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$JCPNQ Another Very Interesting Stock Twits Post!!! ...
https://stocktwits.com/Simonjcp/message/243366413
Quote:Simonjcp
9/12/20, 12:23 PM
$JCP
BEFORE LAWSUIT ACTION WE GONA START EMAILS ALL MEDIA NEWSPAPERS TVS MAGAZINES....TO BE AWARE OF FRAUD SCAM JCPENNEY BK AS ITS PUNISHMENT UNDER NEW BK LAWS ARE CRIMINAL CHARGES ...
Look to the Post's Graphic to see all the Contact People and Emails Addresses to start your Protest Of Shareholder and Pensioner and Employee Treatment by the Corrupt JCP BOD and their Scamming Lawyers!
$JCPNQ Another Very Interesting Stock Twits Post! ...
https://stocktwits.com/Simonjcp/message/243366413
$JCPNQ Very Interesting Stock Twits Post! ...
https://stocktwits.com/Eddiesito/message/243415818
JWW: Agree 100%! Stalking-Horse Bid is only an INITIAL BID!!! ...
UpYoursASAP ... J.C. Penney Has $1.48 Billion In Cash And Over $300 Million In Credit Card Revenue, Are They Really Insolvent?
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4371666-j-c-penney-1_48-billion-in-cash-and-over-300-million-in-credit-card-revenue-are-really
Aug. 31, 2020 9:30 AM ET|103 comments | About: J. C. Penney Company, Inc. (JCPNQ), Includes: SHLDQ, SRG, SRG.PA
Eric Moore
Eric Moore
Long/Short Equity, Special Situations, Value, Relative Value Arbitrage
Summary
J.C. Penney filed Bankruptcy with $1.4 Billion in Unencumbered Real Estate and $2.1 Billion in Inventory (at cost) and over $500 Million in cash?
As of August 20, 2020 J.C. Penney has $1.48 Billion Dollars in cash after reporting in May they would be out of cash in June/July.
A Motion to appoint an Official Equity Committee was filed on August 19th making the case that the equity is worth between $869 Million and $2.522 Billion Dollars.
J.C. Penney's online business and credit card royalty revenue are collectively worth at least $3 Billion without the retail business or real estate.
All J.C. Penney shareholders should buy unsecured bonds as a hedge as they are 1 cents on dollar (or less) and are higher in priority than the common stock.
This is my first article on J.C. Penney (OTCPK:JCPNQ) the historic retailer that filed Bankruptcy on May 15, 2020 with $500 Million dollars in cash, and $1.4 Billion dollars in unencumbered real estate.
I have over 20 years experience consulting in large complex Bankruptcy cases for Law firms, large creditors and Debtors. This is the strangest case I have ever seen.
This article will make the case that J.C. Penney is not "Hopelessly insolvent" and in fact has plenty of money left for unsecured creditors and shareholders if the right actions are taken and the right plan is implemented.
It's interesting to note, the debtor stressed two main points at the hearing for approval of the Debtor in Possession Loan in May 2020:
A. They predicted that unless they received a $450 Million dollar DIP Loan, they would run out of money in late June/July.
B. The Bankruptcy needed to move fast in order to keep the support of the 1st Lien holders.
From the beginning of the Bankruptcy, the projections made by the debtors advisors were very pessimistic, which was understandable due to the shut down of all of their stores during the quarantine. However, 300 stores opened sooner than expected, so the revenue projections which were based on a total shut down for many more months, were off by a long shot.
As shown in the chart below (Doc 1268) as of July 18th, 2020 their total available cash exceeded the June 4th projections by approximately $400 Million dollars (and exceeded the the projections in the interim cash flow projections by over $500 Million dollars)
This large increase in revenue gave shareholders a reason to celebrate as the Current Restructuring Support Agreement, wipes them about but was based on much lower revenue numbers.
However, after failing to run out of cash in June or July as they predicted, the Debtors' advisors predicted a liquidity crisis would now happen sometime in mid August, but instead they have amassed over $1.48 Billion in cash as of the writing of this article.
JCP Doc 1268
Because of the increasing revenue, J.C. Penney has a $450 Million dollar (DIP) Debtor in possession loan they have not had drawn on. Despite their earlier projections In May and June being off by hundreds of millions of dollars, they still have not adjusted their recovery projections for unsecured creditors and shareholders. This is further proof that an official equity committee needs to be appointed.
Does a company with $1.48 Billion in cash and no bond debt due until 2023, earning over $300 Million a year in Credit card royalties (which cost less than 1 Million in expenses to generate) sound like a company that is insolvent to you?
Regardless of how much money JCP earns, or how positive the numbers continue to be, JCP advisors haven't changed their recovery projections, the Debtors net cash flow exceeded it's interim Budget Projection by 229.4% and the Debtors had accumulated $721 Million more in short-term investment funds than projected.
Why should the Bankruptcy Court trust the future projections presented by the JCP advisors, when so far they have been off my literally hundreds of millions dollars?
Many shareholders predicted this revenue windfall and filed letters and motions accusing the JCP Management of filing the Bankruptcy in Bad Faith, some don't go that far but just accuse them of gross undervaluation of assets, some cite financials and appraisals based on SEC disclosures made by management just a few months earlier (See Docs 294, 319,333, 389, 518, 555, 529, 575, 576, 577 484) and many others. These letters are quite convincing, especially since the numbers presented to shareholders have been more in line with the shareholder letters than the JCP advisors.
Nick Celentano, the Chairman of the ad hoc equity Committee recently said"
We've been working with counsel and our financial advisors for two months now analyzing data and putting together a true valuation of JCP. The results confirmed what we knew from the start, JCP is worth much more than the Debtors believe. We see a recovery in all models for equity we've ran. Let me make one thing clear to all parties involved. We will not accept any plan that does not give equity it's fair share.
The Ad Hoc shareholders committee has filed a motion to have an official equity committee appointed (Doc 1268) I fully support this motion and Pandemic or not, the numbers don't lie, even if the real estate and inventory are worth much less than appraised value, the Online Business and Credit Card royalty revenue are not valued at close to ZERO.
J.C. Penney Bankruptcy vs. Sears Holdings Bankruptcy
J.C. Penney is a different animal than the Sears Holdings, Inc. (OTCPK:SHLDQ) Bankruptcy, in that case which I have covered in multiple articles, the debt and common stock is majority owned and controlled by Eddie Lampert and his investment vehicle ESL Investments. The REIT made up of former Sears real estate is controlled by ESL, and so is the spin-off Lands' End (LE) and the old Sears Transform Holdco.
