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Still here folks GLTA here holding till the end not sure what 404 or who they are attempting to protect here most longs ain't leaving now after all this and all these year. here to stay until the end. Go LEHLQ, LEHNQ.
Apple and WalMart must all attend the same school of how to be an Azz Hole in business. This is corporate crime at its very worst here. I will say that the management of GTAT after reading this article should have had a much stronger leader in the role with Apple. Not that what Apple did here if true and obviously from the stock price alone something bad occurred here in a deal. I would think if there is signed contract language whereas the ground rules were violated by Apple toward GTAT then GTAT can recover all costs associated with the changes that created these losses.
Can they come up with a test that tells if someone had Ebola?
If it can only be transmitted by bodily fluids according to our experts and I use that term loosely here. If a person was infected and did not know it yet and they were bitten by a mosquito and that mosquito were to bite another person blood to blood so to speak can the other person become infected? I think I know this answer but have not heard any of our EXPERTS speak to this fact due to fear perhaps? Anyone? Thanks.
To me if we are not allowed any return from this special investment in a company that the most wealthy wanted to go down in flames and pick up the big pieces of the pie, what if anything is our recourse to recoup these funds outside of any Bankruptcy case, ir POR document if it does not address the needs of the CT holders of record? I think the folks involved are responsible for these being overlooked, if they have been and not address as part of any of the prior proceedings to overlook them to me seems to make one think why are they discriminating against the CT's only? To me that is illegality with Judges involved as well as they allowed that to occur here without support to our cause. To me that is a legal wrong that needs to be corrected, again if in fact there is nothing we can do to get our value back here.
Question: Did any Judge during this whole time show prejudice or discrimination or let discrimination toward the payment of Trups Preferreds be part of any settlement as smart as these folks are they know that they exist heck they probably own some of them too.
So is there any case outside of this bankruptcy such as another court where Trups holders could win a discrimination type of law suit due to us being pushed aside as shareholders in a company? Any precedence anyone knows of to that regards here?
10-4 agreed A GREED here too. Just give us our just rewards for investing this entity, we are small fish here, some will be big fish if we get paid, hope they use that money wisely if that happens here, GLTA here. Thanks Jersey.
Follow the money if you do not think these kinds of things go on behind the scenes we all need to wake up. WAMU was gift to JPM/GS, Lehman gift to JPM/Barclays/BNYM. Are you all kidding me here. Just coincidence right. I hope the brains on this board who post great DD have a larger realm of scope than just these small trinkets of court documents. This is a smart enough group on this board that by now know anything is possible or probable. If it looks like a duck.
My bad close by then I assume right? Close enough.
Went to Yale Law School, appointed by guess who, George Bush guess where he went as well hmmmmmm.......... Yale Law School. Coincidence I guess right folks. Right just like I thought.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_J._Sullivan
To me all the Judges are bought and paid for and just go through the motions caring only for the most wealthy in this debacle just as WAMU ann GM investors got little out of it if anything. Just like the D.C. crowd Judges are paid for.
I am wondering when the powers that be will say it is now time for JPM and GS to go Bankrupt as well as WAMU and Lehman Brothers. Who will be the next cash cow for the lawyers and the REAL most wealthy here behind the scenes. Neither of these firms needed to go out of business but others needed them to. Can you say competition.
Yes Joe verrrrry interestink. I am thinking of Hogans Heroes here.
Two-Laner about 1:30 a.m. straight for about 3 miles.
Camaro4me, Me too, not a lawyer but I did stay at a Holiday Inn Express last night!!!! Used to own a 1970-1/2 Z-28 Camaro LT1 motor, 350 Cu.In. and 330HP what a beast. Lost my brakes one night doing 150 mph in the country at night. What a beast. By the way I was passed along that same stretch at the same time by a 450Cu. In. Poncho GTO and my speedometer said 150 mph, oh things we did when we were kids.
My point being that if BNYM as the Trustee filed for all CT's then are they not the holder of the CT's versus Barclays here as has been disputed by JS.
Camaro4me, Remember this from August 2013 you had responded to my question about CT's and if we as shareholders needed to file any documentation to record them and the below was your response.
camaro4me Sunday, 08/25/13 08:18:22 AM
Re: dine post# 31571
Post # of 49839
livefree - bank of new york mellon filed paperwork for all ct holders
Some links to read on how the Federal Reserve is supposed to act and some whistleblower links pdf.'s here as well. Dry reading though.
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/default.htm
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_oversight.htm
http://www.federalreserve.gov/nofearnotice.htm
About Whistleblowers.
