Tornado Alley (PROG)

[fuagf]

Exactly what i was thinking .. let the region handle it, also, just perhaps, ISIS, too vicious and
extreme than even AQ, may be just about approaching a stretch point .. this is the 2nd i got ..

Iraq: Looming War of Shiite, Kurdish, Extremist-Sunni Militias

By Juan Cole | Jun. 12, 2014 |


By Juan Cole

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS] .. http://news.yahoo.com/sunni-insurgents-close-iraqs-biggest-oil-refinery-111013537.html;_ylt=AwrBJR4yaJlTKzsASWLQtDMD .. is apparently keeping control of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city of 2 million, and advanced to take Tikrit, the birthplace of Saddam Hussein, where they held a huge Sunni prayer session.

It has been pointed out by a number of commentators that ISIS (also sometimes called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL) is probably too small an organization of cadre fighters actually to have accomplished all this by itself. Sunni tribes and townspeople appear to have joined in the attacks on the Iraqi military, which, ran away.

Since the military is largely Shiite and had been lording it over local Sunnis as though they were an occupied and humiliated population, it isn’t any wonder that they fled in the face of a popular uprising against them. They couldn’t have stood against so many hostile Sunnis. (There is a parallel to the Taliban withdrawal from Kabul in late 2001, long before they would have had to do so on purely military grounds As Pushtuns in a large hostile Tajik city, they had to worry about a popular massacre of the occupiers; this had happened in Mazar in 1997). But it is also the case that the new Iraqi army is green, whereas ISIS has been involved in fierce guerrilla war for two years and is way ahead on tactics.

Spokesman for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Adnan called for its fighters to advance on Baghdad [can't read a few of these] .. http://tiny.cc/gjodhx . He addressed Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki as an incompetent screw-up who had squandered a historic opportunity for his “people” [the Shiites?] by his misrule of Iraq.

The ISIS militants were stopped 70 miles north of Baghdad by regime air strikes on Thursday morning according to the Iraqi government. But a BBC correspondent is cautioning that the Iraqi government is frequently overly optimistic. ISIS is still trying for the oil refining city of Baiji, which they had held on a number of occasions during the period of American military occupation. They also want Samarra, a largely Sunni city that is the site of a major Shiite shrine with associations with the messianic Twelfth Imam whom many Iraqi Shiites expect to return, as Christians expect the return of Christ. An attack on the Golden Dome in February 2006 kicked off a Shiite-Sunni civil war.

Although PM Nouri al-Maliki, the Shiite prime minister, has asked for US air strikes on ISIS .. http://tiny.cc/4nodhx , the White House is declining to intervene so directly but is pledging to help the Iraqi army up its game.

Since the central Iraqi army is doing so poorly, Iraqis are mobilizing ethnic militias. Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, a Kurd, is pledging that the Kurdistan Peshmerga militia will cooperate with the Iraq army in keeping Kirkuk out of ISIS hands and recovering Mosul. And, indeed, the Kurdistan Peshmerga paramilitary seized Kirkuk .. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27809051 .. on Thursday morning.

Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and his colleagues in Najaf, the seat of Shiite religious authority, issued a statement .. http://burathanews.com/news/238913.html .. roundly condemning the Iraqi political class for its divisions and wrangling and calling on them to unite to protect Iraqi citizens from the terrorist groups that had taken over Ninevah Province (i.e. Mosul and environs). Sistani also expressed condolences for the Iraqi troops killed by ISIS fighters and pledged the religious authority’s support to the Iraqi army in this struggle. It is more or less a declaration of Shiite jihad on ISIS.

Meanwhile other members of the Shiite establishment are pledging a war of militias. The leader of the The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), Sayyid Ammar al-Hakim, said that there is no place in Iraq for ISIS extremists, and pledged that he will be the first to volunteer to go to the front to fight them .. http://burathanews.com/news/239037.html . ISCI has a paramilitary, the Badr Corps, with close links to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. It had largely been absorbed into the Iraqi army and Interior Ministry, but the use of the word “volunteer” suggests that Ammar may be thinking of reviving it.

Likewise, Shiite clerical leader Muqtada al-Sadr has offered to create “Peace Brigades .. http://ar.aswataliraq.info/%28S%283wqx5ub103e0t055gtmiseyh%29%29/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=332519&l=1 ” to fight what he called Sunni terrorists and “undisciplined militias” and to protect Shiite shrines and Christian churches from ISIS militants. He attacked al-Maliki implicitly for having provoked the crisis.

