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Six Questions for Robert Young Pelton

Posted on Thursday, September 7, 2006. By Ken Silverstein.

Robert Young Pelton is a writer and filmmaker who has worked in war zones, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Liberia. He is the author of the bestselling World's Most Dangerous Places and the newly released License to Kill, about the growing use of private contractors by the armed forces of the United States and other nations. Pelton estimates that there are currently about 70,000 hired guns in Iraq alone (about half Iraqi and half expatriates) and that private military contracting is now a $100 billion industry. I recently asked him a series of questions about the origins of the industry, where it's headed, and how contractors have performed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

1. What accounts for the rapid growth in the government's use of private military contractors?

The post–Cold War trend to outsource military responsibility to the private sector began in 1992 when then–Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney hired Brown and Root (now KBR) to demonstrate how private industry could allow an expeditionary military to downsize. In this scenario, civilian contractors were unarmed, did not wear military uniforms, and were protected by the military. In the days after 9/11, the CIA started pulling people out of retirement, “sheep dipping” active special operations soldiers, and hiring civilian contractors—just like they did in the bad old days of the secret war in Laos, in Nicaragua during the 1980s, and elsewhere. The opening of the war on terror in Afghanistan essentially opened the market for these types of services on a more widespread scale, and then after Iraq the industry just exploded. At every step, the U.S. government's increasing employment of hired guns has been necessary in order to buy the manpower required to advance the U.S. agenda. However, it should not be forgotten that outsourcing to civilians also allows the type of deniable, opaque, and unaccountable activities that led to a number of abuses outlined in the Church-Pike reports.

2. Have contractors generally performed support and infrastructure work, or have they been moving into more sensitive areas like interrogations and “black ops” for American intelligence agencies?

The bulk of the private security business is mundane, such as protecting personnel and facilities. There simply aren't enough troops in Iraq to protect all the contractors involved in the reconstruction. Much of the “black” work done by private contractors is simple site and personnel security for the CIA and other agencies. But we have begun to privatize PsyOps, occupation work, intelligence, the interrogation process, and PR and media work. The problem with contractors performing these sensitive tasks is that the corporations who perform these functions are not accountable to the American public. Not surprisingly, no one knows for sure how often contractors are used for black ops. Blackwater has said that about 15% of its business is “black” or classified.

3. Have private contractors committed extensive abuses in Iraq or Afghanistan or are there just isolated incidents? In cases where abuses have been committed, have contractors been held accountable?

The entire concept that we must hire American and foreigners to “do our dirty work” by replacing the military with “neo-mercenaries” has engendered negative feelings among Iraqis and Afghans. It has not helped that the hard-rolling, guns-up, aggressive style of security convoys in Iraq have instilled a real sense of fear and resentment. The military operations usually are concentrated in expected areas, but an Iraqi might just be going to work and have the misfortune of driving too close to a security convoy. I don't think it's unreasonable to estimate that accidental shootings happen on a daily basis. I have personally witnessed numerous questionable incidents similar to those in the infamous AEGIS PSD trophy video in my ride-alongs with various companies. David Passaro, the CIA contractor in Afghanistan who was convicted of beating to death a detainee, is thus far the only contractor who has been held accountable for violent crimes. The Bush Administration's intentional perpetuation of an environment of legal permissiveness with regard to security contractor-rendered violence is one of the most morally offensive dirty secrets of this war.

4. Have private firms been able to win contracts through political connections, as often happens in Washington, or is politics kept out of the contracting process?

Industry members have told me that the company that wins a given contract is often determined by the writing of the contract and the specifications for the contract. If the CIA creates an “urgent and compelling” need, a multi-million dollar contract can be handed to a crony without bid. Not surprisingly the PMC world is a right-wing, pro-military, pro-Republican environment.

5. Will the use of contractors continue to grow and is it likely that they will become more commonly used in direct, offensive military operations?

There is no indication that the military and intelligence community has any incentive to reduce their reliance on the private sector. Erik Prince of Blackwater has already announced his 1,740 man private army. It comes complete with gun ships, fighter-bombers, armored vehicles, and intelligence. He calls it “Relief with Teeth” and is hoping that the United States or the United Nations will hire his army to buttress or even replace intervention and stability operations. Prince's biggest customer is the U.S. government, and he is careful not to jeopardize that relationship, but the war on terror has created a massive labor pool of combat-hardened professionals who have a much higher monetary value in the private sector with guns in their hands. There have been examples—like the coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea—in which investors, contractors, and mercenaries tried to effect “regime change” with naked self-interest in mind. So if an investor or world leader wants to hire his own proxy army, this new, informal and massive “old boys network” can provide them the capability.

6. Can private contractors sometimes be a good option?

It is my opinion that the enemy we are fighting is in essence a privatized military organization, and it makes perfect sense to rethink how we fight war. Under ideal conditions, including proper oversight, private contractors are a perfect short-term disposable resource because they come with training and experience, and do not create a long-term burden on taxpayers. Security contractors earn $350 to $1,200 a day for their services, but there is no long-term housing for their families, or pensions, or health care. Most Western personnel in Iraq and even 700 members of the Iraqi government require security contractors just to stay alive, so they are not a “good” option—they are mandatory. The one place that private contractors could be an especially good option is as a replacement for the currently broken UN peacekeeping machinery. Competing national interests always paralyze the deployment of peacekeepers. If the United Nations had contracts for a rapid-reaction force to be ready to deploy within weeks of a Security Council vote, a privatized force could act as an immediate stabilizer—assuming amenable local political conditions—and stay in place until the UN could form a more extensive force for a long-term operation. This, of course, could never happen until after exhaustive debate about the legal jurisdiction such a force would fall under, the standards they would be held to, and the mandate of their operation.

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This is Six Questions for Robert Young Pelton by Ken Silverstein, published Thursday, September 7, 2006. It is part of Washington Babylon, which is part of Harpers.org.

© 2006 Harper's Magazine Foundation

http://www.harpers.org/sb-six-questions-robert-young-pelton-1157654152.html