AI
Monday, September 18, 2006 4:51:58 AM
Six Blunders We Made In Iraq We Can Still Fix
Marshall Adame
August 27, 2006
When I arrived in Iraq in mid 2003 as the newly appointed Coalition Airport Director for Basrah International Airport I was sure that what we, the US led coalition, had just done by invading Iraq, was a good thing. I likened our arrival in Iraq to the rescuing of people in a burning building. It was risky and it brought with it ramifications that no-one could predict. Our arrival in Iraq was a rescue effort of the highest degree, long overdue and welcomed by the Iraqi citizens who had suffered so greatly under the Saddam regime. Our president told the world that we were there to “do the right thing” and I believed him. I also felt an awareness of the incredible commitment we brought with us. We entered Iraq without invitation; consequently our commitment had to be whole and complete. The Iraqi citizens, owed us nothing, we owed them our word of honor that our presence was on their behalf. I mean it. This is how I felt, in fact, I still feel this commitment to these suffering people, who’s daily trials and woes, for many reasons, have increased ten fold since our arrival.
During the early days of the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA) Paul Bremmer [sic - Bremer - further instances not noted] reigned. With an entire country to save, it seemed to me the whole preoccupation of the CPA in the Baghdad Palace, in 2003, was the health and comfort of Paul Bremmer. All else took a distant second. I was bewildered by the priorities the Coalition was exercising.
There were some USAID Local Governance Program teams out in several Iraq Provinces who were trying hard to make a real difference and I think they actually did begin to develop real and significant relationships with the Iraqi Provincial Governments primarily because the leadership and direction was coming through USAID. It seemed that the further away from Baghdad, the more effective the program.
Through all appearances, the US and Coalition Military forces were operating with no present or direct civilian guidance, oversight, or control. Even the civilian departments of the CPA were each running their own operations with little or no apparent oversight. The difficult military mission was being brilliantly accomplished by the generals and our magnificent military forces, but a large part of the civilian mission, which should have been staffed and led by Department of State (DoS) professionals, was also being left to the same military who were, for need to fight the battle, quite ill-prepared to start nation building, a mission far removed from fighting a war against terrorism.
US Department of State civilian direction, guidance and leadership was, and still is, crucial to the Governance capacity building part of restoring the Iraqi government and its institutions. The military found themselves in charge of the civilian mission by default and, as good soldiers do, they proceeded to do the mission however ill-equipped and wrongly appointed they were to do it.
No one admires or respects our military forces more than I. I am a retired US Marine and the father of two Army soldiers in Iraq, one wounded on 2 July 2006 in Baqubah while on patrol. The US Military is awesome as a military force, but their forte is to be a military force, not a force meant to build civil institutions.
Mistakes were made from the beginning, big mistakes. The Coalition school of thought followed that rebuilding, refurbishment and large infrastructure projects were the most important requirements. Vigorous Iraqi job programs, civil programs, city assistance, provincial governance teams, civilian medical care, food programs and housing starts, although present to a very small degree, were not considered as important. The funding to those immediate need projects was miniscule in comparison to the billions being allocated for the vast infrastructure projects which brought no immediate relief to the people, but became a cash cow for US and British contractors. Almost none of the US dollars being pumped into Iraq went to projects that would stimulate the Iraqi economy, or put bread on an Iraqi table. The needs of the Iraqi people were, seemingly, not a serious consideration. Immediate employment programs, aid to families with children, and other programs which would have included the average Iraqi citizen and incorporated their abilities, time and talent were simply absent to any discernable level.
The security environment was not nearly as serious as it is now, but even then, the coalition still found a way to keep the Iraqi population at arms length. With billions of dollars coming into the country, hiring Iraqis to work with the Coalition was all but forbidden. Although some Iraqi labor was used, we brought in thousands of third world laborers, all but freezing out the Iraqis as the major labor pool. That practice of excluding Iraqis, for the most part, still exists today. In this regard, Paul Bremmer’s leadership was dismal and his early made policies probably contributed to the present insurgency which, at that time, was considered insignificant.
In this thought piece I am listing six of the serious issues in Iraq I feel we did not address appropriately in the early days of the war which are consequently haunting us today.
Six things which have had, or may have disastrous consequences. Six things which can still be remedied. Each has its own story of indecision, mismanagement and disregard for the Iraqi people and their interest. Because I have been in Iraq for the most part of the past three years I could share many first hand incidences and stories of wonderful and unfortunate events having happened here. Stories of individual sacrifice, heroism, compassion and generosity as well as those of greed, callousness, cruelty and cowards. In this case however I will remain on the surface issues of each area I discuss. The issues are described and discussed based on my own personal experience and perspective.
1. The Iraq Ministry of Interior (MOI) development and assistance
Problem: US Department of State is charged with policy and oversight responsibilities related to our work in the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI). The MOI is a civilian ministry responsible for police, customs, science and technology, property, state owned enterprises, boarder guards, education structures, housing and construction all over Iraq. The MOI is the single largest civilian ministry in Iraq. Its structured viability as a civilian institution would be critical in Iraq’s emergence as a democratic society. Incredibly, the responsibility to revive the MOI into a credible civilian Ministry was turned over to our military, Multinational Force (MNF), who were at the least, ill-prepared to develop civil institutions. Additionally, although there are many military assistance programs in place, primarily for the police and security forces, there are no Ministerial Governance programs in the MOI to assist in the develop this civilian institution. Consequently, the MOI, as it exists today in 2006, is almost the mirror image of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. The MOI today lacks any semblance of a civilian controlled institution. We, the coalition have essentially militarized the single Ministry in Iraq charged with the responsibility for almost all civil institutions and structure in Iraq. With the exception of the minister himself, the leadership of the MOI is made up of military generals, retired and active duty. It was the US military generals who decided, through advisory influence, on who would control the MOI and it was all of us who looked the other way while these Iraqi generals, led by the Minister, trampled all over the rights and liberties of the good Iraqi people. Many of whom worked with us in the MOI and lived in fear of ever coming to the attention of the Minister. An Iraqi Minister of Interior (now Minister of Finance) with an Iranian passport which, as far as I am aware, he has not relinquished to this day.
On one occasion in 2005 I was with the Army Maj. Gen who was at the time the Director General for Logistics for the MOI when he received an order to issue one thousand AK47s to a Muslim cleric (Imam). The order was signed by the Minister. When he rightly refused, he was immediately jailed by order of the Minister. Although advised to stay out of it, I made an issue of his unlawful imprisonment and he was released soon after. Later he told me that had I not brought the issue into the light of American scrutiny, he feels he would have most certainly been killed. Shortly after his release two failed assassination attempts were made on his life which took the lives of his brother and two nephews. He is now retired and still living in Iraq.
Through some misguided thinking by the CPA/DoS and the American Military in Iraq, during 2003/2004, the non-military mission of Governance capacity building, Focus Stabilization in cities, police development and training was assigned or just assumed by the American Military (Okay, the Coalition). No one ever questioned our military’s capacity to oversee and manage this normally exclusive domain of civilians in any successful country.
After taking over from the CPA, the US State Department (DoS) recognized the need, but lacked the financial resources and the will to carry out the mission of assisting the emergence of the MOI as a viable civilian institution. Surprisingly little or no effort was made by the DoS through the Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) to retain the mission and be resourced to operate accordingly. Because our government had allocated the bulk of financial resources to the Department of Defense, the DOD had the assets so they, qualified or not, were given the job. The military accepted the mission. Consequently our military set up commands in the Ministry of Interior in the very same way they had set up the Ministry of Defense. Thinking in terms of a “cookie cutter solution” our coalition Military (MNSTC-I), began developing the MOI in the image of the MOD resulting in a highly militarized MOI which has no real military mission in Iraq. Distinguishing the differences between police powers and military powers, apparently, was never a consideration.
Today the MOI is a very powerful military / police force deep in accusations of ethnic cleansing and human rights violations against the Sunni minority and others in Iraq. Many of the MOI Iraqi Police commanders are former and active Shia Iraqi Army Officers who previously had never held a civilian or Police post or position in their working lives. All this through guidance and with assets provided by the USA. The DoD may showcase the “Civilian” Police Trainers primarily provided by DynCorp, but the fact is DynCorp, as the contracted member, takes its lead from the DoD liaison officers assigned to them. The DynCorp trainers train. That is all. The activity in and around Iraqi Police stations, is to the greatest degree, dictated by the Coalition liaison officers and troops assigned to them. Where there is no regular presence of coalition troops, the militias, in many cases, have the fullest support of the local police. This constant coalition presence however does not apply to the Southern regions of Iraq where the British have exercised carte blanche in their relationship with the Iraqi police and provincial governments.
The British, in the execution of their mission of defending the Iraqis in the southern four provinces of Iraq, for various reasons, one being lack of oversight from Baghdad, have managed to alienate, not only the Basrah Iraqi Police, but the Governates members as well. I personally credit the British inaction and cultural superciliousness with the rising influence of the militias and others in Basrah. Since 2003 the Iraqis in Basrah have found it very difficult and at times humiliating in their efforts to work with the British there. The militia’s willingness to respect certain parameters relative to the provincial government and police, evidently, has proven somewhat more amenable to the local and provincial officials than the British approach which recognized none. It appears that the militia was just easier to work with. Recently (2006) the Basrah Governing officials have begun dialoging with the British once again. That is a good sign, but the influence of the MOI control over the national police in that region has been severely diminished while the Sadar militia influence grows. It didn’t have to happen that way.