URL: http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/directors/PDF/audits-audit-committee-duties-and-responsibilities.pdf
URL: http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/desjardins-3g-20131231.pdf
http://www.newyorkfed.org/banking/trainingprograms.html
UNQT still here hoping this will happen been here for years and if a scam would have gone by now. Still alive and to me that means a possibility here for all.
Modern day bank robbers.
A stock like this should require zero pump. If it has the real goods and an decent offer comes we are in the money folks. Hang tight this is a chance of a lifetime for most here. GLTA. GO MCET.
I think folks are busy with MJ stocks now and have not noticed this stock has been here a long time still here still keeping on.
Joe you really cannot change the concept around like you have attempted to do here. It is illogical when the reality is that the CT's are to recover full value based on the information given. I think you state what normally is a good argument most cases but you are relating it to what the reality is here and what is going to occur. I agree with Hestheman here and this particular stock price has no bearing whatsoever as to where it will end up. Again as I have said before Buyer Beware, big risk big reward, Joe your turn to buy in now.
When asked of a robber. Why did you rob that bank? Answer:
Because that is where the money is. CT's.
Europeans work to live...........
Americans live to work...........
O.T.:Some good humor for the board here,
Everybody, Somebody, Anybody, And Nobody
This is a little story about four people named Everybody, Somebody, Anybody, and Nobody.
There was an important job to be done and Everybody was sure that Somebody would do it.
Anybody could have done it, but Nobody did it.
Somebody got angry about that because it was Everybody's job.
Everybody thought that Anybody could do it, but Nobody realized that Everybody wouldn't do it.
It ended up that Everybody blamed Somebody when Nobody did what Anybody could have done
If a stockholder of CT's sold some last year do they receive any interest for the time they held those sold shares for five year? For those of us think that there is a payment on interest coming Oct. 2nd. Thanks. Joe you do not need to answer as I know what your answer already is.
No set up Joe, Thanks for your answer. Seems to have brought up some issues with others as well here. Oh well discussion of different points is well taken. My Father-in-Law when he was alive spent a lot of time on Town affairs and meetings and when he would find that during a meeting no one would take the other side of the argument as all were in agreement, he would take the other side to see what reactions he would muster to flush out all the information. I liked that about him and I like that about you in some regards. Thanks again and GLTA here no matter what your position may be here. Back to lurking again.
Joe you seem to be a pretty smart person here. I have read most of your posts as I have others here as well. Can you answer my simple layman's question if what you say is true that the CT's get a zero payout or are worth zero or whatever zero terminology you want to use for the amount of Zero in our CT holdings. Why are these stocks CT's like LEHNQ and LEHLQ still trading if since 2008, 2009 and 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and now 2014, why are they still trading if everyone knows as you say they are worth Zero value? Can you let us know, as a matter of fact I will open this up to our kind Board here does anyone know that answer?
Also Joe you stated you have no position here but like to help others as you have gotten burned on other such BK stock or capital ownership of some kind in the past. You sir are an totally admirable person to attempt to save us from our losses here and I for one would like to thank you for your efforts here on this Board, I will bet there are other stock boards that could be better off knowing you are on their Boards as well attempting to save them their hard earned dollars too. Thanks again Joe for your efforts here and GLTA here on this seemingly poor journey to Zero.
Good News is that paying out of 17% means there is 83% left of something that will be coming if using the 100% as the whole value. So if the $25 per share for example was 100% of our whole here then the value of $4.25 payout of $25 whole value would mean that there is another $20.75 more to come. Point being is that 17% of something means there is a 100% valuation of some number they know what it is. We are guessing a bit at what that is. But I like the thought process and I like to see numbers anyway old habit. GLTA here of course. Back to lurking.
hestheman, not that you need to read this but for others waiting to here news this may pass some time and also shed some light if folks read anymore these days. Not sure it was upheld if it was sustained on appeal, not sure that occurred here. Anyway thanks to those who share information, including you Joe.
