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Tuesday, March 24, 2026 8:00:45 AM
Proposed Questions for USPTO Director John Squires’ March 25, 2026 Hearing https://krauseonpatents.substack.com/p/proposed-questions-for-uspto-director
long page, dont know if i got it all...........
Before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, Artificial Intelligence, and the Internet
Tom Krause
Mar 23, 2026
The House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, Artificial Intelligence, and the Internet will hold a hearing on March 25, 2026 with USPTO Director John Squires.
Below is a set of proposed questions for that hearing, which I will be sharing with Subcommittee staff. I am posting them here for broader access.
If you know individuals who may find these questions useful, please feel free to share this post. A pdf is provided at the end of this post.
Proposed Questions for the March 25, 2026 Hearing
Before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, Artificial Intelligence, and the Internet
Hearing with USPTO Director John Squires
Submitted by:
Thomas W. Krause
Former Solicitor and Director Review Executive, USPTO
Introduction
This document provides proposed questions for the Subcommittee’s March 25, 2026 hearing with USPTO Director John Squires.
The questions are organized by topic and are intended to assist Members in examining recent USPTO policies affecting inter partes review (IPR) proceedings, patent quality, and institutional governance.
An Appendix is included with links to relevant materials. It also serves as an index to the 19 topics addressed in the questions.
I encourage the Subcommittee to use Questions for the Record to obtain the Director’s answers to questions not addressed during the hearing.
1. Confirmation Commitments and Current Policy Direction
At your confirmation hearing you indicated that, before making major changes to PTAB practice, you would work with Congress and stakeholders to determine what reforms – if any – were appropriate. You also made clear that you did not intend to restrict access to IPRs, particularly where they serve to address abusive patent practices and questionable pharmaceutical patents.
Since then, the Office has adopted or proposed a series of policies – including “settled expectations,” non-transparent (“black-box”) institution determinations, the “one-and-done” rule, the stipulation requirement, and an “error correction” framing of IPRs – that significantly narrow access to IPRs.
Do you believe this overall policy direction is consistent with the commitments you made at your confirmation hearing? If so, please explain how.
Should the Subcommittee understand these initiatives as reflecting your considered judgment about the proper role and future of the PTAB?
To what extent, if any, were you involved in shaping or directing these policies before you assumed office?
What would you say to those who see these policies as moving sharply away from the role Congress envisioned for IPRs?
2. Congressional Role and the 2023 ANPRM
At this Subcommittee’s April 2023 hearing with the prior USPTO Director, many Members raised concerns about a pending ANPRM that would have used discretionary authority to reshape IPR practice, including increasing discretionary denials.
While views differed on the specific proposals, there was broad consensus that decisions of that magnitude – affecting access to IPRs – were ultimately for Congress to make, not the agency acting on its own.
Since then, the Office has implemented or advanced policies – including “settled expectations” and the “one-and-done” rule – that go much further than anything that was proposed in the ANPRM.
Do you believe § 314(a) gives the Director authority to make policy choices of that scale – effectively limiting access to IPRs – without additional direction from Congress?
Assuming such authority exists, what constraints should govern how a Director exercises it?
Is Congress’s intent in enacting the AIA relevant to how you should use your discretion?
If so, please explain how your current practices are consistent with your understanding of that intent.
How should Congress think about the risk that each new Director might take a completely different view of the purpose of IPRs, and reverse everything the previous Director had done?
3. Shift in the Basis for Discretionary Denial
Historically, the Office’s use of discretionary denial focused on the management of proceedings – including limiting the number of petitions and preventing duplication across USPTO and district court proceedings.
More recently, however, the Office has adopted doctrines that appear to turn not on the conduct or posture of a particular proceeding, but on characteristics of the patent itself – such as age, prior litigation history, or examination history. More recently still, you have issued guidance under which you’ll consider characteristics of the petitioner and the patent owner, including the size and manufacturing activity of the petitioner, and the manufacturing activity of the patent owner.
This appears to represent a shift from managing proceedings to determining which patents and parties may access the IPR system at all.
It seems reasonable and perhaps permissible for the Office to address procedural issues that Congress arguably recognized but did not fully address – such as abusive behavior by petitioners, or how to avoid having district courts and the USPTO decide the same issues at the same time.
But how does the Office justify using discretionary denial to effectively exclude whole categories of patents – such as older patents – from IPR review altogether, when Congress made IPR available for all patents?
Is there any indication in the AIA that Congress contemplated that the Director might exclude entire categories of patents from IPR review?
To the extent these policies were motivated by concerns that the PTAB was finding too many patents unpatentable, what evidence supports that concern?
Even assuming such concerns were valid, why not address them through other tools – such as training or your Director Review authority – rather than restricting access to IPR?
What is the limiting principle that prevents the Office from excluding additional categories of patents from IPR review?
For example, if the Office can deny review based on a patent’s age, what prevents it from doing so based on other characteristics – such as the patent’s subject matter or the identity of the patent owner?
4. “Settled Expectations”
Under the USPTO’s “settled expectations” doctrine, the USPTO will generally not institute an IPR if a patent is over six years old, and the USPTO has also invited patentees to make arguments as to why they have “settled expectations” that even younger patents won’t be challenged. Settled expectations is a far greater change than anything proposed in the agency’s 2023 ANPRM, which most Members of this Subcommittee thought was encroaching on Congress’s role. It also goes further than any of the various versions of the PREVAIL Act that have been introduced but not enacted over the past decade.
a. USPTO’s Role
Is it appropriate for the USPTO to implement a policy change of this magnitude while Congress is actively considering legislation in this area?
b. Statutory Consistency
Congress created IPRs as a more robust alternative to inter partes reexamination, which did not include a “settled expectations” limitation.
Do you believe the “settled expectations” doctrine is consistent with Congress’s intent in enacting the AIA? If so, how?
c. Policy Rationale
The term “settled expectations” typically refers to reliance interests that developed over time. But before this doctrine was introduced, patent owners had no reason to expect that older patents would be insulated from IPR review, while petitioners had every reason – based on years of PTAB practice – to expect that such patents would be reviewable.
How does the Office justify using the term “settled expectations” to describe a doctrine that creates new expectations rather than protecting settled ones?
What problem is the “settled expectations” doctrine intended to solve?
If the justification for “settled expectations” is that patent owners should have “quiet title” after a certain period of time, how do you reconcile that with the continued availability of district court challenges and ex parte reexamination for older patents?
d. Evidence and Analysis
35 U.S.C. § 316(b) requires the Office to consider the economic impact of its regulatory decisions. Although “settled expectations” was not adopted through rulemaking, and does not appear in any proposed rule, it has significant system-wide effects.
What empirical or economic analysis did the Office conduct before adopting this doctrine?
What evidence supports the conclusion that this policy improves innovation, competition, or patent quality?
e. Distributional Effects and Fairness
Does the Office have any data or analysis regarding which types of patent owners benefit most from the “settled expectations” doctrine – for example, operating companies versus entities that acquire patents on the secondary market?
Does the Office consider it appropriate if this doctrine has the practical effect of shielding patents held primarily for monetization or licensing, rather than to support products or technological development?
Was any consideration given to tailoring the doctrine – for example, excluding second-hand patents purchased before the doctrine was created – rather than applying it categorically?
At what point does protecting “settled expectations” risk creating a windfall for parties who acquired patents with no expectation of insulation from IPR review?
If evidence shows that “settled expectations” has contributed to increased litigation by foreign-owned non-practicing entities against U.S. operating companies, would you reconsider the doctrine?
5. Black Box Decision-Making / APA
On October 17, 2025, you announced that you would begin personally making all institution decisions, and that process was implemented shortly thereafter. Since then, you have issued hundreds of decisions, the vast majority consisting of one- or two-page orders that list dozens of cases by disposition category—most often discretionary denials.
This represents a significant departure from prior PTAB practice, where petitioners’ fees paid for institution decisions that typically included detailed explanations of the Board’s reasoning, including how specific discretionary factors were applied.
a. APA and Transparency
How does the current practice of issuing abbreviated or unexplained denials comply with 5 U.S.C. § 555(e), which requires a statement of the grounds for denial of a written application or petition?
What steps does the Office take to ensure that these decisions are based on consistent and permissible criteria, given the absence of articulated reasoning?
In the absence of written explanations, how can the public evaluate whether the Office is applying its policies in a reasoned and non-arbitrary manner?
b. Transparency
In the past, detailed institution decisions helped parties assess whether to seek rehearing and provided insight into how the Board viewed the merits of a case.
In the absence of articulated reasoning, how can parties or the public assess whether similarly situated cases are being treated consistently?
How are parties expected to evaluate or respond to decisions when the basis for those decisions is not explained?
Given the significant filing fees associated with IPRs, how is the Office ensuring that petitioners receive meaningful consideration of their arguments?
c. Resource Allocation and Fees
Approximately how much time do you spend, on average, on each institution decision under the current process?
How often do you disagree with the recommendations that you get regarding your institution decisions?
Do you believe current filing fees accurately reflect the level of analysis being performed?
Has the Office considered adjusting those fees to reflect the current process?
d. Consistency with USPTO Regulations
Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides that institution decisions are made by PTAB panels, typically consisting of three administrative patent judges.
How does the current practice – where the Director personally makes institution decisions – comply with the existing framework set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations?
e. GAO and Regulatory Framework
In December 2022, the Government Accountability Office found that PTAB adjudication raised concerns regarding independence from management and recommended that the USPTO clarify the respective roles of the Director and the Board through rulemaking.
The USPTO subsequently adopted regulations intended to ensure that PTAB panels issue decisions independently, with the Director serving a review function.
How does the current practice – where the Director personally decides institution in hundreds of cases – fit within the regulations that were added in response to the GAO report? (37 CFR §§ 42.75, 43.1-6)
Has the Office evaluated whether this approach is consistent with its prior representations to GAO and the public?
