Orda: Steven Levy wrote a whole book on that precise subject--titled "Crypto," if you are interested. He documents the NSA's omnipotent search for crytography the NSA can't break--and how they infiltrate, water down, and destroy any real efforts to create difficult encryption.
I don't think the NSA are behind the drag of TCG adoption.
They are all for it and have helped in many efforts. I think they and their allies want all the products (TC and others) to be implemented in a consistent manner by the OEM's and any Company developing/Marketing IT security products to the Gov'ts/Military and Enterprise.
The NSA has written many of the NIAP Protection Profiles that IT products are to be tested against for use in the critical infrastructure etc.
As an example they wrote the one for Software Based Encryption and the only product to date that has been certified is Microsoft's Bit Locker and it uses a TPM to store the encryption key when the Device is powered down.
Notice it has a Sunset Date.
Could be the world is about to start to migrate to hardware based encryption storage (OPAL and E-drives) after all. Could explain why all the Drive OEM's have continued to develop SED's and yet not much market demand for their efforts. JMO
" Encrypted Storage
Protection Profile for Software Full Disk Encryption Version 1.1 Sponsor = NSA Approved Date = 2014-03-31 Sunset Date = 2015-08-27
U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - Protection Profile for Software Full Disk Encryption Version 1.1
PP OVERVIEW
This PP addresses the threat that an adversary will obtain a lost or stolen hard disk (e.g., a disk contained in a laptop or a portable external hard disk drive) containing sensitive data. The Target of Evaluation (TOE) defined in this Protection Profile (PP) is for a software full disk encryption product that encrypts the data on the hard disk device. As defined by NIST: “Full Disk Encryption (FDE), also known as whole disk encryption, is the process of encrypting all the data on the hard drive used to boot a computer, including the computer’s OS, and permitting access to the data only after successful authentication to the FDE product.” Note that software encryption products will leave a portion of the drive unencrypted for the Master Boot Record (MBR) and the initial bootable partition. For this Protection Profile, the term “disk encryption” will be interpreted as per the NIST definition of full disk encryption modified to allow software disk encryption products to leave a portion of the drive unencrypted for the MBR and bootable partition so long as no information is written there that could contain user data.
Assigned to the following Validated Product
• VID10540 – Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 - BitLocker
Snips from the PP (there are many references to the TPM just search the PP):
Protection Profile for Software Full Disk Encryption Mitigating the Risk of a Lost or Stolen Hard Disk 31 March 2014
An authorization factor must consist of one of the following:
• An administrator-provided passphrase; or
• A bit string contained on an token external to the platform (e.g., a USB device)—defined as an external token authorization factor; or
• A combination of a passphrase and external token authorization factor;
And in addition to one of the above it may consist of:
• A Security Target (ST) author defined authorization factor (e.g. a bit string protected in a TPM and protected by a pin (which has anti-hammer protections incorporated)—defined as a TPM-protected authorization factor).
Also:
As long as the TOE supports at least one of these authorization factors, it can also support other authorization factors, including or a TPM-based authorization factor (shown on the right of the diagram above); these are specified in FCS_CKM.1(2). FCS_CKM.1(2) also specifies how the various authorization factors are combined to form the KEK. With this background, the key generation requirements are presented below.
Application Note: These requirements are intended to define how the authorization factors are used to create the KEK. While specific guidance to the ST author is provided below for each assignment and selection, the following is a high-level description of the point of this component. The ST author chooses a passphrase authorization factor, and/or an external token authorization factor. The ST Author then has the option of choosing a TPM-protected authorization factor or defining additional authorization factors. ...etc...
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