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who bought the dip I know I did
"Immutable Holdings (Ticker: $HOLD) is the world's first publicly traded Blockchain Holding Company. We're investing in the metaverse by building businesses like http://NFT.com, 1-800-Bitcoin, Immutable Asset Management, and more. We're traded on the NEO in Canada." Jordan Fried
Immutable Holdings (Ticker: $HOLD) is the world's first publicly traded Blockchain Holding Company. We're investing in the metaverse by building businesses like https://t.co/J5QFXdSpmG, 1-800-Bitcoin, Immutable Asset Management, and more. We're traded on the NEO in Canada.
— Jordan Fried (@JordanFried) November 3, 2021
NFT of $HOLD CEO Jordan Fried just sold for 150,000 $HBAR which is roughly 70,000 usd
@jordanfried, the #HBAR people definitely love you. 💕 Second copy of "#023 Jordan Fried" #Hashgraph Card #NFT just been sold for 150,000 $HBAR with the help of @SuperheroesLazy, to a #LazySuperheroes holder, @caleb45925828 🚨 #Hedera #NFTs #NFTCommunity #HBARBarians pic.twitter.com/yUDKvS8UST
— Hashgraph Cards (@HashgraphC) November 16, 2021
video of $HOLD ceo Jordan Fried
I’m super excited to be pulling back the curtain and sharing more video content about what we’re building @ImmutableHold $HOLD. We’re just getting started and I can’t wait to share what we do next!
— Jordan Fried (@JordanFried) November 10, 2021
Follow The Journey 🚀https://t.co/w9pM2RKK24https://t.co/Nx67TI1TiV pic.twitter.com/hoayzDlm8g
Immutable Holdings Strengthens Commitment To HBAR Ecosystem With Acquisition Of MyHBARWallet.com
https://stockhouse.com/news/press-releases/2021/11/09/immutable-holdings-strengthens-commitment-to-hbar-ecosystem-with-acquisition-of
Now is the time to buy!!!
Agreed
$HOLD according to this owns a boatload of $HBAR crypto coins exactly how much I don't know but knowing Jordan Fried its got to be in the hundreds of millions! $HBAR just hit 40 cents today at that price 100million = 40 million usd ...I personally think they own a lot more than 100mill and soon we will find out but this companies market cap is sitting at 3 million ps also research Hedera Hashgraph their coin $HBAR I believe will be 3 dollars by year end of which I own a boatload also.
$HOLD has less than a million outstanding shares which gives it a market cap of around 3 million usd
Here is an excerpt of the minutes from Hedera $HBAR governing council meeting
2021 Budget
Young C. reviewed the proposed 2021 HBAR budget request for 4,393,150,000 hbars.
Young C. confirmed that the terms of the sale of hbars to Immutable Holdings had been
agreed. Young C. also presented a proposal for a joint venture Hedera ecosystem fund of $50
million, which would be funded 50% by Hedera and 50% by a venture capital firm.
Brett M. noted that the 6-month budget requests to the Council Members occur due to a
security policy established by the Council Members in 2019. After being moved and seconded,
the Council approved the allocation of 4,393,150,000 HBAR for the H2 2021 budget.
$HOLD ceo and Kevin oleary live right now
and did you notice they are the moderators too what a joke
I see thank you both for filling me in but didn't Neom say that if they didn't get the RS they would be in big trouble or did that just turn out to be an empty threat
hello everyone say can anyone tell me what is going on with proposal 4 and 5 .
The last thing I knew is they were going to have a vote to reverse split to be able to pay YA off now it seems like nobodies even talking about it. Did they not get the votes needed for the RS
Wongyal
test
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Living in Vegas; Playing with Maniacs
I came back to Vegas on a tuesday night. To my surprise Dan was packing up his things, preparing for a two week LA vacation; The roommate experience would have to wait. Upon entering the poker room at the Bellagio It became apparent that he wasn't the only one leaving Vegas for LA. Half the tables were vacant. In fact, only one 5/10 game was running. I've NEVER seen less than two in all my experience and speculation was that it could be like this until the end of february when the LAPC (Las Angeles Poker Classic) wraps up.
Cold sweats began formulating on my forehead, making my mental state obvious to anyone who cared to look. How could I not have checked this? I got lazy when it counted the most and now the biggest decision of my life could turn out to be the wrong one. Two hours into town and I already wanted to catch the next flight back to Chicago.
"Serenity Now" I told myself, taking a page out of Cosmo Kramer's book of mental stability. Life is 10% what happens to us and 90% how we react to it. I could sit around feeling sorry for myself, or I could make the best of the situation. Even if it meant living alone in an action-lacking town.
Feeling a bit lonely on the walk home down Flamingo, John Mayer's Why Georgia came on my ipod. It couldn't have been better timed."Everybody is just a stranger, but that's the danger, in going my own way…it's the price I have to pay." Nobody said that being "different" was going to be easy. I left my comfort zone to live my own life. If I'm going relish in the positives, I've got to also accept the negatives.
I lost $500 that night, half a buy in. But it's just money. The wisdom I gained and the lesson I learned was invaluable. Thing's aren't always gonna go your way, even when you feel like you've got your whole life planned out. Roommates are going to leave, and poker games are going to dry out; these are things that are out of our control. But like a good poker player, you must adjust. To survive, if nothing else.
And things would get better. By wednesday night there were two games running. Thursday saw 3 5/10s. And by friday night the room was packed, including 4 5/10 NLs.
During the week I played with 3 different types of maniacs. A couple of them were drunk, a couple were clueless, but most importantly, they all had too much money for their own good.
My first maniac experience came late wednesday night. At around 2am a young, fast talking, greased hair, drunk as all hell New Yorker sat down to my left. Coincidentally, just as he sat down, I'd hit a nice run of preflop cards. I raised 4 out of 10 hands, before I picked up JJ in MP.
Stacks
Hero 1700
Villain 1500
I raised the action to 40 and our villain reraised me up to 150 directly to my left. I called and the flop came down K43. I checked and he put $280 in one over-sized stack into the pot. I called and the turn came a Q. I checked knowing if he fired I would have trouble continuing in the hand with two overs on board. Thankfully, he checked back. The river paired the 4 and again I checked. Instantly, the villain placed 7 bills into the pot. It didn't make sense. AK and KQ would've bet the turn. Sure he could have a 4, but I was willing to take that chance. I call. "Ace high" he said.
The next night I was playing in a pretty tight/boring game when a new comer sat down across the table and started raising more hands then variance could account for. He was a dark skinned gentleman from Madagascar. Eventually people caught on and he started turning over hands. From what I witnessed it was apparent that he did not know much about Texas Hold'em and that he had ALOT of money to burn.
Stacks
Hero 1800
CO 1900
Our Madagascar friend limped the CO , as did I in the SB with QJ. The flop came down KT9 and I bet 20. BB folded and Madagascar called. The turn was a 4 and this time I bet 40. Again, I was called. The river was an A, putting 5 clubs on the board. Usually I would value bet 100 here with the nuts. But against this opponent I had a unique opportunity. He's the type of player who might think that a flush on the board meant we chopped. So I shoved all in for 1700. 8 and a half times the pot. Madagascar began trading off between thinking and smiling at me while laughing about the hand. Clearly the money was not an issue. Eventually, he asked the dealer If he would still have money left if he called. Not having to go back to his room was the most important factor in the decision. Once the dealer notified him that he would still have money he told me "I pay, I pay" as he got eager to flip over his hand.
"I've got the nuts" I told him. He nodded his head and congratulated me as the dealer began shoving me all of his chips except the 7 $10 chips he had remaining. "Wait a minute" he said in his broken english. "You told me I would still have these chips" referring to two stacks ($400) in total. "No sir I told you, you would have chips remaining, and you do." Madagascar felt cheated. I honestly believe he would've folded if he knew he wouldn't have any more chips. The situation lingered for about 30 more seconds before I came to my senses and told the man "You're an honest guy, I believe you when you say you thought you would still have chips." "Let him keep the $400" I notified the dealer. But just then Madagascar reached across the table, shook my hand, told me he appreciated me honesty, but that he lost them fair and square and that they now belonged to me.
My last maniac experience came yesterday evening. While sitting at the 5/10, I began exchanging some friendly banter with a player at next tables' limit game. He was funny and clearly intoxicated. Eventually, I challenged him to come over to our table and he insta-accepted. Bringing over his Coors Light, he immediately ordered two shots of patron for him and I. And then he started raising. A lot. Every hand in fact, he raised it up to 60 preflop. This happened for 3 hours straight. Probably 100 hands in a row. "I'm hungry Matt," my new friend Mark told me. "I'm on it" I told him, trying to make him as comfortable as possible. He ordered two meals at in room dining which I paid for with my comps, and a sizable tip to Carmen at the front desk. He appreciated the gesture and gave me his card, telling me that if I ever wanted to come out to San Diego he would take me to the nicest golf courses and the best poker games. I looked at the card "Mark Bradley President and CEO of MSB Financial Group." It all makes sense.
Stacks
Hero 3300
SB 1600
Even though we were friendly, Mark and I were more than willing to gamble with each other. Eventually we played a huge pot. With A8 i raised to 40 on the btn and he made it 150 in the SB. I called and the flop came AKK. He bet 300 while saying "You don't have the AK do you?" I called and the turn brought a J. "I'm all in" Mark said in stride. The count turned out to be 1200. Later in the night this would've been an immediate call, but this was early in Mark's raising rampage. I didn't have a good gauge of how ****ing crazy he was yet. So to gain a little more information I used my favorite amateur question and said "Will you show me If I fold Mark?" "Of course Matt, we boys. Yea, Yea Ill show you" he told me confidently. Now while we were certainly friends, he still wanted to take all my money. If he had a strong hand he wouldn't want to give me any reason to fold. So I called, and we both watched as the 10 hit the river. "You just doubled me up my friend" he said while flipping over QJ for the rivered straight. A $3300 pot wiped away by a 6 outer with one to go. I told him good hand and we went on with our shared dinner. I've come to terms with bad beats, and felt no reason to ruin our friendship.
Mark kept playing. Winning a ton with terrible hands, but eventually losing at all and much more. Before he could go broke, however, he had to deal with the berating of fellow 5/10 regulars. One player specifically told him "You're terrible. You should stick to limit" after a bad beat. This boggled my mind. Some people just don't get it. As much as poker is about the cards at the table, it's more so about the experience of the tourists. Catering to their needs, making them feel comfortable, is just as important as correctly calling their bluffs and value betting them light.
Poker is a people game. I'm catching on to this quick. They say Chip Reese was the best at understanding this concept. It should come as a surprise to no one, that he too, was one of the most successful players of all time.
All in all this first week has been great. In total I'm up 5k, the weather is great, and school is more interesting then it's ever been. Til next time…
Running awesome in life…and horrible at the tables
"God Sha'll give ith, and god she'll take ith away." No good blog has ever begun with a Mike Matusow quote, but right now The Mouth is a better reference for advice then Ghandi ever could be. After all, I don't think Ghandi' ever seesawed between broke and millionaire, yet alone hundreds of times in his life. Not that my seesaw is quite reaching the depths of Matusow Valley but my current "run bad" is definitely the worst that I've ever experienced in Vegas.
But before we get into Hold'em lets discuss how it all began. My neighbor, Mr. Sam Grizzle, has been coming over recently and coaching me through the low stakes mixed games online. The games are a barrel of fun and typically contain a super weak player field. "These donkeys don't even know what town they're in" Sam constantly reminds me. And he's right. The mixed games are an untapped resource. Just like PLO a few years back, most good players haven't picked them up yet, and those who have still make a ton of mistakes.
So after a few winning sessions online, I felt I was ready for the big show. I called up my buddy Dustin, a mixed game regular, and asked him where the game was at. "20/40 at the Wynn" he responded. Ten minutes later, I was there, 2k at the table. Ready to learn, ready to win.
Well…things didn't exactly go as I had hoped. Four hours later, I was stuck 1k and realizing that I was by far the worst player at the table. It's a very humbling experience, knowing that you're making all these mistakes and the pros are just dying to get into a pot with you. I'd finally gained the perspective of the fish in the NL games. I now knew what they were feeling.
But before I could go, I got involved in one more 2-7 triple draw pot. The stakes had been raised to 30/60 by this point, and the drunk Asian youngster, Kevin, had the straddle on. UTG, probably the 2nd worst player (to me), raised the straddle and I 4-bet in MP with 2357X. Both players called and they both drew two cards as I took one. I got my 6; giving me the 3rd nuts. We bet and raised throughout this draw and the next one. By the 3rd draw I was standing pat and they were both still drawing one card. After the final round of betting, the pot was somewhere north of 700. Kevin flipped up his hand. 8 high. I flipped over mine, expecting to rake in the pot. But little did I know that the fish UTG hit a 3 on the river giving him 23467…the 2nd nuts.
As I was ready to leave Dustin explained to me that he didn't think I played very poorly at all, but that the lineup was super tough. "For example" he said "The 1 seat, best Omaha 8 player in the world. The 2 seat, one of the best limit Hold'em players in the world, and the 4,5 and 9 have all made WSOP final tables."
Jesus bro where was this advice two thousand dollars ago I thought to myself. Either way, I asked for the game, and I got it. I took the loss as a very expensive lesson. Don't jump into games you're not ready for. Good poker may make you, but bad game selection will break you.
After the mixed game debacle I got a call from Joe asking me if I wanted to go out with him and his new friend. He met me at the poker room and took me back to the "Villa Suites" entrance at the Wynn; Explaining to me along the way how he knew this guy.
A few days back Joe got in a 10/25 NL game at the Wynn with a super rich owner of one of the most famous car companies overseas. Joe took the man for 50K, but did it with grace. Apparently, the guy liked him so much that he invited him out the next weekend. Well the next weekend was now and I officially had mingled my way into an amazing night. The Villa overlooked the Wynn golf course and had a waterfall pool on the back porch. 8 of us, mostly poker players, including Ozzy87, pre gamed there before our limo was ready to take us to Marque at the Cosmo. As we approached the hundreds of people waiting in line, we walked right past them to the front, where the VIPs get treated. Our personal host escorted us to our table, right in front of the dance floor, where our night was about to begin.
The club rang with house music as the DJ's lead fist pumping shoulder swaging dances. Our friend ordered 8 bottles of grey goose and crystal, leaving me clueless as to how much he had spent. An hour into the night all of the cutest girls in the club were escorted to our table to party with us. And for those who couldn't make use of them…the high end escorts showed up later. When I say high end, I'm talking these girls would've been some of the sexiest porn stars had they chosen that route of business...
They don't lie when they say you get what you pay for. I have never partied like that, and I may never again. But that night will remain imbedded in my memory until Alzheimer's or excessive drinking wipes it away.
Yesterday I returned to the B, hoping to win back my losses in my bread and butter game. And at first, things were going great. Up about $1,000 I found AA on the BTN. UTG raised to 40, two players called and I made it 150. All of the players called and all of a sudden we had a $600 pot. The flop came 889 and it was checked to me. Instead of making a standard Cbet, I opted for a small one, thinking this would give the amateur players an opportunity to make a mistake. I bet 200. Everyone folded to the fish directly to my right and he began thinking hard. Legitimate thinking, no hollywood. Eventually he went all in for 800. I called as it seemed my "betting to induce" worked out perfectly unless he stumbled into an 8. The turn was a 7 and the river was a K. I flipped over my hand as did he. 77 for a turned boat.
It stung more than usual coming after a losing day, but I think I handled the tilt pretty well. A few hours later, I found myself in an opportunity to get that money back. A new player in a Cutco sweatshirt had sat down to my right and immediately began playing super aggressively. After one of his open raises in MP i 3bet to 120 with AQ, telling him this was only because he was crazy. "I'll show you crazy" he said and made it 340 total. The spot turned from super +EV to fairly marginal. Still, being in position and having $1,000 behind us, I felt I had to call. The flop came Q52 and Cutco placed out a $400 bet. I postured for a few moments, deciding whether to call or go all in, before placing all of my chips in the middle. He thought forever and i now knew I was good. Still he was in deep and decided to call off his final $550 of his hard earned Knife selling monies. The turn brought a 5 and the river brought a J. "AQ" I announced. My opponent wasn't budging. So after a few seconds I turned my hand over. It was then that he turned over JJ for a rivered full house. Another huge blow to the bankroll, and worst of all it happened in the form of a slow roll.
For those keeping track at home, my last 3 pots between 2k-3k have all seen me as at least 88% favorites. I've lost all three. I was beginning to think I was above variance, and then the deck smacked me back to reality. This is the nature of the game we choose to play. The deck can make you look brilliant, but it can also make you look broke. Today it's my worst enemy. But I won't swear off my old friend. Instead, I'll come back fighting, putting my faith in those same odds that have brought me such agony this week
Table Instincts and Running Bad in Non-Poker Activities
"I wish we could just run even all the time," I complained to Deep and Joe as we walked past the main Bellagio cage and into the parking garage. I was still steaming from my most recent beat; Aces against Fours, all in on a J99 flop for 2500. They were barely listening. After all, why would they? They hate hearing bad beat stories just as much as I hate telling them. But sometimes if you don't release the negative energy, the bare thought of an unlucky hand will gnaw away at your insides until you go insane.
"At least if we ran even, I wouldn't have to be concerned about running well," I said. "From now on, with each large pot that I win, the anxiety is just going to build and build, knowing the poker gods are quietly preparing my doom." They laughed at that one. Two of my best friends in Vegas. They won't give me the time of day when I cry about my bad luck, but they'll break into hysteria like two pot heads at a Chris Rock show at the prospect of my downfall. Bastards.
Anyways we were on our way to the Cosmopolitan, where we had bottle service planned at the Marquee. I was already regretting my commitment; But my ex gf and her "newly single" girlfriends were in town and I had promised that I would show them a good time. Plus I needed a drink, or 7.
We got into the 2nd level and compliments of Joe's friend, Joe Cassidy, had top notch service getting us into our table in no time. The night was a blast. The girl's seemed to be having a great time and I was having fun with a sexy Asian girl who I'd met at the 5/10 game a few nights earlier. Splitting my attention between her and my ex, I caught the eye of a gorgeous brunette at the table next to ours with the prettiest blue eyes in the club. We started talking and it became apparent that she was into me. I guess it's true what they say about girls wanting what other girls have. After some sensual dancing we left the club together and went back to her hotel for some gambling. She told me her friend was sleeping in her room and I asked her if she wanted to to go back to my place. She smiled and nodded. Deal closed….or so I thought.
We took a cab back to the Meridian and got dropped off at security. Holding hands with my left, I reached my right into my pocket to grab my keys. It was then that my heart sunk. There were no keys. Anywhere. I called my roommate; once, twice, fourteen times. He was passed out drunk…in LA. My next idea was to bribe security. After all, it works for all other lines of service in Vegas. They apologized and told me it wasn't worth losing their job. All the while, I'm trying to keep this girl calm, tipsy, and horny; before she sobers up and freaks out for being off the strip, with a local who can't even get into his own god damn building.
20 minutes later and the inevitable conversation finally transpired. "Okay I thiiiinkkk I'm going to take a taxi back to MGM. Why don't you call me tomorrow when you get everything figured out" she told me. I wanted to argue, but I had no basis. Not to mention I was sober now and worried about the whereabouts of my key set. They not only held my apartment key, but also my car keys, and a key to my box, which contains 40 something thousand dollars.
Eventually, I called Sam knowing that 4am was like noon to him. "Hey there partner" he said with some pep in his voice. He was up, eating lunch, watching Poker after dark. I strolled into his apartment but was in no mood to talk. I went straight to the living room and crashed, alone, on Sam Grizzle's couch. Even the unluckiest of poker players can sympathize with that bad beat.
As morning came I walked over to Cosmopolitan, hoping to find my keys. I didn't. I shoved both hands into my pants in a last ditch effort, hoping to find them hiding in the pocket lint. I didn't. But I did find something of importance. A Bellagio Valet ticket. YOU MORON I thought to myself. My car…and keys were at valet the whole time.
I took sunday off and went to a local Barnes and Noble to buy some books and catch up on my reading. By monday I was refreshed and prepared to put a stop to my 7k losing streak. The Bellagio was surprisingly packed. Four 5/10 games were running, more then your average Saturday. My table was good too. Two players were particularly aggressive. They were definitely winning players, but players I knew I could exploit better than your average regular.
My first effort to exploit came with QQ in mp. An aggressive player opened to 40 and I 3bet to 130. He called and the flop came J83. He check called 170. On a 6 turn I fired a second barrel of 360. He called again and a 9 came on the river. I took one more shot at thin value and bet 440 after he checked. I expected a fold most of the time, but it was important to not have to show my hand against this particular opponent for metagame purposes. He looked me up and my QQ was good.
Moments later, I saw everyone at table 12 standing up, looking concerned. Spooky Deja-Vu, as that was the same reaction from thesame table that was robbed 2 weeks ago by a guy who lit a fire in the sports book and grabbed all the black chips. Today it was the dealer, Andy. He had fallen forward in his chair and was foaming out of the mouth. His skin was turning blue as he had suffered from an apparent seizure. I've never seen anyone die in front of me,and I was legitimately worried this would be the first time. Luckily, he was breathing and talking by the end of the night; but that doesn't take away from the curse developing at table 12. The table of doom.
It took the room a while to regroup but eventually more poker was played. And I got involved with the same loose cannon from the first hand. He raised UTG to 40, which didn't show much strength, as he was raising about 33% of his preflop hands. I had 79 in MP and considered raising for 15 seconds, knowing he would make mistakes in big pots. I ended up calling, as did the BTN, SB, and BB. The flop came 37T and it checked to me. I bet 170 and everybody folded to the aggressive preflop raiser. He thought for a bit and raised it to 470. Usually this is a fold, but I know this player would lead out in a multi-way pot with any big hand. So I called. The turn was a 2. My opponent took four stacks of chips and bet out 750.
Again something seemed off about his line. My instincts were telling me I was good. But so much more goes into a poker hand then just basic instincts. I was down 7k the last 9 days. I was sliding down a slippery slope, on the verge of falling off the ****ing cliff. Not to mention what this streak was doing to me mentally. I wasn't sleeping well at night. The last bad call I'd made had haunted my dreams, leaving me second guessing myself for 2 days. And what about the money I'd spent going out last weekend. Why the **** did I spend soo much money last weekend. I finally had a winning session. Even if I folded, I'd be up 800 for the day. He had 1100 behind. If I called this bet, I'd have to call a shove on the river. What have I gotten myself into? Stop thinking that way; focus on the problem at hand. His line DOESN'T make sense. You've got a read. If you can't trust your read, then what CAN you trust?
I placed 7 black chips and 5 orange into the middle and stared my opponent down as the river fell. He was in deep thought, he didn't know what to do. I checked the board, it was the 6. 30 seconds later my opponent checked. I tapped the table right back. He flipped up 68. I knew the board was small. Please god tell me I'm good. No straight, no flush. Just a 6. I flipped over my 79 and reeled in the biggest pot of the night with 2nd pair.
With my heart still beating through my shirt, I took a walk around the casino for a few minutes. This was the type of hand that ends down swings. I went with my read and my read was right.
I ended my night with a $700 bluff on a river that completed a flush, again confirming that my instincts were spot on. I racked up a $3500 winner and with a refurbished confidence. A confidence that had been broken to pieces in one short week. While the money is satisfying, it's simply a side note compared to my decision making in big pots. Tonight I'm out to prove that it wasn't a fluke…that I'm back.
MM
Super Bowl Weekend
Super Bowl Sunday represents a victory for the boys in every committed male's battle between "bros" and "hoes". A chance to start off the year by showing your buddies that she doesn't call the shots. That you can and will go drink beers and eat wings whenever you damn feel like it. Sure, by monday morning you'll be back in captivity, asking permission over so much as taking a dump; but for those three hours on sunday night, the phone's on vibrate and the TV's on football.