Has the Office provided any updates to GAO regarding these changes?
6. “One-and-Done” Rule (NPRM)
On October 17, 2025, the USPTO issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that would significantly restrict access to IPRs by barring a petitioner from filing a challenge if a prior challenge – brought by a different party – was unsuccessful in a non-final decision in another forum, such as a district court or the ITC.
This would represent a substantial departure from current practice, under which parties are generally permitted to bring their own challenges based on their own interests and evidence, subject to the statutory limits Congress enacted.
a. Statutory Authority and Analysis
The NPRM cites 35 U.S.C. § 316(b) as authority for this proposal, which requires the Office to consider the effect of its regulations on the economy.
What economic or empirical analysis did the Office conduct to assess the impact of this proposal on the economy?
b. Consistency with the AIA Framework
Congress designed IPRs to allow multiple parties to challenge potentially invalid patents, subject to party-specific statutory limits such as estoppel and time bars.
Do you believe that this proposal – effectively extending estoppel to unrelated parties – is consistent with Congress’s intent in enacting the AIA?
c. Practical Consequences
Many of the biggest patent assertion campaigns involve non-practicing entities suing multiple operating companies across an industry in patent-friendly courts. The one-and-done rule appears to provide a huge windfall to such entities, by immunizing their patents from further USPTO scrutiny after surviving a single challenge in a non-final decision in a different forum.
How does the Office justify that result as a matter of patent policy?
How does the Office account for the fact that different parties may have access to different prior art, different arguments, or different incentives to challenge a patent?
How would this rule affect industries in which the same patents are asserted repeatedly against multiple defendants over time?
d. Public Input and Next Steps
It has been reported that an overwhelming majority of comments submitted in response to the NPRM opposed the proposal.
How is the Office evaluating that feedback?
Have you submitted final rules for regulatory review, and if so, when?
Under what circumstances would the Office reconsider or withdraw the proposal?
7. Stipulation Requirement (NPRM)
The October 17 NPRM also proposes a stipulation requirement under which a petitioner, as a condition of institution, must agree not to pursue any § 102 or § 103 invalidity challenges in any other forum.
This would represent a significant change to current practice and would require petitioners to forgo defenses that are available in district court but not in IPRs.
a. Statutory Authority
In the AIA, Congress provided certain party-based estoppel provisions, but nothing like this.
Do you believe that this proposal is consistent with Congress’s intent in enacting the AIA? If so, how?
b. Practical Consequences
In many cases, the strongest invalidity evidence is not limited to patents or printed publications, but includes product prior art – evidence that a product embodying the claimed invention already existed.
Because IPRs are limited to patents and printed publications, how does the Office justify requiring petitioners to give up the ability to rely on product prior art in other forums?
c. System Design and Fairness
Is it appropriate for the Office to condition access to a statutory review proceeding on the surrender of rights that Congress chose to preserve in other forums?
d. Real-World Effects
What economic or empirical analysis has the Office conducted regarding the impact of this proposed rule?
e. Purpose
What would you say to those who contend that the sole purpose of this provision appears to be to discourage use of IPRs?
8. Prior Framework: Fintiv and Sotera
Under prior USPTO practice, discretionary denial was primarily justified as a tool to avoid duplicative proceedings between the PTAB and district courts, as reflected in the Fintiv framework.
At the same time, the Office recognized in the precedential Sotera decision that where a petitioner stipulates that it will not pursue invalidity arguments in district court that it raised or could have raised in the IPR, the concern about duplication is effectively eliminated, and institution is generally appropriate.
The Fintiv framework also recognized that district court judges often schedule multiple trials for the same date, and that a more reliable “trial date” for Fintiv purposes is one based on historical time to trial data.
That framework provided a clear principle: discretionary denial was tied to avoiding duplicative proceedings, and petitioners could take concrete steps – such as filing a Sotera stipulation – to ensure that their petitions would be heard on the merits.
Based on decisions the Office issued before you implemented “Black Box” procedure, it appears that the Fintiv analysis has changed to provide much greater weight to the district court’s scheduled trial date than before.
It also appears that Sotera stipulations no longer carry much weight, although the Office now appears to weigh the absence of a Sotera stipulation against the petitioner even when the trial date is far off.
So even within the Fintiv framework, the Office’s analysis appears to have changed. But none of this has been memorialized in clear guidance as to how the Fintiv analysis is now applied.
Do you believe the Office has clearly articulated how the Fintiv analysis is currently applied, including the role of Sotera stipulations? If so, where?
If not, how are parties expected to brief the issue?
9. “Error Correction” Framing of IPRs
Recent statements from USPTO leadership, including the Deputy Director, suggest that the Office is increasingly viewing IPRs as a mechanism primarily for correcting examiner error, rather than as a broader merits-based review of patent validity.
This appears to represent a shift from the framework Congress established in the AIA, which created IPRs as a mechanism to reassess patent validity based on the best available prior art, regardless of how the patent was originally examined.
a. Statutory Purpose
Do you believe that the primary purpose of IPRs is to correct examiner error, to reassess patentability on the merits, or something else?
Do you believe that Congress contemplated that a Director would use discretionary authority to limit IPRs to “error correction” cases?
b. Implications for Merits-Based Review
Does the Office plan to issue guidance on how the “error correction” framework interacts with the other discretionary denial doctrines?
How is the “error correction” framework applied alongside other doctrines like “settled expectations” or Fintiv?
If the petition would not be denied based on settled expectations, Fintiv, or any other discretionary denial doctrine, must it still satisfy an “error correction” threshold?
c. Tension with 35 USC § 325(d)
Historically, petitioners have generally avoided relying on prior art or arguments that were before the examiner, because doing so risked denial under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). As a result, the vast majority of petitions rely on different prior art than what was before the examiner during prosecution.
At the same time, the Office now suggests that IPRs should focus on correcting examiner error, which would often require revisiting that same art or identifying specific examination defects.
How are petitioners supposed to reconcile these two expectations?
Why should a petitioner who has identified stronger prior art than what was considered during examination be required to set that aside and instead attempt to identify errors in how the examiner evaluated the prior art that was before them?
d. Definition of “Examiner Error”
How does the Office define “examiner error” in this context?
Would the failure to identify the most relevant prior art during examination qualify as error?
If not, how should Congress understand the scope of cases that remain eligible for IPR review?
Is it appropriate for the Office to deny review of a potentially invalid patent simply because the petitioner cannot identify a specific “error” in the original examination?
e. System Design and Consequences
How does an “error correction” model of IPR align with Congress’s goal of improving patent quality across the system as a whole?
10. Real Party-in-Interest (RPI) Requirements
The Federal Circuit in Mayne Pharma made clear that the identification of real parties-in-interest (RPIs) is not a jurisdictional requirement under the AIA. The USPTO adopted that position in its precedential SharkNinja decision.
But you have removed SharkNinja’s precedential status and have designated Corning Optical – a case that pre-dated Mayne Pharma – as precedential. And the Office now appears to treat RPI identification as a threshold issue that can result in denial even where no statutory time bar is implicated.
a. Statutory Framework
Why is the Office treating RPI identification as effectively jurisdictional in practice, despite the Federal Circuit’s guidance?
Do you believe Congress expected the USPTO to deny institution based on RPI issues where there is no risk of a time bar under § 315(b)?
b. Practical Consequences
Why is the Office requiring parties to devote significant time and resources to litigating RPI disputes even where there is no potential time bar, estoppel, or conflict of interest raised?
Is the Office concerned about the growing burden and cost associated with litigating RPI as a threshold issue?
How does this focus on RPI disputes advance Congress’s goal of providing an efficient mechanism for resolving patent validity?
c. System Design and Priorities
What problem is the Office attempting to solve by elevating RPI disputes in this way?
If RPI identification does not affect the merits of patentability and does not implicate any statutory bar, why should it serve as a basis for denying review altogether?
11. Pattern of Expanding Doctrines Relating to Discretion
Several recent decisions raise a broader concern that the Office is applying, extending, or reinterpreting doctrines in ways that increasingly result in denial of IPR review – even where those doctrines have not historically been applied in that manner.
a. Assignor Estoppel
In the Government’s briefing in Minerva v. Hologic before the Supreme Court, the United States – including the USPTO – argued that there are many situations in which it would be inappropriate to prevent a previous assignor of a patent from challenging patent validity.
That position is consistent with Federal Circuit and PTAB precedential decisions holding that assignor estoppel is not a bar to IPR proceedings. The PTAB’s decision in Athena Automation, IPR2013-00290 remains precedential.
And yet, the Office has denied a petition on the basis of assignor estoppel with no examination of the underlying facts.
Is the Office now taking the position that assignor estoppel will categorically bar IPR petitions, notwithstanding its prior statements to the contrary, and without consideration of the underlying equities or merits?
Do you believe Congress contemplated that the USPTO might deny IPRs on the basis of assignor estoppel?
b. Termination of IPR After Unpatentability Finding
On Director Review in Interactive Communications v. Blackhawk, you concluded that the Board had abused its discretion in crediting an expert witness after finding that witness not credible on another issue.
However, rather than remanding for consideration of other grounds raised in the petition, you vacated the final written decision and terminated the IPR altogether – preventing further consideration of the petition and potentially avoiding appellate review of the merits.
Why did you choose to terminate the proceeding entirely, rather than remanding for consideration of the remaining grounds?
Do you believe Congress expected the Director to step in and vacate final written decisions by the PTAB and terminate the proceedings, even when there were outstanding issues to be addressed?
c. Application of “One-and-Done” Principles Outside Rulemaking
As we’ve discussed, the Office has proposed, through rulemaking, a “one-and-done” approach that would limit successive challenges to patents.
At the same time, you already seem to be applying one-and-done – for example, in a recent sua sponte Director Review decision, you deinstituted a petition based on an initial determination in an ITC proceeding involving different parties. (Sinclair v. Hydrafacial)
Do you agree that this is a fair characterization of your decision in Sinclair v. Hydrafacial?
