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PhenixBleu

01/19/19 10:34 AM

#295528 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

If anyone wants to read about Maciora's latest efforts to "earn" an income through pro se litigation, read ROA's 433 and 434. He is asking the Court for monetary sanctions against SST and notes his hourly rate is $100.

According to comments made here, Maciora thinks SST will partner with him. I think that's highly doubtful. It would be cool if SST requests proof he earns $100/hour, maybe through his billing statements over the past year.

Unreal...

https://services.saccourt.ca.gov/PublicCaseAccess/Civil/SearchByCaseNumber

Year Filed 2016 and Case 00202624

PhenixBleu

02/03/19 11:16 AM

#295617 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

Tentative Ruling on SST's 02/04/2019 Hearing on Demurrer to Maciora's Cross-Complaint

2016-00202624-CU-SL
MyECheck, Inc. vs. Kenneth Maciora
Nature of Proceeding: Hearing on Demurrer to Cross-Complaint
Filed By: Howard, Jeffrey M.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties must at the time oral argument is requested notify the clerk and opposing counsel of the causes of action that will be addressed at the hearing. The parties are also reminded that pursuant to local court rules, only limited oral argument is permitted on law and motion matters. ***

Cross-Defendant Signature Stock Transfer’s (“SST”) demurrer to Defendant/Cross-Complainant in pro per Kenneth Maciora’s (“Maciora”) Cross-Complaint (“XC”) is ruled upon as follows.

Overview

This case presents a multi-party business dispute. Plaintiff MyECheck, Inc. ("MEC") alleges its former CEO, defendant Zalunardo, falsified an employment agreement purportedly entitling him to MEC shares and that he purported to transfer these shares to Maciora in 2015 and 2016, paying de minimis consideration because he knew the shares were fake. MEC further alleges Maciora and others maintain that a draft proposal to issue MEC shares to certain employees, which was never ratified, legitimizes the transfers to Maciora.

In his XC, Maciora alleges that in July 2016, MEC’s alter-ego, cross-defendant Edward Starrs (“Starrs”) contacted Jason Bogutski (“Bogustki”) of SST. At that time, Maciora had filed suit against SST, MEC’s stock transfer agent. Starrs “instructed Signature Stock Transfer to settle with Maciora through a settlement agreement in which Maciora would be issued 66,666,666 shares of MyECheck through a real and 100% genuine paper stock certificate signed by Edward Starrs and a representative of Signature Stock Transfer and that Maciora would be listed in the shareholder registrar as a registered shareholder.” (XC, ¶ 68.) Maciora alleges that Starrs told Bogustki that “when the day came that Maciora would choose to sell his stock, the Cross-Defendants would tell any buyer that Maciora obtained his shares through fraudulent and forged employment agreements and Maciora's shares were therefore fraudulent” and SST agreed to the plan. (Id.) The settlement agreement was signed by SST and Maciora.

In August 2016, SST sent Maciora 3 stock certificates which added up to 66,666,666 shares of MEC. Maciora then attempted to sell the stocks and contacted Bogustki to issue a stock certificate in saleable form. Maciora alleges that SST and others interfered with his attempt to sell his shares.

As against SST, Maciora asserts causes of action for: (1) Negligence (2) Negligence per se, (3) Violation of Commercial Code §8401, (4) Violation of Corp. Code §8403, (5) Fraud, (6) Constructive Fraud, and (7) Conspiracy to Defraud.

SST demurs to each on the ground that Maciora fails to state sufficient facts and uncertainty.

Uncertainty

SST contends that the following two paragraphs in the XC are inconsistent and therefore uncertain.

Paragraph 79 states “Starrs, representing his alter egos MyECheck and GreenPay, upon information and belief knew Maciora was going to rely on the fact that Starrs told Signature Stock Transfer and Signature's attorney that Starrs would forever agree that Maciora is a registered shareholder and that he should be issued the stock.”

Paragraph 190 states “Maciora is informed and believes, thereon alleging, that MyECheck, GreenPay Starrs and Signature Stock Transfer agreed in July of 2016 never to recognize Maciora as a shareholder and to never recognize his stock certificate as genuine even though they were agreeing and representing to Maciora that he would receive a stock certificate and be a registered shareholder.” SST further insists that paragraph 79 is a “judicial admission” that there was no agreement to defraud Maciora.

The Court disagrees with SST that the two paragraphs are inconsistent, and that paragraph 79 is a judicial admission. Paragraph 79 is an allegation regarding Starrs’ knowledge that Maciora would rely on certain representations. Paragraph 190 is an allegation regarding the cross-defendants plan/intent to deceive.

The demurrer is OVERRULED.

Negligence

SST demurs on the ground that as a transfer agent, it owed no common law duty to Maciora. The Court agrees with SST.

At common law, a transfer agent is not liable to a stockholder for damages for mere “nonfeasance” such as a failure to act to remove restrictive legends on stock. (See Mears v. Crocker First Nat. Bank (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 482, 485 (Mears); Lacoe v. Wolfe (1933) 133 Cal.App. 159, 161; Yuen v. U.S. Stock Transfer Co. (C.D.Cal. 1997) 966 F.Supp. 944, 950; see also Kenler v. Canal National Bank (1st Cir. 1973) 489 F.2d 482, 485 & fn. 3.) This is because the transfer agent serves only as the agent for the issuing corporation. (See Kenler, supra, 489 F.2d 482, 485 & fn. 3.) As explained in Mears, “[t]he theoretical basis of the rule is that the delay or refusal is a nonfeasance, the nonperformance of a duty owed to the principal only because of the existing agency relation, not a misfeasance or malfeasance, the breach of a duty owed individually to third parties independent of such agency relation.” (Mears, supra, 97 Cal.App.2d 485.)

