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It is my understanding they only have to submit 'plans' within 45 days on how they will meet listing requirements by September 2011. Blockbuster has plenty of time at this point. It might not be as bad as everyone thinks, as combining both classes may, in itself, likely be enough to meet NYSE listing requirements... imho.
I doubt it. Blockbuster has many options at this point. Hollywood does not want to see Blockbuster go away and is actively working with Blockbuster for better pricing terms and window release advantages to Blockbuster over Netflix / Redbox. The upcoming sale of European assets of Blockbuster properties will add necessary cashflow. The "Bluebox" Kiosk partnership with NCR, not to mention the set-top box and online streaming to PC's / smartphones with the Blockbuster brand name are sure to be winners. Besides, a R/S is not always a bad thing. Many companies actually have a price increase leading up to and after a split. For example, GNPR underwent a 500:1 R/S in April 2009 and is currently up over 800% + and climbing fast with the upcoming release of Scratch: The Ultimate DJ. At any rate, with all of the volume we had today, the price held strong at .25. I believe the downside is priced in at this point and I am holding strong, imho. GLTY!
Note To Self: BBI is holding strong at .25 this may be the bottom, imo.
With pending R/S and possibility of delisting and bankruptcy, I see no reason to be long on BBI at this point until the dust settles, imo.
My vote is for a reverse split / merger / mega dilution with NCR corp, imo.
Note To Self... It seems PALM has a Stock Split every 4 years or so, (1:20 split on October 2002 and a 2:1 split on March 2006). Another stock split is overdue, imo.
Also:
Barclays analysts believe that Palm Inc.'s (NASDAQ:PALM) launch at AT&T (NYSE:T) and China Telecom (NYSE:CHA) will provide necessary carrier distribution but will do little to ease the company's challenge of material CDMA channel inventory at incumbent carriers.
Palm announced the availability of the Pre and Pixi Plus at AT&T with availability in the upcoming months. China Telecom also confirmed that they plan to launch the Palm Pre in July.
The bank believes that the launches will provide the company with much needed additional distribution.
Analysts Amir Rozwadowski and Jeffrey Kvaal said, "We believe growing share at AT&T is likely to prove challenging as Palm's devices will now go head to head with the iPhone, RIM, and the carrier's ramping efforts in Android."
Source: http://www.mysmartrend.com/nw/20279
Patience, patience... ;oD
Waiting for a lower entry point, ~ 2.50 or less, imo.
Iron Man: Armored Adventures - The Complete Season One Coming to DVD
THE NEW HERO OF THE DIGITAL AGE
IRON MAN: ARMORED ADVENTURES - THE COMPLETE FIRST SEASON
Entire First Season Of Fan-Favorite Series Debuts On DVD May 4
From Marvel Animation, Method Films, Genius Products And Vivendi Entertainment
Arriving Just In Time For The Theatrical Debut Of Iron Man 2
Program Description: Embark on the high-octane adventures of boy-genius Tony Stark and his friends as they combine the latest technology and a little teamwork to save the world from evil when "Iron Man: Armored Adventures" The Complete First Season soars onto DVD May 4 from Marvel Animation, Method Films, Genius Products and Vivendi Entertainment. Based on the hugely popular and successful Iron Man franchise from Marvel Entertainment, the four-disc set features all 26 episodes from the action-packed first season. With pulse-pounding showdowns, secrets and larger-than-life challenges, Iron Man and his ever-evolving, adaptable armor are always ready for high-speed flight and whatever high-tech battles ensue. Possessing "smart writing and stellar CG butt-kickery" (Entertainment Weekly), the 3D CGI animated hit television series launched in 2009 and holds the record for the highest-rated original series premiere on Nicktoons Network. The perfect adrenaline-rush for fans before the theatrical release of Iron Man 2, the "Iron Man: Armored Adventures" The Complete First Season four-disc set will be available for the suggested retail price of $29.93.
Show Synopsis: Tony Stark is not the typical teenager... he's a billionaire, brilliant inventor... and Iron Man! "Iron Man: Armored Adventures" follows Tony Stark, 16-year-old genius and heir to the billion-dollar corporation Stark International, as he battles the enemies of world peace with his revolutionary power armor technology. Growing up, Tony had always lived a life of luxury, but everything went horribly wrong when a tragic plane accident robbed him of his father and nearly cost him his own life. Eager to honor the memory of his dad, Tony now uses his suit of invincible armor and technical know-how to protect those who would also fall prey to tragedy, corruption and conspiracy. With help from his friends Jim Rhodes and Pepper Potts, Tony's activities as Iron Man usually result in high-speed flight, high-tech battles and high-octane quests for justice.
"Iron Man: Armored Adventures" The Complete First Season
Join the adventures of teenage prodigy Tony Stark and his alter ego, Iron Man as he uses his technological inventions to battle villains and save the world! Includes all 26 episodes from Season 1.
Special Features:
Storyboards
Original Sketches of Characters, Vehicles and More!
BASICS
Price: $29.93
Street Date: May 4, 2010
Prebook Date: March 30, 2010
Catalog Number: GN01369
Rating: NR
Run time: 572 minutes
Format: Wide Screen
Language: English
Closed Captioned
Source: http://dvdlegiondotcom.blogspot.com/2010/03/iron-man-armored-adventures-complete.html
Accountants raise doubts about Cell Therapeutics; stock slides
Cell Therapeutics Inc.’s accounting firm said it has “substantial doubt” about the Seattle biotech’s ability to continue as a going concern and shares in the company plummeted in early Monday trading.
On Feb. 26, the accounting firm of Stonefield Josephson, Inc. of San Francisco said Cell Therapeutics (NASDAQ: CTIC) “has sustained loss from operations over the audit periods, incurred an accumulated deficit, and has substantial monetary liabilities in excess of monetary assets as of Dec. 31, 2009. Given these factors and the company’s inability to demonstrate its ability to satisfy the monetary liabilities raises substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern.”
Company officials acknowledged the accountants’ concerns in a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
“This may have a negative impact on the trading price of our common stock and we may have a more difficult time obtaining necessary financing,” Cell Therapeutics officials wrote.
In early Monday trading, shares in Cell Therapeutics had fallen more than 10 percent, dropping more than 7 cents to around 60 cents.
Company officials said they’re counting on for FDA approval of its pixantrone drug for treatment of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.
“If we receive FDA approval and have a successful commercial launch of pixantrone in the second quarter of 2010 ... we expect to be cash flow positive in the fourth quarter of 2010. However, if we do not receive FDA approval but we are successful in exchanging our convertible notes due July 1, 2010, we expect that our existing cash and cash equivalents ... are sufficient to fund our presently anticipated operations through the fourth quarter of 2010.”
Source: http://news.moneycentral.msn.com/provider/providerarticle.aspx?feed=ACBJ&date=20100301&id=11174517
Activision's Guitar Hero 'Patent Pending' ... perhaps not
Buy Guitar Hero and you might notice amongst the packaging and paperwork that you get with it that Activision claim that the product is “patent pending” … but Patent Arcade have uncovered information that might indicate that this statement is false.
… on February 12, 2010, Patent Compliance Group, Inc. (”PCG”) filed a qui tam action against Activision, alleging that Activision has falsely marked many of its video games including Guitar Hero 5, Band Hero, DJ Hero and Guitar Hero Smash Hits (collectively “Activision video game products”) as patented or patent pending.
The PCG claim that Activision has violated 35 U.S.C. 292(a):
Whoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in connection with any unpatented article the word “patent” or any word or number importing the same is patented, for the purpose of deceiving the public; or Whoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in connection with any article the words “patent applied for,” “patent pending,” or any word importing that an application for patent has been made, when no application for patent has been made, or if made, is not pending, for the purpose of deceiving the public - Shall be fined not more than $500 for every such offense.
Specifically, the false patent claims relate to:
Activision’s Guitar Hero 5, DJ Hero, Band Hero and Guitar Hero Smash Hits video games are falsely marked with U.S. Patent No. 5,739,457 (”‘457 Patent”).
Guitar Hero 5, DJ Hero, Band Hero and Guitar Hero Smash Hits video games are falsely marked with U.S. Patent No. 6,018,121 (”‘121 Patent”).
Guitar Hero 5, Band Hero and Guitar Hero Smash Hits video games are falsely marked with U.S. Patent No. 6,252,153 (”‘153 Patent”).
Guitar Hero 5, Band Hero and Guitar Hero Smash Hits video games are falsely marked with U.S. Patent No. 6,268,557 (”‘557 Patent”).
Guitar Hero 5, DJ Hero, Band Hero and Guitar Hero Smash Hits video games are falsely marked with U.S. Patent No. 6,369,313 (”‘313 Patent”).
Guitar Hero 5, Band Hero and Guitar Hero Smash Hits video games are falsely marked with U.S. Patent No. 6,379,244 (”‘244 Patent”).
Guitar Hero 5, DJ Hero, Band Hero and Guitar Hero Smash Hits video games are falsely marked with U.S. Patent No. 6,429,863 (”‘863 Patent”).
Guitar Hero 5, Band Hero and Guitar Hero Smash Hits video games are falsely marked with U.S. Patent No. 6,758,753 (”‘753 Patent”).
Guitar Hero 5, Band Hero and Guitar Hero Smash Hits video games are falsely marked with U.S. Patent No. 6,769,689 (”‘689 Patent”).
Guitar Hero 5 and Guitar Hero Smash Hits video games are falsely marked with U.S. Design Patent No. D441,403 (”‘403 Patent”).
Guitar Hero 5, DJ Hero, Band Hero and Guitar Hero Smash Hits video games are falsely marked as “patent pending” or “patent applied for.”
PCG claims that the scopes of the patents which Activision’s video game products are marked with does not cover the methods or systems of the actual products.
Questions remain over who the PCG is, and what its motives might be, but at this time it doesn’t really matter. Also, Activision isn’t the only company that the PCG has sued this month. Others are Timex, Brunswick and Wright Medical Technology.
Note: Qui tam action is a “writ whereby a private individual who assists a prosecution can receive all or part of any penalty imposed.”
Given the popularity of Guitar Hero, this could be expensive for Activision if it is found guilty.
Source: http://blogs.zdnet.com/hardware/?p=7446
Mixmaster Mike on Scratch vs. DJ Hero: "Our Apple Is Going to be Juicier"
Check out more images from the event in Ivan Fernandez's photo gallery.
There are two types of Mixmaster Mike fans. There are those who love him for his work with The Beastie Boys and there are those who love him for his work with Invisibl Skratch Piklz. Both groups came out to Playhouse Hollywood to catch his special two-hour set at the Red Bull Thre3style event. We spoke with the turntable auteur about life in L.A., sampling and his upcoming album and video game.
