Replies to post #102658 on DD Support Board and Research Team

[shajandr]

Yeah, you gott that wrong. The DOJ had to ask the court to grant leave to travel for Marty. Just as I stated.

And one doesn't "squash" a subpoena, one moves to quash it.

And you cannot move to quash a Congressional subpoena, as it doesn't come from the judicial branch. Well, I suppose you could move for it, but an Article III court likely would nott quash a Congressional subpoena.

As I've stated before, a Congressional subpoena is NOT a court subpoena. It comes from the legislative branch, nott the judicial branch nor the executive branch and it does nott arise from a pending court action (i.e, drug pricing does nott arise from Marty's fraud case for Ponzi scheming).

So there's that.

Thanks for the 'advice' though! :)

Perhaps you can give us your opinion of Vosburg v. Putney or International Shoe also?

[scion]

The Scope of Congress’s Subpoena Power

Congress has long been held to possess plenary authority to investigate any matter that is or might be the subject of legislation or oversight. And as the Supreme Court observed over 35 years ago, this authority includes the power to use compulsory processes, such as the issuance of subpoenas. See Eastland v. U.S. Serviceman’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975). The scope of Congress’s power “is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.” Id. at 504 n.15 (quoting Barenblatt v. U.S., 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959)). Put another way, although Congress ought not to delve needlessly into the “private affairs” of the citizenry, it has the power to inquire about and investigate any issue “on which legislation could be had.” Id. (quoting McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177 (1927)). So long as Congress stays within this “necessarily broad” grant of constitutional authority, courts have little power to restrain its action. See Id. at 508 (“The wisdom of congressional approach or methodology is not open to judicial veto.”).

As a practical matter, this means that courts generally will not interfere with a congressional subpoena absent a truly opprobrious violation of an individual’s constitutional rights. Indeed, in the entire history of American jurisprudence, courts have sought to limit congressional investigations in only a handful of cases and, there, only in the face of blatant constitutional violations. See, e.g., McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F.2d 1024, 1043 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applied to congressional inquiries, and explaining that congressional staff did not have immunity from a civil lawsuit alleging that they participated in an unlawful search and seizure by removing documents from a private residence); see also Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589 F.2d 582, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (declining to issue an injunction to protect purported trade secrets from congressional subpoena because, “[a]lthough the courts will intervene to protect constitutional rights from infringement by Congress, including its committees and members, where constitutional rights are not violated there is no warrant for the judiciary to interfere with the internal procedures of Congress.”)

In sum, the legal authority of Congress to seek and use investigatory information is extremely broad and is subject to only minimal oversight by the courts. Absent clear violations of substantive constitutional rights, there are few formal restraints on congressional action, and recourse to the judiciary for relief from such action is extremely limited.

Extract -
https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/ec1203b2-a787-44ac-8344-5d5fab374ffa/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/11509b8b-df81-4db6-9e89-1d1b16c20856/White-Paper-Congressional-Subpoena.pdf