Here, since MEC is the issuing corporation, SST owed no common law duty to Maciora for nonfeasance. Maciora counters that Mears is distinguishable since it involved an action for conspiracy. This is a distinction without a difference given the rationale behind the rule - that the duty is owed to the issuing corporation and not the stockholder.

The demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Negligence per se

SST demurs on the grounds that pursuant to Mears, it owed no duty to Maciora. In opposition, Maciora advances that he has sufficiently alleged duties based on Commercial Code §§ 8401, 8403 and 8407, and that SST failed to comply with those duties.

Negligence per se, this is not a separate cause of action but instead is a presumption regarding the standard of care rather than the duty of care. (Rosales v. City of L.A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 419, 430.) Since SST owed no common law duty to Maciora, the demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Violation of Commercial Code §§8401 and 8403

Maciora alleges that SST violated its duties pursuant to Commercial Code §§ 8401 and 8403. SST demurs on the ground that pursuant to Mears and Yuen v. U.S. Stock Transfer Co. (C.D.Cal. 1997) 966 F.Supp. 944, 950, there is no common law duty imposed on SST.

The demurrer is OVERRULED. Here, these cause of action are not based on a common law duty, but rather the statutory duties imposed by Commercial Code §§8401 and 8403. As an aside, the Court notes that the court in Yuen v. U.S. Stock Transfer Co. (C.D.Cal. 1997) 966 F.Supp. 944, 500, recognized that the Commercial Code has a choice of law provision which requires that the law of the issuer’s jurisdiction determines the duties owed by the issuer. (Com. Code § 8110.) With respect to a transfer agent, the Yuen court explained that “the law of incorporation of the issuer establishes the transfer duties under the UCC, including obligations of a transfer agent.” (Id.) Here, MEC is the issuer of the stocks. MEC is a Wyoming corporation.

Neither party has addressed this choice of law provision in the Commercial Code, and the Court will not do so here.

Fraud

SST’s demurrer on the ground that Maciora fails to allege that SST intended to defraud him is OVERRULED. Construing the complaint liberally, Maciora has sufficiently alleged an intent to defraud.

Constructive Fraud

The elements of constructive fraud are: (1) a fiduciary or confidential relationship; (2) nondisclosure (breach of fiduciary duty); (3) intent to deceive; and (4) reliance and resulting injury. (Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1105, 1131.)

Here, as stated above, Maciora fails to sufficiently plead duty. The demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Conspiracy to Defraud

"Conspiracy is not a cause of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration." (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 510-511.) "By participation in a civil conspiracy, a coconspirator effectively adopts as his or her own the torts of other coconspirators within the ambit of the conspiracy. In this way, a coconspirator incurs tort liability co-equal with the immediate tortfeasors. (Id.) "The conspiring defendants must have actual knowledge that a tort is planned and concur in the tortious scheme with knowledge of its unlawful purpose. (Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1582.) "The elements of a civil conspiracy are '(1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy; (2) the wrongful act or acts done pursuant thereto; and (3) the damage resulting.'" (Mosier v. Southern Cal.Physicians Ins. Exch. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1048.)

SST demurs on the ground that conspiracy is not a cause of action. However, since the Court has overruled the demurrer to the fraud cause of action, the conspiracy claim is sufficient. The demurrer is OVERRULED.

Where leave to amend is granted, Maciora may file and serve a first amended crosscomplaint ("FAXC") by no later than February 14, 2019, Response to be filed and served within 30 days thereafter, 35 days if the FAXC is served by mail. (Although not required by any statute or rule of court, Maciora is requested to attach a copy of the instant minute order to the FAXC to facilitate the filing of the pleading.)

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.

Moving counsel’s notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact Maciora and advise him of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact Maciora prior to hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing in person or by
telephone.

PhenixBleu

04/23/19 9:33 PM

#296182 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

Case Update - The Sacramento Court handed Ken Maciora another Loss!

Maciora filed an Application to Extend Time to File a Motion to Compel on April 18, 2019. The Court DENIED his Application on April 19, 2019.

Reference ROA Items 466-468

MyECheck v. Ken Maciora et al

Securities Fraud, Breach of Contract, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Intentional Interference with Prospective
Business Advantage, Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations, Business and Professions Code 17200, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

https://services.saccourt.ca.gov/PublicCaseAccess/Civil/SearchByCaseNumber

Year Filed 2016 and Case 00202624

PhenixBleu

04/27/19 5:02 PM

#296206 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

CASE UPDATE - Look for a Tentative Order on Monday, April 29 around 2:00 pm PST. It will be available through the following link:

https://services.saccourt.ca.gov/PublicCaseAccess/Civil/TentativeRulingSearchByDepartment

Enter Department 54 and April 30.

This hearing is for Maciora's Motion - Other (for OSC RE Discovery Sanctions) filed. It's ROA 458.

In summary, Maciora claims the attorneys for MEC are being evasive and wants them sanctioned to the fullest extent of the law. He is also asking for reimbursement of his costs.

MEC's Opposition argues against Maciora's claims on procedural grounds. They're requesting sanctions against Maciora for 3.5 hours of Ryan Hanlon's time required to respond to the Motion. They again note Maciora's ongoing harassment of Starrs/MEC.

MyECheck v. Ken Maciora et al

Securities Fraud, Breach of Contract, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Intentional Interference with Prospective
Business Advantage, Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations, Business and Professions Code 17200, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

https://services.saccourt.ca.gov/PublicCaseAccess/Civil/SearchByCaseNumber

Year Filed 2016 and Case 00202624

PhenixBleu

05/15/19 12:43 AM

#296391 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

Look for another Tentative Ruling Thursday afternoon on Maciora's Motion to Compel. I have a feeling the Court will postpone it since the Motion to Withdraw impacts all future decisions.