Lehman Bankruptcy Judge Prevents Trigger of CDO Subordination Provision Based on Credit Support Provider and Swap Counterparty Bankruptcy Filings
February 2, 2010
Evan M. Jones
It has long been a basic rule of U.S. bankruptcy law, subject to certain important exceptions, that contract provisions creating a default or altering the rights or duties of a debtor simply because the debtor files for bankruptcy are unenforceable. Recently, the Bankruptcy Court for the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases applied and arguably expanded this rule in examining a collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) transaction. The result may have significant impacts not only on CDO vehicles and other structured finance transactions but on many unrelated transactions in bankruptcy. Judge Peck’s decision is expressly limited to the extraordinary facts of Lehman and does not address whether his analysis would apply in other situations. It is not clear how broadly the decision will apply if sustained on appeal.[1]
The payment waterfalls of most CDO transactions give priority to swap counterparties over noteholders. In many cases, the priority is “flipped” and noteholders then receive priority when there is a swap counterparty default. The recent memorandum decision of Judge Peck of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, in Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services, Ltd., Case No. 08-13555, Adv. No. 09-01242 (January 25, 2010) (“Ruling”), may preclude enforcement of such “flip” priorities in the bankruptcy of the swap counterparty. Granting summary judgment to debtor Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. (“Special Financing”), Judge Peck held that CDO provisions subordinating collateral payments to Special Financing, as swap counterparty on its default due to the insolvency of Special Financing and Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (“Holdings”) were an unenforceable ipso facto clause. If Judge Peck’s ruling is sustained on appeal, Special Financing’s claim for an early termination amount would be paid from available collateral before the claims due to noteholders. The Ruling also potentially conflicts with decisions from the English High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) and the English Court of Appeal (Civil Division) which held these CDO provisions enforceable under English law.
The Ruling suggests drafting lessons for default provisions in any contract. Some of the impacts on existing transactions, as well as more specific practical implications for future structured finance deals, are discussed below.
1. BACKGROUND
Special Financing was a Lehman entity that regularly served as counterparty in structured finance swap transactions (“Swap Transactions”)[2] with structured finance vehicles (“Issuers”) that issue securities (including senior and junior notes), swapping cash flows derived from the underlying investments. In some cases, Special Financing paid cash flows that better matched the obligations of the Issuer to its noteholders; in other cases, Special Financing paid returns based on notional investments. In nearly all cases, Holdings acted as “credit support provider” for Special Financing, essentially guaranteeing its performance. The obligations of the Issuer to both Special Financing (as swap counterparty) and its noteholders were typically secured by a pledge of the investments held by the vehicle. In the controversy addressed in the Ruling, the collateral was pledged under a Supplemental Trust Deed governed by English law. Under the terms of the pledge, so long as neither Special Financing nor Holdings was in default, Special Financing benefited from a first priority interest in collateral; on default of Special Financing or Holdings, the priority “flipped” and the noteholders would become the senior creditors.
Holdings filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on September 15, 2008, and Special Financing followed Holdings into bankruptcy on October 3, 2008. Citing Special Financing’s filing, the Issuer (acting through BNY Corporate Trustee Services, Ltd.) sent notice on December 1 that it was terminating the swap agreement with Special Financing (“Swap Agreement”).
Before the Ruling, both the English High Court of Justice (Chancery Division), and after appeal, the English Court of Appeal (Civil Division), ruled that the subordination “flip” provisions in the payment waterfall were enforceable under English law[3] and that the bankruptcy of Holdings on September 15, 2008 was the default that triggered the “flip,” entitling noteholders to take a senior claim against the proceeds of the pledged collateral. Special Financing commenced an adversary proceeding before Judge Peck after the English High Court of Justice issued its decision, but before the decision was upheld by the English Court of Appeal, seeking a ruling that the “flip” provision was not triggered by a bankruptcy default.
Special Financing’s primary argument in its summary judgment motion was that the “flip” provision was an ipso facto clause unenforceable in bankruptcy. An ipso facto clause is one that specifies a default or dispossesses the debtor of an interest in property solely as a result of the insolvency of the party, the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding, or appointment of a trustee. An ipso facto clause may purport to affect a bankruptcy debtor’s interests in property (governed by Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code) or to terminate or modify a debtor’s rights arising from executory contracts (governed by Section 365). While there are notable exceptions to the rule, generally ipso facto clauses are unenforceable in bankruptcy. The Ruling applies this general rule in a new and particularly broad fashion.
The Ruling focuses on two primary issues in determining whether the ipso facto provisions contained in the payment waterfall were unenforceable in bankruptcy. First, Judge Peck held that language in the ISDA Master Agreement governing the Swap Transactions demonstrated that the swap agreements as a whole constituted “executory contracts” under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.[4] While Judge Peck observes that “all obligations of the parties under the ISDA Master Agreement remain outstanding” on termination of the underlying Swap Transaction, and that “the failure of either party to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other,” he does not specifically identify the “material mutual obligations” that warrant characterization of the contract as “executory.”
