High Wire Networks Inc (HWNI)

[nordicroots]

Great points. And I am most intrigued by the third one on your list! It is very succinct but implies so much. Allow me to explain.
Looking beyond the prospects of developmental projects with German brewers, I have been shifting my attention to the plight of the International Oil Companies (IOCs) and the prospect of their “Stranded Assets” as highlighted by a recent white paper. Under numerous carbon emission legislation scenarios, it becomes apparent that positioning to be able to tap (pardon the pun) this single area of the market would present tremendous opportunities for a company with the right solutions to step up and partner with some of the strongest businesses on the planet blessed with superb balance sheets.
Here are some interesting excerpt from a white paper by Chathamhouse discussing some of the issues they currently face. Providing breakthrough technological solutions to this area of the market would be a game changer for sure.

https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-05-05-international-oil-companies-stevens.pdf

Maximizing bookable reserves
A key strategy of the IOCs’ business model was to maximize bookable proved reserves. This could be done either by exploration drilling and assessment to ‘prove’, with varying probability, that stated volumes of oil in a reservoir are recoverable with known technology and at current prices, or through the purchase of other companies with proved reserves on their books.13 In theory, more bookable reserves meant two things. First, it created expectations of future revenue. Second, it allowed companies to add the capital costs (including capitalized exploration expenditure) to their financial balance sheet. The value of oil or gas in the reserves is declared as supplementary information under US Securities and Exchange Commission rules under a notional formula, but does not appear as an asset in the company’s balance sheet.
Recent difficulties
‘Unburnable carbon’ Climate-change policies have evolved since the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1988 and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992. The Paris agreement of 2015 (see Box 4) consolidated the Framework Convention as a hybrid mechanism with a ‘bottom-up’ concerted effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through nationally determined plans (the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions – INDCs) rather than a set of quotas or obligations or a global carbon price determined at the UN level. This is then combined with a ‘topdown’ legal framework that requires countries to review and set ever more ambitious plans every five years. Although the majority of INDC policies focus on demand, some countries may use emission trading permits to establish a carbon price, and others may introduce carbon taxes. The World Bank estimates that carbon-pricing mechanisms currently cover 12 per cent of global emissions, and this number may rise significantly in 2017 when China launches a national emissions-trading scheme. All of this suggests that demand-driven ‘peak oil’ is a serious possibility.
The prospect of a peak in demand for oil and gas undermines the main strategy of the current and historical business models for oil and gas companies to maximize value for shareholders by preparing to meet increased demand. One consequence of the foreseeable decline in demand for oil, gas and coal means that the issue of ‘unburnable carbon’ has been moving rapidly up the agenda. The concept is a very simple idea. There exists a level of hydrocarbon resources in the world, made up of coal, oil and gas. If these reserves were burnt, they would produce 2,795 gigatons of carbon, with 65 per cent coming from coal, 22 per cent from oil and 13 per cent from gas. The scientific consensus reflected at the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change suggests that to achieve a 50 per cent probability of limiting global warming to 2°C, emissions should be limited to 3,000 gigatons of CO2. Before 2014, 1,970 gigatons had been emitted. The scientific consensus reflected at the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change suggests that to achieve a 50 per cent probability of limiting global warming to 2°C, emissions should be limited to 3,000 gigatons of CO2. Before 2014, 1,970 gigatons had been emitted. Taking account of changes in land use, deforestation and non-energy use, this leaves a ‘budget’ of 980 gigatons (in the range of 882 to 1,180) for post-2014 emissions. This means that only 565 gigatons of carbon can be added by 2050 (IEA, 2015). Unfortunately, estimates suggest that at current rates this figure will in fact be reached by 2028. It is in this sense and in this context that the balance of hydrocarbon resources becomes ‘unburnable’. The global excess of proved reserves over the ‘budget’ is so large that the uncertainties on both sides of the calculation do not undermine the possibility that companies hold reserves and resources that will not be developed. This has always been the case: reserves have increased steadily and, despite production, still stand globally for oil at around 60 years of current production. In relation to Figure 9, one study estimates that 340 billion barrels of oil resources will be produced and added to reserves that are not burnt by 2050 because of their higher cost.
The relevance of unburnable carbon for the IOCs’ prospects is obvious. A key pillar of their old business model is to maximize bookable reserves on the grounds that this will increase the value of the company in terms of book value and of expected future cash flows. This increased value is then expected to translate into higher share prices. However, the ‘unburnable carbon’ argument implies the value of these reserves could be overstated. This has given rise to much discussion about a ‘carbon bubble’ and the dangers of stranded assets, which carries important implications for the financial markets. It has been estimated that the top 100 coal and top 100 oil and gas companies had a combined value of $7.42 trillion as of February 2011 (IFAC, 2013). In March 2014, the chair of the Environmental Audit Committee of the UK House of Commons, Joan Walley, said that ‘Financial stability could be threatened if shares in fossil fuel companies turn out to be over-valued’ (Walley, 2014). In a similar vein, the governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, warned in September 2015 about the dangers to financial stability from climate change if it implies an over-valuation of assets. While the stranded-asset argument has appealing simplicity, it is potentially flawed in the context of providing a threat to the IOCs’ business model and should therefore be analysed carefully. In particular the interaction between reserves held by the NOCs and those held by the IOCs will be critical. A stranded asset can be defined as an asset that has lost value because circumstances have changed, or a potential asset that cannot be monetized because of circumstances beyond the owner’s control. The carbon-bubble argument suggests the IOCs’ assets will be stranded because policies designed to prevent climate change will prevent the reserves from being burnt.49 However, the time frame over which this is assessed is vital. Mark Carney has noted ‘the tragedy of the horizon’, whereby impacts beyond 10–15 years into the future are not considered by investors and central bank regulators. On average, the IOCs have a reserves-to production ratio of 13 years whereas that ratio is higher for NOCs.
There are questions over the demand response to lower prices in a post-Paris Agreement world, in which the contracting parties are committed to policies aimed at reducing emissions of greenhouse gases and therefore reducing fossil fuel consumption. This is reinforced by the fact that many governments realize that imposing sales taxes on oil products is a good way to raise revenue. Such sales taxes have large tax bases; inelasticity of demand means high rates can be imposed without reducing consumption; and they are relatively cheap to collect. Subsequently, many governments are absorbing some of the fall in crude-oil prices by increasing sales taxes. In a similar vein, many governments are removing or reducing subsidies on oil products. All of this implies the current lower crude prices may not produce lower product prices and hence the sort of demand response seen in the past. The oil price cycle described above may no longer be relevant.
Given some of these factors noted above, it occurs to me that some of the IOCs would be a logical place to start looking to establish partnering agreements and actually work to provide them with the solutions that help avoid the stranded assets scenario. This would ultimately work to the advantage of both parties and make both organizations stronger; the IOC by maximizing the value of producible reserves and the technology company that helps provide the solutions implied by your third bullet!