From my personal vantage point I saw no Coalition effort to stop the corrupt or illegal activities of the MOI allegedly being directed by the Minister of Interior (Jabar) who reportedly maintained very close ties to Iran. (In 2006 Minister Jabar is the new Minister of Finance). The Minister was neck deep in allegations of corruption from directing death squads to financial impropriety. The Command element made up from American and British general officers were too preoccupied with making their own mark to be bothered. Each American and British Coalition military general I knew in the MOI seemingly wanted something great to happen on his watch, consequently many thoughtless decisions were made in the hopes of hitting a significant or historical home run. In one instance a senior American Lt. General was shown an aerial photograph of hundreds of brand new SUVs and trucks parked at the Iraqi southern port of Um Qazar in Basrah. He asked why all those vehicles were there and was told that the vehicles were going to be given to the Iraqi Police throughout Iraq through a process named Project Daytona (courtesy of the US Taxpayer), which I was personally involved in. The General was also told that no spare parts were ordered for any of the 8,600 cars either on the way, or already here in Iraq.
The General didn’t like the idea of how the presence of so many vehicles just sitting in the port might look, so he ordered the vehicles dispersed and issued to the Iraqi police throughout Iraq. With no spare parts and no maintenance facilities, or plans to order the spare parts, or build the maintenance facilities, the order was carried out, and the state of the art vehicles were dispersed throughout Iraq. This included dozens of factory armored Mercedes Benz sedans. Today there is no sure accounting for the vehicles but last I heard, more than 50% were missing and 50% of the remainder were no longer in service. It was recently said that a plan to build maintenance facilities is on the planning boards. Actually, IRMO (DoS) representatives working at the MOI had, in July 2005, created and submitted a very comprehensive country wide vehicle maintenance plan to MNSTC-I specifically to address this problem. It was looked at by MNSTC-I J4 and never acted on. Very similar instances occurred with weapon systems as well. Thousands of weapons provided by Uncle Sam are unaccounted for. This General was also known for providing weapons to the Minister of Interior with little or no accountability through his MNSTC-I command element. On one occasion I personally sent a verbal message to this same general through one of his aides, a colonel who happened to be attending a meeting I was also attending. I told the colonel to tell the general “Sir, you are arming the enemy by providing weapons directly to the Minister without accountability”. Although that message was never acknowledged, two days after having sent the message, the general sent out a message to MNSTC-I ordering the accountability for all weapons being issued. A little late.
The development of the MOI, as it has occurred thus far, has been dismal and, if continued, will not bode well for the Iraqi people or their future. The Iraqi MOI today is a child of our coalition forces who never made the distinction between civilian and military institutions. Coalition failure to influence the structure and civilian control over and throughout the Ministry of Interior is unconscionable and will prove to be a major detractor to a stable democracy; however that democracy develops in Iraq. The US Department of State should have vigorously objected to the military authority over the development of the Ministry of Interior. As far as I know, that never happened.
The presence of the Department of State in a management and oversight position and USAID Governance Programs could have, and probably would have created a civil organization within the MOI grounded in a standard which recognized and understood the fundamental importance of civil governance, rule of law, and management structure. Although there is a DOS presence in the MOI, those working there are under the complete control of the Coalition MNSTC-I command through an agreement between the US Embassy and Multinational Command. The development and current condition of the MOI has lent itself to being a recipe for a coup.
The most viable fix: Assign civilian (DoS) oversight and policy decision making authority related to any US participation with the MOI and MOD (Today the MOD exercises excessive influence in the MOI). The DoS is well suited for this responsibility. The military presently advising the MOI require oversight and should be placed in a strictly subordinate role to the DoS in all matters pertaining to the further development and assistance to the MOI. Additionally, install USAID Local Governance programs in the MOI, through the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), for civil, economic and governance capacity building instruction and mentoring in addition to the active assistance of the DoS office of the Ministerial Coordination Team (MCT) who’s mission it is to ensure the successful delivery of Ministerial Capacity Development by:
– Coordinating and supporting the Capacity Development efforts of the IRMO Senior Consultants’ Ministerial Advisory Teams (MAT)
– Ensuring that elements of the national capacity development initiative co-ordinate effectively.
– Bench-marking progress being made in strengthening ministerial capacity.
Reallocate CERP appropriations to fund the USAID and State Department programs. Give the MOI and MOD US Dept. of State Senior Advisors authority over all US activity in the MOI and US logistics efforts and assistance in the MOD. US DoS civilians must have the ability to prevent any inappropriate activity or assistance from the US Military and coalition forces. The fact is, it might already be too late.
2. Basrah Airport and thereabouts
Basrah is Iraq’s second largest city of 2.5 million people. Basrah has Iraq’s only sea port, a border with a valuable trading partner Kuwait, and a well designed and viable International Airport with the potential of becoming the greatest cargo hub in Iraq. It also has the largest oil deposits in Iraq. Basrah possesses the potential to exceed any economic or social development design being considered in any part of Iraq, including Baghdad.
Problem: The British government, through their Military commanders and the acquiescence of the Coalition authorities, fully occupied the Basrah International Airport in 2003. By 2005 they had increased their occupation throughout the airport infrastructure to the point of making, for all practical purposes, the entire airport a British Air Base. Today, in 2006, the entire airport, specifically every single infrastructure element of the airport, is a strictly operated Military Base. The main terminal and the engineering building are occupied, but not controlled, by the Iraqi Airport Director and his employees who normally wait as long as three hours just to get into the gate of the base each day. The British have even placed a sign at the entrance calling it “Basrah Air Base”. Just recently, the British announced that they will move an additional 2,000 troops onto the airport although for the past three years they had been assuring the Iraqis they would be vacating the airport “in the very near future”. I have personally attended meetings between the Iraqis and the British where this assurance was given. The vast majority of the water supply from the Iraqi airport water plant (owned, operated and maintained by Iraqis and repaired by USAID), has been diverted for British Forces use and now flows through newly British installed filtering units which, although taking most of the Iraqi water plant water, provides no benefit to the Iraq area of the airport property. In effect, the British Government has decided that Iraq’s second largest city does not need a viable airport. The few commercial flights that are “allowed” by the British, through no authority or control by the Iraqis, is what the British call an “active Airport”. The British, over the past three years have made few, if any, significant improvements to the Airport infrastructure or to its future as an Iraqi commercial use area. US contracts have performed virtually all major contracting work on the airport. British financed projects, primarily, were done to benefit the British army or other British entities.
The British RAF and the British Army have made the Basrah airport their main base in the south of Iraq. The infrastructure of the airport served their purpose, was convenient and not to mention free of charge. (Even though there is a large and developed base nearby called Shieba Base). On one occasion in 2003, in my capacity as CPA Airport Director, I actually felt the need to communicate, via email, with the British Legal office in Basrah wherein I was complaining about the British Army looting of the airport and an even more serious issue which I cannot discuss in this paper. The disinterested email reply I received from the British Army legal office in Basrah was disheartening. (The disheartening demeanor displayed by the British in this matter did not go unnoticed by the Iraqis).
The British have since built up their presence in the Airport even though there is no mission requirement for the presence of the British Army in the Airport. All airport security is provided by the Royal Air force who do provide some air traffic assistance and training to the Iraqis, but even that is minimal to the point of not justifying their presence en masse.
In Contrast, when the US ground forces occupied Baghdad International Airport in 2003, they immediately began the planning to occupy the far side of the airport property, far from the commercial facilities, so to allow the immediate refurbishment and commercialization of the Baghdad airport and its infrastructure. The terminal buildings, fuel farms, support hangars and other buildings were vacated by US military forces and the Airport, and all the materials and property which had been inventoried and stored, was eventually and fully turned over to the Iraqis in late 2004. Today, you will find no US military personnel assigned in the commercial terminals or commercial cargo areas of the Baghdad Airport. The Iraqis have complete control and are operating as a civilian commercial entity. In 2003 the British were giving the Basrah Government and Airport officials the same assurance of leaving the Airport soon. It never happened. (It is my personal opinion that in the near future, the British will announce the closing of Shieba Base and will exclusively occupy the airport. I believe this action will provoke the Iraqis in Basrah and the Provincial Government).
