Good read: Dangerous curves on Turkey's energy policy: Jammed between Russia and Iran
This revision will not only shape Turkey's national energy policy, but will also modify Turkey's foreign policy and the government's focus.
This is a significant statement.
It seems the U.S. is willing to sacrifice Turkey’s allegiance by giving the Kurds independence in Iraq.
It would spark another great conflict up there if Kurdistan goes independent. The Turks would not tolerate. That is not acceptable. There is huge Turkish minorities inside -- Kurdish minors inside Turkey, inside Syria, inside Iraq, inside Iran and all those countries would feel very shaky. SEYMOUR HERSH
#msg-3465824
-Am
Dangerous curves on Turkey's energy policy: Jammed between Russia and Iran
M. Faruk DEMIR
Turkey's energy policy is very related to its foreign policy. The density of Turkey's demand from the outside requires a supply of energy from surrounding states. Therefore, Turkey's relations with the countries from which it imports its energy is a critical issue in terms of foreign policy. In addition, Turkey's geopolitical location is one of a crossing state for the countries with energy resources to export. Thus, the issues of energy security, energy diplomacy and a national energy strategy in Turkey's foreign policy are a concern not just for Ankara, but also for many related countries.
So what is Turkey's energy policy today? Turkey's energy policy was reshaped after the Cold War era. Its national energy policy is based on three elements. The first one is energy diversity. In other words, to ensure that Turkey is not absolutely dependent on any one country for more than 35-40 percent of its energy. The second is to ensure a sustainable, high-quality and cheap energy supply. Finally the third is to function as a bridge of energy by maintaining the country's geopolitical opportunities. For the last five years, Turkey has spent much important effort in order to implement this policy. The Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan pipeline, or East-West, North-South pipeline projects crisscrossing Turkey, are the results of this policy.
Today, Turkey's national energy policy needs a rapid and effective revision. There are three reasons for the need of such a reconfiguration. Firstly, Turkey's energy needs and diversity rates are changing. Secondly, regional geopolitical instability results in new political and security risks. And thirdly, in the international markets energy prices and the balance of supply and demand changes radically at short notice. For these three reasons, this revision will not only shape Turkey's national energy policy, but will also modify Turkey's foreign policy and the government's focus. But despite the need for such a revision, there has been no progress to this end. Both the government and the Energy Ministry seem unwilling or unable to act proactively on this issue. A question arrises: Why doesn't the government work proactively to revise the nation's energy policy?
The answer can be quite complex. Maybe the answer to the question above is hidden in the preferences of the government's current foreign policy. Nevertheless, I think it is beneficial to analyze the dilemmas which reside in the minds of the rulers who govern Turkey's national energy policy. What are these dilemmas?
Before all else, Turkey's energy policy is stunted due to the situations in Russia and Iran. Iran's hope to sell gas to Europe by transporting it through Turkey is currently impossible because of the sanctions against Iran. It seems that Iran's insistence to develop its nuclear facilities will leave the exports of this gas to Europe in doubt. The government and the Energy Ministry are warming to Russia by using Iran's negative situation as an excuse for the past two years. And this sympathy continues to grow and deepen.
The claim of the government and Energy Ministry is that they have to get closer to Russia by using the tensions between the U.S. and Iran as an excuse. Some, however, claim this is merely a trick by the government and the Energy Ministry towards the U.S. I also agree with this evaluation. The Turkish government is at a serious distance from the U.S. This distance is due to the U.S.' policies in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Turkish government wants the U.S. to stop its activities in these regions by working together with Russia, and also wants to show that it can make a choice independent and even against Washington's interests by using the Russian trump card. And the best trump card in Turkey's hands is its relations in energy and the military. But the issue of closer military relations with Russia cannot even be discussed between the government and the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). Therefore, the only trump card left in the government's hands is its energy policy.
So, will the government and the Energy Ministry really be able to implement such an assertive energy policy and energy strategy when its geopolitical character is at stake? I think we'll learn the answer to this question very soon. But already some concrete signs can be seen. Turkey's loss maintains increasingly on the Blue Stream. Turkey still has not taken a step back on buying expensive gas from Russia. The answer to why Turkey couldn't get a lower price in Russian gas is hidden in the memories of the prime minister and the energy minister who met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at his summer home in Sochi. Actually, there's an important dimension to the government and Energy Ministry's stalling on Russia and Iran. Since they've come to power, both the Justice and Development (AK) party government and the Energy Ministry have maintained the weaknesses of previous governments, and they don't seem able to implement a realistic, serious and persuasive policy for attracting gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Turkey. Turkey's inability to use gas-rich Turkmenistan and oil-rich Kazakhstan between Russia and Iran shows the failure of Turkey's national energy policy. In addition, there is another dimension to this issue in terms of the dangerous new curve involved that the future of Iraq's petrol industry surely brings. I will analyze this multi-dimensional issue by detailing and profiling the administration and politics of Turkey's national energy policy in another article.
The New Anatolian
13 august 2005
2005-08-13 13:21:17
Updated 24/7 - 365 days
Journal of Turkish Weekly is an ISRO (USAK) publication
ISRO is an Ankara based NGO
http://www.turkishweekly.net/comments.php?id=1687
This revision will not only shape Turkey's national energy policy, but will also modify Turkey's foreign policy and the government's focus.
