This is only my opinion. I find this weak, and some big errors. Arizona law is quite clear on what grounds are available 60(b)
(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)(1); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason justifying relief.
So the talk about the merits of the case are not grounds to set aside which much of the motion goes into. And as I had expected they are relying on number 1 - excusable neglect saying it was excusable.
What is their excuse? I am still trying to figure it out. That their lawyer withdrew from the case? In March 2025? New owners/officers by July 2024 ? Huh?
And what about this that they released on April 29th, 2025
Additionally, a dedicated legal team has been engaged to protect the company's interests and reputation, including addressing actions stemming from the prior ownership and management.
That kind of says they dropped the ball.
B. HIRU Has Meritorious Defenses (Already Recognized by the Court)
1. Unauthorized signature/lack of authority (UCC § 3-403 principles). The Court previously found HIRU had a meritorious defense when it set aside default. Ex. C. Initial Disclosures (Oct. 2024) identify witnesses and facts showing Joel Natario was never an officer/director, had no board authorization to sign checks, and admitted he signed Gavin’s name on the six checks drawn on HIRU’s Chase account. Ex. P (Initial Disclosures). Board records confirm the authority changes in October 2023 (Gavin out; Vasiljevic in) and July 2024 (Al-Thani/Thorp installed), defeating any apparent authority theory tied to Gavin/Natario in 2024–2025. Exs. L–M.
Again this is not about the merits of the case but what they said is completely untrue. The court did not set aside the default because Joel Natario was never an officer/director, had no board authorization to sign checks, and admitted he signed Gavin’s name on the six checks drawn on HIRU’s Chase account. Here is the ruling. Tell me anyone where it says that?
Pending before this Court is Defendant Hiru Corporation’s (Hiru) Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default filed on January 25, 2024. The Motion has been fully briefed. An entry of default maybe set aside for good cause. 55 (c), Ariz. R. Civ. P. For the reasons set forth in this minute entry, the Court finds good cause exists to set aside the entry of default as to Hiru. The First Amended Complaint was not served on Hiru’s Statutory Agent. The First Amended Complaint was served on Kathryn Gavin (Gavin) on behalf of Hiru on October 24, 2023. Gavin resigned from Hiru on October 16, 2023, and was not authorized to accept service on behalf of Hiru. Her failure to disclose this and her failure to forward the paperwork to Hiru’s new management is not the fault of Hiru. Gavin is a codefendant who herself has failed to respond to the lawsuit and a Default Judgment has been entered against her. Her apparent failure to take this lawsuit seriously should not be imputed to Hiru. Secondly, the Application for Entry of Default was also served on Gavin on November 16, 2023. By this time, Hiru’s new officers, directors and the corporate address in Florida was of record with the Georgia Secretary of State.
Secondly, Defendant has shown each of the following elements that satisfy the requirement for setting aside entry of default. Specifically, Defendant (1) acted promptly in seeking relief from the entry of default; (2) that its failure to timely answer was due to excusable neglect; and (3) that Defendant has a meritorious defense. Richas v. Superior Crt. of Ariz. in and for Maricopa Cty., 133 Ariz. 512, 652 P.2d 1035 (1982).
Therefore, IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default.
It doesn't even mention Joel Natario. If I can find these big errors image what the Plaintiff's lawyer will come back with. This may sound good to many of you but I think it's poorly written.
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