Unlike J.C. Penney, Mr. Lampert refused to fire sale the Sears real estate, in fact years prior to the Bankruptcy, ALL Sears shareholders were provided the opportunity to purchase 266 prime real estate assets from the company on a parri passu basis, this entity became Seritage Growth Properties (SRG) As stated later in this article, if you are going to sell the real estate, why not offer it to shareholders FIRST. Why favor the first lien holders?
Why not offer the opportunity to shareholder and unsecured bondholders?
J.C. Penney's management owns little or no equity in J.C. Penney and have a different plan than Sears Holdings had for their Real Estate, they plan to essentially allow the First lien holders to foreclose on it at a depressed price during a once in a hundred year pandemic (See the Reconstructing Support agreement Doc 25 page 48)
J.C. Penney's side of the Story
J.C. Penney in it's earlier pleadings, alleged that due to the pandemic their first lien holders are essentially unsecured and most or all of the real estate assets of the company must be sold and/or foreclosed on by them and turned into a REIT, the operating retail business would be sold with shareholders receiving nothing and unsecured creditors getting an undisclosed amount.
J.C. Penney asserts that the COVID-19 Pandemic has reduced the value of ALL their assets so much that the only class of creditors in the money are the 1st lien holders, even though J.C. Penney had $1.4 Billion in unencumbered real estate prior to the filing pf the Bankruptcy. (that real estate is now a part of the DIP loan collateral, see Doc 333 Page 15)
In all of the pleadings addressing the stock holders the actual value of the assets (Pandemic or not) are not provided via appraisal or a market test, they simple point to the trading price of the debt and stock allege that this is why shareholders are out of the money.
In their objection to the motion for an official equity committee (Doc 1300) the debtors assert:
The Motion also ignores market realities, reflected in the trading prices for the Debtors' debt and equity securities that place shareholders near the money, where (as here) nearly $2 Billion of the first lien debt is trading at 38 cents on the dollar, $400 Million of second lien debt is trading at a penny on the dollar, and $1.3 Billion of unsecured debt is trading at a penny on the dollar, it seems highly unlikely that shareholders will end up in the money.
J.C. Penney's listed $8.467 Billion in assets in the Initial Bankruptcy filing but now they say those assets are worth less than $3.9 Billion dollars. Perhaps the real estate has declined some or even a lot, but the e-commerce business and credit card revenue has done substantially better, and these assets and revenue are totally unaccounted for, or grossly undervalued at best.
The credit card royalty stream is a totally separate business from the retail business and e-commerce business and must be appraised and sold separately for this very reason. It should not be "gifted" to whoever buys the brick and mortar retailer.
In the Motion for an official equity committee (Doc 1268) the Ad Hoc equity committee lawyers/advisors made points that were not properly addressed in the objection to the motion (Doc 1300)
To be clear, JCP has an extra $700 Million dollars they didn't expect to have but they still filed an objection to approval of an official equity committee. I estimate this committee would cost less than 2-3 Million dollars depending upon how amiable other constituencies are. Page 23 of this motion shows that plenty of value is left for Shareholders.
JCP Doc 1268 Page 23
As shown below on a Discounted cash flow analysis and an Orderly Liquidation Analysis the equity committee lawyers make a compelling case for value being left for the equity (See Doc 1268 Page 25 Below)
JCP Doc 1268 Page 25
THE MOORE PLAN FOR SHAREHOLDER RECOVERY
The Debtors’ original bankruptcy petition stated assets of $8.6 Billion, and debts of $8.2 Billion, with no unsecured Bond until 2023. The issue they have promoted has been the refinancing of the 1st Lien Debt.
The funded debt totals $4.9 Billion dollars (See Below)
JCP Doc 25 Page 36
JCP themselves asserted their assets were worth $8.6 Billion in their own Bankruptcy filing but based on the fact that their other projections have been so far off, can we trust this number?
The JCP advisors have continued to assert that the first lien holders are impaired, meaning ALL the J.C. Penney the assets are worth close to or less than less than $3.6 Billion. Even after exceeding revenue projections by more than $500 Million dollars they have not made any adjustments to the Restructuring Support agreement. (See Doc 25 page 48) (If they have they have not been disclosed to the shareholders)
The JCP Credit Card Royalty Revenue is Significant
The largest undervaluation of assets that JCP has made is that they value the credit card royalty revenue at essentially ZERO, I value this income at $1.5-$3 Billion dollars.
In a New York Times Article Published on May 11 2017, it was reported that the money from the Macy's branded credit cards accounted for 39 percent of the company’s total profit of $1.9 billion last year in 2014, up from 26 percent in 2013, according to an analysis by Morgan Stanley. At Kohl’s, the profit from plastic totaled 35 percent, up from 23 percent, over that same period. At Target, it made up 13 percent of total earnings, up from 11 percent in 2013. Now, let's take a look at the J.C. Penney credit card royalties.
JCP MASTERCARD
J.C. Penney has two credit cards, a J.C. Penney Store card and a J.C. Penney MasterCard (Which can be used everywhere MasterCard is accepted) the royalty numbers since 2014 are listed below:
2014- $313 Million
2015- $367 Million
2016-$347 Million
2017-$319 Million
2018-$355 Million
2019-$452 Million
* This year was higher due to the change in reserves
More than Four years prior to the filing Bankruptcy, Sears Holdings converted ALL their Sears Store Cards to Shop Your Way MasterCards, this way the credit card royalty revenue is not dependent upon the survival of the brick and mortar retailer (among other reasons)
The Moore Plan converts all JCP store cards to a JCP General MasterCard that can be accepted anywhere MasterCard is accepted.
The Moore Plan would offer all shareholders an equal opportunity to buy into the JCP REIT (Like Sears Holdings did with Seritage Growth Properties) If shareholders do not purchase all the units of the REIT, other constituencies would be provided the opportunity to buy the Surplus.
The Moore Plan provides that the Retail Business would be sold separately without the credit card revenue, so that at least $1.5 -$3 Billion more in value is available to all stakeholders, below are a few options:
Option 1: Have JCP to issue Secured Bonds backed by this revenue, (similar to the Bowie Bonds Back by David Bowie's song royalties) these funds can be used to refinance the 1st lien debt and develop the Real Estate to be transferred into the REIT.
