Replies to post #531021 on Mr Cooper Group Inc (COOP)

[BBANBOB]

DMDMD2020
Amazes me how people can really BELIEVE that as big as this overall company was and withh the SENATE SUB COMM stating we WAMU had 600 bill of loans in force, that there is nothing left of any of those!!!!!!!! Like everything accumulated that would be due to us for 10 yrs


Let alone the brick and mortar that the fdic indicated they would break leases on those that they could and maintain the rest!!!!!!!


We were imho just put on an administrative HOLD for 10 yrs,but what loans we had kept going and JPM serviced those as did all the other servicers we had, INCLUDING NSM, and ALL FUNDS DUE us were put in COURT ORDERED REGISTRY ACCT!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

IF IF IF we had 600 bill out and our cut was ONLY 1%(LOL) that alone is 60 bill over 10 yrs, what if it was more?

DB ALONE had 64 bill of WMB/WMI loans what if it was just 1% of that over 10 yrs that is 6.4 BILL over a 10 yrs period.........

JPM had a ton NSM had some PHH had some as did the other 3 servicers.

Lots of seat cushions around the country in 2300 branches

Even at the low 6.4 bill



WHAT ABOUT MINERAL INTERESTS????????? of 46 bill??????????? Even if it was only 4.6 bill(LOL)

[hotmeat]

Quote: "Mr. Friedlander spent 5 years as a portfolio manager with Washington Mutual in Seattle, Washington, where he managed over $8 billion across RMBS, ABS, US government and Agency portfolios. He also served as the chief strategist behind the institution’s $25 billion investment portfolio.



The highlighted statement can be confirmed in WAMU's June 30, Form 10Q where they referenced this Investment Portfolio under "Available for Sale Securities". At that time the value was quoted at $24.375B and consisted of highly rated MBS and Investments Securities Excellent DD as usual Dmdm!!! Thanks.



See pages 21, 39, 41, 49, 50 + 51 where the Investment Portfolio is cited in detail.

Wamu June 2008 Form 10Q

[Dmdmd2020]

Articles published in 2009 & 2013 cites Friedlander and Prabhu (former WMI employees) leaving WMI before seizure.


https://www.housingwire.com/articles/two-wamu-execs-chase-mbs

“Two WaMu Execs to Chase MBS
May 25, 2009 Jacob Gaffney

Former Washington Mutual executives Sreeni Prabhu and Brad Friedlander partnered with SouthStar Funding founding partner, Michael Fierman, to start Angel Oak Capital Partners. Angel Oak is now focusing on distressed mortgage-backed securities (MBS), currently manages $30m in assets and is looking for more. So far, the fund's strategy is focused on acquiring pools of MBS that are trading at distressed prices despite prime performance. "We underwrite to buy and hold but will look to opportunistically sell when market liquidity returns," explains Prabhu. "The key difference with bigger firms who have the same strategy as us, we distribute monthly cash flows generated from these bonds back to investors on a monthly basis," he adds. Angel Oak is based in Atlanta, as was SouthStar, the wholesale and subprime mortgage lender that originated as much as $6.5bn of non agency mortgage products annually before it closed operations in 2007. Write to Jacob Gaffney.”

_______________________


https://www.barrons.com/articles/SB50001424052748704093404578607763019872242

“Looking to the Past

BySteve Garmhausen
July 20, 2013

You can't fault investors for being a bit giddy about the housing recovery: Looking to cash in on rising demand and prices, they've been snapping up everything from rental properties to home-builder stocks for many months.

But while those investors see a bright future for the sector, Brad Friedlander is more interested in its past. Friedlander's $1.8 billion Angel Oak Multi-Strategy Income fund (ticker: ANGLX) has a large weighting in "nonagency" mortgage loans (those not backed by the government) that predate the housing bubble. Those loans, stigmatized since the bubble burst, have been available for cheap—and they've powered Friedlander's two-year-old fund to an auspicious start.

"Five years removed from the height of the housing crisis, there are still opportunities within the fixed-income realm," says Friedlander, 36, managing partner at Angel Oak Capital Partners, in Atlanta.

Since Angel Oak Multi-Strategy Income made its debut in June 2011, it has returned 24.1%, compared with 6.1% for the Barclays Aggregate Bond Index. Last year, the fund returned 22.7%, crushing its rivals in the multisector bond category by an average of 11 percentage points and putting it in the top percentile.

This year, however, is off to a rockier start. The fund is down 0.1% amid the broad market selloff, but that's still nearly two percentage points better than the index. In the meantime, it's delivering a yield of 4.42%.

