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On the reception and detection of pseudo-profound bullshit

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2023

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4 The current investigation

Here we report four studies in which we ask participants to rate pseudo-profound bullshit and other statements on a profundity scale. Our primary goal is to establish this as a legitimate measure of bullshit receptivity. For this, bullshit profundity ratings are correlated with a collection of individual difference factors that are conceptually related to pseudo-profound bullshit in a variety of ways.

4.1 Analytic thinking

Dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making distinguish between intuitive (“Type 1”) processes that are autonomously cued and reflective (“Type 2”) processes that are effortful, typically deliberative, and require working memory (Reference Evans and StanovichEvans & Stanovich, 2013). A crucial finding that has emerged from the dual-process literature is that the ability to reason involves a discretionary aspect (Reference StanovichStanovich, 2011; Reference Stanovich and WestStanovich & West, 2000); a distinction that has long historical precedent (Reference BaronBaron, 1985). Namely, to be a good reasoner, one must have both the capacity to do whatever computation is necessary (i.e., cognitive ability, intelligence) and the willingness to engage deliberative reasoning processes (i.e., analytic cognitive style; thinking disposition). Moreover, individual differences in analytic cognitive style are positively correlated with conflict detection effects in reasoning research (Reference Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler and FugelsangPennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler & Fugelsang, 2014; Reference Pennycook, Fugelsang and KoehlerPennycook, et al., 2015), indicating that more analytic individuals are either better able to detect conflict during reasoning or are more responsive to such conflict. Consistent with Sagan’s (1996) argument that critical thinking facilitates “baloney detection”, we posit that reflective thinking should be linked to bullshit receptivity, such that people who are better at solving reasoning problems should be more likely to consider the specific meaning of the presented statements (or lack thereof) and judge failure to discern meaning as a possible defect of the statement rather than of themselves. In other words, more analytic individuals should be more likely to detect the need for additional scrutiny when exposed to pseudo-profound bullshit. More intuitive individuals, in contrast, should respond based on a sort of first impression, which will be inflated due to the vagueness of the pseudo-profound bullshit. Analytic thinking is thus the primary focus of our investigation, as it is most directly related to the proposed ability to detect blatant bullshit.

4.2 Ontological confusions

Both children and adults tend to confuse aspects of reality (i.e., “core knowledge”) in systematic ways (Reference Lindeman, Svedholm-Hakkinen and LipsanenLindeman, Svedholm-Hakkinen & Lipsanen, 2015). Any category mistake involving property differences between animate and inanimate or mental and physical, as examples, constitutes an ontological confusion. Consider the belief that prayers have the capacity to heal (i.e., spiritual healing). Such beliefs are taken to result from conflation of mental phenomenon, which are subjective and immaterial, and physical phenomenon, which are objective and material (Reference Lindeman, Svedholm-Hakkinen and LipsanenLindeman, Svedholm-Hakkinen & Lipsanen, 2015). On a dual-process view, ontological confusions constitute a failure to reflect on and inhibit such intuitive ontological confusions (Reference Svedholm and LindemanSvedholm & Lindeman, 2013). Ontological confusions may also be supported by a bias toward believing the literal truth of statements. Thus, ontological confusions are conceptually related to both detection and response bias as mechanisms that may underlie bullshit receptivity. As such, the propensity to endorse ontological confusions should be linked to higher levels of bullshit receptivity.

4.3 Epistemically suspect beliefs

Beliefs that conflict with common naturalistic conceptions of the world have been labelled epistemically suspect (e.g., Lobato et al., 2014; Pennycook, Fugelsang & Koehler, in press). For example, the belief in angels (and the corresponding belief that they can move through walls) conflicts with the common folk-mechanical belief that things cannot pass through solid objects (Reference Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler and FugelsangPennycook et al., 2014). Epistemically suspect beliefs, once formed, are often accompanied by an unwillingness to critically reflect on such beliefs. Indeed, reflective thinkers are less likely to be religious and paranormal believers (e.g., Reference Gervais and NorenzayanGervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Reference Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler and FugelsangPennycook et al., 2012; Reference Shenhav, Rand and GreeneShenhav, Rand & Greene, 2012), and are less likely to engage in conspiratorial ideation (Reference Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran and FurnhamSwami et al., 2014) or believe in the efficacy of alternative medicine (Reference Browne, Thomson, Rockloff and PennycookBrowne et al., 2015; Reference LindemanLindeman, 2011). Ontological confusions are also more common among believers in the supernatural (e.g., Lindeman, Svedholm-Hakkinen & Lipsanen, 2015; Reference Svedholm and LindemanSvedholm & Lindeman, 2013). Although epistemically suspect claims may or may not themselves qualify as bullshit, the lack of skepticism that underlies the acceptance of epistemically suspect claims should also promote positive bullshit receptivity.

5 Study 1

We presented participants with ten statements that have syntactic structure but that consist of a series of randomly selected vague buzzwords. Participants were asked to indicate the relative profundity of each statement on a scale from 1 (not at all profound) to 5 (very profound). We argue that high ratings indicate receptivity toward bullshit. Participants also completed a series of relevant cognitive and demographic questions.

6 Method

In all studies, we report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, and all measures.

6.1 Participants

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/judgment-and-decision-making/article/on-the-reception-and-detection-of-pseudoprofound-bullshit/0D3C87BCC238BCA38BC55E395BDC9999

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