Luckily for us in Vegas, Super Bowl Sunday is extended to Super Bowl weekend. "The biggest gambling weekend of the whole year" Sam told me. "It's like New Years, except everyone leaves their broads at home. No dinners or ******** shows. Strictly gambling," he added.
So like a kid on Christmas I waited anxiously for the weekend. You see, while normal Americans are out celebrating on holidays, poker professionals know it's time to work. One of the nuances of the lifestyle I've chosen. The timing couldn't have been better. I'd just fully recovered from my 7k downswing and was ready to start booking some profits for the month of february.
Friday morning I woke up and passed the time with a few friends at Rhodes Ranch golf course. My game was sub-par, but my mind was elsewhere. Dustin, Joe, Deep and I talked strategy and fantasized about the weekend's potential while we hacked our way around the back nine. "I think 10k is a conceivable goal," Deep said. "I heard last year they had 5 10/20's going."
Driving back home down I-215 I caught myself entranced in the lights of the strip hotels, dreaming about a 5 figure weekend. Soon I would realize that it's not always that simple...
I got to the Bellagio around 7pm and for the first time in my experience every table was occupied. Five 5/10's were running and the list to join the game was 20 players deeps. An hour or so of waiting and I was finally in the game. Excited to be surrounded my so many unfamiliar faces, I made the rookie mistake of getting in as many pots as possible. At first it was working and my $1500 starting stack was up to $1900, but eventually it would catch up to me.
Stacks
UTG 4k
Hero 1900
The biggest spot at the table opened UTG to 40. The sb called and I joined in the BB with JT. The flop came 743 and I decided to bet 90, knowing it mostly missed UTG's range and thinking I could outplay the Sb in position later in the hand. The fish called UTG, leaving us head up to the turn. The turn was a 9, completing the flush, and presenting a pretty good opportunity to double barrel him off his medium strength hands. I bet 260 and again was called. My read told me I needed to get my opponent off an over pair as the 3 fell face up on the river. Sure the player was a fish, but now I could conceivably represent a full house or a flush with a big bet. "750" I announced. My opponent clearly wasn't happy with the spot. He shook his head and told the table that he could only beat a bluff. Just as I thought he was about to fold he picked up his loan 1k chip and tossed it in the middle. I flipped over my hand and he showed the J6. A bit unlucky to run into the top of his range, but generally a really poor timed bluff, that I'll blame on an anxiousness to get involved.
A few hands later, I picked up JJ UTG. I hadn't yet had a chance to reload as my stack sat at 900. I raised to 40 and there was one fold to the btn. He shoved his final 150 into the middle, which concerned me very little as he was both tilting and a fish. However, the hand got interesting when the kid in the BB began picking up chips for a raise. He made it 340 total, putting me in a tough spot. My hand is usually not good in this spot, but I must've looked like I was steaming and I'm sure he didn't give me an ample amount of credit. So I shoved in for 900 total and he called telling me he had AQ suited. The flop came 37T. The turn was a 6 and the river an 8. I was good, unless he had hearts...He did.
After a few more hours of play I was in for 4k and sitting on a 1700 stack when I found a great opportunity to win some chips back. MP raised the action to 40 and 3 players called to me in the BB. I called with 35 and saw the sexy 468 flop. We checked to the original raiser who bet out 110. The Sb called and I decided to raise to 380, knowing I was completely comfortable getting it in here with my equity. Surprisingly both players called. The turn was an offsuit Ace leaving me with a choice. Shove in for 1300 or check and hope to catch up. Their was too much money in the pot. "I'm all in" I announced. My chance of winning the pot uncontested lasted about 20 seconds before MP chose to put all his chips in the middle. To my amazement the Sb came in right behind him. The pot was now $4800. As long as no one else had clubs I could win with any , 2, or 7. Sitting in the 9 seat I caught a glimpse of the card as the dealer ripped it off the deck. It was small and it was black. My eyes were glued to the felt, right next to the turn, where the dealer would place it moments later. 5. I was in shock. How the **** did I miss that draw? MP flipped over KK and the Sb raked in the monster pot with A8.
It was barely past 11 on the biggest gambling night of the year and I had to quit the game. I had checked, called, and raised my way out of the door before the party even began. The gambler in me wanted to stay, but the realists knew that mentally I'd passed the point of winning poker. I needed to leave immediately before I ran through my whole bankroll.
That night I laid in bed restless. My body was exhausted, but my mind was jolting between the three big hands I'd played, keeping me from reaching unconsciousness. By 4am I was forced to bargain with my brain just to achieve any peace of mind. Starting tomorrow afternoon I would return to Bellagio and grind until the last tourists left town on monday, only taking breaks to eat and sleep. My focus would be on playing the best poker possible, not getting unstuck.
And so upon waking up that Saturday afternoon, I returned to the battle field, humbled, and hoping to regain my touch. However, things wouldn't come easy. Immediately my patience was tested. Twice in the first two hours I was forced to lay down big pairs on low card flops. Twice I was right.
By 2am I'd grinded myself a $1,000 profit through controlled aggression and picking on the players who played too many pots. With my reputation very LAGGY I opened AK UTG to 40. 4 players called and I hit the bingo flop of AA7. There are situations where a check is the best play here, but with my reputation I was confidant I could get 3 streets of value from any Ace. So after the Sb checked I bet 100. The first three players folded and the action got back to the Sb who raised me another 100. I chose to just call and play the rest of the hand in position. The turn was an 8 and this time my opponent checked to me. It seemed like his attempt to control the size of the pot after inexcusably ballooning it out of position. So i made him pay with a $290 bet. He called pretty quickly and checked in the dark on a 6 river. He had about $760 remaining and with my reputation the situation was perfect for a bluffy looking shove. As I announced "all in" his posture sunk and his face cringed up like a 40 year old dropping drawers for his first colonoscopy. He tried to talk to me about how obvious it was that he had an Ace. I just stared ahead with my headphones on trying to throw in subtle clues that I was uncomfortable. Another player called the clock and as the count approached ten he still hadn't made up his mind. Finally with seconds to spare he slid his chips in the middle. My hand was good as my Saturday night concluded with a $2500 profit.
Sunday I returned, bright and early, eager to exploit the tourists before they ventured off to their various sportsbook or Super Bowl parties. Again my game felt as confidant as ever. I was 3-betting lightly in all the right spots and folding big hands against all the right players. Without winning any big hands of note I had booked another $1000 profit by the time the game started. I was dangerously close to climbing out of the hole I'd dug myself, and thought I'd earned the right to take 3 hours off and watch the game peacefully.
By the time Aaron Rogers took the final knee and the Green Bay Packers were crowned Champions of the World, I was more than eager to escape the moron cheesehead fans and return to the poker room. Knowing the pain they must've been feeling back home, I vowed revenge on any Packer's fan who sat down at my table.
It took a while, but around 9pm the tourists began drunkenly stumbling back into the poker room. One particular Packer's fan sat down in the 1/2 while wearing a signed Clay Mathews helmet. I considered sitting in the game, but it proved unnecessary as I was handed my very own Cheese brain in the 5/10 game. He sat down with a blinking GB hat on and $1500 for the taking.
With my own stack up to $2,000 I found a spot to get involved with 89. UTG, a tight regular, raised to 40 and I called in MP. The Packers fan called on the btn and 3 of us took a flop of JT7. The nuts. UTG bet out 100 putting me in an interesting spot. UTG and I had enough history where I knew she would fold all one pair hands to a raise, so even though the flop was wet, the best play was a call to get the fish involved. When action reached the fish he looked like he was counting out chips to raise but eventually called. Praying for a safe card, the 5 fell on the turn. This time UTG checked and I made another unique decision and decided to check to the fish, confidant he would now bet his hand. He did. $250. UTG looked confused but still put in the chips for the call. Now the action was back to me and I had to protect my hand. I chose to make it $740. Obviously the cheesehead did not have the brain capacity to wrap his mind around what was going on in the hand, and quickly called the bet with $800 behind. UTG got the hint and surrendered her hand. Even though the pot was huge, I still put the fish on a range of mostly just JX hands based on his line. The river was safe in that it missed the flush, but dangerous in that it paired the T. I sat for a minute thinking about the shove. I knew I was going to do it, but I needed to sell indecision to my opponent. Finally I announced "all in" and the action was back to the fish. I stared him down as his green hat periodically blinked yellow, not too be confused with any lightbulbs going off in his brain. Eventually, he nodded his head and said "I call". He turned over AJ for a one pair hand in a $3500 pot.
I racked up at 2 in the morning as the drunks had mostly resorted back to their pads and the tables tightened up. Not only had I erased my Freaky Friday deficit, but I now had a $2200 profit for the weekend. I wanted to celebrate, but I was exhausted. I needed to sleep and clean up the mess from the few true super bowl fans (or maybe just degenerates) who extended their trips through monday.
Monday was much of the same story. I folded Aces on an ugly flop and was rewarded by the poker gods with two sets later in the night. With another winning session in the books I played one more big pot on the final day of my first super bowl weekend. After shoving a New York tourist off of KK and refusing to show my cards, it took him all of one hand to get involved in revenge poker. With J8 I raised the CO and he called in the Sb. The flop was QJ2 and I checked back the flop after he checked to me. The turn was the beautiful 8 and the Sb lead into me for 70. I made it 230, hoping that his pride would get in the way of his poker game. It did. He shoved all in for 700 more. It's a pretty "iffy" spot in most situations but not against a tilting fish. I called and the the K hit the river. My two pair was good against his Q9.
Add another $2,000 to my profit and I finished the weekend with $4,200 more than I began it with. While it wasn't quite the 5 figure weekend that I'd hoped for, I think I passed a major test on my first Vegas Super Bowl. I'd been kicked in the groin by the visiting fish, I received pity from the worst players at the table and was forced to make the walk of shame before midnight on a jam packed Friday. I could've quit; gone and played golf, drank away my troubles, or sat at the pool all weekend. But I got right back in the ring and challenged myself to play my A game. The discipline paid off and as a result I've never been more confidant.
MM
PS going to commerce sometime in the next week to check out LA. If anyone lives out there and wants to get together let me know
My Motivation
It was 6am on Saturday morning; Though for Brittany and I it was still friday night. We were half naked, keeping warm by means of the Meridian Jacuzzi and Cranberry Vodkas as the sun began peeking its way around the Platinum Hotel and through the leaves of the palm trees. The aftermath of my little cousin's 21st Bday and 3 bottles of Grey Goose at Marquee Nightclub. She was from Seattle..or San Diego..or something that started with an S. Not that it mattered, tomorrow she'd be gone and a new batch of 20-something bachlorettes would be only a few sessions away.
At that moment I may have been too inebriated to know my own name, but I was well aware that my life had become a fantasy turned reality. I'm 22 years old, single, and living in the best city in the world for those two circumstances. Whenever the cards betray me and the pressure to play bad builds inside my veins, it's these moments that keep me motivated. Motivated to play well; motivated to not go broke.
Recently I've needed every ounce of incentive to refrain from spazzing off my entire bankroll. After a few more winning sessions post Super Bowl, my progress was halted, turned around, and kicked back the opposite direction. Losing can do crazy things to the brain. I feel anxious at the table. My patience remains intact, but it hasn't been easy. It's as if there's voices in my head begging me to get involved in marginal spots.
Down $4500 for the week, I visited the Bellagio for a day session, hoping a change of routine could help spark a comeback. Sitting at an empty table while I waited for an open seat, I felt a tap on my shoulder.
It was a Finnish kid who'd been regularly playing in the 5/10 game for a few weeks now. He's a good player, but a few days back he had been losing pretty badly. After one particular pot that I beat him in, I noticed the look of disdain in his face as the chips were pushed my way. I'm used to witnessing disappointment in my opponents eyes, it's part of the business. But this was different. This was days, possibly weeks, of frustration built up in his head. So when we had a free moment, I called him aside and I gave him a pep talk. I told him that he could have all the talent in the world, but that if he didn't handle losing well, the downswings would be too steep to recover from. I told him to view losing streaks like a test to his toughness. A challenge to play his A game amidst the most difficult of mental circumstances.
He was coming to tell me thank you. That hearing a player he respected tell him those things was exactly the motivation he needed to "man up". It was time for me to listen to my own advice.
I sat down at the must move game and before I could even un rack my chips I was involved in a big pot. With QT in the bb I called a raise to 30 from a young kid on the btn. The flop came KJ4 and I check called his $50 cbet. The turn was a beauty as the 9 peeled off the deck. I set my trap and checked to my opponent. This time he bet $100 leaving me confident that on this type of board he had a strong hand. So I raised to $300 hoping to build the pot for a river shove. Instead of calling, my opponent pushed his remaining chips into the middle. Expecting to be chopping a fair amount of time I called as we witnessed the 9 on the river. My straight was no good. Quads on the river.
As brutal as it was, I saw a chance at redemption a few hours later. With the straddle on, UTG limped in and I bumped it up to 80 with AJ. A thinking player on the BTN called as did UTG. The flop came J72 and UTG decided to lead into me for 150. The board wasn't wet enough to where I thought he would lead a set, but a raise seemed too strong, so I flat called. The btn folded and the 5 came up on the turn. This time the btn confidently bet 300 with 600 behind. My read told me that his range was weighted towards AJ and KJ type hands. So with the nut flush draw to go along with my top pair I shipped in for his entire stack. He instantly called me and all of a sudden I wasn't so confident in my read. Before I could really examine what type of cards I did and didn't want on the river, the dealer had burned and turned. The K fell on it's back and my opponent flipped over AK for the rivered winner.
With nowhere to go on a Sunday evening, I forced myself to remain calm and at least try to regain some of the days lost funds. Within a half hour, I had mentally recovered from the losing and was in a good mindset to return to the table. Upon my arrival, I recognized a new player in the 6 seat. He was a familiar face and one that I despised. He's never been rude or obnoxious, but there's something about this 45 year old semi-regular that rubs me the wrong way. Maybe it's the way he tucks in his affliction T-Shirts, illuminating the roundness of belly. Or maybe it's the way he plays on his IPad all session, barely paying attention to the game. There's something about his demeanor, his arrogance, that makes me want to beat him more then anybody at the table.
After winning a couple small hands off of Affliction, we finally played a big pot. He opened to 30 UTG and I quickly 3bet to 100 in MP with QQ. Typically he likes to see flops so I was expecting a call. However, when the action retuned to him, he didn't insta-call in his normal fashion. Instead he counted out bills and raised it to 430. We were about 1600 deep so it put me in an interesting spot. I decided on utilizing my position and called to see a flop. I stared down his eyes as the dealer turned over the first 3 cards. Before I could see the flop my opponent had quickly bet 700. I turned my attention to the table, praying to see a Queen. It was AT2. I had around 1100 total remaining. The hand he was trying to represent was AK. But the big, non-thought out bet made little sense for that hand.
Maybe he got creative with AX suited? Maybe he actually has AK and wants to win the pot now. Best case scenario I'm up against a flush draw? His 4bet preflop was so large. Why was it so large? How much am I stuck for the day? For the week? Can I afford to be putting 1500 in the middle with 2nd pair right now. Every time I got into my money box it gets more and more depressing to look at. I can find better spots.
So I folded. He flipped over his hand and I knew before I saw it that I'd been bluffed. 34:. It didn't take long for me to rack up after that hand. My game was off and I wasn't trusting my instincts. Money had officially taken a precedent in my mind over strategy.
I had gone from being in an awesome mood to wanting to blow up the Bellagio in 7 hours. As hard as I try to remain at a constant temperament throughout the winning and losing sessions, it sure seems next to impossible. Poker is about respect to me. I want to be the big stack that people eye down when they walk past the table. I want to be the guy that made the incredible call with 4th pair or fold with bottom set. I want to be the kid that tourists rave about when they leave the game and head to dinner. But this week, I've just been the loser whose stuck, day after day. It's humbling and it's frustrating. I feel like I'm the best player in the 5/10; But as I'm learning the best player doesn't always win. I'm discovering the evils of variance in the most difficult of ways. I can only hope it'll make me stronger down the road.
MM
Background music for the read
Is it a lifestyle? A mindset? Or maybe it's how we're expected to act and think in relation to our environment. But who determines that environment? While we're typically classified by our physical standing on earth, I'm learning, that sometimes, the roots of our character are located in mental realms far away and intangible from the very people sitting right next to us.
I used to have a good grasp on normal. Growing up i could classify people by the clothes they wore or the music on their IPod. It was the midwest after all. More specifically the northern chicago suburbs. Kids were products of their parents. And parents were middle class, hard working people, with very similar ideals and expectations for their children.
So when I moved out West and met people who looked like me and talked like me, i expected them to be, well…like me. And for awhile that expectation went fairly uninterrupted. After all, when the boundaries of your communication lie within the felt of the poker table it's difficult to delve into the areas of our personalities that truly make us unique. Eventually, however, as my friendships have grown and our conversations gone deeper, I've realized that we are far from the same; And that my perception of "normal" was polluted years ago by a sheltered upbringing.
I was hit with this truth two nights ago over a 4 way game of Blockus at my apartment on Koval. Blockus is a strategy game, where the goal is for each player to place their tetris shaped pieces onto the board while abiding by the rules of the game and the pieces of others. It's a game of aggression and protection; but mostly it's a game of imagination. So what better place for four young poker players to truly get to know each other then over a joint and a game of blockus.
It was 3am and we had just finished a long session at the Bellagio. Friends Justin and Etu had accompanied Dan and I back to our apartment. While the real world may have been resting, our poker playing schedule left us wide awake. Anyways as the games progressed and the conversations expanded, I finally got to know my new friends.
First, their's Etu. He's the finnish kid that I'd mentioned in my previous blog. While his passport claims he's 25 you wouldn't know it by his facial appearance. Known at the B as the Baby Face Killer, he looks like he'd get ID'ed at a Justin Bieber show. But while his face lacks the weathering of a seasoned veteran, don't let it fool you into thinking he has a lack of experience. Since his 21st birthday and his coincided dropout from university, he's been coming to Vegas for 3 months at a time, staying until the Visa, or the money, runs out. Watching him play poker, you'd never imagine that the money could run out. But Etu revealed a secret over that game of Blockus. One that I could never have imagined.
"Sense John unary, I'm down nine tee tousand in roulette" he tells us in his solid, but accented English. Our jaws dropped to the floor as he just laughed his way through the tale. He would continue backwards with his story, giving us an insight into the roots of his degeneracy. Last year he bet $30,000 on the All Star game without ever having watched an NBA game on TV before. Also on his last trip he reluctantly swapped 5% of his main event winnings with Rob Pisano. He didn't care to check in on his investment until months later when he saw Rob on TV when the tournament was down to 3 tables. Sick thing is Rob wanted to swap more.
Etu developed a love for poker during his first years of college. Immediately he realized that he had all the skills to crush the games. All of them except bankroll management. "I would play de 250/500 NL wif one buy-in in my account. Sometimes I would ween and cosh out. And udder times I would lose and go back to grinding," he said again laughing towards the latter and more misfortunate portion of the story. I've noticed that Etu finds humor in the misery of his degeneracy. It's possibly a defense mechanism; Or maybe he just understands the ups and downs of gambling, the ups and downs of life. The same ups and downs that make me cringe and drive me insane, he just laughs his way through.
Next there's Dan. Figuratively (and I guess according to the lease) he's been my roommate for two months. But literally, he just returned from a 6 week trip to LA, so I'm still just getting to know him. Dan is what I would call a conspiracy theorist; Though he hates the term, saying it diminishes the strength of his beliefs. He places no faith in the government, the media, or any other people of power; instead placing all of his trust into personal beliefs that he's picked up on through a lifetime of asking questions and accepting no concrete truths. Though as Etu says "your theories have no facts", the strength of Dan's faith in these commonly discounted theories reflects in his confidence and his strong-willed approach to life.
"What would you guys say if I told you that Extra-Terestrial's have been in power in governments all around the world for the past 70 years" Dan asked us in between hits of the weed. The question seemed ridiculous and we treated it as such, with laughter, as Dan continued with his theory. "What if I told you that after we dropped the atom bomb, the force of the energy attracted the Aliens to earth. That E.T.s were responsible for the Nazi Regime, the war on terrorism, and every other significant event leading up to 2012." He knows were not going to agree with him, but Dan is persistent and unafraid to express his beliefs even if their far-fetched and unpopular.
While he may not agree, I give credit for his creativity at the poker table and in life, to his upbringing. Growing up in a self described "rough area" of New Jersey, Dan never had much money. He had to be creative; he had to hustle to get what he wanted. He once told me a story about a gameboy he got for christmas. A gameboy that wouldn't work without batteries; batteries that weren't part of the gift. So instead of pestering his mom who had done enough by getting him the present, he went down to the gas station and secretly stole some batteries. Well soon he realized that batteries run out of power and that a lot of kids at his school needed batteries. So everyday before school he would go to that same gas station, hijack some batteries and sell them to the kids at recess. Before he knew it, he was an 11 year old kid worth hundreds of dollars; but more importantly with a taste of how to use his creativity as a means to an end. While I may not agree with a lot of his viewpoints, I certainly respect and admire the way he goes about obtaining them.
The final member of the blockus game that night, may very well be the most interesting. I started talking to Justin Lall, during a 5/10 game about a month back. He was aggressive, fearless, and clearly a thinking player. The more familiar we got with each other, the friendlier we became. I knew he was a professional bridge player and a recreational drug user, but the extent of either wasn't clear until that very night.
"So Matt tells me you're a good bridge player" Dan asked curiously to Justin. "Yeah I'm a top 3 junior in the world" he responded matter of factly (though future research shows that he's clearly number 1). I didn't have to ask Justin what school he went to, to figure out that he's smart; it's illuminated in the way he thinks and the way he articulates his thoughts. Still, I was curious and wanted to know which prestigious university he attended. "College" he laughed. " The last grade I technically graduated was 6th. They let me keep going forward towards high school because I was smart enough, but I shouldn't have made it to junior high." He made it until he was 15, before eventually pursuing cards professionally, traveling the world, and experimenting with every drug imaginable. But not before he could take the SAT and score a 1490 (out of 1600).
This was all new to me. Where I'm from smart people don't do drugs; Smart people finish high school. But the human brain is a lot more complex then I gave it credit for. The idea of school wasn't satisfying for Justin. The idea that results will be obtained "down the road" didn't do it for his attention riddled mind. So he spent all of his time mastering bridge (eventually poker) and using what was left of the day to reach new mental dimensions through the world of psychedelic drugs. That night he told us about week long benders where he'd switch off between ecstasy and cocaine, doing whatever he could to avoid the depression that comes with coming off the drug. 6 or 7 days later when it was time to recover and finally rest, he would take handfuls of ambian to sleep through the depressive stages. Two days later he would wake up, and go on with his life.
Justin recognizes that it's not a healthy way to live, but that it was the way he dealt with bi-polar disorder, after personally choosing to stop taking his prescription medications at 18. Eventually, it all became too much and two years ago he found a new, more permanent way to deal with the pain. He documented what went on that february day here: http://forumserver.twoplustwo.com/34...bridge-462466/ in one of the most fascinating pieces of internet literature that I've ever read.
I think Justin struggles with a concept that a lot of brilliant people have trouble dealing with; Over thinking and a lack of satisfaction. Combined with mental illness, it can be a deadly combination. Still I don't view Justin's suicide attempt as a personal weakness, but I take it as more of an example of what it takes to achieve true happiness. The idea of reaching total happiness is directly correlated with expectations. Some of the smartest, wealthiest people in the world can't reach this state because of their internal drive to continue accomplishing more then they are capable of. It's a difficult lesson to learn when you've been taught that "success" comes with never being satisfied. Though if we're never satisfied, how can we be truly happy?
The night of blockus ended with my perception of "normal", my perception of reality, in shambles. Poker players, collectively, and particularly those three, are some of the most intelligent people that I've come across. Though if I called home and said that my friends were degenerate pit game playing, drug bender, Alien Believers, they would laugh in my face.