Friedlander credits the fund's outperformance largely to its heavy weighting in nonagency mortgages that originated in the early- to mid-2000s. Nonagencies include everything from so-called jumbo loans—which exceed the roughly $400,000 to $730,000 mortgage the government will back—to lower-quality mortgages and subprime loans.

Nearly 70% of Angel Oak's assets are invested in this "private label paper," far more than any other mutual fund. Friedlander avoids subprime loans, which helped keep his fund from losing money along with its peers as those securities took a big hit in June. Instead, he focuses on jumbo loans that were issued before the financial crisis. What makes these mortgages of pre-bubble vintage so attractive, says Friedlander, is the continuing disconnect between their credit ratings and their inherent value.

Credit-rating agencies "absolutely obliterated the sector" after the housing crisis, stripping these securities of their investment-grade status. This led to forced selling by banks and other institutions, which are restricted from holding non-investment-grade bonds. Now nonagencies are available at 88 cents on the dollar, and Friedlander has taken advantage of the discount.

That's not his only focus, though. Collateralized loan obligations—bank loans backed by tangible assets—account for 15% of the fund. And Friedlander generally keeps 20% of the fund in very liquid assets, including government-agency debt.

Friedlander's knowledge of the mortgage market comes in part from having a front-row seat to the mortgage meltdown. He managed $8 billion of mortgage-backed securities for Washington Mutual before leaving in March 2008, six months before the bank's failure, and after he had become concerned about its future.

During the crisis, Friedlander saw investors flee from any and all mortgage-backed securities, but suspected there was more to the story. In May 2008, he and WaMu colleague Sreeni Prabhu joined mortgage-industry veteran Michael Fierman to found Angel Oak Capital Partners. "We saw a generational opportunity," Friedlander says.

The team first launched one hedge fund, which gained 57.8% between its July 2008 launch and its closure five months ago.Its best-performing hedge fund has scored a gain of 176.6% since its inception in early 2009. Between its mutual fund and hedge funds, Angel Oak manages $3 billion in total assets.


TRUE TO HIS OPPORTUNISTIC approach, Friedlander snapped up assets during the market's recent soft period. The fund had been stockpiling cash, which Friedlander unleashed on purchases that now account for 25% of its assets. Much of that is in high-quality fixed-rate and hybrid mortgage bonds as well as floating-rate bonds composed of certain types of adjustable-rate mortgages. The fund now has less than 1% in cash.

Meanwhile, the housing market is looking better than it has in years. Home prices in April were up 12.1% compared with a year earlier, according to the S&P/Case-Shiller home-price index. The increase was the largest in seven years. And new homes sold at an annual pace of 476,000 in May, according to the U.S. Census Bureau—the best reading since July 2008. As the housing recovery continues, many related securities will appreciate. What's more, 70% of the mortgages the fund holds carry adjustable rates. That means the fund is positioned to serve as a hedge against inflation and rising interest rates, says Terrence Demorest, senior portfolio manager at Westmount Asset Management, a $1.6 billion investment advisor in Los Angeles. "We consider this a core position," says Demorest, who uses the fund for as much as 30% of his clients' fixed-income portfolios. "We have a lot of faith and conviction in what they're investing in."

Friedlander buys pools of mortgages rather than individual securities, but says he keeps a close eye on quality. He likes to see a large component of jumbo or "ultralux" loans behind the securities. These typically perform well in an improving economy, and rising home prices mean there's more collateral should a default occur. Friedlander prefers mortgages for owner-occupied properties, which have lower default rates than those for rentals or vacation homes. He looks for borrowers with substantial equity, and likes to see geographic diversification within a loan portfolio.

Friedlander has been looking at other kinds of structured credit, including commercial mortgage-backed securities and the student-loan market. Should events like sharply rising interest ratespush investors in those areas into panicked selling, says Friedlander, "this fund is ready to pounce on the opportunity."

_________________________


IMO...it’s obvious that Friedlander and Prabhu left WMI in March 2008 to start Angel Oak Partners in July 2008 with a plethora of inside information that lead to profitable investments.

After closing the first fund in 2013 (assets under management = $30 million), they opened another fund (assets under management = $3 billion). What is interesting is the fact that they continued to invest in WMI subsidiary created MBS Trusts.

[nhtrader]

Dmdmd2020 You're welcome, thanks for bouncing it over, I'm colorsvoid on BP. I thought this went unnoticed. And I could've sworn the report was filed on 4/1/18!? Maybe it was another I was researching?