In your current, non-transparent decision-making process, are you also applying “one-and-done” principles in individual cases, even before the completion of the rulemaking process?
If not, how could anybody know that?
And if so, what’s the point of the rulemaking?
d. Expansion of Discretionary Factors
The Office has recently announced additional discretionary denial factors, including:
the extent to which accused products are manufactured in the United States,
the extent to which the patent owner’s products are manufactured domestically, and
whether the petitioner is a small business.
Your memorandum introducing these factors cites 35 U.S.C. § 316(b). But § 316(b) does not provide independent authority to create new discretionary denial factors; it simply requires the Office to consider economic effects when promulgating regulations.
Do you believe § 316(b) authorizes the Office to create new categories of discretionary denial factors, or does it merely require consideration of economic effects when issuing regulations?
How are petitioners expected to evaluate whether to file an IPR when the outcome appears to depend on an ever-growing set of discretionary factors, many of which are not clearly defined and will almost certainly have to be litigated before the agency?
The concern has been raised that these new factors may discriminate against foreign entities, since foreign entities are less likely to manufacture in the U.S. than U.S. entities.
Did you consult with the State Department or the U.S. Trade Representative before adopting factors that may disproportionately affect foreign entities?
Did you consider the possibility that other countries would retaliate by discriminating against U.S. owners of patents in those countries?
e. Treatment of Economic and National Security Interest Arguments
Economic and national security impacts have long been permissible considerations under Fintiv factor 6, and Deputy Director Stewart’s March 2025 “Interim Processes” Memo specifically identified those impacts as relevant considerations.
Yet the Office has generally rejected arguments by petitioners who provide tens of thousands of jobs in the U.S. and manufacture products that are important to national security.
What level or type of showing does the Office require to allow a petition to proceed based on economic or national security concerns?
f. Excessive Resources Devoted to Non-Merits Issues
All of the discretionary considerations discussed above have imposed significant litigation costs and uncertainty on the parties. Originally, parties were given 50 pages to brief discretionary issues and often used nearly all of that space. Now they are limited to 20 pages, even as the Office introduces additional factors and urges parties to “tell their stories” more effectively.
And after all that briefing, they just get a thumbs up or a thumbs down from you.
Do you believe requiring parties to devote substantial resources to briefing discretionary issues – only to receive unexplained outcomes – is consistent with Congress’s intent in enacting the AIA?
Taken together, do you believe these developments reflect a shift from a system focused on merits-based review to one in which discretionary considerations increasingly determine access to IPR?
12. Patent Quality and the Role of IPRs
You have emphasized the importance of improving patent quality, which suggests an acknowledgment that some patents issued by the Office may not meet the statutory standards for patentability.
Congress created IPRs as a central mechanism for reassessing patent validity in light of the best available prior art. As a result, IPRs play a significant role in ensuring the quality of issued patents.
a. Role of IPRs
Do you regard IPRs as an important tool for policing patent quality?
If so, how should Congress reconcile that view with recent policies that make it more difficult to obtain IPR review?
b. Consistency with Policy Choices
Is the Office concerned that limiting access to IPRs may allow patents that are invalid in light of prior art to remain in force?
How do the various ways that you’ve limited access to IPRs advance the goal of improving patent quality?
Is there a tension between the Office’s stated goal of improving patent quality and policies that reduce the availability of IPR review?
13. Drug Pricing and Pharmaceutical Competition
Congress has long recognized that patent policy plays a significant role in pharmaceutical competition and drug pricing. The IPR system has served as an efficient mechanism for clearing invalid patents that can delay generic and biosimilar entry.
Recent Office policies – including the application of the “settled expectations” doctrine – raise questions about whether that mechanism remains available when it is most needed.
a. Timing and Practical Effects
In practice, many patents within pharmaceutical patent thickets are not challenged immediately after issuance, because there is no practical path to market entry until earlier, foundational patents expire.
As a result, challenges to these follow-on patents often occur years later – frequently when the patents are more than six years old.
In Amgen v. BMS, which you recently designated as “informative,” application of “settled expectations” prevented IPR review of patents within the Opdivo patent thicket.
How does that outcome align with the Administration’s broader policy goals of promoting competition and reducing drug prices?
b. Economic and Policy Analysis
What analysis has the Office conducted regarding the impact of its current discretionary denial policies on pharmaceutical competition and drug pricing?
Has the Office consulted with other agencies, such as the FTC or HHS, regarding these effects?
c. System-Level Questions
In your view, what role should the PTAB play in ensuring that invalid pharmaceutical patents do not delay competition?
Do current policies support or undermine that role?
Do you believe Congress expected the USPTO to deny IPRs brought by generics and biosimilars against patents in a patent thicket based solely on the age of the patents in question?
Is the Office concerned that limiting IPR access for older pharmaceutical patents may allow weak or invalid patents to delay generic or biosimilar entry?
14. Shift to Reexamination as an Alternative Path
Recent USPTO policies limiting access to inter partes review have reportedly led many petitioners to pursue ex parte reexamination as an alternative mechanism for challenging patent validity. This has led to calls by patent owners for the USPTO to limit access to reexamination as well.
Do you agree that, unlike inter partes review, ex parte reexamination is a statutory right that must be granted upon a showing of a substantial new question of patentability?
Under current law, what discretion – if any – does the Director have to deny a properly supported request for ex parte reexamination?
Given the increased use of reexamination following discretionary denials of IPR, does the Office intend to institute policies that would limit the availability of reexamination or otherwise make it a less attractive option than it currently is?
If so, will you seek stakeholder or congressional input before implementing those policies?
If not, can you confirm that the USPTO will not limit access to reexamination through policy changes?
15. Executive Order Compliance and OIRA Review
The recent USPTO initiatives affecting access to IPRs all raise questions about compliance with Executive Orders governing agency rulemaking and policy development.
The Administration’s Ensuring Lawful Governance Executive Order identifies categories of agency actions that are subject to heightened scrutiny or rescission, including actions that lack clear statutory grounding, impose unjustified burdens, impede innovation, or harm small businesses.
That Executive Order also requires agencies to consult with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) before proceeding with such actions.
a. Scope of “Rules” Under Executive Order 12866
Executive Order 12866 incorporates the Administrative Procedure Act’s definition of a “rule,” which includes agency statements of general applicability and future effect designed to implement or interpret law or policy.
Do you believe that doctrines such as “settled expectations” fall within that definition?
If not, how does the Office distinguish between case-specific exercises of discretion and policies applied across cases with predictable, system-wide effects?
b. OIRA Consultation
Has the USPTO consulted with OIRA regarding:
the “one-and-done” rule, and
other policies that materially affect access to IPRs, such as “settled expectations” and the discretionary factors relating to domestic manufacturing and small-business status?
If so, what feedback did OIRA provide regarding the statutory basis, economic impact, and broader policy implications of these initiatives?
If not, what is the Office’s basis for concluding that such consultation was not required?
c. Executive Order 12866 Analysis
Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to evaluate whether regulatory actions:
address a clearly identified problem within the agency’s statutory authority;
produce benefits that justify their costs;
represent the least burdensome alternative;
promote stability and predictability; and
avoid undue burdens on small entities and the broader economy.
What analysis has the USPTO conducted under these factors with respect to:
the “one-and-done” rule,
“settled expectations,”
other policies governing access to IPR review?
· What specific problem, within the USPTO’s statutory authority, are these policies intended to solve?
What evidence supports the conclusion that their benefits outweigh their costs?
d. Economic and Innovation Impacts
Has the Office evaluated whether these policies may increase litigation costs or reduce the ability of companies – particularly small businesses – to challenge potentially invalid patents?
Has the Office considered whether limiting access to IPRs could impede innovation by allowing potentially invalid patents to remain in force?
e. Transparency and Accountability
Will the USPTO publicly disclose its OIRA consultations and its analyses under Executive Order 12866?
Does the Office believe that policies with system-wide effects on access to IPR can be implemented without notice-and-comment rulemaking or OIRA review?
16. Expansion of Patent Eligibility and Resulting Market Uncertainty
Much of this discussion has focused on restrictions on IPR review. I’d also like to ask about the front end of the system – what patents the Office is issuing in the first place.
The Office appears to be expanding patent eligibility beyond established legal boundaries – issuing design patents not tied to a traditional article of manufacture, and allowing AI- and software-related patents that go beyond what the courts have permitted.
The Office also appears to have stepped back from determining whether an invention was made entirely by artificial intelligence, without any inventive contribution by a human – even though the Federal Circuit in Thaler v. Vidal ruled that inventions made solely by artificial intelligence are not patentable.
We’ve seen this pattern before, with business methods, genes, and diagnostic methods – areas where the USPTO issued large numbers of patents that were later invalidated by the courts.
The result was years of uncertainty, followed by widespread invalidation and significant wasted investment.
Should the USPTO err on the side of granting borderline patents, or on the side of rejecting them and allowing the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court to provide guidance?
Do you agree that the Office’s past expansions in areas like business methods and diagnostic patents resulted in significant economic waste once those patents were later invalidated?
How is the Office ensuring that current expansions – such as design patents not tied to a traditional article of manufacture or certain AI-related patents – do not repeat that cycle?
Does the USPTO have authority to interpret patent eligibility more broadly than the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court?
What steps is the Office taking to avoid issuing large numbers of patents that may ultimately be held invalid?
17. Leadership Changes and Institutional Capacity
During the transition period before your confirmation, several senior USPTO officials – including the PTAB Chief Judge, Deputy Chief Judge, and Solicitor – were removed from their positions, and many of those individuals subsequently left the agency. Additional departures have included the Deputy Solicitor, two Vice Chief Judges, more than 40 administrative patent judges, and, it appears, the entire Chief Economist’s Office.