Shiite militias could be more effective than the Iraqi army. In Syria, it was Lebanese Hizbullah intervention that allowed the regime to recover Homs from Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS. Militias are after all oriented toward guerrilla tactics. And, you can bet that master strategist Qasem Sulaimani, head of Iran’s Jerusalem (Quds) Brigade of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, is planning out a counter-guerrilla war as we speak.

—–

Related video:

Reuters: “Sunni insurgents make Iraq gains as army flees Mosul .. http://youtu.be/R4nz8_qM3Pc "

[embedded video]

http://www.juancole.com/2014/06/looming-extremist-militias.html

.. this was the first .. it's old, so background now .. note: the suggestion was ISIS could have been too extended going on some 4 months ago ..

Al-Qaeda: The third generation? Part II

A new concept of Jihad may emerge from the infighting within al-Qaeda and groups affiliated with it.

Last updated: 28 Feb 2014 09:30

Abdulaziz Alhies is a Doha-based researcher and editor of the forthcoming book "The Afghan Dilemma".

Hamza Mustafa is a reasearcher at the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, based in Doha.


Al-Nusra's possible survival might have two contradictory implications for the al-Qaeda mother organisation, argue the authors [Reuters]

With the passage of time, perhaps every phenomenon is likely to mutate and generate different copies of itself. This is precisely the case with al-Qaeda. In its third generation, one can clearly see two al-Qaeda mutants co-existing - one (al-Nusra) marginally better, the other (ISIS) much worse than the original al-Qaeda organisation. The two groups had tried for months to resolve their differences and had obviously failed. Confrontations and schisms finally culminated in an open and bloody war .. http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidesyria/2014/01/syria-war-within-war-201411280260147.html .. which left 12,000 people from both sides dead.

Shifting alliances

Abu Baker al-Baghadadi .. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Jan-29/245709-iraq-releases-rare-isis-chief-photo.ashx#axzz2uatamOOP , the ISIS leader, was initially hesitant about taking part in the fighting in Syria. The Syrian Opposition groups seemed to be much better equipped and larger in numbers than his own group.

Some of his aides suggested that he set up a Jihadist front in Syria led by Syrian fighters. Abu Mohamed al-Golani came to the fore with his 40-page plan for the formation of such a Jihadist front in Syria, which came later to be known as al-Nusra Front.

Al-Baghdadi admired Golani and supplied him with funds and fighters. Later, in a statement released in April 2013, Golani himself admitted that he was delegated by Baghdadi to lead this front.

With its stakes rising high and steadily increasing its strength and popularity, al-Nusra, however, did not declare its loyalty to any party, including al-Qaeda. Baghdadi sensed al-Nusra's growing influence and power, working actively and independently in Syria. He asked Golani to disband al-Nusra Front and join the ISIS, a demand which Golani adamantly refused. He told al-Baghdadi that this would undermine the Syrian revolution.

Empire - Behind-the-scenes: America & al-Qaeda 3.0 .. [ listen inside ]

By April 2013, the rift between the two groups became public, when Baghdadi announced - in a recorded tape - "the merger" between al-Nusra Front and ISIS to form the so-called "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant". Using a softer, less confrontational tone, Golani refused.

In a similar recorded tape, dated 10 April 2013, he insisted on keeping al-Nusra Front and maintaining its independence. Fearing Baghdadi's violent retribution, Golani declared .. http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/04/12-al-qaeda-zawahiri-riedel .. his loyalty to al-Qaeda and asked Zawahiri to arbitrate between him and Baghdadi.

As al-Nusra Jihadist experiment was in line with Zawahiri's theorisation, i.e. the dispersed national versions of al-Qaeda, Golani was vindicated. The arbitration came strongly in his favour since Zawahiri adjudicated that al-Nusra remain a separate group, fighting its own independent war in Syria, and that ISIS confines its fighting to Iraq. Baghdadi rejected the verdict, claiming that the arbitration was wrong. That was a momentous event. For the first time in al-Qaeda history, the branch faulted the parent organisation and rebelled against it.

ISIS rebels vs al-Qaeda mother organisation

As soon as the Islamic State was declared, al-Nusra Front suffered a severe rift. Almost one third of its fighters, mostly foreigners ("Muhajirin" or emigrants), withdrew and joined the Islamic State in Iraq, swearing allegiance to Baghdadi as their Emir. However, a large number of Syrian fighters (the Ansar or locals) decided to stay on with al-Nusra and refused to join the new ISIS organisation.

ISIS began to storm Al-Nusra strongholds and seize its headquarters. It controlled large swathes of land and "liberated territories", precisely because the larger groups among the Syrian opposition had not yet decided to confront ISIS. Only weaker and smaller groups stood up to ISIS and were easily quashed.