And I kind've like it that way…
MM
(If you can hear what I listen to while I write, then you're one step closer to understanding my state of mind throughout this journey).
The past year has taught me a lot about poker. Lessons that life had tried teaching me years ago. Lessons I was too naive to believe could be applied to my profession. Variance is everywhere in life. We see it in the weather, our relationships, and our everyday moods. We take drugs, move across the country, and date through the internet in our personal attempts to control the uncontrollable. It's the reason why the employment system is structured with salaried jobs. As a society we crave stability. Why then, as poker players, do we choose to get on this ride that jerks our heads from side to side; Blindfolded. Without a clue what's next to come.
It was 3am, about two weeks back, when I got a text from Sam. He was deep in the Venetian Horse tournament and wondering if I'd stop by for some moral support. So with my session coming to an end anyways, I drove down the strip just in time to see him finish off the final table and take home the nine thousand and change cash prize.
I've seen the man grind the lowest of games, hours on end, just to pay the rent. So to see the smile on his face as the final chips were pushed his way and his bankroll gained some much deserved breathing room brought me a lot of personal joy. "Been a millionaire and then broke 13 times Matt. Still, I betcha tomorrow this victory is gonna be all over the Twitters, and the Spitters, and the Critters," He told me over his celebratory eggs, grits, and toast at a downtown diner. "Cheers to the Spitters and the Critters" I said, raising my orange juice, as we laughed away the night and enjoyed a moment where justice seemed to finally make sense.
I couldn't help but think what a 5 figure score like that would do for me; more so mentally then financially. I'd just gone through a month long stretch of break even poker and was in search of something, anything, to show for the time I'd been putting into the game.
I spent the next week focusing on the games of other successful players and tightening up a few leaks in my game that I recognized through their play. Still, at first, I couldn't get off the roller coaster. Day after day, session after session I found myself winning and then losing back that very profit the next day. My game felt solid, but I was prone to at least one big mistake each session. With each mistake I made, I learned something new. Whether it was spots I shouldn't be bluffing or spots where they are never bluffing, I paid a price for information that would help me in the future.
Then after watching Joey Bartholdi breeze through the Venetian Deepstack Main Event, finishing 2nd for $93,000 9 days ago, I told myself it was time to start putting that knowledge to practice. I was tired of watching friends of mine doing big things while I jogged in place. It was time to hold myself accountable for my progress.
I took that newfound motivation to the tables, ready for some triumph of my own. I played loads of hands the past 9 days. Many of them winners, and some of them losers. These are the three that I found most interesting.
The first spot was that Sunday night against an overaggressive, yet winning player, in the 5/10 game. With one limper he raised in MP to 50. I called on the btn, with A2, as did the limper. The flop came down KT5 and both players checked to me on the btn. I bet out 100 and the limper quickly folded. Now the action returned to the pre flop raiser who made it 300 total. I couldn't think of many hands he would check raise on this board, but I knew I couldn't represent much by raising, so I called, planning on using my position later in the hand. The turn was a J and now my opponent checked to me. On this type of turn card, all of his strong hands would have to continue with a bet, but so would his bluffs. His likely holdings were now one pair hands with a small amount of showdown value. I wasn't going to let him get to showdown that cheaply. "I'm all in" I announced, effective for my opponents final 950 or so. He thought for quite some time, clearly irritated and eventually folded. While the pot may not have been huge, it gave me confidence to go with my reads and put pressure on my opponents.
Later that week I got involved with Rib Pisano, poker famous from his TV time at this year's main event. In our very first session together I decided to use my unknown reputation by playing back at him lightly. He opened to 50 in the CO and the btn called. I made it 200 from the BB with K9 expecting him to give me a ton of credit. He called as the btn folded, and we took a KJT flop. While this is a great flop, my hand isn't that good against his range. Not yet, at least. I considered check raising the flop all in, but I knew a good player would check back all of his medium strength hands. So instead I bet out 240. Big enough to build the pot, but small enough where he may get curious with medium strength hands. The plan was to shove about any turn if he called; But we never got that chance. Rob counted his chips and announced all in. While this doesn't bode well for my hand, for only 800 more I had too much potential to fold. I called as we saw the turn pair the T. A horrible card for me. I prayed for a spade, but it was not to be as the A hit the river. "I missed" I said shaking my head. "So did I" responded Rob, while he flipped over his A6 for a missed flush, but a rivered higher pair. My heart sunk as I realized how close I was to holding for a $2600 pot. Still the way I strategically thought out the hand and got the money in good against a solid player showed that my game was making strides in the right direction.
The final hand took place during a shot I took at the 10/20 NL game. No, Joe Hachem and Phil Laak were not in the game. By the time the waiting list emptied out, they were both long gone for the night. But the lineup looked weak, and my game felt strong. Up a $1,000, I played this hand with pocket 9's in MP. It folded to me and I opened the action to 80. The co, btn, and both blinds called, making it difficult for a middle pair to hold up. The flop came K82 rainbow and I chose to check and basically give up when the action got to me. Surprisingly both players checked behind me as we took a 5 on the turn. This time when it was checked to me I bet out 260, thinking there was a strong chance my hand was still good. Almost immediately, the CO tried to convince me otherwise. He threw 9 bills in the middle for a substantial raise. The rest of the players folded and the action was back to me. My hand clearly wasn't all that strong, but what was my opponent representing. Why not bet the flop with a K or a set? There aren't any reasonable two pair combos out there. The one value hand I could put him on was 55. Too many combinations of air and draws. So I stuck with my read and shoved him all in for his final 600. He called and we took a 4 on the river. My 99 was good.
I smiled inside as the dealer shipped me that pot. It was to be my last session before a weekend trip to LA, and finally I was seeing things clearly at the poker table. Since I last wrote about poker I'm up roughly 10k, which puts me a tad north of 31k profit since my move in December.
It was nice to take a vacation after a winning streak. There weren't any hands running through my mind and for the first time I could just relax and check out a new city. On our final night in LA we were invited to a party in West Hollywood. The area was seedy and the house was probably the cheapest on the block. But inside there was more energy then any nightclub I've attended this year. The hosts were aspiring actors and struggling musicians who were celebrating the completion of their most recent Web Series. For everyone not familiar, a Web Series is an unpaid production, put onto the internet strictly for exposure. There were no financial gains, and the actors were still undiscovered; Yet you wouldn't have known it based on the celebration. Stories of auditions for Entourage and opening for Jason Mraz lit up the faces of the storytellers, just as pots played with Sammy Farha and Don Cheadle did for me.
While they may have been waiting tables while they awaited their big break, there was no evidence of a struggle in these people. In fact the mood of the night was epitomized when this song:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jdlTt3E7w4Y came on the speakers and everyone scrambled for a tambourine to bang to the beat while they screamed the lyrics as if they had written them themselves. The scene brought chills to my bones. I saw beauty in their struggle; Notably in the character it built and the companionships it helped form. I thought about my own circle of friends in Vegas and the way we're chasing a very similar dream in a very similar manner. The tough times build character and bring us closer to the people who are fighting for the same cause; And even a bad month at the tables or a stretch of rejected auditions beat a lifetime of regret. Regret for not following a dream or having the courage to take a risk.
I thank god for giving me the courage to take this risk. Because without it I'd be lost and bored, dreaming of the turbulence.
MM
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Poker Celebs and Tourney Runs
I was on a boat, in choppy water; without any site of land. It's been my worst nightmare since I was 13, when "Open Water" the movie came out. You know the one where the couple gets left behind by their cruise ship and eventually needs to make the conscious decision as to whether they'd rather drowned to death or be eaten by sharks. How the hell did I get here? Where are all my friends? And why the **** is this boat so unstable? And then it happened. The power of the waves became too strong for the paper thin sailboat to withstand. I went flying through the air as the boat turned upside down, crashing into the open water…
I woke up in a cold swet, to my roommate, accompanied by an unfamiliar face shaking me like a mad man. "Jesus man, what the **** are you doing," I said to him, with my heart still racing from the inevitable drowning. I checked my watch. It was 4. 4am. Where am I? What happened after those shots of Jameson? Why on earth am I ass-naked?….And is that Jungleman?
I was too drunk to articulate any of those thoughts into words, so instead I just "mooooooooed" until Dan got the point that whatever he wanted, I wanted nothing to do with.
Eight hours later, I woke up, not sure if what had happened during the middle of the night was a dream. But just in case I walked over to Dan's room and repaid the favor by turning his lights on. This time it was him who sounded like an injured cow. "Dude why did you wake me up in the middle of the night?" I asked him confused. "Jungleman. Came over. Head's up. Sweated me. Thought you'd wanna watch." he said quickly and concisely, implying that the story of the best Heads up NL player in the world being in our apartment could wait until he woke up.
This is what our lives have come to. The circle of young mid-high stakes poker players is actually quite small, and very accessible as long as your social skills are stronger then that of a 4 year old. Last week Deep, Joe, Dan, and I woke up bright and early (before noon) and drove out to the Las Vegas Speedway to watch Dan Blizerian race his '68 cobra and against Tom the Lawyer's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tom_Goldstein) brand new ferrari in a quarter mile race for 400k. The crowd for the race was a mixture of about 60 beautifully plastic women and young poker players. The likes of Andrew Robl, Durrr, Kingofcards, Peachykeen, and many of the Bellagio high stakes regulars joined us on the rail as we all traded bets and useless knowledge on why we thought each racer had the edge. Guys I've been watching on TV for years were now colleagues, acquaintances.
Later that week, my "celebrity" encounters continued as we celebrated Joe's bday at his Turnberry apartment. I talked to Huck Seed about a strange connection we shared with one of his college bball teammates and joined in as Jeff Madsen challenged any and everybody to a rap battle.
Fast forward to late saturday night and Grizzle and I are drinking whiskey and playing Chinese poker at the Bellagio. "…And then Jeff Madsen started busting out raps about any subject we suggested. It was crazy." I told him, finishing the story of Joe's birthday. Sam was barely paying attention. He didn't give a rats ass about whose been on ESPN or in Cardplayer Magazine. "Ain't dat duh guy who won all dose tournaments a few years back. Boy I'd like to have him all alone at a head up table. See what he raps about after I take all his money." I gave up and returned my focus to my 13 card hand. There's no impressing a guy whose seen it all. "Alright Matt I'ma head home. I'm tryna make it up for that tournament over at the Wynn tomorrow," he finally told me. "Tournament?" "Yeah it's their final $500 buy-in for the Wynn Classic at noon." Maybe I'll play too, I thought, before checking my watch and realizing it was already 4:30am. **** you daylight savings.
I went to bed with no intentions of waking up for the tournament, but a sore and immobile neck kept me from getting any real sleep. Finally, at 1130 after hours of tossing and turning, I gave up and zombied my way into the shower. I tossed on some shorts, my black UNLV jersey and jumped in Dan's car as he too was up early and willing to give me a ride to the Wynn. "These are those rocks with the energy you're always talking about," I asked him while I fiddled around with a black one he had sitting in his cup holder, "Care if I take one. It would make a great card protector." He agreed and just like that, the first of my new tournament superstitions was inherited.
I sat down at my table and recognized no one as I looked around at all the old men; Guys who were in town just as much for the booze and the hookers as they were the poker tournaments. I'd chop off my left thumb to have this lineup at one of my cash game tables, I thought to myself, as the cards were tossed. Still, with my tournament game, I fully expected to be bounced and back at the pool by 2 sharp.
With my starting stack up to 12k from the original 10, I played my first interesting spot at 50/100 when a guy who'd just lost a big pot last hand raised in EP to 300. I looked down at two black Queens while I nodded my head to the Kid Cudi beat playing in my ear. I chose to reraise the action up to 800 on the btn. The rest of the table folded and my opponent took the opportunity to 4-bet me to 2200. Some people may bluff here, but this guy ALWAYS has a value hand. The problem was he may be on tilt, so his range is deeper then it's usual AA or KK. Plus I don't like to fold. Why the **** am I still thinking? I called. The flop came 862 and in stride the old man stuck the rest of his stack in the middle. A 6,000 chip bet for me to call. Oh well, I thought, as I tossed in the call, preparing myself not to be surprised either way. Luckily it was JJ. The turn was an A and the river a T. I was the early chip leader at the table, and ready to take on the role of table captain.
But first let me digress and talk about my 2nd tournament superstition. Every time I win my first big pot I keep whatever song was playing on repeat until I run into bad luck. Yes it becomes repetitive, but that's the world of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder. Plus the song I was stuck withhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aIaIcN2YLtk for the rest of the day was at least motivating and uplifting. Once I had to listen to Sara Berellis "Love Song" for 94 straight times during a deep Full Tilt run. Now that was the worst.
Later an old man with a big stack and a Titleist hat got moved 2 to my right. He did not take a liking to my constant raising and it showed in these two hands we played together.
With the blinds at 200/400 A25 it was folded to me in the btn and I made it 1075 with J4. Titleist called in the BB and then checked to me on a 965 flop. I cbet 1200 and he called almost immediately. As he called I double checked my cards, strictly a habitual thing. Turns out I actually had 34. Now the flops not so bad. The turn was a 3 and I decided to check back after his check, thinking he's not folding any hands better than mine. The river was a Q, completing a backdoor flush draw, but missing my straight. This time my opponent led into me for 2900. A very big bet for any one pair hands. Wouldn't he just bet small with a 9 and check a 5 or a 6? So i called. "You're good"I heard as he flipped over 84 for just an 8 high. I flipped over my pair of 3s and you could see in this guy's eyes that it made him sick. It was personal now.
One round later I raised the CO to 1125 with K4 and Titleist again cold-called me out of position, this time in the SB. The flop came J56 and I Cbet 1600, knowing we were deep and that I had a couple backdoor draws. Well, calling didn't work for Titleist last time, so this time he tried raising. He made it 4200, 2600 more for me to call. I didn't see him raising me with a J, so I called Bull**** and decided to float the flop, knowing I could raise him on a lot of turns. The turn was a K. And this time he bet really small into me, 3200. I called without much thought. The river was an A and now I expected him to shut down. But to my surprise he bet out 6800, completely throwing me for a loop. It was a good bet and took me some time to decipher it's meaning. Could he have run into an Ace? Unlikely as he would've probably just called the flop with some showdown value. Plus this guy wanted to beat me bad after last hand. "I call". Again he nodded, this time mucking his hand before I could even turn over a winner. By the end of his time at our table I'd taken 95% of his 30K stack, busting him, and moving myself into chip lead territory with 60k in amo.
With 80 of the original 180 players remaining or table broke and i took my 60k in chips to my next battle ground. My first hand took place with the blinds at 500/1000 a100. I raised 88 in MP only to see an Asian girl (JJ Lui) raise all in for 19k total on the btn. It was her 3rd all in shove in 2 orbits. Apparently, this is a difficult spot. Being a cash game donk I wouldn't personally know, but tournament people tell me it's close. So what do gamblers like me do in tough spots. Call, obviously. After all, you can't win when you fold. She flipped over 99. Just great. The board ran out KT47A and I was down to about 40k in chips.
It seemed like light years passed before my next playable hand. After all, the experts say you're supposed to play tight in these tournament things. But finally at 800/1600 a100 I picked up KK on the btn. A mid aged guy raised the CO to 3600 and I had a decision with a 30k stack. Any type of non-shove raise looks really strong and his hand doesn't necessarily have to be premium, so I saw a good slow playing opportunity. The flop came JJ5 and he checked to me. I imagined he would've bet all of his bluffs, so I bet 4700, expecting him to call with a hand that had decent show down value. He did. The turn was a bad card as the A peeled off, but again he checked to me. I checked back almost immediately. A 2 came on the river and again my opponent checked his hand. I saw a chance at some thin value and bet 8400, hoping all his mid pairs would get greedy and make the call. Well I got one part of the equation correct; he made the call. But his mid pair was actually A7. I had value owned my self to a short stack.
I counted my measly remaining 13k in chips as Kid Cudi continued to sing the words "Up, Up, and Away" in my ears, seemingly referencing my disappearing chip stack. **** you Cudi. You've worn out your welcome. Next song up: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lLJf9qJHR3E
I tightened up as we proceeded, only playing to shove the btn or co as a means to survival. With 14K I found another standard shoving position with one limper to me in the HJ. I pushed all the money in the middle with AQ. Unfortunately the Btn woke up with a real hand. The heavily accented Spaniard counted all of his chips and announced all in himself. He had JJ and we were off to the races for my tournament life. The Flop came KT6 giving me a little bit of life. The turn was the interesting J, filling up my straight, but leaving him outs to a full boat. Brick, brick, brick, I prayed as the river unfolded. It was a 9. I was still in business. I had made it to dinner break. Unfamiliar territory to say the least.
I wandered down to the pool, as I did during every break, returned to the bathroom as the we were returning to play, and relieved myself in the same urinal I had the previous 2 times, 3 spots from the wall. We were down to 5 tables and I was 20 players from my first cash since before I was legally old enough to play tournaments.
While my stack was a little rejuvenated, I still needed to make moves. And with 26K at 1k/2k 200a I did just that. The only player in the field who was still limping, limped in MP. Another bad player limped to my direct right. I looked down at A8 in the CO and saw a bunch of chips in the middle that I needed to make mine. I went all in, dropping to my new signature all in pos. My elbows rested on the table and formed a triangle with my hands. My head rested on my hands and my spiritual rock was moved from my chips to my cards. The action got to JJ Lui in the SB. She thought forever. Oh dear god she's going to call me. I panicked on the inside, while remaining calm on the outside. But the longer she took, the more likely I knew she was to fold. A minute went by before she tossed her hand in the muck. Then the first limper mucked while mumbling something I couldn't comprehend with my headphones in. The final action was on he 2nd limper, the player I thought least likely at the whole table to call my bet. He was short stacked too. It appeared he was one "oh screw it" thought from shoving in. But eventually he turned over his 88, a hand that had me murdered and folded face up. To make the survival more unlikely, JJ commented how she folded AJ.
Now I'm getting the hang of these things I thought, with a smile on my face, As I relaxed a little bit, singing along to Mumford and Sons. Up to 33k, my stack was far from comfortable at 1200/2400. But I found another good opportunity to better my situation when the action folded to me on the btn with 22. I announced all in and assumed the position as the blinds checked their cards. Out of the corner of my eye I watched as the SB counted his chips and eyed the stack of the BB's instead of worrying about mine. Uh oh. I really ****ed it up this time, didn't I my dear. He announced all in and flipped over pocket 1s. I had him dominated in UNO, but in Texas Hold'em I was on life support. "Good hand" I commented as the dealer burned and turned. But before he could even respond the tides had changed. Deuce in the door. My opponent smacked the table, just about knocking off my whole stack. There was no more help for the Aces and now I was in business. I kinda stared at the rock for a few seconds as the dealer pushed me the pot as if to say "you really did that didn't you." The energy, the Karma. I was a believer.
With 3 tables left I was moved to a new location and chose to take advantage of my unknown reputation by stealing the now important blinds a few times before anyone caught on. Then with 19 players left, one from the money, I got into an interesting spot with a tight player at the table. He was in the Sb and raised to 5600. I looked down at my cards in the Bb and saw AT. He had 34K remaining. Of all my 3 options I had no clue which was best. God, I suck at tournaments. I had only seen this guy show one hand and it was Aces. I decided to call, thinking with the money bubble upon us, he would give up a lot on bad flops. The flop came T73. Perfect. But now my opponent confidently moved in for 34k. I shuffled the chips and weighed my risk and reward. I had no idea what I wanted to do. As i was thinking, the payout structure caught my eye. I saw 770 for 18th and 25k for 1st. That was all I needed to see to remind me that I entered to win, not to place. I call. He reached for his cards confidently. Too confidently. T9. I was good…for the moment. The turn was a Q. No redraws, he was down to 3 outs. The river had no paint. It looked medium. I stood up tall from the 1 seat to get a quick glance, it was a 7.
"And we're in the money" the tournament director announced. The low stacks congratulated each other and the big stacks walked around eyeing the competition. I was somewhere in the middle. 6th out of 18. I was ecstatic to have finally accomplished something, but joy is a weak emotion. I showed no signs of content as I eyed the big stacks letting them know I was there to win.
We bagged up our chips, we were done playing for the night. I went home with a stack of 105K, but I knew i still was short of the ultimate goal. Thoughts of 25k consumed my thoughts as I laid awake in bed staring at the ceiling, dreaming of the stars
Wynn Tournament Day 2
I woke up for day two at 7:45. Not because of nerves or adrenaline; I had none of those. After all I'd made the money in a tournament for the first time since Obama took office. The rest was gravy.
I woke up to my alarm. We had a tee time at Rio Seco for 9am and it would've been criminal to pass up on the free $100 Joe and I were about to win. Especially the way we'd been hitting the ball lately.
So I drove out to Henderson and spent the morning in the mountains, playing the nicest course we'd played to date (a smidge better then Paiute). Although I hadn't planned it that way, golf proved to be the perfect remedy to the hopeful thinking and wild daydreaming that comes whenever a potential big score is on the horizon. To give the day a somewhat normal feel. Somewhat.
No thanks to me, we gave our opponents the ample whooping they deserved, finishing out the match with 5 holes to play. I spent most of the day searching the desert for my erratic tee shots, though I finished the match with a 20 foot birdie putt on the 14th, boosting my mental confidence in ways that would hopefully pay off later.
After a drawn out lunch and some afternoon traffic, I exited the I-15 at 4:10, a bit late for the 4 o'clock starting time. Still, play was slow and by the time I'd reached my seat I'd only gone through the blinds once, leaving me right around 100k in chips.
The table was solid, but tentative. I used that description to gain chips early without any real hands. I opened twice in the first couple rounds, both times from UTG. Tuna, my golfing buddy/opponent had opened my eyes to a strategy he'd been using in tournaments recently; stealing from UTG against solid opponents. People give too much respect, he told us. I liked the theory behind it and both times I attempted it, it worked to the tune of folds around the table.
With my stack up to 115k and with 14 players left, I was in the Sb when UTG, a solid internet player, raised the action to 9800 at 2k/4k 500a. This was the 2nd time he'd raised UTG. Perhaps he was a friend of Tuna's as well. Regardless, I knew he respected my game and I assumed he'd give me credit for a 3-bet in this spot. So I raised him to 23.5k with 93 He thought for a bit as I crouched into my newfound "poker position" and eventually folded while telling me "I was this close to pulling the trigger". He would pull the trigger plenty of times later, busting a few of the remaining players while taking the chip lead into the final table.
We drew cards and moved up to the elevated stage when we reached 10 players. My stack was around 130K, somewhere in the middle, and I was awarded the 10 seat, my favorite position. I analyzed the remaining opponents and determined that I was probably the 4th best tournament player remaining (ZOMG threads a joke, Matt just said he's 4th best!); With all three superior players to my immediate right. It seemed as though the stars were aligning perfectly in my favor.
I had little time to relish in my fortune however, as I was involved in an unfamiliar spot in the very first hand. The tournament short stack shipped all in for 26k in MP at 3k/6k/ 500a and I had the Bb with Q5. Getting exactly 2:1 on my money I wouldn't have thought twice about calling in a cash game. But this was a tournament and I was clueless as to the value of those 20k in chips to my stack, vs the reward of knocking out an opponent. In fact, I still have no idea. But at the time I called because, well, calling is more fun then folding. He had A8 and we were off to the races. The tournament director called out the hands and was greeted with "ooooooos" and "aaaaaaaas" as the flop brought out 224. Though I didn't know what they were getting so excited about. I knew that flushes never come when you flop the world. They only sneak up on you when you least expect it. The turn was a 7, making me more suspicious, and the river a J, confirming my belief that I was drawing dead as soon as I picked up 15 outs on the flop.
