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Microsoft Flaw Demonstrates Dangers Of Remote Desktop Access
Fear is that attackers will soon come up with exploits for targeted attacks, worms
Mar 14, 2012 | 07:00 PM | 1 Comment
By Kelly Jackson Higgins
Dark Reading
Microsoft's Patch Tuesday warning of possible attacks emerging quickly for a vulnerability in its Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) is a chilling reminder of the potential dangers of desktop remote-access tools commonly used by IT departments to handle from afar help-desk issues and by administrators to manage virtualized machines.
The sole "critical" vulnerability among the updates in Microsoft's batch of patches yesterday was for a flaw in Microsoft's implementation of RDP, which gives one user remote access to another's desktop. Microsoft strongly urged users to patch this one (CVE-2012-002 in MS12-020) as soon as possible, or to apply the FixIt temporary fix that was also issued among the updates. Other security organizations, such as SANS, and vendors echoed Microsoft's warning that this particular patch should be a priority this month.
"Although Remote Desktop Protocol, RDP, is not enabled on the default configuration for any version of Windows, Microsoft strongly recommends that all customers prioritize the MS12-020 security update this month, in order to ensure that systems are protected," a Microsoft spokesperson said. Microsoft says an attacker could reverse-engineer its new patch for the RDP bug in relatively short order, which raises the potential for exploits to be written for a targeted attack or for automatic-propagation worms that would let attacks quickly take over systems within corporate networks for botnets or other purposes.
That's a scary scenario, security experts say. "We saw this two months ago with Symantec's pcAnywhere" remote-desktop tool code leak," says Wolfgang Kandek, CTO at Qualys. "All of these remote-access tools are great for productivity, but when you set them up and look at who connects and how you can restrict that," it's just username and password, which is weak, Kandek says.
Remote-desktop access tools are popular among organizations with branch offices and users who work at home: Rather than the old days where the IT guy flew to the branch office to physically work on the user's machine, the tools allow IT and security teams to work on users' machines from their own desktops. And this feature is used for managing virtualized servers and machines, including Amazon's EC2.
This particular vulnerability with Microsoft's RDP is a preauthentication one, so an attacker could get into the machine without even using credentials. "It seems rather easy to exploit, which is why they are urging [customers] to patch this as quickly as possible," Kandek says.
SANS Internet Storm Center handler Lenny Zeltser recommended that users move their RDP "listeners" to non-standard ports, rather than TCP port 3389, where it traditionally sits. "Until you install the patch, consider moving your RDP listeners to non-standard ports," Zeltser said in a SANS ISC Diary post.
Microsoft yesterday also offered up the FixIt tool for the vulnerability that lets users enable the Network Level Authentication (NLA) feature in RDP. NLA would require the attacker to authenticate to the server before trying to run an exploit, and ISC's Seltzer also recommends checking out NLA as an option.
[Remote VPN connections are not necessarily as secure as you'd think -- how enterprises can get infected by far-flung users via their SSL VPNs. See VPN An Oft-Forgotten Attack Vector. ]
Leaving RDP open basically increases your attack surface, says Rainer Enders, CTO Americas at NCP Engineering. "If you have it running, you have an active connection that can be attacked," he says. "And the way it's used, an app can be used from any machine."
Jason Miller, manager of research and development for VMware, says RDP is commonly used to connect to virtualized machines. "Although Microsoft is stating that most machines do not have RDP enabled by default, I know of many organizations that use RDP to troubleshoot machines," Miller said in a blog post. "This Windows component comes even more into play with machines that are not physically located next to users, such as virtualized machines."
He worries that the vulnerability could be exploited as a worm: "This bulletin simply scares me when it comes to protecting an environment from future attacks. This vulnerability has the real potential to become victim to a worm outbreak if this vulnerability is not patched," he said. "Although this vulnerability may be difficult to exploit, I can assure you attackers will be working hard to create a valid attack against the vulnerability."
So how can you use remote desktop access safely? Qualys' Kandek recommends adding another security control to the picture, including firewalls or first requiring a VPN log-in.
"The security battlefield today is the access device," NCP's Enders adds. "Administrators need to pay more attention [to these devices]."
Have a comment on this story? Please click "Add Your Comment" below. If you'd like to contact Dark Reading's editors directly, send us a message.
The Turf Battles over NFC Continue....
News Alert
from The Wall Street Journal
Wal-Mart and Target are among roughly two dozen retailers working together to develop a mobile-payments system to compete with similar products from Google and big cellphone companies.
The push represents an effort by frustrated merchants to get the upper hand in the fast-developing market that turns cellphones into payment devices. The race pits the retailers against banks, credit-card networks, telecommunications firms and technology companies.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204571404577255261085314318.html?mod=djemalertNEWS
Flaw Found in an Online Encryption Method
By JOHN MARKOFF
Published: February 14, 2012
SAN FRANCISCO — A team of European and American mathematicians and cryptographers have discovered an unexpected weakness in the encryption system widely used worldwide for online shopping, banking, e-mail and other Internet services intended to remain private and secure.
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The flaw — which involves a small but measurable number of cases — has to do with the way the system generates random numbers, which are used to make it practically impossible for an attacker to unscramble digital messages. It is not of immediate concern to most individual Internet users, but the operators of large Web sites will need to make changes to ensure the security of their systems, the researchers said.
The system requires that a user first create and publish the product of two large prime numbers in addition to another number to generate a public “key.” The original numbers are kept secret. To encrypt a message, a second person employs a formula that contains the public number. In practice, only someone with the knowledge of the original prime numbers can decode that message.
For the system to provide security, however, it is essential that the secret prime numbers be generated randomly. The researchers discovered that in a small but significant number of cases, the random number generation system failed to work correctly.
The importance in ensuring that encryption systems do not have undetected flaws cannot be overstated. The modern world’s online commerce system rests entirely on the secrecy afforded by the public key cryptographic infrastructure.
The researchers described their work in a paper that will be presented at a cryptography conference to be held in Santa Barbara, Calif., in August, but made their findings public on Tuesday because they believe the issue is of immediate concern to the operators of Web servers that rely on the public key cryptography system.
“This comes as an unwelcome warning that underscores the difficulty of key generation in the real world,” said James P. Hughes, an independent Silicon Valley cryptanalyst who worked with a group of researchers led by Arjen K. Lenstra, a widely respected Dutch mathematician who is a professor at the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne in Switzerland. “Some people may say that 99.8 percent security is fine,” he added. That still means that approximately as many as two out of every thousand keys would not be secure.
The researchers examined public databases of 4.7 million public keys that are used to secure e-mail messages, online banking transactions and other secure data exchanges. The researchers employed the Euclidean algorithm, an efficient way to find the greatest common divisor of two integers, to examine those public key numbers. They were able to produce evidence that a small percentage of those numbers were not truly random, making it possible to determine the underlying numbers, or secret keys, used to generate the public key.
They said they “stumbled upon” almost 27,000 different keys that offer no security. “Their secret keys are accessible to anyone who takes the trouble to redo our work,” they wrote.
To prevent this, one of the organizations that had collected the public keys has removed the information from the Internet and taken steps to protect it from theft.
To perform their study, the researchers used several databases of public keys, including one at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and another created by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a Internet privacy rights group. The foundation’s database, known as the SSL observatory, results from a project that was originally intended to investigate the security of the digital certificates that are used to protect encrypted data transmitted between Internet users and Web sites.
“We were very careful: we did not intercept any traffic, we did not sniff any networks,” Mr. Hughes said. “We went to databases that contained public information and downloaded public keys.”
News Alert
from The Wall Street Journal
For nearly a decade, hackers enjoyed widespread access to the corporate computer network of Nortel Networks, a once-giant telecommunications firm.
Using seven passwords stolen from top Nortel executives, including the chief executive, the hackers—who appeared to be working in China—penetrated Nortel's computers at least as far back as 2000 and over the years downloaded technical papers, research-and-development reports, business plans, employee emails and other documents.
The hackers also hid spying software so deeply within some employees' computers that it took investigators years to realize the pervasiveness of the problem.
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203363504577187502201577054.html?mod=djemalertNEWS
Samsung announces Galaxy Tab 2
View Photo Gallery — ?Here are some of the top consumer gadgets that have been creating a lot of buzz.
Hayley Tsukayama, Monday, February 13, 1:14 PM
Samsung has taken the wraps off of its next offering in the Galaxy Tab line, the Galaxy Tab 2. The seven-inch tablet is the first Samsung tablet to have Android 4.0, a.k.a. Ice Cream Sandwich.
The device has a 1GHz dual-core processor, a 3MP rear-facing camera and a front-facing camera for video chat. It also has some Samsung-specific features such as access to the Korean electronics company’s Music Hub, Readers Hub, Game Hub and Video Hub as well as its AllSharePlay system. The new content-sharing hub from Samsung lets users livestream their multimedia content to their new tablet from PCs, other Samsung devices and third-party cloud providers. It will have 3G or WiFi connectivity.
?From the iPod nano to the Sony Cyber-shot, tech gadgets in red and pink are all the rage for Valentine’s Day.
The Galaxy Tab 2 is 0.4 inches thick, and weighs 0.75 pounds, considerably lighter than the 9.7-inch iPad. The statement Samsung provided didn’t include a price, but Computerworld reports that the tablet will sell for $350.
The new tablet will be launched globally in March, starting in Britain.
Attackers Divert Bank Phone Calls to Cover Tracks
Researchers at Trusteer uncover banking malware that steals telephone information to help attackers re-route calls from banks alerting customers to fraud.
Feb 01, 2012 | 06:08 PM | 0 Comments
By Brian Prince
A new version of a sneaky piece of banking malware has been armed with a new feature to help attackers cover their tracks. According to Trusteer, certain new configurations of Ice IX – a modified variant of the Zeus platform – are capturing telephone account information belonging to their victims. The goal is to enable the attackers to divert calls from banks that are intended for the customer to telephones controlled by the attacker. “We believe the fraudsters are executing fraudulent transactions using the stolen credentials and redirecting the bank’s post-transaction verification phone calls to professional criminal caller services…that approve the transactions,” noted Amit Klein, CTO of Trusteer. In one attack observed by researchers at Trusteer, the malware stole the victim’s user ID and password as well as their secret question answer, date of birth and account balance at login. In the second phase of the attack, the victim is asked to update their home, mobile and work telephone information and select the name of their service provider from a drop-down list featuring three popular UK providers: British Telecommunications, TalkTalk and Sky. Next, the victim is asked to submit their telephone account number. “This is very private data typically only known to the phone subscriber and the phone company,” explained Klein. “It is used by the phone company to verify the identity of the subscriber and authorize sensitive account modifications such as call forwarding. The fraudsters justify this request by stating this information is required as a part of verification process caused by "a malfunction of the bank’s anti-fraud system with its landline phone service provider".” The end result is that attackers can circumvent attempts by the bank to alert customers via phone of malicious activity. Such activities are no longer rare, noted Liam O Murchu, manager of operations for Symantec Security Response. “Common post-theft activities we’ve observed include acting as a man-in-the-browser, whereby the malware prevents the end user from seeing fraudulent transactions on the bank’s website, ensuring the victims do not suspect any nefarious activity has occurred behind the scenes,” he said. “We’ve been seeing this tactic for a few years. Another example of such activity is malware that modifies the banking webpage displayed in the browser in a manner to prevent certain actions, such as printing a statement, logging off, etc. One such threat is W32.Qakbot.” Ice IX is actually one of the first spin offs of Zeus to appear last year after the Zeus source code was leaked. The malware is not particularly prevalent at this point, especially next to the native Zeus code’s binaries, Vikram Thakur, principal security response manager at Symantec, told Dark Reading. “We think the reason for this is because most people who are feeding off the Zeus source code aren’t necessarily developers and simply compile and use what they already have in their possession,” he said. “Zeus is by far the most prevalent banking malware in the wild today,” Murchu added. “That being said, there are other sophisticated pieces of malware in the wild that use rootkits to cover their tracks and are involved in siphoning information off one’s computer without specifically targeting banking information.”
Hackers shut down Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, El Al websites
Hack comes in the wake of series of cyber attacks over the past two weeks, and only a day after Hamas calls for harsher hacking attempts against Israel.
By Oded Yaron
Tags: El Al Hamas Tel Aviv Stock Exchange
Hackers shut down both the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) and El Al’s respective websites on Monday, one day after a hacker network threatened to carry out attacks on both sites.
The network, which goes by the name “nightmare group,” was able to cause severe problems for both sites. By 10 A.M., TASE's website was only partially functioning, while El Al’s website did not function at all.
A trader at the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.
Following the attack, Israeli Bank ordered to block IP addresses from Saudi Arabia, Iran and Algeria, fearing hackers could penetrate databases of Israeli banks. Even before Israel Bank gave the order, Discount bank and Bank Leumi blocked international access altogether.
The hack comes in the wake of a series of cyber attacks over the past two weeks, and only a day after Hamas called for harsher hacking attempts against Israeli websites.
“The penetration into Israeli websites opens a new front for electronic resistance and war against the Israeli occupation,” said Hamas spokesperson Sami Abu Zuhri on Sunday during a news conference in the Gaza Strip.
A TASE spokesperson stated that the trading system and the website are not connected, emphasizing that the trading system was in no way damaged by the hack.
El Al said they were “taking safety measures in the operations of the company’s website,” and that disruptions were to be expected.
Cyber-Crimes Pose 'Existential' Threat, FBI Warns
Posted: 1/12/12 02:26 PM ET
Despite the increased frequency and severity of online crime and espionage in 2011, many American corporations and consumers are still not taking the threat seriously, the FBI's top cyber official said Thursday.
The risk posed by criminal hackers is "existential, meaning it could eliminate whole companies," said Shawn Henry, the FBI's executive assistant director. If hackers were able to tamper with critical infrastructure such as the power grid, "it could actually cause death," Henry said in remarks at the International Conference on Cyber Security in New York.
To highlight the growing threat, Henry cited several recent FBI investigations, such as one involving a smaller company that went out of business after hackers stole $5 million from accounts, another concerning a larger firm that "virtually overnight" lost a decade of research and development worth $1 billion, and still another regarding hackers who encrypted millions of records of a health services company and demanded money for the password.
"We've seen the number and sophistication of the attacks by these cyber actors increase dramatically," Henry said.
"Hundreds of millions of dollars have been stolen, primarily through the financial services sector, just in the last couple years," he said. An organized crime ring in Eastern Europe, for example, earned about $750,000 per week from cyber theft, he added.
Henry's warnings came after what some have called the Year of the Hacker. Numerous major organizations, from Sony to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, revealed last year that hackers had infiltrated their networks to steal corporate secrets or leak sensitive customer data.
Many security breaches last year were attributed to the hacker group Anonymous, which claimed responsibility over the holidays for bringing down the servers of global intelligence firm Stratfor and stealing thousands of credit card numbers and other customer information.
But Henry made no mention of the group in his remarks. Instead, he said today's most dangerous hackers generally fit three profiles: nation states targeting research and development, intellectual property and corporate strategies of American companies; terrorists who use cyber attacks against critical infrastructure; and organized criminals tapping botnets (or networks of zombie computers) to attack corporate computer networks.
The FBI is also noticing more "persistent threats," hackers who access a company network "for many months, in some cases years" without detection, Henry said.
In one case, Henry said, "the administrator of a network ... had no concept or understanding that an adversary had been pilfering data, viewing data and all the transactions within that organizations for a very long time."
To combat rising cyber-crime, Henry said, the FBI has taken several new measures, such as embedding agents with police departments across Eastern Europe, including Estonia, Romania and Ukraine. Such efforts have paid dividends, he said, citing Operation Ghost Click, a two-year FBI investigation that led to the arrests of six men from Estonia for allegedly running a sophisticated Internet fraud ring that netted more than $14 million in online advertising revenue.
The growing cyber risks threaten not just corporations but also consumers, Henry said. The advent of new technology, particularly smartphones, has opened up new attack vectors for hackers. Many Americans now conduct personal banking by accessing Wi-Fi hot spots on their smartphones, which can lead them directly into traps set by cybercriminals.