Public reporting indicates that the PTAB had approximately 225–230 administrative patent judges at the beginning of 2025, and that the number has now declined to roughly 180 – a reduction on the order of 20–25%.
a. Decision-Making and Transition
Were you consulted regarding these personnel changes before they were implemented?
When you assumed office, what steps did you take to evaluate the leadership structure and determine whether changes were warranted?
b. Institutional Capacity
Do you have plans to replace the 40-plus administrative patent judges who have left?
If a court ultimately decides that your discretionary denial practices exceed your discretion, or a subsequent Director decides to reverse your policies, does the PTAB still have the capacity to handle that workload?
If not, is that fair to your successor, who may have a different view of the AIA’s purpose?
c. Solicitor’s Office and Legal Function
The Solicitor and Deputy Solicitor have historically been career positions, helping to ensure that USPTO leadership receives independent legal advice on litigation and policy matters.
Both the current Solicitor and the current Deputy Solicitor originally joined the office in this Administration as political employees, and presumably support your vision of the AIA and the use of discretionary denials.
Are there any senior leaders left within the agency who disagree with the agency’s new policies regarding discretionary denials?
d. Chief Economist’s Office and Economic Analysis
The USPTO has historically maintained a Chief Economist’s Office to support data-driven policymaking, including analysis of the economic impact of patent policies.
It is my understanding that, around October 2025, personnel associated with that office were separated or reassigned, that the Chief Economist departed the agency by December, and that the Office no longer maintains a visible public presence.
At the same time, many of the policies we’ve discussed – such as “settled expectations,” the “one-and-done” rule, and other discretionary denial practices – purport to rely on economic considerations under 35 U.S.C. § 316(b).
What is the current status of the Chief Economist’s Office?
Does the USPTO currently have an internal capability to conduct independent economic analysis of its policies?
If that capability has been reduced or eliminated, who is performing that function?
What economic analysis, if any, supported the recent discretionary denial policies and proposed rules we’ve discussed?
How can the Office satisfy its obligation under § 316(b) to consider the economic impact of its actions without a dedicated economic team?
18. Public Advisory Committees (PPAC / TPAC)
Congress established the Patent Public Advisory Committee (PPAC) and the Trademark Public Advisory Committee (TPAC) to provide independent, structured input on USPTO policies, operations, and performance.
These committees are required by statute to have nine members each, meet regularly, and issue annual reports to Congress. Members serve staggered terms to ensure institutional continuity. Yet, in March 2025, all nine members of the PPAC were dismissed, reportedly by the Secretary of Commerce.
a. Current Status
What is the current membership of PPAC and TPAC?
Is it correct that both committees are currently operating with significantly fewer than the statutorily required number of members?
Have the committees held all required meetings and issued their required annual reports?
b. Statutory Compliance
How does the Office justify operating these committees in a state that appears to fall short of statutory requirements?
When does the Office expect to restore full compliance with the statutory structure Congress established?
c. Role of the Secretary and Appointments
When filling these positions, how will the Office ensure that appointments reflect a balanced and representative set of stakeholders, consistent with Congress’s intent?
What safeguards are in place to ensure that advisory committee members are able to provide independent perspectives, including views that may differ from current USPTO policies?
d. Loss of Public Input
In the absence of fully functioning advisory committees, how is the Office ensuring meaningful public input into major policy decisions affecting the patent system?
Is the Office concerned that recent policy changes may have been implemented without the level of stakeholder engagement Congress intended these committees to provide?
Do you believe the advisory committees established by Congress are currently fulfilling their intended role in informing USPTO policy?
19. Potential Contacts with Prior Clients and Interested Parties
At your confirmation hearing and in response to QFRs, you stated that you last represented Fortress Investment Group in 2017 and that you have had no financial or other arrangements with the firm since that time.
It has been reported that individuals affiliated with Fortress, including its Global Head of Intellectual Property, may have attended events associated with your swearing-in.
Can you describe the nature and frequency of any communications you have had with individuals affiliated with Fortress Investment Group since assuming your role as Director?
Have you had any discussions with such individuals regarding patent policy, PTAB practices, or specific categories of cases?
What steps have you taken to ensure that your prior professional relationships do not create either actual conflicts of interest or the appearance of such conflicts in your decision-making as Director?
Appendix — Selected Background Materials
(Selected writings and materials relevant to the topics addressed in this document. Many of these materials were authored contemporaneously with the events described and may provide additional factual detail, analysis, links, and citations relevant to the questions presented)
1. Confirmation Commitments and Current Policy Direction
Squires Confirmation — Good News! — Substack (Sept. 18, 2025)
Second Letter Re Squires Nomination — Please Confirm Him ASAP!! — Substack (Sept. 10, 2025)
Opposition to Squires Nomination — Substack (May 29, 2025)
2. Congressional Role and the 2023 ANPRM
Oversight Hearing “Informally” Set for March 4, 2026 — Substack (Jan. 29, 2026)
3. Shift in the Basis for Discretionary Denial
A Strange Trio of Cases — Making sense of the nonsensical — Substack (July 1, 2025)
Shenzen and Motorola, and a little more iRhythm — Substack (June 16, 2025)
Guest Post by QED: Update on the new, bifurcated, holistic, ultra vires petitioner loses process — Substack (July 31, 2025)
LinkedIn Post re Application of Settled Expectations and Proto-One-and Done in Intel v. Advanced Cluster Systems — LinkedIn (Aug. 2025)
4. “Settled Expectations”
More on iRhythm v. Welch Allyn — Substack (June 10, 2025)
More on Dabico v. AXA Power — When Unfair Surprise Becomes Settled Expectations — Substack (June 22, 2025)
Guest Post by QED: Not-so-Great, Settled Expectations — Substack (Sept. 30, 2025)
5. Black Box Decision-Making / APA
Turning It Up to Eleven: A New and Improved 11-Count Complaint Against Black Box Institution, Settled Expectations, and One-and-Done — Substack (Nov. 24, 2025)
Today’s USPTO Hour — Inside the Black Box — Substack (Oct. 29, 2025)
Open Letter to Director Squires re “Summary Notice” Decision-Making Initiative — Substack (Oct. 20, 2025)
6. “One-and-Done” Rule (NPRM)
Turning It Up to Eleven (also cited in section 5) — Substack (Nov. 24, 2025)
Comment Submitted on One-and-Done! — Substack (Dec. 2, 2025)
LinkedIn Post re Business Coalition Letter to Administration Officials — LinkedIn (Feb. 2026)
7. Stipulation Requirement (NPRM)
Justin L. Krieger, Efficiency at What Cost? The USPTO’s New PTAB Proposal Would Unfairly Strip Defendants of Legitimate Defenses — Kilpatrick (Oct. 17, 2025)
8. Prior Framework: Fintiv and Sotera
A Strange Trio of Cases — Making sense of the nonsensical — Substack (July 1, 2025)
Shenzen and Motorola, and a little more iRhythm — Substack (June 16, 2025)
Guest Post by QED: Update on the new, bifurcated, holistic, ultra vires petitioner loses process — Substack (July 31, 2025)
9. “Error Correction” Framing of IPRs
Eileen McDermott, USPTO’s Stewart to PTAB Masters Attendees: Tell Us Your Story, Focus on the Errors — IP Watchdog (Jan. 29, 2026)
10. Real Party-in-Interest (RPI) Requirements
LinkedIn Post re Removal of SharkNinja’s Precedential Status — LinkedIn (Sept. 2025)
11. Pattern of Expanding Doctrines Relating to Discretion
LinkedIn Post re Termination after FWD in Blackhawk v. Interactive — LinkedIn (March 2026)
LinkedIn Post re Application of One-and-Done in Sinclair v. Hydrafacial — LinkedIn (Feb. 2026)
LinkedIn Post on Application of Fintiv Factor 5 in Entegris v. Inpria — LinkedIn (July 2025)
LinkedIn Post re Application of Assignor Estoppel in Tessell v. Nutanix — LinkedIn (June 2025)
LinkedIn Post re Application of Settled Expectations and Proto-One-and Done in Intel v. Advanced Cluster Systems — LinkedIn (Aug. 2025)
Bastille Week Bloodbath — series — Substack (July 2025)
Another Week, Another Bloodbath — July 21, 2025
Bastille Week Bloodbath Part II — July 21, 2025
Bastille Week Bloodbath III — July 21, 2025
12. Patent Quality and the Role of IPRs
A “New Era of Honest and Informed Policy Discussion”? — Taking a closer look at the Sunwater Institute’s 7% patent error-rate claim — Substack (Feb. 5, 2026)
13. Drug Pricing and Pharmaceutical Competition
Yes C4IP, There Are Patent Thickets — Responding to Patent-Thicket Deniers — Substack (Jan. 29, 2026)
LinkedIn Post on Amgen v. BMS — LinkedIn (Aug. 2025)
LinkedIn Post on Amgen v. BMS Rehearing Request — LinkedIn (Sept. 2025)
14. Shift to Reexamination as an Alternative Path
· Gene Quinn, The Problem of Abusive Serial Challenges Using Reexaminations Needs to Be Addressed by the USPTO — IP Watchdog (March 22, 2026)
15. Executive Order Compliance and OIRA Review
Comment Submitted on One-and-Done! — Substack (Dec. 2, 2025)
16. Leadership Changes and Institutional Capacity
LinkedIn Post re Talent and Institutional Knowledge Drain at the USPTO — LinkedIn (Sept. 2025)
LinkedIn Post re Deputy Solicitor Appointment — LinkedIn (Feb. 2026)
17. Expansion of Patent Eligibility and Resulting Market Uncertainty
LinkedIn Post re Recent USPTO Guidance on Design Patent Eligibility — LinkedIn (Mar. 2026)
18. Public Advisory Committees (PPAC / TPAC)
More Lawlessness, Less Transparency at the USPTO: The Prolonged Disablement of PPAC — Substack (Jan. 4, 2026)
19. Potential Contacts with Prior Clients and Interested Parties
LinkedIn Post by Doug Pittman re Private Swearing-In Ceremony — LinkedIn (Oct.
long page, dont know if i got it all...........