****. Time for a new song. The Ipod was on shuffle and the next song not only relaxed me, but got me in the singing mood. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qIVX1_J_87s Don't get me wrong, I'm no Whitney Houston, but boy do I love to sing, especially when I'm nervous. It sure beat my old nervous habit. Growing up I used to chew my shirts and put holes in the neck, until my mom threatened to dress me in my sister's clothes if I didn't stop ruining all of my shirts. So, I moved on to singing.
"Rock me gently, rock me slowly" kept me sane for the next 2 hours as the short stacks won every race and we couldn't get down past 8 players. The old guy to my left was getting a kick out of it. Old guys always get a good tickle when us youngsters do something out of the ordinary.
Anyways my patience paid off as I was hit with a small rush of cards with the blinds at 4k/8k 1k. I shoved my stack of 100k into the middle twice in a row from MP with the respectable hands 55 and AJ. Both times it folded around and "WAlaaa" just like that I was back up to 140k.
Looking down at my next hand I saw a pair of Queens in very early position. My default play was to just shove in again as I still only had like 17bb. Though before I could pull the trigger, I had a moment of clarity. I had been super active 3 hands in a row. My opponents don't know that I had legitimate hands. In their eyes it looks like I've been overactive. If I just make a small bet here, maybe one of the more active players will try and take advantage of my aggressiveness. So I made it 19k to go. With my headphones on and my eyes aimed at the floor, I received a nudge from the dealer. The action was back on me and the overaggressive player on the btn had shoved his entire 130k stack into the middle. "I call" I announced confidently as I flipped over my hand. He sheepishly countered with K8o. Oh my god, my plan had worked. My plans never work. Still, the hand was far from over. After all, one little King ball and I'm out the door with nothing to show for my performance except a lousy $1,000 prize. I took a deep breath in between singing as I prepared myself for the potential end. The flop kept me safe as the J 4 and 6 popped their way out. The turn brought paint. Male paint. J paired the board. "Phew" I said as my heart did it's best attempt at breaking through my rib cage. The river was the prettiest card in the deck, the Ace of Spades. We were down to 7 players and my stack was now one of the tops in the game.
I stayed out of trouble for the next little while, as the shorter stacks fought for survival. Barely paying attention I heard the words I'd been singing all afternoon coming from the other side of the dealer. I turned and looked, it was the old man and he was all in. He gave me a wink and I smiled back as we awaited the Bb's decision. His pocket 8s got called by AJ and he was all in for his tournament life. Logically, I was rooting for the big stack to win, but that old man gained some of my respect as he rocked out to Andy Kim. However, it wasn't meant to be as a J on the turn proved to be the old man's swan song
After another knock out we were down to 5 players, with all of our stacks fairly even, around 300k. The blinds were up to 8k/16k a1k as each decision was gaining more importance. I found myself in a pickle when the most solid player remaining raised his btn to 48k. The sb folded and it was up to me. I had A4o. This player was solid, so it was tough to know if I was good. But he did something different this time. His raises earlier in the table had typically been 2-2.5x the bb. It was as if he was trying to tell me through his bet sizing that he had a strong hand. But strong meant weak to me. With 5th place "only getting" 4k, it was easier to strategize in my head then to actually go forward with the plan. But the final straw came when I asked him how much he had remaining. Instead of telling me how much he had left he told me how much he began the hand with, 290k. It sounds stronger, are we catching on yet? Before I could properly think out my decision, the words "all in" came flying out of my mouth. It was instinctual, it didn't come from my brain. Please don't **** me instincts. Don't do me like that. The adrenaline rush was short-lived as my opponent tossed his hand into the muck and my stack took a huge boost.
A few hands later that same opponent ran AQ into AK and we were down to 4 players. One solid player to my right and two old men, clearly recreational players. Unfortunately they had most of the chips. So we proposed a deal and eventually agreed on 3rd and 4th place making 10k, 2nd getting 16k, and 1st getting 20k and the trophy. Just like that I was guaranteed my biggest tournament score of all time. The nerves were officially gone. Sure the goal was to still win, but knowing I was guaranteed 10k, meant I wouldn't leave disappointed. We ordered patron shots for the table and cheers'd to the good fortune that landed us with such a great opportunity.
It didn't take long for 4th to be decided as the last solid player got his A8 in against QJ, but couldn't hold up. We were 3 handed with the stacks looking like: 1 seat 500k, 5 seat 600k, Me 400k. The blinds were up to 10k/20k leaving variance as the ultimate decider as to who took home the trophy, but still I couldn't help but think about how much better I was then the competition. The 5 seat had turned his game up a notch and began raising erratically. He raised out of the Sb to 55k, and before I could look at my cards I told him "I hope I have a good hand because I would love to go all in right now." The first card was an A. The 2nd a K. I put on the hollywood for half a minute before announcing "All in". Immediately I was greeted with a call. "Oh no" he said in his Asian accented english as he showed KQ. "I would love an Ace" I told the dealer as he prepared to bring us the flop. J 6 2. I nodded my head in agreement, but stopped as the T brought my opponent new life. Please god, don't **** me. Not now, not while I'm this close. Burn. Turn. Ace of spades; the ugliest card in the deck.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WZ88oTITMoM This Lou Reed beat played in my head, as I weighed the frustration of the finish vs. the ecstasy of the whole 2 days.
I shook my head, and then the hands of the remaining players. I congratulated them and made my way to the podium to fill out the necessary forms. Before i could even sign on the dotted line, the match had ended. The 5 seat took my chips and used them to take down the 1 seat the very next hand.
I was disappointed, but I refused to let it alter my perception of the experience. After all, I gained quite a bit of luck in the form of 22 vs AA and just the absolute nut table draw to begin the final table. A victory would've been satisfying, but 10k certainly helped ice the pain.
We celebrated at Naked fish with enough sushi to fill Lake Mead and enough Saki to block out all of our individual worries…at least for the moment. The 10k put my Vegas profit north of 40k, and my main focus now is to avoid "Too much money syndrome" and instead continue growing my bankroll closer to 100k.
When Justin gets back from his bridge tournament we have a 2 week "who can profit more at the 5/10NL" prop bet beginning. He's definitely a favorite, but hopefully the competition can motivate me to keep striving towards the levels I know my game can reach.
But for now I'm enjoying the moment. My life upswing.
March Madness
After a few days of relaxing and enjoying my tournament success, the turnover was quick with March Madness beginning that Thursday. The first two days of the big dance may be an annual hooky day for many of America's youth and elders; A day to sit on the couch and watch basketball for twelve straight hours. But around here it's one of the largest tourist weekends of the year. High School get togethers and Fraternity reunions fly in by the thousands to get wasted bright and early, betting on teams with players they've never heard of, based on the logic of "Dude it's Moore-head st." and "I once nailed this slut who dropped out of VCU. She was so dumb. They must be good at basketball". Yes, I heard both of these statements last weekend.
With the weekend overlapping with St. Patrick's Day this year, the scene was something like straight out of Boon Dock Saints. The streets were more crowded then any day of the year (besides New Years) with the majority of the people dressed in Green and draped in beads, listening to the free concert taking place in the alley outside of O'sheas. Those who were inside filled the Sportsbooks to the brim as they shifted their attention from TV to TV, from ticket to ticket. As if the booze and the gambling weren't enough, two gorgeous girls (in a Pamela Anderson and Tila Tequila kind've way), wearing basically nothing, were walking through the Bellagio crowd, passing out their own personalized hooker cards. When times are tough you gotta eliminate the middle man.
As the law of averages would have it, I too had a few friends in town for the festivities. Friends who played a direct role in getting me into poker, friends I needed to show a good time. Slowly I gave my best effort to donate my tournament score back to where it came from. I spent the week at the Wynn rotating between whiskey and espresso, between craps and blackjack. The gambling really wasn't too much of a problem as I kept my investments minimal, but the late nights and excessive partying was killing my energy and motivation the next day.
In fact, on saturday I arrived at the Bellagio around 9pm and witnessed the juiciest 10/20 NL game I'd ever seen assembled. I walked up to the podium, registered for the list and ordered a double shot of espresso to make sure my awareness and alertness were prepared for the opportunity. Still, 45 minutes later, by the time my name was called, I could barely keep my eyes open. All the caffeine in the world couldn't account for the the lack of sleep and nutrition that I'd put myself through the previous 2 nights. I was forced to walk home before 10pm and call it an early night. My seat, and the potential of a small fortune, was taken by another regular. A regular with their priorities in tact, who understood the opportunity cost of lacking maturity on a big tourist weekend.
It's a difficult dilemma to balance, especially for someone my age. Vegas is the Mecca for young adult weekend getaways. I've had countless amount of friends come to town since December. Some who I talk to on a daily basis, others who I haven't seen since junior high. Still the pressure is large to play host and show everyone a good time. After all, I'm the Vegas local. I'm supposed to know the tourist hot spots and the local gems. And if you've ever gone out with tourists in town for the weekend, they party like the world's about to end. Sometimes it gets difficult to maintain a "real world lifestyle" when the rest of the town is living in a fantasy land.
Finally on sunday I was mentally rejuvenated and eager to play a long session for the first time all week. I got to Bellagio and there was still a relatively packed room with plenty of leftover gamblers from the weekend. I sat down in a 5 handed must move game with a couple regulars and two Russians. Right away, one of the particular russians set the tone for an aggressive game when he 3-bet the first two pots without any resistance. Then in the 3rd hand I picked up KQ and raised one limper to 50 in the CO. The btn called and AGAIN the same russian squeezed to 220. Folding a hand with this kind of strength wasn't much of an option in position, so I called and the btn followed suit. The flop came K87 and the russian led into us for 320. With a 1300 stack I had an interesting decision. A shove over reps my hand, but a lot of turn cards can kill my action if I choose to just call. In the end I decided on going all in, as the money in the pot was large enough to justify the move. The btn quickly folded and the russian went into the tank. "Okay I call" he said after a few moments as we watched the board run out 4 9. "One pair" I said as he responded with a shoulder shrug as if to say "okay which one". I flipped up my KQ and knew I was in trouble as he reached quickly for his cards. His AK had me out kicked as somehow I'd ran into the top of the this Lagtard's range.
After reloading, I established a wild image pretty quickly. I 3bet in a few spots showing a 5 or a 7 when my opponent folded in order to get paid off down the road. Down the road turned out to be 5 minutes later when I picked up a real hand when the action folded to me. With AK I opened the CO to 40. The btn and sb called as the action reached the same aggressive russian opponent. He 3bet the action up to 210 and it was back to me. Quickly and efficiently I made it 560 in order to appear like I was playing off his aggression. The spectators folded and my russsian opponent went into the tank. When he emerged he announced all in, to which I almost beat him into the pot. Surely this time I had to be good. He showed a K, then another K. This can't be real, I thought to myself. I shook my head as the flop brought me no help with the 965. The shakes reached violent levels as the turn paired the 9. I was in disbelief. The 2 on the river finished me off as I'd officially shipped the KGB 3k in a matter of 14 minutes.
Broke, I walked back to my box, in search of more currency. "I decided to play in a bigger game" I lied to the sexy Phillipeano who works at the cage, embarrassed by the real reason I was back in so little time. She nodded with a "I know why your here" smirk as she handed me my box. "Oh this time don't forget your magic rock" she told me while placing my forgotten piece of karma into my hand. "Thanks" I laughed, too tilted to decipher her level of sarcasm.
I returned to the table, this time with the rock, joking to the foreigners that it may take at least an hour to win this 3k.
In my first chance to get involved, I looked down at the dreaded AK again, this time in the Sb. A girl, who I hand't yet seen play a hand, raised it up to 40 in the CO. I made it 150 and she quickly called me. The flop came QJ2 and I checked my cards and then checked the action upon discovering that I didn't have a diamond. She checked back and we saw an A on the turn. While this appears to be a great card, most of her range should be AQ, AJ, and AT in this spot. So I checked again and she fired 240 this time. I called, not liking my hand very much, but definitely too stuck to fold. The river brought a Q and again I checked to her. She didn't hesitate before betting $400 of her remaining $700 in chips. The spot seemed very strange. She never has a non-A high flush here, and now AQ has become a lot less likely. Still it seems like a horrible spot to bluff. But sometimes recreational players do stupid things I reminded myself as I announced "call". "pair of two's" she announced as I checked the board assuming she meant 2's full. But all she had was the 24o for one lonely pair.
Up to $2500 I made most of my profit by isolating the new table fish with extremely large raises. The table didn't adjust to my strategy and virtually allowed me to single handily abuse the fish. Then just like that, they fought back.
The fish limped utg and a bad regular limped behind him. I raised to 90 in the HJ with K8. The btn cold called, the fish called, and the regular joined in as well. The flop came KT4 and I pot controlled with a check. The btn checked behind and we took a 7 on the turn. The fish checked but this time the bad regular bet 200. I called and the other two players folded. The river was an 8 and this time my opponent lead into me for 600. My 2 pair was strong but all of his value hands were crushing mine. However, something smelled fishy, so I called, and wasn't surprised to hear him say "I missed".
The battle to even was completed when I coolered a non-believing regular with 99 against his AJ on a 4J9 6 4 board. After collecting my chips, I counted them up to see that I was in fact an $80 winner for the night. Still, I was ecstatic. Sometimes the relief of getting unstuck is more powerful then the elation after a huge score.
I woke up the next morning to a call from Deep. It was early and I could tell something unusual was happening as he asked me for my landlord's number. "Is your lease up or something" I asked him curiously. "No dude, I got robbed this morning, and I am getting the **** out of this place". I could feel the anger in his voice. Turns out after he left his West side apartment complex at 4am for a late night Bellagio session, someone climbed up through his balcony, entered his bedroom and stole both of his computers. Lucky for him the moron's didn't search long enough to find the camera or the 50k in cash he had stashed in his desk.
Still, the situation could've been easily avoidable. Deep chose to save a little money by living in a low security apartment complex. He chose not to get a box at a casino because no one ever thinks they're a candidate to get robbed until it happens to them. It made me think of what it takes to be a great poker player. It's more then picking good spots and exploiting fish. It's about being safe and responsible. It's about being prepared and taking advantage of opportunities when they smack you in the face. Being a poker professional is a 24 hour job. For the better and for the worse. There are always decisions we can make and drinks we can pass up that can greater our EV. And there are always backdoor flushes and balcony robberies that can bust our bankrolls if we're not careful enough.
The past year has taught me a lot about poker. Lessons that life had tried teaching me years ago. Lessons I was too naive to believe could be applied to my profession. Variance is everywhere in life. We see it in the weather, our relationships, and our everyday moods. We take drugs, move across the country, and date through the internet in our personal attempts to control the uncontrollable. It's the reason why the employment system is structured with salaried jobs. As a society we crave stability. Why then, as poker players, do we choose to get on this ride that jerks our heads from side to side; Blindfolded. Without a clue what's next to come.
It was 3am, about two weeks back, when I got a text from Sam. He was deep in the Venetian Horse tournament and wondering if I'd stop by for some moral support. So with my session coming to an end anyways, I drove down the strip just in time to see him finish off the final table and take home the nine thousand and change cash prize.
I've seen the man grind the lowest of games, hours on end, just to pay the rent. So to see the smile on his face as the final chips were pushed his way and his bankroll gained some much deserved breathing room brought me a lot of personal joy. "Been a millionaire and then broke 13 times Matt. Still, I betcha tomorrow this victory is gonna be all over the Twitters, and the Spitters, and the Critters," He told me over his celebratory eggs, grits, and toast at a downtown diner. "Cheers to the Spitters and the Critters" I said, raising my orange juice, as we laughed away the night and enjoyed a moment where justice seemed to finally make sense.
I couldn't help but think what a 5 figure score like that would do for me; more so mentally then financially. I'd just gone through a month long stretch of break even poker and was in search of something, anything, to show for the time I'd been putting into the game.
I spent the next week focusing on the games of other successful players and tightening up a few leaks in my game that I recognized through their play. Still, at first, I couldn't get off the roller coaster. Day after day, session after session I found myself winning and then losing back that very profit the next day. My game felt solid, but I was prone to at least one big mistake each session. With each mistake I made, I learned something new. Whether it was spots I shouldn't be bluffing or spots where they are never bluffing, I paid a price for information that would help me in the future.
Then after watching Joey Bartholdi breeze through the Venetian Deepstack Main Event, finishing 2nd for $93,000 9 days ago, I told myself it was time to start putting that knowledge to practice. I was tired of watching friends of mine doing big things while I jogged in place. It was time to hold myself accountable for my progress.
I took that newfound motivation to the tables, ready for some triumph of my own. I played loads of hands the past 9 days. Many of them winners, and some of them losers. These are the three that I found most interesting.
The first spot was that Sunday night against an overaggressive, yet winning player, in the 5/10 game. With one limper he raised in MP to 50. I called on the btn, with A2, as did the limper. The flop came down KT5 and both players checked to me on the btn. I bet out 100 and the limper quickly folded. Now the action returned to the pre flop raiser who made it 300 total. I couldn't think of many hands he would check raise on this board, but I knew I couldn't represent much by raising, so I called, planning on using my position later in the hand. The turn was a J and now my opponent checked to me. On this type of turn card, all of his strong hands would have to continue with a bet, but so would his bluffs. His likely holdings were now one pair hands with a small amount of showdown value. I wasn't going to let him get to showdown that cheaply. "I'm all in" I announced, effective for my opponents final 950 or so. He thought for quite some time, clearly irritated and eventually folded. While the pot may not have been huge, it gave me confidence to go with my reads and put pressure on my opponents.
Later that week I got involved with Rib Pisano, poker famous from his TV time at this year's main event. In our very first session together I decided to use my unknown reputation by playing back at him lightly. He opened to 50 in the CO and the btn called. I made it 200 from the BB with K9 expecting him to give me a ton of credit. He called as the btn folded, and we took a KJT flop. While this is a great flop, my hand isn't that good against his range. Not yet, at least. I considered check raising the flop all in, but I knew a good player would check back all of his medium strength hands. So instead I bet out 240. Big enough to build the pot, but small enough where he may get curious with medium strength hands. The plan was to shove about any turn if he called; But we never got that chance. Rob counted his chips and announced all in. While this doesn't bode well for my hand, for only 800 more I had too much potential to fold. I called as we saw the turn pair the T. A horrible card for me. I prayed for a spade, but it was not to be as the A hit the river. "I missed" I said shaking my head. "So did I" responded Rob, while he flipped over his A6 for a missed flush, but a rivered higher pair. My heart sunk as I realized how close I was to holding for a $2600 pot. Still the way I strategically thought out the hand and got the money in good against a solid player showed that my game was making strides in the right direction.
The final hand took place during a shot I took at the 10/20 NL game. No, Joe Hachem and Phil Laak were not in the game. By the time the waiting list emptied out, they were both long gone for the night. But the lineup looked weak, and my game felt strong. Up a $1,000, I played this hand with pocket 9's in MP. It folded to me and I opened the action to 80. The co, btn, and both blinds called, making it difficult for a middle pair to hold up. The flop came K82 rainbow and I chose to check and basically give up when the action got to me. Surprisingly both players checked behind me as we took a 5 on the turn. This time when it was checked to me I bet out 260, thinking there was a strong chance my hand was still good. Almost immediately, the CO tried to convince me otherwise. He threw 9 bills in the middle for a substantial raise. The rest of the players folded and the action was back to me. My hand clearly wasn't all that strong, but what was my opponent representing. Why not bet the flop with a K or a set? There aren't any reasonable two pair combos out there. The one value hand I could put him on was 55. Too many combinations of air and draws. So I stuck with my read and shoved him all in for his final 600. He called and we took a 4 on the river. My 99 was good.
I smiled inside as the dealer shipped me that pot. It was to be my last session before a weekend trip to LA, and finally I was seeing things clearly at the poker table. Since I last wrote about poker I'm up roughly 10k, which puts me a tad north of 31k profit since my move in December.
It was nice to take a vacation after a winning streak. There weren't any hands running through my mind and for the first time I could just relax and check out a new city. On our final night in LA we were invited to a party in West Hollywood. The area was seedy and the house was probably the cheapest on the block. But inside there was more energy then any nightclub I've attended this year. The hosts were aspiring actors and struggling musicians who were celebrating the completion of their most recent Web Series. For everyone not familiar, a Web Series is an unpaid production, put onto the internet strictly for exposure. There were no financial gains, and the actors were still undiscovered; Yet you wouldn't have known it based on the celebration. Stories of auditions for Entourage and opening for Jason Mraz lit up the faces of the storytellers, just as pots played with Sammy Farha and Don Cheadle did for me.
While they may have been waiting tables while they awaited their big break, there was no evidence of a struggle in these people. In fact the mood of the night was epitomized when this song:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jdlTt3E7w4Y came on the speakers and everyone scrambled for a tambourine to bang to the beat while they screamed the lyrics as if they had written them themselves. The scene brought chills to my bones. I saw beauty in their struggle; Notably in the character it built and the companionships it helped form. I thought about my own circle of friends in Vegas and the way we're chasing a very similar dream in a very similar manner. The tough times build character and bring us closer to the people who are fighting for the same cause; And even a bad month at the tables or a stretch of rejected auditions beat a lifetime of regret. Regret for not following a dream or having the courage to take a risk.
I thank god for giving me the courage to take this risk. Because without it I'd be lost and bored, dreaming of the turbulence.
MM
test
.
.
.
.
Riding the Roller Coaster
I've always preached about separating the value of the dollar from the chip and staying stable while the poker gods jerk your emotions up and down. But like a bad roller coaster sometimes it's impossible not to grow sick when you're thrown up and down. So sick you want to puke.
I took my own ride last night at the B, starting with a downslope slipperier than the Vegas sidewalks after an unsuspecting rain. With a full stack, I spent the first hour picking up very logical opening hands, but bricking the flops, turns, and rivers. In my first interesting decision, your typical middle-aged Asian in the HJ opened to 30, which was only important because he had opened to 40 the previous hand. The CO and BTN called and I made it 160 in the SB with JJ. My control of the pot lasted for about 3 seconds, before the initial raiser shipped his full buyin into the middle. An interesting move to say the least. I sat there talking to my opponent for about 45 seconds, trying to gain a perspective for where he was in the hand. My plan was interrupted by the grumpy European who reeked of BO, when he yelled out "Clock! I didn't come here to listen to you talk kid." I sat there stunned. A $1000 decision and you want to call the clock after 45 seconds? Alright ******* you wanna play like that. It's on. I folded my hand, all while staring down the smelly foreigner.
After reloading for another $1,000, I got a shot at revenge. The Smelly European opened to 40 UTG and I called with the red 77. The flop came 47K and I prayed like never before that this particular time my opponent picked up a piece. I checked my set and he obliged with an 80 dollar Cbet, to which I reraised to 220. Suddenly his concentration heightened as his eyes bolted back and forth from the flop to his cards to my stack. When the dust settled, he called the 220 and raised it another 500 bucks on top. 30 seconds of acting and then I shoved my whole stack into the middle giving him the same stare I had when he called the clock. He called the final 700 and started talking to his friend on the rail in another language. I heard something that sounded like "suit" so I presumed I needed to avoid the remaining spades. The turn was the 2, but the river brought the ugly Q. I turned my hand over angrily, mad at God for letting me down this particular time. But to my delight, I was still good. I threw a rare fist pump into the air as I stacked the enemies money and sent him home for the night.