"We've seen adversaries who set up these Wi-Fi hotspots intentionally to pilfer data," Henry said.
Hackers working within organizations, or "insider threats'' have also become a growing risk, he said. In February an Apple employee was convicted of transmitting confidential information to Asian suppliers of iPhone and iPod accessories in return for more than $1 million dollars in kickbacks, he said.
Yet despite the growing cyber-security threats, many organizations continue to ignore it, Henry said: "Either they don't recognize it, they don't understand it or they don't care."
Said Henry: "They look at many risks but they don't see this risk -- the loss of all their intellectual property, the loss of all their corporate strategies into the ether."
Authorities Probe US-China Commission Email Hack
Published: Monday, 9 Jan 2012 | 10:03 PM ET Text Size
By: Reuters
U.S. authorities are investigating allegations that an Indian government spy unit hacked into emails of an official U.S. commission that monitors economic and security relations between the United States and China, including cyber-security issues.
The request for an investigation came after hackers posted on the Internet what purports to be an Indian military intelligence document on cyber-spying, which discusses plans to target the commission - apparently using technical know-how provided by Western mobile phone manufacturers.
Appended to the document are transcripts of what are said to be email exchanges among commission members.
"We are aware of these reports and have contacted relevant authorities to investigate the matter. We are unable to make further comments at this time," Jonathan Weston, a spokesman for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, said on Monday.
The document's authenticity could not be independently verified. But the U.S.-China commission is not denying the authenticity of the emails.
Officials in India could not be reached for comment on the document's content or authenticity. One India-based website quoted an unnamed army representative as denying that India used mobile companies to spy on the commission and calling the documents forged.
The purported memo says that India cut a technological agreement — the details are not clear - with mobile phone manufacturers "in exchange for the Indian market presence." It cites three: Research in Motion [RIMM 15.505 0.165 (+1.08%) ], maker of the BlackBerry; Nokia [NOK 5.23 -0.01 (-0.19%) ]; and Apple [AAPL 421.73 -0.67 (-0.16%) ].
Apple spokeswoman Trudy Muller said her company had not provided the Indian government with backdoor access to its products. A spokesman for Nokia declined comment; RIM officials could not be reached for comment.
The U.S. Congress created the commission in 2000 to investigate and report on the national security implications of the economic relationship between the United States and China. The bipartisan, 12-member panel holds periodic hearings each year on China-related topics such as cyber security, weapons proliferation, energy, international trade compliance, and information policy.
The email breach, if confirmed, would be the latest in a series of cyber intrusions that have struck U.S. institutions ranging from the Pentagon and defense contractors to Google [GOOG 622.46 -27.56 (-4.24%) ].
A U.S. government official, who asked not to be identified, said the matter is under investigation. The FBI has jurisdiction to investigate cyber-hacking inside the United States. An FBI spokesman declined to comment.
Many of the previous hacks have been blamed on China. In this case, it is unclear whether India might have been eavesdropping on the U.S.-China commission for itself or sought to pass any information collected to authorities in China.
India Interested
India and China have more often been competitors rather than collaborators on economic and foreign policy matters in recent years, and India would be intensely interested in the official U.S. view of Beijing.
Stewart Baker, a former cyber-security policy expert at the National Security Agency and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, said the commission "would be a high-priority target for China, since USCC has been one of the most vocal US agencies in warning against Chinese hacking."
"What's interesting is that they seem to have become a target for India for the same reason," Baker said. "If it's genuine, it should cause red faces all around. At USCC for apparently getting hacked by Indian intelligence, and even more so at Indian intelligence for getting hacked by what may be a bunch of amateurs."
RELATED LINKS
China Hackers Hit US Chamber of Commerce: Report China ‘Incredibly Aggressive’ in Cyber Theft: Ex-CIA ChiefUS Blames China, Russia for Cyber Espionage
The purported emails between U.S.-China commission staff members, dating from September and October 2011, include discussions of how senior analysts from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence were scheduling a classified briefing for commission officials on a forthcoming National Intelligence Estimate looking at global manufacturing trends.
The messages also contain discussions between commission staff members about legislation pending in Congress related to alleged currency manipulation by China.
In one email, a staff member, reacting to criticism that a China currency bill pending on Capitol Hill would be "ineffective," argues: "Don't make the perfect the enemy of the good; we should confront bullies even if there is a risk we will get punched back."
The emails are attached to what purports to be a memo dated Oct. 6 and signed by a Colonel Ishwal Singh of India's Directorate General of Military Intelligence, Foreign Division.
In the memo, Singh describes how "the President" had given "sanction" to an operation "to gain access to USCC transmittals." What "President" the memo is referring to is not further explained.
According to the memo, because "MI" — presumably Military Intelligence — had trouble accessing U.S.-China commission cyber networks, the "decision was made earlier this year to sign an agreement with mobile manufacturers (MM) in exchange for the Indian market presence."
One U.S. law enforcement official said the commission would be a logical target for intense surveillance by Chinese authorities, since its principal mission was to produce policy studies and recommendations about the U.S.-China relationship.
In October 2009 the commission produced a detailed study on the "Capability of the People's Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation." A spokesman for the commission said it was working on a second study of cyber security issues related to China.
Apple's Scariest Competitor Rises 8% Amid iPhone Decline
By Louis Bedigian
Benzinga Staff Writer
iPhone demand is still very high, but only one company is experiencing a massive increase.
Samsung.
Once a harmless cellular phone manufacturer, now a dangerous iPhone competitor with the hottest Android devices, Samsung made significant progress in December. In addition to manufacturing the best-selling phone in England (or so a PC Advisor report claims), a new ChangeWave Research survey shows that more American consumers are looking toward Samsung smartphones.
The survey – which was conducted in December and included 4,000 North American consumers – asked, “Who is the manufacturer of the smartphone you plan on buying?” Not surprisingly, Apple (NASDAQ: AAPL [FREE Stock Trend Analysis]) leads the pack of manufacturers, which includes Motorola (NYSE: MMI), Research in Motion (NASDAQ: RIMM), and HTC.
With more than 50% of consumers choosing an iPhone (specific models weren't mentioned, but it's safe to assume that most buyers are planning to get the iPhone 4S), Apple is still the easy champion. There is really no comparison. Research in Motion couldn't even muster 3% of the market – since September, consumer interest has dropped to 2%! If that weren't so sad, it'd be hilarious.
HTC's decline is even worse, going from 6% to just 3%. While consumers may have been excited by its iPhone clones in the past, the company is clearly losing its edge in the Android market.
Then we have Motorola, which actually rose from 5% to 7%. I'm not even sure how this was possible, but it seems as if the redesigned RAZR may have sparked new interest in the struggling manufacturer.
From September to December, Apple dropped from 65% to 54%. Regard;ess, the iPhone maker still maintains a massive lead in the smartphone market (in terms of prospective consumer desire, at least). Better still, the ChangeWave results found that Apple has “never dominated smart phone planned buying to this extent more than two months after a major new release.”
The real winner of this survey, however, is Samsung, which saw an eight-point increase in consumer interest from September to December, jumping from 5% to 13%. While Apple may still be the dominant player in America, Samsung's rise in consumer interest presents a couple of problems for Apple.
First, it means that Samsung is effectively rising as the number-one manufacturer of iPhone alternatives. This is not necessarily a bad thing, as there will always be iPhone alternatives that manage to devour any portion of the market that Apple can't reach. However, it would be best for Apple if those competitors were all on the same weakness level. When one begins to jump ahead, that's when Apple could be in trouble.
Second, Samsung rose in the months after the iPhone 4S was released. This could simply be due to the fact that in September consumers were anticipating the release of the iPhone 5. Once the iPhone 4S was unveiled instead, some consumers may have decided to wait for the iPhone 5, and therefore said that they were more likely to buy another manufacturer's product within the next 90 days. This would be great news for Apple, since it would mean that these consumers will likely abandon its competitors and buy an iPhone 5 later this year.
That is the best-case scenario for Apple. The worst-case scenario would be that consumers were disappointed with the iPhone 4S and decided to look elsewhere.
But if that's the case, how was Apple able to maintain its dominance – and such a massive lead – two months after its latest phone was released? Doesn't that mean that Apple is actually improving its popularity?
No – it just means that Android's carrier advantage is finally over. Up until last year, consumers couldn't buy an iPhone without signing up for AT&T (NYSE: T). That changed the moment the iPhone 4S was released. Though the older iPhone 4 had come to Verizon (NYSE: VZ) earlier in the year, it wasn't until the 4S arrived that consumers could get a brand-new iPhone on all three of the major carriers, including Sprint (NYSE: S). Thus, the number of consumers who can now buy an iPhone is much greater than the number who could obtain one before, which inevitably helped the company maintain its powerful lead.
What's scary is how fast Samsung is growing despite Apple's lead. Today, Samsung will be a laughing point to iPhone loyalists. They'll snicker and sneer at the idea that anyone – least of all the maker of the Galaxy S II – could compete with Apple.
But with every month of improving sales, Samsung inches closer and closer to threatening Apple's dominance.
Symantec Hack Exposes Antivirus Source Code
Posted: 1/6/12 05:49 PM ET
By Nicola Leske
(Reuters) - Symantec Corp, the top maker of security software, said hackers had exposed a chunk of its source code, which is essentially the blueprint for its products, potentially giving rivals some insight into the company's technology.
The developer of the popular Norton antivirus software said the hackers stole the code from a third party and that the company's own network had not been breached, nor had any customer information been affected.
The software maker would not confirm the claim of a group called the Lords of Dharmaraja, who said that they had obtained Symantec's source code by hacking the Indian military.
Some governments ask their security vendors to provide their source code to ensure there is nothing in the code that could act as spyware, said Rob Rachwald, director of security strategy at data security firm Imperva.
Microsoft Corp, for example, in 2003 began allowing governments including Russia and international organizations such as NATO to look at the source code for its Windows operating system to dispel rumors that it had a secret "back door" built in to let the U.S. government spy on its users.
Symantec downplayed the risks, saying the exposed code was several years old.
"Symantec can confirm that a segment of its source code used in two of our older enterprise products has been accessed, one of which has been discontinued," Cris Paden, a spokesman for Symantec, said in an email on Friday.
Symantec, which reported $1.68 billion in sales in the third quarter, has benefited from heightened concern over hacking in the wave of high-profile attacks on Google Inc, Lockheed Martin and Nasdaq OMX Group Inc.
A software maker's intellectual property, specifically its source code, is its most precious asset. Symantec's Norton Internet Security is among the most popular software available to stop viruses, spyware, and online identity theft.
The code that was exposed for Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) 11.0 - which is used to block outgoing data from being leaked - was four years old and had been updated regularly since, Paden said.
The code for Symantec Antivirus 10.2 was five years old and had been discontinued, he said, adding that while it was not on sale anymore it was still being serviced.
"There are no indications that customer information has been impacted or exposed at this time," Paden said.
Rachwald said it was likely that Symantec's source code had been overhauled and that there was not much in the exposed code that the hackers did not know before.
"The workings of most of the anti-virus' algorithms have also been studied already by hackers in order to write the malware that defeats them," Rachwald said in a blog on the Imperva website.
Unlike hackers who aim to get around firewalls and software protection, rivals could be more interested in having the source code to study the market leader's software, Rachwald said.
On Thursday, the Lords of Dharmaraja said on the information-sharing website pastebin that it would soon list a Norton antivirus source code package. A person using the handle "Yama Tough" posted several items in an effort to prove the group had accessed the code.
"...we are sharing here one technical documentation file from Symantec Soruce (sic) Code transferred to Indian Military Intel and located at MEA (Ministry of External Affairs) servers we owneed (sic) recently," Yama Tough posted.
(Reporting by Nicola Leske in New York, additional reporting by Jim Finkle in Boston, editing by Matthew Lewis)
A while ago we entered into some partnership with NTT Dacomo. Could it be the beginning of positive things to come?
Nominating Committee!
Expect more younger technically-relevant and futuristic appointments to the BOD!
Very interesting to see that we are an important player with Windows 8!
Great thinking and a very smart PR move!It is from the horse's mouth.What are the bashers going to say?
U.S. Must Develop Cyber Intelligence To Counter Computer Threats: Study
By LOLITA C. BALDOR 09/12/11 06:54 AM ET
WASHINGTON -- A new study warns that the U.S. must develop cyber intelligence as a new and better coordinated government discipline that can predict computer-related threats and deter them.
The report by the Intelligence and National Security Alliance says the dramatic expansion of sophisticated cyber-attacks has moved beyond acceptable losses for government and businesses that simply threaten finances or intellectual property.
"The impact has increased in magnitude, and the potential for catastrophic collapse of a company has grown," said the report, which is slated to be released later this month. It adds that it is not clear that the business community understands or accepts that.
The report comes amid growing worries the U.S. is not prepared for a major cyberattack, even as hackers, criminals and nation states continue to probe and infiltrate government and critical business networks millions of times a day.
INSA, a non-partisan national security organization, says the U.S. must develop strategies beyond the current "patch and pray" procedures, create cyber intelligence policies, coordinate and share intelligence better among government agencies and businesses, and increase research on attack attribution and warnings.
And it says the U.S. must develop effective cyber intelligence so officials can assess and mitigate the risks.
Many of the report's observations echo sentiments expressed by Pentagon and Department of Homeland Security officials who have been struggling to improve information sharing between the government and key businesses. But efforts to craft needed cybersecurity legislation have stalled on Capitol Hill.
INSA's report also lays out the growing threats from other nations – including those who are friendly, corrupt or just unable to control hackers within their borders.
While it doesn't name the countries, it notes that failed states provide opportunities for hackers, as they do for criminals and terrorists, while other nations tolerate the criminals as long as they concentrate their activities beyond their borders.
U.S. officials have long pointed to Russia and China, as well as a number of Eastern European nations, as some of the leading safe havens for cybercriminals, or government-sponsored or tolerated hacking.
At the same time, the report warns that the U.S. has also outsourced much of the design and maintenance of computer technology to other countries where potential adversaries can easily insert themselves into the supply chain.
"The present situation is as dangerous as if the United States decided to outsource the design of bridges, electrical grids, and other physical infrastructure to the Soviet Union during the Cold War," said INSA, which is headed by Frances Townsend, who was homeland security adviser in the Bush administration.
Much like the criticism of the overall intelligence community in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, the INSA report says that cyber intelligence needs better coordination among government agencies, as well as with the private sector.
___
Patient Data Posted Online in Major Breach of Privacy
By KEVIN SACK
Published: September 8, 2011
A medical privacy breach at Stanford University’s hospital in Palo Alto, Calif., led to the public posting of medical records for 20,000 emergency room patients, including names and diagnosis codes, on a commercial Web site for nearly a year, the hospital has confirmed.
Since discovering the breach last month, the hospital has been investigating how a detailed spreadsheet made its way from one of its vendors, a billing contractor identified as Multi-Specialty Collection Services, to a Web site called “Student of Fortune,” which allows students to solicit paid assistance with their school work. Gary Migdol, a spokesman for Stanford Hospital and Clinics, said the spreadsheet first appeared on the site on Sept. 9, 2010, as an attachment to a question about how to convert the data into a bar graph.
Even as government regulators strengthen oversight by requiring public reporting of breaches and imposing heavy fines, experts on medical security said the Stanford incident spotlights the persistent vulnerability posed by legions of outside contractors who gain access to private data.
The spreadsheet contained names, diagnosis codes, account numbers, admission and discharge dates, and billing charges for patients seen at Stanford Hospital’s emergency room during a six-month period in 2009, Mr. Migdol said. It did not include Social Security numbers, birthdates, credit-card accounts or other information used to perpetrate identity theft, he said, but the hospital is offering free identity protection services to affected patients.
The breach was discovered by a patient and reported to the hospital on Aug. 22, according to a letter written four days later to affected patients by Diane Meyer, Stanford Hospital’s chief privacy officer. The hospital took “aggressive steps,” and the Web site removed the post the next day, Ms. Meyer wrote. It also notified state and federal agencies, Mr. Migdol said.