* Shareholders and creditors could exchange some or all of their debt for these Bonds and be offered the first opportunity to buy any surplus
Option 2: Sell the royalty stream a Minimum of $1.5 Billion-$2 dollars to an outside party and use the funds to refinance the first lien debt, tender for unsecured bonds and develop the real estate internally.
Option 3: Spin-off the credit card royalties into a separate company with shareholders and unsecured creditors getting a piece of the company on a pro rata basis with the surplus going to refinance the first lien debt or replace them altogether.
Option 4: Request an advance on this royalty stream from Synchrony (the Card portfolio owner) of no less than $1 Billion dollars (about 3.3 years revenue) and perhaps renegotiate for a higher royalty and refinance the first lien debt, then tender for the unsecured Bonds and/or convert them to PIK (Paid In Kind) Bonds with an extension of 3-5 or years and offer 25-50 cents on the dollar in cash for those that don't want to convert to PIK.
CONCLUSION
Because their is no unsecured debt due until 2023, using the credit card royalty revenue to significantly pay down down and/or refinance the 1st lien debt makes sense, this plan makes cash interest an option of the company and/or pays off the debt at a discount. The credit card royalty advance or securitization would be recouped from the royalties generated from the credit card portfolio not other revenue of J.C. Penney.
Any of these options raises $1-$3 Billion Dollars from an unencumbered asset that is listed at close to ZERO value by J.C. Penney, again, the royalties would be recouped first and only from that source of revenue, this revenue stream is mostly unaffected by COVID 19, which the debtors blame for devaluing all the other assets, and it has nothing to do with real estate appraisals and isn't connected to the survival of the brick and mortar retailer.
All shareholders should buy unsecured bonds as a way to hedge, even when value is available for shareholders the wrong plan and lack of incentive from management can cause the stock to be wiped out, so hedging is essential. ALL shareholders should own unsecured bonds as they are worth par plus interest under the Moore Plan.
J.C. Penney's management has no skin in the game and in Bankruptcy, unsecured bondholders are higher in priority than shareholders, these Bonds currently cost 1 cents on the dollar. In my opinion, it is irrational not to own unsecured bonds if you believe their is value left for stockholders. Under the absolute priority rule, unsecured Bondholders get paid BEFORE stockholders.
For new investors, It's possible to make 25-100X your investment on the unsecured Bonds, for stockholders you can protect yourself from receiving no recovery but owning the unsecured bonds. All this is contingent upon the equity committee becoming official and the Moore Plan or a variation of it is implemented.
Disclosure: I am/we are long JCPNQ. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.
Additional disclosure: I own unsecured bonds and common stock
J.C. Penney Has $1.48 Billion In Cash And Over $300 Million In Credit Card Revenue, Are They Really Insolvent?
Aug. 31, 2020 9:30 AM ET|103 comments | About: J. C. Penney Company, Inc. (JCPNQ), Includes: SHLDQ, SRG, SRG.PA
Eric Moore
Eric Moore
Long/Short Equity, Special Situations, Value, Relative Value Arbitrage
Summary
J.C. Penney filed Bankruptcy with $1.4 Billion in Unencumbered Real Estate and $2.1 Billion in Inventory (at cost) and over $500 Million in cash?
As of August 20, 2020 J.C. Penney has $1.48 Billion Dollars in cash after reporting in May they would be out of cash in June/July.
A Motion to appoint an Official Equity Committee was filed on August 19th making the case that the equity is worth between $869 Million and $2.522 Billion Dollars.
J.C. Penney's online business and credit card royalty revenue are collectively worth at least $3 Billion without the retail business or real estate.
All J.C. Penney shareholders should buy unsecured bonds as a hedge as they are 1 cents on dollar (or less) and are higher in priority than the common stock.
This is my first article on J.C. Penney (OTCPK:JCPNQ) the historic retailer that filed Bankruptcy on May 15, 2020 with $500 Million dollars in cash, and $1.4 Billion dollars in unencumbered real estate.
I have over 20 years experience consulting in large complex Bankruptcy cases for Law firms, large creditors and Debtors. This is the strangest case I have ever seen.
This article will make the case that J.C. Penney is not "Hopelessly insolvent" and in fact has plenty of money left for unsecured creditors and shareholders if the right actions are taken and the right plan is implemented.
It's interesting to note, the debtor stressed two main points at the hearing for approval of the Debtor in Possession Loan in May 2020:
A. They predicted that unless they received a $450 Million dollar DIP Loan, they would run out of money in late June/July.
B. The Bankruptcy needed to move fast in order to keep the support of the 1st Lien holders.
From the beginning of the Bankruptcy, the projections made by the debtors advisors were very pessimistic, which was understandable due to the shut down of all of their stores during the quarantine. However, 300 stores opened sooner than expected, so the revenue projections which were based on a total shut down for many more months, were off by a long shot.
As shown in the chart below (Doc 1268) as of July 18th, 2020 their total available cash exceeded the June 4th projections by approximately $400 Million dollars (and exceeded the the projections in the interim cash flow projections by over $500 Million dollars)
This large increase in revenue gave shareholders a reason to celebrate as the Current Restructuring Support Agreement, wipes them about but was based on much lower revenue numbers.
However, after failing to run out of cash in June or July as they predicted, the Debtors' advisors predicted a liquidity crisis would now happen sometime in mid August, but instead they have amassed over $1.48 Billion in cash as of the writing of this article.
JCP Doc 1268
Because of the increasing revenue, J.C. Penney has a $450 Million dollar (DIP) Debtor in possession loan they have not had drawn on. Despite their earlier projections In May and June being off by hundreds of millions of dollars, they still have not adjusted their recovery projections for unsecured creditors and shareholders. This is further proof that an official equity committee needs to be appointed.
Does a company with $1.48 Billion in cash and no bond debt due until 2023, earning over $300 Million a year in Credit card royalties (which cost less than 1 Million in expenses to generate) sound like a company that is insolvent to you?
Regardless of how much money JCP earns, or how positive the numbers continue to be, JCP advisors haven't changed their recovery projections, the Debtors net cash flow exceeded it's interim Budget Projection by 229.4% and the Debtors had accumulated $721 Million more in short-term investment funds than projected.
Why should the Bankruptcy Court trust the future projections presented by the JCP advisors, when so far they have been off my literally hundreds of millions dollars?
