... These Guys have not fused ANYTHING EVER!! The Texatron is a big fat scam!!.

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT RISKS

An investment in our common stock involves substantial risks. The most significant risks include: our pre-revenue, development-stage status with no operating history in fusion energy; the unproven nature of the Texatron™ platform and risk that we may never achieve net-positive energy or commercial viability; substantial capital requirements and potential going concern issues; extensive regulatory hurdles (DOE, NRC, EPA); intense competition in the fusion sector; and risks related to our common stock (e.g., volatility, limited liquidity on OTC Markets). See “Item 1A. Risk Factors” for a more detailed discussion of these and other risks.

We are a development-stage company with a history of losses and no revenue, and we may never achieve profitability.

We are a pre-revenue, development-stage company focused on fusion energy technology. Since our inception in 1947, we have undergone multiple business transformations, including periods of limited operations and reporting suspensions. The Company reported net losses of $255,333 and $773,994 for the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024, respectively. As of December 31, 2025 and 2024, the Company had accumulated deficits of $20,356,048 and $20,100,715, respectively. Our operations have been funded primarily through equity issuances and related-party loans, and we have no history of generating revenue from our Texatron™ platform or any other product. We expect to continue incurring significant losses as we advance R&D, prototype testing, and commercialization efforts. If we fail to achieve technological milestones, such as demonstrating a 100 MW Texatron™ system by the end of 2026, or secure additional financing (including our planned $50 million raise in 2026), we may be unable to continue as a going concern. Our independent auditors may issue a qualified opinion on our financial statements if substantial doubt exists about our ability to continue operations.

Our fusion technology is unproven and may never achieve commercial viability.

The Texatron™ platform relies on pulsed magneto-inertial fusion using aneutronic fuels like deuterium-helium-3 (D–He³), which requires higher plasma temperatures than traditional deuterium-tritium systems. We have not yet achieved net-positive energy fusion, sustained reactions, or grid-scale power generation. Proof-of-principle experiments, such as our Version 9 prototype in Midland, Texas, have demonstrated stable plasma formation at sub-fusion temperatures, but scaling to fusion-relevant conditions involves significant uncertainties, including plasma instability, MHD disruptions, material degradation from charged particles, and efficient direct energy conversion. If we cannot overcome these technical challenges, our technology may fail, rendering our IP and investments worthless.

We depend on successful R&D and prototype testing, which are inherently uncertain and costly.

Our success hinges on advancing the Texatron™ through milestones like third-party IP valuation, audited financials, and a 100 MW demonstration by end-2026. R&D expenses are expected to increase substantially, and unforeseen issues (e.g., component failures, data anomalies, or safety incidents) could delay progress. We have limited resources and may not attract or retain specialized talent in plasma physics, materials science, or engineering. Past experiments validate core concepts, but full-scale testing may reveal flaws, leading to redesigns, cost overruns, or abandonment.

Our aneutronic fusion approach involves unique risks, including fuel supply challenges.

While D–He³ fusion offers benefits like reduced neutron damage and minimal waste, it requires rare helium-3, which is scarce on Earth and primarily sourced from lunar regolith or tritium decay. Supply disruptions, geopolitical issues, or price volatility could hinder development. Alternative fuels may not perform as expected, and our direct energy conversion methods remain experimental, potentially resulting in lower efficiency or system failures.

Our pulsed operation model may introduce additional engineering complexities and failure modes.

The Texatron™'s cyclic pulsed design, involving rapid compression and dissipation, could lead to fatigue in magnetic coils, vacuum systems, or structural components over repeated cycles. Unanticipated wear or synchronization errors in pulse timing may cause system failures, increasing maintenance costs and delaying commercialization.

We may not achieve the projected efficiencies or cost reductions from our modular design.

Our Texatron™ is designed for modular scaling (1 MW to 500 MW), but manufacturing complexities, integration issues, or unforeseen economies of scale limitations could result in higher-than-expected costs per unit. If modular deployment does not yield the anticipated reductions in construction time or expenses, our Power-as-a-Service model may not be competitive.

Our IP development timeline may not be achieved, exposing us to competitive risks.

We plan to file at least 250 additional patent applications by the end of 2026, but delays in drafting, prosecution, or approvals could leave our technology unprotected. If competitors file similar patents first or challenge ours, we may lose market advantage or face infringement claims.

We depend on third-party validations and partnerships for key milestones.

Our development timeline includes third-party valuation of our intellectual property and potential collaborations (e.g., for data center pilots or university research). If these validations are unfavorable or partnerships fail to materialize, it could delay financing, erode investor confidence, or require us to seek alternatives at higher cost.

Our reliance on aneutronic fusion may limit our ability to achieve net-positive energy in the near term.