“It is clearly disturbing when this information gets public,” he said. “It is our intent 100 percent of the time to keep this information confidential and private, and we work hard every day to ensure that.”
Diane Dobson, of Santa Clara, Calif., said her “jaw dropped” on Saturday when she intercepted the letter from Ms. Meyer addressed to her 21-year-old son, who she said received emergency psychiatric treatment at Stanford in 2009. Ms. Dobson said it could have been disastrous if her son, who lives at home, had learned that his name was linked online to a diagnosis for psychosis.
“My son, I can tell you, is fragile and confused enough that this would have sent him over the edge,” Ms. Dobson said. “Everyone with an electronic medical record is at risk, and that means everyone.”
The incident at Stanford, while egregious in its details, is far from rare. Records compiled by the Department of Health and Human Services reveal that personal medical data for more than 11 million people has been improperly exposed during the last two years alone.
Since passage of the federal stimulus package, which included provisions requiring prompt public reporting of breaches, the government has received notice of 306 incidents between September 2009 and June 2011 that affected at least 500 people. Four of the breaches involved more than a million people each. A recent report to Congress tallied 30,000 smaller breaches from September 2009 to December 2010, affecting more than 72,000 people.
The major breaches — a disconcerting log of stolen laptops, hacked networks, unencrypted records, misdirected mailings, missing files and wayward e-mails — took place in 44 states.
One occurred at Stanford’s Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital in January 2010, when a desktop computer holding the medical records of 532 patients was stolen from the heart center by an employee. Hospital officials said at the time that no patient information was compromised.
But California’s Department of Public Health fined the hospital $250,000, the maximum allowed, for failing to report the breach within five days of discovery, as is required under state law. State officials contend it took the hospital 19 days to disclose. The hospital contests that timeline and is appealing the fine, a Department of Public Health spokesman said.
The breaches at Stanford reinforce that even the most prestigious medical centers are not immune to risk.
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Netherlands Acknowledges Hacking of Government Sites
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published: September 3, 2011
AMSTERDAM — The Dutch government said Saturday it could not guarantee the security of its own Web sites, days after the private company it uses to authenticate them acknowledged it had been hacked. An official also said the government was taking over the company’s operations.
The announcement affects millions of people who use the Netherlands government’s online services and rely on the authenticator, DigiNotar, to confirm they are visiting the correct sites. To date, there have been no reports of stolen identities or other specific security breaches.
Officials stopped short of telling people not to use government Web sites, but said they should heed warnings posted on the sites or from their browsers. Already, Google and other major Web browser providers have begun rejecting security certificates issued by DigiNotar.
It is unclear who is behind the hacking, though Google said last week that those affected “were primarily located in Iran.” The hacking’s extent also is unclear, and investigators are trying to find out how many bogus certificates were issued, and what other sites — or countries — were affected.
Piet Hein Donner, the Dutch interior minister, said that, for now, a user of government sites could not be certain “that he is on the site where he wanted to be.”
Earlier in the week, DigiNotar acknowledged it had been hacked in July, though it did not disclose it at the time. It said as late as Tuesday that its certificates for government sites had not been compromised.
But Mr. Donner said a review by an external security company had found DigiNotar’s government certificates were compromised, and that the government was now taking control of the company’s operations.
“As distressing as this situation is for DigiNotar, the company is cooperating in a professional manner,” he said.
DigiNotar could not be reached for comment Saturday.
How about DELL?
HP Sinks as Company Refocuses on Corporate Biz
SAN FRANCISCO August 19, 2011 (AP)
Hewlett-Packard Co.'s shares sank to a 6-year low Friday after the technology conglomerate announced third-quarter results and said it will shut down its mobile devices business, try spinning off its PC business and pay about $10 billion for business software maker Autonomy Corp.
THE SPARK: HP said Thursday that it will attempt to spin off or sell its PC business, which is the largest in the world, and buy Autonomy — one of HP's largest acquisitions ever — to enhance its software and services offerings. It also said that by October, it will stop churning out smartphones and tablet computers, which run on the webOS software the company got when it paid $1.8 billion for struggling mobile device maker Palm Inc. last year.
The company said its third-quarter net income rose, but it gave a lower outlook for the current quarter than analysts expected and it lowered its revenue outlook for the full year.
THE BIG PICTURE: HP, based in Palo Alto, Calif., is trying to focus on its strength in the corporate market. Its consumer business has struggled in recent years as it competes against Apple's iPhone and iPad and against phones and tablets running Google Inc.'s Android operating software. By getting out of the consumer market, the company will become more like its business technology rivals IBM Corp., Oracle Corp. and Cisco Systems Inc.
THE ANALYSIS: In a note to investors, Sterne Agee analyst Shaw Wu downgraded the stock to "neutral" from "buy," saying the changes at HP present "increased execution risk."
Wu, who also removed his $33 price target for the stock, noted that the company's PC business brings in $40 billion in revenue per year — about 30 percent of the company's total revenue and 16 percent of its net income.
Though he agrees with HP's reasoning for removing the PC business, he said uncertainty about the business will put pressure on the unit's financials and its value will drop because it's now clearly up for sale.
Wu is concerned that HP "may be stretched thin" by making all these changes at once.
SHARE ACTION: HP shares sank $5.91, or 20 percent, to $23.60 after falling as low as $22.75 earlier in the day, its lowest point since June 2005. It has traded as high as $49.39 in the past year.
This is a serious research company and will bring us to the eyes of many knowledgeable investors!
Great find!
Citi Card Data Hacked Again
Breach Exposes PII about 92K Japanese Customers
by Tracy Kitten
Just over a month after Citigroup confirmed a breach of its online banking platform, a second breach affecting Citi customers has come to light, this time in Japan.
More...
Report identifies widespread cyber-spying
By Ellen Nakashima, Published: August 2
A leading computer security firm has used logs produced by a single server to trace the hacking of more than 70 corporations and government organizations over many months, and experts familiar with the analysis say the snooping probably originated in China.
Among the targets were the Hong Kong and New York offices of the Associated Press, where unsuspecting reporters working on China issues clicked on infected links in e-mail, the experts said.
Other targets included the networks of the International Olympic Committee, the United Nations secretariat, a U.S. Energy Department lab, and a dozen U.S. defense firms, according to a report to be released Wednesday by McAfee, a security firm that monitors network intrusions around the world.
McAfee said hundreds of other servers have been used by the same adversary, which the company did not identify.
But James A. Lewis, a cybersecurity expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said “the most likely candidate is China.” The target list’s emphasis on Taiwan and on Olympic organizations in the run-up to the Beijing Games in 2008 “points to China” as the perpetrator, he said. “This isn’t the first we’ve seen. This has been going on from China since at least 1998.”
Another computer expert with knowledge of the study, who spoke on the condition of anonymity out of reluctance to blame China publicly, said the intrusions appear to have originated in China.
The intruders were after data on sensitive U.S. military systems, as well as material from satellite communications, electronics, natural gas companies and even bid data from a Florida real estate company, McAfee said. Forty-nine of the 72 compromised organizations were in the United States.
“We’re facing a massive transfer of wealth in the form of intellectual property that is unprecedented in history,” said Dmitri Alperovitch, McAfee’s vice president of threat research. He would not name the private entities targeted, but said McAfee helped half a dozen of them investigate intrusions.
Some of the intrusions — such as one into the World Anti-Doping Agency in Montreal — are continuing, he said. Spokesmen for that organization and for the International Olympic Committee said they were not aware of the intrusions. A U.N. spokesman said technicians analyzing the logs have not seen evidence of stolen data. The Energy Department had no comment.
According to the report, which does not identify the AP by name, the organization’s New York office was targeted in August 2009 in an intrusion that lasted, on and off, for eight months. Its Hong Kong bureau was penetrated at the same time, in an intrusion that continued for 21 months.
AP spokesman Jack Stokes said the company was aware of the report. “We do not comment on network security,” he said.
The Associated Press has been targeted before. A March 2009 report by Canadian researchers about allegations of Chinese espionage against the Tibetan community found that computer systems in AP offices in Hong Kong and Britain had been compromised.
McAfee had been aware for years of a “command and control” server located in a Western country that was used to control malware deployed on target computers. But the firm just recently discovered that the hackers had made a tradecraft mistake, configuring the server to generate logs that identified every Internet protocol address the server had controlled since 2006.
Google’s disclosure early last year that hackers in China had broken into its networks and stolen valuable source code was a watershed moment: A major U.S. company volunteered that it had been hacked. Google also said that more than 20 other large companies were similarly targeted.
Scott Borg, chief economist at the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit, a research group, has assessed the annual loss of intellectual property and investment opportunities across all industries at $6 billion to $20 billion, with a big part owing to oil industry losses. These firms spend hundreds of millions of dollars to explore oil fields before bidding on them, Borg said.
One measure of pain came recently when EMC Corp. disclosed that it had taken a $66 million charge to cover remediation costs associated with a March intrusion of its RSA division. That intrusion, which industry experts say appeared to have originated in China, resulted in the compromise of RSA’s SecurID computer tokens that companies and governments worldwide use to log on remotely to workplace systems.
As a result of the compromise, at least a dozen major financial institutions are switching to other vendors, said Gary McGraw, chief technology officer at Cigital, a security firm that works with banks. Stina Ehrensvard, chief executive of YubiKey in Palo Alto, Calif., said at least 25 firms have switched to YubiKey or are testing its token as a result of the RSA breach.
Last updated: August 3, 2011 2:00 am
Security concerns for Apple servers
By Joseph Menn in Las Vegas
Companies relying on Apple servers might be more susceptible to the most harmful type of cyber-attacks than those with Windows set-ups, research to be presented at the Black Hat security conference on Wednesday suggests.
Though a far lower proportion of Apple laptops and desktop computers become infected with malicious software than do their Windows PC rivals, a sophisticated hacker would find it easier to roam through an Apple network once inside, the report finds.
Hackers claim Apple security breach
Threat ends Mac users’ comfort zone
Apple Macs hit by scareware attacks
Apple open to lawsuit over data collection
In depth Apple
Researchers from consulting firm iSEC Partners showed the Financial Times an advance copy of their presentation to the conference, which begins in Las Vegas on Wednesday.
Apple did not respond to questions about the report.
A unit of NCC Group, iSEC advises clients including Google, Facebook and four of the five largest US commercial banks on security. The team said that while the security of Apple’s Mac OS X operating system for individual computers had improved with new versions, infections were no longer unheard of. This year, Apple issued a series of security updates to its software as it battled with distributors of fake antivirus programs who tricked some Mac users into downloading and installing their wares.
Just last week, Microsoft, which makes Windows software, reported that it had discovered that a Mac version of a program for stealing passwords, called Olyx, now exists.
Company IT departments increasingly assume that one or more computers under their watch will become infected at some point. Hackers use personalised e-mails with malicious attachments that can appear to have been sent by a friend or colleague, or previously unknown software that security scans will not detect, or both, as in the recent attacks on security firm RSA and the International Monetary Fund.
For companies with something of value to protect, the test is what happens next. In what have been termed “advanced persistent threats”, hackers typically try to move through the information networks, taking control of administrator or executive accounts and increasing their levels of authorised access.
Windows-run servers had been retooled to make that more difficult, said iSEC researcher Alex Stamos, but Apple’s server software is lagging behind.
Among other measures on its servers, Microsoft enforces the use of one set of encryptions, which are difficult to crack. But Apple had multiple pieces of server software with five different authentication systems, Mr Stamos said, all of which can be broken.
Apple’s server security was not as critical if corporate technology departments kept Macs isolated from the network. But, as Apple’s share of the business market has increased, more companies have added Apple server software and treated the desktop computers as part of the network.
Is CISCO using Trusted Platform Modules?
by may1sep2 » Sat Jul 23, 2011 9:26 am
If you look at the bottom of article, at a Cisco site they have instructions for installing
Trusted Platform Modules. Interesting article showing a push being put on in the UK.
Categories
Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Computing & WAVE
Technology Update 7 Responses »
Dec 062010
I was invited to the EU Trusted Computing Seminar last week. It was really interesting and I thought I would give a summary about what it was about.
All organisations who deal with sensitive information should take note of this. One of the major draw backs with information security is you can spend a lot of time and money securing the network with VPN’s, firewalls, encryption etc. but at the end of the day your weak point will be the end user. It doesn’t matter how secure your network is if your end users keep sensitive information locally it’s at risk of falling into the wrong hands. There have been many examples of laptops and portable devices being lost or stolen with critical information on it.
Most hardware vendors today are now including a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip in their equipment. The list of vendors who have been supporting this technology for a while is endless. I was however surprised that Apple and Cisco haven’t joined the party. I’m not sure why. I did see companies like Juniper and HP on the list.
This module controls the end device security at the hardware level. It has the ability to store certificates and keys for encryption. Prior to this seminar I thought private software certificates were fairly secure. During the workshops they demonstrated with some simple free tools downloaded from a Google search you were able to export a private certificate and install it on another device.
TPM allows you to move the management of these software certificates to the hardware level. When you try and export the private certificate the TPM won’t allow it. The TPM is also used to encrypt self encrypting disks for example Seagate so that if devices are lost or stolen the information remains secure. The TPM is enabled in the BIOS and even if the disks are removed and placed in another machine the information still can’t be accessed. These are just some of the features of the TPM. The thing is the TPM is just a module and is widely distributed but hardly enabled. It needs something to enable it and drive it. This is where WAVE (http://wave.com/) comes into play. It’s an inexpensive tool to enable and manage the TPM. It has some really advanced features which include being able to lock down USB ports, remotely manage security on devices, and works with other 3rd party applications like Microsoft Bitlocker.
WAVE has been very successful in the US and there’s going to be a big push to introduce this into the public and banking sectors in the UK. It’s very possible that it might even become a compliance requirement in the future.
If you are an IT Manager or Director and looking to refresh your desktops I would strongly urge you to make sure your device has a TPM. The TPM is very inexpensive. I was told it’s basically free so there’s no excuse. The important thing to note is that the TPM can’t be fitted to a device retrospectively. You need to purchase a whole new device. If you are looking at buying new hardware it would be worth checking that it comes with a TPM.
We are going to be working with WAVE to better understand this technology so we’re able to help you as the end customer when the time comes to enable your TPM with WAVE.
I hope this has been helpful. If you have any questions feel free to contact me.
— [ UPDATE 01/02/2011 ] —
I would like to thank Michael Mainelli from Zyen for providing this update from Cisco:
We have TPM as an option in out server blades and soon to be in our rack mount servers.
These links are out on cisco.com
Cisco UCS C250 M2 Extended-Memory Rack-Mount Server
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/partner/prod ... mbers.html
From link above, see that several models have a TPM module option, “Trusted Platform Module Chip R200-TPM1”.