Ivan Fernandez
?
You're originally from San Francisco where you established your career with Invisibl Skratch Piklz. Why did you decide to head south to Los Angeles?
I've been here for 10 years and I moved because I met this real cool girl and I ended up marrying her. We've been married for the past 12 years and it's a beautiful thing. I also got family out here. The Beat Junkies, J Rocc, Babu, all those cats, they're like my brothers. L.A. has embraced me and I embrace it back.
How are the DJ cultures in each city different?
I'm gonna go out on a limb and say that San Francisco was the Mecca of the scratch DJs. It was me and Q-Bert and our crew. We started out there and then we came over here. It's good being out here from a business aspect. There are so many different things out here. The tree here is full of different branches. In San Francisco, you hone your skills, you chill out but out here you get discovered.
You signed on to help with the development of Scratch: The Ultimate DJ video game. How is that coming along?
The game's gonna be dope. I'm very happy with the direction of it. Bedlam in Toronto is working on it right now. They got their hearts into it. I turned in my original track today. I also have a character in the game. You get to be me when you get to a certain level in the game. It's awesome.
How does it compare to DJ Hero?
DJ Hero is a whole different thing. It's in the whole mash-up area. This one's gonna be more about scratching and be on the MPC (MIDI/Music Production Center) tip. It's different. I'm not taking anything away from the guys on DJ Hero but I think our apple is going to be juicier.
Ivan Fernandez
?
Speaking of electronics, how has technology changed the culture? It's difficult to find someone who isn't using Serato.
It's a gift and a curse because it's on your computer and people think they're DJs automatically and the whole "paying dues" aspect is out the window. You can't fight technology and I'm not fighting it one bit. I'm not carrying a crate of records on my back every night. I carry four records with me now but I treat it as a record crate.
You also appear in the documentary Copyright Criminals. How'd that come about?
These rap cats approached me and said they were doing a film about copyrights and stuff like that. It was dope to raise awareness about the art of sampling where they ask how far is too far because times are changing.
I like to be a ninja about it. Whatever you're using, you just have to smash it up into little bitty pieces and replay it to where they don't know what the fuck's going on. My last record had about 200, 000 samples but it was constructed in a strategic way.
That's up there with Girl Talk.
He's probably at a million. I try not to be so ADD about it. I have a record coming out called Plasma Rifle where I've honed it down to where you're not hitting people over the head all the time. You want people to get up and breathe and then hit them over the head.
The album's coming out with the custom Mixmaster Mike Skullcandy headphones in May. They're going to be packaged together. I wanted to make an all-in-one pair of headphones because they're always one thing that's wrong with every pair I use. I wanted something diverse where you can DJ with them or answer the phone with them.
What do you think is the next step for DJ culture in LA?
Well, next for me is to DJ on the MIR space station. Look for Mixmaster Mike live by satellite on the MIR space station.
Source: http://blogs.laweekly.com/westcoastsound/interviews/mixmaster-mike-scratch-video-g/
Blockbuster continues its decline, posts $425M loss in Q4
Blockbuster continues its downward spiral with the once powerful movie rental company now posting yet another quarterly loss. Bad news across the board with sales plunging 16%, revenue falling 18%, and an income loss of $425 million which exceeds the $360 million loss posted in Q4 2008. Blockbuster is in tough shape; its stock is hovering around $0.31, a point that places its future on the NYSE at risk, and analysts en masse are questioning if it has the ability to repay its debts which total $964 million. In an attempt to reverse this trend, Blockbuster is closing stores, shuttering 253 of them last month with another 150 planned for April, and extending its reach by offering a video by mail service, an on-demand video streaming service, and is introducing kiosks which offer movie rentals without the overhead costs associated with a brick and mortar store. Blockbuster is jumping feet first into the kiosk market, rolling out 2,000 kiosks in 2009 with another 7,000 planned for 2010. This may be a little too little, a little too late as kiosk rental champion Redbox continues to eat away Blockbusters market share and Netflix, Blockbuster’s primary rival, is laughing all the way to the bank with $31 million in quarterly income and 12.3 million subscribers in tow.
Source: http://www.boygeniusreport.com/2010/02/25/blockbuster-continues-its-decline-posts-425m-loss-in-q4
:oD Cool! Do you carry around a swiss army knife and ducktape too? heh
Strong Sell, IMO.
"Janney analyst Tony Wible downgraded Blockbuster to "Sell" from "Neutral," saying a thin cash buffer of only $150 million, according to his estimates, combined with market share losses could impair the company's ability to service its debt next year. Debt obligations are about $200 million a year, he said."
Source: http://www.seattlepi.com/business/1310ap_us_blockbuster_ahead_of_the_bell.html
I agree, hey are you related to Mac?
STRONG SELL, imo.
Blockbuster Reports Fourth Quarter and Fiscal-Year 2009 Financial Results
PR Newswire
DALLAS, Feb. 24
DALLAS, Feb. 24 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ — Blockbuster Inc. (NYSE: BBI, BBI.B), a leading global provider of media entertainment, today announced financial results for the fourth quarter and fiscal year ended January 3, 2010.
“While Blockbuster had a challenging year, we did make progress during the year towards the continued transformation of Blockbuster. We closed several hundred stores, but added over 2,000 new Blockbuster Express kiosks. In addition, we introduced a new a la carte by-mail program that provides our in-store customers access to over 95,000 titles and launched Blockbuster On Demand, making streaming video-on-demand available to millions of households with the movies they enjoy at the touch of a button. We completed these initiatives in spite of a challenging global economy and the practical constraints of limited liquidity while we were refinancing the Company’s debt,” stated Jim Keyes, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Blockbuster Inc. “Increased inventory levels to support a higher in-stock availability and our investment in advertising were intended to improve top line performance; however, disappointing holiday sales due primarily to aggressive new competition and lower than expected international performance led to a shortfall in our financial results.”
Mr. Keyes concluded, “While we believe the future is bright, the next 12 to 18 months will remain challenging as we balance the secular decline of a single channel with the ascension of emerging channels; such as vending and digital. As we look at our plans for 2010, stores remain a key component of our multi-channel offering. Through our alliance with NCR, we expect to add an additional 7,000 Blockbuster Express kiosks. We also plan to grow the by-mail channel and further expand availability of our digital offering through Blockbuster On Demand. We recognize the need to focus on liquidity and regain the confidence of our stakeholders and will continue to reduce costs, while expanding our new channels through collaborative partnerships. Meanwhile, we will continue to explore a variety of strategic alternatives to strengthen our capital structure to position the Company for success in our transformational efforts.”
“For the full year 2010 we will continue to take actions to improve liquidity,” stated Tom Casey, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Blockbuster Inc. “We expect to further reduce G&A expenses by over $200 million, continue to rationalize the domestic store portfolio and work to divest international assets. In addition, in 2010 global capital expenditures will remain at maintenance levels in the range of approximately $30 million to $35 million and we will aggressively manage working capital.”
Consolidated Fourth Quarter Financial Results
Total revenues for the fourth quarter of 2009 were $1.08 billion as compared to total revenue of $1.31 billion for the same period one year ago. Results of the fourth quarter were primarily attributable to a 14.7 percent decrease in same-store comparables, a further reduction in company-operated stores and competitive pressures.
Gross profit for the fourth quarter of 2009 was $540.4 million, compared to $658.9 million in the same period one year ago. Gross profit results for the fourth quarter of 2009 were primarily attributable to lower same-store revenues. Blockbuster recorded consolidated gross margin of 49.8 percent, compared to gross margin of 50.1 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008. Domestic store rental margin as a percent of revenue decreased by 190 basis points year-over-year as the Company increased investments to support its rental in-stock initiative for the 2009 holiday season. Domestic store merchandise margin as a percent of revenue increased by 640 basis points year-over-year, primarily due to a product mix shift from lower margin games, hardware and software to higher margin product.
Operating expenses for the fourth quarter of 2009 decreased by $73.2 million, or approximately 7 percent, to $934.0 million as compared to operating expenses of $1.01 billion for the same period one year ago. In the fourth quarter of 2009 the Company incurred a non-cash charge of $369.2 million for the impairment of goodwill and other long-lived assets, compared to a $435.0 million non-cash charge for the impairment of goodwill and other long-lived assets for the same period one year ago. General and administrative expenses during the fourth quarter of 2009 were $487.6 million as compared to $509.6 million in the fourth quarter of 2008, representing a decrease of $22.0 million, or approximately 4 percent. Blockbuster’s investment in advertising during the fourth quarter of 2009 was $36.3 million, compared to an advertising investment of $26.5 million for the same period one year ago and $19.0 million in the third quarter of 2009. The Company increased its investment in advertising during the fourth quarter of 2009 in an effort to increase traffic in stores and online, specifically in the month of December where historically 30 percent of the Company’s annual EBITDA has been generated. Total selling, general and administrative expense for the fourth quarter of 2009 was $523.9 million, compared to $536.1 million for the same period one year ago.
Operating loss for the fourth quarter of 2009 was $393.6 million as compared to an operating loss of $348.3 million in the fourth quarter one year ago, which includes non-cash charges for the impairment of goodwill and other long-lived assets. Adjusted operating loss, which excludes costs associated with store closures, severance and the impairment of goodwill and other long-lived assets, was $6.3 million for the fourth quarter of 2009, compared to adjusted operating income of $91.9 million for the fourth quarter of 2008.
Net loss in the fourth quarter of 2009 was $434.9 million, or $2.24 per share, which includes the non-cash charge of $369.2 million for the impairment of goodwill and other long-lived assets. This compares to a net loss of $359.8 million, or $1.89 per share, in the fourth quarter of 2008, which included the $435.0 million non-cash charge for the impairment of goodwill and other long-lived assets. Adjusted net loss for the fourth quarter of 2009, which excludes costs associated with store closures, severance and impairments, totaled $44.3 million, or $0.24 per share. This compares to adjusted net income of $75.5 million, or $0.38 per share, in the fourth quarter of 2008. A reconciliation of adjusted results is shown in the tables following the text of this press release.
Fourth quarter 2009 earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (“EBITDA”) was $16.5 million, compared to $122.8 million for the fourth quarter of 2008. Adjusted EBITDA, which excludes stock-based compensation, costs associated with lease terminations and severance, was $31.3 million in the fourth quarter of 2009, compared to adjusted EBITDA of $128.1 million in the same period one year ago.
Blockbuster ended the fourth quarter of 2009 with $188.7 million in cash and cash equivalents and $58.5 million in restricted cash related to the Company’s letters of credit. On January 14, 2010 Blockbuster announced the elimination of the remaining $24 million of letters of credit related to Viacom, which enhanced the Company’s liquidity and reduced its restricted cash balance to approximately $36 million as of January 2010. The remaining portion of the Company’s restricted cash is primarily related to its workers’ compensation insurance.