Next, in an issue of first impression, Judge Peck determined that the prohibition against ipso facto clauses in Section 365(e)(1), which invalidates any clause altering a debtor’s rights based on “commencement of a case under this title,” when construed broadly means that Holdings’s filing on September 15 prevented trigger of the ipso facto clauses against Special Financing from that date forward.[5] In so ruling, Judge Peck observed that nothing in the language or the legislative history of Section 365(e)(1) suggested an intent to limit ipso facto protection to those situations where the debtor had sought bankruptcy protection, and therefore the subordination “flip” would not have been enforceable even if triggered by Holdings’s earlier filing. The Ruling notes that extending Section 365(e)(1) protection based on a bankruptcy filing other than the debtor’s own filing may only make sense in the context of an “integrated enterprise” such as Lehman. Judge Peck also ruled that Section 560 of the Bankruptcy Code, which generally protects the right to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate obligations under “swap agreements” notwithstanding Section 365(e)(1), did not cover the Note Documents (which contained the subordination “flip” provisions and the Supplemental Trust Deeds) because these documents were not part of the “swap agreements” themselves as reflected in the separate Swap Agreement Documents. This latter conclusion is particularly surprising in light of the structure of a CDO transaction, in which the Issuer is created for the purpose of facilitating a single integrated transaction and — notwithstanding the use of documents that on their face contemplate a repeated transaction — all the documents are intended to work together to facilitate the overall objectives of the transaction.
2. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS — BANKRUPTCY
The Ruling notes that it does not intend to advance a broad rule that would always make it appropriate for one debtor to invoke ipso facto protection based on a bankruptcy filing by another corporate affiliate. Moreover, the Ruling goes to great lengths to explain the uniqueness of the Lehman bankruptcy case, possibly reflecting an acknowledgement of certain extraordinary features of the decision and a corresponding desire on Judge Peck’s part to undercut future reliance on the decision.[6] To the extent Judge Peck’s broader interpretation of 365(e)(1) applies outside of these specific facts, Judge Peck appears to intend that it would be limited to cases of “integrated enterprises” as noted in the Ruling. If so construed, affiliated companies which file for bankruptcy close in time (although not on the same day) are those most likely to benefit from this decision as these cases seem most likely to apply the conclusion Judge Peck reaches. It is unclear whether and how far this rule may be applied, but retroactively treating ipso facto protection for the later bankruptcy as occurring on the date of the first bankruptcy presents numerous opportunities for frustrating the expectations of contract parties.
Certain aspects of the structure of these CDO transactions may have played a role in Judge Peck’s decision not to enforce the subordination “flip” provisions. In first ruling that the contract containing the “flip” provision was executory, Judge Peck concluded that the form Master Agreement was a “central part” of the Swap Transaction and relied heavily on the form ISDA Master Agreement to determine that obligations remained on both sides. Judge Peck then limited the application of the “swap agreement” safe harbor provision in Section 560 of the Bankruptcy Code to only the actual swap (the Swap Agreement Documents, including the form ISDA Master Agreement), and not the supporting Note Documents which contained the “flip” provision itself. From the noteholders’ perspective, the Ruling likely represents the worst of both worlds. While parties cannot insure that a judge will always treat their agreements in the manner intended by the parties, with planning it may be possible in any transaction to weaken a judge’s ability to construe different documents as one integrated executory contract. The chances of a judge determining that separate documents are an integrated executory contract are diminished if contract parties expressly state in the documents that they intend to treat each document as a separate agreement, and if each separate agreement is supported by its own consideration. Conversely, if the goal is to treat separate documents as one integrated agreement, parties should make this intent clear in the documents themselves.
Parties drafting default provisions should also consider whether their interests may be equally served by alternate language if the ipso facto provision poses a concern. Section 365(e)’s ipso facto protection is triggered only by specific insolvency or financial condition defaults in a contract. To this point, courts have largely refrained from extending ipso facto protection to defaults that may accompany insolvency but are not explicitly defined as insolvency defaults. For instance, a transaction may be structured to trigger defaults upon the failure to pay money after a certain number of days, regardless of the party’s financial condition. The utility and feasibility of such alternate approaches can be expected to vary by transaction.
3. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS — CAPITAL MARKETS
If the Ruling is upheld in its broadest terms, the ripples of this wave of increased bankruptcy protection could touch not only the synthetic CDO and structured finance market, but could also have broader implications for many market participants in terms of financing opportunities, risk mitigation and, for banks, capital requirements.