Many shareholders predicted this revenue windfall and filed letters and motions accusing the JCP Management of filing the Bankruptcy in Bad Faith, some don't go that far but just accuse them of gross undervaluation of assets, some cite financials and appraisals based on SEC disclosures made by management just a few months earlier (See Docs 294, 319,333, 389, 518, 555, 529, 575, 576, 577 484) and many others. These letters are quite convincing, especially since the numbers presented to shareholders have been more in line with the shareholder letters than the JCP advisors.
Nick Celentano, the Chairman of the ad hoc equity Committee recently said"
We've been working with counsel and our financial advisors for two months now analyzing data and putting together a true valuation of JCP. The results confirmed what we knew from the start, JCP is worth much more than the Debtors believe. We see a recovery in all models for equity we've ran. Let me make one thing clear to all parties involved. We will not accept any plan that does not give equity it's fair share.
The Ad Hoc shareholders committee has filed a motion to have an official equity committee appointed (Doc 1268) I fully support this motion and Pandemic or not, the numbers don't lie, even if the real estate and inventory are worth much less than appraised value, the Online Business and Credit Card royalty revenue are not valued at close to ZERO.
J.C. Penney Bankruptcy vs. Sears Holdings Bankruptcy
J.C. Penney is a different animal than the Sears Holdings, Inc. (OTCPK:SHLDQ) Bankruptcy, in that case which I have covered in multiple articles, the debt and common stock is majority owned and controlled by Eddie Lampert and his investment vehicle ESL Investments. The REIT made up of former Sears real estate is controlled by ESL, and so is the spin-off Lands' End (LE) and the old Sears Transform Holdco.
Unlike J.C. Penney, Mr. Lampert refused to fire sale the Sears real estate, in fact years prior to the Bankruptcy, ALL Sears shareholders were provided the opportunity to purchase 266 prime real estate assets from the company on a parri passu basis, this entity became Seritage Growth Properties (SRG) As stated later in this article, if you are going to sell the real estate, why not offer it to shareholders FIRST. Why favor the first lien holders?
Why not offer the opportunity to shareholder and unsecured bondholders?
J.C. Penney's management owns little or no equity in J.C. Penney and have a different plan than Sears Holdings had for their Real Estate, they plan to essentially allow the First lien holders to foreclose on it at a depressed price during a once in a hundred year pandemic (See the Reconstructing Support agreement Doc 25 page 48)
J.C. Penney's side of the Story
J.C. Penney in it's earlier pleadings, alleged that due to the pandemic their first lien holders are essentially unsecured and most or all of the real estate assets of the company must be sold and/or foreclosed on by them and turned into a REIT, the operating retail business would be sold with shareholders receiving nothing and unsecured creditors getting an undisclosed amount.
J.C. Penney asserts that the COVID-19 Pandemic has reduced the value of ALL their assets so much that the only class of creditors in the money are the 1st lien holders, even though J.C. Penney had $1.4 Billion in unencumbered real estate prior to the filing pf the Bankruptcy. (that real estate is now a part of the DIP loan collateral, see Doc 333 Page 15)
In all of the pleadings addressing the stock holders the actual value of the assets (Pandemic or not) are not provided via appraisal or a market test, they simple point to the trading price of the debt and stock allege that this is why shareholders are out of the money.
In their objection to the motion for an official equity committee (Doc 1300) the debtors assert:
The Motion also ignores market realities, reflected in the trading prices for the Debtors' debt and equity securities that place shareholders near the money, where (as here) nearly $2 Billion of the first lien debt is trading at 38 cents on the dollar, $400 Million of second lien debt is trading at a penny on the dollar, and $1.3 Billion of unsecured debt is trading at a penny on the dollar, it seems highly unlikely that shareholders will end up in the money.
J.C. Penney's listed $8.467 Billion in assets in the Initial Bankruptcy filing but now they say those assets are worth less than $3.9 Billion dollars. Perhaps the real estate has declined some or even a lot, but the e-commerce business and credit card revenue has done substantially better, and these assets and revenue are totally unaccounted for, or grossly undervalued at best.
The credit card royalty stream is a totally separate business from the retail business and e-commerce business and must be appraised and sold separately for this very reason. It should not be "gifted" to whoever buys the brick and mortar retailer.
In the Motion for an official equity committee (Doc 1268) the Ad Hoc equity committee lawyers/advisors made points that were not properly addressed in the objection to the motion (Doc 1300)
To be clear, JCP has an extra $700 Million dollars they didn't expect to have but they still filed an objection to approval of an official equity committee. I estimate this committee would cost less than 2-3 Million dollars depending upon how amiable other constituencies are. Page 23 of this motion shows that plenty of value is left for Shareholders.
JCP Doc 1268 Page 23
As shown below on a Discounted cash flow analysis and an Orderly Liquidation Analysis the equity committee lawyers make a compelling case for value being left for the equity (See Doc 1268 Page 25 Below)
JCP Doc 1268 Page 25
THE MOORE PLAN FOR SHAREHOLDER RECOVERY
The Debtors’ original bankruptcy petition stated assets of $8.6 Billion, and debts of $8.2 Billion, with no unsecured Bond until 2023. The issue they have promoted has been the refinancing of the 1st Lien Debt.
The funded debt totals $4.9 Billion dollars (See Below)
JCP Doc 25 Page 36
JCP themselves asserted their assets were worth $8.6 Billion in their own Bankruptcy filing but based on the fact that their other projections have been so far off, can we trust this number?
The JCP advisors have continued to assert that the first lien holders are impaired, meaning ALL the J.C. Penney the assets are worth close to or less than less than $3.6 Billion. Even after exceeding revenue projections by more than $500 Million dollars they have not made any adjustments to the Restructuring Support agreement. (See Doc 25 page 48) (If they have they have not been disclosed to the shareholders)
The JCP Credit Card Royalty Revenue is Significant
The largest undervaluation of assets that JCP has made is that they value the credit card royalty revenue at essentially ZERO, I value this income at $1.5-$3 Billion dollars.
In a New York Times Article Published on May 11 2017, it was reported that the money from the Macy's branded credit cards accounted for 39 percent of the company’s total profit of $1.9 billion last year in 2014, up from 26 percent in 2013, according to an analysis by Morgan Stanley. At Kohl’s, the profit from plastic totaled 35 percent, up from 23 percent, over that same period. At Target, it made up 13 percent of total earnings, up from 11 percent in 2013. Now, let's take a look at the J.C. Penney credit card royalties.