Cash provided by operating activities during the fourth quarter was $55.3 million, compared with $152.1 million of cash provided by operating activities in the fourth quarter of 2008. Free cash flow (net cash used for operating activities less capital expenditures) was positive at $42.9 million in the fourth quarter of 2009, compared with positive free cash flow of $110.1 million in the same period one year ago.
Consolidated Fiscal-Year 2009 Financial Results
The Company expects to file its Annual Report on Form 10-K for fiscal 2009 with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on or before March 19, 2010. Management anticipates the report of the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm relative to the Company’s 2009 consolidated financial statements will contain an explanatory paragraph indicating that substantial doubt exists with respect to the Company’s ability to continue as a going concern. The Company’s independent public accountants have advised management that such an opinion will be related to the risk that the Company will have a low level of liquidity particularly as a result of decreased cash from operations. As the Company noted, it intends to explore strategic alternatives, one or more of which could improve its liquidity.
Total revenues for the full year 2009 were $4.06 billion, compared to $5.07 billion for the full year of 2008.
For the full year of 2009, operating expenses decreased by $401.2 million or approximately 14 percent, to $2.53 billion as compared to operating expenses of $2.93 billion for the full year of 2008. The 2009 operating expense total includes the non-cash charge of $369.2 million for the impairment of goodwill and other long-lived assets as mentioned above. In 2008, the Company incurred a non-cash charge of $435.0 million for the impairment of goodwill and other long-lived assets, also mentioned above.
Operating loss for fiscal 2009 totaled $355.2 million, compared to operating loss of $304.3 million for the full year 2008, which includes the non-cash charges of $369.2 million and $435.0 million, respectively, for the impairment of goodwill and other long-lived assets.
Net loss for the full year of 2009 was $558.2 million, or $2.93 per share. This compares with net loss of $374.1 million, or $2.01 per share, in 2008. Excluding costs associated with store closures, severance, impairments and certain other items, as shown on the financial tables following the text of this release, adjusted net loss for the full year of 2009 was $73.7 million, or $0.44 per share. This compares with adjusted net income of $70.2 million, of $0.31 per share, in 2008.
Full year 2009 EBITDA was $158.1 million, compared to $277.3 million for the full year of 2008. Adjusted EBITDA, which excludes stock-based compensation, costs associated with lease terminations, severance and certain other items was $196.4 million for the full year of 2009, compared to adjusted EBITDA of $302.5 million for the full year of 2008.
Additional financial and operational information, including the calculation of adjusted results and the reconciliations of other non-GAAP financial measures used herein, may be found in the tables accompanying this release.
Same-Store Sales
Fourth quarter 2009 domestic same-store sales decreased 15.9 percent, reflecting rental and retail comparable decreases of 11.3 percent and 26.5 percent, respectively. The domestic rental and retail comparable results were primarily driven by the competitive pressures and macroeconomic environment. International same-store sales for the fourth quarter of 2009 decreased 12.1 percent, reflecting rental and retail comparable decreases of 5.9 percent and 17.1 percent, respectively. Worldwide same-store sales for the fourth quarter of 2009 declined 14.7 percent.
For the full year of 2009, domestic same-store sales decreased 15.6 percent, reflecting rental and retail comparable decreases of 12.8 percent and 26.2 percent, respectively. International same-store sales for the full year of 2009 decreased 7.0 percent, reflecting rental and retail comparable decreases of 5.0 percent and 9.4 percent, respectively. Worldwide same-store sales for the full year of 2009 declined 13.1 percent.
Optimizing the Domestic Portfolio
During 2010 Blockbuster will continue to rationalize its footprint. Portfolio optimization key metrics are as follows:
Through the Company’s alliance with NCR, we will add an additional 7,000 Blockbuster Express kiosks and expect to have at least 10,000 by 2010 year end.
With regard to the Company’s store portfolio, for the full year of 2009 Blockbuster closed 374 domestic company-owned stores, which includes 140 domestic company-owned stores that were closed during the fourth quarter of 2009.
Consistent with the Company’s plan disclosed in its 2009 8-K filing, for the full year of 2010 Blockbuster expects to close a range of 500 to 545 underperforming domestic company-owned stores. Blockbuster closed 253 domestic company-owned stores in January 2010 and has identified approximately 150 domestic company-owned stores that are expected to be closed in April 2010. The Company expects to close approximately 75 to 125 domestic company-owned stores throughout the remaining portion of 2010.
The Company continues to expect approximately $50 million in benefit to 2010 adjusted EBITDA from revenue transfer and loss avoidance from 2009 domestic company-owned store closures and expected domestic company-owned store closures in 2010
Equity and Capital Structure
During the fourth quarter of 2009 Blockbuster announced it would seek shareholder approval to combine its two classes of common stock into one class of common stock. The ratio for the proposed combination is expected to be one-for-one and is subject to obtaining stockholder approval at Blockbuster's annual stockholders’ meeting, which is currently scheduled to occur in May 2010. Blockbuster’s dual class capital structure was originally established in connection with its prior ownership by Viacom. The Company believes the elimination of the dual class capital structure will improve the market liquidity for its common stock and provide a more clearly defined equity structure.
In addition, in November 2009 the Company was notified by the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") that the Company’s Class A common stock did not satisfy the NYSE's continued listing standard that requires the average closing price of a listed security be no less than $1.00 per share over a consecutive thirty (30) trading-day period. Under NYSE rules, the Company has through the date of its 2010 annual meeting within which to cure this deficiency. As such, the Company has identified action items that it believes will enable it to meet this continued listing standard within the cure period. These actions include a reverse stock split, which will be voted upon at Blockbuster’s upcoming annual stockholders’ meeting currently scheduled for May 2010.
Blockbuster continues to actively explore various recapitalization opportunities, which may include a recapitalization of the Company’s outstanding debt or equity securities. Rothschild Inc. has worked with Blockbuster since February 2009 on a variety of financing and strategic initiatives and continues to assist the Company in connection with evaluating capital structure alternatives.
Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2009 Financial Results Web Cast and Conference Call
Blockbuster will host a conference call today, Wednesday, February 24, 2010, at 4:30 p.m. Eastern Time (“ET”). Investors and analysts may join the conference call by dialing 1.866.788.0538 with the pass code of 44048397. International callers may join the teleconference by dialing 1.857.350.1676, with the same pass code. A telephonic replay will be available beginning two hours after the conclusion of the call and will be available until midnight ET on Wednesday, March 10, 2010. The replay number is 1.888.286.8010, with the pass code of 94860317. International callers interested in listening to the replay should dial 1.617.801.6888 with the same pass code. A live web cast (voice only) of the conference call will be accessible from the Investor Relations section of the Company’s website at http://investor.blockbuster.com. Following the live voice only web cast, an archived version will be available on Blockbuster’s web site. Finally, a Podcast of the conference call will also be available on the Company’s web site. Additional details regarding the Company’s fourth quarter and fiscal year 2009 financial and operational results may be found in its upcoming Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 3, 2010, which will be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on or before March 19, 2010. Information may also be found in other Company filings from time-to-time with the SEC.
Forward Looking Statements
This release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Forward-looking statements may also be included from time to time in our other public filings, press releases, our website and oral and written presentations by management. Specific forward-looking statements can be identified by the fact that they do not relate strictly to historical or current facts and include, without limitation, words such as “may,” “will,” “expects,” “believes,” “anticipates,” “plans,” “estimates,” “projects,” “predicts,” “targets,” “seeks,” “could,” “intends,” “foresees” or the negative of such terms or other variations on such terms or comparable terminology. Similarly, statements in this release that describe our strategies, initiatives, objectives, plans or goals are forward-looking. These forward-looking statements are based on management’s current intent, belief, expectations, estimates and projections. These statements are not guarantees of future performance and involve risks, uncertainties, assumptions and other factors that are difficult to predict. Therefore, actual results may vary materially from what is expressed in or indicated by the forward-looking statements. Currently, the risks and uncertainties that may most directly affect our future results include (i) whether our operating results continue to decline and whether we are able to generate sufficient cash flows to meet our liquidity needs; (ii) whether we will have sufficient cash flows from operating activities and cash on hand to service our indebtedness and finance the ongoing obligations of our business; and (iii) whether we are able to execute our transformational strategies, and (iv) whether we are able to execute the strategies to retain our NYSE listing and obtain requisite approvals to recapitalize or restructure our balance sheet and capital structure or, in the alternative, whether a pre-packaged, pre-arranged or other type of filing under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code will be required. The risk factors set forth under “Item 1A. Risk Factors” in our Annual Reports on Form 10-K and other matters discussed from time to time in our filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including the “Disclosure Regarding Forward-Looking Information” and “Risk Factors” sections of our Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q, among others, could affect future results, causing these results to differ materially from those expressed in our forward-looking statements. In the event that the risks disclosed in our public filings and those discussed above cause results to differ materially from those expressed in our forward-looking statements, our business, financial condition, results of operations or liquidity could be materially adversely affected and investors in our securities could lose part or all of their investments. Accordingly, our investors are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements because, while we believe the assumptions on which the forward-looking statements are based are reasonable, there can be no assurance that these forward-looking statements will prove to be accurate. Further, the forward-looking statements included in this release and those included from time to time in our other public filings, press releases, our website and oral and written presentations by management are only made as of the respective dates thereof. Except as otherwise required by law, we undertake no obligation to update publicly any forward-looking statement in this release or in other documents, our website or oral statements for any reason, even if new information becomes available or other events occur in the future.
About Blockbuster Inc.
Blockbuster Inc. is a leading global provider of rental and retail movie and game entertainment. The Company provides its customers with convenient access to media entertainment anywhere and any way they want it – whether in-store, by-mail, through vending and kiosks or digital download. With a highly recognized brand name and a library of over 125,000 movie and game titles, Blockbuster leverages its multi-channel presence to further build upon its leadership position in the media entertainment industry and to best serve the two million daily global customers and over 50 million annual global customers. The Company may be accessed worldwide at www.blockbuster.com.
- Financial Tables to Follow –
BLOCKBUSTER INC.