[Dmdmd2020]

Chain of title?
Endorsements or assignments of title of loans after September 25, 2008?

The above important questions are the basis of ownership for portfolio loans and securitized loans alike regarding if JPMC is the rightful owner of WMI subsidiary originated loans which were securitized or kept on the WMI balance sheet (portfolio loans)?

IMO...the following articles and audio clips will prove that JPMC illegally endorsed/assigned WMI loans over to JPMC after September 25, 2008, thus JPMC did not acquire the portfolio loans from WMI (WMB + WMB, fsb) which totaled ~$247 billion upon seizure.

Article 1: https://bpinvestigativeagency.com/wamu-investor-code-ao1-revealed-chase-stipulates-it-represents-wamu-asset-acceptance-corp/

“WaMu Investor Code “AO1? Revealed – Chase Stipulates It Represents “WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp.”
Posted by Bill Paatalo on Jun 19, 2017 in Uncategorized | 1 comment
(DISCLOSURE: This article is not intended to be construed as legal advice. Seek advice from a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction regarding any of the information provided below.)

High praise to Attorney Ron Freshman in San Diego, CA and his paralegal Kimberly Cromwell who recently obtained this remarkable “Stipulation of Fact” from JPMorgan Chase Bank’s counsel. (See #8 – Chase Stipulated Fact – AO1 – WMAAC). Last November, I wrote the following article seeking the identity of private investor “AO1.” (See: https://bpinvestigativeagency.com/who-is-private-investor-ao1-jpmorgan-chase-refuses-to-reveal-the-identity-of-this-investor/).

Thanks to the aggressive prosecution and discovery efforts put forth by Attorney Freshman and his team, the answer has now been revealed. JPMorgan Chase’s counsel has stipulated in paragraph #8, “Investor code AO1 in the Loan Transfer History File represents WaMu Asset Acceptance Corporation.”

Folks, I have opined against Chase for years now that this investor code does not signify “banked owned” loans on the “books of Washington Mutual Bank,” but rather a securitization subsidiary of Washington Mutual, Inc. I’ve been attacked by Chase who has argued vehemently that my opinion is simply dead wrong, and has sought to have my testimony stricken. Well it appears as though I’ve now been vindicated! This stipulated fact runs contrary to Chase’s long standing position, in thousands of foreclosures across the United States, that it acquired “AO1? loans because they were “on the books” of “Washington Mutual Bank” per the Purchase & Assumption Agreement (PAA) with the FDIC. This has been a lie, as these “AO1? loans could not have been a part of the PAA due to the sale and securitization of said loans by WMB through its “off-balance sheet activities.” More so, Chase’s use of the FIRREA argument against homeowners for loans not on WMB’s books may have suffered a tremendous blow here.

It has long been my opinion that testimony put forth by Chase witnesses, like the following by Peter Katsikas, have been downright false. Again, more vindication. Here’s what Katsikas had to say under oath regarding investor code “AO1?:

PETER KATSIKAS,

called as a witness, having been duly sworn, testified as follows:

(Beginning – P. 43):

Q. And do you know whether or not at the time of the acquisition of the assets that are identified in the purchase and assumption agreement with the FDIC to Chase dated September 2008, did it include a list of the loans that Chase was acquiring?

A. I mean, I didn’t see an actual list, but there’s — it’s in the system. It’s in the MSP servicing — that’s a system the bank uses to service the accounts.

Q. Is it your testimony that the Freeman loans were owned by Washington Mutual F.A. at the time the bank failed?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it your testimony that Washington Mutual Bank or some subsidiary of the bank was not servicing those loan at the time?

MR. HERMAN: Can you read that back, please.

(Question read)

MR. HERMAN: At what time?

MR. WRIGHT: Prior to September 25, 2008, between the time they were made and September 25, 2008.

A. The servicer was Washington Mutual F.A.

Q. Okay. Was there an investor?

A. It was bank-owned. It’s always been bank-owned.

Q. It’s always been bank-owned?

A. Correct.

Q. And you know that because?

A. I reviewed Chase’s books and records.

Q. What in the books and records would indicate to you that it was

bank-owned versus not bank-owned?

A. Well, they’re through the investor screens and also the ID codes,investor ID codes.

Q. Okay. And the ID codes are letters, aren’t they?

MR. HERMAN: Objection.

A. They consist of letters and numerals.

Q. Okay. And what letters would indicate an investor?

A. There’s three digits or three characters.

Q. Two letters and a number?

A. No, it could be a mixture of.

Q. So what three characters — well, let’s put it another way. What characters would indicate a Chase-owned asset — a WaMu-owned asset?