A couple hours later my stack had risen up to $3400 and I had officially taken over the reigns as the table captain. However, I crossed over a bit to the sloppy side when I raised up the BTN to 70 with 34 after a couple limpers. The BB and UTG called and we saw a flop of 236. Checked to me and I bet 120. The BB, a mid aged black guy quickly minraised to 240. Not the type of minraise that felt like a trap, but the type that screamed, I have a decent hand for this board, I must raise. So it got back to me and I made it 300 on top. He burrowed his eyebrows before putting out the necessary call. The turn was a bad card for me as the 2 fell off. My opponent check again and This time I bet 450. My opponent was not to be bullied however, as he once again matched my bet. The river was the A and once again my opponent gave me a shot at winning the pot by checking to me. Maybe it was his perfect stack size (900), or maybe it was Eminem screaming in my ear about one opportunity, but I was not going to pussy out. I announced all in and the pressure was back on my opponent. I sat there nervous as hell, while my heart beated through my chest at a million miles an hour. Please fold. Please ****ing fold. Finally after sighing his shoulders like a fighter knowing he was outmatched, but too prideful to back down to a challenge, he pushed his stack into the middle. "good call" I nervously squeaked out as he turned over 99.
The feeling of failure dwindled inside my heart for the next 2 hours. I couldn't even look my table mates in the eyes out of embarrassment for my failed bluff. In fact, before I knew it I was reloading, for the 3rd time today. But before I returned to the table, I took a break, watching my Bears pounce on the Vikings while I regained my mental sanity. I returned to the table once calm, and started playing good poker. My bluffy reputation paid off in a few medium sized pots as the cards picked a good time to turn around. Before I knew it, I was on the verge of climbing out of the hole for the day.
With a stack of 2800 I found a great opportunity with KK in the BB. It was limped around to the SB, a competent but translucent player, who made it 50 in the SB. I repopped it to 180, to which a tilting Asian player cold called in the CO. Back to the SB and he made it 400 more. Wow. 4-bets are extremely rare preflop in these games, especially from "non tricky" players. I immediately feared Aces. I called, as did the Asian. The flop brought the 822 and this time the SB checked. It seemed like the perfect opportunity to bet small and gain value from his QQ. However, before I could place out a bet, the Asian went all in for 250 out of turn. With the action back to the SB, he shoved for 970. This is exactly what I didn't want to see. He can have two hands here, AA or QQ. "You wouldn't check raise here with QQ, right?" I asked him. "You would just hammer the dry flop and get it in." No reaction. "Alright I fold" I said, showing him my Kings. He let out a huge sigh of relief as he flipped over QQ and avoided danger in the final two cards to rake in a huge pot.
Back down to 2300, but not feeling as stupid as you may imagine. Every part of his line indicated that he had Aces. He even admitted to me that he had no idea I was so strong or he wouldn't have played the hand in that manner. I was disappointed in the result, but surprisingly okay with my thought process.
A few minutes later and I got a chance at redemption with the black Aces UTG. I raised it up to 40. An old guy to my left called, and a kid in MP made it 160. Now here's where it gets interesting. The BTN, a spazzy, but good player raises it to 400. Was I dreaming? However, I still needed to concentrate on the best line. It's easy to get lazy and mess up an opportunity like this. So I chip shuffled for a couple minutes and eventually made it 940 all day. Everyone folded to the BTN, who shoved in for 900 on top. I called telling him I had Aces and he shook his head in acceptance. The flop came 66T and I could see the hope dying in his eyes. A 4 hit the turn and it was all over. Before we saw the river his cards were in the muck and I had won potentially the biggest pot of my life.
I was at the top of the ride, and this time I was getting off. I cashed out my $4300 stack. The $1300 prize exceeded it's monetary value with it's emotional reward. It marked determination and tilt control. I felt like Michael Vick. I had been to the top, threw it all away with one terrible mistake and then battled my way back to glory. I won't take all the credit for winning with Aces, but I will say that I think I used my reputation to the best of it's ability on this particular day.
Iron Men and Sea Urchants
I've yet to see the sun out here in Vegas. Not that I spend much time outside in this town anyways, but it's been surprising to see the dark clouds dominate the sky above the casinos. Coincidentally my poker game has yet to see much of the "sun" either. After a horrible first day I've spent the last few trying to get back into the black. Two days ago I got the ball rolling with a 1300 dollar win in a ten hour session, and yesterday I looked to continue on the winning pace.
I walked into the Bellagio at about 4pm local time. I got a seat immediately and noticed that those who were present were familiar faces. Not necessarily locals, but definitely serious players. There were two players on the other side of the table from my very first trip; the internet nerd with the Bryan Devonshire fascination and the old guy jewelry salesman. And then next to me, a rich French Restaurant owner and a former Romanian professional soccer player.
Stacks:
UTG 1500
Hero 1000
Once again I dug myself an early hole. A lot of strange spots where I don't think I played poorly, but where the results were horrid. One example is a spot where I picked up AQ in the SB. Utg, a young kid, opened to 50. I was the only caller, as we saw a flop of A25. I checked and he bet out 60. I called out of position, planning on leading all turns. The turn was a 4 which seemed like a good card to lead for pot controlling against his range. I bet 110 and he called in stride. The river was a 7 and again I lead, this time for a small price of 150. Again he immediately called and I tabled my AQ which was no good against his 37. I was Strangely confused and grateful the pot stayed small at the same time.
Stacks:
SB 1500
Hero 1400
The action was weak for the first 4 hours, yet somehow I was stuck 600 when we saw our first preflop 3bet of the day. I raised the BTN to 45 after one limper with KK and the tight asian youngster in the SB reraised to 180. Now I had opened a lot of hands, but I was afraid that a 4bet would look super strong figuring this was our first 3bet of the day. So I called and we took a 1092 flop. He bet 250 and I flat called. An 8 on the turn and this time he led for 450. I couldn't find much justification for folding or calling, so I shoved in for 520 more. My opponent cut his chips, rechecked his cards, but eventually folded showing me QQ.
While waiting out a card dead streak, I got into an interesting conversation with the old man 2 seats to my left. He had on an iron man sweatshirt and even though I have no interest in competing in one, I'm always looking for tips on getting into better shape. For those unaware an iron man consists of a 2.4 mile swim, a 112 mile bike ride, and a 26.2 mile marathon. I asked him about the process that goes into training one's body for such an event, and apparently it's all about changing the physiology of the body. The body is trained to break down calories as it's source for energy. Obviously over the course of a 15 hour workout, the body runs out of calories. The trick behind training for such a long event, is tricking the body into turning to fat storage instead of calories or energy. The process takes up to two years of training, mostly by slowly pushing ones cardiovascular limits until the body gets comfortable with the process. Anyways, it wasn't long before our conversation was interrupted by a huge hand.
Stacks:
BB 1000
Hero 2100
BTN 1400
Back to even with a 2k stack, I picked up 56 in the HJ. 3 limpers to me and I joined, as did the btn and the sb. The BB a very tight woman raised it up to 70. The first 3 limpers called as did I and the btn. The flop couldn't have been better as the 246 popped out. The lady led for 200 and I made it 450, thinking that was a pretty believable number. The hand got interesting when Iron Man shoved all in for 800 more on the BTN. Obviously a man who bikes mountains and swims across oceans wasn't going to be intimidated by a measly bet of 450. The lady regrettingly folded and the action was back to me. However, before I could auto call my opponent showed me his 35. What's my play. I like to think I have a basic understanding of the math behind the game, but is this still a call? I thought for awhile and eventually couldn't fold with all the money in the pot. The hand got more interesting as the 6 peeled off the turn, giving me a plethora of more outs. With my heart pounding, the river brought the 3 salvaging a chop, which I was perfectly fine with seeing that Iron Man was capable of killing me, eating my remains, and biking down to mexico before anyone could catch up to him.
With Iron man a bit annoyed at my call, so I refocused my attention on the new player to my left. A sharply dressed french gentleman, I'd recognized him from the previous days. We got to talking about what he was doing here and he told me he was trying to open a french restaurant, first here and then in Las Angeles. This explains his over active playing style. It wasn't long before my new friend and I were involved in a big pot.
Stacks:
UTG 3,000
Hero 1,600
He raised to 60 UTG and 4 players called. I joined the party in the BB with QJ and we saw a flop of KT4. I checked, Frenchie bet 220 and everyone else folded. Back to me I called and saw the perfect 9 on the turn. I checked again and this time he fired 550. Now this wasn't the first big hand we had played. Twice before I had called his flop aggression and folded to a turn bet. So I decided to shove for 850 more, knowing It may look like I was getting fed up with his aggression. He eventually called me and I assumed there was a good chance he was drawing dead. The river was the 7 and he mucked when he saw my straight.
Up to 3,400 I started betting flops (red or black for $10) with the ex-Romanian soccer player. Now a soccer coach for girls in Orange County, you could see the regret in his eyes when he talked about quitting soccer. He had been kicked out of High School at 16 because he was too busy with his soccer club to attend. At 17 he got injured and went to visit his mother in the US. By 18 he was ready to return to playing, but his mother suggested he stay another 6 months in order to earn his green card. He agreed and stayed. Months later he was in a bad car accident that broke both of his legs, ending his career. "I couldn't even watch the game on TV for five years" he told me. Definitely a sad story, one that got me thinking about pursuing the things I love and people I love being around, knowing that they might not always be there.
Stacks:
BTN 1500
Hero 3400
I got into my last big pot of the night when the BTN, a middle eastern kid, opened to 50 after one limper. I called in the SB with KQ as did two others. The flop came KK4 and it checked around. The turn was a 5 and again I planned a check raise. This time the BTN bet out 80, to which I met with a raise to 220. With the action back on him, he spent an awful long time thinking out his options. Eventually he raised it to 600 all day. Immediately I was confused by the line, but leaning towards giving him credit because he hadn't played a hand all day. However, I couldn't justify folding as I placed in the proper amount. The river was an 8 and after I checked my opponent bet 940 leaving himself with 120 in chips. It was a very interesting bet and one I read as very strong. As strong as my hand was, it was strictly a bluff catcher. He's never value betting a worse K or AA. So eventually I gave him credit and tossed my hand in. He flipped over the 9J offsuit and I AGAIN had made a horrible fold in a big pot.
Tilted and embarrassed, I racked up a few hands later and called it a night. Up 400 for the night, It felt good to leave with more than I started, but I couldn't stop thinking about the possibilities.
To take a bit of the edge off I went to a bar in the Miracle Mile with a friend who was in town. We eventually got to chatting with 3 girls from Utah, in for today's big game against Boise St. Two of them were very attractive, and one of them was a bit unfortunate looking. Either way, we all moved over to Blondies and continued celebrating the MAACO Bowl. By 5 in the morning my friend and I had paired up with the two attractive ones and all five of us went back to their room for some more partying.
Unfortunately, the less fortunate one was not as happy about the idea as we were. After numerous ignored attempts of her asking us to leave so she could go to sleep, she got fed up and pulled to desperate measures. Going to the bathroom, she came back out with a bottle of pepper spray and her finger on the trigger. Now I have never been pepper sprayed, and had no intentions of trying it out, but with the opponent blocking the front door it seemed inevitable. With my friend and the girls already escaped it was just me and the sea enchant, eye to eye. It all plays back so slowly in my mind. I came at her hard. I juked right. Then left. I placed my left hand on the bottle, misdirecting the spray as i pulled a Barry Sanders spin move towards the door; escaping the enemy. With my heart pounding, we couldn't help but laugh as we waited for the elevator. My poker game may be rusty, but my football game is stronger than ever.
Tony Korfman and refusing to fold
I woke up early yesterday. Before noon atleast. I could've sworn I was dreaming as it sounded like a band was banging on the drums outside my door. So I strapped on my running shoes and took the elevator down the gym, ready to start my day nice and early. As the elevator approached the "Meza" floor, the sound of the band grew louder. As I turned the corner, it became apparent that I was in the middle of the Utah Utes pep rally. I rarely pay attention to the days out here, so it was hardly surprisingly that I'd forgotten the game was tonight. But the hundreds of folks who gathered to listen to the band and watch the cheerleaders dance clearly had not. As they played Journey's, Don't Stop Believing, I found myself entranced in Utes fever. I wanted to bet the game. I wanted to attend the game. Thankfully, I did neither.
I've started the process of adjusting my Vegas clock. No good 5/10 games get started before 5 or 6 o'clock. So it seems that the hours I've been wasting from 2 to 6 would be way better spent from 10pm to 2am. Yesterday I showed up around 4 promising myself that I wouldn't continue the trend of getting stuck early. However, sitting down in a 3 handed game to begin the day, I knew I would need to be aggressive to profit, and aggression is a high variance playing style.
Stacks:
BB 1500
Hero 1100
The first hand I played I raised the BTN to 35 with JT. Both blinds called and we saw a flop of 788. The Sb led for 70 and the Bb called. It seemed like a good spot to put pressure on lower pairs, so I raised it to 250. The Sb folded, but the Bb, an older, bigger gentleman, called the bet. The turn was a Q and we went check check. The river came another 7 and my opponent checked again. Now at this time I assessed him a range of an 8 or a busted draw. Unfortunately with the Q on board we now chop all busted draws. So I decided to fire a really small 120 bet, knowing it would give me the full pot against his missed draws and that obviously I would lose to his full houses. He raised it 500 more and I released my hand immediately.
After getting into another $600 hole, I spent the next couple hours at the main game getting back to even. My game was feeling awesome. I'd noticed a leak in my bet sizing by watching the successful players at the table. Because I haven't played any live poker recently and when I had it was tournaments, all my raise sizes were too small. Also, I was floating too much, thinking my opponents would see my calls as powerful. These were two leaks that I immediately corrected, and the results showed.
Stacks:
Sb 2100
Hero 1600
I opened the CO to 35 with 22. The BTN, SB, and BB all called. The flop came 279 and I bet 85 with my set. The BTN and SB folded, but the BB raised it up to 200 even. The BB was occupied by a very tight female player that I had played with the night before. She does not play her draws aggressively so this was definitely a big made hand. I raised her 200 more on top hoping to build the pot. To my surprise she didn't even think before raising ME 400 more. I couldn't believe this was happening again. Another huge hand, this time against the tightest player at the table. Could she really have 77 or 99? Hell could she possibly have anything OTHER than those hands. With 850 behind, I fought inside my head, before realizing that I could never justify another incorrect fold in a huge pot. So I announced all in and put my head to the felt. 5 seconds went by and she hadn't called. I blew out a huge sigh of relief. Eventually, she folded and I was now up around 800 for the day.
Later the big old man from my first table moved to my left. As soon as he sat down everybody recognized him. One guy said "Hey Tony I've heard I need to buy your book." "Who is this guy." I asked the dealer. "Tony Korfman" I was told. Immediately i recognized the name from a 2p2 thread. Apparently he smacked some young kid in the middle of a tournament after too much trash talk. However, he didn't come off as rude in the slightest. In fact he was really funny guy, who played okay poker and wore an extremely ugly nascar jacket.
Stacks
CO 2000
BTN 1200
Hero 2400
After two limpers I raised the HJ to 60 with KQ. Tony in the HJ, the BTN and the first limper called. The flop looked good as the K popped out in the door, followed by QT. With top two I led for 160. Tony called, as did the BTN. I was confidant I was ahead as the 6 fell on the turn, so I bet 500 to protect my hand. Tony folded and the action got back to the btn. He announced all in. Roughly 1300 more. Talk about another tough spot. After a few minutes of thought I couldn't see him making that bet with a worse hand. My line looks strong, the 6 definitely didn't help him, and a bluff just isn't credible. I gave the dealer my cards and my opponent proudly flipped over J9 for the flopped straight. Finally a fold that was correct!
Still that pot took away all my profit and left me even on a day that I was positive I'd played my best poker. Later in the night I started growing anxious. Possibly because I was approaching hour 8 of my session. Either way it affected my play.
Stacks
UTG+1 2000
Hero 1700
After 3 limps I limped the BTN with 46. The flop came 559 and I bet 50 when checked too. The BB and UTG+1 called. The turn was another 5 and I decided to just check and give up. The river was a K and after the BB checked, UTG+2 fired out 100. My read on this particular opponent was that he was a loose limper preflop, but tight in calling larger bets. Thinking that the majority of his range was a 9, I raised it up to 380, confidant he would fold a high percentage of the time. After the BB folded and the action was back to him, he sat there nodding his head. I was hoping that meant he believed my story. But after he finished nodding he placed the 280 in chips into the pot. I tabled my hand and he took about 30 seconds before flipping up his winning JJ.
By this time it was midnight and the games were getting pretty good. However, I was off my game, and could't continue to bleed money. So I picked up a 500 loser and headed back to the hotel. Even with a fatigued last hour, I feel my game is finally coming into shape. However I need to avoid dumb mistakes. Being undisciplined is not an option.
For the trip I'm down a little more than 1k and with only one day left before I head home for Christmas. I'll be returning the 27th and staying until the 9th. Hopefully, like last year, this first week will have served as a "spring training" for my game, getting me prepared for a big 2 weeks when the new years tourists come to town
The Man in Black
I woke up late on the 23rd. Trying to adjust to the prime time hours of the 5/10 games, I walked out the front door of the Miracle Mile at around 3pm with a new pair of Beats headphones on. With the Hash House A GoGo as my final destination, I started singing "I Can See Clearly Now" with my arms stretched out wide, as I caught a glimpse at the sun for the first time all week. Sure, singing in public may be weird, but when you're passing grown men dressed as Batman, and women as Gaga, the notion of "weird" doesn't register. Atleast not for stretching the golden pipes.
As I approached the marble stairs leading down to LV Blvd, I made a crucial mistake in assuming the sun had taken care of three days of rain. Quick stepping the stairs like a football player running ladders, I lost my footing as I approached the ground level. Flying through the air parallel to the ground, I landed hard on my back, mid note. The whole town started laughing, even the street performers. **** you tin man, I thought as he mockingly offered me a high face.
At around 6pm, with my peers back home out east winding down their days, I was just beginning mine. Sitting down at the must move table, I immediately called over a masseuse to work on my cracked back and bruised ego. "So many knots" the blonde said. ""You must've been playing sports." "Yep" I lied. With a fairly easy looking table, I singled out one opponent I wanted to get involved with; A loose cannon black guy who'd raised 75% of his hands so far and called with the other 25%. I got that wish with a premium holding.
Stacks:
CO 900
BTN 1300
Hero 1200
The loose cannon raised it to 50 in the CO and was met with a raise to 180 by the BTN, a young asian guy in an Ed Hardy hat. I decided to flat with KK in the SB, thinking the loose cannon would stack off if he hit any part of the flop and knowing how strong a 4bet would look. The loose cannon called and the flop came T98. I knew I couldn't afford for it to check through, so I led out with 280. After the loose cannon folded, the BTN moved in for my final 750. It's not the greatest flop, but I can't fold Kings on such a board so I called. The turn was a 6 and the river a 4. I flipped over my hand and my opponent showed a losing TJ.
Up to 2500 I got moved to the main game where I sat next to a young jewish looking kid who I had played with for the past few days. We got to talking and it turns out he just moved here from San Francisco. I've heard quite a few young players tell me that they've "just moved here" recently. Some of them better players than others. With the variance and all the temptations, it'll be interesting to see how many end up staying in Las Vegas. So far, there aren't any that I recognize from the summer.
Stacks:
MP 2000
Hero 2500
The next hand put me in quite the tricky spot. With the red TT I raised it to 100 after 5 players limped to me in the BB. UTG, a persian gambler, and MP a standard mid aged white guy called the bet. The flop came 467 and I bet out 170. UTG folded and MP called after some thought. The turn was a J. This is a card where being out of position put me in a tough situation. I decided to bet 350, because I didn't want my opponent to take control in such a large pot. Again he called, this time quicker than last. The river was a 5 putting a 4 card straight on the board. I now, clearly, had to check. My opponent thought, counted his money, and bet 650. I tried very very hard to find a call. But I just couldn't. I released my hand and was down to 1800.
As the night got later the table got more aggressive. Tony Korfman showed up again. As did "Feed My Kids" from 2p2 and the Man In Black. I had played with the M.I.B. the day before and he was one of the most unpleasant people I've been around. Dressed in all black, he always met you with a frown and never had anything pleasant to say. After showing off his MGM VIP Card, I kindly and quietly asked him if He'd like to arrange a deal for selling me rooms after Christmas. To which he called out to the whole table, "You hear this guy? He wants me to sell him rooms. Kid I wouldn't sell you 3 nights for 100 grand." Yea Right.
Stacks
BB 1500
Hero 1800
Soon after, I found a nice spot against the table fish, a persian player with no fold button. I raised AQ up in mp to 50 and he was the only caller in the BB. The flop came A35 and I put out a pot sized bet of 120, knowing he wouldn't read the size for strength. The turn was a K and again I bet the pot, about 360. He called in stride and disappointingly the 2 came out on the river. Instead of betting for value, I planned a check call. The plan was deterred when he shipped in for 1000. While he was aggressive and liked to semi-bluff he wasn't the type of player to turn a hand with showdown value into a bluff. So I folded and for the third day straight had turned a good start on the tables into a deficit.
Stacks:
CO 2000
Hero 1300
In for 1500 I had a 1300 stack when I played my last pot of the night; against the M.I.B. 4 players limped to my BB and I made it 90 with KJ. MIB was the only caller in the CO as we saw a flop of AT9. I led for 140 and my opponent immediately asked me how much I was playing while he called. "A little over a thousand" I responded. I loved the question because I knew it meant strength. The beautiful Q came on the turn and I doubled my flop bet to 280. Instantaneously I was met with an all in. He turned over AQ and I was looking pretty going into the river. That's when I saw it. The Q came screaming belly up on the river. MIB fist pumped. I was out of words. Ready to run to the airport. Then as I double checked I noticed it was the Q, giving me the winning straight flush. The table tried to remain professional, but as soon as MIB left, everyone commented on how happy it made them to see him lose that way.
So there it was, the prospect of losing 1500, turned into an 1100 winner in the blink of an eye; based on the silly suit of a card. Needless to say the Christmas flight was a bit more enjoyable then it could've been. Im back in Vegas. Trying to make it to the Jerry Seinfeld show in a couple hours, and if that doesn't work out, straight to the B…
First Day Back
I made it to the box office at Caesar's with 5 minutes until Seinfeld was scheduled to take the stage. Half expecting the show to be sold out, I asked the ticket attendant what was left available. "We've got some tickets in the back balcony for $75 or 7th row center for $175" he told me. Completely unprepared to make a big decision, I had to take a step back to evaluate the EV of the situation. Still stuck $400 for the trip, I wasn't exactly in a position to be splurging on luxury; But it's not every day your favorite comedian is in town. **** it. "I'll take the front and center."
After the show I walked back through the Bellagio forum shops and over to the poker room. Sitting down at the 5/10, It was nice to see Jacque, the french restaurant owner, on the other side of the table. It didn't take long before we tangled.
Stacks:
UTG+1 2500
UTG+2 1000
Hero 11000
After 3 limps I raised up the btn to 80 with 99. UTG , a young middle eastern, called, and Jacque, to his left, did the same. The Flop came AKQ and I Cbet 150. Both players called, preparing me to shut down for the hand. That is until the 9 hit the turn. This time Jaque went all in before the action got to me for 650. I reshoved for 750 total, expecting him to have some sort of wacky combo draw. Surprisingly, UTG did not immediately release his hand. Instead he asked for a count and eventually called my shove. UTG showed AK and Jacque produced the QJ of spades. "Be good to me Darlene" I asked the dealer as she burned and turned. The 3. I double checked both hands, then threw a red bird on my cards, realizing that no one had improved.
Up to 3k, I was called over to the main game. The table was pretty tight, except for a young pro named Mike. Mike and I had a bit of relevant history. Last week I 3bet him out of the SB with AK and double barreled a T843 board. We talked about the hand later and I told him what I had. This sharing of information would change the dynamic of a hand we played yesterday.
Stacks:
MP 1500
HJ 1500
Hero 3400
MIke raised the HJ to 50 after Jacque limped in mp. I called on the btn with KJ, as did Jacque. The flop came QT4and mike Cbet 80. We both called and saw a 9 on the turn. This time it checked to me on the btn, to which I bet 250. Jacque folded and mike took his time before making the call and checking the river in the dark. The final card was an 8 and with the action on me I had a choice to make. One option was for a small 1/4 pot value bet. This would've been a good option against a bad player who only considers there own holdings. But with Mike as my opponent, a large bet was a more profitable choice. "750" I announced. Mike started playing through his thought process out loud, trying to gather information from me. I just sat there silently. Eventually he said "Okay you either got it or you don't, I call."