COMPARATIVE FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS
(In millions, except per share amounts)
Fiscal Quarter Ended Fiscal Year Ended
-------------------- -----------------
January 3, January 4, January 3, January 4,
2010 2009 2010 2009
---- ---- ---- ----
Revenues:
Base rental revenues $600.4 $758.9 $2,528.0 $3,166.5
Previously rented
product ("PRP")
revenues 159.8 142.4 557.9 619.8
----- ----- ----- -----
Total rental
revenues 760.2 901.3 3,085.9 3,786.3
Merchandise sales 319.5 404.0 956.1 1,246.9
Other revenues 4.5 9.1 20.4 32.2
--- --- ---- ----
1,084.2 1,314.4 4,062.4 5,065.4
------- ------- ------- -------
Cost of sales:
Cost of rental
revenues 292.7 325.6 1,130.6 1,446.7
Cost of merchandise
sold 251.1 329.9 753.6 988.4
----- ----- ----- -----
Total cost of
sales 543.8 655.5 1,884.2 2,435.1
----- ----- ------- -------
Gross profit 540.4 658.9 2,178.2 2,630.3
----- ----- ------- -------
Operating expenses:
General and
administrative 487.6 509.6 1,928.7 2,235.3
Advertising 36.3 26.5 91.4 117.7
Depreciation and
intangible amortization 40.9 36.1 144.1 146.6
Impairment of goodwill
and other long-lived
assets 369.2 435.0 369.2 435.0
----- ----- ----- -----
934.0 1,007.2 2,533.4 2,934.6
----- ------- ------- -------
Operating income (loss) (393.6) (348.3) (355.2) (304.3)
Interest expense (33.5) (17.5) (111.6) (72.9)
Loss on extinguishment
of debt - - (29.9) -
Interest income 0.2 0.3 1.3 2.4
Other items, net (2.7) 10.7 (10.4) 16.3
---- ---- ----- ----
Income (loss) from
continuing operations
before income taxes (429.6) (354.8) (505.8) (358.5)
Provision for income
taxes (2.0) (9.9) (11.8) (24.4)
---- ---- ----- -----
Income (loss) from
continuing operations (431.6) (364.7) (517.6) (382.9)
Income (loss) from
discontinued
operations, net of tax (3.3) 4.9 (40.6) 8.8
---- --- ----- ---
Net income (loss) (434.9) (359.8) (558.2) (374.1)
Preferred stock
dividends (2.8) (2.9) (11.1) (11.3)
---- ---- ----- -----
Net income (loss)
applicable to common
stockholders $(437.7) $(362.7) $(569.3) $(385.4)
======= ======= ======= =======
Net income (loss)
per common share:
Basic and diluted
Continuing
operations $(2.23) $(1.91) $(2.72) $(2.06)
Discontinued
operations (0.01) 0.02 (0.21) 0.05
----- ---- ----- ----
Net income (loss) $(2.24) $(1.89) $(2.93) $(2.01)
====== ====== ====== ======
Weighted average
common shares
outstanding:
Basic and diluted 195.0 192.1 194.1 191.8
===== ===== ===== =====
BLOCKBUSTER INC.
SUPPLEMENTAL FINANCIAL INFORMATION
(Dollars in millions)
Revenues by Product Line:
Fiscal Quarter Ended Fiscal Quarter Ended
January 3, 2010 January 4, 2009
--------------- ---------------
Percent Percent
Revenues of Total Revenues of Total
-------- -------- -------- --------
Domestic Stores
---------------
Rental revenues:
Movies $399.4 55.5% $551.8 59.7%
Games 53.8 7.5% 62.3 6.7%
PRP 132.1 18.4% 116.1 12.6%
----- ---- ----- ----
Total rental revenues 585.3 81.4% 730.2 79.0%
----- ---- ----- ----
Merchandise sales:
Movies 59.1 8.3% 79.3 8.6%
Games 11.0 1.5% 54.1 5.8%
General merchandise 59.6 8.3% 55.7 6.0%
---- --- ---- ---
Total merchandise sales 129.7 18.1% 189.1 20.4%
----- ---- ----- ----
Royalties and other 3.3 0.5% 5.7 0.6%
--- --- --- ---
Total domestic stores
revenues $718.3 100.0% $925.0 100.0%
====== ===== ====== =====
International
-------------
Rental revenues:
Movies $132.9 36.3% $131.3 33.6%
Games 14.3 3.9% 13.5 3.5%
PRP 27.7 7.6% 26.3 6.8%
---- --- ---- ---
Total rental revenues 174.9 47.8% 171.1 43.9%
----- ---- ----- ----
Merchandise sales:
Movies 49.7 13.6% 50.5 13.0%
Games 108.5 29.7% 131.7 33.8%
General merchandise 31.6 8.6% 32.7 8.4%
---- --- ---- ---
Total merchandise sales 189.8 51.9% 214.9 55.2%
----- ---- ----- ----
Royalties and other 1.2 0.3% 3.4 0.9%
------ ----- ------ -----
Total international
revenues $365.9 100.0% $389.4 100.0%
====== ===== ====== =====
Total consolidated
revenues $1,084.2 $1,314.4
======== ========
Fiscal Year Ended Fiscal Year Ended
January 3, 2010 January 4, 2009
--------------- ---------------
Percent Percent
Revenues of Total Revenues of Total
-------- -------- -------- --------
Domestic Stores
---------------
Rental revenues:
Movies $1,763.6 61.7% $2,272.4 63.4%
Games 200.2 7.0% 219.9 6.1%
PRP 455.3 15.9% 492.7 13.7%
----- ---- ----- ----
Total rental revenues 2,419.1 84.6% 2,985.0 83.2%
------- ---- ------- ----
Merchandise sales:
Movies 174.2 6.1% 227.4 6.3%
Games 60.2 2.1% 155.0 4.3%
General merchandise 187.5 6.6% 200.1 5.6%
----- --- ----- ---
Total merchandise sales 421.9 14.8% 582.5 16.2%
----- ---- ----- ----
Royalties and other 16.7 0.6% 23.3 0.6%
---- --- ---- ---
Total domestic stores
revenues $2,857.7 100.0% $3,590.8 100.0%
======== ===== ======== =====
International
-------------
Rental revenues:
Movies $512.7 42.6% $621.5 42.1%
Games 51.5 4.3% 52.7 3.6%
PRP 102.6 8.5% 127.1 8.6%
----- --- ----- ---
Total rental revenues 666.8 55.4% 801.3 54.3%
----- ---- ----- ----
Merchandise sales:
Movies 141.6 11.8% 162.9 11.0%
Games 282.4 23.4% 366.5 24.9%
General merchandise 110.2 9.1% 135.0 9.2%
----- --- ----- ---
Total merchandise sales 534.2 44.3% 664.4 45.1%
----- ---- ----- ----
Royalties and other 3.7 0.3% 8.9 0.6%
--- --- --- ---
Total international
revenues $1,204.7 100.0% $1,474.6 100.0%
======== ===== ======== =====
Total consolidated
revenues $4,062.4 $5,065.4
======== ========
Gross Profit by Product Line:
Fiscal Quarter Ended Fiscal Quarter Ended
January 3, 2010 January 4, 2009
--------------- ---------------
Percent Percent
Gross Profit of Revenue Gross Profit of Revenue
------------ ---------- ------------ ----------
Domestic Stores
---------------
Rental $352.7 60.3% $454.1 62.2%
Merchandise 27.6 21.3% 28.1 14.9%
Other 3.3 100.0% 5.7 100.0%
--- ---
Total domestic stores 383.6 53.4% 487.9 52.7%
----- -----
International
-------------
Rental 114.8 65.6% 121.6 71.1%
Merchandise 40.8 21.5% 46.0 21.4%
Other 1.2 100.0% 3.4 100.0%
--- ---
Total international 156.8 42.9% 171.0 43.9%
----- -----
Total consolidated $540.4 49.8% $658.9 50.1%
====== ======
Fiscal Year Ended Fiscal Year Ended
January 3, 2010 January 4, 2009
--------------- ---------------
Percent Percent
Gross Profit of Revenue Gross Profit of Revenue
------------ ---------- ------------ ----------
Domestic Stores
---------------
Rental $1,508.8 62.4% $1,788.1 59.9%
Merchandise 72.3 17.1% 106.0 18.2%
Other 16.7 100.0% 23.3 100.0%
---- ----
Total domestic stores 1,597.8 55.9% 1,917.4 53.4%
------- -------
International
-------------
Rental 446.5 67.0% 551.5 68.8%
Merchandise 130.2 24.4% 152.5 23.0%
Other 3.7 100.0% 8.9 100.0%
--- ---
Total international 580.4 48.2% 712.9 48.3%
----- -----
Total consolidated $2,178.2 53.6% $2,630.3 51.9%
======== ========
BLOCKBUSTER INC.
SUPPLEMENTAL FINANCIAL INFORMATION
Selling, General and Administrative (SG&A) Comparison
(Dollars in millions)
Selling, General and Administrative Expenses:
Fiscal Quarter Ended Fiscal Quarter Ended
January 3, 2010 January 4, 2009
--------------- ---------------
Percent Percent
SG&A Expense of Revenue SG&A Expense of Revenue
------------ ---------- ------------ ----------
Advertising
Domestic stores $27.6 2.5% $18.3 1.4%
International 8.7 0.8% 8.2 0.6%
General &
Administrative
Domestic stores -
(4 wall) 297.3 27.4% 317.7 24.2%
Domestic stores -
other 34.2 3.2% 41.8 3.2%
International 129.3 11.9% 121.5 9.2%
Unallocated corporate 26.8 2.5% 28.6 2.2%
---- --- ---- ---
Total SG&A $523.9 48.3% $536.1 40.8%
====== ==== ====== ====
Fiscal Year Ended Fiscal Year Ended
January 3, 2010 January 4, 2009
--------------- ---------------
Percent Percent
SG&A Expense of Revenue SG&A Expense of Revenue
------------ ---------- ------------ ----------
Advertising
Domestic stores $67.2 1.6% $85.9 1.8%
International 24.2 0.6% 31.8 0.6%
General &
Administrative
Domestic stores -
(4 wall) 1,187.2 29.2% 1,338.2 26.4%
Domestic stores -
other 138.1 3.4% 178.3 3.5%
International 495.7 12.2% 580.7 11.5%
Unallocated corporate 107.7 2.7% 138.1 2.7%
-------- ---- -------- ----
Total SG&A $2,020.1 49.7% $2,353.0 46.5%
======== ==== ======== ====
Facilities Statistics:
As of January 3, 2010
---------------------
Domestic International
-------- -------------
Total Avg Sq Total Sq Total Avg Sq Total Sq
Number Footage Footage Number Footage Footage
------ ------- ------- ------ ------- -------
(in (in (in (in
thousands) thousands) thousands) thousands)
Stores 3,525 5.5 19,503 1,695 3.2 5,439
Distribution
centers 39 N/A 1,121 6 N/A 170
Corporate/
regional
offices 8 N/A 400 6 N/A 80
BLOCKBUSTER INC.