A. CDO and Structured Finance Market
The Ruling may have a significant impact on the ratings of many synthetic CDOs. Synthetic CDOs became a thriving market during the early-to mid-2000s, accounting for a fair portion of the annually multi-billion dollar CDO market at that time. These derivative-based transactions were especially common throughout Europe and Asia, due in part to lower capital availability relative to the United States and greater investor familiarity with derivative products. After the global credit downturn in 2008, Standard & Poor’s, Ltd. (“S&P”) and Moody’s Investor Services (“Moody’s”) issued separate reports stating they were revising the ratings methodologies of synthetic CDOs and that the credit quality of swap counterparties would be a relevant factor in their updated methodologies. The increased risk that a swap counterparty could go bankrupt while still retaining a senior spot in the waterfall could lead S&P and Moody’s to take a further critical review of the synthetic CDOs they rate, and the credit ratings of the swap counterparties therein. This increased risk may also limit the issuance of new synthetic CDOs due to the difficulty and cost in getting high enough ratings for the issuance to be feasible. Many cash flow CDOs also have swap counterparties providing currency, interest rate or other protections. These transactions also will be affected by the Ruling, although presumably to a lesser degree than is the case with synthetic CDOs, due to the typically lower levels of risk exposure cash flow CDO issuers have to their swap counterparties.
A less efficient CDO new issuance market also may limit the reemergence and future growth of the credit default swap (“CDS”) market. Synthetic CDOs accounted for approximately 15% of the notional amount of outstanding credit default swaps. In standard CDS transactions, investment banks have often sold credit protection on securities to customers, many of whom wanted to hedge their positions and lower their exposure to market risk. In the past, the investment banks have sometimes sponsored synthetic CDOs to repurchase this credit protection while paying a lower premium for such protection, thereby significantly reducing the investment banks’ overall risk exposure in the positions while locking in a profit due to the differences in the premium payments. The Ruling, together with other relevant market factors, may render synthetic CDO transactions less desirable for investment, effectively reducing the universe of alternatives available to investment banks to reduce their risk on CDS transactions. Due to the increased cost of hedging, the cost of any CDS could increase, which could reduce the overall market size and increase the costs for many businesses and other market participants to hedge their investment risks.
B. Limiting Safe Harbor for Derivative Transactions
A broad reading of the ipso facto clause could also prevent execution of certain derivative terms. Judge Peck determined in the Ruling that the safe harbor for derivative transactions contained in Section 560 of the Bankruptcy Code is intended mainly to facilitate the termination, netting and liquidation process. The Ruling may imply that this safe harbor does not protect other terms in the swap agreements or other security documents and related transactions that are not expressly referenced as part of the swap transactions. Parties often enter into transactions under swap agreements in the context of a broader transaction or with related security agreements.
Taken to its broadest conclusions, the Ruling could be read to state that these swap agreements can be separated from those related transactions in the bankruptcy proceedings, despite the fact that the parties intended the terms to work as a whole. A broad interpretation of the Ruling may also suggest that ISDA's termination valuation terms (e.g., permitting a non-defaulting party to value a transaction on the side of a bid-ask quotation favorable to such party rather than at a mid-market level) are unenforceable ipso facto clauses because they are based on the bankruptcy of the Debtor. More directly tying security documents and related transactions to the swap agreements themselves may lead courts to apply Section 560 protection to broader components of the transaction, or even the entire transaction as a whole.
C. Risk and Capital Requirements
If the Ruling is followed by other courts, the increased cost of the transactions may reduce the economic efficiency of certain CDOs and other synthetic asset-backed deals.
Moreover, because investment banks have often historically used synthetic CDO transactions to limit their exposure to outstanding CDS, their loan portfolios and other risks, any increased costs or further reduced availability in the synthetic CDO market could compel investment banks to either increase their capital base held against other transactions or to limit their exposure in the CDS and other derivatives markets. Such changes could significantly increase a company’s cost in effectively hedging its risk exposure.
4. CONCLUSION
Judge Peck’s decision could have broad and as yet unknown implications. If the Ruling is sustained on appeal, the implications for both CDOs and other transactions will develop as further cases work their way through the courts, and as the market reacts through innovative structuring and drafting in new transactions. At a minimum, parties should consider the Ruling’s impact on a broad array of existing and future transactions.
The bankruptcy and securitization lawyers of O’Melveny & Myers LLP are market leaders in the areas discussed in this Client Alert and are known for their pragmatic and commercial approaches to client work. Please do not hesitate to contact the authors of this Alert to discuss the implications the Ruling may have for your business.
