Sunday, April 02, 2006 10:51:37 AM
A little background.
3. The political problems of Ilisu
Water is considered a major cause of international conflicts in the 21st century. The claims of Turkey, Syria and Iraq on the water of the Euphrates and Tigris exceed the capacities of the two rivers by 55 and 12 percent respectively. While the dams on Euphrates, used primarily for irrigation, reduce the average annual water flow by almost 50 percent, the Tigris projects, primarily used for power production, will reduce water flows by 10 percent. Turkey has so far not been prepared to negotiate a peaceful compromise regarding the management of the rivers, but relies on its position of power on the upstream part of the river to pressurize and blackmail the other riparian countries. Syria supports the Kurdish PKK guerilla as a pawn against this threat. The recent crisis between Turkey and Syria can only be understood in the context of the conflict over water. In late August 1998, the Iraqi government in turn threatened to bring the water issue to an international tribunal if Turkey proceeded with its present water and dam-building policies.
In May 1997, the UN General Assembly approved the Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of Transboundary Waterways with a vote of 103 : 3 (with 27 abstentions). This convention attempts to prevent significant negative impacts of projects on international waterways on other riparian countries. Apart from China and Burundi, Turkey was the only country which rejected the convention. More specifically, Turkey rejected the provisions ruling the prior notification of riparians about water projects, the prevention of significant harm, and the peaceful resolution of international water conflicts. (Cf. chapter 9.)
While the irrigation projects of the GAP significantly reduce the water flows, hydropower projects can be used for political blackmail of Syria and Iraq as well. Ilisu is a case in point. Its reservoir will have a total capacity of 10.4 billion m3, and a normal operating capacity of 7.46 billion m3. At its normal operating level, Ilisu will thus have a spare capacity of 3 billion m3. Given the average streamflow of the Tigris of 15 billion m3, filling the reservoir alone will absorb one half of a yearly streamflow. And the spare capacity of the reservoir will be sufficient for Turkey to block any water flowing to Syria and Iraq for several months.
4. Social impacts
GAP reservoirs such as Ataturk or Karakaya have so far involuntarily displaced 100,000s of persons. Compensation has usually been tied to the property of land or houses. Since most land in South-East Anatolia is concentrated in the hands of large landowners, many landless families were not compensated at all. Instead, they quietly moved to the slums of big cities such as Diyarbakir or Istanbul. Given the war between the Turkish army and the Kurdish guerilla in East Anatolia, affected people cannot voice any protest or discontent against the GAP, lest they be prosecuted as sympathizers of the guerilla.
The Ilisu reservoir will flood 52 villages and 15 small towns, including the city of Hasankeyf, and will affect 15,000-20,000 people. The exact number of affected people has so far not been established, since the surveys of the reservoir area were in part conducted by helicopter rides. Affected people are not being consulted. Sulzer and ABB commissioned an environmental impact assessment (EIA) on Ilisu, but did not make this document available to affected people or NGOs. When the Berne Declaration asked for a copy, company spokespeople openly admitted that the EIA had been made for the ECAs and creditor banks only.
As was the case with earlier GAP projects, the mode of compensation will only be decided after construction starts. Senior managers of the GAP authority in the Ilisu region expressed conflicting opinions when they were interviewed by the Swiss journalist Joerg Dietziker in April 1998. While R. Erkan Alemdaroglu claimed that the affected people would be compensated with cash payments or appartments, Recep Serbetçi mantained that no cash payments would be made. It appears that the authorities will not draw lessons from the negative impacts of earlier GAP projects, and that Ilisu again will produce refugees.
http://www.rivernet.org/turquie/ilisu.htm#The
more
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ilisu_Dam
3. The political problems of Ilisu
Water is considered a major cause of international conflicts in the 21st century. The claims of Turkey, Syria and Iraq on the water of the Euphrates and Tigris exceed the capacities of the two rivers by 55 and 12 percent respectively. While the dams on Euphrates, used primarily for irrigation, reduce the average annual water flow by almost 50 percent, the Tigris projects, primarily used for power production, will reduce water flows by 10 percent. Turkey has so far not been prepared to negotiate a peaceful compromise regarding the management of the rivers, but relies on its position of power on the upstream part of the river to pressurize and blackmail the other riparian countries. Syria supports the Kurdish PKK guerilla as a pawn against this threat. The recent crisis between Turkey and Syria can only be understood in the context of the conflict over water. In late August 1998, the Iraqi government in turn threatened to bring the water issue to an international tribunal if Turkey proceeded with its present water and dam-building policies.
In May 1997, the UN General Assembly approved the Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of Transboundary Waterways with a vote of 103 : 3 (with 27 abstentions). This convention attempts to prevent significant negative impacts of projects on international waterways on other riparian countries. Apart from China and Burundi, Turkey was the only country which rejected the convention. More specifically, Turkey rejected the provisions ruling the prior notification of riparians about water projects, the prevention of significant harm, and the peaceful resolution of international water conflicts. (Cf. chapter 9.)
While the irrigation projects of the GAP significantly reduce the water flows, hydropower projects can be used for political blackmail of Syria and Iraq as well. Ilisu is a case in point. Its reservoir will have a total capacity of 10.4 billion m3, and a normal operating capacity of 7.46 billion m3. At its normal operating level, Ilisu will thus have a spare capacity of 3 billion m3. Given the average streamflow of the Tigris of 15 billion m3, filling the reservoir alone will absorb one half of a yearly streamflow. And the spare capacity of the reservoir will be sufficient for Turkey to block any water flowing to Syria and Iraq for several months.
4. Social impacts
GAP reservoirs such as Ataturk or Karakaya have so far involuntarily displaced 100,000s of persons. Compensation has usually been tied to the property of land or houses. Since most land in South-East Anatolia is concentrated in the hands of large landowners, many landless families were not compensated at all. Instead, they quietly moved to the slums of big cities such as Diyarbakir or Istanbul. Given the war between the Turkish army and the Kurdish guerilla in East Anatolia, affected people cannot voice any protest or discontent against the GAP, lest they be prosecuted as sympathizers of the guerilla.
The Ilisu reservoir will flood 52 villages and 15 small towns, including the city of Hasankeyf, and will affect 15,000-20,000 people. The exact number of affected people has so far not been established, since the surveys of the reservoir area were in part conducted by helicopter rides. Affected people are not being consulted. Sulzer and ABB commissioned an environmental impact assessment (EIA) on Ilisu, but did not make this document available to affected people or NGOs. When the Berne Declaration asked for a copy, company spokespeople openly admitted that the EIA had been made for the ECAs and creditor banks only.
As was the case with earlier GAP projects, the mode of compensation will only be decided after construction starts. Senior managers of the GAP authority in the Ilisu region expressed conflicting opinions when they were interviewed by the Swiss journalist Joerg Dietziker in April 1998. While R. Erkan Alemdaroglu claimed that the affected people would be compensated with cash payments or appartments, Recep Serbetçi mantained that no cash payments would be made. It appears that the authorities will not draw lessons from the negative impacts of earlier GAP projects, and that Ilisu again will produce refugees.
http://www.rivernet.org/turquie/ilisu.htm#The
more
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ilisu_Dam
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