The most viable fix (with a little background): The British Army should announce that they have decided, for Basrah’s sake, to remove all British Army forces from the Airport and move them to Sheiba base. The foot print of the RAF should also be reduced substantially and removed from all infrastructure areas of the airport. Portable Air Traffic control tower units can be placed on the unoccupied far side of the airport for British flight operations. (Perhaps an agreement with the Basrah Iraqi Tower Authority for dual use of the tower, similar to the arrangement the US has with the Iraqis in Baghdad can be arranged). A refurbishment and replacement project needs to be funded through CERP or other funds to replace the airport support equipment deliberately or accidentally destroyed by the British forces. (The Basrah Airport was not occupied through force. The airport fire trucks and other airport emergency vehicles and support equipment were damaged deliberately by the British forces in May 2003 as documented by the RAF). New or used refurbished airport fire trucks should be sent to Basrah. The Coalition should contract a management company to assist in the full commercialization, and management training for the Airport and its infrastructure development. The DoS Senior Advisor to the Transportation Ministry should be tasked to oversee all of the development funded with US and Kuwaiti money (If we can talk them into it. Why? It has been the Kuwaitis who have stepped up to the plate to get many Basrah residents to the Haage in Saudi Arabia. It was Kuwait who provided the much needed fuel to Iraq and the Coalition for over two years. It is Kuwait who has afforded free flow passage across its boarders with Iraq to the coalition, and it should be the Kuwaitis who declare, with the Iraqis, the new relationship of mutual support and assistance between Kuwait International Airport and Basrah International Airport).
The North gate (Main entrance) to the airport should be totally vacated by British troops and replaced by the Iraq Army troops of the 10th IA Division and augmented by the Basrah Iraqi police, and border police. These Iraqi entities have a great and mutual interest in the operation of a successful commercial airport in Basrah. The “hotel”, a building now being used as the British HQ just in front of the Main Airport Terminal should be immediately vacated and all upgrades or repairs and furniture kept in place. (In 2003 all of the furnishings in the Main Terminal building office spaces, not useful to the British forces, were removed from the terminal and burned. Much of this furniture was the personal property of the airport employees. No compensation was ever paid or offered).
Coalition members, more amenable to the Iraqis in the south (US persons), should be the primary interface for logistics, training, support and civil action. They can be assigned to Basrah and located either on Sheiba base with the British or on the Iraqi Army base of the 10th Division currently posted on a newly built base just outside of the city. A vigorous Iraqi led information campaign targeted at the plan to rebuild the Basrah economic base (the Ports area and the Airport). It should be augmented by large scholarship programs and vocational training programs. Additionally a campaign to inform the population of Basrah of the Iraqi Governments intent to fully assist the Iraqi Minster of Transportation in opening the Basrah Airport and assisting in its ICAO certification process. As for their part, the Iraqi Minister of Transportation should insist on the coalition forces removal from the commercial side of the airport and invite them to resettle on the opposite side as was accomplished in Baghdad.
However unfortunate, I believe the relationship between the British Army and the Iraqis in Basrah is irreconcilable. The opportunity the British had to make a real difference to the Iraqis in Basrah has passed. Any trust and confidence between the two which may have existed in the distant past is gone.
(Financial assistance and logistic support to assist and hasten the British forces in moving from the Basrah airport should be provided by the Coalition).
3. Prisoners and Prisons
Problem: From 2003 until today our coalition forces have captured or killed some of the most dangerous people in the world. These people will never have the opportunity to hurt anyone else in Iraq or anywhere. That’s the good news. The bad news is that in the process of combing Iraq for bad guys, field commanders, for one reason or another, and at times indiscriminately, have confined many men and women without any specific charges or reasons that can be remembered or recorded. We have, in essence, deprived many people of their liberty with out any real reason or purpose. As a result the coalition now faces the problem of building more prisons even with the knowledge that a very large percentage of the detainees are most likely not ever going to be charged with a crime and may in fact be not guilty of any crime other than being in the wrong place at the wrong time or having the wrong friend or relative. The possibility here is that we may have separated innocent fathers from their wives and children, sons from their families, daughters from their only source of protection and support and in the process created many more enemies. Consequently the coalition has, without charge or specific reason, confined many innocent people and deprived them, without cause, of the very liberties we came here to preserve. Even in war, the principles of due process, within reason, must be upheld.
The most viable fix: The New Iraqi Prime Minister should announce an immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners that fall into certain categories (not including those captured in hostilities or known to be involved in hostile activities).
Categories: All Handicapped * All prisoners over 50 years old * All only sons * All women not specifically charged but have been confined for over 60 days * All confined persons under the age of 16 * All detainees in any juvenile facility in Iraq * All females under the age of 18 not specifically charged with a violent crime against Iraqi or Coalition forces.(Not to include the charge of “throwing rocks”) * All Imams, Sunni and Shia, not specifically charged with a violent crime, conspiracy to commit a violent crime, or aiding and abetting the enemy * All persons confined for misdemeanors or petty theft or confined for the reason of failure to pay a debt.
(The June 2006 announcement by PM Maliki of the planned release of 2,500 detainees in Iraqi and Coalition prison facilities was a great start and better late than never, but the numbers of prisoners remaining is staggering, many of whom still having not been told why they were detained. The Coalition, being responsible for the vast majority of the detainments, should be concentrating on a means to provide the process by which the rest can be either charged and held, or simply released and compensated for having their liberties violated without cause. The planning effort should not be on building new prisons to hold people who will ultimately be released with out charge. This equates to simply leaving the problem to the new government). Any release schedules should not be conditioned on political timing as those recently announced. Depriving anyone of his or her liberty, even for a short time for a political advantage, should be unconscionable to those of us who enjoy protections from that very thing.
Every person in these release categories and never charged should be released with a letter of assurance that they are not considered criminal or enemies of Iraq, $500US or $15US per everyday of confinement (which ever is greater) and assured transportation home. They should not necessarily be required to sign any renouncement of violence since the only violence having occurred may have been our violence against them in the process of arrest and detainment. They should be asked to sign an acknowledgement that they may have been detained wrongly due to unpredictable circumstances brought on by the hostilities occurring in Iraq and that they understand that the county if Iraq does not classify them as having a criminal record of any kind as a result of their arrest and confinement.
(Two of my soldier sons came to Iraq and one was wounded during a battle in Baqubah. I would like them to believe we all serve for the preservation of very specific principles and rules of behavior regarding other human beings, even during war. We do not herald our principles of liberty because we are strong, rather we are strong because of our belief and respect for these principles. If we sacrifice the very principles of inalienable rights that define who we are, then we sacrifice our right to defend the helpless. We will have surrendered our banner of hope and liberty).
4. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)
Wrongly named, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams are actually Provincial Governance Teams organized for the purpose of assisting, mentoring and developing “governance capacity building” at the provincial level throughout Iraq. As a tool for governance capacity building construction projects are developed by the Iraqi Provincial councils and their appointed Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee (PRDC) and are funded through the PRTs. All USAID Local Governance Programs are monitored and reported through the PRTs located in each province. The potential of the PRTs is great in furthering the Iraqi understanding and acceptance of civil governance, city planning, economics, rule of law and community (civil) responsibility and the operation of Focus Stabilization programs. The problem is the DoS has relied on the good will of the DoD to fund the PRTs throughout Iraq. In early 2005 an agreement between the DoS and General Casey, Commander of all Coalition Multinational Forces, was made in Baghdad to support the PRTs to the fullest extent in Iraq. A cable was released to that effect. The DoS assumed then full cooperation and support from the subordinate commands in Iraq for the PRTs. Only when the DoS finally agreed, in mid 2006, to fund some of the support for the PRTs did the DoD finally agree to fully cooperate in fully supporting the effort.
(Today, according to the MNF-I lawyers in Iraq, support for the PRTs utilizing DoD assets is illegal despite a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) of 11 May 2004 authorizing and even directing such support. As a direct consequence of that initial DoS miscalculation of willing cooperation and funding from DoD, the PRTs are behind schedule, under-funded and overly reliant on the DoD whose primary mission is, at times, diametrically opposed to the PRT mission requirement).
The Military commanders in Iraq are focused on pulling out of as many forward operating bases (FOBs) as possible and turning them over to the Iraqi Military forces. Support of the PRTs may, but not always, extend the coalition service where they are trying to curtail coalition presence. Generally speaking the DoD has kept their support very low level. Enough attention to show support to the Secretary of State, but too little to allow the PRTs to function at full capacity throughout Iraq. Road blocks and stalls are common. The DoD knows the PRTs are on a finite time table and seemingly are holding out until somebody (DoS) finally calls it a failed effort or fully funds itself. The PRT program is even poorly supported by the DoS itself for many reasons including that the PRTs are under the authority of IRMO. Whether they would admit it or not, there is a certain disdain of IRMO by regular DoS Foreign Service employees who do not consider the appointed “3161 category” DoS employee as a “real” member of the DoS. As a result, it is commonly believed DoS (Foreign Service Officers) do not enthusiastically work in the interest of IRMO, ergo the PRTs. Any IRMO failure in Iraq is a feather in the hat of those DoS nay-Sayers who, for political reasons, have always opposed IRMO operations being associated with the foreign service area of DoS, or with the DoS at all.