"I got it mike…"
The next couple hours I sat patiently and slowly coasted out one of the biggest heaters of my life. During this time of perfecting the folding toss, I got to talking with Dan, a young kid from out east. A recent college grad, he came out to Vegas in July for vacation and never left. We swapped stories, and I quickly learned that I this guy was glowing with personality. His tales of dating strippers, poker lessons from Sam Grizzle, and being roofied and robbed by a prostitute made me feel like a minor leaguer in comparison.
Eventually we moved over to Aria where we started drinking heavily and playing 2/5 NL. In between the hilarity of our conversations, I actually played some solid poker. By 7am I had a 1,000 stack, making my total profit 4500 for the day.
Stacks:
BB 1,000
Hero 1,000
But before I could call it quits I got involved in one more spot. In an 8 way limped pot I held J8 in the co. The flop came 793 and the table fish bet out 50 in MP. I called, moving the action back to the SB, a local player who'd been supplying us endless laughs all night. With a goofy "bowl cut" and an outdated sweat suit, the guy had all the mannerisms of Alan from the Hangover, including his voice. Needless to say it was hard to hold a conversation with him without laughing hysterically. Alan raised it up to 200, forcing out the original aggressor. I called and stared him down as the turn was flipped over. "All in" he announced before I could get a glance at the card. ****, must mean I missed. But as I refocused my attention on the board, I saw the 3 on the turn. "Well I didn't come here to fold flushes" I announced while placing my stack in the middle. "You're good" he said, turning over 22 for bottom set. A 2000 pot. All I had to do was avoid the board pairing. The river was a 3. "You were good," finished Alan as he pounded his cards in celebration.
On the basis of losing to an Alan look-a-like I decided to call it a night. When the dust settled, I was a $3500 winner. One card from my biggest day of all time, but a monster session non the less
Big Pots and Bad Haircuts
I woke up in mid-afternoon feeling like I'd just been hit by Denzel's train in Unstoppable. With working out out of the question, I stumbled my way down Tropicana, looking to release some endorphins in the form non-baller shopping. On my way through the Miracle Mile I stumbled upon a much needed salon. You see in my attempt to reach my inner west-coast hippie, I'd been growing out my hair to it's fullest extent. Unfortunately when you're hair grows like mine, the fullest extent becomes an overgrown jew-fro, a close resemblance to the mop on Richard Simmons' head.
So I entered the Salon and had two choices of barbers; the straight guy, or the gay guy. I confidently told the gay guy that I'd feel more confidant in his hair cutting abilities and we got to work. Things went horribly wrong right off the bat. I almost told him to stop when he came at my head with his trembling hand, almost. But I didn't, and instead I let this clown butcher my hair one clip at a time. You'd think one of the requirements to cutting hair would we a steady hand. Kind've like how a public speaker probably shouldn't have a stutter. But I guess when you work at a hotel and know that people won't be coming back for 2nds anyways, it really doesn't matter if you're good or not. Hell you can have Parkinson's as long as you look presentable.
An hour and a half later I exited the same door I came in, this time looking like an uneven penis…but one with a stylish wardrobe. I crossed the street over to Bellagio and sat down at the 5/10 must move game. While I sat there feeling out my opponents, 2 guys I played with the night before came over and warned the table to "watch out for that guy in the nine seat." I humbly laughed on the outside, while my ego exploded on the inside.
In the past, ego inflating compliments have been the death of me, but this time I remedied that obstacle by reminding myself of how horribly I'd played a few hands earlier in the trip. With that in mind, I tightened up my range, making sure not to make any stupid mistakes. I made a couple nice value bets and was up to 1500 when I played my first big pot. While the cards were getting dealt Dan stopped over to update me on his stack. On his way back to his seat he advised me that "The girl to your right is a huge fish..though I'm sure you know that by now." Actually I had no idea, though this would play relevant as the action folded to her in the SB.
Stacks:
SB 1400
Hero 1500
The mid-aged woman asked me if I chopped, I said no and she limped. With AK I raised it up to 40 and she called. The flop came QT8 and I checked back, knowing that she would float me with any pair. The turn brought the perfect J and this time she led for 100. I pulled out one stack of 10's and one Hundred dollar bill and made it 300. She called immediately. The river was another J and this time I bet out for 470. She thought for quite a bit as she enjoyed her table massage, but eventually she did what fish do and made the call.
Up to 2300 I got involved in a big pot with the tight black player on the other end of the table.
Stacks
UTG 2000
Hero 2300
After 3 limps, I raised the SB to 80 with QQ. The BB and UTG made the call. The flop was very friendly to me as it came 22J. I lead out for 160 and UTG quickly called. He hd been playing pretty tight and solid so I put him on a strong range. When the 6 came on the turn I decided to use my LAG image by check raising. After I checked he led out for 200 and I reraised it up to 620. He called without wasting a second. The stars were aligning for a huge pot, and his range was narrowed to a bunch of strong 2nd place hands. Unfortunately my plan to move all-in on the river was deterred by the final card. A J put myself in a bad spot out of position. I decided to check and my opponent wasted little time in going all in. I thought for about a minute, but never truly considered calling.
Down to 1400 I started opening like 50% of my hands against the super tight table. No one was playing back and my stack had grown to 1700 in the process.Then, finally, someone took a stand.
Stacks
SB 900
Hero 1700
1 limp to me and I raised the CO up to 55 with J2. The Sb was the only caller and together we saw the beautiful QJ2 flop. Running well is soo much fun. I bet 75 and he immediately put in 2 bills. With a flush draw on board I decided to play my hand fast in case any scare cards came. I made it 300 more, and he almost simultaneously went all in. Usually I wouldn't like my chances of being ahead, but with my image I knew I was crushing his range, so I called. The turn was a J and I let him know that I'd hit my boat. He stood up as the 4 hit the river and threw his hands in the air in amazement when he saw my Jack Deuce.
With my stack unto 2600, I decided it was a good time to quit before the symptoms of a bad head cold and a worse hangover caused me to do something stupid. I made a celebratory trip through In N Out on the way home and got some well needed sleep. With about 4600 in profit for the trip I've gotten the urge to play a tournament or two. Does anyone know of any good ones running in town?
The System and Tilt Control
Sitting in suite 1227 at Aria Hotel, I got to thinking how a poker player grinding the daily $100 tournaments could logically afford such a place for 2 weeks. "It's all free" said Matt, a 27 year old grinder from the Bay Area. "Not only is it free (Including NYE and New Years), but they give me $200 in food credit and $200 in gambling chips as well." No ****ing way. I needed to figure out how this was happening. I've been wasting thousands of dollars over the past year on something that was absolutely unnecessary. I felt like Tyson, accept my Lion, was only a hotel room. So we got to talking about the catch behind "free" and eventually Matt told me about what he refers to as "The system."
The first step of the system is finding a hotel aimed at gaining "young money." Hotels like Aria and Cosmopolitan are fine choices, while the Bellagio and the Wynn may not be the best fits for the situation. Once you've located you're prey, according to Matt, the next step is going to the cage to purchase your chips. Always purchase your chips at the cage. Exposure is everything.
Hand the cage $1,000 with your players card, and strike up a friendly conversation with the attendant. Make sure the attendant knows that your intention is to play blackjack until all of the money is gone or until you are rich. Perception is everything.
The next step is to take those ten black chips to the blackjack table. Again, hand the dealer your card and again involve yourself with the staff, making it blatantly obvious that you are here for a good time and that money is not an obstacle. Place $100 down and get ready for the first shoe. You will play either one shoe or until you are down $400. If you are down $400, let the dealers know that this table does not feel lucky and that you need a change of scenery.
Once you finish your session, lets say you break even, you take your $1,000 in chips and bring it to a different cage then the original one. At this cage you cash in your chips, take your $1,000 and return to the first cage. Using the same attendant from the first transaction you explain to her how unlucky you were in losing your first $1,000, but that you are not a quitter. You hand her the same $1,000 you bought in with originally and tell her to send you some lucky chips. Once you get those chips you take them back to your room and cash them out the next day.
Matt says he does this once a trip and every month he's sent offers from Aria to come stay, eat and gamble gamble for free. He says that even if he loses the $400, which he sets as his limit, he makes up for it ten fold in comps from the casino. Today will be my first shot at "the system".
I got to the Bellagio yesterday, a bit uneasy about starting my session. While I'm super confidant in my game right now, that's not always a good thing. In the past I've followed up my hot streaks with a major down day, bringing me back to earth. Whether it's over confidence or over aggression it's turned into a trend, one that I'd like to bring a stop to. So with everything to lose, I sat down in the must move and played patient poker until my name was called for the main game. Hearing my name called for table 34, I racked up and headed over to the corner table. However, on my way to my new table i noticed my friend Jacque on table 35 and an empty seat 2 to his right. So I quickly sat down hoping nobody would notice. They didn't.
Per usual, Jacque called all of my raises preflop, never believing I could possibly have a strong hand. Eventually we played a pot of significance.
Stacks
SB 3000
Hero 1100
I raised in EP in 45 with AK. Jacque called in the SB and we took a flop of K23. Jacque then check raised my 70 bet to 200. I decided to call, seeing no need to over represent my hand. The turn was a 7 and Jacque quickly checked. I bet 250 and he eventually called. On a 2 river, he again checked the action to me. His range here is Kx and midpairs. Knowing I had a K, I thought I needed to bet small to get a call out of the bottom half of his range. So I bet 280, and Jacque did something very unusual in thinking instead of instacalling. "Okay I think you got it" he said, folding his hand. Damnit, he's finally adjusting to my game.
Stacks
UTG 1600
Hero 1800
Up to 1800, I played an interesting spot in a limped pot. I limped the CO with 35 and 7 of us saw a TJ3 flop. UTG bet out for 50 and I called, feeling confidant that he had a one pair type hand and not a draw. On a board so draw heavy I felt like I could successfully represent a plethora of bad cards that hit the turn and river. Interestingly, though, the turn was a "good" card. The 5 came on the turn and this time he bet 140. Back to me and I bumped the action to 320 with my bottom two pair. My opponent started counting his chips and then moved in on me for 1250 more. I think this is a spot where table dynamic plays a huge role. I had been opening a lot of pots and in general playing very aggressive poker. Most players would put there money in here against me light. This old guy however, I didn't think to be most players. I hadn't seen him play aggressively all night and eventually concluded that he would've just called with all one pair hands. So either I'm drawing dead or I need to avoid a huge combo draw. I folded and while telling him next time I was calling.
Stacks
BTN 100
BB 520
Hero 1200
A round or two later I played another awkward spot. With AQ I raised in EP to 40 and the BB, who had just lost a huge pot, put his last 100 in the middle. The action got back to a LAG black guy in the BB and he cold called with 420 behind. Not knowing what to do, I made the easy decision and just shipped it in. "I call" I heard confidently and quickly. "You got Aces?" he asked me. The flop finished out Q high but I knew I was no good. The BB flipped over his KK and I was now down half a buyin for the day.
Stacks:
BTN 750
Hero 1200
Immediately after I rebought I found the perfect opportunity to play the "tilt card". After a table of limpers the btn raised to 70. I quickly and carelessly put in two bills and 6 orange chips for a raise to 260 with QQ. Shortly there after my opponent moved in for 750 total and I made the call. The flop came A76. The turn was another 6 and the river was a 9. I tried to table my hand, but my opponent beat me to it with his AK.
Trying to avoid tilt, I took a break for an hour and sat in the sports book reading my kindle. I made sure to remind myself that every decision was important, and that "getting back to even for the night" was not my goal. I focused on playing good poker, and when my heart had returned to a normal beating rate, I moved back into the action.
Stacks:
BB 2400
Hero 1050
With KQ I raised it to 40 in mp. In the BB, the LAG black guy raised it up to 120. Usually, even in position, this is a fold against most live players' ranges. But not against this guy. I called and the flop came K53. He bet 120 and I called in stride. The turn gave me 2pair with a Q, but it also brought the flush. My opponent check called 250 in a manner that led me to believe I was definitely ahead. The K came on the river and this time he lead into me for 200. I assessed the situation and then moved all in for 450 on top. He looked confused, but he wasn't the type of player to lay down a hand in a big pot. So he called and nodded when I flipped over the nuts.
Stacks
BTN 300
CO 1200
Hero 2200
Back to even I got involved in one last pot. With KT I began a table-wide limping UTG. 7 to a flop of KT3. I checked and a fishy Asian led for 50. The BTN called and I check raised to 170. Both players called and the turn was a safe 7. This time I led for 350. The CO called again and the BTN put in his remaining 100 chips. I stayed calm on the outside, but on the inside I was praying for any card accept an A or a 9. The river paired the 7 and internally I let out a major sigh of relief. "550" I announced after a few moments. My opponent shook his head and folded his QJ face up saying "The money is yours my friend."
He was right. On a day when it seemed like nothing was going to go my way, I stayed calm and battled back to a $700 profit. It's exciting to think that I'm slowly turning a corner that affects even the best players in the game; the battle against tilt. That session put me up a little more than $5200 for the trip and comes at a good time with New Years only a day away.
Chasing Nelly
Out here I'm rarely aware of the time of the day, or the day of the year. It's really all the same. But as I walk through the Bellagio lobby and gauge the growing number of people waiting for check in and congesting the alleys, I can tell that the new year is approaching. And with the celebration of New Years Eve comes the presence of celebrities, lots of them poker lovers. Throughout the past few days I've heard stories of ARod playing the no limit game and Cameron Diaz sitting amongst the pros in Limit Hold'em in Ivey's room. Still, I'd yet to see any of them for myself.
While waiting for my 5/10 seat at Bellagio, I walked over to the other side of the room to swet Dan in the 10/20, when out of the corner of my eye I noticed a familiar face. It was hard to tell as he was covered up in a hoodie, sunglasses, and scarf, but once I saw the red STL hat I knew it was Nelly. I'd heard stories about the "Country Grammar" star playing the 10/20, most of them leaving me to believe that I had to get in that game; if not for the story, for the EV. If only I had a bigger bankroll…
Depressed and ashamed, I walked back over to the other side of the room with my tail between my legs when they finally called me for the 5/10. Sitting in the 1 seat, the poker god's displayed their empathetic side as they placed me to the right of Poker "D-Lister" Doug Lee. My consolation prize. God I bet my friends can't wait to hear that I played with Doug Lee! He's been on TV! Still a bit salty, I opened a lot of hands preflop, trying to loosen up the table.
Stacks
MP 800
Hero 1100
After CBetting Doug Lee out of one pot, we got involved in a second battle when I opened AT to 50 UTG. Doug called in MP and we saw a flop of K74. I Cbet 80 and Doug called immediately. The turn was a 3 and after I checked, he quickly checked back. Ready to surrender for the hand, I caught the beautiful A on the river. Still it was a very thin spot to gain value. Against an experienced player like Doug I needed to make it look like I was trying to buy the pot. So I bet 275. Doug looked confused, giving me his discrete yet devilish smile. The type a child gives a parent when they've done something wrong and know their bout to get caught. Eventually he called and mumbled something like "stupid me, should've bet the turn" as he paid off my pair of Aces.
A few rounds later, I was going through the motions in a rather tight and boring game when Dan approached and told me there was a good game at the Aria going on. I told him I'd come with and racked up a $700 winner. However, after taking the tram over to City Center, I couldn't get in the game. Knowing that there was no time better than now, I thought to myself, why not try out the system? So with $1,000 I walked up to the cage, started conversation with the young lady with the clipboard and told her I needed ten black chips for some black jack. She smiled, wrote something down, and I was on my way to the pit. As I sat down at the $100 minimum table, I made sure to be as loud, warm, and friendly to the pit boss and the dealers. Betting $100 a hand, I acted more interested in the drink lady and talking to the Pit Boss about New Years Eve plans then the gambling itself. Somehow throughout my experiment I went on a bit of a run. Two shoes after I sat down and I was up $1000. Not wanting to play anymore I pretended like i got a call from my girlfriend. I left the table warning the employees that I would be back to take the rest of the casinos money later. But before I could leave, I tipped the drink lady 5 bucks, the dealer 25, and asked where the best video poker was, all in plain sight of the pit boss. In other words, I made the system my bitch.
With a whole bunch of found money in my pocket, there was no better time then now for a shot. With Nelly waiting over at 10/20, I returned to the Bellagio and got seated immediately. However I wasn't the only one who wanted to play with the rap star. Nelly was already at the main game, but there were 3 levels of must move to get through first. Time to grind.
My first table was tough, most notably the young kid to my right, who bought in for 12k and played really solid. We played an interesting hand when I opened my first pot UTG.
Stacks
BB 12,000
Hero 2,600
I made it 80 with JJ. 5 players called and the action returned to the kid in the BB. He took out a whole bunch of chips and made it 590 total. It seemed like the perfect spot to squeeze. Especially for a good player. But he could also have it; and that would mean my dreams of splashing pots with Nelly would be over. So I folded. Eventually the hand went to the flop and the AJ4 came out. A few hands later, I told the kid I gave him too much credit and that he should've doubled me up. He looked me dead in the eyes and said "No I wasn't doubling you up." "It was that sick?" I asked. "Aces" he responded with a smile.
Feeling good about my fold, I continued to play snug. Unfortunately all that entailed was making good folds. And while good folds may save you money, they certainly don't make you money. Down 800 bucks I was transfered to must move table number 2. 1 down, 2 to go. Strangely, all of my good hands came in the BB, which must've made it look like I was trying to steal the dead money in all of the limped pots. This certainly added to the dynamic of my next hand.
Stacks
BTN 1300
Hero 1800
I picked up KK in the BB and made it 160 after a table full of limpers. Folded to the BTN, and he picks up a whole bunch of chips before deciding to make it 400 more. With the action back to me I shuffled through my chips and examined my opponents movements. It was all an act to get a lighter call, as I knew I was going all in right when he raised me. "All in" I announced. "Okay I call. You got those Kings" the BTN asked. Praying for no Qs or Js I faded the flop as the 974 fell. The turn looked dangerous as I saw paint. It was a J. I checked my opponent. He cringed. What the **** does that mean. Did you just **** yourself. The river was another 9 and I flipped my hand over. No flip. No slow roll. I was good.
As I was stacking my chips Nelly walked down to the must move section. "Come on Carmen, Give me some new blood, it's starting to smell like an old folks home up here." I'll be there soon Nelly.
An hour later and I got called to the 3rd and final must move with a $3800 stack. An hour or so of grinding and my stack was up to $4200 and my position for the main had improved to 4th. The end was in sight. That's when I picked up KQ
Stacks
BTN 3500
Hero 3800
I raised UTG+1 to 100. The btn called and we saw a flop of TJ4. I cbet 200 and he called me quicker then I'd ever seen anybody call. The turn was a 3 and as I shuffled my chips a check raise felt right. My opponent obliged with a 450 bet, opening the action back up to me. "1400" I announced. It felt so right on paper, but as he started counting his bills for the call, I wished I could take it back. Eventually, the mid aged man looked back up, sighed, and said "if I wasn't so snake bitten today, I would've called you with this" as he threw his AJ face up into the muck.
"Did you put him on snakebitten?" remarked my new witty friend Joe who had joined the rail for the hand. Trying not to laugh at the hilarious remark, I heard "seat open" shouted from the main 10/20 game. Yes, almost there. As I peaked up to see who had exited, my dreams were crushed as I saw Nelly in his 5 foot 6 frame surrounded by his 6'9 body guards taking his chips to the cage. Mother ****er.
With my goal now officially inconceivable, I saw no reason to continue playing the game. The table was pretty solid and my profit was up to 2300. After cashing out, I was content on going home, but Joe and Dan wanted to head over to Aria to play more poker. I agreed, looking to complete the cycle, by beating the 2/5 5/10 10/20 and Black Jack all in one day. Waiting for our car in the Valet hut, my friends had the idea of starting a beatbox/freestyle session. So in front of all the old-proper conservative Bellagio residents, we started rapping about girls, poker, money, and drugs. And to top it, off we were a hit.
Laughing all the way to the Aria, Dan asked me if I knew who Joe was. "No clue dude". "He won the biggest WPT event of all time in 2006. $3.7 Million dollars," he told me. "No ****ing ****". Truth was I wouldn't have had a clue if Dan hadn't told me. Joe doesn't act like he's better than anybody else and just comes off as a regular, hilarious dude. There's a few stories I'll save for another day as this entry is getting pretty long. We played 2/5 at Aria for a few hours after Joe had walked us into Ivey's room and introduced us to Greenstein and Brunson. I won 600 for the session, mostly due to a hand where I check raised Joe all in on board with only the A and he folded. Life is good; I can do no wrong. In poker I made 3600 for the day. My friend is in town from LA for the night and were heading to a party at Vdara with Joe and Dan.
Peace out 2010! Have a safe and happy New Years everyone
New Years Hangover
There's no worse city to live in or lifestyle to lead while being sick than playing poker in Las Vegas. It's nothing major, just a head cold and a sore throat; But it's impossible to get better at a reasonable rate when I spend 80% of my days with dirty old men, shuffling filthy chips that have probably been used as hooker currency a few hundred times. Not to mention I packed for Mexico and somehow got Canada. **** you mother nature.
My sickness escalated the morning of the 1st, as my body did not have the strength to recover from the 20 something redbull and vodkas I'd consumed the day before. My usual remedies of sickness, sleep and exercise, were not possible due to my physical state, so I started off the New Year with an 8am 2/5 NL session at MGM Grand. Sitting down with the most dedicated of regulars, I caught 5 mid aged guys at the tail end of their all night New Years Eve session. GrinderFish as Dan calls them. These are the guys that spend all of their time playing poker, but don't show any sort of improvement for whatever reason.
Sitting down i caught the action on the turn of a huge pot where a guy called $600 on a board of AJT4 with QQ while saying "You just don't get pocket Queens all that often." Of course he hit the K on the river, taking the stack of the other GrinderFish who'd put all his vhips in with A7.
Of course I would spend three hours limping lots of pots and trying to get involved as much as possible before donating $250 to the cesspool and going on my way. On the way back to my room I saw perhaps the coolest game in the world next to the BJ pit. Its a horse racing game played with action figure sized horses racing around a track, with each Thoroughbred getting certain odds to win.
Somehow I resisted to temptation to put the rest of my stack into that game and headed back to the room where I was finally able to take a short nap. By 4 O'Clock I was ready to go, or as ready as I was going to be, and took off for the Bellagio. The room was packed which was a great sign. Unfortunately it also meant that the wait would be long. An hour or so after watching the most horrible New Years bowl games in a decade, I was called for the 5/10. Sitting in the must move I got involved in a few marginal spots early on.
Stacks
SB 1400
Hero 1000
With 3 limpers to me I raised up the btn to 70 with KJ. The SB, who coincidentally was the guy from the MGM with the A7, and two limpers called. On a J56 flop I bet 160 when it checked to me. The Sb was the only caller and we saw possibly the worst turn in the deck as the 9 popped it's way onto the felt. The Sb then led into me for 200. I feel like this is a spot where I was getting into trouble earlier in the trip. I probably would've called here and hoped my opponent checked the river. This time I just folded, knowing it not only saved me 200, but possibly a big bet on the river if I tried to convince myself he was bluffing.
For the next few rounds I found a couple more unfortunate spots where I would flop top pair, bet, and then get raised by nits. The result was a lot of folding, and a slow bleeding of my stack.