Excuse me.

A. For these two loans?

Q. Yes.

A. AO1.

Q. AO1?

A. Yeah.

Q. And that AO1 stands for what?

A. That’s just the three digit code, which is bank-owned.

Q. AO1?

A. Uh-huh.

(Recess)

Katsikas Depo Transcript”

________________________________________


Article 2: https://bpinvestigativeagency.com/why-jpmorgan-chase-did-not-purchase-ownership-of-615b-worth-of-wamu-loans-in-three-simple-steps/

“Why JPMorgan Chase Did Not Purchase Ownership Of $615B Worth Of WaMu Loans In Three Simple Steps
Posted by Bill Paatalo on Jul 24, 2017 in Uncategorized | 0 comments
Here is a simple “3-step Analysis” to show that “ownership” of at least $615,000,000,000.00 (over half a TRILLION Dollars!) of WaMu loans were not purchased by JPMorgan Chase from the FDIC.

STEP 1:

The U.S. Senate Sub-Committee (Levin – Coburn Report) reveals in its findings of fact that WaMu sold and securitized at least $615B of residential mortgage loans through its subsidiaries “WaMu Asset Acceptance Corporation” and “Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corporation” who acted as “Depositors” in the securitization transactions.

See:

https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/senate-investigations-subcommittee-releases-levin-coburn-report-on-the-financial-crisis



Pg. 116 –

From 2000 to 2007, Washington Mutual and Long Beach securitized at least $77 billion in subprime and home equity loans. WaMu also sold or securitized at least $115 billion in Option ARM loans. Between 2000 and 2008, Washington Mutual sold over $500 billion in loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, accounting for more than a quarter of every dollar in loans WaMu originated.



Pg. 119 –

“WaMu Capital Corp. acted as an underwriter of securitization transactions generally involving Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp. or WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. Generally, one of the two entities would sell loans into a securitization trust in exchange for securities backed by the loans in question, and WaMu Capital Corp. would then underwrite the securities consistent with industry standards.

STEP 2:

See: Page 2. – PAA – (click here: FDIC-Chase – PAA)

“Assets” means all assets of the Failed Bank purchased pursuant to Section 3.1. Assets owned by Subsidiaries of the Failed Bank are not “Assets” within the meaning of this definition.”

STEP 3:

In the case of Fox v. JPMorgan Chase, a specific REMIC Trust is named in the action. To prevail on its argument that the loan was sold and transferred to the Trust, JPMorgan Chase and U.S. Bank, N.A. as Trustee, both admitted / “stipulated” that the loan contained both investor codes “AO1? and “369” in the loan transfer history, which means the loan was sold by Washington Mutual Bank to the subsidiaries prior to those subsidiaries transferring the loan into the Trust. AND, it was stipulated that the loan was NOT PURCHASED FROM THE FDIC.

(Click here: Chase Stipulated Fact – AO1 – WMAAC)

Stipulated Facts:

“8. Investor Code AO1 in the Loan Transfer History File represents WaMu Asset Acceptance Corporation.”

“9. Investor Code 369 in the Loan Transfer History File represents Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corporation.”

“10. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. did not purchase the loan from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.”



In the Fox case, “JPMorgan Chase” and “U.S. Bank as Trustee,” have taken a position that universally applies to all $615B of these securitized loans.

Each one of these loan transactions will show either the investor code “AO1,” “369,” or both somewhere in the “Loan Transfer History” screenshots within the servicing system, and as such, the loans were not purchased from the FDIC.

The presumptions that Chase has relied upon in order to maintain its position in thousands of foreclosure proceedings that (1) it acquired the loans through the PAA, and (2) the assignments of beneficial-ownership interests to the loans unto itself as “attorney-in-fact” for the FDIC have now been debunked by its own admissions! Unless of course, you were to believe in the [1/1,000,000] proposition that the Fox loan was the only loan not included in the receivership.”

____________________________________________


Article 3: https://bpinvestigativeagency.com/10th-circuit-court-of-appeals-if-wamu-notes-were-endorsed-post-receivership-firrea-does-not-apply/


“10th Circuit Court of Appeals – If WaMu notes were endorsed post-receivership, FIRREA does not apply!
Posted by Bill Paatalo on Apr 29, 2018 in Uncategorized | 0 comments
(Disclaimer: This is not legal advice. Seek an opinion from a licensed attorney regarding this information.)