Before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, Artificial Intelligence, and the Internet
Tom Krause
Mar 23, 2026
The House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, Artificial Intelligence, and the Internet will hold a hearing on March 25, 2026 with USPTO Director John Squires.
Below is a set of proposed questions for that hearing, which I will be sharing with Subcommittee staff. I am posting them here for broader access.
If you know individuals who may find these questions useful, please feel free to share this post. A pdf is provided at the end of this post.
Proposed Questions for the March 25, 2026 Hearing
Before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, Artificial Intelligence, and the Internet
Hearing with USPTO Director John Squires
Submitted by:
Thomas W. Krause
Former Solicitor and Director Review Executive, USPTO
Introduction
This document provides proposed questions for the Subcommittee’s March 25, 2026 hearing with USPTO Director John Squires.
The questions are organized by topic and are intended to assist Members in examining recent USPTO policies affecting inter partes review (IPR) proceedings, patent quality, and institutional governance.
An Appendix is included with links to relevant materials. It also serves as an index to the 19 topics addressed in the questions.
I encourage the Subcommittee to use Questions for the Record to obtain the Director’s answers to questions not addressed during the hearing.
1. Confirmation Commitments and Current Policy Direction
At your confirmation hearing you indicated that, before making major changes to PTAB practice, you would work with Congress and stakeholders to determine what reforms – if any – were appropriate. You also made clear that you did not intend to restrict access to IPRs, particularly where they serve to address abusive patent practices and questionable pharmaceutical patents.
Since then, the Office has adopted or proposed a series of policies – including “settled expectations,” non-transparent (“black-box”) institution determinations, the “one-and-done” rule, the stipulation requirement, and an “error correction” framing of IPRs – that significantly narrow access to IPRs.
Do you believe this overall policy direction is consistent with the commitments you made at your confirmation hearing? If so, please explain how.
Should the Subcommittee understand these initiatives as reflecting your considered judgment about the proper role and future of the PTAB?
To what extent, if any, were you involved in shaping or directing these policies before you assumed office?
What would you say to those who see these policies as moving sharply away from the role Congress envisioned for IPRs?
2. Congressional Role and the 2023 ANPRM
At this Subcommittee’s April 2023 hearing with the prior USPTO Director, many Members raised concerns about a pending ANPRM that would have used discretionary authority to reshape IPR practice, including increasing discretionary denials.
While views differed on the specific proposals, there was broad consensus that decisions of that magnitude – affecting access to IPRs – were ultimately for Congress to make, not the agency acting on its own.
Since then, the Office has implemented or advanced policies – including “settled expectations” and the “one-and-done” rule – that go much further than anything that was proposed in the ANPRM.
Do you believe § 314(a) gives the Director authority to make policy choices of that scale – effectively limiting access to IPRs – without additional direction from Congress?
Assuming such authority exists, what constraints should govern how a Director exercises it?
Is Congress’s intent in enacting the AIA relevant to how you should use your discretion?
If so, please explain how your current practices are consistent with your understanding of that intent.
How should Congress think about the risk that each new Director might take a completely different view of the purpose of IPRs, and reverse everything the previous Director had done?
3. Shift in the Basis for Discretionary Denial
Historically, the Office’s use of discretionary denial focused on the management of proceedings – including limiting the number of petitions and preventing duplication across USPTO and district court proceedings.
More recently, however, the Office has adopted doctrines that appear to turn not on the conduct or posture of a particular proceeding, but on characteristics of the patent itself – such as age, prior litigation history, or examination history. More recently still, you have issued guidance under which you’ll consider characteristics of the petitioner and the patent owner, including the size and manufacturing activity of the petitioner, and the manufacturing activity of the patent owner.
This appears to represent a shift from managing proceedings to determining which patents and parties may access the IPR system at all.
It seems reasonable and perhaps permissible for the Office to address procedural issues that Congress arguably recognized but did not fully address – such as abusive behavior by petitioners, or how to avoid having district courts and the USPTO decide the same issues at the same time.
But how does the Office justify using discretionary denial to effectively exclude whole categories of patents – such as older patents – from IPR review altogether, when Congress made IPR available for all patents?
Is there any indication in the AIA that Congress contemplated that the Director might exclude entire categories of patents from IPR review?
To the extent these policies were motivated by concerns that the PTAB was finding too many patents unpatentable, what evidence supports that concern?
Even assuming such concerns were valid, why not address them through other tools – such as training or your Director Review authority – rather than restricting access to IPR?
What is the limiting principle that prevents the Office from excluding additional categories of patents from IPR review?
For example, if the Office can deny review based on a patent’s age, what prevents it from doing so based on other characteristics – such as the patent’s subject matter or the identity of the patent owner?
4. “Settled Expectations”
Under the USPTO’s “settled expectations” doctrine, the USPTO will generally not institute an IPR if a patent is over six years old, and the USPTO has also invited patentees to make arguments as to why they have “settled expectations” that even younger patents won’t be challenged. Settled expectations is a far greater change than anything proposed in the agency’s 2023 ANPRM, which most Members of this Subcommittee thought was encroaching on Congress’s role. It also goes further than any of the various versions of the PREVAIL Act that have been introduced but not enacted over the past decade.
a. USPTO’s Role
Is it appropriate for the USPTO to implement a policy change of this magnitude while Congress is actively considering legislation in this area?
b. Statutory Consistency
Congress created IPRs as a more robust alternative to inter partes reexamination, which did not include a “settled expectations” limitation.
Do you believe the “settled expectations” doctrine is consistent with Congress’s intent in enacting the AIA? If so, how?
c. Policy Rationale
The term “settled expectations” typically refers to reliance interests that developed over time. But before this doctrine was introduced, patent owners had no reason to expect that older patents would be insulated from IPR review, while petitioners had every reason – based on years of PTAB practice – to expect that such patents would be reviewable.
How does the Office justify using the term “settled expectations” to describe a doctrine that creates new expectations rather than protecting settled ones?
What problem is the “settled expectations” doctrine intended to solve?
If the justification for “settled expectations” is that patent owners should have “quiet title” after a certain period of time, how do you reconcile that with the continued availability of district court challenges and ex parte reexamination for older patents?
d. Evidence and Analysis
35 U.S.C. § 316(b) requires the Office to consider the economic impact of its regulatory decisions. Although “settled expectations” was not adopted through rulemaking, and does not appear in any proposed rule, it has significant system-wide effects.
What empirical or economic analysis did the Office conduct before adopting this doctrine?
What evidence supports the conclusion that this policy improves innovation, competition, or patent quality?
e. Distributional Effects and Fairness
Does the Office have any data or analysis regarding which types of patent owners benefit most from the “settled expectations” doctrine – for example, operating companies versus entities that acquire patents on the secondary market?
Does the Office consider it appropriate if this doctrine has the practical effect of shielding patents held primarily for monetization or licensing, rather than to support products or technological development?
Was any consideration given to tailoring the doctrine – for example, excluding second-hand patents purchased before the doctrine was created – rather than applying it categorically?
At what point does protecting “settled expectations” risk creating a windfall for parties who acquired patents with no expectation of insulation from IPR review?
If evidence shows that “settled expectations” has contributed to increased litigation by foreign-owned non-practicing entities against U.S. operating companies, would you reconsider the doctrine?
5. Black Box Decision-Making / APA
On October 17, 2025, you announced that you would begin personally making all institution decisions, and that process was implemented shortly thereafter. Since then, you have issued hundreds of decisions, the vast majority consisting of one- or two-page orders that list dozens of cases by disposition category—most often discretionary denials.
This represents a significant departure from prior PTAB practice, where petitioners’ fees paid for institution decisions that typically included detailed explanations of the Board’s reasoning, including how specific discretionary factors were applied.
a. APA and Transparency
How does the current practice of issuing abbreviated or unexplained denials comply with 5 U.S.C. § 555(e), which requires a statement of the grounds for denial of a written application or petition?
What steps does the Office take to ensure that these decisions are based on consistent and permissible criteria, given the absence of articulated reasoning?
In the absence of written explanations, how can the public evaluate whether the Office is applying its policies in a reasoned and non-arbitrary manner?
b. Transparency
In the past, detailed institution decisions helped parties assess whether to seek rehearing and provided insight into how the Board viewed the merits of a case.
In the absence of articulated reasoning, how can parties or the public assess whether similarly situated cases are being treated consistently?
How are parties expected to evaluate or respond to decisions when the basis for those decisions is not explained?
Given the significant filing fees associated with IPRs, how is the Office ensuring that petitioners receive meaningful consideration of their arguments?
c. Resource Allocation and Fees
Approximately how much time do you spend, on average, on each institution decision under the current process?
How often do you disagree with the recommendations that you get regarding your institution decisions?
Do you believe current filing fees accurately reflect the level of analysis being performed?
Has the Office considered adjusting those fees to reflect the current process?
d. Consistency with USPTO Regulations
Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides that institution decisions are made by PTAB panels, typically consisting of three administrative patent judges.
How does the current practice – where the Director personally makes institution decisions – comply with the existing framework set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations?
e. GAO and Regulatory Framework
In December 2022, the Government Accountability Office found that PTAB adjudication raised concerns regarding independence from management and recommended that the USPTO clarify the respective roles of the Director and the Board through rulemaking.
The USPTO subsequently adopted regulations intended to ensure that PTAB panels issue decisions independently, with the Director serving a review function.
How does the current practice – where the Director personally decides institution in hundreds of cases – fit within the regulations that were added in response to the GAO report? (37 CFR §§ 42.75, 43.1-6)
Has the Office evaluated whether this approach is consistent with its prior representations to GAO and the public?
Has the Office provided any updates to GAO regarding these changes?