This is a significant statement.
It seems the U.S. is willing to sacrifice Turkey’s allegiance by giving the Kurds independence in Iraq.
It would spark another great conflict up there if Kurdistan goes independent. The Turks would not tolerate. That is not acceptable. There is huge Turkish minorities inside -- Kurdish minors inside Turkey, inside Syria, inside Iraq, inside Iran and all those countries would feel very shaky. SEYMOUR HERSH
#msg-3465824
-Am
Dangerous curves on Turkey's energy policy: Jammed between Russia and Iran
M. Faruk DEMIR
Turkey's energy policy is very related to its foreign policy. The density of Turkey's demand from the outside requires a supply of energy from surrounding states. Therefore, Turkey's relations with the countries from which it imports its energy is a critical issue in terms of foreign policy. In addition, Turkey's geopolitical location is one of a crossing state for the countries with energy resources to export. Thus, the issues of energy security, energy diplomacy and a national energy strategy in Turkey's foreign policy are a concern not just for Ankara, but also for many related countries.
So what is Turkey's energy policy today? Turkey's energy policy was reshaped after the Cold War era. Its national energy policy is based on three elements. The first one is energy diversity. In other words, to ensure that Turkey is not absolutely dependent on any one country for more than 35-40 percent of its energy. The second is to ensure a sustainable, high-quality and cheap energy supply. Finally the third is to function as a bridge of energy by maintaining the country's geopolitical opportunities. For the last five years, Turkey has spent much important effort in order to implement this policy. The Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan pipeline, or East-West, North-South pipeline projects crisscrossing Turkey, are the results of this policy.
Today, Turkey's national energy policy needs a rapid and effective revision. There are three reasons for the need of such a reconfiguration. Firstly, Turkey's energy needs and diversity rates are changing. Secondly, regional geopolitical instability results in new political and security risks. And thirdly, in the international markets energy prices and the balance of supply and demand changes radically at short notice. For these three reasons, this revision will not only shape Turkey's national energy policy, but will also modify Turkey's foreign policy and the government's focus. But despite the need for such a revision, there has been no progress to this end. Both the government and the Energy Ministry seem unwilling or unable to act proactively on this issue. A question arrises: Why doesn't the government work proactively to revise the nation's energy policy?
The answer can be quite complex. Maybe the answer to the question above is hidden in the preferences of the government's current foreign policy. Nevertheless, I think it is beneficial to analyze the dilemmas which reside in the minds of the rulers who govern Turkey's national energy policy. What are these dilemmas?
Before all else, Turkey's energy policy is stunted due to the situations in Russia and Iran. Iran's hope to sell gas to Europe by transporting it through Turkey is currently impossible because of the sanctions against Iran. It seems that Iran's insistence to develop its nuclear facilities will leave the exports of this gas to Europe in doubt. The government and the Energy Ministry are warming to Russia by using Iran's negative situation as an excuse for the past two years. And this sympathy continues to grow and deepen.
The claim of the government and Energy Ministry is that they have to get closer to Russia by using the tensions between the U.S. and Iran as an excuse. Some, however, claim this is merely a trick by the government and the Energy Ministry towards the U.S. I also agree with this evaluation. The Turkish government is at a serious distance from the U.S. This distance is due to the U.S.' policies in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Turkish government wants the U.S. to stop its activities in these regions by working together with Russia, and also wants to show that it can make a choice independent and even against Washington's interests by using the Russian trump card. And the best trump card in Turkey's hands is its relations in energy and the military. But the issue of closer military relations with Russia cannot even be discussed between the government and the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). Therefore, the only trump card left in the government's hands is its energy policy.
So, will the government and the Energy Ministry really be able to implement such an assertive energy policy and energy strategy when its geopolitical character is at stake? I think we'll learn the answer to this question very soon. But already some concrete signs can be seen. Turkey's loss maintains increasingly on the Blue Stream. Turkey still has not taken a step back on buying expensive gas from Russia. The answer to why Turkey couldn't get a lower price in Russian gas is hidden in the memories of the prime minister and the energy minister who met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at his summer home in Sochi. Actually, there's an important dimension to the government and Energy Ministry's stalling on Russia and Iran. Since they've come to power, both the Justice and Development (AK) party government and the Energy Ministry have maintained the weaknesses of previous governments, and they don't seem able to implement a realistic, serious and persuasive policy for attracting gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Turkey. Turkey's inability to use gas-rich Turkmenistan and oil-rich Kazakhstan between Russia and Iran shows the failure of Turkey's national energy policy. In addition, there is another dimension to this issue in terms of the dangerous new curve involved that the future of Iraq's petrol industry surely brings. I will analyze this multi-dimensional issue by detailing and profiling the administration and politics of Turkey's national energy policy in another article.
The New Anatolian
13 august 2005
2005-08-13 13:21:17
Updated 24/7 - 365 days
Journal of Turkish Weekly is an ISRO (USAK) publication
ISRO is an Ankara based NGO
http://www.turkishweekly.net/comments.php?id=1687
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