PhenixBleu

05/16/19 9:07 PM

#296429 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

CASE UPDATE - Motion to Compel Response to Specially Prepared Interrogatories

Hearing Date: May 17, 2019

The Court dropped Maciora's Motion as it wasn't timely filed.

Moving party failed to file the moving papers 16 court days prior to the date of hearing. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1005(b) (“Unless otherwise ordered or specifically provided by law, all moving and supporting papers shall be served and filedat least 16 court daysbefore the hearing.”) (emphasis added); California Rule of Court 3.1300(a) ("Unless otherwise ordered or specifically provided by law, all moving and supporting papers must be served and filed in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 1005") (emphasis added).)

Here, moving party filed the motion on May 2, 2019, for a hearing date of May 17, 2019. The moving papers were therefore not timely filed. The Court requires the statutory time period to properly review the case. The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.


PhenixBleu

05/16/19 9:08 PM

#296430 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

CASE UPDATE - Motion to Compel Production of Documents

Hearing Date: May 17, 2019

The motion is DROPPED from the calendar. Moving party failed to file the moving papers 16 court days prior to the date of hearing. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1005(b) (“Unless otherwise ordered or specifically provided by law, all moving and supporting papers shall be served and filedat least 16 court daysbefore the hearing.”) (emphasis added); California Rule of Court 3.1300(a) ("Unless otherwise ordered or specifically provided by law, all moving and supporting papers must be served and filed in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 1005") (emphasis added).)

Here, moving party filed the motion on May 2, 2019, for a hearing date of May 17, 2019. The moving papers were therefore not timely filed. The Court requires the statutory time period to properly review the case.The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.

PhenixBleu

05/28/19 10:54 PM

#296470 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

CASE UPDATE - Maciora's OSC re: False Declarations DENIED!

KennethPro per Defendant/Cross-Complainant Kenneth Maciora's ("Maciora") motion for order to show cause re: false declarations is DENIED.

Maciora desires an OSC against Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant MEC Inc. (formerly MyEcheck, Inc.) and Cross-Defendant Edward Starrs ("Starrs"). According to Maciora, Starrs signed "false" verifications to MEC Inc.'s responses to Special Interrogatories and Request for Admissions.

The motion is DENIED since Maciora fails to proffer legal authority that an OSC may be entered in such a circumstance. Indeed, with respect to request for admissions, the proper procedure for an allegedly unjustified denial is a motion for sanctions after trial. (CCP §2033.420(a).)

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.

Maciora failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1110(f)(3) which requires that each paper exhibit must be separated by a hard 8 1/2 x 11 sheet with hard paper or plastic tabs extending below the bottom of the page, bearing the exhibit designation.

PhenixBleu

05/28/19 10:57 PM

#296471 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

CASE UPDATE - Maciora's OSC re: Discovery Action DENIED!

Defendant/cross-complainant in pro per Maciora’s motion for Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) re: discovery sanctions (including monetary sanctions of at least $1,000 and contempt of court) as against plaintiff/cross-defendant MEC Inc., cross-defendant Starrs and their attorneys of record is DENIED.

Maciora desires an OSC against plaintiff, cross-defendant Starrs and their attorneys of record for having prepared, verified and served “completely evasive responses...to most, if not all[,] of [Maciora’s] 57 special interrogatories,” thereby “caus[ing] unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden and expense.

”The motion is denied since Maciora fails to proffer legal authority that this Court may issue an OSC under these circumstances. Indeed, with respect to interrogatories, the proper remedy when evasive interrogatory responses are received is a motion to compel further responses pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §2030.300 and it appears that Maciora has already filed such a motion, which is currently set to be heard on 5/30/2019.

Maciora failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1110(f)(3), requiring that each paper exhibit be separated by an 8½ x 11 inch sheet with hard paper or plastic tabs extending below the bottom of the page, bearing the exhibit designation.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.

PhenixBleu

05/28/19 11:03 PM

#296473 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

CASE UPDATE - Motion to Withdraw as Counsel GRANTED!

Counsel for Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant MEC Incorporated, dba Seergate, Inc. and Cross-Defendant Edward Starrs--Joseph M. ElGuindy and Ryan N. Meyer of the firm ElGuindy, Meyer & Koegel, APC (“EMK Lawyers”)--seek to be relieved as counsel.

The motion is ruled upon as follows.

Argument

EMK Lawyers seek to be relieved on counsel on the basis that their clients have failed to make payments for legal fees “in quite some time” and currently owe over $260,000. The motion states “[t]he result of all the foregoing is a breakdown of our relationship and precipitates this unfortunate motion.”

Defendant/Cross-Complainant Kenneth Maciora (“Maciora”) opposes the motion on the basis that Defendants/Cross-Complainant will be severely prejudiced if the motion is granted “until the outstanding issues are resolved.” Maciora challenges whether Edward R. Starrs and My ECheck were properly served, citing Code of Civil Procedure sections 416.10 and 416.20, which relate to service of summons. Maciora alleges that, during the course of discovery, he was provided with a different mailing address for Edward Starrs. Additionally on the issue of service, Maciora alleges that EMK Lawyers have not complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(d), which requires that the service address is the current residence or business address of client or the service address is the last known residence or business address of the client and the attorney has been unable to locate a more current address after making reasonable efforts to do so within 30 days before filing the motion to be relieved as counsel. Maciora argues that EMK Lawyers should not be relieved as counsel until after pending motions are heard on May 29 and May 30, 2019, in part because there are outstanding sanctions requests against the Mr. ElGuindy and Mr. Meyer personally. Additionally, Maciora alleges the motion is incomplete, as an additional attorney, Ryan Hanlon, is an attorney of the same firm, has appeared in this case, but is not listed in the motion. Maciora argues My ECheck cannot represent itself and it is unlikely that it will be able to retain replacement counsel. Additionally, Maciora argues that his ability to serve Edward Starrs is “severely compromised” until Mr. Starrs provides a valid and verifiable residential address. Previously, EMK Lawyers informed Maciora that Mr. Starrs could be reached through counsel.