The most viable fix: The Department of State must partially fund the PRTs through IRMO and its subordinate office, the National Coordination Team (NCT), which has the supervisory authority over all PRTs in Iraq. The manpower allocation for the PRTs must be strengthened and all PRT Team Leaders assigned over each PRT in the Provinces must be Senior Foreign Officers of the State Department. DoS needs to acknowledge the costs associated with the successful execution of the PRTS and request the operational support appropriation necessary to carry out the mission. The DoD must be given the mandate to support, to their greatest capacity, every PRT in Iraq where there is a DoS employee assigned. None of the DoD support should be on a “reimbursable” basis and every field commander should be provided a written field directive to ensure total support to the PRT in his area of operation. The Civil Affairs (CA) forces, although “direct support” to the PRTs, should have a military officer assign to the PRT who carries the OPCON authority over the CA forces. The mandate to the DoD relative to PRT support must be direct and unambiguous. That clear actionable mandate does not exist today. Short of this, the prospects for real measurable success across the board for the PRTs are dismal.
5. Juvenile Detainment Centers and Women’s prisons
Problem: In Iraq, there are a few Juvenile detention centers filled with children, some of whom have never been charged with a crime and others who, for lack of someone to pick them up have been held in confinement. Reports of physical and other abuse have been made and it seems the Coalition considers this issue “not our urgent business”. Our responsibility or not, any and all abuses or illegal activity reported from those facilities will be laid at the door of the USA who will take the brunt of responsibility. The issue here is Children. These are not hardened criminals or terrorists. In today’s Iraq, the very notion of a juvenile detention center is draconian. I would consider this a “no brainier” but that is not the prevailing school of thought.
The most viable fix:
1. Release every single child, under the age of 16 from any and all “Juvenile” detention centers in Iraq.
2. Restructure every juvenile facility into vocational schools and training centers.
3. Fund the expansion or establishment of vocational training centers in every provincial capital in an effort to develop a work ethic in the idle and poor youth through out Iraq.
4. Create an Iraqi “Youth Jobs Corp” program.
5. Create Iraqi assistance “welfare” program for single mothers, widows, aged and handicapped Iraqi citizens who are all too often left with responsibility for the children.
6. Provide incentives to those contracted with the coalition to utilize the Iraqi labor force.
7. Create massive scholarship programs, through assistance and cooperation of Egypt, Jordan, Dubai and Kuwait to fund Iraqi youth education in Iraq and for Iraqis who may be sent outside of Iraq for educational purposes.
6. Jobs Programs
Problem: The Coalition has expended billions of dollars in construction projects all over Iraq. Although, to a small degree, the Iraqi work force has been utilized, they have not nearly benefited as they should have from these expenditures which could have provided incredible employment opportunities all over Iraq for Iraqis. For “security” reasons (a term often used for anything we don’t want to explain or justify), the Coalition brought thousands of foreign workers into Iraq to fill labor positions. The military prevented the hiring of Iraqis on many very large construction projects and created circumstances and policies which made it all but impossible for contractors to hire Iraqis. It is my belief that we went way overboard with this perception of the Iraqis, as a population, being the enemy or dangerous to the coalition.
(I do not think there is a single recorded instance of a vetted Iraqi “legitimate” employee, working with the coalition, having committed a violent act against his employer. The violent acts against forces on Forward Operating Bases (FOB) have occurred through infiltration of the enemy onto a FOB).
The most viable fix:
1. The creation and immediate establishment of an Iraqi Job Corps which will organize, categorize and match Iraqi labor pools in each province with Iraqi Government and foreign assistance projects.
2. The creation of vocational training centers in each province of Iraq. Certification programs and skill validation certification processes should be developed to officially recognize the experience level of skilled journeymen and levels below that master skill designation.
FOCUS: The coalition focus on large Corps of Engineer infrastructure projects must be replaced with a focus on immediate impact and assistance projects effecting the population on personal levels. I do not believe that it was ever the mission of the Coalition to actually build the infrastructure of Iraq. That was not and should not have become our mission. By whatever name one may want to call it, the Coalition has been, and continues to be, very occupied with infrastructure development of Iraq. In that vein, one would have thought that developing airports, the port area (The port has in fact been extensively repaired), rail and strong borders would have been at the top of the list of things to do. Not so. Only one airport, Baghdad, actually received real priority assistance. The second largest airport, Basrah is still not turned over to the Iraqis and is being used as the Headquarters for the British (The USA has done some repairs at Basrah airport. The British have, for the most part, only consumed the Iraqi assets at the airport). Najaf has been left to the Iraqis to fix and they (the Iraqis) seem to be doing a very good job of preparing that airport for commercial operations. Iran has offered assistance for Najaf Airport. The Border Security Forces, controlled by the MOI, has received the least support assets from either the Iraqi government or the coalition. These boarder forts guard the boarders between Iraq and its hostile neighbors Syria and Iran. The border forts, in some cases, are remote and manned by ill-equipped forces that, at times, have even gone without pay, food or water deliveries from the Ministry of Interior which has not normally considered them a high priority, especially along the boarder with Iran. Much of the resources provided by the coalition to the Ministry of Interior for the Border police never got to the Boarders Police. Much of the very profitable smuggling is going on across these boarders, not to mention the terrorist who cross back and forth every day.
The generations most likely to directly benefit from any democratic developments in Iraq, however it develops, is going to be those Iraqis who are ten to twenty years old today. They should be the focus of our most sincere efforts. Many Iraqi friends from Basrah to Mosul have told me that what is being taught in the schools in Iraq today is very pro-militant, anti-western and dogmatically religious. I am told by many Iraqis that this Islamic religious dogma was never taught in schools in Iraq prior to the arrival of the Coalition forces. Many of the teachers in the schools are now strict Muslim Sadarist, having pushed out those educators not strictly aligned to Islam, and more importantly to Sadar [sic - Sadr] the radical cleric.
In Basrah, the Sadar militia is very influential in every regard throughout the province, having almost never been challenged by either the Iraqi government or Coalition forces. From my understanding militia activity in Basrah, not directly targeting the coalition is rarely challenged by the coalition (British). While we have been winning the country, the enemy has been winning the youth. We are failing to learn many real lessons here. Our sacrifice has been and continues to be great, yet we have allowed our impatient nature and cultural arrogance to dim our memory as to our original purpose. The youth should be at the top of our list. They require vision, preparedness and direction, all of which we have failed to provide. Our focus has been much to narrow. It is not too late.
Security considerations in the course of our mission here are critical and should be, but not to the extent that we are prevented from performing our mission.
“Where there is no vision, the people perish”, and our vision for Iraq is dimming when it should not. There was a US Major General in the Baghdad Embassy who used to love to say “vision without resources is an illusion”. He was wrong. Christopher Columbus expressed a vision. A vision of a new land beyond the edge of the earth. He had no resources, but the vision he shared with another persuaded her to provide what he needed. If the Queen had not provided him the resources, somebody else would have. His vision had value.
We can still fix what we have broken. It will require transferring more of the responsibility for its future to the people of Iraq and their elected government. Their must be an acceptance, by the coalition, that however the government of Iraq develops, it will be their development, not ours. Iraq may not develop its democracy the way we want it to. To quote the king of Jordan, “Democracy will mean different things to different nations”. America needs to leave Iraq, but only after the Iraq government and the people of Iraq are sure they are ready for us to leave. Unfortunately I also believe that we (The USA) are so vested in our present course that change, at this juncture, is highly unlikely. Fear, or uncertainty should not drive our decision or our desire “to do the right thing”, even if it seems the hardest thing to do.
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CPA - Coalition Provincial Authority
MNF - Multinational Force
MNC - Multinational Corps
MNSTC-I - Multinational Support and Training Command-Iraq
MOI - Ministry of Interior
MOD - Ministry of Defense
PRT - Provincial Reconstruction Team FOB- Forward Operating Base
NCT - National Coordination Team
NSPD - National Security Presidential Directive
MCT - Ministerial Coordination Teams
MAT - Ministerial Advisory Teams
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About The Author
Marshall Adame is a retired US Marine Vietnam veteran who became an aviation management/logistics consultant in 1992. He worked in the Kuwait recovery of 1992-93 and was the senior aviation logistics manager for Kaman Aerospace in their Egypt US Government Aviation assistance programs for four years.
Marshall has been in Iraq since 2003 where he was the Coalition Airport Director for Basrah International Airport. Later he was VP for Aviation Development with The Sandi Group Int’l, Iraq. Marshall, in 2005, then became a Department of State US Advisor for logistics to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. Marshall’s current assignment in the Department of State (DoS) is with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) where he is on the staff of the National Coordination Team (NCT) in Baghdad.
Marshall, 54, and his wife Becky (a 3rd grade teacher) have been married for 37 years and have four children, Paul, Veronica, William and Benjamin, and eleven grandchildren. Two of their sons, William and Benjamin, have served in Iraq in the US Army. William was wounded in action on July 2nd 2006. Marshall and Becky reside in Jacksonville North Carolina. marshall_adame@yahoo.com
Note: Marshall Adame is a likely 2008 Democratic candidate for Congress from the third district of North Carolina and is a strong supporter of John Edwards for President.
Disclaimer: No material used in this article was derived from, or is in any way related to US Government classified material. No part of this article refers or alludes to information which may be, or has ever been, classified.
The opinions stated or implied in this paper reflect only the personal opinions, experiences and perspective of the author and no other.