SUPPLEMENTAL FINANCIAL INFORMATION
(Dollars in millions)
Other Information: Revenue
Fiscal Quarter Ended Fiscal Year Ended
-------------------- -----------------
January 3, January 4, January 3, January 4,
2010 2009 2010 2009
---- ---- ---- ----
Domestic same-store
revenues increase (decrease)
Rental revenues (11.3)% (2.6)% (12.8)% 1.2%
Merchandise sales (26.5)% 36.5% (26.2)% 37.4%
Total revenues (15.9)% 4.4% (15.6)% 6.4%
International same-store
revenues increase (decrease)
Rental revenues (5.9)% (5.9)% (5.0)% (2.8)%
Merchandise sales (17.1)% 10.1% (9.4)% 2.4%
Total revenues (12.1)% 2.8% (7.0)% (0.4)%
Worldwide same-store
revenues increase (decrease)
Rental revenues (10.1)% (3.5)% (11.1)% 0.1%
Merchandise sales (21.6)% 18.8% (17.9)% 14.6%
Total revenues (14.7)% 3.7% (13.1)% 3.9%
Cash Flow Data:
Fiscal Quarter Ended Fiscal Year Ended
-------------------- -----------------
January 3, January 4, January 3, January 4,
2010 2009 2010 2009
---- ---- ---- ----
Net cash provided by (used in)
operating activities $55.3 $152.1 $29.3 $51.0
Net cash provided by
(used in) investing
activities $(3.5) $(42.7) $(74.9) $(116.5)
Net cash provided by
(used in) financing
activities $(6.3) $(39.3) $72.4 $49.4
Capital expenditures $12.4 $42.0 $32.3 $118.1
Balance Sheet Information:
January 3, January 4,
2010 2009
----- -----
Cash and cash equivalents $188.7 $154.9
Restricted cash $58.5 $-
Merchandise inventories $298.5 $432.8
Rental library, net $340.7 $355.8
Accounts payable $300.8 $427.3
Total debt (including capital lease
obligations) $963.6 $817.8
BLOCKBUSTER INC.
SUPPLEMENTAL FINANCIAL INFORMATION
Worldwide Store Count Information:
Company-Operated
----------------
U.S. Int’l. Total
---- ------ -----
January 4, 2009 3,878 1,928 5,806
Opened 5 7 12
Closed (374) (56) (430)
Purchased/(sold) 16 (184) (168)
-- ---- ----
Net additions/(closures) (353) (233) (586)
---- ---- ----
January 3, 2010 3,525 1,695 5,220
===== ===== =====
Franchised
----------
U.S. Int’l. Total
---- ------ -----
January 4, 2009 707 892 1,599
Opened - 5 5
Closed (198) (90) (288)
Purchased/(sold) (16) - (16)
--- --- ---
Net additions/(closures) (214) (85) (299)
---- --- ----
January 3, 2010 493 807 1,300
=== === =====
Total
-----
U.S. Int’l. Total
---- ------ -----
January 4, 2009 4,585 2,820 7,405
Opened 5 12 17
Closed (572) (146) (718)
Purchased/(sold) - (184) (184)
--- ---- ----
Net additions/(closures) (567) (318) (885)
---- ---- ----
January 3, 2010 4,018 2,502 6,520
===== ===== =====
BLOCKBUSTER INC.
DISCLOSURES REGARDING NON-GAAP FINANCIAL INFORMATION
(Dollars in millions)
For the fiscal quarter and fiscal year ended January 3, 2010, the Company
reports adjusted net income (loss), adjusted net income (loss) per common
share and adjusted operating income (loss) excluding costs incurred for
severance, store closures and the impairment of goodwill and other long-
lived assets. Additionally, for the fiscal year ended January 3, 2010,
the Company reports adjusted net income (loss) and adjusted net income
(loss) per common share excluding the loss on extinguishment of debt, net
loss on a third party games sale and the favorable settlement of a future
liability.
For the fiscal quarter and fiscal year ended January 4, 2009, the Company
reports adjusted net income (loss), adjusted net income (loss) per common
share and adjusted operating income (loss) excluding costs incurred for
severance, store closures and impairment of goodwill and other long-lived
assets. Additionally, for the fiscal year ended January 4, 2009, the
Company reports adjusted net income (loss), adjusted net income (loss) per
common share and adjusted operating income (loss) excluding costs to
explore the acquisition of Circuit City Stores, Inc.
Adjusted net income (loss), adjusted net income (loss) per common share
and adjusted operating income (loss) are non-GAAP financial measures
within the meaning of Regulation G of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and are not measures of operating performance calculated in
accordance with GAAP. As a result, adjusted net income (loss), adjusted
net income (loss) per common share and adjusted operating income (loss)
should not be considered in isolation of, or as a substitute for, income
(loss) from continuing operations, net income (loss) per common share and
operating income (loss) as indicators of operating performance. Adjusted
net income (loss), adjusted net income (loss) per common share and
adjusted operating income (loss), as the Company calculates them, may not
be comparable to similarly titled measures employed by other companies.
Management believes excluding the recurring and non-recurring items listed
below from the Company's financial results provides investors with a
clearer perspective of the current underlying operating performance of the
Company, a clearer comparison to current period results and greater
transparency regarding supplemental information used by management in its
financial and operational decisionmaking.
Management uses these non-GAAP financial measures as an internal measure
of business operating performance, to establish operational goals, to
allocate resources and to analyze trends. Income (loss) from continuing
operations is the financial measure calculated and presented in accordance
with GAAP that is most comparable to adjusted net income (loss).
Operating income (loss) is the financial measure calculated and presented
in accordance with GAAP that is most comparable to adjusted operating
income (loss).
Fiscal Quarter Ended Fiscal Year Ended
-------------------- -----------------
January 3, January 4, January 3, January 4,
2010 2009 2010 2009
---- ---- ---- ----
Reconciliation of adjusted net
income (loss):
Income (loss) from
continuing operations $(431.6) $(364.7) $(517.6) $(382.9)
Adjustments to reconcile
income (loss) from
continuing operations to
adjusted net income (loss):
Loss on extinguishment of
debt - - 29.9 -
Store closure costs
including lease
terminations (recurring) 15.1 1.9 29.8 11.6
Severance costs (recurring) 3.0 3.3 8.6 4.6
Impairment of goodwill and
other long-lived assets
(non-recurring) 369.2 435.0 369.2 435.0
Net loss on a third
party games sale
(non-recurring) - - 14.0 -
Settlement of future
liability (non-recurring) - - (7.6) -
Costs incurred to explore the
acquisition of Circuit City
Stores, Inc. (non-recurring) - - - 1.9
--- --- --- ---
Adjusted net income (loss) (44.3) 75.5 (73.7) 70.2
Preferred stock dividends (2.8) (2.9) (11.1) (11.3)
---- ---- ----- -----
Adjusted net income
(loss) applicable to
common stockholders $(47.1) $72.6 $(84.8) $58.9
====== ===== ====== =====
Adjusted net income (loss)
per common share - basic
and diluted $(0.24) $0.38 $(0.44) $0.31
====== ===== ====== =====
Reconciliation of adjusted
operating income (loss):
Operating income (loss) $(393.6) $(348.3) $(355.2) $(304.3)
Adjustments to reconcile operating
income (loss) to adjusted
operating income (loss):
Store closure costs
including lease
terminations (recurring) 15.1 1.9 29.8 11.6
Severance costs (recurring) 3.0 3.3 8.6 4.6
Impairment of goodwill and
other long-lived assets
(non-recurring) 369.2 435.0 369.2 435.0
Net loss on a third
party games sale
(non-recurring) - - 14.0 -
Settlement of future
liability (non-recurring) - - (7.6) -
Costs incurred to explore the
acquisition of Circuit City
Stores, Inc. (non-recurring) - - - 1.9
--- --- --- ---
Adjusted operating income
(loss) $(6.3) $91.9 $58.8 $148.8
===== ===== ===== ======
BLOCKBUSTER INC.
DISCLOSURES REGARDING NON-GAAP FINANCIAL INFORMATION
(Dollars in millions)
For the fiscal quarter and fiscal year ended January 3, 2010, the Company
reports adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization ("adjusted EBITDA") excluding costs incurred for stock
compensation, severance, store closures and impairment of goodwill and
other long-lived assets. Additionally, for the fiscal year ended January
3, 2010, the Company reports adjusted EBITDA excluding a net loss on a
third party games sale and the favorable settlement of a future liability.
For the fiscal quarter and fiscal year ended January 4, 2009, the Company
reports adjusted EBITDA excluding costs incurred for stock compensation,
severance and store closures. Additionally, for the fiscal year ended
January 4, 2009, the Company reports adjusted EBITDA excluding costs
incurred to explore the acquisition of Circuit City Stores, Inc.
Adjusted EBITDA is a non-GAAP financial measure within the meaning of
Regulation G of the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not a
measure of operating performance calculated in accordance with GAAP. As a
result, adjusted EBITDA should not be considered in isolation of, or as a
substitute for, net income (loss) as an indicator of operating
performance. Adjusted EBITDA, as the Company calculates it, may not be
comparable to similarly titled measures employed by other companies.
Management believes excluding the recurring and non-recurring items listed
under EBITDA below from the Company's financial results provides
investors with a clearer perspective of the current underlying operating
performance of the Company, a clearer comparison to current period results
and greater transparency regarding supplemental information used by
management in its financial and operational decisionmaking.
In addition, management believes that adjusting the Company's financial
results to exclude income (loss) from discontinued operations, net of tax,
taxes, interest and other income, net and depreciation and amortization of
intangibles also provides investors with a clearer perspective of the
current underlying operating performance of the Company and a clearer
comparison to current period results.
Management uses adjusted EBITDA as an internal measure of business
operating performance, to establish operational goals, to allocate
resources and to analyze trends. Net income (loss) is the financial
measure calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP that is most
comparable to adjusted EBITDA.
Fiscal Quarter Ended Fiscal Year Ended
-------------------- -----------------
January 3, January 4, January 3, January 4,
2010 2009 2010 2009
---- ---- ---- ----
Reconciliation of adjusted
EBITDA:
Net income (loss) $(434.9) $(359.8) $(558.2) $(374.1)
Adjustments to reconcile
net income (loss) to adjusted
EBITDA:
(Income) loss from
discontinued operations,
net of tax 3.3 (4.9) 40.6 (8.8)
Provision for income taxes 2.0 9.9 11.8 24.4
Interest and other income,
net 36.0 6.5 150.6 54.2
Depreciation and intangible
amortization 40.9 36.1 144.1 146.6
Impairment of goodwill and
other long-lived assets 369.2 435.0 369.2 435.0
----- ----- ----- -----
EBITDA 16.5 122.8 158.1 277.3
---- ----- ----- -----
Lease termination costs
incurred for store closures
(recurring) 10.7 0.6 16.0 4.6
Severance costs (recurring) 3.0 3.3 8.6 4.6
Stock compensation (recurring) 1.1 1.4 7.3 14.1
Net loss on a third party
games sale (non-recurring) - - 14.0 -
Settlement of future liability
(non-recurring) - - (7.6) -
Costs incurred to explore the
acquisition of Circuit City
Stores, Inc. (non-recurring) - - - 1.9
--- --- --- ---
Adjusted EBITDA $31.3 $128.1 $196.4 $302.5
===== ====== ====== ======
BLOCKBUSTER INC.