ATTENTION EVERYONE WITH A WAMU MORTGAGE / DEED OF TRUST!:

For years now, JPMorgan Chase has been getting away with murder in foreclosure cases involving WaMu loans by hiding behind the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). If homeowners facing foreclosure of their WaMu loans by Chase were to raise claims or defenses regarding WaMu misconduct, including WaMu’s failure to transfer the notes by proper endorsements/ assignments to trusts, the courts almost universally have slammed the door shut in the homeowners’ faces by claiming it doesn’t have jurisdiction. If the claims weren’t raised with the FDIC by the “claims bar deadline of December 30, 2008” then too bad, game over.

Well maybe the game isn’t over if the arguments are made properly. This is because the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals just gave us this clarification regarding WaMu endorsed notes and FIRREA. Even though the homeowner lost in this ruling, this clarification is very useful to all.

“But it is clear from Pembroke Trust’s complaint that the alleged misconduct stretches years beyond WaMu’s failure and placement into receivership. The complaint contends that someone altered the blank copy of the note—which had not been endorsed back in 2006—to shore up title problems by fraudulently placing Ms. Riley’s endorsement on it after she no longer had endorsement authority. This event supposedly occurred sometime between 2012 and 2014—a time frame that is indisputably post-receivership. The FIRREA exhaustion requirement does not apply to post-receivership misconduct. See Homeland Stores, 17 F.3d at 1272-76. Therefore, we have jurisdiction over these nonrescission claims.”

(See: 18-4-27 – Order affirming District Court)

This is very significant, as there is an overwhelming amount of evidence to now show, and prove, that JPMorgan Chase has been executing assignments and fabricating endorsements of WaMu officers upon thousands of WaMu notes POST-RECEIVERSHIP. This is forgery! With FIRREA barred as a defense, it becomes an issue of fact that should prevent a dismissal of claims or the granting of a summary judgment if the allegations are that the notes were endorsed sometime AFTER September 25, 2008, and by unauthorized persons.

If anyone is currently facing a foreclosure action on a WaMu mortgage / deed of trust with an endorsement on the note by “Cynthia Riley,” “Jess Almanza,” “Robin Tange,” or “Leta Hutchinson” to name some, contact me immediately to discuss how my expert services can help.”


______________________________________

Audio clip as of May 03, 2018: http://www.blogtalkradio.com/neilgarfield/2018/05/03/10th-circuit-limits-chase-using-bankruptcy-claim-preemption-to-dismiss-lawsuits

Listen to the whole 30 minute clip....very informative!

“Bill Paatalo is back on the West Coast Foreclosure Show to discuss a recent 10th Circuit Court of Appeals ruling which going forward will deny Chase the right to use bankruptcy preemption rules to deny homeowners pursuing claims against Chase due to endorsements of notes from WAMU, when those ostensibly legal (not!) endorsements occurred after September 25, 2008. Sounds complicated let's unpack matters for you: When WAMU went into bankruptcy receivership after going broke in September 2008, the FDIC took over its assets in receivership, using that receivership to transfer the WAMU assets to Chase Bank. Meanwhile, the FDIC set a 'claims bar' date of December 30, 2008, which had the effect of limiting and sometimes preventing homeowners from pursuing lawsuits against Chase based upon note endorsements from WAMU, when those endorsements happened while the FDIC had WAMU in receivership. Since many of those WAMU to Chase note endorsements occurred after the FDIC receivership ended, the bankruptcy preemption rules Chase has been using to stifle lawsuits will no longer be available to Chase to shut down those same lawsuits against them over illegal note endorsements. And all of this by the way in a TILA rescission lawsuit. The 10th Circuit ruling of Pembroke Living Trust v. US Bank National Association concerns principally a TILA rescission claim, which the 10th Circuit shot down. While issuing that ruling, the Court formally addressed the bankruptcy preemption claim issue highlighted above.”


____________________________________

IMO....my conclusions as of August 09, 2018:

1). JPMC illegally transferred title of any WMI loan after September 25, 2008.

2). FIRREA defense no longer applies according to the 10th circuit ruling on April 2018.

3). JPMC was just a servicer not owner of any WMI originated loan

4). The $247 billion of portfolio loans still belongs to WMI and not JPMC, thus JPMC needs to pay book value for those loans.

5). $1.616 trillion in WMI securitized loans are owned by the Trustees that bought them when it was deemed a “true sale” upon creation of the MBS Trusts

6). WMI Escrow Marker Holders are the rightful owners of beneficial interests in MBS Trusts (IMO...participation is between 2.5%-5.16%.