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Copyright © 2006 Ultio LLC
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articleID=12887
Marshall Adame
August 27, 2006
When I arrived in Iraq in mid 2003 as the newly appointed Coalition Airport Director for Basrah International Airport I was sure that what we, the US led coalition, had just done by invading Iraq, was a good thing. I likened our arrival in Iraq to the rescuing of people in a burning building. It was risky and it brought with it ramifications that no-one could predict. Our arrival in Iraq was a rescue effort of the highest degree, long overdue and welcomed by the Iraqi citizens who had suffered so greatly under the Saddam regime. Our president told the world that we were there to “do the right thing” and I believed him. I also felt an awareness of the incredible commitment we brought with us. We entered Iraq without invitation; consequently our commitment had to be whole and complete. The Iraqi citizens, owed us nothing, we owed them our word of honor that our presence was on their behalf. I mean it. This is how I felt, in fact, I still feel this commitment to these suffering people, who’s daily trials and woes, for many reasons, have increased ten fold since our arrival.
During the early days of the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA) Paul Bremmer [sic - Bremer - further instances not noted] reigned. With an entire country to save, it seemed to me the whole preoccupation of the CPA in the Baghdad Palace, in 2003, was the health and comfort of Paul Bremmer. All else took a distant second. I was bewildered by the priorities the Coalition was exercising.
There were some USAID Local Governance Program teams out in several Iraq Provinces who were trying hard to make a real difference and I think they actually did begin to develop real and significant relationships with the Iraqi Provincial Governments primarily because the leadership and direction was coming through USAID. It seemed that the further away from Baghdad, the more effective the program.
Through all appearances, the US and Coalition Military forces were operating with no present or direct civilian guidance, oversight, or control. Even the civilian departments of the CPA were each running their own operations with little or no apparent oversight. The difficult military mission was being brilliantly accomplished by the generals and our magnificent military forces, but a large part of the civilian mission, which should have been staffed and led by Department of State (DoS) professionals, was also being left to the same military who were, for need to fight the battle, quite ill-prepared to start nation building, a mission far removed from fighting a war against terrorism.
US Department of State civilian direction, guidance and leadership was, and still is, crucial to the Governance capacity building part of restoring the Iraqi government and its institutions. The military found themselves in charge of the civilian mission by default and, as good soldiers do, they proceeded to do the mission however ill-equipped and wrongly appointed they were to do it.
No one admires or respects our military forces more than I. I am a retired US Marine and the father of two Army soldiers in Iraq, one wounded on 2 July 2006 in Baqubah while on patrol. The US Military is awesome as a military force, but their forte is to be a military force, not a force meant to build civil institutions.
Mistakes were made from the beginning, big mistakes. The Coalition school of thought followed that rebuilding, refurbishment and large infrastructure projects were the most important requirements. Vigorous Iraqi job programs, civil programs, city assistance, provincial governance teams, civilian medical care, food programs and housing starts, although present to a very small degree, were not considered as important. The funding to those immediate need projects was miniscule in comparison to the billions being allocated for the vast infrastructure projects which brought no immediate relief to the people, but became a cash cow for US and British contractors. Almost none of the US dollars being pumped into Iraq went to projects that would stimulate the Iraqi economy, or put bread on an Iraqi table. The needs of the Iraqi people were, seemingly, not a serious consideration. Immediate employment programs, aid to families with children, and other programs which would have included the average Iraqi citizen and incorporated their abilities, time and talent were simply absent to any discernable level.
The security environment was not nearly as serious as it is now, but even then, the coalition still found a way to keep the Iraqi population at arms length. With billions of dollars coming into the country, hiring Iraqis to work with the Coalition was all but forbidden. Although some Iraqi labor was used, we brought in thousands of third world laborers, all but freezing out the Iraqis as the major labor pool. That practice of excluding Iraqis, for the most part, still exists today. In this regard, Paul Bremmer’s leadership was dismal and his early made policies probably contributed to the present insurgency which, at that time, was considered insignificant.
In this thought piece I am listing six of the serious issues in Iraq I feel we did not address appropriately in the early days of the war which are consequently haunting us today.
Six things which have had, or may have disastrous consequences. Six things which can still be remedied. Each has its own story of indecision, mismanagement and disregard for the Iraqi people and their interest. Because I have been in Iraq for the most part of the past three years I could share many first hand incidences and stories of wonderful and unfortunate events having happened here. Stories of individual sacrifice, heroism, compassion and generosity as well as those of greed, callousness, cruelty and cowards. In this case however I will remain on the surface issues of each area I discuss. The issues are described and discussed based on my own personal experience and perspective.
1. The Iraq Ministry of Interior (MOI) development and assistance
Problem: US Department of State is charged with policy and oversight responsibilities related to our work in the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI). The MOI is a civilian ministry responsible for police, customs, science and technology, property, state owned enterprises, boarder guards, education structures, housing and construction all over Iraq. The MOI is the single largest civilian ministry in Iraq. Its structured viability as a civilian institution would be critical in Iraq’s emergence as a democratic society. Incredibly, the responsibility to revive the MOI into a credible civilian Ministry was turned over to our military, Multinational Force (MNF), who were at the least, ill-prepared to develop civil institutions. Additionally, although there are many military assistance programs in place, primarily for the police and security forces, there are no Ministerial Governance programs in the MOI to assist in the develop this civilian institution. Consequently, the MOI, as it exists today in 2006, is almost the mirror image of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. The MOI today lacks any semblance of a civilian controlled institution. We, the coalition have essentially militarized the single Ministry in Iraq charged with the responsibility for almost all civil institutions and structure in Iraq. With the exception of the minister himself, the leadership of the MOI is made up of military generals, retired and active duty. It was the US military generals who decided, through advisory influence, on who would control the MOI and it was all of us who looked the other way while these Iraqi generals, led by the Minister, trampled all over the rights and liberties of the good Iraqi people. Many of whom worked with us in the MOI and lived in fear of ever coming to the attention of the Minister. An Iraqi Minister of Interior (now Minister of Finance) with an Iranian passport which, as far as I am aware, he has not relinquished to this day.
On one occasion in 2005 I was with the Army Maj. Gen who was at the time the Director General for Logistics for the MOI when he received an order to issue one thousand AK47s to a Muslim cleric (Imam). The order was signed by the Minister. When he rightly refused, he was immediately jailed by order of the Minister. Although advised to stay out of it, I made an issue of his unlawful imprisonment and he was released soon after. Later he told me that had I not brought the issue into the light of American scrutiny, he feels he would have most certainly been killed. Shortly after his release two failed assassination attempts were made on his life which took the lives of his brother and two nephews. He is now retired and still living in Iraq.
Through some misguided thinking by the CPA/DoS and the American Military in Iraq, during 2003/2004, the non-military mission of Governance capacity building, Focus Stabilization in cities, police development and training was assigned or just assumed by the American Military (Okay, the Coalition). No one ever questioned our military’s capacity to oversee and manage this normally exclusive domain of civilians in any successful country.
After taking over from the CPA, the US State Department (DoS) recognized the need, but lacked the financial resources and the will to carry out the mission of assisting the emergence of the MOI as a viable civilian institution. Surprisingly little or no effort was made by the DoS through the Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) to retain the mission and be resourced to operate accordingly. Because our government had allocated the bulk of financial resources to the Department of Defense, the DOD had the assets so they, qualified or not, were given the job. The military accepted the mission. Consequently our military set up commands in the Ministry of Interior in the very same way they had set up the Ministry of Defense. Thinking in terms of a “cookie cutter solution” our coalition Military (MNSTC-I), began developing the MOI in the image of the MOD resulting in a highly militarized MOI which has no real military mission in Iraq. Distinguishing the differences between police powers and military powers, apparently, was never a consideration.
Today the MOI is a very powerful military / police force deep in accusations of ethnic cleansing and human rights violations against the Sunni minority and others in Iraq. Many of the MOI Iraqi Police commanders are former and active Shia Iraqi Army Officers who previously had never held a civilian or Police post or position in their working lives. All this through guidance and with assets provided by the USA. The DoD may showcase the “Civilian” Police Trainers primarily provided by DynCorp, but the fact is DynCorp, as the contracted member, takes its lead from the DoD liaison officers assigned to them. The DynCorp trainers train. That is all. The activity in and around Iraqi Police stations, is to the greatest degree, dictated by the Coalition liaison officers and troops assigned to them. Where there is no regular presence of coalition troops, the militias, in many cases, have the fullest support of the local police. This constant coalition presence however does not apply to the Southern regions of Iraq where the British have exercised carte blanche in their relationship with the Iraqi police and provincial governments.
The British, in the execution of their mission of defending the Iraqis in the southern four provinces of Iraq, for various reasons, one being lack of oversight from Baghdad, have managed to alienate, not only the Basrah Iraqi Police, but the Governates members as well. I personally credit the British inaction and cultural superciliousness with the rising influence of the militias and others in Basrah. Since 2003 the Iraqis in Basrah have found it very difficult and at times humiliating in their efforts to work with the British there. The militia’s willingness to respect certain parameters relative to the provincial government and police, evidently, has proven somewhat more amenable to the local and provincial officials than the British approach which recognized none. It appears that the militia was just easier to work with. Recently (2006) the Basrah Governing officials have begun dialoging with the British once again. That is a good sign, but the influence of the MOI control over the national police in that region has been severely diminished while the Sadar militia influence grows. It didn’t have to happen that way.