UCS 200 Installation Guide, Installing a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/partner/docs ... #wp1085003
UCS 210 Installation Guide, Installing a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/partner/docs ... #wp1054148
— [ UPDATE 22/04/2012 ] —
Click here for more information:
Laptop/Notebook Security (TPM)
Posted by Michael Whittle at 8:00 pm Tagged with: hardware certificates, mobile laptop security, mobile notebook security, opal, opal drives, remote access security, remote security administration, sed, self encrypting drives, tpm, wave partner, wave systems, wireless security
http://www.lifecycle-ps.com/blog/?cat=4
may1sep2
Posts: 69
Joined: Thu Jan 27, 2011 6:20 pm
From Snackman
In case the link does open for you
by Snackman » Thu Jul 21, 2011 6:07 pm
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3015103 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001003-6Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015104 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 3000 12-001003-7Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015105 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 5000 12-001003-8Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015106 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001003-9Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015107 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 1-49 12-001003-1Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015108 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 50-9 12-001003-2Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015109 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001003-3Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015110 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001003-4Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015111 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001003-5Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015112 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001003-6Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015113 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 3000 12-001003-7Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015114 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 5000 12-001003-8Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015115 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001003-9Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015116 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 1-49 12-001003-1Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015117 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 50-9 12-001003-2Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015118 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001003-3Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015119 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001003-4Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015120 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001003-5Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015121 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001003-6Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015122 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 3000 12-001003-7Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015123 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 5000 12-001003-8Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015124 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001003-9Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015134 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001004-1Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015135 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001004-2Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015136 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001004-3Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015137 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001004-4Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015138 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001004-5Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015139 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001004-6Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015140 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001004-7Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015141 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001004-8Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015142 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001004-9Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015143 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001004-1Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015144 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001004-2Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015145 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001004-3Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015146 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001004-4Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015147 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001004-5Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015148 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001004-6Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015149 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001004-7Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015150 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001004-8Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015151 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001004-9Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015152 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001004-1Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015153 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001004-2Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015154 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001004-3Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015155 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001004-4Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015156 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001004-5Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015157 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001004-6Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015158 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001004-7Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015159 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001004-8Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015160 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001004-9Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015170 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-1Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015171 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-2Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015172 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-3Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015173 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-4Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015174 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-5Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015175 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-6Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015176 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-7Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015177 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-8Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015178 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-9Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015179 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-1Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015180 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-2Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015181 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-3Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015182 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-4Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015183 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-5Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015184 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-6Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015185 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-7Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015186 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-8Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015187 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-9Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015188 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-1Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015189 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-2Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015190 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-3Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015191 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-4Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015192 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-5Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015193 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-6Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015194 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-7Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015195 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-8Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015196 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-9Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015198 WAVE FOR BITLOCKER MGMNT YEAR 1 GOLD MA 12-001006-Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015199 WAVE FOR BITLOCKER MGMNT YEAR 2 GOLD MAI 12-001006-Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015200 WAVE FOR BITLOCKER MGMNT YEAR 3 GOLD MAI 12-001006-Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015210 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-1Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015211 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-2Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015212 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-3Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015213 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-4Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015214 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-5Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015215 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-6Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015216 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-7Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015217 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-8Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015218 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-9Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015238 WAVE ERAS SED-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT YR 12-001008-Y1
3015239 WAVE ERAS SED-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT YR 12-001008-Y2
3015240 WAVE ERAS SED-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT YR 12-001008-Y3
3015242 WAVE ERAS TPM-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT YR 12-001009-Y1
3015243 WAVE ERAS TPM-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT YR 12-001009-Y2
3015244 WAVE ERAS TPM-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT YR 12-001009-Y3
3015246 WAVE ERAS BL-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT YR 12-001010-Y1
3015247 WAVE ERAS BL-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT YR 12-001010-Y2
3015248 WAVE ERAS BL-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT YR 12-001010-Y3
3015294 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 2 GOLD MAINT 1-49 S 12-001012-1Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015295 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 2 GOLD MAINT 50-99 12-001012-2Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015296 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 2 GOLD MAINT24 12-001012-3Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015297 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 2 GOLD MAINT49 12-001012-4Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015298 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 2 GOLD MAINT99 12-001012-5Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015299 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 2 GOLD MAINT 1000-2 12-001012-6Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015300 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 2 GOLD MAINT 3000-4 12-001012-7Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015301 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 2 GOLD MAINT 5000-9 12-001012-8Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015302 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 2 GOLD MAINT 10000- 12-001012-9Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015303 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 3 GOLD MAINT 1-49 S 12-001012-1Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015304 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 3 GOLD MAINT 50-99 12-001012-2Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015305 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 3 GOLD MAINT24 12-001012-3Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015306 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 3 GOLD MAINT49 12-001012-4Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015307 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 3 GOLD MAINT99 12-001012-5Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015308 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 3 GOLD MAINT 1000-2 12-001012-6Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015309 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 3 GOLD MAINT 3000-4 12-001012-7Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015310 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 3 GOLD MAINT 5000-9 12-001012-8Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015311 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 3 GOLD MAINT 10000- 12-001012-9Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015321 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 2 GOLD M 12-001013-1Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015322 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 2 GOLD M 12-001013-2Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015323 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 2 GOLD M 12-001013-3Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015324 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 2 GOLD M 12-001013-4Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015325 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 2 GOLD M 12-001013-5Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015326 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 2 GOLD M 12-001013-6Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015327 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 2 GOLD M 12-001013-7Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015328 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 2 GOLD M 12-001013-8Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015329 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 2 GOLD M 12-001013-9Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015330 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 3 GOLD M 12-001013-1Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015331 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 3 GOLD M 12-001013-2Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015332 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 3 GOLD M 12-001013-3Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015333 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 3 GOLD M 12-001013-4Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015334 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 3 GOLD M 12-001013-5Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015335 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 3 GOLD M 12-001013-6Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015336 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 3 GOLD M 12-001013-7Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015337 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 3 GOLD M 12-001013-8Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015338 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 3 GOLD M 12-001013-9Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015348 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1-49 12-001014-1Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015349 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 50-9 12-001014-2Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015350 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001014-3Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015351 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001014-4Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015352 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001014-5Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015353 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001014-6Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015354 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 3000 12-001014-7Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015355 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 5000 12-001014-8Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015356 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001014-9Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015357 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 1-49 12-001014-1Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015358 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 50-9 12-001014-2Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015359 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001014-3Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015360 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001014-4Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015361 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001014-5Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015362 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001014-6Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015363 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 3000 12-001014-7Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015364 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 5000 12-001014-8Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015365 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001014-9Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015366 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 1-49 12-001014-1Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015367 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 50-9 12-001014-2Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015368 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001014-3Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015369 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001014-4Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015370 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001014-5Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015371 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001014-6Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015372 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 3000 12-001014-7Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015373 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 5000 12-001014-8Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015374 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001014-9Y3 Vendor Authorization
Software >> Internet Application >> Internet Security
2267472 PROTECTDRIVE V8.2X SOFTWARE AND LICENSE 14-000079-1 Vendor Authorization
2267478 WAVE TOTAL SECURITY BUNDLE 50-500 USERS 14-000082-1 Vendor Authorization
2267479 TOTAL SECURITY BUNDLE 501-1000 USERS 14-000082-2 Vendor Authorization
2267480 TOTAL SECURITY BUNDLE 1001-2500 USERS 14-000082-3 Vendor Authorization
2267481 TOTAL SECURITY BUNDLE 2501-5000 USERS 14-000082-4 Vendor Authorization
2267482 TOTAL SECURITY BUNDLE 5001-10000 USERS 14-000082-5 Vendor Authorization
2455859 SafeNet ProtectDrive V8.2X Software and 14-000079-2 Vendor Authorization
2488531 SAFENET PROTECTDRIVE V8.2X SOFTWARE 14-000079-3 Vendor Authorization
2488533 SAFENET PROTECTDRIVE V8.2X SOFTWARE 14-000079-4 Vendor Authorization
2488535 SAFENET PROTECTDRIVE V8.2X SOFTWARE 14-000079-5 Vendor Authorization
2658310 ERAS/ESC TD EDITION BUNDLE 50 - 500 LICE 14-000125-1 Vendor Authorization
2658311 ERAS/ESC TD EDITION BUNDLE 501 - 1000 LI 14-000125-2 Vendor Authorization
2658312 ERAS/ESC TD EDITION BUNDLE 1001 - 2500 L 14-000125-3 Vendor Authorization
2658313 ERAS/ESC TD EDITION BUNDLE 2501 - 5000 L 14-000125-4 Vendor Authorization
2658314 ERAS/ESC TD EDITION BUNDLE 5001-10000 LI 14-000125-5 Vendor Authorization
2812919 Wave Systems ERAS for Bitlocker License 14-000149-Y1-HP Vendor Authorization
2878160 Wave for Bitlocker Mgmnt with Year 1 14-000167
3015219 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-1Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015220 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-2Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015221 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-3Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015222 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-4Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015223 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-5Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015224 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-6Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015225 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-7Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015226 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-8Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015227 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-9Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015228 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-1Y3
3015229 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-2Y3
3015230 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-3Y3
3015231 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-4Y3
3015232 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-5Y3
3015233 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-6Y3
3015234 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-7Y3
3015235 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-8Y3
3015236 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-9Y3
Software >> Network Management Tools >> Other
2267449 TPMADMIN BUNDLE(ETS,ERAS,EKMS) 50-500 14-000061-1 Vendor Authorization
2267450 TPMADMIN BUNDLE(ETS,ERAS,EKMS) 501-1000 14-000061-2 Vendor Authorization
2267451 TPMADMIN BUNDLE(ETS,ERAS,EKMS)1001-2500 14-000061-3 Vendor Authorization
2267452 TPMADMIN BUNDLE(ETS,ERAS,EKMS)2501-5000 14-000061-4 Vendor Authorization
2267453 TPMADMIN BUNDLE(ETS,ERAS,EKMS)5001-10000 14-000061-5 Vendor Authorization
2267469 CS-L3 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMIN SERVER 14-000089 Vendor Authorization
2267474 ERAS for Livingston Technologies/St. 14-000090 Vendor Authorization
2267476 WAVE ERAS FOR COMMUNITY COFFEE 14-000091 Vendor Authorization
2267483 WAVE ERAS & 1YR MAINTENANCE FOR L-3 ONLY 14-000093 Vendor Authorization
2267484 WAVE ERAS & 3YR MAINTENANCE FOR L-3 ONLY 14-000094 Vendor Authorization
2267485 TPM BUNDLE MATSON NAVIGATION ONLY W/1YR 14-000095 Vendor Authorization
2267486 WAVE ERAS WITH 1 YR MAINTENANCE 14-000096 Vendor Authorization
2267487 WAVE ERAS AND 1YR GOLD MAINTENANCE 14-000084-5 Vendor Authorization
2267488 EMBASSY REMOT ADMIN SERVER AFT/PILOT1-49 14-000044-R Vendor Authorization
2267491 WAVE ETS -ENT ED FOR NON-DELL MACHINES 14-000062 Vendor Authorization
2267492 EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER 50-500 14-000016-1 Vendor Authorization
2267493 WAVE EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER 14-000016-2 Vendor Authorization
2267494 WAVE EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER 1001 14-000016-3 Vendor Authorization
2267495 EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER 2501-5000 14-000016-4 Vendor Authorization
2267496 EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER 5001-10000 14-000016-5 Vendor Authorization
2267497 EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER 50-500 14-000040-1 Vendor Authorization
2267498 EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER 501-1000 14-000040-2 Vendor Authorization
2267499 EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER 1001-2500 14-000040-3 Vendor Authorization
2267500 EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER 2501-5000 14-000040-4 Vendor Authorization
2267501 EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER 5001-10000 14-000040-5 Vendor Authorization
2267502 WAVE ETS - Ent ED for Dell Systems 14-000063 Vendor Authorization
2267503 EMBASSY REMOTE SERVER PILOT 20 USERS 14-000044-P Vendor Authorization
2267504 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMINSERVER 50-500 14-000044-1 Vendor Authorization
2267505 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMINSERVER 501-1000 14-000044-2 Vendor Authorization
2267506 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMINSERVER 1001-2500 14-000044-3 Vendor Authorization
2267507 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMINSERVER 2501- 5000 14-000044-4 Vendor Authorization
2267508 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMINSERVER 5001-1000 14-000044-5 Vendor Authorization
2271245 WAVE ETS FOR NON-DELL MACHINES 14-000062-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271246 WAVE EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER50-500 14-000016-1-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271247 EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER 501-1000 14-000016-2-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271248 EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER 1001-2500 14-000016-3-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271249 EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER 2501-5000 14-000016-4-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271250 EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER 5001-10000 14-000016-5-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271251 WAVE EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER50-500 14-000040-1-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271252 EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER 501-1000 14-000040-2-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271253 EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER 1001-2500 14-000040-3-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271254 EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER 2501-5000 14-000040-4-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271255 EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER 5001-10000 14-000040-5-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271256 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMIN SERVER PILOT(20)GSA 14-000044-P-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271257 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMIN SERVER(50-500)GSA 14-000044-1-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271258 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMIN SERVER(501-1000)GSA 14-000044-2-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271259 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMIN SERVER1001-2500)GSA 14-000044-3-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271260 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMIN SERVER2501-5000)GSA 14-000044-4-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271261 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMIN SERVER5001-10000GSA 14-000044-5-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271263 SAFENET IKEY2032 AUTHENTICATION TOKEN 14-000097 Vendor Authorization