6. “One-and-Done” Rule (NPRM)
On October 17, 2025, the USPTO issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that would significantly restrict access to IPRs by barring a petitioner from filing a challenge if a prior challenge – brought by a different party – was unsuccessful in a non-final decision in another forum, such as a district court or the ITC.
This would represent a substantial departure from current practice, under which parties are generally permitted to bring their own challenges based on their own interests and evidence, subject to the statutory limits Congress enacted.
a. Statutory Authority and Analysis
The NPRM cites 35 U.S.C. § 316(b) as authority for this proposal, which requires the Office to consider the effect of its regulations on the economy.
What economic or empirical analysis did the Office conduct to assess the impact of this proposal on the economy?
b. Consistency with the AIA Framework
Congress designed IPRs to allow multiple parties to challenge potentially invalid patents, subject to party-specific statutory limits such as estoppel and time bars.
Do you believe that this proposal – effectively extending estoppel to unrelated parties – is consistent with Congress’s intent in enacting the AIA?
c. Practical Consequences
Many of the biggest patent assertion campaigns involve non-practicing entities suing multiple operating companies across an industry in patent-friendly courts. The one-and-done rule appears to provide a huge windfall to such entities, by immunizing their patents from further USPTO scrutiny after surviving a single challenge in a non-final decision in a different forum.
How does the Office justify that result as a matter of patent policy?
How does the Office account for the fact that different parties may have access to different prior art, different arguments, or different incentives to challenge a patent?
How would this rule affect industries in which the same patents are asserted repeatedly against multiple defendants over time?
d. Public Input and Next Steps
It has been reported that an overwhelming majority of comments submitted in response to the NPRM opposed the proposal.
How is the Office evaluating that feedback?
Have you submitted final rules for regulatory review, and if so, when?
Under what circumstances would the Office reconsider or withdraw the proposal?
7. Stipulation Requirement (NPRM)
The October 17 NPRM also proposes a stipulation requirement under which a petitioner, as a condition of institution, must agree not to pursue any § 102 or § 103 invalidity challenges in any other forum.
This would represent a significant change to current practice and would require petitioners to forgo defenses that are available in district court but not in IPRs.
a. Statutory Authority
In the AIA, Congress provided certain party-based estoppel provisions, but nothing like this.
Do you believe that this proposal is consistent with Congress’s intent in enacting the AIA? If so, how?
b. Practical Consequences
In many cases, the strongest invalidity evidence is not limited to patents or printed publications, but includes product prior art – evidence that a product embodying the claimed invention already existed.
Because IPRs are limited to patents and printed publications, how does the Office justify requiring petitioners to give up the ability to rely on product prior art in other forums?
c. System Design and Fairness
Is it appropriate for the Office to condition access to a statutory review proceeding on the surrender of rights that Congress chose to preserve in other forums?
d. Real-World Effects
What economic or empirical analysis has the Office conducted regarding the impact of this proposed rule?
e. Purpose
What would you say to those who contend that the sole purpose of this provision appears to be to discourage use of IPRs?
8. Prior Framework: Fintiv and Sotera
Under prior USPTO practice, discretionary denial was primarily justified as a tool to avoid duplicative proceedings between the PTAB and district courts, as reflected in the Fintiv framework.
At the same time, the Office recognized in the precedential Sotera decision that where a petitioner stipulates that it will not pursue invalidity arguments in district court that it raised or could have raised in the IPR, the concern about duplication is effectively eliminated, and institution is generally appropriate.
The Fintiv framework also recognized that district court judges often schedule multiple trials for the same date, and that a more reliable “trial date” for Fintiv purposes is one based on historical time to trial data.
That framework provided a clear principle: discretionary denial was tied to avoiding duplicative proceedings, and petitioners could take concrete steps – such as filing a Sotera stipulation – to ensure that their petitions would be heard on the merits.
Based on decisions the Office issued before you implemented “Black Box” procedure, it appears that the Fintiv analysis has changed to provide much greater weight to the district court’s scheduled trial date than before.
It also appears that Sotera stipulations no longer carry much weight, although the Office now appears to weigh the absence of a Sotera stipulation against the petitioner even when the trial date is far off.
So even within the Fintiv framework, the Office’s analysis appears to have changed. But none of this has been memorialized in clear guidance as to how the Fintiv analysis is now applied.
Do you believe the Office has clearly articulated how the Fintiv analysis is currently applied, including the role of Sotera stipulations? If so, where?
If not, how are parties expected to brief the issue?
9. “Error Correction” Framing of IPRs
Recent statements from USPTO leadership, including the Deputy Director, suggest that the Office is increasingly viewing IPRs as a mechanism primarily for correcting examiner error, rather than as a broader merits-based review of patent validity.
This appears to represent a shift from the framework Congress established in the AIA, which created IPRs as a mechanism to reassess patent validity based on the best available prior art, regardless of how the patent was originally examined.
a. Statutory Purpose
Do you believe that the primary purpose of IPRs is to correct examiner error, to reassess patentability on the merits, or something else?
Do you believe that Congress contemplated that a Director would use discretionary authority to limit IPRs to “error correction” cases?
b. Implications for Merits-Based Review
Does the Office plan to issue guidance on how the “error correction” framework interacts with the other discretionary denial doctrines?
How is the “error correction” framework applied alongside other doctrines like “settled expectations” or Fintiv?
If the petition would not be denied based on settled expectations, Fintiv, or any other discretionary denial doctrine, must it still satisfy an “error correction” threshold?
c. Tension with 35 USC § 325(d)
Historically, petitioners have generally avoided relying on prior art or arguments that were before the examiner, because doing so risked denial under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). As a result, the vast majority of petitions rely on different prior art than what was before the examiner during prosecution.
At the same time, the Office now suggests that IPRs should focus on correcting examiner error, which would often require revisiting that same art or identifying specific examination defects.
How are petitioners supposed to reconcile these two expectations?
Why should a petitioner who has identified stronger prior art than what was considered during examination be required to set that aside and instead attempt to identify errors in how the examiner evaluated the prior art that was before them?
d. Definition of “Examiner Error”
How does the Office define “examiner error” in this context?
Would the failure to identify the most relevant prior art during examination qualify as error?
If not, how should Congress understand the scope of cases that remain eligible for IPR review?
Is it appropriate for the Office to deny review of a potentially invalid patent simply because the petitioner cannot identify a specific “error” in the original examination?
e. System Design and Consequences
How does an “error correction” model of IPR align with Congress’s goal of improving patent quality across the system as a whole?
10. Real Party-in-Interest (RPI) Requirements
The Federal Circuit in Mayne Pharma made clear that the identification of real parties-in-interest (RPIs) is not a jurisdictional requirement under the AIA. The USPTO adopted that position in its precedential SharkNinja decision.
But you have removed SharkNinja’s precedential status and have designated Corning Optical – a case that pre-dated Mayne Pharma – as precedential. And the Office now appears to treat RPI identification as a threshold issue that can result in denial even where no statutory time bar is implicated.
a. Statutory Framework
Why is the Office treating RPI identification as effectively jurisdictional in practice, despite the Federal Circuit’s guidance?
Do you believe Congress expected the USPTO to deny institution based on RPI issues where there is no risk of a time bar under § 315(b)?
b. Practical Consequences
Why is the Office requiring parties to devote significant time and resources to litigating RPI disputes even where there is no potential time bar, estoppel, or conflict of interest raised?
Is the Office concerned about the growing burden and cost associated with litigating RPI as a threshold issue?
How does this focus on RPI disputes advance Congress’s goal of providing an efficient mechanism for resolving patent validity?
c. System Design and Priorities
What problem is the Office attempting to solve by elevating RPI disputes in this way?
If RPI identification does not affect the merits of patentability and does not implicate any statutory bar, why should it serve as a basis for denying review altogether?
11. Pattern of Expanding Doctrines Relating to Discretion
Several recent decisions raise a broader concern that the Office is applying, extending, or reinterpreting doctrines in ways that increasingly result in denial of IPR review – even where those doctrines have not historically been applied in that manner.
a. Assignor Estoppel
In the Government’s briefing in Minerva v. Hologic before the Supreme Court, the United States – including the USPTO – argued that there are many situations in which it would be inappropriate to prevent a previous assignor of a patent from challenging patent validity.
That position is consistent with Federal Circuit and PTAB precedential decisions holding that assignor estoppel is not a bar to IPR proceedings. The PTAB’s decision in Athena Automation, IPR2013-00290 remains precedential.
And yet, the Office has denied a petition on the basis of assignor estoppel with no examination of the underlying facts.
Is the Office now taking the position that assignor estoppel will categorically bar IPR petitions, notwithstanding its prior statements to the contrary, and without consideration of the underlying equities or merits?
Do you believe Congress contemplated that the USPTO might deny IPRs on the basis of assignor estoppel?
b. Termination of IPR After Unpatentability Finding
On Director Review in Interactive Communications v. Blackhawk, you concluded that the Board had abused its discretion in crediting an expert witness after finding that witness not credible on another issue.
However, rather than remanding for consideration of other grounds raised in the petition, you vacated the final written decision and terminated the IPR altogether – preventing further consideration of the petition and potentially avoiding appellate review of the merits.
Why did you choose to terminate the proceeding entirely, rather than remanding for consideration of the remaining grounds?
Do you believe Congress expected the Director to step in and vacate final written decisions by the PTAB and terminate the proceedings, even when there were outstanding issues to be addressed?
c. Application of “One-and-Done” Principles Outside Rulemaking
As we’ve discussed, the Office has proposed, through rulemaking, a “one-and-done” approach that would limit successive challenges to patents.
At the same time, you already seem to be applying one-and-done – for example, in a recent sua sponte Director Review decision, you deinstituted a petition based on an initial determination in an ITC proceeding involving different parties. (Sinclair v. Hydrafacial)
Do you agree that this is a fair characterization of your decision in Sinclair v. Hydrafacial?