DISCLOSURES REGARDING NON-GAAP FINANCIAL INFORMATION
(Dollars in millions)
Free cash flow reflects the Company's net cash flow provided by (used in)
operating activities less capital expenditures. The Company uses free
cash flow, among other things, to evaluate its operating performance and
as a measure of liquidity. Management believes free cash flow provides
investors with an important perspective on the cash available for debt
service, acquisitions and stockholders after making the capital
investments required to support ongoing business operations and long-term
value creation. The Company believes the presentation of free cash flow
is relevant and useful for investors because it allows investors to view
performance in a manner similar to the method used by management and helps
improve their ability to understand the Company's operating performance.
In addition, free cash flow is also a measure used by the Company's
investors and analysts for purposes of valuation and comparing the
operating performance of the Company to other companies in its industry.
Free cash flow is a non-GAAP financial measure within the meaning of
Regulation G of the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not a
measure of performance calculated in accordance with GAAP. As a result,
free cash flow should not be considered in isolation of, or as a
substitute for, net income (loss) as an indicator of operating performance
or net cash flow provided by (used in) operating activities as a measure
of liquidity. Free cash flow, as the Company calculates it, may not be
comparable to similarly titled measures employed by other companies. In
addition, free cash flow does not necessarily represent funds available
for discretionary use and is not necessarily a measure of the Company's
ability to fund its cash needs. As the Company uses free cash flow as a
measure of performance and as a measure of liquidity, the tables below
reconcile free cash flow to both net income (loss) and net cash flow
provided by (used in) operating activities, the most directly comparable
financial measures reported under GAAP.
The following table provides a reconciliation of net cash provided by
(used in) operating activities to free cash flow:
Fiscal Quarter Ended Fiscal Year Ended
-------------------- -----------------
January 3, January 4, January 3, January 4,
2010 2009 2010 2009
---- ---- ---- ----
Net cash provided by
(used in) operating
activities $55.3 $152.1 $29.3 $51.0
Adjustments to reconcile
net cash provided by
(used in) operating
activities to free cash flow:
Capital expenditures (12.4) (42.0) (32.3) (118.1)
----- ----- ----- ------
Free cash flow $42.9 $110.1 $(3.0) $(67.1)
===== ====== ===== ======
The following table provides a reconciliation of
net income (loss) to free cash flow:
Fiscal Quarter Ended Fiscal Year Ended
-------------------- -----------------
January 3, January 4, January 3, January 4,
2010 2009 2010 2009
---- ---- ---- ----
Net income (loss) $(434.9) $(359.8) $(558.2) $(374.1)
Adjustments to reconcile net
income (loss) to free cash
flow:
Depreciation and intangible
amortization 41.0 37.3 147.1 152.2
Impairment of goodwill and
other long-lived assets 369.2 435.0 369.2 435.0
Non-cash share-based
compensation expense 1.1 1.4 7.3 14.1
Capital expenditures (12.4) (42.0) (32.3) (118.1)
Rental library purchases,
net of rental amortization (9.3) 10.8 19.6 71.3
Changes in operating assets
and liabilities 80.8 17.5 (47.4) (258.5)
Changes in deferred
taxes and other 4.2 9.2 19.9 10.3
Loss on sale of store
operations 3.2 0.7 41.9 0.7
Loss on extinguishment
of debt - - 29.9 -
--- --- ---- ---
Free cash flow $42.9 $110.1 $(3.0) $(67.1)
===== ====== ===== ======
Source: http://www.your-story.org/blockbuster-reports-fourth-quarter-and-fiscal-year-2009-financial-results-122727/
Analyst Calls Blockbuster (NYSE:BBI) – “Dead Man Walking”
Analysts are mulling over Blockbuster’s restructuring, announced yesterday. Ironically, Blockbuster's own story might not have a happy ending.
Competitors Netflix (NASDQ:NFLX) and Redbox are steadily eroding the company’s market share, while services like Hulu and On Demand make a trip to the video store unnecessary. Analysts say Blockbuster needs a revenue stream to offset failing brick-and-mortar operations, which they’re unlikely to get.
Needham & Co. analyst Charles Wolf is skeptical. “If they can't build a profitable stores operation, then there is no Blockbuster. It's real simple," Mr. Wolf said. If traffic doesn't pick up by mid-year, "we may just kiss this whole story good-bye. We got a dead-man-walking situation here."
Source: http://www.benzinga.com/analyst-ratings/analyst-color/140436/analyst-calls-blockbuster-nyse-bbi-%E2%80%93-%E2%80%9Cdead-man-walking%E2%80%9D
Genius Products homepage has been updated!!!
"As sales, brand and retail marketing experts our mission is to help IP and content owners connect directly with the retail world by delivering sound, creative and profitable retail marketing strategies. No traditional agency can offer this today.
Our un-paralleled relationships with all national retailers coupled with our strong sales and marketing background enables us to explore unique programs and business models that open doors and opportunities our partners never knew existed.
We also have a unique ability to leverage our retail relationships to mitigate the risk of content development and investment strategies.
The company is lead by a seasoned, committed management team with significant experience in brand building, retail execution and sales force management with companies including: Nestle, Frito-Lay, Warner Bros., Take 2 Interactive and Blockbuster.
We provide services such as brand consulting, marketing and retail strategy development, sales and financial planning, and have the ability to manage all aspects of the physical distribution process to retail across many different entertainment categories."
Source: http://www.geniusproducts.com/
GAME v. CALIFORNIA 7 STUDIOS, INC.
SCRATCH DJ GAME, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CALIFORNIA 7 STUDIOS, INC. Defendant and Appellant.
B216183.
Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Five.
February 18, 2010.
Liner Grode Stein Yankelevitz Sunshine Regenstreif & Taylor, Stanton L. Stein, Miles J. Feldman, Robert M. Shore, Daniel A. Fiore and Maribeth Annaguey for Defendant and Appellant.
Duffy & Sweeney, Stacey P. Nakasian, Byron L. McMasters; Fenwick & West, Rodger R. Cole and Ilana S. Rubel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Not to be Published in the Official Reports
TURNER, P. J.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case arises out of a failed video game development arrangement pursuant to which defendant, California 7 Studios, Inc., was developing a game for plaintiff, Scratch DJ Game. Defendant appeals from a May 12, 2009 preliminary injunction. The trial court ordered defendant to turn over to plaintiff all of its work product including source code. The work product contained defendant's pre-existing tools and technology. We affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's predecessor in interest, Genius Products LLC, hired defendant to develop a disc jockey video game for the PlayStation 3 and Xbox 360 game consoles. The parties entered into a February 26, 2008 Developer Agreement. But on April 3, 2009, Genius Products, LLC, plaintiff's predecessor, terminated the parties' contract. Genius Products LLC and Numark Industries, which had designed certain features of the game, entered into a joint venture—Scratch DJ—to complete development of the game. On April 14, 2009, plaintiff filed this action alleging contract and implied covenant breach. On plaintiff's application, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order followed by a preliminary injunction. Defendant appeals from the preliminary injunction.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Our Supreme Court set forth the standard of review on appeal from an order granting a preliminary injunction in Hunt v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 984, 999, as follows: "The appellate standard for reviewing preliminary injunctions is well established. In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a trial court weighs two interrelated factors: the likelihood the moving party ultimately will prevail on the merits, and the relative interim harm to the parties from the issuance or nonissuance of the injunction. (Butt v. State of California [(1992)] 4 Cal.4th [668,] 677-678.) `Generally, the ruling on an application for a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. The exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that it has been abused. [Citations.]' (Cohen v. Board of Supervisors [(1985)] 40 Cal.3d at [277,] 286.) `A trial court may not grant a preliminary injunction, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless there is some possibility that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim. [Citation.]' (Butt v. State of California, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 678.)" The Supreme Court has further held, "Discretion is abused in the legal sense `whenever it may be fairly said that in its exercise the court in a given case exceeded the bounds of reason or contravened the uncontradicted evidence.' [Citations.]" (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 527; accord, IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 69; City of Los Altos v. Barnes (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1199.) The burden is on the party challenging the injunction to establish the trial court clearly abused its discretion. (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 69; TSMC North America v. Semiconductor Mfg. Intern. Corp. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 581, 588; Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 618, 624; City of Los Altos v. Barnes, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 1199.)
With respect to underlying questions of law or fact, however, our Supreme Court has held: "Of course, questions underlying the preliminary injunction are reviewed under the appropriate standard of review. Thus, for example, issues of fact are subject to review under the substantial evidence standard . . . . [Citation.]" (People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1136-1137.) As explained in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego Congress of Racial Equality (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 405, 407: "The classic rule that if any substantial evidence supports the finding of the trial court as to an issue of fact a reviewing court may not substitute its own evaluation of the evidence, applies to an appeal from a preliminary injunction. A reviewing court may reverse only if an abuse of discretion is shown; and it follows that if substantial evidence supports the order there is no abuse of discretion. (Union Interchange, Inc. v. Savage [(1959)] 52 Cal.2d 601, 606.)" (Accord, Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 400, 409; Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 625.) The Court of Appeal has explained: "Where the evidence before the trial court was in conflict, we do not reweigh it or determine the credibility of witnesses on appeal. `[T]he trial court is the judge of the credibility of the affidavits filed in support of the application for preliminary injunction and it is that court's province to resolve conflicts.' [Citation.] Our task is to ensure that the trial court's factual determinations, whether express or implied, are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]" (Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 625.) It is well settled that on appeal from an order granting a preliminary injunction on conflicting evidence, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. (People v. iMERGENT, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 333, 341-342; Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 625; Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Ins. Services v. Robb (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1812, 1820; Volpicelli v. Jared Sydney Torrance Memorial Hosp. (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 242, 247; American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 831, 838; People v. Mobile Magic Sales, Inc. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 1, 5, fn. 1; San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego Congress of Racial Equality, supra, 241 Cal.App.2d at p. 407; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Lee (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 23, 27-28.)