On reply, EMK Lawyers argue that My ECheck and Mr. Starrs were appropriately served, distinguishing the cited Code of Civil Procedure sections on the basis that they apply to service of summons and not a motion to be relieved as counsel. Rather, California Rule of Court 3.1362(d) requires that a motion to be relieved as counsel be served by “personal service, electronic service, or mail.” EMK Lawyers attach the supplemental declaration of Mr. Meyer, reflecting that the clients were served at the last known address provided to the lawyers. (Meyers Supp. Decl. ¶ 3.) In addition to mailing the notice, the lawyers also sent notice of the motion by electronic mail to the clients and “EMK Lawyers has been in routine contact with the Clients and advised them repeatedly of the pending Motion as well as the ramifications of the Court’s granting of the relief sought. [Meyer Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.] It is EMK Lawyers’ understanding that the Clients do not oppose the Motion, despite having full knowledge of the same. [Id. ¶ 5.]” (Reply at 3.) EMK Lawyers argue that the pending motions will be not be affected because “[t]ypically, the Court will set the effective date of withdrawal as the day the proof of service of the entered order is served on the client (usually 10 days after the order is issued)” so EMK Lawyers will still be counsel on the pending motions set for May 29 and May 30, 2019. EMK Lawyers argue that their clients will need to seek replacement counsel and their difficulty in doing so is not cause to “force” EMK Lawyers to continue to represent them. (See Thomas G. Ferruzzo, Inc. v. Superior Court (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 501,504. (“An attorney may be allowed to withdraw without offending the rule against corporate self-representation.”).) EMK Lawyers argue there is no undue prejudice to their clients by allowing them to withdraw at this time. EMK Lawyers argue the motion is complete, as its clients retain them through two of its partners, Joseph ElGuindy and Ryan Meyer. EMK Lawyers contend that it is not their obligation to update the Court and parties of their clients’ current address, but that this is the obligation of their clients and reflected in paragraph 12 of the proposed order.

Conclusion

The Court finds that EMK Lawyers have complied with the requirements to withdraw as counsel and the motion is GRANTED. The Court will sign the proposed order.EMK Lawyers’ objections to the Declaration of Kenneth Maciora are sustained.

PhenixBleu

05/30/19 10:02 AM

#296491 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

CASE UPDATE - Today's hearings have been moved to June 20.

No reason was given by the Court. Therefore, no one knows next steps, requirements or outcomes at this time.

Motion to Compel From Interrogatories filed by Maciora, Kenneth

Motion to Compel Special Interrogatories filed by Maciora, Kenneth

Demurrer to First Amended Cross-Complaint filed by Howard, Jeffrey M.

PhenixBleu

05/31/19 9:29 AM

#296498 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

The case is "not found" at this time.

PhenixBleu

06/20/19 2:59 AM

#296603 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

This case is well known to the court due to the inordinate amount of Motions filed."


PhenixBleu

06/20/19 10:26 AM

#296611 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

CASE UPDATE - Demurrer to First Amended Cross-Complaint

Cross-defendant Signature Stock Transfer’s (“SST”) demurrer to defendant/cross-complainant in pro per Maciora’s First Amended Cross-complaint (“1AXC”) is ruled upon as follows.

Moving counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1110(b)(3)-(4).

Overview

This case presents a multi-party business dispute. Plaintiff MyECheck, Inc. (“MEC”) alleges its former CEO, defendant Zalunardo, falsified an employment agreement purportedly entitling him to MEC shares and that he purported to transfer these shares to defendant Maciora in 2015 and 2016, who paid de minimis consideration because Maciora knew the shares were fake. MEC further alleges Maciora and others maintain that a draft proposal to issue MEC shares to certain employees, which was never ratified, legitimizes the transfers to Maciora.

In his 1AXC Maciora alleges that in July 2016 MEC’s alter-ego, cross-defendant Edward Starrs contacted Jason Bogutski (“Bogutski”) of SST. At that time, Maciora had filed suit against SST, MEC’s stock transfer agent. Starrs “instructed [SST] to settle with Maciora through a settlement agreement in which Maciora would be issued 66,666,666 shares of MyECheck through a real and 100% genuine paper stock certificate signed by Edward Starrs and a representative of [SST] and that Maciora would be listed in the shareholder registrar as a registered shareholder.” (1AXC, ¶68.) Maciora alleges that Starrs told Bogutski that “when the day came that Maciora would choose to sell his stock, the cross-defendants would tell any buyer that Maciora obtained his shares through fraudulent and forged employment agreements and Maciora’s shares were therefore fraudulent” and SST agreed to the plan. (1AXC, ¶¶68-69.) The settlement agreement was signed by SST and Maciora.

In August 2016 SST sent Maciora 3 stock certificates which added up to 66,666,666 shares of MEC. (1AXC, ¶83.) Maciora then attempted to sell the stocks and contacted Bogutski to issue a stock certificate in saleable form. (1AXC, ¶¶84-86.) Maciora alleges that SST and others interfered with his attempt to sell his shares.

Maciora’s original cross-complaint was filed on 4/5/2018 and purported to assert against SST causes of action for (1) Negligence (2) Negligence per se, (3) Violation of Commercial Code §8401, (4) Violation of Commercial Code §8403, (5) Fraud, (6) Constructive Fraud and (7) Conspiracy to Defraud. SST demurred on the grounds of uncertainty and failure to state sufficient facts. This Court sustained with leave to amend SST’s demurrer to the causes of action for Negligence, Negligence per se and Constructive Fraud but overruled it as to the others as well as to the claim of uncertainty.