JCP MASTERCARD
J.C. Penney has two credit cards, a J.C. Penney Store card and a J.C. Penney MasterCard (Which can be used everywhere MasterCard is accepted) the royalty numbers since 2014 are listed below:
2014- $313 Million
2015- $367 Million
2016-$347 Million
2017-$319 Million
2018-$355 Million
2019-$452 Million
* This year was higher due to the change in reserves
More than Four years prior to the filing Bankruptcy, Sears Holdings converted ALL their Sears Store Cards to Shop Your Way MasterCards, this way the credit card royalty revenue is not dependent upon the survival of the brick and mortar retailer (among other reasons)
The Moore Plan converts all JCP store cards to a JCP General MasterCard that can be accepted anywhere MasterCard is accepted.
The Moore Plan would offer all shareholders an equal opportunity to buy into the JCP REIT (Like Sears Holdings did with Seritage Growth Properties) If shareholders do not purchase all the units of the REIT, other constituencies would be provided the opportunity to buy the Surplus.
The Moore Plan provides that the Retail Business would be sold separately without the credit card revenue, so that at least $1.5 -$3 Billion more in value is available to all stakeholders, below are a few options:
Option 1: Have JCP to issue Secured Bonds backed by this revenue, (similar to the Bowie Bonds Back by David Bowie's song royalties) these funds can be used to refinance the 1st lien debt and develop the Real Estate to be transferred into the REIT.
* Shareholders and creditors could exchange some or all of their debt for these Bonds and be offered the first opportunity to buy any surplus
Option 2: Sell the royalty stream a Minimum of $1.5 Billion-$2 dollars to an outside party and use the funds to refinance the first lien debt, tender for unsecured bonds and develop the real estate internally.
Option 3: Spin-off the credit card royalties into a separate company with shareholders and unsecured creditors getting a piece of the company on a pro rata basis with the surplus going to refinance the first lien debt or replace them altogether.
Option 4: Request an advance on this royalty stream from Synchrony (the Card portfolio owner) of no less than $1 Billion dollars (about 3.3 years revenue) and perhaps renegotiate for a higher royalty and refinance the first lien debt, then tender for the unsecured Bonds and/or convert them to PIK (Paid In Kind) Bonds with an extension of 3-5 or years and offer 25-50 cents on the dollar in cash for those that don't want to convert to PIK.
CONCLUSION
Because their is no unsecured debt due until 2023, using the credit card royalty revenue to significantly pay down down and/or refinance the 1st lien debt makes sense, this plan makes cash interest an option of the company and/or pays off the debt at a discount. The credit card royalty advance or securitization would be recouped from the royalties generated from the credit card portfolio not other revenue of J.C. Penney.
Any of these options raises $1-$3 Billion Dollars from an unencumbered asset that is listed at close to ZERO value by J.C. Penney, again, the royalties would be recouped first and only from that source of revenue, this revenue stream is mostly unaffected by COVID 19, which the debtors blame for devaluing all the other assets, and it has nothing to do with real estate appraisals and isn't connected to the survival of the brick and mortar retailer.
All shareholders should buy unsecured bonds as a way to hedge, even when value is available for shareholders the wrong plan and lack of incentive from management can cause the stock to be wiped out, so hedging is essential. ALL shareholders should own unsecured bonds as they are worth par plus interest under the Moore Plan.
J.C. Penney's management has no skin in the game and in Bankruptcy, unsecured bondholders are higher in priority than shareholders, these Bonds currently cost 1 cents on the dollar. In my opinion, it is irrational not to own unsecured bonds if you believe their is value left for stockholders. Under the absolute priority rule, unsecured Bondholders get paid BEFORE stockholders.
For new investors, It's possible to make 25-100X your investment on the unsecured Bonds, for stockholders you can protect yourself from receiving no recovery but owning the unsecured bonds. All this is contingent upon the equity committee becoming official and the Moore Plan or a variation of it is implemented.
Disclosure: I am/we are long JCPNQ. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.
Additional disclosure: I own unsecured bonds and common stock
$JCPNQ Same Judge in Both our BK Case and this BK Case ...
My Two Cents is this has got to give Judge Jones the needed backbone to do the right thing for Shareholders!
Stock Twits Post ...
TK: What are the specific Ticker Symbols etc for the Unsecured Debt you are talking about?
MB: What are the specific Ticker Symbols etc for Unsecured Debt are you referring to?
$HENC Any Educated Guesstimates on when we hear something worthwhile about this Company's direction and potential? ...
$JCPNQ Interesting Post on Stock Twits ...
Shareholders are livid on how this Fraud and Corruption has played out.
$JCPNQ Fascinating Post from Stock Twits! ...
http://stocktwits.com/SPIRITOFTHESTREET/message/240272250
LG: Fascinating Post! Thanks for your relentless quest for Truth and Justice in this BK Case and others! ...
Cheers! ...
You said ...
Rick, I look for the Judge on Monday to announce Sussberg and the Debtor’s replacement possibly with Equity. Sussberg came clean and advised the Judge in a recent filing this week that his brother-in-law is a Sr. Director for C&W who has done the valuations for JCPNQ.
This omission until now is a huge legal conundrum due to valuation being at the very heart of any Bk case. So, this means no credibility for the Debtor, K&E, the Lender, JCPNQ Executives and more which explains why the Executives have hired liability accounting lawyers as they have been caught.
I am sure Judge Jones has been in contact with the DOJ thus making a plan for Monday as the valuations for JCPNQ will have to be valued properly by a non conflicted group.
To say the least, Monday will be very interesting or should be.
$JCPNQ on Twitter and Stock Twits! ...
Cheers! ...
Twitter ...
https://twitter.com/search?q=%24jcpnq&src=recent_search_click&f=live
Stock Twits ...
https://stocktwits.com/symbol/JCP
NDT: I agree 100%! Full EC Committee is required ASAP! ...
That's the ONLY WAY we are going to get Fair and Balanced Legal Representation! ...
WaMu, Kmart, Sears etc etc etc ... People just don't trust these Lying Company Officers, Corrupt FDIC Government Officials and BK Judges and Slick Criminal Lawyers like Brian Rosen etc etc etc!
No Justice, No Peace!
NDT: Another Fascinating Post with Important Insights! ...
Thanks!