A mandatory injunction, as here, is only granted in an extreme case. (Hagen v. Beth (1897) 118 Cal. 330, 331; Slatkin v. White (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 963, 972; Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 625.) The Supreme Court has held, "[T]he granting of a mandatory injunction [as here] pending the trial, and before the rights of the parties in the subject matter which the injunction is designed to affect have been definitively ascertained by the [trial court], is not permitted except in an extreme case where the right thereto is clearly established and it appears that irreparable injury will flow from its refusal. [Citations.]" (Hagen v. Beth, supra, 118 Cal. at p. 331; accord, Davenport v. Blue Cross of California (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 435, 446.)
It bears emphasis that a ruling on a preliminary injunction request is not a final determination of the controversy and neither the trial nor the appellate court undertakes a final adjudication of the lawsuit. (Hunt v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 999; People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1109; Butt v. State of California, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 678, fn. 8; Cohen v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 286; Continental Baking Co. v. Katz, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 528.) Our Supreme Court has emphasized: "[A]lthough we will not ordinarily disturb the trial court's ruling absent a showing of abuse, an order granting or denying interlocutory relief reflects nothing more than the superior court's evaluation of the controversy on the record before it at the time of its ruling; it is not an adjudication of the ultimate merits of the dispute. [Citations.]" (People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1109.)
B. Application To The Present Case
1. Likelihood Of Prevailing On The Merits
Defendant conceded in the trial court that if it was in material breach of the parties' contract, it would be required to turn over its work product including source code. The trial court found it was likely plaintiff ultimately would prevail on the claim defendant was in material breach of the agreement for failure to meet contractual development milestones. Substantial evidence supported that conclusion.
On or about February 26, 2008, the parties entered into a Developer Agreement. The Developer Agreement set forth a series of 17 milestones—dates by which certain work product was to be delivered to Genius Products LLC—and associated payments to defendant. The milestones commenced on February 1, 2008, and ended with final asset delivery due May 1, 2009. According to Michael Rubinelli, a Genius Products LLC vice president, the game was expected to be the first disc jockey based video game on the market, ahead of its competitors. To that end, in paragraph 2.3 of the Developer Agreement, defendant expressly acknowledged, "[T]he successful completion of each Milestone in accordance with the Milestone schedule . . . is critical to the commercial viability of the Game." Moreover, under paragraph 11.2 of the Developer Agreement, defendant's failure to meet the milestone schedule was a material breach of the agreement, "A material breach may include, but is not limited to, Developer's failure to finish and deliver any milestone in accordance with the Milestone schedule . . . ." And a material breach of the agreement gave rise to certain rights in Genius Products LLC, now plaintiff. Pursuant to paragraph 11.4 of the Developer Agreement: "In addition to Publisher's other rights and remedies, in the event Publisher terminates the Agreement as a result of a material breach of this Agreement by Developer, Publisher may elect[,] in its sole discretion, to (i) retain all rights licensed and/or granted to it hereunder in connection with Developer's Tools and Technology and (ii) take over the development of the Game. Publisher shall provide Developer with written notice of Publisher's election to take over development of the Game and within five (5) days of receipt of such notice, Developer shall deliver to Publisher all source materials, including source code, for the Game and provide Publisher with reasonable assistance in completing development of the Game. Publisher may provide Developer's Tools and Technology to a third party developer for completion of the Game pursuant to Publisher's direction, control, and approval and reasonable and appropriate written confidentiality restrictions." On April 10, 2009, plaintiff's lawyers notified defendant's counsel in writing a material breach had occurred. Plaintiff's lawyers asserted defendant had breached the agreement by failing to meet the milestone schedule. Plaintiff's lawyers also notified defendant that Genius Products LLC elected to take over development of the game. Plaintiff demanded that defendant turn over its entire work product.
Defendant complied in part but refused to turn over, among other things, the game engine source code it claimed was part of its pre-existing tools and technology. Defendant provided the game engine in object code rather than source code. In the trial court, defendant's technical director, Paul Haban, explained: "Source code is simply a human-readable language for giving instructions to a computer. In other words, all software written by human beings is born as source code. Because computers can process only binary language (0s and 1s) rather than human-readable languages, source code cannot be used by a computer until and unless it has been `compiled' into binary `object code.' [¶] [] Since object code cannot be read by human beings, proprietary software typically is distributed to users in that form in order to protect trade secrets embodied in the software." There was evidence defendant had fallen behind the development schedule by September 2008, six months after the parties entered into the Developer Agreement. There was also evidence defendant did not meet any milestones after December 1, 2008. There was no evidence the milestone due dates were ever amended in writing as required under paragraph 15.4 of the Developer Agreement, "Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, Exhibits, and/or the Appendices, this Agreement . . . can be modified, amended, or any provision waived only by a written instrument signed by an authorized officer of Publisher and by an authorized representative of Developer." This was substantial evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion it was likely plaintiff would ultimately prevail on its material breach claim. Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in impliedly finding this was an extreme case where the right to the injunction was clearly established and irreparable harm would result from its refusal.
Defendant argues it was unable to meet its contractual obligations because the staff of Genius Products LLC failed to timely deliver hardware, tools and music and to obtain approval from the manufacturers of the game platforms. The evidence before the trial court was conflicting. Defendant's chief executive officer, Lewis Peterson, said that in September 2008 the parties began discussing a revised milestone schedule. According to Mr. Peterson the revisions were necessitated because of the failure to "deliver key development hardware and other materials critical to the [g]ame's development in a timely fashion" to his company. Defendant's vice president of production, Michael Fletcher, similarly declared his company was entitled to receive game platform development and test kits from Genius Products LLC in April and July 2008. But, Mr. Fletcher declared, the hardware was not obtained until August 1, 2008, which caused "substantial delay" in the development process. Mr. Fletcher further averred plaintiff's predecessor, Genius Products LLC, delivered only half the promised music for the game. By contrast, Genius Products LLC's senior vice president for game development, Mr. Rubinelli, agreed that some delay had been encountered in obtaining the hardware. But Mr. Rubinelli denied the delay affected the game's development: "At no time in the course of the discussions . . . did [defendant] ask for more time or indicate that any extension of the development schedule was required. In fact, at that point [defendant] was on track with the development schedule . . . ." Mr. Rubinelli also stated: "For the most part [defendant] had a steady stream of music around which it could implement . . . . [Defendant] never mentioned to me that the completion date was being held up by its not having additional music to work with."
The trial court was not required to credit defendant's evidence. The trial court noted, for example, "The statement in the Declaration of Michael Fletcher . . . that he `learned' that the failure to obtain platform approval meant that [plaintiff] could not purchase the necessary hardware and deliver it to [defendant] is not evidence." Further, with respect to the approvals by the game platform manufacturers, the trial court found there was no evidence establishing the lack of approval had anything to do with defendant's obligation to develop the game: "If there was no approval for the platform, the Game would never be sold, would never be played, and [plaintiff] would lose its investment. But it has nothing to do with [defendant's] obligation to create the Game as a work for hire." (Fn. omitted.) We cannot reweigh the evidence. (Union Interchange, Inc. v. Savage, supra, 52 Cal.2d at p. 606; Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 409; Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 625.)
2. Relative Interim Harm
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in resolving the relative interim harm issue. The trial court found: the hardship to plaintiff absent an injunction would outweigh any harm to defendant; and permitting another developer access to defendant's trade secret source code would not cause defendant irreversible damage. We find substantial evidence supported the trial court's conclusions; hence, there was no abuse of discretion. Genius Products LLC had paid defendant more than $6 million to develop the game, which was more than the total development fee specified in the Developer Agreement. It was undisputed that without the engine source code, plaintiff could not compile a working version of the game and further develop it; rather it would take plaintiff "additional years" to complete the project. In the meantime, potential competitors of plaintiff would be marketing their own disc jockey based games. Moreover, defendant had by contract granted Genius Products LLC, now plaintiff, a license for its pre-existing tools and technology. And defendant had agreed that in the event it materially breached the Developer Agreement it would turn over its source code and assist plaintiff to complete development of the game. And the parties agreed that plaintiff could provide defendant's tools and technology to another developer for game completion subject to "reasonable and appropriate written confidentiality restrictions." Under these circumstances, the trial court could reasonably conclude the relative interim harm experienced by plaintiff warranted issuance of the preliminary injunction.
3. The Undertaking
Defendant contends it was foreclosed from using the procedures for seeking an increase in the bond amount (Code Civ. Proc., § 995.910 et seq.) because the trial court "prejudged" the matter. This contention is without merit. Article 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs objections to bonds. (Code Civ. Proc., § 995.910.) A party can object to a bond by noticed motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 995.930.) Defendant does not contend it filed or attempted to file such a motion. At the hearing in the trial court, the following transpired: "The Court: . . . [¶] I'm going to arbitrarily pick a bond amount. It may go down; it may never go up. [¶] Two million dollars . . . . [¶] [Plaintiff's counsel, Stacy Nakasian]: Yes, Your Honor. [¶] The Court: Post it by Tuesday . . . [¶] You may still provide me with evidence . . . as to why it should be less. But it won't go up. Two million dollars. If you don't give me evidence it will remain two million. [¶] [Defendant's counsel, Stanton L. Stein]: If I give you evidence that it ought to be substantially more, Your Honor, you are not going to consider it? [¶] The Court: No. Look, bond amounts are somewhat arbitrary, I concede that. But I just don't see—the license couldn't possible cost a million dollars." While the trial court's comments suggest it was not disposed to increase the bond, those statements did not prevent defendant from filing a statutory motion. Had the trial court denied a motion to increase the bond amount, defendant would be in a position to object. Instead, defendant has forfeited the issue by failing to file a timely motion under Code of Civil Procedure sections 995.910 et seq. (Code Civ. Proc., § 995.930, subd. (c).)
IV. DISPOSITION
The May 12, 2009 preliminary injunction order is affirmed. Plaintiff, Scratch DJ Game, is to recover its costs on appeal from defendant, California 7 Studios, Inc.
I concur:
ARMSTRONG, J.
Source: http://www.leagle.com/unsecure/page.htm?shortname=incaco20100218039
The official specs and art for Marcus Dunstan's The Collector have finally come to light, and the movie will be hitting retailers on April 6th from Genius Products and Vivendi Entertainment.
An underground edge-of-your-seat spine-chiller, garnering a $7.7 million box office, The Collector follows the story of Arkin, a handyman and ex-con who aims to repay his debt to his ex-wife by robbing his new employer’s country home. Little does he know, a far worse enemy has already laid claim to the property – and Arkin finds himself a reluctant hero trapped by a masked “Collector” in a maze of lethal invention. Featuring gripping performances from Josh Stewart (Law Abiding Citizen), Madeline Zima (“Californication”) and Andrea Roth (“Rescue Me”), The Collector is the directorial debut of screenwriter Marcus Dunstan (Saw IV- VI, Feast I- III).