On 2/8/2019 Maciora filed his 1AXC which now purports to allege against SST causes of action for (1) Conversion, (2) Negligence (3) Negligence per se, (4) Violation of Commercial Code §8401, (5) Violation of Commercial Code §8403, (6) Fraud, (7) Constructive Fraud and (8) Conspiracy to Defraud. SST now demurs to all of these causes of action except the one based on Commercial Code §8401 on the grounds that the Conspiracy to Defraud cause of action is uncertain and that the other causes of action fail to plead facts sufficient to state a claim on which recovery can be had. Defendant/cross-complainant in pro per Maciora opposes.

Analysis

Conversion - The Court notes that while Maciora’s original 4/5/2018 cross-complaint included a cause of action for conversion, the conversion cause of action was not alleged against SST. Since SST did not demur to the conversion cause of action, the Court’s ruling which sustained SST’s prior demurrer with leave to amend did not authorize Maciora to amend the conversion cause of action by adding SST to the allegations. Instead, current California law holds that where leave to amend is granted following the sustaining of a demurrer, that leave to amend is limited to amending only those causes of action which were found to be deficient and does not authorize the addition of any new or different causes of action against any party. (See, e.g., Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023.)
Given that Maciora failed to obtain leave to amend the cause of action for conversion, the Court hereby strikes same to the extent it purports to be directed against SST. To the extent Maciora desires to add such a cause of action as against SST, he must file a noticed motion to amend.

Negligence - SST again demurs on the ground that as a transfer agent, it owed no common law duty to Maciora and as support, SST cites both Yuen v. U.S. Stock Transfer Co. (C.D.Cal. 1997) 966 F.Supp. 944, 950 and Mears v. Crocker First Nat. Bank (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 482, 485, which this Court relied upon in sustaining SST’s demurrer to the original negligence cause of action. As the question of whether a duty of care exists in a particular case remains a question of law for the Court alone to decide and as the existing decisional law of this State including Mears confirms that a transfer agent is not liable to a stockholder for damages for failing to remove restrictive legends on stock, SST’s demurrer to this cause of action must be sustained.

Negligence Per Se - The demurrer to this cause of action must be sustained since negligence per se is not a separate cause of action but is instead merely a presumption of negligence which arises in from a statutory violation provided that certain conditions exist. (See, e.g., Evidence Code §669.) However, Maciora has failed to identify any statute which this Court finds gives rise to a duty of care on the part of SST so as to trigger potential liability under a negligence theory. Thus, the demurrer to the negligence per se separate cause of action shall be sustained as well.

Violation of Commercial Code §8403 - SST’s demurrer to this cause of action is overruled because SST’s argument relating to the application of Wyoming law could have been advanced in SST’s demurrer to the original cross-complaint but was not and thus, SST is barred from raising this argument here pursuant to the express provisions of Code of Civil Procedure §430.41(b). This subdivision provides in its entirety: A party demurring to a pleading that has been amended after a demurrer to an earlier version of the pleading was sustained shall not demur to any portion of the amended complaint, cross-complaint, or answer on grounds that could have been raised by demurrer to the earlier version of the complaint, cross-complaint, or answer. (Underline added for emphasis.) In short, SST is barred from now demurring to this cause of action based on Wyoming law which was not provided in connection with the earlier demurrer to the original cross-complaint.

Fraud - SST again demurs to the fraud cause of action on the ground that Maciora fails to allege SST intended to defraud Maciora but as this same argument was previously overruled (thereby obviating the need for Maciora to amend the allegation relating to “intent to defraud”), the Court need not consider this contention a second time here. Still, it is worth adding that “intent to defraud” is technically not an element of misrepresentation but rather, the “intent to induce” reliance is what must be shown to establish intentional or negligent misrepresentation. (See, e.g., Civil Code §1709; CACI 1900, 1903.) For these reasons, the demurrer to the fraud cause of action is (again) overruled.

Constructive Fraud - SST again demurs to this cause of action on the ground that it owed to Maciora no duty of disclosure since the 1AXC fails to plead facts establishing the necessary existence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship between SST and Maciora. The Court agrees and will again sustain the demurrer to this cause of action.

Conspiracy to Defraud - SST’s demurrer to this “cause of action” on the ground of uncertainty must be overruled because SST could have demurred to this “cause of action” on the same ground of uncertainty in connection with SST’s earlier demurrer to the original cross-complaint but did not. Consequently, Code of Civil Procedure §430.41(b) precludes SST from now advancing this argument for the first time in the present challenge to the 1AXC.

Conclusion

Maciora’s cause of action for conversion is stricken since he did not obtain leave to allege this against SST.

SST’s demurrer to the causes of action for Violation of Commercial Code §8403, Fraud and Conspiracy to Defraud is overruled but is sustained as to the causes of action for Negligence, Negligence per se and Constructive Fraud.

As the Court finds that Maciora has no reasonable possibility of curing the above-cited defects in the Negligence, Negligence per se and Constructive Fraud causes of action, leave to amend these causes of action is denied.

PhenixBleu

06/21/19 9:36 AM

#296622 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

CASE UPDATE - Motion to Compel Special Interrogatories

Defendant in pro per Maciora’s motion to compel plaintiff’s further responses to Special Interrogatories, Set 2, is ruled on as follows.

Factual Background

This case is well known to the Court due to the inordinate amount of law & motion filings but in short, plaintiff MyECheck, Inc. (“MEC”) alleges its former CEO, defendant Zalunardo, falsified an employment agreement purportedly entitling him to MEC shares and that he purported to transfer these shares to defendant Maciora in 2015 and 2016, paying de minimis consideration because he knew the shares were fake. MEC further alleges Maciora and others maintain that a draft proposal to issue MEC shares to certain employees, which was never ratified, legitimizes the transfers to Maciora. It is further alleged that Maciora wrongfully obtained and disseminated MEC’s confidential information in violation of a non-disclosure agreement and in an attempt to extort money and stock from MEC and its officers.

