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Re: Amaunet post# 930

Sunday, 07/04/2004 9:54:41 PM

Sunday, July 04, 2004 9:54:41 PM

Post# of 9338
Readjustment to American Weakness: Signs of a Power Vacuum

02 July, 2004

Indications are growing of a shift in the world balance of power in the wake of the American occupation of Iraq. Two events reported widely in the press on June 24, 2004 show the broad ramifications of the loss of power incurred by the United States through its Iraq intervention.

A reversal of policy on the North Korea nuclear issue and failure of the United States to renew its exemption from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court at the United Nations Security Council show in different ways a slackening of American influence. Neither of them marks a decisive readjustment and realignment, but together they point to a tendency that moves in a single direction -- the erosion of American power.

In the dimension of world politics, the strategic intentions of the Iraq intervention were to stabilize the Middle East through a successful demonstration project of market democratization and to convince the other "rogue states" of Iran and North Korea that they would face unacceptable consequences if they did not abandon their nuclear programs. Neither of these goals has been met; indeed, they are farther from realization than ever.

The most obvious slackening of American resolve reported on June 24 was the proposal presented by the United States to the Beijing talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program that offered North Korea a phased plan of de-nuclearization in exchange for a security guarantee and a generous economic aid package. The significance of this move is not as a predictor of the course of the negotiations -- the differences between the two sides are still serious; the intentions of neither side are clear and the good faith of their positions is problematic. The importance of the American proposal is that it represents a public -- and perhaps an actual -- concession to multilateralism.

Japan and South Korea in particular were anxious to return to the phased approach that had been abandoned after North Korea had admitted to violating the previous agreement in 2002. South Korea was willing to go as far as settling for a North Korean nuclear freeze to get the process restarted. Facing pressures from its closest partners in the talks, the United States fell back from its insistence that North Korea de-nuclearize before it received any aid to a compromise that came just short of North Korea's demand for a freeze. This is how multilateralism works for the United States -- it takes account of its regional allies' concerns and attempts to hold a line. How far back that line is drawn depends on how many concessions have to be made, encouraging further bids to wrest concessions. The threat to the United States is a vicious cycle of concessions that opens the way to multi-polarism.

The Beijing talks themselves remain wrapped in uncertainty. It is not clear that North Korea, China and the United States are good-faith negotiators; Russia has little leverage and China's policy is ambivalent or, perhaps, deceptive. What does North Korea want? Has the regime decided that it will have to concede its weapons program and is trying to get the best deal it can? Or is the regime committed to dragging out the talks so that it can gain a more credible nuclear capability, even -- as it suggested on the last day of the present round -- testing a nuclear weapon? Does the American proposal represent a genuine return to incentives diplomacy, or is it simply an ad hoc adjustment to present weakness, masking a continued commitment to the hard line? Is China interested in being an honest broker and getting an agreement, or does it condone North Korea's nuclear weaponization as a way of shifting the balance of power in East Asia against the United States? Does South Korea imagine the distant possibility of a united Korea with nuclear capability?

The Beijing talks highlight the complexity of contemporary world politics. Each of the adversaries has divided interests, undermining any stable expectations of how they will act toward each other. At present, the United States is specially hampered by the lack of any security strategy to replace the unilateralism articulated in its 2002 National Security Strategy. It is stumbling into multilateralism. Other powers can be expected to assert themselves and experiment with policies in this environment. A loosening of structured power relations does not signal a collapse, but a multitude of readjustments, barring some calamitous event. Those readjustments will center on other powers testing the United States, forcing it to generate a new strategy.

The second instance of readjustment to American power loss reported on June 24 was the decision by the United States not to seek a renewal from the U.N. Security Council of a grant of immunity for its military from prosecution in the International Criminal Court (I.C.C.). More symbolic than substantive, the effective opposition to the immunity grant was a punishment administered to the United States for its unilateralist policies, made possible by the revelations of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib. The refusal to grant American troops immunity signals pressure to force the United States into international structures of mediation, where it would no longer function as a putative "empire," able to impose its will and its conception of global interests on other powers.

At the Security Council, there was sufficient resolve to teach the United States a lesson to override interests in Iraqi stability. That resolve was made possible by the perception of the other powers that the United States had no option but to accept the blow to its claims to exceptionalism. Those claims are based on the notion made famous by former American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright who articulated that the United States is the "indispensable nation" and, therefore, deserves privileges commensurate with its role. The Security Council did not agree, portending similar reactions to American initiatives in other international forums.

The denial of immunity itself is not determinative of future American troop deployments around the world. It does not affect Iraq, because neither the United States nor Iraq is a party to the I.C.C., nor does it prevent the United States from negotiating bilateral immunity agreements with other states, as it has already done. Further, immunity could be granted once again by the Security Council for American participation in future missions. What is off the table is any expectation of automatic or blanket immunity in the future.

The two American concessions reported on June 24 mark steps along the path to a loosening of American power to successful external pressure to return the United States to a player that must make compromises in international institutions. They are likely to be followed by many other efforts along the same lines. Any new stable configuration of world politics is a long way off, but readjustment of the balance of power is underway. At present, that readjustment is being driven by powers around the world that believe that their interest is to craft policies tailored solely to their own particular aims -- apart from American interest -- and perceive that they have the opportunity to do so. They can be expected to use international institutions when it is to their advantage to do so and to abandon them when it is not.

The other powers do not have a shared model of world politics to replace American dominance; they have similar and sometimes competing interests in filling the vacuum that has appeared with the erosion of American power. The prospects are high for general global instability.

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein



The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.



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