Orwellian? Puhleeze tell me you’re not for real and are just a lame looser whose thoughts are twisted and confused - again!
“Twisting everything around while accusing the other side of doing the same... ON PURPOSE!” Yeah, right, NOT!
Case 1:24-cv-03051-RDM Document 84 Filed 08/22/25 Page 30 of 75
C. Legal Standard: Defendants Cannot Reframe Anticompetitive Conduct
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) requires that a complaint allege
enough factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Conclusory allegations are not
enough. At the pleading stage, courts must accept plaintiffs’ well-pleaded facts as true — not
defendants’ contrary spin. Defendants’ systematic reversal of the tying arrangement (identifying
Wi-Fi calling as the tied product when the SAC clearly establishes cellular services as tied) and
false misleading claims about offloading benefits constitute fundamental mischaracterizations of
Plaintiff’s factual allegations.
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Defendants are so screwed, ie., The Supreme Court & the DC Court have precedents where they Rejected the defendants request to dismiss the case based upon the Defendants’ Technical Mischaracterizations and their Technical Integration Arguments - haha! Can ya hear me now?
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IV. COURT PRECEDENTS REQUIRE DENIAL OF DISMISSAL WHEN DEFENDANTS
FUNDAMENTALLY MISCHARACTERIZE THEIR CONDUCT
A. Supreme Court Precedent: Courts Must Reject Defendants’ Technical
Mischaracterizations
In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992), Kodak argued
that its control over replacement parts was legitimate aftermarket management rather than
leveraging equipment sales to foreclose service competition. The Court held that Kodak’s
restrictive control over parts, combined with its power in the equipment market, created triable
22.
Case 1:24-cv-03051-RDM Document 84 Filed 08/22/25 Page 28 of 75
issues of fact as to whether Kodak could exploit that control to foreclose competition in service
markets. The Court rejected Kodak’s characterization of this conduct as “legitimate aftermarket
management” and allowed the claims to proceed. The Court reversed summary judgment because
defendants fundamentally mischaracterized how parts control enabled systematic foreclosure of
service competitors. SAC ¶ 372 directly parallels the analysis in Kodak: “The Defendants
maintained exclusive control over carrier-integrated Wi-Fi Calling capabilities and the network-
level infrastructure necessary to support them... effectively blocked VoIP-Pal from
commercializing its technology in the carrier-grade Wi-Fi Calling market.” Like Kodak,
defendants mischaracterize improper control of a market segment as legitimate management when
it systematically forecloses competitors.
In Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), hospital defendants
argued that requiring patients to use hospital-employed anesthesiologists was legitimate quality
control rather than unlawful tying. The Court reaffirmed that tying arrangements are unlawful
where a seller with market power in the tying product compels buyers to accept a tied product they
do not want. Here, Defendants use their market power in Wi-Fi Calling to force consumers into
bundled cellular purchases as the price of accessing Wi-Fi Calling. Their characterization of this
as “legitimate bundling” cannot overcome the tying standard where market power and coercion
are established. Defendants mischaracterize forcing consumers to buy cellular services to access
Wi-Fi calling as legitimate bundling when SAC ¶ 164 establishes it constitutes unlawful tying that,
in conjunction with platform providers, forecloses standalone Wi-Fi calling providers like VoIP-
Pal.
23.
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B. D.C. Circuit Precedent: Rejection of Technical Integration Arguments
In U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), Microsoft argued that bundling
Internet Explorer with Windows was product improvement rather than anticompetitive tying. The
Circuit Court explained that the relevant inquiry is not whether a bundled product offers some
consumer benefits, but whether the integration forecloses rivals without legitimate competitive
justification. Microsoft’s “integration” defense was rejected because it mischaracterized
exclusionary conduct as innovation. Defendants here adopt the same strategy. They describe
conditioning access to Wi-Fi Calling on bundled cellular services as “legitimate bundling,” when
in reality the practice forecloses standalone competition. SAC ¶ 71 confirms the result: “third party
apps and those that wish to compete in the VoWi-Fi market are foreclosed from offering standalone
VoWi-Fi services.” Like Microsoft, Defendants’ conduct serves no legitimate competitive end.
In United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982),
AT&T argued that its control over local telephone networks was necessary technical integration
rather than anticompetitive foreclosure of long-distance competitors. The District Court noted that
“[T]he Bell System is a vast, vertically integrated company which dominates local
telecommunications, intercity telecommunications, telecommunications research, and the
production and marketing of equipment.” Because of this, the District Court (via DOJ’s case and
the MFJ findings) concluded that this was foreclosure, not legitimate integration, and approved
structural separation to restore competition. Defendants today make the same move — portraying
OS-level and platform-level integration as “necessary,” when in fact it the Defendants are again in
essence a “vertically integrated company which dominates” standalone Wi-Fi Calling competitors
(SAC ¶ 70).
24.
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Market Data 
Markets 