Aneutronic D–He³ fusion requires significantly higher plasma temperatures and densities than deuterium-tritium systems, which have themselves not yet achieved sustained net-positive energy at scale. If we cannot reach these conditions efficiently within our pulsed architecture, our timeline for commercialization could be substantially delayed or our technology may prove commercially unviable.

We may experience material delays or failures in prototype scaling and testing.

Our current Version 9 prototype testing in Midland, Texas, is at sub-fusion temperatures. Scaling to higher power outputs (e.g., 100 MW demonstration by end-2026) involves increased magnetic field strengths, energy inputs, and material stresses that could reveal unforeseen instabilities, component failures, or safety issues, requiring iterative redesigns and additional capital.

Our direct energy conversion technology is experimental and may not achieve expected efficiencies.

While charged particle output from aneutronic reactions theoretically enables direct electrical generation without thermal cycles, practical implementation (e.g., magnetic field pressure capture) remains unproven at scale. Lower-than-expected conversion efficiency could make our systems uneconomic compared to conventional generation.

We face risks associated with fuel sourcing and availability.

Helium-3 is extremely rare on Earth and expensive to produce or extract. Any disruption in supply (e.g., from tritium decay sources or future lunar mining concepts) or significant price increases could impair our ability to conduct experiments or deploy systems, forcing reliance on alternative fuels with inferior characteristics.

Safety incidents involving our prototypes could result in significant liability or reputational harm.

High-energy plasma, strong magnetic fields, and pulsed power systems pose risks of electrical hazards, implosions, or radiation exposure (even if minimal in aneutronic systems). Any incident could lead to injuries, regulatory shutdowns, litigation, or negative publicity, delaying development and harming investor confidence.

We may not achieve the anticipated benefits of direct energy conversion.

Our reliance on charged particle output for direct electrical generation is experimental and may yield lower efficiencies than projected due to magnetic field losses or particle scattering. If thermal cycles become necessary as a fallback, this could increase system complexity, costs, and environmental footprint, undermining our competitive advantage.

Regulatory and Environmental Risks

We are subject to extensive government regulations, and failure to obtain approvals could prevent commercialization.

Fusion development requires approvals from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), including export controls under the Atomic Energy Act. Our Texatron™ may need NRC licensing for demonstration plants, environmental impact assessments, and compliance with IAEA standards for international expansion. Regulatory processes are lengthy (potentially years), uncertain, and evolving—changes in fusion guidelines or policy (e.g., under the ADVANCE Act) could delay us. Non-compliance risks fines, shutdowns, or bans.

Environmental, health, and safety risks could impact operations and public perception.

Although aneutronic fusion produces minimal radiation, our prototypes involve high-energy plasma and magnetic fields, posing risks of electromagnetic interference, material failures, or accidents. Public opposition to nuclear technologies (including fusion) could lead to protests, litigation, or permitting denials. Climate-related regulations (e.g., IRA incentives) may benefit us but could change unfavorably.

Fusion-specific regulatory frameworks are evolving and uncertain.

The NRC and DOE have limited precedent for regulating commercial fusion (as opposed to fission). Emerging guidelines (e.g., under the ADVANCE Act or DOE fusion programs) could impose unexpected requirements, timelines, or costs. Changes in federal fusion policy or funding priorities could adversely affect us.

We may be subject to export control and national security restrictions.

Our technology involves sensitive plasma physics and magnetic confinement know-how that may be classified as dual-use or subject to ITAR/EAR export controls. Restrictions on international collaboration, sales, or technology transfer could limit our global deployment strategy.

Environmental permitting and public opposition could delay or prevent deployments.

Even with low radiation output, siting Texatron™ units near customers (e.g., data centers) may require environmental impact statements under NEPA. Public or community opposition to fusion (due to nuclear associations) could result in local zoning denials or delays.

All right here in the Form 10... They have been LYING to you all...

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/96664/000107997326000298/rnwf-form10.htm


More to back up the Texatron is a scam...

Here it is in this Video... Brent Nelson LYING!!

@ 8:16



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He also claimed to have filed licensing applications with Texas like 3 weeks ago now that cannot be found

@ 7:53




https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bkqxP9Uljlw


More...

Folks... It a scam. These guys are nowhere near building one of these things. They have nothing to show it would even actually work. Or is economically feasible.

1. Core concept: pulsed, toroidal, aneutronic D–He³
Claim: Texatron is a pulsed fusion system using a toroidal geometry and an aneutronic D–He³ fuel cycle, with direct electric conversion and low activation.

Physics reality:

D–He³ fusion is real, but its peak cross-section is much smaller and at much higher ion temperatures than D–T—on the order of ~100 keV vs ~10–20 keV
.

At those temperatures, bremsstrahlung and other radiation losses are severe; achieving net gain is substantially harder than for D–T.