2271264 SAFENET SMART CARDS - MODEL 330 14-000098 Vendor Authorization
2271265 SAFENET TOKEN CLIENT SOFTWARE 14-000099 Vendor Authorization
2291081 Wave ERAS + ERAS Gold for DCMA 14-000103 Vendor Authorization
2291243 Trusted Drive Edition 14-000077
2310051 CS Ohio Bureau of Workers Comp-Total 14-000104 Vendor Authorization
2318306 WAVE ERAS - LIFEPOINT HOSPITAL 14-000105-LPH Vendor Authorization
2395397 ERAS for Marcum & Kleigman 14-000108-MK Vendor Authorization
2455625 ERAS for NGIT 14-000112 Vendor Authorization
2521786 CS-DCMA ERAS + ERAS Gold Maintenance 14-000119-DCMA Vendor Authorization
2553119 CS-AR Inc. - Wave Embassy Authentic 14-000124-ARI Vendor Authorization
2566966 CS-DISA-Wave ERAS 14-000130-DSA Vendor Authorization
2796621 CS-BCBSNJ Embassy Protector 14-000165-BCBSNJ Vendor Authorization
2816231 CS-Ochsner Health ERAS 1 SEA 14-000169-OCH Vendor Authorization
2837874 CS-Horizon BCBS NJ-ERAS SED 14-000200-BCBSNJ Vendor Authorization
2855843 CS-Standford SLAC-Wave ERAS 14-000202-SFD Vendor Authorization
2883140 CS-Kroll-Wave SafeNet ProtectDrive 14-000205-KROLL Vendor Authorization
2896591 CS-DR ERAS LICENSE 100-500 USERS 14-000206-DR1 Vendor Authorization
2896592 CS-DR ERAS LICENSE 501-1000 USERS 14-000206-DR2 Vendor Authorization
2896593 CS-DR ERAS LICENSE 1001-2500 USERS 14-000206-DR3 Vendor Authorization
2896594 CS-DR ERAS LICENSE 14-000206-DR4 Vendor Authorization
2940354 CS-Wave SafeNet Mgt 14-00215-NOV Vendor Authorization
2940380 CS-Wave Bitlocker Mgt for NOV 14-000216-NOV Vendor Authorization
Software >> Network Management Tools >> Remote management
2290716 CS-VMWare 14-000101 Vendor Authorization
2906282 CS-Med Wave ERAS 1 seat 14-000213-MED Vendor Authorization
2906293 CS-Med Wave ERAS 1Yr Gold Maint 1 seat 12-000213-MED Vendor Authorization|Not Returnable
Software >> Network Management Tools >> System management
3015258 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-1Y1
3015259 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-2Y1
3015260 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-3Y1
3015261 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-4Y1
3015262 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-5Y1
3015263 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-6Y1
3015264 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-7Y1
3015265 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-8Y1
3015266 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-9Y1
3015267 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-1Y2
3015268 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-2Y2
3015269 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-3Y2
3015270 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-4Y2
3015271 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-5Y2
3015272 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-6Y2
3015273 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-7Y2
3015274 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-8Y2
3015275 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-9Y2
3015276 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-1Y3
3015277 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-2Y3
3015278 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-3Y3
3015279 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-4Y3
3015280 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-5Y3
3015281 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-6Y3
3015282 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-7Y3
3015283 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-8Y3
3015284 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-9Y3
Software >> Productivity Applications >> Database / reporting
2975391 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 14-000212-P Vendor Authorization
2975392 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 14-000212-R Vendor Authorization
2975393 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 14-000212-1 Vendor Authorization
2975394 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 14-000212-2 Vendor Authorization
2975395 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 14-000212-3 Vendor Authorization
2975396 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 14-000212-4 Vendor Authorization
2975397 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 14-000212-5 Vendor Authorization
2975398 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 2 GOLD 12-000212-PY2 Vendor Authorization
2975400 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 2 GOLD 12-000212-RY2 Vendor Authorization
2975401 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 2 GOLD 12-000212-1Y2 Vendor Authorization
2975402 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 2 GOLD 12-000212-2Y2 Vendor Authorization
2975403 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 2 GOLD 12-000212-3Y2 Vendor Authorization
2975404 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 2 GOLD 12-000212-4Y2 Vendor Authorization
2975405 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 2 GOLD 12-000212-5Y2 Vendor Authorization
2975406 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 3 GOLD 12-000212-PY3 Vendor Authorization
2975407 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 3 GOLD 12-000212-RY3 Vendor Authorization
2975408 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 3 GOLD 12-000212-1Y3 Vendor Authorization
2975409 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 3 GOLD 12-000212-2Y3 Vendor Authorization
2975410 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 3 GOLD 12-000212-3Y3 Vendor Authorization
2975411 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 3 GOLD 12-000212-4Y3 Vendor Authorization
2975412 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 3 GOLD 12-000212-5Y3 Vendor Authorization
Software >> Productivity Applications >> Other
2526844 CS-Wave ERAS San Bernardino City Unified 14000121-SB Vendor Authorization
2559294 CS AMEREN-Wave Embassy Remote 14-000126-AME Vendor Authorization
2787256 Wave for Bitlocker Management 14-000151-Y1DELL Vendor Authorization
Software >> Software Suite
3014978 EMBASSY SECURITY CENTER W/TDM 64 BIT 30-001018 Vendor Authorization
3014979 EMBASSY SECURITY CENTER W/TDM (32 BIT) 30-001020 Vendor Authorization
3014980 EMBASSY SECURITY CENTER W/TDM (64 BIT) 30-001019 Vendor Authorization
3014981 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT 1-49 SEATS 31-001000-1 Vendor Authorization
3014982 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT 50-99 SEATS 31-001000-2 Vendor Authorization
3014983 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT249 SEATS 31-001000-3 Vendor Authorization
3014984 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT499 SEATS 31-001000-4 Vendor Authorization
3014985 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT999 SEATS 31-001000-5 Vendor Authorization
3014986 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT 1000-2999 SEATS 31-001000-6 Vendor Authorization
3014987 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT 3000-4999 SEATS 31-001000-7 Vendor Authorization
3014988 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT 5000-9999 SEATS 31-001000-8 Vendor Authorization
3014989 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT 10000-50000 SEATS 31-001000-9 Vendor Authorization
3015017 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC 1-49 SEATS 31-001001-1 Vendor Authorization
3015018 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC 50-99 SEATS 31-001001-2 Vendor Authorization
3015019 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC249 SEAT 31-001001-3 Vendor Authorization
3015020 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC499 SEAT 31-001001-4 Vendor Authorization
3015021 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC999 SEAT 31-001001-5 Vendor Authorization
3015022 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC 1000-2999 31-001001-6 Vendor Authorization
3015023 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC 3000-4999 31-001001-7 Vendor Authorization
3015024 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC 5000-9999 31-001001-8 Vendor Authorization
3015025 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC 10000-50000 31-001001-9 Vendor Authorization
3015053 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT 1-49 SEATS 31-001002-1 Vendor Authorization
3015054 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT 50-99 SEATS 31-001002-2 Vendor Authorization
3015055 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT249 SEATS 31-001002-3 Vendor Authorization
3015056 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT499 SEATS 31-001002-4 Vendor Authorization
3015057 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT999 SEATS 31-001002-5 Vendor Authorization
3015058 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT 1000-2999 SEAT 31-001002-6 Vendor Authorization
3015059 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT 3000-4999 SEAT 31-001002-7 Vendor Authorization
3015060 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT 5000-9999 SEAT 31-001002-8 Vendor Authorization
3015061 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT 10000-50000 SE 31-001002-9 Vendor Authorization
3015089 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT 1-49 SEATS 32-001003-1 Vendor Authorization
3015090 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT 50-99 SEATS 32-001003-2 Vendor Authorization
3015091 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT249 SEATS 32-001003-3 Vendor Authorization
3015092 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT499 SEATS 32-001003-4 Vendor Authorization
3015093 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT999 SEATS 32-001003-5 Vendor Authorization
3015095 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT 3000-4999 SEATS 32-001003-7 Vendor Authorization
3015096 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT 5000-9999 SEATS 32-001003-8 Vendor Authorization
3015097 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT 10000-50000 SEATS 32-001003-9 Vendor Authorization
3015125 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC 1-49 SEATS 32-001004-1 Vendor Authorization
3015126 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC 50-99 SEATS 32-001004-2 Vendor Authorization
3015127 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC249 SEAT 32-001004-3 Vendor Authorization
3015128 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC499 SEAT 32-001004-4 Vendor Authorization
3015129 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC999 SEAT 32-001004-5 Vendor Authorization
3015130 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC 1000-2999 SE 32-001004-6 Vendor Authorization
3015131 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC 3000-4999 SE 32-001004-7 Vendor Authorization
3015132 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC 5000-9999 SE 32-001004-8 Vendor Authorization
3015133 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC 10000-50000 32-001004-9 Vendor Authorization
3015161 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT 1-49 SEATS 32-001005-1 Vendor Authorization
3015162 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT 50-99 SEATS 32-001005-2 Vendor Authorization
3015163 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT249 SEATS 32-001005-3 Vendor Authorization
3015164 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT499 SEATS 32-001005-4 Vendor Authorization
3015165 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT999 SEATS 32-001005-5 Vendor Authorization
3015166 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT 1000-2999 SEATS 32-001005-6 Vendor Authorization
3015167 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT 3000-4999 SEATS 32-001005-7 Vendor Authorization
3015168 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT 5000-9999 SEATS 32-001005-8 Vendor Authorization
3015169 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT 10000-50000 SEA 32-001005-9 Vendor Authorization
3015197 WAVE FOR BITLOCKER MGMNT 1 SEAT 33-001006 Vendor Authorization
3015201 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 34-001007-1 Vendor Authorization
3015202 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 34-001007-2 Vendor Authorization
3015203 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 34-001007-3 Vendor Authorization
3015204 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 34-001007-4 Vendor Authorization
3015205 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 34-001007-5 Vendor Authorization
3015206 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 34-001007-6 Vendor Authorization
3015207 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 34-001007-7 Vendor Authorization
3015208 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 34-001007-8 Vendor Authorization
3015209 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 34-001007-9 Vendor Authorization
3015237 WAVE ERAS SED-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT 51-001008 Vendor Authorization
3015241 WAVE ERAS TPM-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT 52-001009 Vendor Authorization
3015245 WAVE ERAS BL-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT 53-001010 Vendor Authorization
3015249 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 33-001011-1 Vendor Authorization
3015250 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 33-001011-2 Vendor Authorization
3015251 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 33-001011-3 Vendor Authorization
3015252 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 33-001011-4 Vendor Authorization
3015253 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 33-001011-5 Vendor Authorization
3015254 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 33-001011-6 Vendor Authorization
3015255 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 33-001011-7 Vendor Authorization
3015256 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 33-001011-8 Vendor Authorization
3015257 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 33-001011-9 Vendor Authorization
3015285 EMBASSY PROTECTOR WITH YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1 60-001012-1 Vendor Authorization
3015286 EMBASSY PROTECTOR WITH YR 1 GOLD MAINT 5 60-001012-2 Vendor Authorization
3015287 EMBASSY PROTECTOR WITH YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1 60-001012-3 Vendor Authorization
3015288 EMBASSY PROTECTOR WITH YR 1 GOLD MAINT 2 60-001012-4 Vendor Authorization
3015289 EMBASSY PROTECTOR WITH YR 1 GOLD MAINT 5 60-001012-5 Vendor Authorization
3015290 EMBASSY PROTECTOR WITH YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1 60-001012-6 Vendor Authorization
3015291 EMBASSY PROTECTOR WITH YR 1 GOLD MAINT 3 60-001012-7 Vendor Authorization
3015292 EMBASSY PROTECTOR WITH YR 1 GOLD MAINT 5 60-001012-8 Vendor Authorization
3015293 EMBASSY PROTECTOR WITH YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1 60-001012-9 Vendor Authorization
3015312 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 1 G 61-001013-1 Vendor Authorization
3015313 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 1 G 61-001013-2 Vendor Authorization
3015314 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 1 G 61-001013-3 Vendor Authorization
3015315 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 1 G 61-001013-4 Vendor Authorization
3015316 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 1 G 61-001013-5 Vendor Authorization
3015317 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 1 G 61-001013-6 Vendor Authorization
3015318 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 1 G 61-001013-7 Vendor Authorization
3015319 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 1 G 61-001013-8 Vendor Authorization
3015320 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 1 G 61-001013-9 Vendor Authorization
3015339 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT 1-49 SEATS 62-001014-1 Vendor Authorization
3015340 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT 50-99 SEATS 62-001014-2 Vendor Authorization
3015341 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT249 SEATS 62-001014-3 Vendor Authorization
3015342 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT499 SEATS 62-001014-4 Vendor Authorization
3015343 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT999 SEATS 62-001014-5 Vendor Authorization
3015344 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT 1000-2999 SEATS 62-001014-6 Vendor Authorization
3015345 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT 3000-4999 SEATS 62-001014-7 Vendor Authorization
3015346 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT 5000-9999 SEATS 62-001014-8 Vendor Authorization
3015347 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT 10000-50000 SEATS
From Snackman
In case the link does open for you
by Snackman » Thu Jul 21, 2011 6:07 pm
3014990 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1-49 12-001000-1Y1 Vendor Authorization
3014991 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 50-9 12-001000-2Y1 Vendor Authorization
3014992 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001000-3Y1 Vendor Authorization
3014993 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001000-4Y1 Vendor Authorization
3014994 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001000-5Y1 Vendor Authorization
3014995 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001000-6Y1 Vendor Authorization
3014996 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 3000 12-001000-7Y1 Vendor Authorization
3014997 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 5000 12-001000-8Y1 Vendor Authorization
3014998 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001000-9Y1 Vendor Authorization
3014999 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 1-49 12-001000-1Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015000 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 50-9 12-001000-2Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015001 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001000-3Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015002 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001000-4Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015003 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001000-5Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015004 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001000-6Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015005 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 3000 12-001000-7Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015006 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 5000 12-001000-8Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015007 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001000-9Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015008 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 1-49 12-001000-1Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015009 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 50-9 12-001000-2Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015010 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001000-3Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015011 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001000-4Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015012 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001000-5Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015013 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001000-6Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015014 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 3000 12-001000-7Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015015 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 5000 12-001000-8Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015016 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001000-9Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015026 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001001-1Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015027 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001001-2Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015028 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001001-3Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015029 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001001-4Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015030 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001001-5Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015031 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001001-6Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015032 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001001-7Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015033 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001001-8Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015034 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001001-9Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015035 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001001-1Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015036 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001001-2Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015037 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001001-3Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015038 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001001-4Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015039 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001001-5Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015040 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001001-6Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015041 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001001-7Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015042 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001001-8Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015043 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001001-9Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015044 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001001-1Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015045 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001001-2Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015046 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001001-3Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015047 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001001-4Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015048 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001001-5Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015049 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001001-6Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015050 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001001-7Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015051 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001001-8Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015052 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001001-9Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015062 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-1Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015063 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-2Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015064 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-3Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015065 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-4Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015066 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-5Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015067 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-6Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015068 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-7Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015069 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-8Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015070 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-9Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015071 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-1Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015072 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-2Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015073 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-3Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015074 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-4Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015075 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-5Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015076 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-6Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015077 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-7Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015078 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-8Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015079 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-9Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015080 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-1Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015081 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-2Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015082 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-3Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015083 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-4Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015084 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-5Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015085 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-6Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015086 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-7Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015087 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-8Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015088 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAIN 12-001002-9Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015094 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT 1000-2999 SEATS 32-001003-6 Vendor Authorization