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"A fourth generation Al-Qaeda breed, equipped with some political insight, might well embrace the "nationalistic" model, which confines Jihad strictly to the national borders of each country, and opens up to political dialogue and political participation and power sharing with fellow countrymen."
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Ironically, ISIS forces were fighting the Syrian opposition groups on 39 fronts but confronting the Syrian army on only three - Aleppo and its countryside, and the eastern rural areas of Hamah.

Al-Nusra's influence diminished substantially and it lost ground in many Syrian regions, particularly in the coastal area, Aleppo and al-Raqqa. ISIS on the other hand continued to expand, preceded by its ferocious reputation for kidnapping, hostage taking and suicide bombings.

Al-Muhajirin never wavered in their loyalty to the so-called Emir of ISIS, Baghdadi. In fact, some would say, Zawahiri himself never enjoyed such strong support. However, there might be a psychological factor at play here. Baghdadi gave his mostly extremist followers a free hand in the vicious campaigns they had launched against all groups and individuals who did not follow ISIS, killing, maiming and accusing them of apostasy.

Al-Nusra and other Islamic organisations in the Syrian opposition have prohibited or severely restricted such practices. Declaring an "Islamic state" and its bona fide existence on the ground in parts of Syria and Iraq might also have fuelled the ambitions of ISIS fighters and thus strengthened their loyalty to the Emir and the ISIS Islamic Emirate.

Aftermath

It might be early to talk about the total annihilation of ISIS in the short run. [in hindsight that feels to be one of the understatements of the year] Despite the Syrian opposition's collective campaign against it, ISIS is still a solid and tight-knit organisation with ferocious fighters. In the long run, however, the possibility is there.

The very idea behind ISIS was systematically eroded with the massive popular anger the group had faced in different parts of Syria. ISIS was in fact rejected even in the northern rural areas of Syria, where Salafi ideology is readily accepted, let alone in the big cities with their more moderate middle classes. ISIS has also overstretched itself. It has expanded way beyond its ability to control the areas it occupied or, having created too many enemies, has trouble defending itself.

ISIS fighters number no more than 7,000, compared to the joint opposition armed groups with their 220,000 active fighters on the ground across Syria today.

Beyond doubt, al-Nusra will benefit immensely from taking ISIS down. Its chances to survive, and ultimately triumph, are proportionate to al-Nusra aligning itself with other opposition forces and garnering crucial popular support and acceptance. The existence of al-Nusra as a Jihadist group and its ability to expand decisively depend on it. It is also true that there are countries in the region, inclined to support al-Nusra Front, and other opposition groups, against ISIS.

Al-Nusra's possible survival might have two contradictory implications for the al-Qaeda mother organisation. The first is that al-Nusra, the better version, could well extend the lifespan of al-Qaeda network and ideology.

The second, however, is that al-Nusra might part company with the al-Qaeda mother organisation, precisely because Zawahiri was powerless to protect it when ISIS decided to attack it. Only now, he has insisted to have no links with ISIS; add to this al-Nusra's reliance on the local indigenous factor in building its organisational structures, erecting its theoretical scaffolding, and defining the "functional" role it plays in the Syrian arena. Many Syrians who believe in the just cause of their fight against the regime, are critical of belonging to al-Qaeda.

All that could well lead to a new conception of Jihad. A fourth generation al-Qaeda, equipped with some political insight, might well embrace the "nationalistic" model, which confines Jihad strictly to the national borders of each country, and opens up to political dialogue, political participation and power-sharing with fellow countrymen. The steps al-Nusra has recently taken already point to such a transformative model.

This is part two of a two-part series. Part one .. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/02/al-qaida-third-generation-201421312828448349.html .. was published on Wednesday, February 26.

Abdulaziz Alheis is a researcher based in Doha and editor of the forthcoming book "The Afghan Dilemma".

Hamza Mustafa is a researcher with the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies and author of The Syrian Revolution's Virtual Realm: Specificities, Directions and the Mechanisms for the Creation of Public Opinion, 2012.

The views expressed in this article are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

Source:Al Jazeera

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/02/al-qaeda-third-generation-201421911171268539.html

.. the only certainty is that ISIS born of the Bush invasion of Iraq in 2003, the egg being Iraq, i guess, which then became
a welcoming womb more thanks to the dismantling of the Iraq army back then will cause havoc for quite some time .. yeah ..

"Is the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” a Real Country Now? " .. Is that what we can call "Mission Accomplished"
http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=103191193

well done, Mr Bush .. yours will be forever seen as the most overstated statements of that year ..