I1 and LG: Fascinating Post! Thanks to both of you! ...
$TTCM ARknet Version 1.5.9 is now out!
Cheers!
MB: That is a despicable way of looking at $JCPNQ Employees ...
You sadly said ...
I1: Thanks for your Update ...
Any word on when we can expect a $JCPNQ Complete and Fully Funded EC Committee? I am wary of this so-called EC4 Committee. I think we should have an EC Committee that represents all $JCPNQ Shareholders, not just a few.
You said ...
$JCPNQ MM Manipulation etc ...
How MM's manipulate Stocks ...
1. Naked Short Sell.
2. False - Fake Volume by Buying and Selling Shares to each other.
3. Control Public Narrative with corrupt entities like CNBC, Bloomberg etc.
B4: Where is a Public Copy of this Infamous Letter? ...
Can someone post a link to it or better yet post it here?
Thanks.
B4: I agree 100%! ...
This JCP BK has been a long time smelling like another Criminal Kmart BK Scam with a crooked "Judge" ... who lets these lying JCP Company Officers get away with everything including murdering Shareholders!
I say No Justice for Shareholders, No Peace for the Judge and Company Officer Criminals!
Make your voice heard!
You said ...
IF and WHEN the EC brings real numbers to the table, imho this whole thing is gonna take on a NEW LIGHT!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
And feel they JUDGE already is seeing the distinct possibility that is JUST EXACTLY what the EC is gonna do, and blow this whole SCAM DEAL up in their faces!
Can you say K-MART
IMO: Outstanding Letter. Thanks ...
You said ...
MY RESPONSE TO FDIC WITH COPY TO Chairwoman:Jelena McWilliams jmcwilliams@fdic.gov
I also attached my initial Complaint letters. My plan is to send this daily to all departments heads of FDIC until we get answers.
Priscilla,
For how long it took the FDIC for this response to my Complaint is not only unacceptable but seems to be just a canned response – please review the Status of Washington Mutual website for all the answer to your inquiries. It is possible that you have not gone to see the last update was 12/06/2019 so it is far from anything that provide any update. You should know the courts finalized the Chapter 11 as of the end 2019 so what is taking FDIC so long and is any damages or interest on those delaying this receivership?
I and many other plan to send daily letters requesting Transparency to our questions / concerns to the Chairwoman McWilliams on down until we get answers. You can review the letter attach on some of the questions I need answers to. In the Globic Settlement agreement was the Class 17 Bank Bond holders claim of about 13 billion was the responsibilities of FDIC and JPM – so who is holding this payment up and is any interest payments attached as damages for this delay? When will Class 17 Note Bank Bond holders get paid?
I can absolutely show you SEC documents filed by JPM of assets that have disappeared. Just a few below
https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/corporate/cfo_report_3rdqtr_15/0915_cfo_report.pdf
***Bottom of page 7***
'Excludes WAMU with total assets of $299 billion and zero estimated losses to the DIF'
JPM year ending 2014 10K reported R-203...... (Off Balance Sheet 165 Billion) report, and list it as considered assets of the former WaMu Estate.
http://www.secinfo.com/dJ5e.m8v.b.hem
In 2014 JPM made an announcement about shedding 100 billion before the filed there 10K filing showing 127 billion in off balance sheet collections regarding former WaMu.
JPM SAYS ASSETS at FDIC!
1WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., as Securitizer, is filing this Form ABS-15G in respect of all mortgage-backed securities representing interests in pools of residential mortgage loans for which it acted as depositor and which are outstanding during the reporting period. On September 25, 2008, JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (“JPMCB”) acquired the banking operations of Washington Mutual Bank from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). It is JPMCB’s position that certain of the repurchase obligations of Washington Mutual Bank remain with the FDIC receivership. Assets are reported herein in accordance with Rule 15Ga-1 regardless of the validity of the demand or defenses thereto, and nothing in this report shall constitute, or be deemed, a waiver of any rights, defenses, powers or privileges of any party relating to these assets.
http://whalewisdom.com/filer/wamu-asset-acceptance-corp
See FOOT NOTE ONE - Following Link
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1317069/000092963815000128/wamu-67348_abs15g.htm
FOOT NOTE ONE: 1WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., as Securitizer, is filing this Form ABS-15G in respect of all mortgage-backed securities representing interests in pools of residential mortgage loans for which it acted as depositor and which are outstanding during the reporting period. On September 25, 2008, JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (“JPMCB”) acquired the banking operations of Washington Mutual Bank from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). It is JPMCB’s position that certain of the repurchase obligations of Washington Mutual Bank remain with the FDIC receivership. Assets are reported herein in accordance with Rule 15Ga-1 regardless of the validity of the demand or defenses thereto, and nothing in this report shall constitute, or be deemed, a waiver of any rights, defenses, powers or privileges of any party relating to these assets.
AS Note of FACTS: This paper below was written Doctor, Sankarshan Acharya, Associate Professor of Finance who work as top financial advisory to the FDIC so he know FDIC and the corruption of the big banks on Wall Street that FDIC seems to be in a circle of collusion of Fraud with them.
The good Doctor, Sankarshan Acharya, Associate Professor of Finance University of Illinois at Chicago penned the below paper on the Economic Inefficiency of Short-Selling......especially relevant to WMI and WMB is example 2 on pages 9-11...... Note: I can also verify what he states as a fact!
http://www.pro-prosperity.com/Research/Sub-Optimality%20of%20Short%20Selling.pdf
Example 2 (JPM-WM): JP Morgan and Chase conceives of a plan (Project West) to acquire a successful, well-capitalized and valuable bank, Washington Mutual Bank (which is a subsidiary of Washington Mutual Incorporated, a bank holding company), to expand its operations to western parts of the United States. At this time, mutual funds passively hold 90% of 1.7 billion common shares of WMI. JPM then floats its interest in buying WMI. It does so to facilitate short selling of 1.5 billion shares of WMI common stock. JPM creates these shares synthetically or by pulling out of thin air. The Clearing House controlled by JPM does not question JPM on non-delivery of shares sold short. JPM sells these shares to the passive mutual funds, pension plans and individual investors. No buyer suspects anything when JPM has expressed interest in WMI. JPM simultaneously buys 500 million WMI shares through some of its subsidiaries. JPM has to buy some and sell more to entice other buyers through talks of buying WMI. At the end of the trading, JPM holds 1.5 billion shares short in its private trading-inventory account and 500 million shares long in its investment account. JPM files its long positions with the SEC and wins confidence of all other mutual fund holders. JPM has helped create a rule to not let regulatory agencies inspect its trading-inventory account held in its market making subsidiary. JPM has successfully justified and lobbied for keeping such accounts ultra-secret. At the time of constitution of the BOD and appointment of key personnel like the Finance Director of WMI, JPM now dangles its long positions of 500 million shares to project its weight as a benevolent large shareholder of WMI seeking to place its people in a company planned to be acquired.
