Foreign Correspondence

[Amaunet]

Intelligence Brief: Rebel Attack Threatens Deby's Government in Chad

What is at stake in Chad is the country's newly discovered oil wealth. Any faction that takes control of N'djamena will be able to benefit from the kickbacks inherent in crony governments that control energy resources. An international consortium that includes ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco and Petronas are developing the newly-discovered oil fields. The risk to the oil consortium is small if Deby is able to regain control of the country and successfully repels the rebel movement permanently, or if a new government takes control and effectively limits violent opposition.

According to N'djamena and many observers, the F.U.C. rebels are receiving support -- at least indirectly -- from the Sudanese government.

What is interesting is China has stepped up its arms sales to Sudan in line with its increased involvement in the country's oil sector, and the Financial Times believes that the "manufacture in Sudan of Chinese weapons and ammunition complicates the enforcement of a UN embargo on supplies to militias in Darfur." A Sudanese government official is quoted saying that China's presence is important "not only on an economic level but also on a political level."
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-Am




20 April 2006
On April 13, some 600 rebels stormed the capital of Chad, threatening the unstable government of President Idriss Deby. Deby's government in N'djamena managed to repel the coalition of rebel forces -- now united in the United Front for Change (F.U.C.) -- although there is concern that N'djamena may not be able to withstand future attacks. As PINR analyst Dr. Michael A. Weinstein observed in January 2006, Chad's "cycle of instability is gaining momentum for another rise toward a peak" and that a likely outcome will be "a repeat of past instances of regime change." [See: "Chad's Cycle of Instability Gains Momentum"]

The latest rebel attack comes just weeks before the upcoming May 3 presidential election, in which Deby is hoping to be reelected as president. Deby has been in power for 16 years; in 1990 he took power after deposing his former ally President Hissene Habre, and then won elections in 1996 and 2001, the latter of which was marred by irregularities. Despite the threat of a new rebel attack, N'djamena has announced that the elections will not be delayed and will take place on May 3; after the announcement, the F.U.C. released its own statement to AFP, warning that the rebels will "do everything in our power to stop the elections."

According to N'djamena and many observers, the F.U.C. rebels are receiving support -- at least indirectly -- from the Sudanese government. For instance, in the April 13 attack, the rebels rode into N'djamena on dozens of brand new Toyotas -- the vehicles were allegedly supplied to the rebels by Khartoum in December 2005. In addition to the possible materiel support, the rebels have been able to maintain rear bases over the border in Sudan.

The Sudanese government's support of the F.U.C. is tied to the ongoing conflict in Darfur. In the Darfur region of Sudan, Janjaweed militias, supported by the government in Khartoum, are engaged in a war with rebels who are intent on achieving greater autonomy for Darfur. A large section of the rebels hail from the Zagawa tribe, the same ethnic group of Deby's ruling class in Chad; indeed, Deby has supported the rebels against Khartoum. The F.U.C. rebels, however, are primarily from the Tawa ethnic group. Even if Khartoum is not directly supporting the F.U.C. rebels, it is likely that the support it gives to the Janjaweed has been redirected at the ground level to the campaign against N'djamena.

The April 13 rebel attacks displayed the instability inherent in Deby's regime. Additionally, some ten military members recently defected to the rebel forces, and Deby continues to face defections within his own ranks. Conditions in Chad remain fragile, and the country could soon face increased instability if Deby is overthrown. This instability would rise from the lack of cohesion in the F.U.C. rebel coalition; while a handful of rebel groups have united together to form the F.U.C., their cooperation does not extend much further than the common goal of removing Deby from power. Upon Deby's fall, it is possible that the F.U.C. would break apart into different factions, turning Chad into a failed state where no one faction is able to exercise control over the entire country. It is also entirely possible, however, that upon Deby's removal from power, the rebel coalition -- at least temporarily -- will remain united and share the spoils of power.

The F.U.C. currently claims that they are encircling the capital in order to demonstrate to the French -- who support Deby's regime and maintain a military base near the N'djamena airport, stationed with over 1,000 French soldiers -- that Deby's regime must be replaced. The French, for instance, provided "logistics and intelligence support" to Deby's government during the April 13 rebel attack, but apparently did not engage the rebels despite warning shots fired by French aircraft. Nevertheless, the presence of French troops is an added variable that the rebels must take into account.

What is at stake in Chad is the country's newly discovered oil wealth. Any faction that takes control of N'djamena will be able to benefit from the kickbacks inherent in crony governments that control energy resources. An international consortium that includes ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco and Petronas are developing the newly-discovered oil fields. The risk to the oil consortium is small if Deby is able to regain control of the country and successfully repels the rebel movement permanently, or if a new government takes control and effectively limits violent opposition.

However, as long as Deby's government is insecure, he will remain prone to aggressive actions such as following through on his threat to suspend oil production. If Deby is overthrown, on the other hand, and the empowered rebels turn on each other, the country could move down the path of instability, possibly threatening the interests of the oil consortium. Furthermore, such instability would also threaten to spill over into Chad's neighbors, such as Cameroon and the Central African Republic. The coming weeks are critical and it is not clear which scenario will play out in Chad. [See: "Chad's Cycle of Instability Gains Momentum"]






http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=476&language_id=1