3015098 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1-49 12-001003-1Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015099 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 50-9 12-001003-2Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015100 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001003-3Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015101 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001003-4Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015102 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001003-5Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015103 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001003-6Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015104 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 3000 12-001003-7Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015105 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 5000 12-001003-8Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015106 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001003-9Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015107 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 1-49 12-001003-1Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015108 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 50-9 12-001003-2Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015109 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001003-3Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015110 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001003-4Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015111 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001003-5Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015112 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001003-6Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015113 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 3000 12-001003-7Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015114 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 5000 12-001003-8Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015115 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001003-9Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015116 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 1-49 12-001003-1Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015117 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 50-9 12-001003-2Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015118 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001003-3Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015119 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001003-4Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015120 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001003-5Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015121 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001003-6Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015122 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 3000 12-001003-7Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015123 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 5000 12-001003-8Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015124 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001003-9Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015134 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001004-1Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015135 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001004-2Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015136 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001004-3Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015137 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001004-4Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015138 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001004-5Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015139 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001004-6Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015140 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001004-7Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015141 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001004-8Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015142 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 1 GOLD MA 12-001004-9Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015143 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001004-1Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015144 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001004-2Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015145 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001004-3Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015146 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001004-4Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015147 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001004-5Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015148 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001004-6Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015149 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001004-7Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015150 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001004-8Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015151 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 2 GOLD MA 12-001004-9Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015152 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001004-1Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015153 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001004-2Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015154 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001004-3Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015155 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001004-4Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015156 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001004-5Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015157 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001004-6Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015158 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001004-7Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015159 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001004-8Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015160 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC YR 3 GOLD MA 12-001004-9Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015170 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-1Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015171 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-2Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015172 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-3Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015173 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-4Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015174 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-5Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015175 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-6Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015176 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-7Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015177 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-8Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015178 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-9Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015179 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-1Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015180 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-2Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015181 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-3Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015182 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-4Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015183 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-5Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015184 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-6Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015185 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-7Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015186 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-8Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015187 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-9Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015188 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-1Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015189 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-2Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015190 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-3Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015191 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-4Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015192 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-5Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015193 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-6Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015194 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-7Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015195 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-8Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015196 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001005-9Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015198 WAVE FOR BITLOCKER MGMNT YEAR 1 GOLD MA 12-001006-Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015199 WAVE FOR BITLOCKER MGMNT YEAR 2 GOLD MAI 12-001006-Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015200 WAVE FOR BITLOCKER MGMNT YEAR 3 GOLD MAI 12-001006-Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015210 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-1Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015211 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-2Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015212 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-3Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015213 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-4Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015214 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-5Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015215 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-6Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015216 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-7Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015217 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-8Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015218 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-9Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015238 WAVE ERAS SED-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT YR 12-001008-Y1
3015239 WAVE ERAS SED-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT YR 12-001008-Y2
3015240 WAVE ERAS SED-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT YR 12-001008-Y3
3015242 WAVE ERAS TPM-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT YR 12-001009-Y1
3015243 WAVE ERAS TPM-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT YR 12-001009-Y2
3015244 WAVE ERAS TPM-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT YR 12-001009-Y3
3015246 WAVE ERAS BL-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT YR 12-001010-Y1
3015247 WAVE ERAS BL-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT YR 12-001010-Y2
3015248 WAVE ERAS BL-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT YR 12-001010-Y3
3015294 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 2 GOLD MAINT 1-49 S 12-001012-1Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015295 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 2 GOLD MAINT 50-99 12-001012-2Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015296 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 2 GOLD MAINT24 12-001012-3Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015297 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 2 GOLD MAINT49 12-001012-4Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015298 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 2 GOLD MAINT99 12-001012-5Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015299 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 2 GOLD MAINT 1000-2 12-001012-6Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015300 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 2 GOLD MAINT 3000-4 12-001012-7Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015301 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 2 GOLD MAINT 5000-9 12-001012-8Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015302 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 2 GOLD MAINT 10000- 12-001012-9Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015303 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 3 GOLD MAINT 1-49 S 12-001012-1Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015304 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 3 GOLD MAINT 50-99 12-001012-2Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015305 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 3 GOLD MAINT24 12-001012-3Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015306 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 3 GOLD MAINT49 12-001012-4Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015307 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 3 GOLD MAINT99 12-001012-5Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015308 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 3 GOLD MAINT 1000-2 12-001012-6Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015309 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 3 GOLD MAINT 3000-4 12-001012-7Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015310 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 3 GOLD MAINT 5000-9 12-001012-8Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015311 EMBASSY PROTECTOR YR 3 GOLD MAINT 10000- 12-001012-9Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015321 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 2 GOLD M 12-001013-1Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015322 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 2 GOLD M 12-001013-2Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015323 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 2 GOLD M 12-001013-3Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015324 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 2 GOLD M 12-001013-4Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015325 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 2 GOLD M 12-001013-5Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015326 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 2 GOLD M 12-001013-6Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015327 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 2 GOLD M 12-001013-7Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015328 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 2 GOLD M 12-001013-8Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015329 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 2 GOLD M 12-001013-9Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015330 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 3 GOLD M 12-001013-1Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015331 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 3 GOLD M 12-001013-2Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015332 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 3 GOLD M 12-001013-3Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015333 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 3 GOLD M 12-001013-4Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015334 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 3 GOLD M 12-001013-5Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015335 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 3 GOLD M 12-001013-6Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015336 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 3 GOLD M 12-001013-7Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015337 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 3 GOLD M 12-001013-8Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015338 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER YR 3 GOLD M 12-001013-9Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015348 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1-49 12-001014-1Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015349 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 50-9 12-001014-2Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015350 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001014-3Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015351 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001014-4Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015352 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 12-001014-5Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015353 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001014-6Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015354 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 3000 12-001014-7Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015355 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 5000 12-001014-8Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015356 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001014-9Y1 Vendor Authorization
3015357 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 1-49 12-001014-1Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015358 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 50-9 12-001014-2Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015359 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001014-3Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015360 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001014-4Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015361 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 12-001014-5Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015362 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001014-6Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015363 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 3000 12-001014-7Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015364 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 5000 12-001014-8Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015365 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 2 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001014-9Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015366 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 1-49 12-001014-1Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015367 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 50-9 12-001014-2Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015368 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001014-3Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015369 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001014-4Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015370 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 12-001014-5Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015371 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001014-6Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015372 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 3000 12-001014-7Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015373 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 5000 12-001014-8Y3 Vendor Authorization
3015374 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT YR 3 GOLD MAINT 1000 12-001014-9Y3 Vendor Authorization
Software >> Internet Application >> Internet Security
2267472 PROTECTDRIVE V8.2X SOFTWARE AND LICENSE 14-000079-1 Vendor Authorization
2267478 WAVE TOTAL SECURITY BUNDLE 50-500 USERS 14-000082-1 Vendor Authorization
2267479 TOTAL SECURITY BUNDLE 501-1000 USERS 14-000082-2 Vendor Authorization
2267480 TOTAL SECURITY BUNDLE 1001-2500 USERS 14-000082-3 Vendor Authorization
2267481 TOTAL SECURITY BUNDLE 2501-5000 USERS 14-000082-4 Vendor Authorization
2267482 TOTAL SECURITY BUNDLE 5001-10000 USERS 14-000082-5 Vendor Authorization
2455859 SafeNet ProtectDrive V8.2X Software and 14-000079-2 Vendor Authorization
2488531 SAFENET PROTECTDRIVE V8.2X SOFTWARE 14-000079-3 Vendor Authorization
2488533 SAFENET PROTECTDRIVE V8.2X SOFTWARE 14-000079-4 Vendor Authorization
2488535 SAFENET PROTECTDRIVE V8.2X SOFTWARE 14-000079-5 Vendor Authorization
2658310 ERAS/ESC TD EDITION BUNDLE 50 - 500 LICE 14-000125-1 Vendor Authorization
2658311 ERAS/ESC TD EDITION BUNDLE 501 - 1000 LI 14-000125-2 Vendor Authorization
2658312 ERAS/ESC TD EDITION BUNDLE 1001 - 2500 L 14-000125-3 Vendor Authorization
2658313 ERAS/ESC TD EDITION BUNDLE 2501 - 5000 L 14-000125-4 Vendor Authorization
2658314 ERAS/ESC TD EDITION BUNDLE 5001-10000 LI 14-000125-5 Vendor Authorization
2812919 Wave Systems ERAS for Bitlocker License 14-000149-Y1-HP Vendor Authorization
2878160 Wave for Bitlocker Mgmnt with Year 1 14-000167
3015219 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-1Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015220 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-2Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015221 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-3Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015222 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-4Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015223 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-5Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015224 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-6Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015225 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-7Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015226 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-8Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015227 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-9Y2 Vendor Authorization
3015228 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-1Y3
3015229 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-2Y3
3015230 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-3Y3
3015231 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-4Y3
3015232 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-5Y3
3015233 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-6Y3
3015234 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-7Y3
3015235 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-8Y3
3015236 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 12-001007-9Y3
Software >> Network Management Tools >> Other
2267449 TPMADMIN BUNDLE(ETS,ERAS,EKMS) 50-500 14-000061-1 Vendor Authorization
2267450 TPMADMIN BUNDLE(ETS,ERAS,EKMS) 501-1000 14-000061-2 Vendor Authorization
2267451 TPMADMIN BUNDLE(ETS,ERAS,EKMS)1001-2500 14-000061-3 Vendor Authorization
2267452 TPMADMIN BUNDLE(ETS,ERAS,EKMS)2501-5000 14-000061-4 Vendor Authorization
2267453 TPMADMIN BUNDLE(ETS,ERAS,EKMS)5001-10000 14-000061-5 Vendor Authorization
2267469 CS-L3 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMIN SERVER 14-000089 Vendor Authorization
2267474 ERAS for Livingston Technologies/St. 14-000090 Vendor Authorization
2267476 WAVE ERAS FOR COMMUNITY COFFEE 14-000091 Vendor Authorization
2267483 WAVE ERAS & 1YR MAINTENANCE FOR L-3 ONLY 14-000093 Vendor Authorization
2267484 WAVE ERAS & 3YR MAINTENANCE FOR L-3 ONLY 14-000094 Vendor Authorization
2267485 TPM BUNDLE MATSON NAVIGATION ONLY W/1YR 14-000095 Vendor Authorization
2267486 WAVE ERAS WITH 1 YR MAINTENANCE 14-000096 Vendor Authorization
2267487 WAVE ERAS AND 1YR GOLD MAINTENANCE 14-000084-5 Vendor Authorization
2267488 EMBASSY REMOT ADMIN SERVER AFT/PILOT1-49 14-000044-R Vendor Authorization
2267491 WAVE ETS -ENT ED FOR NON-DELL MACHINES 14-000062 Vendor Authorization
2267492 EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER 50-500 14-000016-1 Vendor Authorization
2267493 WAVE EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER 14-000016-2 Vendor Authorization
2267494 WAVE EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER 1001 14-000016-3 Vendor Authorization
2267495 EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER 2501-5000 14-000016-4 Vendor Authorization
2267496 EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER 5001-10000 14-000016-5 Vendor Authorization
2267497 EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER 50-500 14-000040-1 Vendor Authorization
2267498 EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER 501-1000 14-000040-2 Vendor Authorization
2267499 EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER 1001-2500 14-000040-3 Vendor Authorization
2267500 EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER 2501-5000 14-000040-4 Vendor Authorization
2267501 EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER 5001-10000 14-000040-5 Vendor Authorization
2267502 WAVE ETS - Ent ED for Dell Systems 14-000063 Vendor Authorization
2267503 EMBASSY REMOTE SERVER PILOT 20 USERS 14-000044-P Vendor Authorization
2267504 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMINSERVER 50-500 14-000044-1 Vendor Authorization
2267505 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMINSERVER 501-1000 14-000044-2 Vendor Authorization
2267506 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMINSERVER 1001-2500 14-000044-3 Vendor Authorization
2267507 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMINSERVER 2501- 5000 14-000044-4 Vendor Authorization
2267508 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMINSERVER 5001-1000 14-000044-5 Vendor Authorization
2271245 WAVE ETS FOR NON-DELL MACHINES 14-000062-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271246 WAVE EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER50-500 14-000016-1-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271247 EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER 501-1000 14-000016-2-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271248 EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER 1001-2500 14-000016-3-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271249 EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER 2501-5000 14-000016-4-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271250 EMBASSY KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER 5001-10000 14-000016-5-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271251 WAVE EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER50-500 14-000040-1-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271252 EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER 501-1000 14-000040-2-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271253 EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER 1001-2500 14-000040-3-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271254 EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER 2501-5000 14-000040-4-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271255 EMBASSY AUTHENTICATION SERVER 5001-10000 14-000040-5-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271256 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMIN SERVER PILOT(20)GSA 14-000044-P-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271257 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMIN SERVER(50-500)GSA 14-000044-1-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271258 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMIN SERVER(501-1000)GSA 14-000044-2-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271259 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMIN SERVER1001-2500)GSA 14-000044-3-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271260 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMIN SERVER2501-5000)GSA 14-000044-4-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271261 EMBASSY REMOTE ADMIN SERVER5001-10000GSA 14-000044-5-GSA Vendor Authorization
2271263 SAFENET IKEY2032 AUTHENTICATION TOKEN 14-000097 Vendor Authorization
2271264 SAFENET SMART CARDS - MODEL 330 14-000098 Vendor Authorization
2271265 SAFENET TOKEN CLIENT SOFTWARE 14-000099 Vendor Authorization
2291081 Wave ERAS + ERAS Gold for DCMA 14-000103 Vendor Authorization
2291243 Trusted Drive Edition 14-000077
2310051 CS Ohio Bureau of Workers Comp-Total 14-000104 Vendor Authorization
2318306 WAVE ERAS - LIFEPOINT HOSPITAL 14-000105-LPH Vendor Authorization
2395397 ERAS for Marcum & Kleigman 14-000108-MK Vendor Authorization
2455625 ERAS for NGIT 14-000112 Vendor Authorization
2521786 CS-DCMA ERAS + ERAS Gold Maintenance 14-000119-DCMA Vendor Authorization
2553119 CS-AR Inc. - Wave Embassy Authentic 14-000124-ARI Vendor Authorization
2566966 CS-DISA-Wave ERAS 14-000130-DSA Vendor Authorization
2796621 CS-BCBSNJ Embassy Protector 14-000165-BCBSNJ Vendor Authorization
2816231 CS-Ochsner Health ERAS 1 SEA 14-000169-OCH Vendor Authorization
2837874 CS-Horizon BCBS NJ-ERAS SED 14-000200-BCBSNJ Vendor Authorization
2855843 CS-Standford SLAC-Wave ERAS 14-000202-SFD Vendor Authorization
2883140 CS-Kroll-Wave SafeNet ProtectDrive 14-000205-KROLL Vendor Authorization
2896591 CS-DR ERAS LICENSE 100-500 USERS 14-000206-DR1 Vendor Authorization
2896592 CS-DR ERAS LICENSE 501-1000 USERS 14-000206-DR2 Vendor Authorization
2896593 CS-DR ERAS LICENSE 1001-2500 USERS 14-000206-DR3 Vendor Authorization