JPM then obtains all important data to make a low-ball offer of $8 per share to buy WMI. But the WMI CEO refuses. Then JPM appointed WMI BOD fires the CEO with a golden parachute to replace him with a pliant CEO to serve JPM’s interest. JPM then uses its long and short positions to drive down the price of JPM stock to $1 per share. Cohorts of JPM like Goldman Sachs recommend everyone to sell WMI short. JPM simultaneously compels the public rating agencies to downgrade WMI bonds and stocks. The rating agencies have a model to downgrade securities based on dropping stock price. The rating agencies thus follow their model. JPM merely advises the rating agencies to perform their fiduciary duty of downgrading securities of a company with falling stock prices.
The rating downgrades make sure that WMI cannot raise capital on a competitive basis and Federal Reserve has not guaranteed existence of WMI, which is not a member of the clearing house. Then rumors circulate in the grapevine about the FDIC contemplating seizure of WMI. This leads to some WMB depositors withdrawing their funds. The FDIC, Federal Reserve and Treasury are now scared. So is Congress. They are so scared that they have to now ask JPM to take over WMB’s assets and deposits by zeroing all other security holders (WMI equity and debt and WMB bondholders).
Private property is thus seized unconstitutionally and given away to JPM for pittance. JPM CEO, after 1.5 years of the seizure, brags before his shareholders about the immense value of WMI assets it brought for them: about $18 billion in annualized profits which amount to a present value of assets of $360 billion, by using even a very high cost of capital of debt (5%) employed in the acquisition, and by assuming no growth. Washington Mutual Bank was not in default at the time of seizure. The WMB bonds were fully protected with the scheduled coupon payments duly paid on time. WMB bonds would be protected fully even if WMB were not seized and stayed with its previous parent company. Washington Mutual Incorporated (the parent holding company of WMB) was not in default at the time of seizure. Even now, in the bankruptcy court, WMI is highly solvent with all WMI bonds trading in the market above par. That the WMI BOD has acted at the behest of JPM is obvious. On bankruptcy, the WMI BOD has appointed a Debtor’s attorney to propose a plan of reorganization by giving away significant assets of the bankrupt WMI estate to JPM to void any legitimate claim of equity in the estate.
So, JPM has accomplished its Project West plan, unconstitutionally, to grow bigger to dictate sharper terms to the Congress and Regulators, more vociferously than ever before.
WMB was solvent with much more than the minimum required capital, as per the testimony of its primary regulator, the OTS, signed by the FDIC. The FDIC now faces a legal suit from Washington Mutual Bondholders for about $20 billion. These bondholders are too taxpayers. Thousands of families, whose security holdings have been zeroed out due to the seizure, have lost their wherewithal to live or retire. Some of them have committed suicide.
Some have faced painful divorce. They too are the taxpayers. Should their possessions have been unconstitutionally seized? Such unconstitutional seizure and pervasive tragedy leading to depression is possible due to short selling within the current system of money and finance. Short selling creates shares to increase its supply (beyond the legally approved outstanding under the company law) to depress the price and rob the true owners of a company. Short selling is unconstitutional and illegal, yet it is permitted by the Security and Exchange Commission.
Sincerely,
M102: Agree 100%! Get the Earnings Numbers out first! ...
Then, we get the Real Deal Buy Out News etc! ...
Cheers!
$JCPNQ Court Hearing is at 10:30 AM CT - 11:30 AM EST ...
Dial-in number is: (832) 917-1510
Conference room number: 205691
If you want to connect through video you need to download GoToMeeting app and use “JudgeJones” to connect.
Cheers!
$COOP - WAMPQ - WAMKQ: Another Post I really like! ...
Cheers!
$COOP - WAMPQ - WAMKQ: I also like this Post! ...
I would like to add that 75/25 at the End of BK should also be cool! ...
Cheers!
IMO: Very informative Post! ...
Cheers!
You said ...
Hotmeat, I can understand why one can keep believing there are no more assets, but at the same time you need to understand the complexity of this forced receivership / WMI chapter 11.
First, there were two chapter 11 WMI - holding and WMII investment that held most of WMI assets in secured Trust - those assets the court or FDIC could not steal as hard as they tried.
IMO, what may be causing this lengthy delay is how the P&AA was written as FDIC did not understand they had no rights to the assets of the Holding company assets and JPM feels they signed the agreement and should get those for free - but as you see from some of the SEC filing from JPM they removed assets from their off book back to FDIC.
Just a few facts to consider if there is still WMI Estate assets:
JPM year ending 2014 10K reported R-203...... (Off Balance Sheet 165 Billion) report, and list it as considered assets of the former WaMu Estate.
http://www.secinfo.com/dJ5e.m8v.b.hem
In 2014 JPM made an announcement about shedding 100 billion before the filed there 10K filing showing 127 billion in off balance sheet collections regarding former WaMu.
JPM SAYS ASSETS at FDIC!
1WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., as Securitizer, is filing this Form ABS-15G in respect of all mortgage-backed securities representing interests in pools of residential mortgage loans for which it acted as depositor and which are outstanding during the reporting period. On September 25, 2008, JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (“JPMCB”) acquired the banking operations of Washington Mutual Bank from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). It is JPMCB’s position that certain of the repurchase obligations of Washington Mutual Bank remain with the FDIC receivership. Assets are reported herein in accordance with Rule 15Ga-1 regardless of the validity of the demand or defenses thereto, and nothing in this report shall constitute, or be deemed, a waiver of any rights, defenses, powers or privileges of any party relating to these assets.
http://whalewisdom.com/filer/wamu-asset-acceptance-corp
See FOOT NOTE ONE - Following Link
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1317069/000092963815000128/wamu-67348_abs15g.htm
FOOT NOTE ONE: 1WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., as Securitizer, is filing this Form ABS-15G in respect of all mortgage-backed securities representing interests in pools of residential mortgage loans for which it acted as depositor and which are outstanding during the reporting period. On September 25, 2008, JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (“JPMCB”) acquired the banking operations of Washington Mutual Bank from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). It is JPMCB’s position that certain of the repurchase obligations of Washington Mutual Bank remain with the FDIC receivership. Assets are reported herein in accordance with Rule 15Ga-1 regardless of the validity of the demand or defenses thereto, and nothing in this report shall constitute, or be deemed, a waiver of any rights, defenses, powers or privileges of any party relating to these assets.