With special features including an alternate ending, deleted scenes, commentary and more, The Collector will be available on Blu-ray Disc and DVD for the suggested retail price of $24.99 and $24.95 respectively.
Special Features:
Alternate Ending
Deleted Scenes
Soundtrack Song Preview
Commentary
Music Video
Source: http://www.dreadcentral.com/news/36013/full-specs-and-art-dvd-and-blu-ray-the-collector
S&P cuts Blockbuster to deeply distressed rating
Standard & Poor's on Wednesday cut its ratings on Blockbuster Inc (BBI.N) to a deeply distressed rating and said the movie-rental chain is vulnerable to a debt default, though its liquidity is adequate in the near term.
S&P cut Blockbuster's corporate credit rating two steps to CCC, eight steps below investment grade, and assigned the company a negative outlook, indicating an additional downgrade may be likely over the coming 12-to-18 months.
"The negative outlook reflects our expectations for performance to likely remain very weak for at least the near term and for credit metrics to deteriorate substantially," S&P said in a statement.
Blockbuster's debt has been volatile since the company warned in January that its fourth-quarter and fiscal 2009 earnings would be sharply lower than expected, causing its bonds to halve in value.
The company's 9 percent bond due 2012 dropped .37 cent on the dollar on Thursday to 18.5 cents, according to MarketAxess.
Blockbuster is struggling to turn around its business model to compete with new entrants and technologies in the movie rental business.
"The downgrade reflects our view that performance will remain very challenged and our concern that Blockbuster will not be able to transform its business model over the near term, as we had expected, given the competitive pressures in the rapidly evolving domestic media entertainment industry," S&P said.
Blockbuster's liquidity is adequate for the near term, however the company is highly leveraged and has very thin cash flow protection, the rating agency said.
Debt maturities of $95 million due this year will likely use up a significant portion of the company's free operating cash flow, S&P said
Source: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1714408220100217
NITE is short GNPR by 2,800 shares! With only 135K O/S the current market cap of GNPR is only 1.15M Investors are scrambling for shares as Genius Products is about to release Scratch: The Ultimate DJ. I will laugh when NITE has to cover at a big loss.
New DVD Celebrates Work of F. Gary Gray
The work of F. Gary Gray is featured in the new DVD “Shooter Series Volume Two: F. Gary Gray,” due Feb. 16 from Vivendi Entertainment and Genius Products.
Gray’s resume swings from music videos (Dr. Dre, TLC, Mary J. Blige and more) to blockbuster features (“Law Abiding Citizen, “Set it Off,” “The Negotiator” and others).
Spanning the famed director’s decade-plus long career, the DVD includes a documentary titled “Doing The Impossible”; trailers from “Be Cool,” “A Man Apart,” “The Negotiator,” “Set It Off” and “Law Abiding Citizen”; a Law Abiding Citizen: Behind The Scenes featurette, and music videos from Cypress Hill, Ice Cube, R. Kelly, Mary J. Blige, TLC, Queen Latifah and others. Accompanied by a collectable booklet featuring insight into his directorial growth and personal, rarely seen photos, the DVD set will be available for the suggested retail price of $24.95.
Source: http://www.yourgossipfix.com/2010/02/new-dvd-celebrates-work-of-f-gary-gray/
I think we will hear news on the release of Scratch: The Ultimate DJ anytime now. The current shareholders know the potential GNPR has with its low O/S of only 135K shares and extremely low market cap, shares are only going to get harder and harder to come by.
I noticed IH Admin deleted a few of your recent posts. Thanks for your daily blog, I find your topics quite interesting.
Here is some background information on key executives of Bedlam Games, the developer of Scratch: The Ultimate DJ.
Trevor Fencott
CEO, Bedlam Games, an independent venture-capital backed Toronto video-game company. Trevor brings 9 years of game industry experience in the Bedlam management team and has been credited on more than 20 games including Playboy, the Mansion and Land of the Dead. He was the co-founder and president of the boutique video game publisher – Groove Games and previously as a practicing attorney built the video game practice at Goodmans LLP and Goodmans Venture Group.
Don Henderson
Don is the Studio General Manager and Chief Operating Officer of Bedlam Games Inc., authorized developers for the Sony PlayStation3, Xbox360 and Nintendo Wii console platforms. Don brings more than ten years of legal and videogame experience to the Bedlam team. He has been credited on six console and PC titles with Toronto-based boutique publisher Groove Games.
Prior to entering the videogame industry, Don spent six years practicing law at Goodmans LLP where he represented clients in the software and interactive media industries, including Ontario-based video game developers and publishers. Don received an Honours B.A. degree from the University of Toronto (Trinity College) and a Bachelor of Laws degree from the University of British Columbia. He is a member of the Ontario Bar Association and a member of the International Game Developers Association.
Sources: http://www.interactiveontario.com/events/view/392
http://propelict.com/node/7791
Just think, @ $10 the market cap of GNPR is only 1.35M - - Should be AT LEAST ten times that, if not more imo.
Nice blog you got there, the writeup on the revised unemployment formula really made me think twice about what I read about on the major media channels.
GLTA
When they finally do release an update / news on the release of Scratch: The Ultimate DJ, GNPR will soar. My guess is Numark will help out with the Marketing aspect. I caught a few of their promotional videos on the Scratch Deck and was quite impressed.
I have been trying to load up on the cheapies as well, but with no luck.
With only 135k outstanding shares, I am beginning to think anything under $25 are the cheapies!!!
The chart looks strong, and we are set to gap up bigtime!
http://stockcharts.com/c-sc/sc?chart=gnpr,uu[e,a]dhclyiay[dc][pc21!b5!b10!b50!b200!d20,2!f!h][vc60][iut!ua12,26,9!ub14!ul14!uv25!lc20!lc5!lf20!lg20!uq3,10][j20444984,y]&r=3555
GLTA
I agree, FRCMQ is headed to triple 000s, and fast, imo.
I just want to find out what all the hubbub is about with the secret air force base. Maybe it is where they keep the alien spacecraft from Roswell??? LOL
According to Shortsqueeze.com, GNPR currently has 2,800 shares short interest.
As Scratch is soon-to-be released, I believe we will see a run, to much higher levels.
Just think, with only 135,218 O/S:
$25.00 / share GNPR would only have 3.38M market cap!!!
and
$100.00 / share GNPR would only have 13.5M market cap!!!
GLTA
Source: http://www.shortsqueeze.com/?symbol=gnpr
FairPoint to convert pre-bankruptcy debt to equity
NEW YORK, Feb 8 (Reuters) - Telecommunications provider FairPoint Communications Inc on Monday filed a delayed plan of reorganization that calls for distributing millions of new shares to claim holders.
The company said in court filings that $2.1 billion in allowed pre-petition credit agreement claims could expect a recovery of about 87.9 cents on the dollar in cash and new shares, and $635.3 million of unsecured claims could expect to recover 17 cents on the dollar in the form of shares of the reorganized company.
Subject to certain conditions, some 47 million new common shares will be distributed to holders of Class 4 pre-petition credit agreement claims, and 4 million shares will be distributed to Class 7 unsecured claim holders.
Current shareholders would be wiped out.
Source: http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2010-02/16090533-update-1-fairpoint-to-convert-pre-bankruptcy-debt-to-equity-020.htm
I see the glass as half empty, as now there is only one potential bidder, not two. No more bidding war. Does not look good, imho.
Mix Master Mike And Quincy Jones III Crown Dj Hymn The Ultimate Dj
DJ Hymn Reigns Supreme in National Competition Sponsored by Numark®
Scratch The Ultimate DJ (Numark, Genius Products) recently announced LA’s DJ Hymn as winner of their wildly popular contest, Who’s the Ultimate DJ? The contest was announced in November 2009 and called upon DJs nationwide to film and submit videos of themselves scratching to one of the featured tracks in the Scratch video game.
Additionally, DJs were also invited to film their submissions at The Scratch DJ Academy in front of an intimate audience of top Numark executives and noted professionals such as DJ Nu-Mark and DJ Babu (Beat Junkies).
However, in the end it would be the judges: World renowned accomplished music producers Mix Master Mike and Quincy Jones III who would narrow hundreds of entries down to three finalists, eventually choosing DJ Hymn (who was filmed scratching on the track “Slacker” by Tech N9ne as The Ultimate DJ. Prizes include top of the line Akai and Numark equipment. DJ Hymn will also have his video featured on Scratch’s website and social network pages (Youtube, Twitter, MySpace, Facebook), as well as AllHipHop.com.
“This is a dream come true on so many different levels,” says Hymn. “Not only am I humbled to be chosen as winner by two people I greatly admire, I was given the opportunity to compete amongst my peers -in my element. There’s so much talent out there and I got to be a part of it…up close and personal.”
Video:
IBOX updated:
Institutional Investor "Nanocap Fund, L.P." INCREASED position from 6,704 shares to 11,257 shares of GNPR
As we approach the release of Scratch: The ultimate DJ, I expect the PPS to increase, as investors scramble to gather shares. Current market cap is only 1.01M!!! Shares are tight at these levels.
eom
I had a sell order in under the bid all morning and no fill.
41 Boardmarks, eom.
Glad I did not buy into the PCS Koolaid. Too much debt and the market cap is up there. PCS seems to be headed lower, imo.
Check out JALSF - Japan Airlines. Should be trading at a 1:5 ratio to JALSY. JALSY is currently @ ~ $1.10 and JALSF is @ ~ $0.02 JALSF is mega undervalued and should be ~ $0.20 JALSF has volume and is a run in the making, imo.
I agree, JALSY is up to $1.28 as I type this. JALSF should bounce soon, imo.
Japan Airlines Decides on New Top Management Positions
Tokyo, Japan Airlines Group announced today, the appointments of the Group President and Executive Vice President, who will take office with effect from February 1, 2010.
Masaru Onishi, 54, has been elected to lead the JAL Group as the president of the Group’s holding company - Japan Airlines Corporation (JALS), and main air transport operator Japan Airlines International (JALI). He will also be assigned the role of Chief Operating Officer (COO) for the holding company. Onishi joined Japan Airlines in 1978 and for the 6 months prior to his new assignment as president, was serving as the president of Japan Air Commuter and an executive officer of Japan Airlines International.
Hisao Taguchi, also 54, will be assuming the role of executive vice president of the Group and of Japan Airlines International, after serving as an executive officer in charge of the overall operations of the JAL Group in the Kyushu region since April 2009.
Under the strong leadership of the Group chairman Kazuo Inamori, and president Masaru Onishi, Japan Airlines will continue to steadfastly provide flight operations of the highest safety and service levels to its customers, and strive towards the rebuilding of the Group.
Source: http://www.newdesignworld.com/press/story/52734
Strong Buy! imo.