According to MEC, Maciora has also harassed MEC’s shareholders, employees, auditors, business partners and investors to disrupt operations and to extort money but ultimately causing MEC shares to lose significant value and disrupting important business relationships.

The Court recently granted MEC’s attorneys’ motion to withdraw. Defendant Maciora now moves to compel MEC’s further responses to Special Interrogatories, Set 2. Plaintiff opposes.

Analysis

Interrogatory Nos. 1-4, 9, 13-14, 29, 33-40, 49. Each of these interrogatories asks plaintiff to “[d]escribe in detail the reason why” a specified sum of money was on a specific date either wired from plaintiff’s bank account to a third party or was otherwise withdrawn from its bank account. In response, plaintiff merely stated that the reason was either to transmit the specified sum to the third party of to obtain cash in the specified amount. The Court finds plaintiff’s responses to each of these interrogatories to be evasive and incomplete so as to justify an order compelling further responses to Nos. 1-4, 9, 13-14, 29, 33-40 and 49.

Interrogatory Nos. 5, 7-8, 10-12, 15-24, 26-28, 30-32, 46-48, 50-51, 53-54, 57. Each of these interrogatories asks plaintiff to “[d]escribe in detail why” a charge of a specific sum of money from a third party appears on plaintiff’s bank account statement for a specified date. In response, plaintiff merely stated that the third party had charged plaintiff the amount specified. The Court finds plaintiff’s responses to each of these interrogatories to be evasive and incomplete so as to justify an order compelling further responses to same.Interrogatory Nos. 6, 42-45.

The motion is granted as to each of these interrogatories.

Although interrogatory No. 6 does not specify a particular time period, the Court finds no legitimate reason why plaintiff cannot provide and should not be required to provide the name of each landlord for the office located at 1743 Terracina Drive in El Dorado Hills over the last five years. Likewise, while interrogatory Nos. 42-45 merely refer to 1743 Terracina Drive without identifying the city, it is reasonably apparent these questions all refer to 1743 Terracina Drive in El Dorado Hills and therefore, plaintiff shall identify who owned the subject property in the years 2014-2017.

Interrogatory Nos. 55-56. The Court will sustain plaintiff’s objections to these interrogatories and, therefore, the motion is denied as to both of these interrogatories.

Conclusion

The motion is granted as to all special interrogatories except for Nos. 55-56. Where the motion is granted, plaintiff shall provide verified further responses no later than 7/19/2019 (unless defendant Maciora agrees to a later date memorialized in writing).
No sanctions were requested and no sanctions are awarded.

PhenixBleu

06/21/19 9:40 AM

#296623 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

CASE UPDATE - Motion to Compel Form Interrogatories

Defendant in pro per Maciora’s motion to compel plaintiff’s further responses to Form Interrogatories, Sets 1, 2, 5 and 6, is ruled on as follows.

Factual Background

This case is well known to the Court due to the inordinate amount of law & motion filings but in short, plaintiff MyECheck, Inc. (“MEC”) alleges its former CEO, defendant Zalunardo, falsified an employment agreement purportedly entitling him to MEC shares and that he purported to transfer these shares to defendant Maciora in 2015 and 2016, paying de minimis consideration because he knew the shares were fake. MEC further alleges Maciora and others maintain that a draft proposal to issue MEC shares to certain employees, which was never ratified, legitimizes the transfers to Maciora. It is further alleged that Maciora wrongfully obtained and disseminated MEC’s confidential information in violation of a non-disclosure agreement and in an attempt to extort money and stock from MEC and its officers. According to MEC, Maciora has also harassed MEC’s shareholders, employees, auditors, business partners and investors to disrupt operations and to extort money but ultimately causing MEC shares to lose significant value and disrupting important business relationships.

The Court recently granted MEC’s attorneys’ motion to withdraw.

Defendant Maciora now moves to compel MEC’s further responses to Form Interrogatories, Sets 1, 2, 5 and 6. Plaintiff opposes in part.

Analysis

Set One. Contrary to the opposition’s claim, this motion is not “moot” as to interrogatory 7.1 since Code of Civil Procedure §1005.5 provides that a motion is deemed made at the time it is filed and served and since plaintiff did not serve its “amended response” to 7.1 well after the moving papers were served. Coupled with plaintiff’s failure to raise any other argument in connection with this interrogatory, the motion to compel is granted and plaintiff shall provide a verified further response to this interrogatory no later than 7/19/2019 (unless defendant Maciora agrees to a later date memorialized in writing). (To the extent plaintiff has already provided a further response to this interrogatory, it need not re-serve the response in order to comply with this ruling and to the extent moving defendant may contend plaintiff’s further response to this interrogatory is deficient for some reason, defendant may file and serve an appropriate motion after completing the requisite meet-and-confer process.)

The motion is denied as to interrogatory 12.1 since the person verifying the responses need not have personal knowledge to verify every aspect of every response.

Set Two. The motion is granted as to interrogatory 7.1 for the same reasons set forth above. Plaintiff shall provide a verified further response to this interrogatory no later than 7/19/2019 (unless defendant Maciora agrees to a later date memorialized in writing). (To the extent plaintiff has already provided a further response to this interrogatory, it need not re-serve the response in order to comply with this ruling and to the extent moving defendant may contend plaintiff’s further response to this interrogatory is deficient for some reason, defendant may file and serve an appropriate motion after completing the requisite meet-and-confer process.)

The motion is denied as to interrogatory 12.1 since Maciora’s own definition of the term “incident” makes this question fatally uncertain.