From my personal vantage point I saw no Coalition effort to stop the corrupt or illegal activities of the MOI allegedly being directed by the Minister of Interior (Jabar) who reportedly maintained very close ties to Iran. (In 2006 Minister Jabar is the new Minister of Finance). The Minister was neck deep in allegations of corruption from directing death squads to financial impropriety. The Command element made up from American and British general officers were too preoccupied with making their own mark to be bothered. Each American and British Coalition military general I knew in the MOI seemingly wanted something great to happen on his watch, consequently many thoughtless decisions were made in the hopes of hitting a significant or historical home run. In one instance a senior American Lt. General was shown an aerial photograph of hundreds of brand new SUVs and trucks parked at the Iraqi southern port of Um Qazar in Basrah. He asked why all those vehicles were there and was told that the vehicles were going to be given to the Iraqi Police throughout Iraq through a process named Project Daytona (courtesy of the US Taxpayer), which I was personally involved in. The General was also told that no spare parts were ordered for any of the 8,600 cars either on the way, or already here in Iraq.
The General didn’t like the idea of how the presence of so many vehicles just sitting in the port might look, so he ordered the vehicles dispersed and issued to the Iraqi police throughout Iraq. With no spare parts and no maintenance facilities, or plans to order the spare parts, or build the maintenance facilities, the order was carried out, and the state of the art vehicles were dispersed throughout Iraq. This included dozens of factory armored Mercedes Benz sedans. Today there is no sure accounting for the vehicles but last I heard, more than 50% were missing and 50% of the remainder were no longer in service. It was recently said that a plan to build maintenance facilities is on the planning boards. Actually, IRMO (DoS) representatives working at the MOI had, in July 2005, created and submitted a very comprehensive country wide vehicle maintenance plan to MNSTC-I specifically to address this problem. It was looked at by MNSTC-I J4 and never acted on. Very similar instances occurred with weapon systems as well. Thousands of weapons provided by Uncle Sam are unaccounted for. This General was also known for providing weapons to the Minister of Interior with little or no accountability through his MNSTC-I command element. On one occasion I personally sent a verbal message to this same general through one of his aides, a colonel who happened to be attending a meeting I was also attending. I told the colonel to tell the general “Sir, you are arming the enemy by providing weapons directly to the Minister without accountability”. Although that message was never acknowledged, two days after having sent the message, the general sent out a message to MNSTC-I ordering the accountability for all weapons being issued. A little late.
The development of the MOI, as it has occurred thus far, has been dismal and, if continued, will not bode well for the Iraqi people or their future. The Iraqi MOI today is a child of our coalition forces who never made the distinction between civilian and military institutions. Coalition failure to influence the structure and civilian control over and throughout the Ministry of Interior is unconscionable and will prove to be a major detractor to a stable democracy; however that democracy develops in Iraq. The US Department of State should have vigorously objected to the military authority over the development of the Ministry of Interior. As far as I know, that never happened.
The presence of the Department of State in a management and oversight position and USAID Governance Programs could have, and probably would have created a civil organization within the MOI grounded in a standard which recognized and understood the fundamental importance of civil governance, rule of law, and management structure. Although there is a DOS presence in the MOI, those working there are under the complete control of the Coalition MNSTC-I command through an agreement between the US Embassy and Multinational Command. The development and current condition of the MOI has lent itself to being a recipe for a coup.
The most viable fix: Assign civilian (DoS) oversight and policy decision making authority related to any US participation with the MOI and MOD (Today the MOD exercises excessive influence in the MOI). The DoS is well suited for this responsibility. The military presently advising the MOI require oversight and should be placed in a strictly subordinate role to the DoS in all matters pertaining to the further development and assistance to the MOI. Additionally, install USAID Local Governance programs in the MOI, through the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), for civil, economic and governance capacity building instruction and mentoring in addition to the active assistance of the DoS office of the Ministerial Coordination Team (MCT) who’s mission it is to ensure the successful delivery of Ministerial Capacity Development by:
– Coordinating and supporting the Capacity Development efforts of the IRMO Senior Consultants’ Ministerial Advisory Teams (MAT)
– Ensuring that elements of the national capacity development initiative co-ordinate effectively.
– Bench-marking progress being made in strengthening ministerial capacity.
Reallocate CERP appropriations to fund the USAID and State Department programs. Give the MOI and MOD US Dept. of State Senior Advisors authority over all US activity in the MOI and US logistics efforts and assistance in the MOD. US DoS civilians must have the ability to prevent any inappropriate activity or assistance from the US Military and coalition forces. The fact is, it might already be too late.
2. Basrah Airport and thereabouts
Basrah is Iraq’s second largest city of 2.5 million people. Basrah has Iraq’s only sea port, a border with a valuable trading partner Kuwait, and a well designed and viable International Airport with the potential of becoming the greatest cargo hub in Iraq. It also has the largest oil deposits in Iraq. Basrah possesses the potential to exceed any economic or social development design being considered in any part of Iraq, including Baghdad.
Problem: The British government, through their Military commanders and the acquiescence of the Coalition authorities, fully occupied the Basrah International Airport in 2003. By 2005 they had increased their occupation throughout the airport infrastructure to the point of making, for all practical purposes, the entire airport a British Air Base. Today, in 2006, the entire airport, specifically every single infrastructure element of the airport, is a strictly operated Military Base. The main terminal and the engineering building are occupied, but not controlled, by the Iraqi Airport Director and his employees who normally wait as long as three hours just to get into the gate of the base each day. The British have even placed a sign at the entrance calling it “Basrah Air Base”. Just recently, the British announced that they will move an additional 2,000 troops onto the airport although for the past three years they had been assuring the Iraqis they would be vacating the airport “in the very near future”. I have personally attended meetings between the Iraqis and the British where this assurance was given. The vast majority of the water supply from the Iraqi airport water plant (owned, operated and maintained by Iraqis and repaired by USAID), has been diverted for British Forces use and now flows through newly British installed filtering units which, although taking most of the Iraqi water plant water, provides no benefit to the Iraq area of the airport property. In effect, the British Government has decided that Iraq’s second largest city does not need a viable airport. The few commercial flights that are “allowed” by the British, through no authority or control by the Iraqis, is what the British call an “active Airport”. The British, over the past three years have made few, if any, significant improvements to the Airport infrastructure or to its future as an Iraqi commercial use area. US contracts have performed virtually all major contracting work on the airport. British financed projects, primarily, were done to benefit the British army or other British entities.
The British RAF and the British Army have made the Basrah airport their main base in the south of Iraq. The infrastructure of the airport served their purpose, was convenient and not to mention free of charge. (Even though there is a large and developed base nearby called Shieba Base). On one occasion in 2003, in my capacity as CPA Airport Director, I actually felt the need to communicate, via email, with the British Legal office in Basrah wherein I was complaining about the British Army looting of the airport and an even more serious issue which I cannot discuss in this paper. The disinterested email reply I received from the British Army legal office in Basrah was disheartening. (The disheartening demeanor displayed by the British in this matter did not go unnoticed by the Iraqis).
The British have since built up their presence in the Airport even though there is no mission requirement for the presence of the British Army in the Airport. All airport security is provided by the Royal Air force who do provide some air traffic assistance and training to the Iraqis, but even that is minimal to the point of not justifying their presence en masse.
In Contrast, when the US ground forces occupied Baghdad International Airport in 2003, they immediately began the planning to occupy the far side of the airport property, far from the commercial facilities, so to allow the immediate refurbishment and commercialization of the Baghdad airport and its infrastructure. The terminal buildings, fuel farms, support hangars and other buildings were vacated by US military forces and the Airport, and all the materials and property which had been inventoried and stored, was eventually and fully turned over to the Iraqis in late 2004. Today, you will find no US military personnel assigned in the commercial terminals or commercial cargo areas of the Baghdad Airport. The Iraqis have complete control and are operating as a civilian commercial entity. In 2003 the British were giving the Basrah Government and Airport officials the same assurance of leaving the Airport soon. It never happened. (It is my personal opinion that in the near future, the British will announce the closing of Shieba Base and will exclusively occupy the airport. I believe this action will provoke the Iraqis in Basrah and the Provincial Government).