$NDYND What happened to people who did not hold at least the minimum of 40000 NDYN Shares to start with pre Reverse Split? ...
Were they just zeroed out? Or, did they too receive 1 Share not matter how few they held? ...
I held 40750 and now have 2 Shares and and am waiting on the 1 to 200 Forward Split. Hopefully, 400 Shares in this is correct and will lead to a profit.
Cheers!
$NDYND They put 2 Shares in my Brokerage Account. Just waiting on the 1 to 200 Forward Split. Let's see what 400 Shares will do!
Cheers!
SE: How much for each WAMPQ
$1000 and WAMKQ $25 Escrow Share Marker Face Value plus Interest are we due then? What's your estimate of the total dollar Compensation for each?
$JCPNQ J.C. Penney liquidation 'not in the cards,' as retailer moves toward a sale this fall
https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.cnbc.com/amp/2020/07/29/jc-penney-liquidation-not-in-the-cards-retailer-moves-toward-a-sale.html
PUBLISHED WED, JUL 29 2020 12:48 PM EDT
UPDATED WED, JUL 29 2020 2:58 PM EDT
Lauren Thomas
@LAURENTHOMAS
SHARE
KEY POINTS
For bankrupted J.C. Penney, a liquidation is "not in the cards," according to the department store chain's attorney.
Penney is moving forward with a sale that should be completed by this fall, attorney Joshua Sussberg of Kirkland & Ellis said during a court hearing Wednesday afternoon.
He said there are three bidders being considered to keep the company in business.
??
A J.C. Penney store in Laguna Hills, California
Scott Mlyn | CNBC
For bankrupted J.C. Penney, a liquidation is "not in the cards," according to the department store chain's attorney.
Penney is moving forward with a sale that should be completed by this fall, attorney Joshua Sussberg of Kirkland & Ellis said during a court hearing Wednesday afternoon.
"I want to say, unequivocally, we have had not one discussion about a liquidation," Sussberg said about Penney's restructuring process. "It's simply not in the cards."
Sussberg called attention to a report earlier in the week from the New York Post that said the private-equity firm Sycamore was planning to make a $1.75 billion bid to buy the 118-year-old department store chain and merge it with rival Belk.
He called the story "ill-informed" and said, regarding Sycamore's plans to merge Penney with Belk, "that is completely untrue."
There are three separate bids being considered for Penney's real estate and other assets, which would keep the retailer operating its own stores, Sussberg said.
The bidders include Sycamore, a duo of U.S. mall owners Simon Property Group and Brookfield Property Partners, and Saks Fifth Avenue owner Hudson's Bay Co., according to a person familiar with these discussions. The person requested anonymity because the proposals remain confidential.
Sycamore declined to comment. Representatives from Simon, Brookfield and Hudson's Bay did not immediately respond to CNBC's requests for comment.
Kirkland's Sussberg said during Wednesday's hearing that a top bidder had yet to be chosen.
Penney filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on May 15, weighed down by debt and battered by the coronavirus pandemic.
Earlier this month, the company announced it would be laying off roughly 1,000 employees, as it moved forward with shutting about 150 locations across the U.S. When the retailer filed, it was still operating about 860 stores.
Penney said Wednesday that all stores have since reopened, after being temporarily shut due to the Covid-19 crisis.
It said its off-mall locations, of which it has 173, continue to perform better than its stores in enclosed shopping malls, of which it has 520. Sales at off-mall stores are down about 26%, while sales at Penney stores in malls are down about 33% since they have opened, it said.
The department store chain continues to talk to its landlords to negotiate better rents, according to Sussberg, which is allowing the company to cut costs.
Forty retailers including Penney have filed for bankruptcy in 2020, according to a tracking by S&P Global Market Intelligence. The list is still expected to grow.
A number were already struggling prior to the Covid-19 crisis slamming the U.S. economy, forcing shops deemed nonessential and malls to be boarded up. The pressures have only intensified since for an industry already undergoing seismic shifts in consumer behavior and preferred shopping destinations. Department stores' dominance in retail has been waning.
According to Sussberg, Penney aims to have "mass consensus" regarding its go-forward strategy by next month.
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Z: Helpful DDAmanda Chart for $JCPNQ! Cheers! ...
BTW, How do I sign up for a DDAmanda Chart Feed? ...
How Much? ...
Thanks.
$TTCM ARknet Version 1.5.8 is now out!
Cheers!
$BLKIB Interesting News with $JCPNQ ...
https://nypost.com/2020/07/27/sycamore-partners-offers-1-75b-for-jcpenny-with-plan-to-grow-belks/amp/?__twitter_impression=true
Skiluc: What is your opinion on the latest HENC News about this so called CBD - Weed / Pot Company being the possible Merger Candidate? ...
$JCPNQ On Twitter and StockTwits! ...
$JCPNQ On Twitter! ...
https://mobile.twitter.com/search?q=%24JCPNQ&src=cashtag_click
https://mobile.twitter.com/search?q=%24JCPNQ&src=cashtag_click&f=live
$JCPNQ On StockTwits! ...
https://stocktwits.com/symbol/JCP
Cheers!!!
$JCPNQ On Twitter and StockTwits! ...
$JCPNQ On Twitter! ...
https://mobile.twitter.com/search?q=%24JCPNQ&src=cashtag_click
https://mobile.twitter.com/search?q=%24JCPNQ&src=cashtag_click&f=live
$JCPNQ On StockTwits! ...
https://stocktwits.com/symbol/JCP
Cheers!!!
$JCPNQ On Twitter and StockTwits! ...
$JCPNQ On Twitter! ...
https://mobile.twitter.com/search?q=%24JCPNQ&src=cashtag_click
https://mobile.twitter.com/search?q=%24JCPNQ&src=cashtag_click&f=live
$JCPNQ On StockTwits! ...
https://stocktwits.com/symbol/JCP
Cheers!