marsnvest- The connection is that IF this bogus "D" Preferred had been validated by the court, then OMOG would have been controlled by Lanza et. al. and there would be no case.
To explain it in simple terms. If you stole a Rolex from a Jewelry store, but before the store could have you prosecuted, You end up buying the store with countefiet money, but the court rules that the money is real, not bogus then you would probably be off the hook.
Effectively, Lanza, et. al. tried to buy control of OMOG with "Counterfiet" Preferred shares.
Barnett took control in an unfriendly takeover. He bought 51.8%, mostly in the open market and kicked Lanza out. Therefore Lanza was not exactly in a helpful mood at that time. Here is some more of the pleadings that addresses that situation.
Plaintiff’s’ Original Complaint For Declaratory Judgment,
Omda Oil and Gas, Inc. V. Lanza, Et Al. Page 13 of 22 {complaint2doc}
43. According to the records of Signature Stock Transfer, Inc., the Stock transfer agent of Omog since its appointment on 12-26-1996, as of 09-15-2003, there were 999,952,715 common shares Issued and Outstanding of 1,000,000,000 common shares Authorized; the accounts of Adam Barnett held 518,964,640 (over 51.8%) of the common shares.
44. Barnett thereupon took over operational control of Omog and became its Chief Executive Officer and/or President.
45. Lanza delivered some records and documents of Omog, Management and Services to Barnett or Barnett’s representative, but stated that he could not deliver stock certificates of Services and Management to Barnett because he stated that they do not exist.
46. Although requested to deliver the Omog and subsidiary records in early September, 2003, Lanza, Taylor and Anderson did not and have not produced many such records, including particularly the federal income tax returns, a checkbook, any cancelled checks or any bank statements; Lanza directed Barnett to various named accountants and/or attorneys who had or may have had certain of the records.
47. Barnett removed all directors and officers of Omog, Management and Services and appointed new directors on or about September 15, 2003.
48. Barnett requested the records and/or documents of Omog and its subsidiaries from Lanza, Anderson, Neely and Taylor, and other former directors and/or officers of Omog or its subsidiaries, but to date they have refused or failed to deliver any more records and/or documents and have not substantiated any of the purported debts due the Lanza Group, in what appears to be an attempt to convert Omog assets to their own use and benefit.
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