Stacks
HJ 600
Hero 1000
On the final hand at the must move, I was dealt A2 in the CO. The action folded to the HJ who was a new player and checked the $10 that he was forced to post. I saw a good opportunity to raise a marginal hand in position and made it 50. The BTN, BB, and HJ all followed me in, Woops. The flop came down A74 and I was torn between checking and betting. Eventually I figured there was value to gain against draws so I bet 130. The btn and BB folded and the action was back to the HJ. After some thinking he chose to move all in. The bet was for 430 more. With 460 in the pot, again I was in an interesting spot. He checked his action so he can't have a big Ace. He's not just going to shove with a normal Ace, after all it was his first hand at the table and he had no idea what my image was like. So I called, figuring to be losing to the occasional two pair, yet crushing all flush draws. Unfortunately he turned over A7 and I was drawing dead.
Down a full buy in I moved to the main game. With memories of last new year's session in my head, I told myself that a hangover was no excuse for bad poker. If I was going to lose, so be it, but it wasn't going to be because of mental mistakes. For the next 2 hours it seemed like god was testing my will. I was dealt a bunch of marginal hands, in spots I would usually call when tilting but trying to catch up. However, I showed an awesome amount of discipline, as I folded with a smile, knowing that my game was turning a corner. Finally the cards started to pick up.
Stacks
BTN 2500
Hero 1400
With 33 I got in involved in mp after limping and calling a raise to 40 by the BTN. 4 others called as well. The BTN was your typical big talker. Calling people's hands out, literally telling us how good he was, and gloating because he was able to be the "table captain" at the tightest 5/10 table I played all trip.
One example of how bad he plays is when I 3bet him preflop. The flop came down Q high with a flush draw and he folded KQ face up after I bet half pot.
Anyways, back to this hand, the flop came out A35 and I chose to lead out for 110 due to the bad board structure. The self proclaimed pro on the btn called and the turn came up an 8 and this time I checked. He obliged with a bet of 120 and I did my best to act confused before making it 400. He called with one of those quick "I'm not going anywhere calls" and I was in business. The turn was a 2, completing the straight but missing the diamonds. I thought my only hope of getting called was going all in, so that's what I did. My opponent nodded his head saying "I think you got the 4" before folding. Good to know his horrible logic got rewarded.
Stacks
BB 1700
Hero 2200
Back to a stack of 2200, I had to put down my kindle, when I woke up with pocket Aces in the sb of a straddled pot. Two limps to me and I made it 120. The situation just got better when the BB a super tight player threw in 4 black chips without thinking. It was the type of non-thought out "I just want to take down the pot here" raises, so I knew he wasn't bluffing. I toyed with the idea of calling, but eventually decided on making it 850, trying to give him some fold equity. He said "Okay I'm all in" and I notified him that I had Aces, not wanting to mess with the guy in a huge pot. He shook his head and returned the favor by showing me his Kings.
The flop was a great T23, as I was just two cards from another huge day. Sitting in the 9 seat, I saw a small part of the turn as the dealer took it off the deck. It was paint. OH Christ don't be a ****ing King. K. I let out a sigh and shook my head as the river brought a 9, and I'd received potentially my biggest suckout of the trip.
Surprisingly I didn't feel any sort of tilt whatsoever as I paid the man his money. When the dust finally settled, my stack was down to 450. With no more money on me, I decided to play the short stack until I was done. With some unsuspecting patience and a few well timed shoves, I'd moved my stack up to 800.
Stacks
UTG 500
Hero 800
With 3 limps in a straddled pot I raised the K4 on the btn to 130. The tight player in the SB called me, which was a bit of a concern, as did the first limper. The flop was decent for me with the 246. UTG looked at the flop for a bit, began stacking and unstacking his chips, before going all in for 370. Usually this is a fold, but this type of player isn't open shoving with any hand, except a draw. However, I knew I also had to get the SB to fold. So when the action got to me I took no time in shoving my 700 into the pot as well. The tight player did a few chips tricks before folding what I assume was a mid pair. The Sb showed KT and I was in a lot better shape then I could've even imagined. The turn was a 7. Closing my eyes for the river I heard a smack on the table. The 8 of course. "God" I yelled out losing my cool. "I had you in such bad shape."
The truth is I did, but I was lucky to have him in bad shape. I was mad about losing the pot. About finally running bad for the first time since I got back. So as I got up from my seat with my 200 in chips, I apologized to the guy, told him he played it best he could and wished everybody a happy new year.
While I lost 2500 for the day, I strangely feel better about my poker game then I had the day before. As Soon as that K hit the turn I thought about something I'd heard earlier in the trip. It was a pot I played against Mike the pro from florida. After I beat his set with my straight he frustratingly said "It's been like that for the past few days. I just can't win." It took me witnessing a player I respected losing to realize that losing days are part of the game. In the past whenever I was stuck, I used to start playing more aggressively thinking that the losing day had to be a result of my play.
But the truth is, we play a game of chance. As much as the individuals affect the outcome of the game, so do the cards. If I want to survive in this game, I need not to only master the strategical aspect, but I must also become a pro in accepting variance. If you asked me why most players who come to live here are gone before they can leave a mark it's because they can't handle losing. They play so many hands online that they can always grind back a winning session after a bad beat. Live poker is a different animal. You do not see enough hands to always get unstuck. Therefore, the biggest winners, will be the best losers. Still up 7k for the trip, I'll be back at it today.
MM
Just wanted to say happy new years to everyone. Take this time to show appreciation for the people and things in your life that often go unrecognized. I know I will. Sometimes it takes a snake to illuminate the beauty of the garden.
Big Decisions and Big Pots
Waking up on sunday to some meaningless NFL games, there was little excuse to stay in bed until 4. Still, I did. I laid around with my attention drifting between the football and Microsoft word. I had a lot on my mind, but none of it materialized onto paper. I like to write things down when I'm experiencing emotionally stimulating situations. Usually just to look back later and recollect on the incredible depths of the human mind. But yesterday it didn't work out. Instead I stared blankly at the screen, wondering where my life was headed next.
While I'm finished with my Major, I'm still 5 credits from a college degree. Miami (Oh) has given me permission to finish the credits at any University and still receive my degree through them. So I applied to Depaul at home in Chicago and out here at UNLV. I got into both, but I've spent the last 3 weeks delaying the decision, rather than acting on it. As logical as I am at the poker table, none of that common sense spills over to my real life. I'm a serial procrastinator and rarely take initiative unless absolutely necessary. In this particular case it's caused me quite a bit of anxiety.
As the sun began to descend behind the huge casinos and my room slowly turned to dark, I knew I had to rise before major depression set in. I strapped on my PF Flyers and made the treck down the street to the Bellagio. I've been taking a lot of cabs lately, using the cold as an excuse. But yesterday I told myself to stop being such a pussy. I'm 22 years old and from the Windy City. If I can't walk a mile in the 40 degree weather then I don't deserve to play poker at all.
I made it to the Casino in time to catch the warmups of the Seahawks v Rams game on ESPN. The camera's were showing Hasselbeck warming up and the board told me they were getting 3.5 points, at home. That didn't make sense to me, so I threw a C Note on the game and went back to my table. Prepared to nit it up for a bit and enjoy the game. However, the table conditions would not allow that. The combination of the weak passive players and my above average preflop hands resulted in me raising like 50% of my hands for 2 hours while growing my stack from 1k to 2k. Eventually I was forced to show my cards.
Stacks
MP 850
Hero 2000
UTG opened to 40 and I quickly and efficiently raised it to 120 with AK directly to his left. Now a tight kid cold-called me in mp and the UTG raiser completed the call. The flop came AT4 and I bet 120, not concerned that either opponent would catch on to the strength of the small bet. MP called and a K hit the turn. Certain that he had an Ace, I bet 235. Again he called with about 400 behind as the river paired the 4. I shuffled through my chips for a bit before betting 390 and essentially putting him all in. "Call" I heard in his Belgian accent as he nodded his head in defeat at the sight of my cards. His girlfriend and their friends came over to the table right as he was pushing me the chips. Not that I ever feel bad for people at the poker table, but it's an embarrassing feeling to be pushing $1,000 to another player in front of your close friends and I definitely felt for him.
Up to 3,000 I looked up to the TV to check out my sports bet. Seattle had the ball, but Hasselbeck clearly wasn't behind center. Instead it was some Caveman looking chach who had yet to make a start in his NFL career. I really must be the worst sports better of all time.
Stacks
SB 1300
BB 2300
UTG+1 300
About an hour later I got into a pot with 99. I raised UTG to 50 completely expecting to miss the flop. UTG+1, the SB, and the BB all called. I've had loads of pairs the last few sessions, but only one set. It got to the point where I felt like I was owed a set, which was bad karma, so now I just wait completely unbiased and react to the board that I'm given. Lucky for me, I was given a great board. The flop came J97 and the action began before I could even Cbet. The Sb led for 100 and the Bb raised to 200. I decided to make my move on the turn without the worry of either of them having a draw, and just called. The hand got interesting when UTG+1 moved in for 250. The betting then opened again to the SB who appeared distraught but eventually moved all in for 1100. The Bb then wasted no time in making the call. What the hell is going on I thought to myself.
The Bb and I had a little history from earlier when I raised preflop, reraised his flop bet on an Ace high board, and then bet the turn on a card completing a flush. He folded and I showed KQ high, visibly making him angry. While he was a fish, he'd been playing passively all day and hadn't made a raise in a significant pot so I didn't know what to make of his range.
Eventually, like a possessed spirit, the words all in came out of my mouth. I don't remember speaking them, but subconsciously I knew I couldn't fold mid set. The BB called for his last 1200 and all of a sudden we had a gigantic 6k pot. Not knowing If I wanted to hit the board or not I sat emotionless at the A fell on the turn. The river was an 8 and I looked around to see who was happy. I flipped up my 99 and the Sb couldn't beat it. The Bb took his time, before flipping his cards up. **** I thought. But his J7 was no good. The big pot was mine! UTG+1 eventually showed QT for the winning straight, but his side pot was only 1,300. I raked in 5,000, building my empire up to 5,800.
I celebrated with an hour long massage. The back rubs were slowly turning into an expensive addiction, but that worry could wait for another day.
A bit later Joe showed up, waking up for the day at midnight, and we had some dinner/breakfast ordered from Noodles. While eating Sam Grizzle showed up and started talking to Joe. I introduced myself, told him I was friends with Dan and how we had the idea of putting some of his crazy stories to paper. He was overly receptive of the idea, talking my ear off for a good hour, each story more incredible and hilarious then the last.
Eventually I escaped from Sam's grip and rejoined the table where I was met with a couple hours of cold cards. As the wee hours of the night began to pass I finally picked up a playable hand. I raised JJ to 50 UTG and got called by the btn. I had played with the btn in previous trips and the only things I remembered about him were that A) he was a pilot and B) he doesn't like to fold.
Stacks
BTN 1100
Hero 6200
The flop came 236 and I bet out 70. He quickly called, while enjoying a massage, so I knew he wasn't messing around. The turn was a T and this time I bet 150. A few more moments passed and again he called. The river was a K, not the best card, but potentially a card that he may think I would bluff. So I bet 340 after some thought. He made his masseuse stop so he could focus and began counting out his chips like he was going to raise. But the longer he thought, the more I knew he wasn't that strong. 30 seconds later he ditched the idea of the raise as he held the necessary chips for the call in his right hand. In what seemed like an impulsive move, he splashed them into the middle, hoping I was bluffing. I showed the JJ and took down another large pot.
A bit later Joe asked me to join him and two girls at Bank so I racked up for the night, very satisfied with my near 6k day. Not only did I make up for the previous days' misfortune, but I brought my bankroll up to heights that it has never seen. I'm up 13k for the trip. 13k for the week. With one week left my goal has been extended to a 20k trip. With the CES guys in town I think the goal is conceivable, but if the cards don't go my way I understand that I'll need to re-evaluate and adju
Boston Boys and LA Cats
Even though I'd been winning at a pretty incredible rate, I decided to take the day off on monday. It may just seem like a funny play on words, but I really had become burnt out from such a hot streak. The biggest reason being my notion of what winning poker had become. Towards the tail end of my $5700 win on sunday my game plan had changed for the worse. When you have that many chips in front of you, your desire for small wins deteriorates, while your ambition to play big pots grows. On the surface this isn't necessarily a bad thing, but once it starts affecting hand ranges and betting decisions, it becomes a burden towards winning poker.
So with my monday free, I did some shopping on the strip, and then walked to UNLV to talk to an admissions counselor. The idea of burning out has caused me to rethink whether or not I could spend a whole semester in the gambling capital of the world. But compared to the alternatives I think it's the best choice. Plus If I were actually living out here, I would join clubs, play intramural sports, and probably play a minimal amount of poker.
Anyways, after a successful day off, I came back to the Bellagio with a rekindled motivation to crush the 5/10. Sitting between two aggressive internet players, I was forced to tighten up my opening range in order to stay profitable.
Stacks
BTN 2,000
Hero 1,200
I picked up KK in the Sb, but worried it would go for not as the action folded to the btn. Luckily the internet kid from Boston, raised up the action to 40. I frustratingly reraised the pot to 140, to which he called without much thought. The flop came QJ4and I pushed forward one stack of 200. Without any thought at all, my opponent called. This timing tell would prove to be a huge mistake in a big pot. Knowing he had a solid one pair hand and not a draw would allow me to value bet even if a scare card came on the board. The turn was a 2 and this time I bet 375. Again, he called quickly. The river brought the 7, but like I said before, all of his drawing hands would've atleast considered raising the flop. So I comfortably bet my final 520. Unfortunately while the river card didn't help him, it may have scared him as he tossed his hand into the muck after some thought.
Up to 2,000 I spent the next bit of time reading Bill Simmons' book on my kindle. I was interrupted by the Boston kid wondering what I was doing in his very aggressive east coast tone. "What, what, what is that thing. Is that for books? What are you reading?" he asked me so quickly I had to take a few seconds to decode. "Yeah man, you can download any book you want, it's really convenient" I responded. "Ah gotcha. Wouldn't do me much good, I'm illiterate," he concluded. I didn't know whether to laugh or to cry, whether he was serious or kidding. Being from Boston and all, anything's possible.
Stacks
Straddle 3k
BB 1100
Hero 2000
After a straddle from the aggressive internet kid, a few of the recreational players limped in mid position. With the action to me, I took a strange line and just called out of the Sb with AK. The Bb completed and the Straddle raised it to 120, as I believed he would. My plan was to throw in a big reraise if the players in MP called, but none of them did. So not wanting to play a huge preflop pot out of position, I called. The Bb called as well and the flop came K74. We checked to the straddle who obliged with a 220 bet. I confidently and quickly took out 5 bills and raised the action. Now the hand got interesting as the Bb appeared to be interested in the pot. After minutes of looking at both of our stacks and his cards, he shoved all in for 1200 total. The straddle folded while telling the Sb "If you didn't do it I was going to". That's how you manipulate two good players in a big pot. The turn was a 4 and the river fell a 9. My AK had trumped the KT of the BB to win a huge pot.
Up to 3400 I began joking with the "LA" player across the table. His stories of 50k blackjack losses and 100k craps streaks not only made me want to hear more, but these also made me want to play some pots with him. I asked him what kind of work he was in and he just smiled and blinked, leaving me to believe it was something awesomely illegal. After bluffing him off a couple hands and showing, i promised him we would go roll dice after the session and I would win him some cash back. But before that could happen there was poker to be played.
Stacks
MP 2100
BTN 1100
Hero 3300
With 89 I limped in EP. With good players to my left this is probably a leak, but like I said when you're up a lot of money it's hard to turn away cards that can make big hands. The internet player made it 60 in MP and my LA boy called on the BTN. I called as the flop brought the beautiful 892. I checked to MP who bet 120. Now LA boy raised to 300, with the efficiency of a player who wasn't going anywhere. While calling is usually a horrible option on such a wet board, I decided to do just that with a creative thinking player to my left. He then went into the tank, looking at our stacks and counting his bills. Eventually he made it 900, and the BTN almost beat him into the pot with his 1100 all in. When the action returned to me, I quietly and calmly announced that I too was all in; putting MP through a rage. He started asking me all sorts of questions, while telling me he made the bet so he could fold to my all in. After too much thinking though, he had talked himself into a bad call while saying "I have an over pair." The turn was the A and the river was the K. It all happened soo quickly that I didn't have anytime to think about which cards I wanted to see and which that I didn't. The btn showed first. 9T. MP and I locked eyes. We both knew we could beat that. He had claimed an over pair. 2 overs hit. "2 pair" I told him. Immediately his solid posture turned to mush on the felt; his bodies way of showing defeat. The 6300 pot was pushed my way.
Stacks
BTN 2000
Hero 7000
I was up 5100; my second consecutive monster day. But I was greedy, I wanted more. With KJ I raised the action to 50 UTG. Four players called as the flop brought me an inside straight draw with the AT9. Still, we all checked to the btn. He bet 100. My hand was marginal, but we were deep. I called, as did a player in MP. The turn was an 8 giving me an open ended straight draw. I knew that if I bet, I could A) freeze him and B) set up for a large river bluff that would put him to the test. MP folded and the btn called. The river was a 3, missing everything. Still the btn's hand looked marginal, and I was representing a straight. "One thousand I announced" pushing about 1400 in chips across the line in order to look more intimidating. My opponent appeared defeated. He stretched his neck and stared at the board, two premature signs of a fold. Thinking I was in the clear I relaxed in my seat and put my headphones back on. With my noise canceling Dre's placed on my ear I saw my opponent throw his right hand in the air and open his mouth. I removed my headphones. "Did he say call" I asked the dealer. He nodded yes. ****. He turned over AT for top two pair. I guess he wasn't folding that. My 2nd huge river bluff of the trip and my 2nd huge loss. I'm noticing a trend.
Even with that miniature Matt Moore blow up, I cashed out for 5500; a 3500 winning day. The session puts me at a shade over $17,000 for the trip. With 4 days left my goal of 20k is more than conceivable. In fact, since I'm running so well and the CES guys are getting into town today, I'm going to set my new goal for 20k after expenses. Sure I may be setting myself up to be doom switched, but things are going so well right now that I'm gonna keep my dreams high.
Internet Stars and Vegas Mountains
I woke up this morning to the clicking of the room key entering my door. My dreams had been strange; As they often are when I fall asleep intoxicated. "Is it early or late" I grumpily asked Dan as he walked in and headed straight to the couch. "That depends on your concept of time" Dan responded like a smart ass. "Well I went to bed at 7am" I told him. "**** son" he laughed "You better get back to sleep. I checked my phone. 9:45. One text message; It was from Chris…"Ran AK into JJ and bricked the whole board. I'm busted." I sighed and rolled back over.
Yesterday started off uniquely enough with a trip up to the mountains. Mt. Charleston, while only 40 minutes from Vegas, was 25 degrees colder and covered in snow. In fact last week, they had avalanche warnings in this small mountain town. Everyday, it seems, I find out something knew about the diversity of Las Vegas, a city I once believed to be only good for poker and partying.
By the time I returned to the strip it was 7pm and time to begin my poker session. The Bellagio was crowded. Possibly due to the geeks in town for the CES convention, possibly due to creeps in town for the porno awards. Either way, the 5/10 was looking like a wait of up to an hour. So with money to burn and no time to waste I took a seat in the empty 10/20 NL must move game.
Sitting two to my right I recognized a player from sweating Joe in the 25/50NL the night before. He was a young, Jamaican looking kid, Ozzy, they called him. Assuming it was Ozzy87 I prepared to battle the internet legend. It wasn't long before we got involved.
Stacks
HJ 10,000
BTN 2,000
Ozzy raised the Hijack up to 80 and I called on the btn with AT. After a flop of J74 he checked to me. I assumed he had a hand with value but not much strength so I fired 120, expecting to need 1 or 2 more bullets to take down the pot. Ozzy called and the A popped out on the turn. He checked again and this seemed like a perfect time to bet big to get a good player to believe I was bluffing. I bet 340 and again Ozzy called without wasting too much time. On a 4 river, I was checked to for a third time. So to continue my story I placed out a bet of 700. Almost immediately Ozzy grabbed a 1k chip and placed it in his right hand. For 30 seconds he faked between placing it in the pot and pulling it back, trying to gauge my reaction. Then for the next 30 seconds he picked up his cards and pulled the same "fake out" maneuver. I tried to act nervous, which I often due by rubbing my face right around the mouth/chin area. However, right after I began it, I knew it was a mistake. While this move may work on a lot of the inexperienced 5/10 players, a high stakes veteran like Ozzy would see right through this forced discomfort. And he did. A few seconds later his cards were in the muck, and I was shipped the pot, $700 light of it's full potential.
Stacks
MP 1500
Hero 3000
With my stack growing to 3k I got tangled up with a new asian woman who was raising way too much preflop and playing way too poorly postflop. So when she raised to 80 in mp I pushed the action to 250 w/ K6 on the btn with a tight image. She called and the flop came 6TJ. Not necessarily the best board structure to bluff vs a short stack, I checked back when the action got to me. The turn was an A and this time she lead for 300. Her bet seemed very weak and not well thought out, so after two seconds of chip counting I announced all in for her final 900 in chips. She quickly mucked her hand and I was now up to the mid 3k range.
Stacks
UTG 900
Hero 3800
Luckily, I got a chance to finish off that same fish a few hands later. Again she raised to 80 in early position, and again I repopped it to 250, this time in the SB with AA. The board brought two 2's a Q and a club flush draw. I checked by slapping my hand on the table and my opponent moved her stack of 650 into the middle. "I call" I announced. The turn was a 6, adding to my hands strength by giving me the nut flush draw. The river was a 7 and I turned over my hand expecting to scoop vs her super wide range. However, the 58 was good enough to take down my Aces.
A few more frustrating rounds later and my stack seemed to be remaining idle at round 2800. Around that time I got a text from Joe asking if I wanted to go with him to Surrendor at the Wynn where his good buddy Joe Cassidy had bottle service and a table. **** yes I'd like that.
So I racked up and headed to the cage where I noticed one of Dan's roommate's Australian Chris grabbing a rack of yellows ($20 chips). While I'd talked to Chris on a few occasions about poker, my last encounter with him was a bizarre one, taking place on new years eve. We met Chris and Dan at Aria, where we were planning on going to the club. Little did we know they had done some "partying" before we showed up. As we walked in Chris was sitting on the bench with Dan's head on his shoulder while he stroked his hair like a barbie doll. Now I've never done ecstasy but apparently it strengthens the sense of touch because he would not remove his hand from the hair. Imagine the blind kid from Dumb and Dumber petting his dead bird; now replace the bird with another heterosexual male. Only in vegas.
"You playing the 10/20 Chris?" I asked him curiously. "Yeah how's the game," he responded. "Good. I wish I could stay, but I'm ready to party," I confessed. "Take some of my action then? 20%" he replied. "**** yes." So there I was with 20% of a hair petting Aussie's 10/20 stake. Even when the game's over, the action never ends.
Joe picked me up, dressed in his typical hippie rockstar outfit and we drove over to Encore. Unfortunately the door man didn't think his style was as fresh he did. Sneakers and tee shirts were not acceptable attire for Surrender, even if your best friend was spending 5k on bottle service. We were shut down at the door, cutting me short of my first bottle service experience at a top club.
Dejected we resorted to the 20/40 mixed games in the Wynn Poker room while enjoying patron and redbulls on the suggestion of the arab player across the table, who goes by "The Show" . While I needed explanations for 5 of the games, I some how drank myself stupid (or smart) enough to win $600 by 6am. Tired we called it a night and retired to our respective homes as the sun was coming up. Another $1400 winner, minus the $500 Chris lost with his JJ, puts me a shade over 18k for the trip. Still with 3 solid sessions left I have goals for 20K trip after expenses…
Hanging With the Gamblers
Last year around this time I met my first poker playing friends. Guys who thought about the game analytically, managed their bankrolls conservatively, and made money by grinding out a consistent hourly rate. This year I've encountered my first "gambling" friends. These guys also think about the game on deep levels, but their goals economically are drastically different. Guys like Joe, Dan, and Sam Grizzle aren't afraid to go broke. They've been broke. They've been rich. To them poker wins are just a bridge to the next level; An invitation to the higher limits.