2896594 CS-DR ERAS LICENSE 14-000206-DR4 Vendor Authorization
2940354 CS-Wave SafeNet Mgt 14-00215-NOV Vendor Authorization
2940380 CS-Wave Bitlocker Mgt for NOV 14-000216-NOV Vendor Authorization
Software >> Network Management Tools >> Remote management
2290716 CS-VMWare 14-000101 Vendor Authorization
2906282 CS-Med Wave ERAS 1 seat 14-000213-MED Vendor Authorization
2906293 CS-Med Wave ERAS 1Yr Gold Maint 1 seat 12-000213-MED Vendor Authorization|Not Returnable
Software >> Network Management Tools >> System management
3015258 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-1Y1
3015259 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-2Y1
3015260 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-3Y1
3015261 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-4Y1
3015262 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-5Y1
3015263 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-6Y1
3015264 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-7Y1
3015265 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-8Y1
3015266 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-9Y1
3015267 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-1Y2
3015268 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-2Y2
3015269 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-3Y2
3015270 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-4Y2
3015271 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-5Y2
3015272 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-6Y2
3015273 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-7Y2
3015274 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-8Y2
3015275 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-9Y2
3015276 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-1Y3
3015277 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-2Y3
3015278 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-3Y3
3015279 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-4Y3
3015280 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-5Y3
3015281 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-6Y3
3015282 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-7Y3
3015283 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-8Y3
3015284 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 12-001011-9Y3
Software >> Productivity Applications >> Database / reporting
2975391 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 14-000212-P Vendor Authorization
2975392 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 14-000212-R Vendor Authorization
2975393 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 14-000212-1 Vendor Authorization
2975394 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 14-000212-2 Vendor Authorization
2975395 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 14-000212-3 Vendor Authorization
2975396 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 14-000212-4 Vendor Authorization
2975397 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 14-000212-5 Vendor Authorization
2975398 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 2 GOLD 12-000212-PY2 Vendor Authorization
2975400 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 2 GOLD 12-000212-RY2 Vendor Authorization
2975401 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 2 GOLD 12-000212-1Y2 Vendor Authorization
2975402 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 2 GOLD 12-000212-2Y2 Vendor Authorization
2975403 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 2 GOLD 12-000212-3Y2 Vendor Authorization
2975404 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 2 GOLD 12-000212-4Y2 Vendor Authorization
2975405 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 2 GOLD 12-000212-5Y2 Vendor Authorization
2975406 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 3 GOLD 12-000212-PY3 Vendor Authorization
2975407 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 3 GOLD 12-000212-RY3 Vendor Authorization
2975408 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 3 GOLD 12-000212-1Y3 Vendor Authorization
2975409 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 3 GOLD 12-000212-2Y3 Vendor Authorization
2975410 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 3 GOLD 12-000212-3Y3 Vendor Authorization
2975411 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 3 GOLD 12-000212-4Y3 Vendor Authorization
2975412 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER - YR 3 GOLD 12-000212-5Y3 Vendor Authorization
Software >> Productivity Applications >> Other
2526844 CS-Wave ERAS San Bernardino City Unified 14000121-SB Vendor Authorization
2559294 CS AMEREN-Wave Embassy Remote 14-000126-AME Vendor Authorization
2787256 Wave for Bitlocker Management 14-000151-Y1DELL Vendor Authorization
Software >> Software Suite
3014978 EMBASSY SECURITY CENTER W/TDM 64 BIT 30-001018 Vendor Authorization
3014979 EMBASSY SECURITY CENTER W/TDM (32 BIT) 30-001020 Vendor Authorization
3014980 EMBASSY SECURITY CENTER W/TDM (64 BIT) 30-001019 Vendor Authorization
3014981 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT 1-49 SEATS 31-001000-1 Vendor Authorization
3014982 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT 50-99 SEATS 31-001000-2 Vendor Authorization
3014983 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT249 SEATS 31-001000-3 Vendor Authorization
3014984 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT499 SEATS 31-001000-4 Vendor Authorization
3014985 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT999 SEATS 31-001000-5 Vendor Authorization
3014986 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT 1000-2999 SEATS 31-001000-6 Vendor Authorization
3014987 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT 3000-4999 SEATS 31-001000-7 Vendor Authorization
3014988 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT 5000-9999 SEATS 31-001000-8 Vendor Authorization
3014989 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT 10000-50000 SEATS 31-001000-9 Vendor Authorization
3015017 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC 1-49 SEATS 31-001001-1 Vendor Authorization
3015018 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC 50-99 SEATS 31-001001-2 Vendor Authorization
3015019 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC249 SEAT 31-001001-3 Vendor Authorization
3015020 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC499 SEAT 31-001001-4 Vendor Authorization
3015021 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC999 SEAT 31-001001-5 Vendor Authorization
3015022 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC 1000-2999 31-001001-6 Vendor Authorization
3015023 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC 3000-4999 31-001001-7 Vendor Authorization
3015024 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC 5000-9999 31-001001-8 Vendor Authorization
3015025 WAVE ERAS SED MGMNT AND ESC 10000-50000 31-001001-9 Vendor Authorization
3015053 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT 1-49 SEATS 31-001002-1 Vendor Authorization
3015054 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT 50-99 SEATS 31-001002-2 Vendor Authorization
3015055 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT249 SEATS 31-001002-3 Vendor Authorization
3015056 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT499 SEATS 31-001002-4 Vendor Authorization
3015057 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT999 SEATS 31-001002-5 Vendor Authorization
3015058 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT 1000-2999 SEAT 31-001002-6 Vendor Authorization
3015059 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT 3000-4999 SEAT 31-001002-7 Vendor Authorization
3015060 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT 5000-9999 SEAT 31-001002-8 Vendor Authorization
3015061 WAVE ERAS SED OR BL MGMNT 10000-50000 SE 31-001002-9 Vendor Authorization
3015089 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT 1-49 SEATS 32-001003-1 Vendor Authorization
3015090 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT 50-99 SEATS 32-001003-2 Vendor Authorization
3015091 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT249 SEATS 32-001003-3 Vendor Authorization
3015092 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT499 SEATS 32-001003-4 Vendor Authorization
3015093 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT999 SEATS 32-001003-5 Vendor Authorization
3015095 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT 3000-4999 SEATS 32-001003-7 Vendor Authorization
3015096 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT 5000-9999 SEATS 32-001003-8 Vendor Authorization
3015097 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT 10000-50000 SEATS 32-001003-9 Vendor Authorization
3015125 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC 1-49 SEATS 32-001004-1 Vendor Authorization
3015126 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC 50-99 SEATS 32-001004-2 Vendor Authorization
3015127 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC249 SEAT 32-001004-3 Vendor Authorization
3015128 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC499 SEAT 32-001004-4 Vendor Authorization
3015129 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC999 SEAT 32-001004-5 Vendor Authorization
3015130 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC 1000-2999 SE 32-001004-6 Vendor Authorization
3015131 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC 3000-4999 SE 32-001004-7 Vendor Authorization
3015132 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC 5000-9999 SE 32-001004-8 Vendor Authorization
3015133 WAVE ERAS TPM MGMNT AND ESC 10000-50000 32-001004-9 Vendor Authorization
3015161 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT 1-49 SEATS 32-001005-1 Vendor Authorization
3015162 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT 50-99 SEATS 32-001005-2 Vendor Authorization
3015163 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT249 SEATS 32-001005-3 Vendor Authorization
3015164 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT499 SEATS 32-001005-4 Vendor Authorization
3015165 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT999 SEATS 32-001005-5 Vendor Authorization
3015166 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT 1000-2999 SEATS 32-001005-6 Vendor Authorization
3015167 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT 3000-4999 SEATS 32-001005-7 Vendor Authorization
3015168 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT 5000-9999 SEATS 32-001005-8 Vendor Authorization
3015169 WAVE ERAS BL & TPM MGMNT 10000-50000 SEA 32-001005-9 Vendor Authorization
3015197 WAVE FOR BITLOCKER MGMNT 1 SEAT 33-001006 Vendor Authorization
3015201 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 34-001007-1 Vendor Authorization
3015202 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 34-001007-2 Vendor Authorization
3015203 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 34-001007-3 Vendor Authorization
3015204 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 34-001007-4 Vendor Authorization
3015205 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 34-001007-5 Vendor Authorization
3015206 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 34-001007-6 Vendor Authorization
3015207 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 34-001007-7 Vendor Authorization
3015208 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 34-001007-8 Vendor Authorization
3015209 WAVE ERAS SECURITY MGMNT FOR DELL CLIENT 34-001007-9 Vendor Authorization
3015237 WAVE ERAS SED-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT 51-001008 Vendor Authorization
3015241 WAVE ERAS TPM-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT 52-001009 Vendor Authorization
3015245 WAVE ERAS BL-ADD ON TO EXISTING SEAT 53-001010 Vendor Authorization
3015249 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 33-001011-1 Vendor Authorization
3015250 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 33-001011-2 Vendor Authorization
3015251 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 33-001011-3 Vendor Authorization
3015252 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 33-001011-4 Vendor Authorization
3015253 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 33-001011-5 Vendor Authorization
3015254 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 33-001011-6 Vendor Authorization
3015255 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 33-001011-7 Vendor Authorization
3015256 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 33-001011-8 Vendor Authorization
3015257 WAVE ERAS PROTECTDRIVE MGMNT WITH CLIENT 33-001011-9 Vendor Authorization
3015285 EMBASSY PROTECTOR WITH YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1 60-001012-1 Vendor Authorization
3015286 EMBASSY PROTECTOR WITH YR 1 GOLD MAINT 5 60-001012-2 Vendor Authorization
3015287 EMBASSY PROTECTOR WITH YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1 60-001012-3 Vendor Authorization
3015288 EMBASSY PROTECTOR WITH YR 1 GOLD MAINT 2 60-001012-4 Vendor Authorization
3015289 EMBASSY PROTECTOR WITH YR 1 GOLD MAINT 5 60-001012-5 Vendor Authorization
3015290 EMBASSY PROTECTOR WITH YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1 60-001012-6 Vendor Authorization
3015291 EMBASSY PROTECTOR WITH YR 1 GOLD MAINT 3 60-001012-7 Vendor Authorization
3015292 EMBASSY PROTECTOR WITH YR 1 GOLD MAINT 5 60-001012-8 Vendor Authorization
3015293 EMBASSY PROTECTOR WITH YR 1 GOLD MAINT 1 60-001012-9 Vendor Authorization
3015312 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 1 G 61-001013-1 Vendor Authorization
3015313 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 1 G 61-001013-2 Vendor Authorization
3015314 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 1 G 61-001013-3 Vendor Authorization
3015315 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 1 G 61-001013-4 Vendor Authorization
3015316 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 1 G 61-001013-5 Vendor Authorization
3015317 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 1 G 61-001013-6 Vendor Authorization
3015318 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 1 G 61-001013-7 Vendor Authorization
3015319 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 1 G 61-001013-8 Vendor Authorization
3015320 EMBASSY PROTECTOR & REPORTER WITH YR 1 G 61-001013-9 Vendor Authorization
3015339 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT 1-49 SEATS 62-001014-1 Vendor Authorization
3015340 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT 50-99 SEATS 62-001014-2 Vendor Authorization
3015341 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT249 SEATS 62-001014-3 Vendor Authorization
3015342 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT499 SEATS 62-001014-4 Vendor Authorization
3015343 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT999 SEATS 62-001014-5 Vendor Authorization
3015344 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT 1000-2999 SEATS 62-001014-6 Vendor Authorization
3015345 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT 3000-4999 SEATS 62-001014-7 Vendor Authorization
3015346 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT 5000-9999 SEATS 62-001014-8 Vendor Authorization
3015347 PROTECTDRIVE CLIENT 10000-50000 SEATS
From Snackman
by Snackman » Thu Jul 21, 2011 3:07 pm
This was sent to me from OKnPV.
Thank you
-------------------------------------------
I see on synnex 27 new entries starting at #3015258.
Then there are other newbies....106 of them starting at 3014978 involving SEDs & TPMs. 50K seats each.
These were just added today. You can see them at:
http://www.synnex.com/vendors/WAVE_SYSTEMS.html
This is THE BIG LEAGUES , IMO. 133 new entries all at once!!
Looks like we have "blasted off!"
Snackman
Site Admin
Posts: 511
Joined: Tue Jan 25, 2011 11:16 am
Yet Another Bank Sued By A Small Business For Fraudulent Hacker Transfers
According to Village View, Professional Business Bank says bank responsible for $465K loss to hackers, plus fees and damages suffered in online account breach
Jul 19, 2011 | 10:34 PM | 1 Comments
By Ericka Chickowski, Contributing Writer
A new court case brought to bear against Professional Business Bank by Village View Escrow Inc. continued the battle waged over who's to blame for hacking attacks that leave small business accounts drained following online password theft. Filed in late June in the California Superior Court in Los Angeles, the case is the latest in a string of suits filed in U.S courts by small businesses who believe their banks are to blame for failing to properly protect their accounts from predatory hackers.
Village View's lawyers say the bank should be on the hook for $465,000 siphoned off by hackers in March 2010, plus bank fees and damages incurred by the loss. Village View told the court that Professional Business Bank led it to believe that the institution employed safe online banking practices when signed with the bank in 2008.
"Prior to entering into a banking relationship and contract with Professional Business Bank, Village View Escrow was not informed of any unsafe and unsound business practices employed by the bank," the complain read, claiming that the fraudulent account transfers incurred by hackers were caused by the bank's failure to "employ a commercially reasonable security system" and to "accept funds transfers orders in good faith and in compliance with the security procedures selected by Village View Escrow."
It's a scenario that's played itself out many times over the last several years, says George Tubin, analyst for Tower Group. He estimates that small businesses have lost $250 million due to similar attacks over the last few years and says the banks in charge of securing those accounts are skirting legal responsibility due to the inadequacies of the “Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment" guidance released by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) in 2005.
Though best practices in these times of increasingly sophisticated attacks would dictate that a bank acting in good faith apply fraud detection and anomaly detection software, the old FFIEC guidance only recommends outdated two-factor authentication technologies that can easily be gamed by hackers today. Many financial institutions have been skating by on the letter of the law and very often they get away with it because small business owners don't know how to ask their banks about Internet security practices.
"I've always believed it's incumbent upon those banks to put those protections in place, [but] they can do a bare minimum and get by," Tubin says. "Ideally, a small business would be able to go in and ask their bank what kind of security procedures they have. Knowing that if fraud does occur, it's probably going to be contentious as to who's liable. Because of that, you should know what's in place. Unfortunately, most small businesses aren't very conversant in Internet technology and fraud detection technology -- and they shouldn't be. They're in business to run their business."
Nevertheless, Tubin reports that in most instances where bank practices left SMB accounts open to fraud, the small business are only able to settle out of court for pennies on the dollar for money that was stolen. In other cases lawsuit complaints never even go to trial.
Take the suit lodged by PATCO Construction company against Oceans Bank, which was thrown out of court before going to trial. PATCO lost $500,000 from its Oceans Bank commercial account in 2009 after a malware attack made away with its authentication credentials, but the judge ruled that Oceans was following FFIEC protocol.
"The bank can claim that they relied on the FFIEC guidance and a large percentage of the market can claim the same thing:that they looked at the guidance and followed it," says Terry Austin, CEO of fraud detection company Guardian Analytics. "And they're right; the 2005 guidance was not nearly specific enough and it's woefully out of date."
For its part, though, the FFIEC guidance defense may not hold water for long. The banking authority recently announced tightened regulations, effective January 1, 2012, that will require banks to use anomaly detection software and risk management best practices.
For those hit by fraudsters before then, though, the tide of legal precedence may be changing in favor of SMBs, if a recent case between Experi-Metal Inc. and Comerica Bank is any indication. Experi-Metal sued Comerica for over $550,000 in fraudulent wire transfers that it says the bank should have disallowed if it had been scrupulous about looking for anomalous behavior on the account.
"The latest case, the Experi-Metal versus Comerica was the first time we've seen that a SMB has won against their bank. If you read the bench opinion, essentially they are saying that there are two aspects of this: did you have commercially reasonably security in place and did you act in good faith?" Tubin says. "They were fine on the reasonable security, but [the court] felt they didn't act in good faith because they weren't looking for anomalies. The bank didn't spot that Experi-Metal was doing things [with the account] that they typically never do."
If the judge in Village View's case takes the argument of good faith seriously, the escrow company could have a good chance of winning--especially if Village View's claims that its bank didn't even live up to the FFIEC's outdated requirement for two-factor authentication stand up in court. What's more, Village View says that the bank also failed to tell it that the institution had suffered a third-party hacking attack a month before the fraudulent transfers, and had the escrow company known about the attack, it would have taken additional protective measures.
Hackers Gained Access to Sensitive Military Files
By THOM SHANKER and ELISABETH BUMILLER
Published: July 14, 2011
WASHINGTON — The Defense Department suffered one of its worst digital attacks in history in March, when foreign hackers broke into the computers of a corporate contractor and obtained 24,000 sensitive Pentagon files during a single intrusion, senior officials said on Thursday.
The disclosure came as the Pentagon released a strategy for military operations in cyberspace, embodying a belief that traditional passive programs for defending Pentagon data systems are insufficient in an era when espionage, crime, disruptions and attacks are increasingly carried out over the Internet.
In releasing the strategy, William J. Lynn III, the deputy defense secretary, disclosed that over the years “crucial” files stolen from defense industry data networks have included plans for missile tracking systems, satellite navigation devices, unmanned surveillance drones and top-of-the-line jet fighters.
Some of the stolen data was mundane, and included plans for small parts of tanks, airplanes and submarines, he said.
“But a great deal of it concerns our most sensitive systems, including aircraft avionics, surveillance technologies, satellite communications systems and network security protocols,” Mr. Lynn disclosed.
Pentagon and administration officials declined to identify the military contractor whose data system was compromised in the March attack. They also refused to name the nation they suspected was the culprit, saying that any accusation was a matter of official, if confidential, diplomatic dialogue.
However, when major intrusions against computers operated by the Pentagon or military contractors have occurred in the past, officials have regularly blamed China, and sometimes Russia. Even so, it remains unknown whether the attacks were officially sponsored by those governments or were the work of industrial competitors or criminal hackers operating from inside those nations.
“Current countermeasures have not stopped this outflow of sensitive information,” Mr. Lynn said during a speech at the National Defense University. “We need to do more to guard our digital storehouses of design innovation.”
The Pentagon’s new strategy, which is the final official piece of a larger effort launched by the Obama administration to defend computer networks operated by the government and the private sector, calls for actively looking for attackers on the Internet rather than waiting for an intruder to attack. “You have to hunt on your own networks,” Mr. Lynn said. He stressed the importance of cooperation with foreign partners to spot computer-network threats before they try to crack systems in the United States.
The military’s new Cyber Command was ordered to prepare for defensivee and offensive operations on computer networks. Officials confirmed that the command has computer programs to carry out offensive operations in cyberspace if it is so ordered by the president.
Though for now the strategy is centered on how the United States can defend itself against an attack, Gen. James Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the Pentagon had to focus on offense — including the possibility of responding to a cyber attack with military action.
“If it’s O.K. to attack me and I’m not going to do anything other than improve my defenses every time you attack me, it’s very difficult to come up with a deterrent strategy,” General Cartwright told reporters on Thursday.
He said that American military commanders were now devoting 90 percent of their attention to building better firewalls and only 10 percent to ways of keeping hackers from attacking in the first place. He said a better strategy for the Pentagon would be the reverse, focusing almost entirely on offense.
The Pentagon, he said, needs a strategy “that says to the attacker, if you do this, the price to you is going to go up, and it’s going to ever escalate.” He added that right now “we’re on a path that is too predictable — it’s purely defensive, there is no penalty for attacking right now.”
Officials say the main challenge for the United States in mounting a cyber counterattack is determining with certainty who is attacking. The Internet makes it relatively easy for an online assailant to mask his or her identity, even if the geographic location where the attack originated can be confirmed.
Mr. Lynn said most major efforts to probe and penetrate sensitive computer networks were still being mounted by large rival nations, and were focused more on espionage than sabotage.
“U.S. military power offers a strong deterrent against overtly destructive attacks,” he said. “Although attribution in cyberspace can be difficult, the risk of discovery and response for a major nation is still too great to risk launching destructive attacks against the United States.”
However, he warned that the techical expertise needed to carry out harmful Internet raids was certain to migrate to smaller rogue states and to nonstate actors, in particular terrorist organizations.
If a terrorist group obtains “disruptive or destructive cyber tools, we have to assume they will strike with little hesitation,” Mr. Lynn said.
Gerry Smith
Gerald.Smith@huffingtonpost.com
UK Authorities Brace For 'Cynber Jihad' By Al Qaeda After Bin Lade Death
First Posted: 7/12/11 12:17 PM ET Updated: 7/12/11 12:58 PM ET
Al Qaeda , Cyber Jihad , London Olympics , Osama Bin Laden , Al Qaeda Cyber , Al Qaeda Cyber Attack , Bin Laden Cyberattack , British Cyberterrorism , Cyber Attacks , Cyber Terrorism , Cyberattack , Cyberterrorism , Cyberterrorists , Technology News
British authorities are bracing for an increase in cyberterrorism as al Qaeda calls for "cyber jihad" following the death of Osama bin Laden, according to a report released Tuesday.
"There will be more cyber terrorism," said the report, released by the British Home Office to outline the country's counter-terrorism strategy. "We must increase our understanding of how terrorists use the Internet."
Since the death of Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda has "explicitly called not only for acts of lone or individual terrorism but also for 'cyber jihad,'" according to the report. Government officials are pushing for heightened security measures in response, as London prepares to host the 2012 Olympic Games.
While authorities maintain that the overall threat of cyberattack is low and say they have not seen evidence of "systematic cyber terrorism," they predict more Internet-based terrorist threats "as the tools and techniques needed for cyber attack become more widely available and the success of criminal cyber operations becomes more widely known," according to the report.