Set Five. The motion is granted as to interrogatory 7.1 for the same reasons set forth above. Plaintiff shall provide a verified further response to this interrogatory no later than 7/19/2019 (unless defendant Maciora agrees to a later date memorialized in writing). (To the extent plaintiff has already provided a further response to this interrogatory, it need not re-serve the response in order to comply with this ruling and to the extent moving defendant may contend plaintiff’s further response to this interrogatory is deficient for some reason, defendant may file and serve an appropriate motion after completing the requisite meet-and-confer process.)

The motion is denied as to interrogatory 12.1 since Maciora’s own definition of the term “incident” makes this question fatally uncertain.

Set Six. The motion is granted as to interrogatory 7.1 for the same reasons set forth above. Plaintiff shall provide a verified further response to this interrogatory no later than 7/19/2019 (unless defendant Maciora agrees to a later date memorialized in writing). (To the extent plaintiff has already provided a further response to this interrogatory, it need not re-serve the response in order to comply with this ruling and to the extent moving defendant may contend plaintiff’s further response to this interrogatory is deficient for some reason, defendant may file and serve an appropriate motion after completing the requisite meet-and-confer process.)

The motion is denied as to interrogatory 12.1 since Maciora’s own definition of the term “incident” makes this question fatally uncertain.

Conclusion

The motion is granted in part and denied in part. No sanctions were requested and no sanctions are awarded

PhenixBleu

08/25/19 9:15 AM

#296942 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

Ken Maciora didn't pay taxes on his Wyoming MyEcheck business. It has been administratively dissolved.

Maciora told the Sacramento Court it would be operational last Fall. Misleading the Court was a really bad idea. So was registering the MyEcheck name to prevent MEC from renewing the Foreign registration in CA.

Seems to be another form of business interruption.

https://wyobiz.wy.gov/business/FilingDetails.aspx?eFNum=242216159047064160024192146109124205075118144137

PhenixBleu

09/10/19 9:51 AM

#296988 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

Case Update - Sacramento Court dropped Maciora's Motion to Deem Matters Admitted

The reason is Maciora was non-compliant with the Rules of Civil Procedure

PhenixBleu

11/15/19 10:24 AM

#297269 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

Should be interesting to see how the Court rules on Maciora's request for compensation for his costs to file documents. He believes he is entitled to it because MEC did not respond and he spent money on preparation of same.

I wonder if he considers himself a real lawyer and charges himself attorney fees?




PhenixBleu

12/08/19 8:27 PM

#297373 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

Tentative Ruling - MyECheck, Inc. vs. Kenneth Maciora

Filed By: Kenneth Maciora
Motion to Deem Matters Admitted

Defendant/cross-complainant’s motion to deem admitted those matters specified in his requests for admissions to plaintiff MyECheck, Inc. is UNOPPOSED and is GRANTED.

However, defendant/cross-complainant request for monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,100 for expenses consisting of "preparation of the RFA and the motion, including printing, legal research, service fees, motion fees and lost wages" is DENIED since (1) several of these claimed expenses are not recoverable here (including "preparation of the RFA," "legal research" and "lost wages"), (2) the supporting declaration fails to provide an itemized summary of each of the claimed expenses, and (3) the total requested is unreasonably excessive under the circumstances.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required.

(Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)

PhenixBleu

12/27/19 7:03 AM

#297524 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

Maciora filed another cross complaint. It was rejected because he didn't follow California's process.

PhenixBleu

02/04/20 12:12 AM

#297646 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

Docket Entry 568 - Cross-Complaint submitted by Maciora, Kenneth rejected on 12/26/2019.

Hmmm...another rejection?

PhenixBleu

03/24/20 10:06 AM

#297769 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

Information Regarding Coronavirus and Court Operations

https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/general/coronavirus.aspx

PhenixBleu

05/04/20 8:40 PM

#298001 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

No action in Sacramento since Maciora's last rejection.

568 Cross-Complaint submitted by Maciora, Kenneth rejected on 12/26/2019 . 12/26/2019

PhenixBleu

08/05/20 3:41 PM

#298307 RE: PhenixBleu #295404

CASE UPDATE - SST Motion for Protective Order GRANTED

Overview

This case presents a multi-party business dispute. Plaintiff MyECheck, Inc. (“MEC”) alleges its former CEO, defendant Zalunardo, falsified an employment agreement purportedly entitling him to MEC shares and that he purported to transfer these shares to defendant Maciora in 2015 and 2016, paying de minimis consideration because he knew the shares were fake. MEC further alleges Maciora and others maintain that a draft proposal to issue MEC shares to certain employees, which was never ratified, legitimizes the transfers to Maciora. It is further alleged that Maciora wrongfully obtained and disseminated MEC’s confidential information in violation of a non-disclosure agreement and in an attempt to extort money and stock from MEC and its officers. According to MEC, Maciora has also harassed MEC’s shareholders, employees, auditors, business partners and investors to disrupt operations and to extort money but ultimately causing MEC shares to lose significant value and disrupting important business relationships. MEC asserts a number of causes of action against Maciora and others for securities fraud in violation of Corporations Code §25400(D), breach of contract, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage/contractual relations, and violation of Business & Professions Code §17200 et seq.

Maciora has filed a cross-complaint in which he alleges that in July 2016 MEC’s alter-ego, cross-defendant Edward Starrs, contacted Jason Bogutski of SST. At that time, Maciora had filed suit against SST, MEC’s stock transfer agent. Starrs “instructed [SST] to settle with Maciora through a settlement agreement in which Maciora would be issued 66,666,666 shares of MyECheck through a real and 100% genuine paper stock certificate signed by Edward Starrs and a representative of [SST] and that Maciora would be listed in the shareholder registrar as a registered shareholder.” Maciora alleges that Starrs told Bogutski that “when the day came that Maciora would choose to sell his stock, the cross-defendants would tell any buyer that Maciora obtained his shares through fraudulent and forged employment agreements and Maciora’s shares were therefore fraudulent” and SST agreed to the plan. The settlement agreement was signed by SST and Maciora. In August 2016 SST sent Maciora 3 stock certificates which added up to 66,666,666 shares of MEC. Maciora then attempted to sell the stocks and contacted Bogutski to issue a stock certificate in saleable form. Maciora alleges that SST and others interfered with his attempt to sell his shares.In February 2020 Maciora issued a notice of deposition of SST on various subjects, along with requests for production of documents. The notice specifies the deposition will take place at 350 University Avenue in Sacramento.