In your current, non-transparent decision-making process, are you also applying “one-and-done” principles in individual cases, even before the completion of the rulemaking process?
If not, how could anybody know that?
And if so, what’s the point of the rulemaking?
d. Expansion of Discretionary Factors
The Office has recently announced additional discretionary denial factors, including:
the extent to which accused products are manufactured in the United States,
the extent to which the patent owner’s products are manufactured domestically, and
whether the petitioner is a small business.
Your memorandum introducing these factors cites 35 U.S.C. § 316(b). But § 316(b) does not provide independent authority to create new discretionary denial factors; it simply requires the Office to consider economic effects when promulgating regulations.
Do you believe § 316(b) authorizes the Office to create new categories of discretionary denial factors, or does it merely require consideration of economic effects when issuing regulations?
How are petitioners expected to evaluate whether to file an IPR when the outcome appears to depend on an ever-growing set of discretionary factors, many of which are not clearly defined and will almost certainly have to be litigated before the agency?
The concern has been raised that these new factors may discriminate against foreign entities, since foreign entities are less likely to manufacture in the U.S. than U.S. entities.
Did you consult with the State Department or the U.S. Trade Representative before adopting factors that may disproportionately affect foreign entities?
Did you consider the possibility that other countries would retaliate by discriminating against U.S. owners of patents in those countries?
e. Treatment of Economic and National Security Interest Arguments
Economic and national security impacts have long been permissible considerations under Fintiv factor 6, and Deputy Director Stewart’s March 2025 “Interim Processes” Memo specifically identified those impacts as relevant considerations.
Yet the Office has generally rejected arguments by petitioners who provide tens of thousands of jobs in the U.S. and manufacture products that are important to national security.
What level or type of showing does the Office require to allow a petition to proceed based on economic or national security concerns?
f. Excessive Resources Devoted to Non-Merits Issues
All of the discretionary considerations discussed above have imposed significant litigation costs and uncertainty on the parties. Originally, parties were given 50 pages to brief discretionary issues and often used nearly all of that space. Now they are limited to 20 pages, even as the Office introduces additional factors and urges parties to “tell their stories” more effectively.
And after all that briefing, they just get a thumbs up or a thumbs down from you.
Do you believe requiring parties to devote substantial resources to briefing discretionary issues – only to receive unexplained outcomes – is consistent with Congress’s intent in enacting the AIA?
Taken together, do you believe these developments reflect a shift from a system focused on merits-based review to one in which discretionary considerations increasingly determine access to IPR?
12. Patent Quality and the Role of IPRs
You have emphasized the importance of improving patent quality, which suggests an acknowledgment that some patents issued by the Office may not meet the statutory standards for patentability.
Congress created IPRs as a central mechanism for reassessing patent validity in light of the best available prior art. As a result, IPRs play a significant role in ensuring the quality of issued patents.
a. Role of IPRs
Do you regard IPRs as an important tool for policing patent quality?
If so, how should Congress reconcile that view with recent policies that make it more difficult to obtain IPR review?
b. Consistency with Policy Choices
Is the Office concerned that limiting access to IPRs may allow patents that are invalid in light of prior art to remain in force?
How do the various ways that you’ve limited access to IPRs advance the goal of improving patent quality?
Is there a tension between the Office’s stated goal of improving patent quality and policies that reduce the availability of IPR review?
13. Drug Pricing and Pharmaceutical Competition
Congress has long recognized that patent policy plays a significant role in pharmaceutical competition and drug pricing. The IPR system has served as an efficient mechanism for clearing invalid patents that can delay generic and biosimilar entry.
Recent Office policies – including the application of the “settled expectations” doctrine – raise questions about whether that mechanism remains available when it is most needed.
a. Timing and Practical Effects
In practice, many patents within pharmaceutical patent thickets are not challenged immediately after issuance, because there is no practical path to market entry until earlier, foundational patents expire.
As a result, challenges to these follow-on patents often occur years later – frequently when the patents are more than six years old.
In Amgen v. BMS, which you recently designated as “informative,” application of “settled expectations” prevented IPR review of patents within the Opdivo patent thicket.
How does that outcome align with the Administration’s broader policy goals of promoting competition and reducing drug prices?
b. Economic and Policy Analysis
What analysis has the Office conducted regarding the impact of its current discretionary denial policies on pharmaceutical competition and drug pricing?
Has the Office consulted with other agencies, such as the FTC or HHS, regarding these effects?
c. System-Level Questions
In your view, what role should the PTAB play in ensuring that invalid pharmaceutical patents do not delay competition?
Do current policies support or undermine that role?
Do you believe Congress expected the USPTO to deny IPRs brought by generics and biosimilars against patents in a patent thicket based solely on the age of the patents in question?
Is the Office concerned that limiting IPR access for older pharmaceutical patents may allow weak or invalid patents to delay generic or biosimilar entry?
14. Shift to Reexamination as an Alternative Path
Recent USPTO policies limiting access to inter partes review have reportedly led many petitioners to pursue ex parte reexamination as an alternative mechanism for challenging patent validity. This has led to calls by patent owners for the USPTO to limit access to reexamination as well.
Do you agree that, unlike inter partes review, ex parte reexamination is a statutory right that must be granted upon a showing of a substantial new question of patentability?
Under current law, what discretion – if any – does the Director have to deny a properly supported request for ex parte reexamination?
Given the increased use of reexamination following discretionary denials of IPR, does the Office intend to institute policies that would limit the availability of reexamination or otherwise make it a less attractive option than it currently is?
If so, will you seek stakeholder or congressional input before implementing those policies?
If not, can you confirm that the USPTO will not limit access to reexamination through policy changes?
15. Executive Order Compliance and OIRA Review
The recent USPTO initiatives affecting access to IPRs all raise questions about compliance with Executive Orders governing agency rulemaking and policy development.
The Administration’s Ensuring Lawful Governance Executive Order identifies categories of agency actions that are subject to heightened scrutiny or rescission, including actions that lack clear statutory grounding, impose unjustified burdens, impede innovation, or harm small businesses.
That Executive Order also requires agencies to consult with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) before proceeding with such actions.
a. Scope of “Rules” Under Executive Order 12866
Executive Order 12866 incorporates the Administrative Procedure Act’s definition of a “rule,” which includes agency statements of general applicability and future effect designed to implement or interpret law or policy.
Do you believe that doctrines such as “settled expectations” fall within that definition?
If not, how does the Office distinguish between case-specific exercises of discretion and policies applied across cases with predictable, system-wide effects?
b. OIRA Consultation
Has the USPTO consulted with OIRA regarding:
the “one-and-done” rule, and
other policies that materially affect access to IPRs, such as “settled expectations” and the discretionary factors relating to domestic manufacturing and small-business status?
If so, what feedback did OIRA provide regarding the statutory basis, economic impact, and broader policy implications of these initiatives?
If not, what is the Office’s basis for concluding that such consultation was not required?
c. Executive Order 12866 Analysis
Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to evaluate whether regulatory actions:
address a clearly identified problem within the agency’s statutory authority;
produce benefits that justify their costs;
represent the least burdensome alternative;
promote stability and predictability; and
avoid undue burdens on small entities and the broader economy.
What analysis has the USPTO conducted under these factors with respect to:
the “one-and-done” rule,
“settled expectations,”
other policies governing access to IPR review?
· What specific problem, within the USPTO’s statutory authority, are these policies intended to solve?
What evidence supports the conclusion that their benefits outweigh their costs?
d. Economic and Innovation Impacts
Has the Office evaluated whether these policies may increase litigation costs or reduce the ability of companies – particularly small businesses – to challenge potentially invalid patents?
Has the Office considered whether limiting access to IPRs could impede innovation by allowing potentially invalid patents to remain in force?
e. Transparency and Accountability
Will the USPTO publicly disclose its OIRA consultations and its analyses under Executive Order 12866?
Does the Office believe that policies with system-wide effects on access to IPR can be implemented without notice-and-comment rulemaking or OIRA review?
16. Expansion of Patent Eligibility and Resulting Market Uncertainty
Much of this discussion has focused on restrictions on IPR review. I’d also like to ask about the front end of the system – what patents the Office is issuing in the first place.
The Office appears to be expanding patent eligibility beyond established legal boundaries – issuing design patents not tied to a traditional article of manufacture, and allowing AI- and software-related patents that go beyond what the courts have permitted.
The Office also appears to have stepped back from determining whether an invention was made entirely by artificial intelligence, without any inventive contribution by a human – even though the Federal Circuit in Thaler v. Vidal ruled that inventions made solely by artificial intelligence are not patentable.
We’ve seen this pattern before, with business methods, genes, and diagnostic methods – areas where the USPTO issued large numbers of patents that were later invalidated by the courts.
The result was years of uncertainty, followed by widespread invalidation and significant wasted investment.
Should the USPTO err on the side of granting borderline patents, or on the side of rejecting them and allowing the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court to provide guidance?
Do you agree that the Office’s past expansions in areas like business methods and diagnostic patents resulted in significant economic waste once those patents were later invalidated?
How is the Office ensuring that current expansions – such as design patents not tied to a traditional article of manufacture or certain AI-related patents – do not repeat that cycle?
Does the USPTO have authority to interpret patent eligibility more broadly than the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court?
What steps is the Office taking to avoid issuing large numbers of patents that may ultimately be held invalid?
17. Leadership Changes and Institutional Capacity
During the transition period before your confirmation, several senior USPTO officials – including the PTAB Chief Judge, Deputy Chief Judge, and Solicitor – were removed from their positions, and many of those individuals subsequently left the agency. Additional departures have included the Deputy Solicitor, two Vice Chief Judges, more than 40 administrative patent judges, and, it appears, the entire Chief Economist’s Office.
Public reporting indicates that the PTAB had approximately 225–230 administrative patent judges at the beginning of 2025, and that the number has now declined to roughly 180 – a reduction on the order of 20–25%.
a. Decision-Making and Transition
Were you consulted regarding these personnel changes before they were implemented?