"Groups will continue to benefit from off-the-shelf technology in planning and conducting attacks, making operations more secure and potentially more lethal," the report said.
As an example of the type of threat authorities are trying to prevent, the report cited a a virus that spread to several companies around the world including Proctor & Gamble, AIG, Google and NASA. The virus sent users spam emails with the subject line "Here you have" and an attachment containing malware.
A group of hackers called "Brigades of Tariq ibn Ziyad" claimed responsibility for that attack, which the report said was "relatively unsophisticated but a likely indicator of a future trend."
Since material for a cyberattack can be hosted on foreign servers, British authorities must work together with authorities in other countries, particularly the United States, which "is by far the biggest provider of Internet hosting services in the world," according to the report.
But authorities in both countries can't prevent cyberterrorism on their own, the report noted.
"Action against terrorist use of the Internet will only be effective if the public understand the nature of the threat online and act to protect themselves," the report said. "Our role will be to encourage and facilitate public involvement in making the Internet a more hostile environment for terrorists."
July 8, 2011, 6:30 PM
AntiSec Hackers Hit F.B.I. Contractor
By RIVA RICHMOND
Hackers who have claimed responsibility for a spate of recent break-ins said on Friday that they had infiltrated the networkof IRC Federal, an engineering contractor that works for federal agencies including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and stole internal documents from its database and e-mail system.
The group, which is a part of the hacktivist collective Anonymous and includes members of the defunct group Lulz Security, also said it had defaced IRC Federal’s Web site. The firm has taken the site down.
A spokesman for IRC Federal said it was investigating the claim. “We reported it to the authorities, and otherwise we have no comment.”
In a statement online that was decorated with a digital drawing of a mushroom cloud, the group complained that IRC Federal had been “selling out their ‘skills’ to the US empire. So we laid nuclear waste to their systems, owning their pathetic windows box, dropping their databases and private emails, and defaced their professional looking website.”
The group, which has been waging a campaign called AntiSec against what it calls corrupt corporations and governments, said it found within IRC Federal’s e-mails documents that included a proposal to develop for the F.B.I. a “Special Identities Modernization (SIM) Project” that it said would protect records associated with “trusted individuals,” while revealing the identities of individuals who might pose a terrorist or criminal risk to the United States.
It claimed it also found fingerprinting contracts for the Justice Department and biometrics development for the military. It also cited “strategy contracts” for the “National Nuclear Security Administration Nuclear Weapons Complex.”
The F.B.I. declined to comment.
The incident follows arrests earlier this week of 15 alleged members of Anonymous in Italy and Switzerland, aged 15 to 28, in raids in which 32 homes were searched by police. Last month, three men in Spain and 32 people in Turkey were arrested in connection with online attacks by Anonymous.
The collective has promised to retaliate, and has claimed break-ins at Italian universities and to have brought down hundreds of Turkish Web sites.
UCLA Health System Fined $865,000
HIPAA Violations Lead to Resolution Agreement
July 7, 2011 - Jeffrey Roman, Associate Editor
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The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Office for Civil Rights has entered into a resolution agreement with the University of California at Los Angeles Health System to settle violations of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Privacy and Security Rules.
UCLAHS has agreed to pay a fine of $865,500 and has committed to a corrective action plan aimed at remedying gaps in its compliance with the rules.
The investigation began in 2009 after complaints were filed on behalf of two celebrity patients, alleging that employees at UCLAHS repeatedly viewed their electronic protected health information, as well as other patients, without permission.
"From August 31, 2005 to November 16, 2005, workforce members repeatedly and without a permissible reason examined the electronic protected health information of the patients, and again did so between January 31, 2008 to February 2, 2008," according to a statement from HHS.
During the same period of time, UCLAHS failed to provide appropriate training for all members of the workforce, did not apply sanctions and document workers who examined the health records, and neglected to implement security measures "sufficient to reduce the risks of impermissible access to electronic protected health information by unauthorized users to a reasonable and appropriate level," according to the statement.
Pay HHS the amount of $865,500;
Review, revise and maintain, as necessary, existing policies and procedures and develop written policies and procedures that comply with federal standards that govern the privacy of individually identifiable health information;
Distribute updated policies and procedures (having been reviewed by HHS) to all current and new members of its workforce who have access to protected health information within 30 days of HHS approval; and
Update policies and procedures at least annually and more frequently if appropriate.
"Our patients' health, privacy and well-being are of paramount importance to us," says Dr. David T. Feinberg, CEO of UCLAHS and associate vice chancellor for health sciences, in a prepared statement. "We appreciate the involvement and recommendations made by OCR in this matter and will fully comply with the plan of correction it has formulated."
Other resolution agreements include General Hospital Corp. & Massachusetts General Physicians Organization, Inc., Rite Aid Corporation and CVS Pharmacy, Inc.
In 2010, a former surgeon at UCLAHS, Huping Zhou, was sentenced to four months in prison after admitting he illegally read private electronic medical records of celebrities and others. Zhou became the first defendant in the nation to receive a prison sentence for a HIPAA privacy violation, according to the U.S. attorney's office for the central district of California. [See: HIPAA Violation Leads to Prison Term]
HHS enforces Federal standards that govern the privacy of identifiable health information under HIPAA and the Federal standards that govern the security of electronic health information. HHS has the authority to conduct the investigations of complaints alleging violations of HIPAA by covered entities. And those covered entities must cooperate with investigations conducted by HHS.
2. NIST cybersecurity standards would apply to Defense contractors under proposed rule
By David Perera Comment | Forward | Twitter | Facebook | LinkedIn
Certain Defense Department contractors in possession of unclassified yet nonpublic information would become subject to National Institute of Standards and Technology cybersecurity standards under a proposed rule change to the Defense Acquisition Regulation Supplement published in the Federal Register June 29.
Under the proposed rule, the DoD would set up two standards of cybersecurity that private sector contractors would have to contractually affirm an ability to implement: A "basic" standard for any contractor in possession of nonpublic DoD data, and an "enhanced" standard for other contractors. The requirement would apply at least to first-tier subcontractors; the discussion of the rule printed in the Federal Register says the requirement would "be passed down through the supply chain."
The enhanced standard would apply to contractors in possession of critical program information (under DoD Directive 5200.39 [.pdf]); critical information (under DoD 5205.02 [.pdf]); any information with a controlled access designation such as "sensitive but unclassified;" data subject to export controls under International Traffic in Arms Regulations and Export Administration Regulations; technical data; anything exempt from the Freedom of Information Act; and, personally identifiable information.
Contractors under the enhanced security standard would have to implement cybersecurity standards codified by NIST in Special Publication 800-53 (.pdf)--not all of them, just 58 of the standards enumerated in the document.
Enhanced security standard contractors would also come under a reporting requirement whereby they could have to report any cyber incident affecting DoD information with 72 hours of its occurrence. DoD policy would be that a "properly reported" cyber incident "shall not, by itself, be interpreted as evidence that the contractor has failed to provide adequate information safeguards," the proposed rule states.
The basic standard would apply to information exempt from disclosure under FOIA or not yet released to the public.
Basic standard contractors would have a far-less onerous set of requirement to adhere to under the proposal rule, such as attesting that employees don't access DoD information on public computers, and that storage media is sanitized before disposal.
The DoD acknowledges that small businesses are more likely to be affected by the rule than large Defense contractors, since most large contractors handling sensitive information already have information assurance controls and could implement 800-53 standards with minimal additional cost.
About 76 percent of DoD small business contractors would be required to implement the enhanced standard, the Pentagon estimates.
Comments are due by the end of August 29.
For more:
- download the proposed rule, DFARS 2011-D039 (.pdf)
- download NIST SP 800-53, Rev. 3 (.pdf)
Related Articles:
DoD institutes technical data access exception for technical assistance contractors
SASC urges behavioral pattern threat detection DoD cybersecurity pilot
Federal government has dot-secure Internet domain under consideration
Read more about: NIST, DoD Acquisition, cybersecurity, NIST Special Publication
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By IAN SHERR
SAN FRANCISCO--A group of computer hackers on Sunday posted a document it claimed contains usernames and passwords for an Apple Inc. server, the latest in a string of brazen attacks that have compromised government and corporate websites around the world.
"AntiSec," a hacking campaign that includes hackers from both the online vigilante group Anonymous and hackers from the now-defunct Lulz Security, posted a document containing a link to a supposed Apple server along with a list of 26 administrative usernames and passwords. AntiSec is Internet shorthand for "anti-security."
The hackers said in a statement posted to Twitter that they had accessed Apple's systems due to a security flaw used in software used by the Cupertino, Calif.-based gadget maker and other companies. "But don't worry," the hackers said, "we are busy elsewhere."
A spokesman for Apple didn't immediately respond to a request for comment.
The posted information comes as part of a two-month campaign of digital heists targeting corporations including Sony Corp. and AT&T Inc., as well as government agencies such as the U.S. Senate, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Arizona Department of Public Safety.
2nd Breach at Calif. Public Health Dept.
Incident Involves Information Copied to a Drive
June 27, 2011 - Howard Anderson, Executive Editor, HealthcareInfoSecurity.com
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The California Department of Public Health has reported its second health information breach incident in recent months.
The latest breach involves an employee who improperly copied to a private hard drive and removed from state offices information on about 9,000 current and former state employees. The information on staff of the California Department of Health Care Services and the former Department of Health Services included names, addresses, plus varying combinations of Social Security numbers, ethnicity, birth dates, next of kin and their addresses, and/or information from workers' compensation documents.
Although the department has no evidence that the information has been misused or further disclosed, those affected are being offered free credit monitoring services.
The employee responsible is on administrative leave until an investigation is complete, state officials said. The public health department's security detection system alerted officials to the problem.
The department "has begun implementing additional safeguards to protect employee information as the investigation progresses," according to a statement. "CDPH is also conducting a thorough review of information security policies and will put in place any additional necessary policies or practices to help prevent such an incident from happening again."
Back in December, the department reported that a magnetic tape mailed from one office to another had been lost (see: Breaches at 2 Public Health Departments). The unencrypted tape included personal information on up to 2,550 public health facility residents and staff.
Debit Breach Hits Ohio Accounts
Credit
Eligible
Fraudulent Signature Debit Transactions Hit Nearly 24 Institutions
June 21, 2011 - Jeffrey Roman, Associate Editor
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June 21 Update: The recent breaches that affected dozens of Northeast Ohio banks and credit unions were most likely caused by the interception of CVV2 card security codes, says Mike Urban, senior director of fraud product management at FICO.
"It's not a skimming situation," Urban says of the breaches which started in April. "Likely, it was related to one or several attacks on a card-not-present merchant."
The fraudsters, using stolen debit details, hit accounts with fraudulent signature-based transactions used for online and over-the-phone purchases.
Based on the number of organizations hit, tens of thousands of accounts may have been exposed.
The affected banks include Keybank, Dollar Bank, Fifth Third, PNC, Huntington, Charter One, Ohio Savings and FirstMerit. At least six credit unions also were reportedly hit, including Century Federal Credit Union, Ohio First Class Credit Union [formerly the Postal Employees Credit Union], the Firefighters Credit Union, PSE Credit Union and Best Reward Credit Union.
Fraudulent purchases, some of which neared $4,000, at Walmart, AutoZone and CVS were reported. Other transactions were initiated overseas, including some in Germany and the Philippines.
The Electronic Crimes Task Force, a unit of the U.S. Secret Service, is in charge of the investigation.
CVV data can be captured when a magnetic stripe is skimmed. CVV2 data, on the other hand, is used for authenticating online or over-the-phone purchases. "[The CVV2] number is not on a magnetic stripe," Urban says. "When you're skimming, you can compromise the CVV stripe. But you don't get the CVV2, which is on the signature bar."
The breach could also have been related to a phishing scheme, through which attackers gathered card information directly from consumers. A connection among all the compromised debit accounts is probable, says George Tubin, senior research director for TowerGroup's Delivery Channels and Financial Information Security research.
"I'd be interested in knowing what the connection, besides location, these CUs [and banks] have with each other," he says "Shared ATM network or processor? There must be a single point of compromise, versus a fraudster just focusing on CUs in a particular location."
Institutions affected by the breach should work to identify the accounts that were attacked and monitor for testing transactions, "when the criminals do low-amount transactions before they go in with a high transaction," Urban says.
The breach comes in the wake of other noteworthy attacks, namely the hack of Citi's online banking platform, which led to the exposure of account details on more than 360,000 Citi cards. [See Citi Breach: 360K Accounts Affected]
Report Says Pentagon Must Bolster Cyber Staff
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published: June 21, 2011 at 8:50 AM ET
WASHINGTON (AP) — America's enemies recognize that cyberattacks are a low-cost way to counter U.S. military might, a government watchdog agency said Monday, recommending that the Pentagon clarify the duties and command structure of its cyber workforce.
The Government Accountability Office, in a report released Monday, said the Pentagon has made progress setting up its new U.S. Cyber Command, but must set deadlines to lay out more detailed guidelines on how its cyber workforce fits together.
"The threat to Department of Defense (DOD) computer networks is substantial and the potential for sabotage and destruction is present," said GAO.
Defense officials have acknowledged that the department's networks get attacked or probed millions of times a day — with the bulk of the activity being less serious scans. Across the government, officials are struggling to beef up their defense of federal computer systems from hackers, criminals and enemies, including other nations.
GAO said the military has laid the foundation for the operation of its new Cyber Command, which is based at Fort Meade in Maryland, alongside the secretive National Security Agency.
But the Pentagon must now develop better training programs for staff, and determine what cyber jobs civilians can do, and which operations must be done by members of the military.
And it said the Pentagon must also clarify the responsibilities of Cyber Command and lay out the structure and duties of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine cyber components, so the smaller units know best how to support the main command.
In a response to GAO, Robert Butler, the deputy assistant defense secretary for cyber policy, said the Pentagon is working on those issues. But he did not lay out a timeline for completion.
Massive UK Breach: A Call to Action?
It's Time to Consider Mobile Device Security Strategies
June 17, 2011 - Howard Anderson
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When British news media reported that an unencrypted laptop containing information on 8.63 million patients was missing from a National Health Service facility, jaws dropped here in the U.S.
Why would anyone store that much patient information on a portable device that could be lost or stolen? And why wasn't the information encrypted? Good questions. Maybe we'll find out more when the investigation is completed.
I fear that the public and the industry are already numb to these breaches since they are common.
Will the incident serve as a wake-up call for U.S. healthcare organizations about the need to take adequate precautions for preventing breaches involving mobile devices? We'll have to wait and see. In the meantime, the list of security incidents on the federal "wall of shame," which displays many dozens of major breaches stemming from lost or stolen unencrypted mobile devices and media, keeps on growing.
Sanctions Needed
Security expert Kate Borten, president of The Marblehead Group, offers this observation: "Unless the U.K. government takes significant action against the NHS for this serious breach, which is not likely, the message to the U.S. healthcare industry is lost."
Too many healthcare organizations still have a sense that a breach "won't happen to us," Borten says. "Maybe the only thing that will cause all organizations to implement obvious security measures, such as encryption on portables, will be a breach that has a horrible impact on patients who then bring legal action and major publicity that doesn't fade away after a week."
Security consultant Mac McMillan, CEO at CynergisTek, says a significant ramping up of enforcement of HIPAA and HITECH Act regulations is needed. The U.K. incident, and the nearly 290 incidents on the U.S. "wall of shame," are indications that "security is not a priority," he argues.
"If it was a priority, we would never, ever put more than 8 million records on a laptop. You would think someone would have asked the question: 'Do the health records on more than 8 million individuals belong on a device that can be lost or stolen?'"
Healthcare organizations should carefully consider whether any patient information should be stored on mobile devices, he stresses. And if such data absolutely must be stored on a laptop, it's essential to encrypt it, he adds.
So has your organization considered whether to prohibit, or at least limit, the storage of patient information on mobile devices? And are all your mobile devices that store patient data equipped with encryption? Maybe it's time to check.
"I fear that the public and the industry are already numb to these breaches since they are common," Borten says. That's a scary thought, indeed.