A pulsed toroidal magneto-inertial concept is not impossible in principle, but it sits in a very speculative regime: you need both strong magnetic confinement and rapid compression, with exquisite control of instabilities and timing.

Direct answer: the fuel choice and geometry are not “wrong physics”, but they are far beyond demonstrated confinement and gain regimes.

2. Aneutronic marketing vs actual neutron realityClaim:

Texatron is framed as “aneutronic,” low-waste, low-activation, with minimal neutron issues compared to conventional fusion.

Reality check:

Even in a D–He³ system, side reactions (notably D–D) produce neutrons, especially at the very high temperatures needed for D–He³ to burn effectively.

At realistic operating conditions, you do not get a clean, neutron-free system; you get reduced neutron flux, not its elimination.

Materials, shielding, and activation challenges remain—just somewhat mitigated relative to D–T.

So the “aneutronic” branding is exaggerated; it’s a directional improvement, not a categorical shift to neutron-free fusion.

3. Direct energy conversion claims
Claim: Because D–He³ produces charged fusion products, Texatron can use direct electric conversion to achieve high system efficiency.

Physics reality:

In principle, direct conversion of charged fusion products (e.g., via electrostatic or inductive schemes) is plausible and has been studied for decades.

In practice, you need:

Highly collimated, well-controlled product streams

Very low impurity and turbulence

Hardware that survives repeated pulsed loading and intense particle flux

No existing fusion program has demonstrated high-efficiency, reactor-scale direct conversion in a realistic environment.

So: not impossible in principle, but far from demonstrated, and the white paper almost certainly understates the engineering difficulty.

4. Pulsed operation and repetition rate

Claim: Texatron is a pulsed system engineered for commercial deployment, with a roadmap toward a 100-MW demonstration and modular scaling.

Key physics/engineering issues:

To reach 100 MW average electric output in a pulsed system, you need:

Either very high energy per pulse at modest repetition rate, or

High repetition rate with moderate pulse energy.

Each pulse must:

Achieve ignition or at least high gain

Maintain stability through compression and burn

Avoid destroying first-wall and coil structures via mechanical, thermal, and EM stresses

No current pulsed fusion concept (Z-pinch, magneto-inertial, etc.) is anywhere near commercial-duty repetition rates with net-electric gain.

The white paper’s framing of pulsed operation as a near-term commercial advantage is not supported by current experimental evidence.

5. Fuel cycle and He-3 availability

Claim: Texatron leverages a D–He³ fuel pathway as a core commercial feature.

Reality:

He-3 is extremely scarce and expensive under current production routes (mainly tritium decay from fission programs and small by-product streams).

Any commercial-scale D–He³ reactor fleet would require:

A massively expanded He-3 supply chain, or

In-reactor breeding schemes (e.g., via D–D ? T/He-3 and subsequent decay), which reintroduce neutrons and activation.

The white paper’s emphasis on D–He³ as a near-term commercial fuel is therefore economically and logistically implausible without a parallel, large-scale He-3 program.

So even if the physics worked, the fuel cycle is a major bottleneck that the marketing tone glosses over.

6. Timelines and “commercialization pathway:

Claim: The paper and press around it describe a clear commercialization roadmap, including a 100-MW demonstration and broader market entry around the current decade.

Context:

The global fusion ecosystem—tokamaks, stellarators, laser ICF, private startups—is still struggling to reach sustained net-electric gain even with D–T, the easiest fuel.

Moving to D–He³, pulsed operation, direct conversion, and a novel toroidal architecture simultaneously is a stack of unproven leaps, not an incremental extension of existing platforms.

A credible path would require:

Published experimental data on confinement, gain, and pulse repetition

Detailed engineering designs for coils, first wall, and power conversion

Transparent error bars and risk factors, not just a marketing-style roadmap.

Given that, the stated commercialization pathway and timelines are not credible from a physics-plus-engineering standpoint.

7. Overall physics assessment
The underlying ingredients—magneto-inertial flavor, toroidal geometry, D–He³, direct conversion—are not fantasy, but they are stacked at the hardest end of fusion parameter space.

The white paper appears to translate speculative, high-risk physics into a polished commercial narrative, with:

Overstated aneutronic benefits

Understated fuel and materials constraints

Aggressive, unjustified timelines for 100-MW-class deployment.

Look it up...

More...

Currently what is licensed today? And again, Kepler Fusion as no licensing.
Only small research devices and radioactive-material handling licenses exist — and almost all of them are issued by Agreement States, not the NRC and there have also have not been any fusion reactors at the stage of actually building one to produce power. Including Kepler Fusion and the Texatron. They haven't even begun to work out the engineering.



You guys don't even try....

Lol.

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Watch your wallet


Buyer Beware
Social Media Promoted Frontload Pump and Dump Share Selling Scam



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