The most viable fix (with a little background): The British Army should announce that they have decided, for Basrah’s sake, to remove all British Army forces from the Airport and move them to Sheiba base. The foot print of the RAF should also be reduced substantially and removed from all infrastructure areas of the airport. Portable Air Traffic control tower units can be placed on the unoccupied far side of the airport for British flight operations. (Perhaps an agreement with the Basrah Iraqi Tower Authority for dual use of the tower, similar to the arrangement the US has with the Iraqis in Baghdad can be arranged). A refurbishment and replacement project needs to be funded through CERP or other funds to replace the airport support equipment deliberately or accidentally destroyed by the British forces. (The Basrah Airport was not occupied through force. The airport fire trucks and other airport emergency vehicles and support equipment were damaged deliberately by the British forces in May 2003 as documented by the RAF). New or used refurbished airport fire trucks should be sent to Basrah. The Coalition should contract a management company to assist in the full commercialization, and management training for the Airport and its infrastructure development. The DoS Senior Advisor to the Transportation Ministry should be tasked to oversee all of the development funded with US and Kuwaiti money (If we can talk them into it. Why? It has been the Kuwaitis who have stepped up to the plate to get many Basrah residents to the Haage in Saudi Arabia. It was Kuwait who provided the much needed fuel to Iraq and the Coalition for over two years. It is Kuwait who has afforded free flow passage across its boarders with Iraq to the coalition, and it should be the Kuwaitis who declare, with the Iraqis, the new relationship of mutual support and assistance between Kuwait International Airport and Basrah International Airport).
The North gate (Main entrance) to the airport should be totally vacated by British troops and replaced by the Iraq Army troops of the 10th IA Division and augmented by the Basrah Iraqi police, and border police. These Iraqi entities have a great and mutual interest in the operation of a successful commercial airport in Basrah. The “hotel”, a building now being used as the British HQ just in front of the Main Airport Terminal should be immediately vacated and all upgrades or repairs and furniture kept in place. (In 2003 all of the furnishings in the Main Terminal building office spaces, not useful to the British forces, were removed from the terminal and burned. Much of this furniture was the personal property of the airport employees. No compensation was ever paid or offered).
Coalition members, more amenable to the Iraqis in the south (US persons), should be the primary interface for logistics, training, support and civil action. They can be assigned to Basrah and located either on Sheiba base with the British or on the Iraqi Army base of the 10th Division currently posted on a newly built base just outside of the city. A vigorous Iraqi led information campaign targeted at the plan to rebuild the Basrah economic base (the Ports area and the Airport). It should be augmented by large scholarship programs and vocational training programs. Additionally a campaign to inform the population of Basrah of the Iraqi Governments intent to fully assist the Iraqi Minster of Transportation in opening the Basrah Airport and assisting in its ICAO certification process. As for their part, the Iraqi Minister of Transportation should insist on the coalition forces removal from the commercial side of the airport and invite them to resettle on the opposite side as was accomplished in Baghdad.
However unfortunate, I believe the relationship between the British Army and the Iraqis in Basrah is irreconcilable. The opportunity the British had to make a real difference to the Iraqis in Basrah has passed. Any trust and confidence between the two which may have existed in the distant past is gone.
(Financial assistance and logistic support to assist and hasten the British forces in moving from the Basrah airport should be provided by the Coalition).
3. Prisoners and Prisons
Problem: From 2003 until today our coalition forces have captured or killed some of the most dangerous people in the world. These people will never have the opportunity to hurt anyone else in Iraq or anywhere. That’s the good news. The bad news is that in the process of combing Iraq for bad guys, field commanders, for one reason or another, and at times indiscriminately, have confined many men and women without any specific charges or reasons that can be remembered or recorded. We have, in essence, deprived many people of their liberty with out any real reason or purpose. As a result the coalition now faces the problem of building more prisons even with the knowledge that a very large percentage of the detainees are most likely not ever going to be charged with a crime and may in fact be not guilty of any crime other than being in the wrong place at the wrong time or having the wrong friend or relative. The possibility here is that we may have separated innocent fathers from their wives and children, sons from their families, daughters from their only source of protection and support and in the process created many more enemies. Consequently the coalition has, without charge or specific reason, confined many innocent people and deprived them, without cause, of the very liberties we came here to preserve. Even in war, the principles of due process, within reason, must be upheld.
The most viable fix: The New Iraqi Prime Minister should announce an immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners that fall into certain categories (not including those captured in hostilities or known to be involved in hostile activities).
Categories: All Handicapped * All prisoners over 50 years old * All only sons * All women not specifically charged but have been confined for over 60 days * All confined persons under the age of 16 * All detainees in any juvenile facility in Iraq * All females under the age of 18 not specifically charged with a violent crime against Iraqi or Coalition forces.(Not to include the charge of “throwing rocks”) * All Imams, Sunni and Shia, not specifically charged with a violent crime, conspiracy to commit a violent crime, or aiding and abetting the enemy * All persons confined for misdemeanors or petty theft or confined for the reason of failure to pay a debt.
(The June 2006 announcement by PM Maliki of the planned release of 2,500 detainees in Iraqi and Coalition prison facilities was a great start and better late than never, but the numbers of prisoners remaining is staggering, many of whom still having not been told why they were detained. The Coalition, being responsible for the vast majority of the detainments, should be concentrating on a means to provide the process by which the rest can be either charged and held, or simply released and compensated for having their liberties violated without cause. The planning effort should not be on building new prisons to hold people who will ultimately be released with out charge. This equates to simply leaving the problem to the new government). Any release schedules should not be conditioned on political timing as those recently announced. Depriving anyone of his or her liberty, even for a short time for a political advantage, should be unconscionable to those of us who enjoy protections from that very thing.
Every person in these release categories and never charged should be released with a letter of assurance that they are not considered criminal or enemies of Iraq, $500US or $15US per everyday of confinement (which ever is greater) and assured transportation home. They should not necessarily be required to sign any renouncement of violence since the only violence having occurred may have been our violence against them in the process of arrest and detainment. They should be asked to sign an acknowledgement that they may have been detained wrongly due to unpredictable circumstances brought on by the hostilities occurring in Iraq and that they understand that the county if Iraq does not classify them as having a criminal record of any kind as a result of their arrest and confinement.
(Two of my soldier sons came to Iraq and one was wounded during a battle in Baqubah. I would like them to believe we all serve for the preservation of very specific principles and rules of behavior regarding other human beings, even during war. We do not herald our principles of liberty because we are strong, rather we are strong because of our belief and respect for these principles. If we sacrifice the very principles of inalienable rights that define who we are, then we sacrifice our right to defend the helpless. We will have surrendered our banner of hope and liberty).
4. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)
Wrongly named, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams are actually Provincial Governance Teams organized for the purpose of assisting, mentoring and developing “governance capacity building” at the provincial level throughout Iraq. As a tool for governance capacity building construction projects are developed by the Iraqi Provincial councils and their appointed Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee (PRDC) and are funded through the PRTs. All USAID Local Governance Programs are monitored and reported through the PRTs located in each province. The potential of the PRTs is great in furthering the Iraqi understanding and acceptance of civil governance, city planning, economics, rule of law and community (civil) responsibility and the operation of Focus Stabilization programs. The problem is the DoS has relied on the good will of the DoD to fund the PRTs throughout Iraq. In early 2005 an agreement between the DoS and General Casey, Commander of all Coalition Multinational Forces, was made in Baghdad to support the PRTs to the fullest extent in Iraq. A cable was released to that effect. The DoS assumed then full cooperation and support from the subordinate commands in Iraq for the PRTs. Only when the DoS finally agreed, in mid 2006, to fund some of the support for the PRTs did the DoD finally agree to fully cooperate in fully supporting the effort.
(Today, according to the MNF-I lawyers in Iraq, support for the PRTs utilizing DoD assets is illegal despite a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) of 11 May 2004 authorizing and even directing such support. As a direct consequence of that initial DoS miscalculation of willing cooperation and funding from DoD, the PRTs are behind schedule, under-funded and overly reliant on the DoD whose primary mission is, at times, diametrically opposed to the PRT mission requirement).
The Military commanders in Iraq are focused on pulling out of as many forward operating bases (FOBs) as possible and turning them over to the Iraqi Military forces. Support of the PRTs may, but not always, extend the coalition service where they are trying to curtail coalition presence. Generally speaking the DoD has kept their support very low level. Enough attention to show support to the Secretary of State, but too little to allow the PRTs to function at full capacity throughout Iraq. Road blocks and stalls are common. The DoD knows the PRTs are on a finite time table and seemingly are holding out until somebody (DoS) finally calls it a failed effort or fully funds itself. The PRT program is even poorly supported by the DoS itself for many reasons including that the PRTs are under the authority of IRMO. Whether they would admit it or not, there is a certain disdain of IRMO by regular DoS Foreign Service employees who do not consider the appointed “3161 category” DoS employee as a “real” member of the DoS. As a result, it is commonly believed DoS (Foreign Service Officers) do not enthusiastically work in the interest of IRMO, ergo the PRTs. Any IRMO failure in Iraq is a feather in the hat of those DoS nay-Sayers who, for political reasons, have always opposed IRMO operations being associated with the foreign service area of DoS, or with the DoS at all.
The most viable fix: The Department of State must partially fund the PRTs through IRMO and its subordinate office, the National Coordination Team (NCT), which has the supervisory authority over all PRTs in Iraq. The manpower allocation for the PRTs must be strengthened and all PRT Team Leaders assigned over each PRT in the Provinces must be Senior Foreign Officers of the State Department. DoS needs to acknowledge the costs associated with the successful execution of the PRTS and request the operational support appropriation necessary to carry out the mission. The DoD must be given the mandate to support, to their greatest capacity, every PRT in Iraq where there is a DoS employee assigned. None of the DoD support should be on a “reimbursable” basis and every field commander should be provided a written field directive to ensure total support to the PRT in his area of operation. The Civil Affairs (CA) forces, although “direct support” to the PRTs, should have a military officer assign to the PRT who carries the OPCON authority over the CA forces. The mandate to the DoD relative to PRT support must be direct and unambiguous. That clear actionable mandate does not exist today. Short of this, the prospects for real measurable success across the board for the PRTs are dismal.