[1] Given the importance of the Ruling an appeal seems likely. The time to appeal has not run.
[2] The Swap Transactions were memorialized within several different documents. Each series of notes was governed by a Supplemental Trust Deed and other note documents (the “Note Documents”). The Note Documents included the subordination flip provision as well as a provision modifying amounts payable upon the early redemption of a note in the event that Special Financing defaulted under the related “swap agreement” (the “Swap Agreement”). The Swap Agreement itself was composed of a form Master Agreement drafted by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (the “ISDA Master Agreement”), schedules, and written confirmation (the “Swap Agreement Documents”). Each Supplemental Trust Deed referenced the separate Swap Agreement Documents. Under the Swap Agreement, Holdings was a “credit support provider,” acting as guarantor of Special Financing’s obligations under the Swap Transactions.
[3] Judge Peck notes in his Memorandum Decision that the English courts were not considering U.S. bankruptcy law.
[4] “Executory contract” is not a term defined in the Bankruptcy Code. Courts generally agree that an executory contract is a contract as to which material performance remains due on both sides. Judge Peck’s conclusion that the Swap Agreement was executory was based on the following reasoning:
The language and structure of the ISDA Master Agreement that forms a central part of the Swap Agreement of the Swap Agreement demonstrate that these contracts are executory. Paragraph 9(c) of each ISDA Master Agreement expressly provides that the obligations of the parties under the relevant Swap Agreement shall survive the termination of any transaction. Given that all obligations of the parties under the ISDA Master Agreement remain outstanding, the failure of either party to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other. In addition, each of [Special Financing] and [Issuer] has unsatisfied contractual obligations to make various payments. These outstanding obligations to make payments pursuant to the Swap Agreement constitute sufficient grounds to find that the contract in question is executory.
Ruling, pp. 12-13 (internal citations omitted).
[5] Section 365(e)(1) provides that an executory contract may not be terminated or modified by certain events related to insolvency, including “the commencement of a case under this title,” notwithstanding any provision in the contract otherwise allowing termination or modification. The Ruling first determined that the “flip” provision documents only flipped priority of payments after certain affirmative acts took place (including the sale of the collateral). As the collateral had not been affected as of October 3 (the date of Special Financing’s bankruptcy petition), Judge Peck determined that the “flip” provision was not triggered before the Special Financing bankruptcy filing. The Ruling then determined that “commencement of a case under this title” could include the related bankruptcy filing of Holdings on September 15.
[6] Judge Peck limited his reading of Section 365(e)(1) to the particularly unique facts of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, noting that Holdings and Special Financing were “integrated enterprises,” that the Lehman entities were “perhaps the most complex and multi-faceted business ventures ever to seek the protection of chapter 11,” and that the “extraordinary panic” precipitating Holdings’s filing and the magnitude of the Lehman bankruptcy made it difficult for all the Lehman entities to file on one day.
I almost bought BTCS last week at .156 look at it now folks. MELY on its way.
You did read the bad news right?
I bought on TDA weeks ago no issue.
I believe ACDU is there because they own property near to where this canal may get erected. Not a MMJ play you mixed a news report with this company and that is a fraudulent assumption whoever you are about this company.
So I say again then why do they need to be in this MJ business all of a sudden? Nice business plan.
It is like I have said before, companies all now jumping on the MJ wagon must have had zero business plans prior to this. Now all of a sudden they are all MJ experts. Really telling to me.
They need to start funding MMJ companies and allowing transactions for same. Done deal here folks if they do this. Could be a huge uplift if they play their cards correctly. GLTA here been here for years lurking not posting.
There have been many of penny stocks over the last months that all of a sudden are getting into the MMJ business because they have seen that just on the news alone their investments jump in two days time. That gives them enough time to sell out their worthless shares at some semblance of order and leave you holding the bag. Many have done so and now are dead. Move on as AQUM has no need for you or your kind to cover this board. This company is doing just fine with an MMJ pump and has its own real business that does not blow minds away. Move on and your dead head friends and quit pumping untruths here. Thanks.
I believe their updated financials are do out anytime now folks, so perhaps someone knows there is good news perhaps? Sooner the better here for most I think. GLTA here.
Based upon its history of its PPS I'd say we have a diamond in the rough here folks, many people see the same thing as well here. If you wish to place sell order make them in the $.10 range that way MM cannot manipulate those shares as they are tied up as a sell order. Do this all and that will assist the overall rise in this PPS value. Thanks to all you AQUM supporters here, GLTA.