When you assumed office, what steps did you take to evaluate the leadership structure and determine whether changes were warranted?
b. Institutional Capacity
Do you have plans to replace the 40-plus administrative patent judges who have left?
If a court ultimately decides that your discretionary denial practices exceed your discretion, or a subsequent Director decides to reverse your policies, does the PTAB still have the capacity to handle that workload?
If not, is that fair to your successor, who may have a different view of the AIA’s purpose?
c. Solicitor’s Office and Legal Function
The Solicitor and Deputy Solicitor have historically been career positions, helping to ensure that USPTO leadership receives independent legal advice on litigation and policy matters.
Both the current Solicitor and the current Deputy Solicitor originally joined the office in this Administration as political employees, and presumably support your vision of the AIA and the use of discretionary denials.
Are there any senior leaders left within the agency who disagree with the agency’s new policies regarding discretionary denials?
d. Chief Economist’s Office and Economic Analysis
The USPTO has historically maintained a Chief Economist’s Office to support data-driven policymaking, including analysis of the economic impact of patent policies.
It is my understanding that, around October 2025, personnel associated with that office were separated or reassigned, that the Chief Economist departed the agency by December, and that the Office no longer maintains a visible public presence.
At the same time, many of the policies we’ve discussed – such as “settled expectations,” the “one-and-done” rule, and other discretionary denial practices – purport to rely on economic considerations under 35 U.S.C. § 316(b).
What is the current status of the Chief Economist’s Office?
Does the USPTO currently have an internal capability to conduct independent economic analysis of its policies?
If that capability has been reduced or eliminated, who is performing that function?
What economic analysis, if any, supported the recent discretionary denial policies and proposed rules we’ve discussed?
How can the Office satisfy its obligation under § 316(b) to consider the economic impact of its actions without a dedicated economic team?
18. Public Advisory Committees (PPAC / TPAC)
Congress established the Patent Public Advisory Committee (PPAC) and the Trademark Public Advisory Committee (TPAC) to provide independent, structured input on USPTO policies, operations, and performance.
These committees are required by statute to have nine members each, meet regularly, and issue annual reports to Congress. Members serve staggered terms to ensure institutional continuity. Yet, in March 2025, all nine members of the PPAC were dismissed, reportedly by the Secretary of Commerce.
a. Current Status
What is the current membership of PPAC and TPAC?
Is it correct that both committees are currently operating with significantly fewer than the statutorily required number of members?
Have the committees held all required meetings and issued their required annual reports?
b. Statutory Compliance
How does the Office justify operating these committees in a state that appears to fall short of statutory requirements?
When does the Office expect to restore full compliance with the statutory structure Congress established?
c. Role of the Secretary and Appointments
When filling these positions, how will the Office ensure that appointments reflect a balanced and representative set of stakeholders, consistent with Congress’s intent?
What safeguards are in place to ensure that advisory committee members are able to provide independent perspectives, including views that may differ from current USPTO policies?
d. Loss of Public Input
In the absence of fully functioning advisory committees, how is the Office ensuring meaningful public input into major policy decisions affecting the patent system?
Is the Office concerned that recent policy changes may have been implemented without the level of stakeholder engagement Congress intended these committees to provide?
Do you believe the advisory committees established by Congress are currently fulfilling their intended role in informing USPTO policy?
19. Potential Contacts with Prior Clients and Interested Parties
At your confirmation hearing and in response to QFRs, you stated that you last represented Fortress Investment Group in 2017 and that you have had no financial or other arrangements with the firm since that time.
It has been reported that individuals affiliated with Fortress, including its Global Head of Intellectual Property, may have attended events associated with your swearing-in.
Can you describe the nature and frequency of any communications you have had with individuals affiliated with Fortress Investment Group since assuming your role as Director?
Have you had any discussions with such individuals regarding patent policy, PTAB practices, or specific categories of cases?
What steps have you taken to ensure that your prior professional relationships do not create either actual conflicts of interest or the appearance of such conflicts in your decision-making as Director?
Appendix — Selected Background Materials
(Selected writings and materials relevant to the topics addressed in this document. Many of these materials were authored contemporaneously with the events described and may provide additional factual detail, analysis, links, and citations relevant to the questions presented)
1. Confirmation Commitments and Current Policy Direction
Squires Confirmation — Good News! — Substack (Sept. 18, 2025)
Second Letter Re Squires Nomination — Please Confirm Him ASAP!! — Substack (Sept. 10, 2025)
Opposition to Squires Nomination — Substack (May 29, 2025)
2. Congressional Role and the 2023 ANPRM
Oversight Hearing “Informally” Set for March 4, 2026 — Substack (Jan. 29, 2026)
3. Shift in the Basis for Discretionary Denial
A Strange Trio of Cases — Making sense of the nonsensical — Substack (July 1, 2025)
Shenzen and Motorola, and a little more iRhythm — Substack (June 16, 2025)
Guest Post by QED: Update on the new, bifurcated, holistic, ultra vires petitioner loses process — Substack (July 31, 2025)
LinkedIn Post re Application of Settled Expectations and Proto-One-and Done in Intel v. Advanced Cluster Systems — LinkedIn (Aug. 2025)
4. “Settled Expectations”
More on iRhythm v. Welch Allyn — Substack (June 10, 2025)
More on Dabico v. AXA Power — When Unfair Surprise Becomes Settled Expectations — Substack (June 22, 2025)
Guest Post by QED: Not-so-Great, Settled Expectations — Substack (Sept. 30, 2025)
5. Black Box Decision-Making / APA
Turning It Up to Eleven: A New and Improved 11-Count Complaint Against Black Box Institution, Settled Expectations, and One-and-Done — Substack (Nov. 24, 2025)
Today’s USPTO Hour — Inside the Black Box — Substack (Oct. 29, 2025)
Open Letter to Director Squires re “Summary Notice” Decision-Making Initiative — Substack (Oct. 20, 2025)
6. “One-and-Done” Rule (NPRM)
Turning It Up to Eleven (also cited in section 5) — Substack (Nov. 24, 2025)
Comment Submitted on One-and-Done! — Substack (Dec. 2, 2025)
LinkedIn Post re Business Coalition Letter to Administration Officials — LinkedIn (Feb. 2026)
7. Stipulation Requirement (NPRM)
Justin L. Krieger, Efficiency at What Cost? The USPTO’s New PTAB Proposal Would Unfairly Strip Defendants of Legitimate Defenses — Kilpatrick (Oct. 17, 2025)
8. Prior Framework: Fintiv and Sotera
A Strange Trio of Cases — Making sense of the nonsensical — Substack (July 1, 2025)
Shenzen and Motorola, and a little more iRhythm — Substack (June 16, 2025)
Guest Post by QED: Update on the new, bifurcated, holistic, ultra vires petitioner loses process — Substack (July 31, 2025)
9. “Error Correction” Framing of IPRs
Eileen McDermott, USPTO’s Stewart to PTAB Masters Attendees: Tell Us Your Story, Focus on the Errors — IP Watchdog (Jan. 29, 2026)
10. Real Party-in-Interest (RPI) Requirements
LinkedIn Post re Removal of SharkNinja’s Precedential Status — LinkedIn (Sept. 2025)
11. Pattern of Expanding Doctrines Relating to Discretion
LinkedIn Post re Termination after FWD in Blackhawk v. Interactive — LinkedIn (March 2026)
LinkedIn Post re Application of One-and-Done in Sinclair v. Hydrafacial — LinkedIn (Feb. 2026)
LinkedIn Post on Application of Fintiv Factor 5 in Entegris v. Inpria — LinkedIn (July 2025)
LinkedIn Post re Application of Assignor Estoppel in Tessell v. Nutanix — LinkedIn (June 2025)
LinkedIn Post re Application of Settled Expectations and Proto-One-and Done in Intel v. Advanced Cluster Systems — LinkedIn (Aug. 2025)
Bastille Week Bloodbath — series — Substack (July 2025)
Another Week, Another Bloodbath — July 21, 2025
Bastille Week Bloodbath Part II — July 21, 2025
Bastille Week Bloodbath III — July 21, 2025
12. Patent Quality and the Role of IPRs
A “New Era of Honest and Informed Policy Discussion”? — Taking a closer look at the Sunwater Institute’s 7% patent error-rate claim — Substack (Feb. 5, 2026)
13. Drug Pricing and Pharmaceutical Competition
Yes C4IP, There Are Patent Thickets — Responding to Patent-Thicket Deniers — Substack (Jan. 29, 2026)
LinkedIn Post on Amgen v. BMS — LinkedIn (Aug. 2025)
LinkedIn Post on Amgen v. BMS Rehearing Request — LinkedIn (Sept. 2025)
14. Shift to Reexamination as an Alternative Path
· Gene Quinn, The Problem of Abusive Serial Challenges Using Reexaminations Needs to Be Addressed by the USPTO — IP Watchdog (March 22, 2026)
15. Executive Order Compliance and OIRA Review
Comment Submitted on One-and-Done! — Substack (Dec. 2, 2025)
16. Leadership Changes and Institutional Capacity
LinkedIn Post re Talent and Institutional Knowledge Drain at the USPTO — LinkedIn (Sept. 2025)
LinkedIn Post re Deputy Solicitor Appointment — LinkedIn (Feb. 2026)
17. Expansion of Patent Eligibility and Resulting Market Uncertainty
LinkedIn Post re Recent USPTO Guidance on Design Patent Eligibility — LinkedIn (Mar. 2026)
18. Public Advisory Committees (PPAC / TPAC)
More Lawlessness, Less Transparency at the USPTO: The Prolonged Disablement of PPAC — Substack (Jan. 4, 2026)
19. Potential Contacts with Prior Clients and Interested Parties
LinkedIn Post by Doug Pittman re Private Swearing-In Ceremony — LinkedIn (Oct.
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