5. Juvenile Detainment Centers and Women’s prisons
Problem: In Iraq, there are a few Juvenile detention centers filled with children, some of whom have never been charged with a crime and others who, for lack of someone to pick them up have been held in confinement. Reports of physical and other abuse have been made and it seems the Coalition considers this issue “not our urgent business”. Our responsibility or not, any and all abuses or illegal activity reported from those facilities will be laid at the door of the USA who will take the brunt of responsibility. The issue here is Children. These are not hardened criminals or terrorists. In today’s Iraq, the very notion of a juvenile detention center is draconian. I would consider this a “no brainier” but that is not the prevailing school of thought.
The most viable fix:
1. Release every single child, under the age of 16 from any and all “Juvenile” detention centers in Iraq.
2. Restructure every juvenile facility into vocational schools and training centers.
3. Fund the expansion or establishment of vocational training centers in every provincial capital in an effort to develop a work ethic in the idle and poor youth through out Iraq.
4. Create an Iraqi “Youth Jobs Corp” program.
5. Create Iraqi assistance “welfare” program for single mothers, widows, aged and handicapped Iraqi citizens who are all too often left with responsibility for the children.
6. Provide incentives to those contracted with the coalition to utilize the Iraqi labor force.
7. Create massive scholarship programs, through assistance and cooperation of Egypt, Jordan, Dubai and Kuwait to fund Iraqi youth education in Iraq and for Iraqis who may be sent outside of Iraq for educational purposes.
6. Jobs Programs
Problem: The Coalition has expended billions of dollars in construction projects all over Iraq. Although, to a small degree, the Iraqi work force has been utilized, they have not nearly benefited as they should have from these expenditures which could have provided incredible employment opportunities all over Iraq for Iraqis. For “security” reasons (a term often used for anything we don’t want to explain or justify), the Coalition brought thousands of foreign workers into Iraq to fill labor positions. The military prevented the hiring of Iraqis on many very large construction projects and created circumstances and policies which made it all but impossible for contractors to hire Iraqis. It is my belief that we went way overboard with this perception of the Iraqis, as a population, being the enemy or dangerous to the coalition.
(I do not think there is a single recorded instance of a vetted Iraqi “legitimate” employee, working with the coalition, having committed a violent act against his employer. The violent acts against forces on Forward Operating Bases (FOB) have occurred through infiltration of the enemy onto a FOB).
The most viable fix:
1. The creation and immediate establishment of an Iraqi Job Corps which will organize, categorize and match Iraqi labor pools in each province with Iraqi Government and foreign assistance projects.
2. The creation of vocational training centers in each province of Iraq. Certification programs and skill validation certification processes should be developed to officially recognize the experience level of skilled journeymen and levels below that master skill designation.
FOCUS: The coalition focus on large Corps of Engineer infrastructure projects must be replaced with a focus on immediate impact and assistance projects effecting the population on personal levels. I do not believe that it was ever the mission of the Coalition to actually build the infrastructure of Iraq. That was not and should not have become our mission. By whatever name one may want to call it, the Coalition has been, and continues to be, very occupied with infrastructure development of Iraq. In that vein, one would have thought that developing airports, the port area (The port has in fact been extensively repaired), rail and strong borders would have been at the top of the list of things to do. Not so. Only one airport, Baghdad, actually received real priority assistance. The second largest airport, Basrah is still not turned over to the Iraqis and is being used as the Headquarters for the British (The USA has done some repairs at Basrah airport. The British have, for the most part, only consumed the Iraqi assets at the airport). Najaf has been left to the Iraqis to fix and they (the Iraqis) seem to be doing a very good job of preparing that airport for commercial operations. Iran has offered assistance for Najaf Airport. The Border Security Forces, controlled by the MOI, has received the least support assets from either the Iraqi government or the coalition. These boarder forts guard the boarders between Iraq and its hostile neighbors Syria and Iran. The border forts, in some cases, are remote and manned by ill-equipped forces that, at times, have even gone without pay, food or water deliveries from the Ministry of Interior which has not normally considered them a high priority, especially along the boarder with Iran. Much of the resources provided by the coalition to the Ministry of Interior for the Border police never got to the Boarders Police. Much of the very profitable smuggling is going on across these boarders, not to mention the terrorist who cross back and forth every day.
The generations most likely to directly benefit from any democratic developments in Iraq, however it develops, is going to be those Iraqis who are ten to twenty years old today. They should be the focus of our most sincere efforts. Many Iraqi friends from Basrah to Mosul have told me that what is being taught in the schools in Iraq today is very pro-militant, anti-western and dogmatically religious. I am told by many Iraqis that this Islamic religious dogma was never taught in schools in Iraq prior to the arrival of the Coalition forces. Many of the teachers in the schools are now strict Muslim Sadarist, having pushed out those educators not strictly aligned to Islam, and more importantly to Sadar [sic - Sadr] the radical cleric.
In Basrah, the Sadar militia is very influential in every regard throughout the province, having almost never been challenged by either the Iraqi government or Coalition forces. From my understanding militia activity in Basrah, not directly targeting the coalition is rarely challenged by the coalition (British). While we have been winning the country, the enemy has been winning the youth. We are failing to learn many real lessons here. Our sacrifice has been and continues to be great, yet we have allowed our impatient nature and cultural arrogance to dim our memory as to our original purpose. The youth should be at the top of our list. They require vision, preparedness and direction, all of which we have failed to provide. Our focus has been much to narrow. It is not too late.
Security considerations in the course of our mission here are critical and should be, but not to the extent that we are prevented from performing our mission.
“Where there is no vision, the people perish”, and our vision for Iraq is dimming when it should not. There was a US Major General in the Baghdad Embassy who used to love to say “vision without resources is an illusion”. He was wrong. Christopher Columbus expressed a vision. A vision of a new land beyond the edge of the earth. He had no resources, but the vision he shared with another persuaded her to provide what he needed. If the Queen had not provided him the resources, somebody else would have. His vision had value.
We can still fix what we have broken. It will require transferring more of the responsibility for its future to the people of Iraq and their elected government. Their must be an acceptance, by the coalition, that however the government of Iraq develops, it will be their development, not ours. Iraq may not develop its democracy the way we want it to. To quote the king of Jordan, “Democracy will mean different things to different nations”. America needs to leave Iraq, but only after the Iraq government and the people of Iraq are sure they are ready for us to leave. Unfortunately I also believe that we (The USA) are so vested in our present course that change, at this juncture, is highly unlikely. Fear, or uncertainty should not drive our decision or our desire “to do the right thing”, even if it seems the hardest thing to do.
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CPA - Coalition Provincial Authority
MNF - Multinational Force
MNC - Multinational Corps
MNSTC-I - Multinational Support and Training Command-Iraq
MOI - Ministry of Interior
MOD - Ministry of Defense
PRT - Provincial Reconstruction Team FOB- Forward Operating Base
NCT - National Coordination Team
NSPD - National Security Presidential Directive
MCT - Ministerial Coordination Teams
MAT - Ministerial Advisory Teams
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About The Author
Marshall Adame is a retired US Marine Vietnam veteran who became an aviation management/logistics consultant in 1992. He worked in the Kuwait recovery of 1992-93 and was the senior aviation logistics manager for Kaman Aerospace in their Egypt US Government Aviation assistance programs for four years.
Marshall has been in Iraq since 2003 where he was the Coalition Airport Director for Basrah International Airport. Later he was VP for Aviation Development with The Sandi Group Int’l, Iraq. Marshall, in 2005, then became a Department of State US Advisor for logistics to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. Marshall’s current assignment in the Department of State (DoS) is with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) where he is on the staff of the National Coordination Team (NCT) in Baghdad.
Marshall, 54, and his wife Becky (a 3rd grade teacher) have been married for 37 years and have four children, Paul, Veronica, William and Benjamin, and eleven grandchildren. Two of their sons, William and Benjamin, have served in Iraq in the US Army. William was wounded in action on July 2nd 2006. Marshall and Becky reside in Jacksonville North Carolina. marshall_adame@yahoo.com
Note: Marshall Adame is a likely 2008 Democratic candidate for Congress from the third district of North Carolina and is a strong supporter of John Edwards for President.
Disclaimer: No material used in this article was derived from, or is in any way related to US Government classified material. No part of this article refers or alludes to information which may be, or has ever been, classified.
The opinions stated or implied in this paper reflect only the personal opinions, experiences and perspective of the author and no other.
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Copyright © 2006 Ultio LLC
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articleID=12887
Greensburg, KS - 5/4/07
"Eternal vigilance is the price of Liberty."
from John Philpot Curran, Speech
upon the Right of Election, 1790
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