SST now moves for a protective order requiring the deposition occur in Dallas County, Texas since SST does not have any office, employee or other physical presence in the State of California but instead conducts all of its business out of its single business office located in Addison, Texas. SST notes that Maciora, who is acting in pro per, resides in New York State and must travel across the country to take SST’s deposition in Sacramento and suggests that having the deposition in Texas will lessen the distance both Maciora and SST will need to travel but Maciora has stated “under no circumstances will I agree to take a deposition in Dallas. That won’t happen.” SST also requests monetary sanctions against Maciora in the amount of $2,100 for his unreasonable refusal to consider an alternative location for the deposition of SST, which has necessitated this motion.

Maciora opposes, arguing first that SST’s moving papers were “not properly served” in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure §1013(c). The opposition also asserts that his deposition notice complies with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure §2025.250 and that a court may order a deposition occur at a different location but only “if it is within a distance permitted by Sections 2025.250 and 2025.260.”

Subdivision (d) of 2025.250 provides that if an organization has not designated a principal office in California, the deposition shall at the option of the noticing party take place either in the county where the action is pending or within 75 miles of any of the organization’s business offices in California, and thus, the opposition maintains that the subject deposition “must take place in the county of Sacramento.”

Finally, Maciora requests that if the Court finds proper notice of this motion, the hearing be continued four weeks so he can file “a vigorous opposition and request for sanctions.”

Analysis

Service. Code of Civil Procedure §1005 establishes the requisite notice for the present motion and subdivision (b) states in pertinent part:

Unless otherwise ordered..., all moving and supporting papers shall be served and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing. ... However, if the notice is served by...express mail, or another method of delivery providing for overnight delivery, the required 16-day period of notice before the hearing shall be increased by two calendar days. Section 1013, which extends the time within which a right may be exercised or an act may be done, does not apply to a notice of motion, papers opposing a motion, or reply papers governed by this section. ...(Underline added for emphasis.)


Given that §1005(b) expressly states that §1013 “does not apply to a notice of motion,” Maciora’s reliance on §1013(c)’s language (i.e., “...any period of notice and any right or duty to do any act or make any response within any period or on a date certain after service of the document served by Express Mail or other method of delivery providing for overnight delivery shall be extended by two court days” (underline added for emphasis)) is misplaced and this Court must therefore reject his suggestion that SST failed to properly serve the moving papers. Likewise, the opposition’s contention that SST’s service of the moving papers via FedEx (dropping them off at a FedEx location on Saturday, 7/11/2020 and being delivered to Maciora on the following Monday) was “not overnight delivery” falls short in light of

(1) §1013(c)’s express provision that “service is complete at the time of the deposit” to the “express service carrier” and

(2) Code of Civil Procedure §10 deeming every Sunday a “holiday” and Maciora admitting receipt of the moving papers on the next business day, Monday, 7/13/2020.

Code of Civil Procedure §2025.250. This statute provides in pertinent part:(a) Unless the court orders otherwise under Section 2025.260, the deposition of a natural person...(b) The deposition of an organization that is a party to the action shall be taken at a place that is, at the option of the party giving notice of the deposition, either within 75 miles of the organization’s principal executive or business office in California, or within the county where the action is pending and within 150 miles of that office.(c) Unless the organization consents to a more distant place, the deposition of any other organization shall be taken within 75 miles of the organization’s principal executive or business office in California.(d) If an organization has not designated a principal executive or business office in California, the deposition shall be taken at a place that is, at the option of the party giving notice of the deposition, either within the county where the action is pending, or within 75 miles of any executive or business office in California of the organization.(Underline added for emphasis.)Subdivisions (b) - (d) each presuppose that the deponent organization has at least one executive or business office located in California but none of these provisions actually addresses the scenario presented here where the deponent organization has not merely failed to designate a “principal executive or business office in California” but rather simply has no office of any type in California (and therefore is unable to designate a “principal executive or business office in California”). Accordingly, the Court is not convinced that §2025.250(d) controls the location of the proposed deposition of SST and the outcome of this motion.In the end, this Court can find no legitimate justification for requiring SST to travel from its sole business office which is located in Texas to Sacramento for this deposition particularly when Texas is closer to Maciora’s own New York home and when there is ongoing surge in Covid-19 cases, indisputably making travel far more risky than in the past. It is worth adding that the granting of the requested protective order is also consistent with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure §1989, stating that a witness who is not a resident of the State of California is not obliged to attend as a witness before any court, judge, justice or any other officer. (See also, Toyota Motor Corporation v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1113 [“section 1989 applies not only to those witnesses obliged to attend as witnesses in court proceedings, but those witnesses obliged to give testimony by deposition before deposition officers”].)

Continuance

As noted above, the opposition requests that if the Court finds proper notice of the moving papers, the hearing be continued four weeks so Maciora can file “a vigorous opposition and request for sanctions.” As Maciora has already had a full and fair opportunity to prepare “a vigorous opposition and request for sanctions” in advance of the current hearing date, the Court finds no grounds which warrant a continuance of the hearing on the present motion.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, SST’s motion for protective order requiring its deposition to take place in Dallas County, Texas is GRANTED. SST’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED since the Court is unable to conclude that Maciora’s opposition was not substantially justified under the circumstances.This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)