I've watched Joe shove in 5k on an inside straight draw at 25/50 NL with a bankroll barely sufficient for 5/10. I've heard Sam Grizzle tell me stories about turning a $500 loan to 150K before he even went to sleep. All these guys need are a place to sleep, food to eat, and a seat in the game. I personally don't have that type of personality. Even when I'm winning I'm concerned about moving up and losing a weeks worth of profit in one or two sessions. These are thoughts that have kept me from reaching my full poker potential, but have also kept me comfortable with the money in my pocket.
This trip I've begun to branch out a bit. I've taken a few shots at 10/20 but more importantly I've grown more comfortable playing deep 5/10 NL. Before, I used to wish for a table of short stacks because I knew that I couldn't lose too much. Now I get a boner at the site of an average player with a big stack because I know that I can win it all. It wasn't easy to get to this point mentally. It took a couple losses in huge pots, a growing confidence in my game, and stories of friends who took shots to train my brain to play best with deep stacks and to crave big pots.
It came as either a huge coincidence or a sign from god, but right when I'd been getting settled with my gambling crew, I had an encounter with the biggest gambler of them all. While examining the lineup of the 10/20NL yesterday at the Bellagio, I thought I recognized a familiar figure. I couldn't be sure because he was missing his traditional unlit cigarette and tailored suit, but the guy in the 8 seat, hiding behind a pair of aviators and a white sweat suit had a strong resemblance to Sammy Farha. Farha, who finished 2nd in the 2003 Main Event, infamously told the cameras during the broadcast that it would take a 3rd place finish just to get him unstuck for the summer.
Without much consideration I told the dealer that I'd be taking the 9 seat, directly to Sammy's left. The opportunity was great, not just because it gave me a chance to play with one of the most recognizable faces in poker, but also because I was sitting to the left of an over aggressive player playing stakes way lower than they were used to.
I sat down with 2k and decided to sit out until the Bb reach my seat. With one hand to go the dealer tapped me on the shoulder and told me it was time to post. "No I've got one more hand" I told her. "No sir, this is a 10/20/40 game. 3 blinds. You are big," she corrected me. I thought about leaving. After all 10/20 was out of my league. 10/20/40 was out of my universe. But I was already here, with a perfect seat next to a guy I grew up watching on tv. I wasn't going anywhere.
The game stayed short handed for the duration of the session, and I spent the first hour playing very tight. I raised up 3 hands and won all of the pots on the flop. People were giving me a lot of respect. Too much respect.
Stacks
Sb 5000
Hero 2100
I made my loosest raise of the day in the CO with 78. I made it 140 and the Sb, Mb (middle blind), and Sammy in the Bb called. The flop came AJ4 and the Mb bet out 180 after the Sb checked. Sammy folded and the action was to me. Clearly this was usually a fold, but my reputation was so perfect, that I raised it up to 700. Initially when the action got back to the Asian gentleman in the Mb it appeared that he wanted to call. But as it usually goes in these situations, the longer he took, the closer he got to folding. Eventually he puckered his lips, shook his head, and tossed his cards into the muck. I turned over the 78; It was time to get some action.
I went back to folding a lot for the next hour, searching for a chance to use that shown bluff to my advantage. In the meantime I looked for opportunities to make small talk with Farha. I asked him things like how his new years went and why he couldn't find a bigger game. Each time he shrugged me off with no more than two or three words. I couldn't really believe his attitude. He seemed so friendly and talkative on tv. But that's all it was, an act on tv. In real life, when the funds were low, and he wasn't sitting behind the glass doors of Bobby's room, Sammy Farha wasn't approachable or gregarious at all.
Stacks
CO 8k
Hero 2800
Eventually I found an opportunity to get involved with the world famous gambler himself. Sammy raised the CO (which was also UTG) to 120 and I was the only caller on the btn with K7. Sammy had been opening about 60% of his hands so this spot seemed profitable. However, in this particular hand he did something that he had yet to do. He blind bet 300 on the flop. I took note and waited as the dealer flipped over the A75, a monster board for me. Still, it's a very interesting decision on the proper way to play it. His range was stronger than usual, and weighted more towards medium to high pairs as opposed to Ax type hands because of the blind bet. So I decided I would raise. The next decision was whether to make a big raise or a small raise. In a game this small, I'm never going to be able to intimidate a guy like Farha with a big raise so shoving was out of the question. Instead I needed to tell a story that would get him to release his mid pair type of hands. "1000" I announced. Farha quickly began shuffling his chips. "Ok I guess I'm all in then" he said. I wasn't happy about the situation, as it meant he had an Ace, but I was still 50/50 for a gigantic pot. I called almost immediately, asking Sammy if he wanted to run it once or twice. He raised one finger. The turn was a J. What have I done I thought. That's it. My shot at king is over. Back to the 5/10 tables. The river was flipped over extremely fast. I initially caught some paint. It was a Queen. A black Queen. The Queen of Clubs. "Two pair" Sammy said flipping over AQ. "I got the nuts Sammy." He nodded confidently; like a man with too much pride too admit that it stung a bit. "Every time I need the flush I miss it and every time they need the flush it comes" he said to no one in particular while counting out the 2700 that he owed me. When I'd finally stacked the chips and counted the bills, my stack totaled up to 5600.
I played a few more hands, but none could compare to the feeling of beating Sammy. About an hour after the Qc hit the river, Sammy was called to the main game, leaving us with 4 players. I quit about a round later up $3700 for the day and almost $22,000 for the trip, lying that i had to go. The stakes were too high and the purpose was gone. As Mike McD once said "I sat with the best. And I won."
Dan picked me up from the Bellagio and I told him the story while we rented "The Last Exorcism" and prepared for tomorrow's big move into the Meridian. "Dude you just won rent for the semester. Sammy Farha just paid your rent."
Yes, he did.
MM
Too Much Money Syndrome
The final two days of my trip were like the last few weeks of the old PGA Tour season. Remember after the PGA Championship, where they used to play the Disney Classic, the Las Vegas Open, and other bottom feeder tournaments. Tournaments without the excitement and the allure of the rest of the season, but put into place to ease the transition into the 2 month off season. Well last Friday and Saturday were my October on the PGA Tour. Sammy Farha was my PGA Championship. After beating him out of a 5700 dollar pot, I’d lost my motivation to keep grinding the 5/10. Not to mention I was burnt out from the countless 10-12 hour sessions I’d played in the past 3weeks.
It was time to go home. But still I had 48 hours until my flight. Joe told me to take the days off; worried I was vulnerable to “too much money syndrome”. Too much money syndrome is a common epidemic in the poker world, caught by the players who run too well over a period of time and still remain at the same stakes. Many of you have probably felt it before. You become over-rolled for the game and the medium sized wins aren’t appreciated like they used to be. Instead, you challenge every player at the table to play huge pots, so you can show them how big your balls are. More often than not it results in stacking off to an inferior player and burning currency that you won’t regret until weeks later when the heater has ended and you finally realize how ****ing stupid you were being.
Well, I took Joe’s words of wisdom and considered them a challenge. In order to prove to myself that I could consistently make money out here, I needed to show that I was different from the other “talented” poker players; that I was mentally tough enough to win under any conditions. So I returned to the Bellagio and the 5/10 game, and vowed to finish off my goal of winning $20,000 after expenses.
Stacks
BTN 1400
Hero 1000
My first pot of the day was against a player that I had some history with. Daniel, a young Asian kid, plays a bit on the tighter side. I exploited this in a few previous sessions by 3-betting him and generally opening up my range when he was in the pot. However, in this session he had position on me. So when I opened the CO to 40 with QT I saw it as revenge when he popped it up to 130. Usually this is a fold; it should’ve been a fold. But against him I saw an opportunity to call. The flop came AJ9 and we went check check. I figured he would bet all his super strong hands and all of his bluffs on this flop, so I now pinpointed him on a medium strength hand that wanted to get to showdown cheaply. On a 3 turn I checked again. This time he bet out 160. “I raise” I announced after a few seconds. “500 total.” The raise caught him for a surprise, as I expected it too. He shuffled through his chips before asking “Will you show if I fold.” That’s my question! I didn’t respond, just kept chip shuffling with a serious look on my face. “Alright I’m all in” he finally announced. Bastard. It was only 360 more so obviously I called with my 8 outs. But it wasn’t to be. The river was a 5 and Daniel showed A4 off suit, completely owning me with his top pair ****house kicker.
“Too much money syndrome” I heard from over my shoulder. It was Joe; I didn’t even know he was behind me. Sadly, I wanted to agree with him, but I also wanted to punch him in the kidneys. I compromised by shaking my head until he left the rail.
I continued to bleed my 2nd buy-in and eventually was down to 1100 and in for 2500.
Stacks
BB 1800
Hero 1100
With JJ in mp I raised one limper up to 50. The Bb, Iron Man (see previous session), made it 170 total and I called to reevaluate the flop. My decision became easier as the J popped out in the door. The flop finished out JQ4 and he bet into me for 250. I smooth called and we saw the K on the turn. Thoughtlessly, Iron man moved in for his entire stack. I called quickly, telling him I had a set. The river was a Q and he turned over AK. My boat was good and I raked in the $2200pot.
I called it a night, down $300, and retreated to the Signature for my last night of sleep. Dan and I woke up at 2; predictably sleeping through our appointment with the realtor and royally pissing off the Signature cleaning crew who expected us to be checked out by 11am. We threw them a $20, asked for another hour and everyone was all smiles as we jumped in the shower and finished up some last minute packing. Luckily the realtor understood as well. “Not my first run in with poker players” she told us while cracking a mom like smile.
With our living situation finally handled I had 6 hours until my flight; enough time for one last chance at reaching my goal for the trip.
Stacks
MP 2,000
Hero 1,000
In the Bb I picked up 8T. An older Asian gentleman raised it to 40 in MP. The co, btn, and sb called, so I took my pot odds and placed in 3 more orange chips. The flop brought me a straight draw with the 972 and I faced a decision after the preflop raiser bet 160. I opted for a call. The turn was a 4 and the Asian gentleman asked me how much I had left after I checked. Go ahead, shove it all in. To my surprise he gave me a free card. Big mistake. The J on the river gave me the nuts. I bet 600, a little more than the full pot. Luckily, It worked. I was called and shipped the $900 pot.
With two hours until my midnight flight the sun was setting on my Vegas dream. I was still short of my goal by about $1000, but completely content with the final results. To celebrate, I ordered a steak from Cut, vowing to play until it arrived and then take off to McCarran. But before I could leave, I got involved one last time.
Stacks
BTN 900
Hero 1900
Half the table limped to me in the BB, and I chose to take the passive route and check my 88 while I enjoyed my table massage. The flop came 672 and with 60 in the pot I lead for 50. The btn an unknown player raised it up to 150. All options seemed pretty bad, so I chose the middle of the 3 and called. The turn dragged me out of any upcoming dilemma as the 8 gave me the essential nuts. I checked again and my opponent bet out 200. I settled on the raise that seemed most “bluffy” and put him all in for his final 600 or so. He called and I hoped to avoid a club. Well, the club came. The 8. “Quads” I said flipping over my runner-runner.
I tipped the dealer a ten spot, extended my massage ten more minutes and closed my eyes, folding my cards without even looking. When my steak arrived, I wished everybody good luck and cashed out for the trip’s final time. A trip that began with a straight flush, had ended with Quads. I had made $23,000 in 3 weeks; $20k after expenses.
I’m at home right now, relaxing and catching up with friends and family. Tomorrow I’ll do my final breakdown of the trip, with all expenses, profit, reflections, and plans for the future. Once again thanks to everyone who followed along and everyone who stopped to say hi in Vegas. All of the compliments and criticisms were motivating in ways that you probably don’t even realize.
Poker as in Life; A Final Wrap Up
I apologize for the delay in my response. Who knew that laziness could be so time consuming. I've spent so much time watching How I Met Your Mother and bubbling $11 Rush Poker tournaments that I haven't found a free second for anything productive. With that being said I'm as ready as ever to get out of Chicago and go back to Vegas. My flight was supposed to be Monday (today) at 2pm…or so I thought. Turns out I'd made it for sunday at 2pm and didn't realize it until late last night. Not that it would've mattered anyways. There's no way I was gonna miss the 2nd half of my Bears demolition of the Seahawks. It's not like New England here in the Midwest. Opportunities to make the Super Bowl don't just fall into our laps every January. It's these very opportunities that have sparked my largest life decision to date...
Financially, this was the biggest 3 weeks of my life. $23,100 in nineteen days. The problem lies within what I'll do with those winnings. Currently all of my money is sitting in a player box at the Bellagio, just filling up space. While it makes for convenience, I'm not allowing my money to work for me, as the professionals say. So in an attempt to be fiscally more responsible, I've come up a plan to deposit 15% of all of my money from the trip (and from future winning sessions) into an investment fund. This will help me on two accounts. A) it will provide me with a layer of insurance in case I start running miserably, and B) it will aid in my fight against "too much money syndrome." Let me explain. Now, in order for me to feel like my "poker bankroll" is growing, my wins will have to outperform my losses by at least 15%. This should force me to maintain motivation after a winning days and help me gain a stronger grasp on the value of the dollar.
Unfortunately as is always the case with Vegas, not all of that $23k made it's way into my box. There were expenses, lots of them. Let's start by looking at the transportation. First and Foremost, the flight. $400 to fly American across the country. Not too bad of a rate, even with the added $50 bad charge at the airport.
I've learned to master the cab system a bit. I'm aware of hotels that are worth walking to and times of day that I should be walking. During the first week when I was staying at Planet Hollywood I didn't take one cab. But on my post-christmas return I walked to the Bellagio in the morning and took cabs back at night. 13 trips at $10 a ride comes to $130 on cabs.
Lodging, as always, was extremely expensive during the time of year that I chose to go. Prices for New Years and the Porn/Nerd Conventions are unreasonably high. The last 13 days cost me $1700 to stay at the MGM signature. Planet Hollywood on the other hand was only $300 for my first week of stay. As I've stated before, The MGM Signature is nice, but not necessarily worth their expensive prices. My other option for the final two weeks was working with KingBBV and receiving good rates but having to change hotels on 3 separate occasions. The comfort and convenience of the Signature was worth the extra few hundred dollars to me.
Food. My food expense was usually a once a day charge. Typically I ate my 1st meal while I wrote my blog in the morning (or afternoon depending on your concept of time) and ate my 2nd meal at the Bellagio, using the comps I earned from playing poker. With the occasional nice dinner after a big win my food bill was around $400. One of those dinner splurges was Fix at Bellagio. My favorite expensive restaurant by far.
Rake. The rake at the Bellagio works on a time system. What that means is that every 30 minutes (when the dealer changes) each player owes $6 ($7 at the 10/20). Well I played 153 hours of poker. 20 hours at 10/20 and the rest at either 5/10, 2/5, 1/2, or 20/40 mixed game. For the sake of calculation I'm going to assume that all of the latter games had a rake similar to the 5/10. After all the calculations the rake comes to a total of $1,876; Nearly two whole buy ins. Figuring that we average sometimes only 24 hands an hour, each player must make $1 every two hands, or a small blind every time around the table just to be a break even player.
Tipping. If there was one thing I learned most about the poker business on this trip, it was how to effectively tip. Thanks to a long conversation with Joe late one night at the Bellagio, I learned a whole new dimension to the theory of tipping. Lets start off with the basics. There are two main reasons for tipping; A) to help out someone who works hard but is generally unappreciated, and B) when the person you are tipping has the power to better your life.
Looking at the first group, I realized there were lots of people who deserve to be tipped that I had previously ignored. But once I experimented and saw how far a few dollars could go towards the happiness of the cashiers, the girl picking up empty drinks, and employees delivering food, I tried to make it a habit. You realize that more than the value of the tip, these people appreciate it when their work is recognized.
The second group of people can be more expensive, but also more beneficial to your experience in the poker room, if you execute it effectively. The key here lies in two types of people, the floorman, and the guy who deals with comps. It's important to tip the floorman because they can help you get into games sooner when the room is busy and it's also good to have them on your side in case you're involved in a pot where their judgement is called upon. Tipping the guy who deals with comps can completely change your dining experience. While playing 5/10 NL may only earn you $1.5 an hour, if you begin tipping the comp guy this system proves to be bendable. The friendlier you are with the staff, the more they allow you to go into "debt" and order meals way more expensive than your allowed balance.
With that in mind, I began tipping a ton more this trip. In total, I imagine I tipped on average $40/day. Now this does include the $25 or so that I will inevitably tip for all of my winning pots, but it also includes $10-$15/day towards all the other people I started helping out. In total tipping caused me approximately $800.
Gambling. My gambling actually went pretty well this trip, especially for how poorly it started. During my 4 sessions with the Heads Up Texas Hold'em machine outside the Bellagio Poker room I lost $600 before quitting him forever. My two roulette sessions resulted in a $200 deficit and my one drunken night at the Passion Pit spinning wheel cost me $200. Asides from that I was a winner in every game. Betting sports I was a $400 winner (Highlighted by a $250 bet on Miami Universities GoDaddy.com bowl win), Craps was a roller coaster but ended $100 in the black, and Blackjack profited me $900, most of which came during my attempt at mastering "the system". Subtract the one time I took action in a friend at the 10/20 and lost $500 and my gambling profits turned up at $100.
Now to my biggest leak; table massages. If you thought I had a problem before, you may want to skip this section. I spent a total of $2100 on table massages over the course of 19 days, which averages out to about a 45 minute massage EVERY session. It's definitely a major problem and one that can be avoided, but I struggle deciding whether or not I would've been able to play such long sessions without the help of the masseuses.
Poker. I played 6 different types of games throughout my trip. We'll start with the lowest and work my way up. In one drunken 1/2 NL session on new years eve I lost $300. I played three 2/5 NL sessions; profiting $300 in total. I played one 2/5PLO session at the Aria with the boys and ended up a $400 winner. The 20/40 Limit mixed game was also a one time thing, which also saw me score a small profit of $600. In my 3 sessions at 10/20NL I won every time, netting me a total of $6,600. Coincidentally, that makes me 4 for 4 in successful 10/20 NL sessions in my career. Which leaves me with my main game, 5/10 NL. In roughly 110 hours at the 5/10 NL I profited $15,500, while playing an estimated 3,000 hands. That's over $5 a hand, a super ego-boosting number. However, it's also unsustainable and a humbling number in how it reminds me of my good fortune in big pots throughout the month.
Expenses
Travel $450
Cabs $200
Lodging $2,000
Food $400
Rake $1,876
Tipping $800
Massages $2100
Profits
Gambling $100
Poker $23,100
Now payments for the massages, tipping, and rake were already taken out of my poker profits because I paid for them with my stacks during the game. So in order to find out my total net profit I need to subtract food, lodging, cabs, and travel from $23,200. It leaves me with $20,150; $150 over my 3rd and final goal of the trip. Something I'm really proud of. If not for the financial score, for my determination in accomplishing and surpassing a personal mark.
…On the topic of rare opportunities, you may have already figured out that I'll be attending UNLV this semester. There were a lot of factors, including a few relationships and job opportunities that made it a difficult decision, but at the end of the day living my own life trumped them all. I've spent the past two years watching my friends sacrifice their creative freedoms for the security of low paying jobs and 50 hour weeks. Surrendering their souls out of fear that they'd fall behind societies standards. I'm not quite ready to succumb to those pressures. There are still a lot places in the world I'd like to see, types of people I'd like to meet, and different service projects that I'm eager to work on.
However the determining factor for my move was not about money or weather or school. It came down to happiness. So many people spend all of their time trying to make the most money and trying to salvage imperfect relationships that they lose sight of why they were chasing these things in the first place. I've seen it in kids my age and in grown men. Most importantly I've seen it in myself. Since I've been coming out to Vegas, I've noticed a rise in my spirits every time I touch down at McCarran. Still when I return home I face the inevitable questions from friends and family. "Sure you do well in poker but you're not making much money" and "Yea people like your stories but how do you plan on getting paid for the time your sacrificing." For a year I've been struggling with these moral dilemmas. Searching for answers. Am I really making good use of my time? Is it time to grow up?
Well I had somewhat of an epiphany about ten days back. It happened on the drive back to Chicago from Oxford. A drive with not much to look at and a nonexistent radio signal. A drive where i typically do my best thinking. Sparked through a simple text message, it became clear that I had the whole system backwards. I've been longing for a job, for money, for security, for love, because of the way those things make me feel. But during the process of obtaining them I hadn't found much enjoyment at all. In fact my happiest days had been in Las Vegas where I escaped those anxieties, if only for a few days, or a few weeks. Now I had the opportunity to return to that place; both physically and mentally. An opportunity I wasn't going to pass up.
So I pulled out my phone and re-sent that text message to a few close friends hoping they too could make use of it. And now I'll share it with all of you. It's a quote, originating from a musician. One widely regarded as the brightest in his field, a man ahead of his time.
"When I was 5 years old I went to school and they asked me what I wanted to be when I grew up. I wrote down 'happy'. They told me I misunderstood the meaning of the assignment. I told them they misunderstood the meaning of life."
John Lennon
Thanks again for reading everybody. I will remain in touch through written stories; anytime I encounter an experience interesting or intriguing--in poker or in life.
Matt Moore
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Day 12
Never in my life have I had “poker player friends”. Don’t get me wrong, I’ve had friends who play poker. Hell I learned the game with 5 of my best friends. But never have I made friends who thought about the game analytically. That all changed about a week ago. Playing in the 2/5 at Venetian I met a Dutch fellow named Kai. He introduced me to his travelling partner Otto and together we met two German students Lukas and Sebastian. We started playing in the same games, sharing meals together, and going out for drinks at night. It was refreshing to meet 4 other University students who were also balancing their studies with their poker games. We had Sebastian and Casey (my friend from home) playing 1/2, Otto and Lukas playing 2/5, and Kai and myself venturing into the 5/10. We were like a clan of poker players, always surveying the room to check on each other’s chip stack, and finding someone to replay virtually every interesting spot with.
I can honestly attribute a good portion of my post-Christmas success to these guys. Their presence forced pressure upon myself to play as close to perfect poker as I could. They weren’t concerned with how many chips I had, they were interested in how I obtained those chips. Here’s a perfect example.
On day 12 I was sitting in the 5/10 at Bellagio with Lukas and Otto.
I was around even when I raised 1 limper in the CO to 50 with 36ss. The BTN called and everyone else folded. Flop came 25Q. I led for 100 and got called. Turn came the 10and this time the guy check called 220. We check checked a J river and he scooped in the pot with QK. I made sure to show my bluff face up.
An hour later I opened in MP with AQ and was met with a raise to 120 by the same player. I decided to call, hoping my reputation would get me paid off if I hit the flop hard. Flop came Q66. We checked the flop. Turn came the 7 and I bet 200. Player took little time in calling me. I was fairly certain he had two Jacks. River brought the 2 and I led for 370. He’s thinking. I’m screaming. CALL ME. PLEASE ****ING CALL ME. In my head of course. Eventually, he gives the “Okay I’ll pay you speech” and calls. My AQ is good.
I was proud of the way I used my reputation to get me paid. Otto and Lukas were not convinced. On the way to IN n Out we spent the whole time discussing whether the play was profitable or not pre flop. They agreed that he was going to probably pay me off on dream flops, but convinced me that his range absolutely crushes mine and out of position it’s a losing strategy. Any other friends of mine would’ve been impressed with the huge pot I won, these guys were disappointed. I’ve learned that being critical, even in winning situations, is a huge key to improving my game.
Up a few hundred, I returned from dinner to find an interesting spot with 10 10. It seems like every interesting hand I have had this trip has been with 10 10 or AQ. Weird. Anyways, I opened UTG to 40 and a small stack raised to 160 with about 160 back. Crazy loose Asian in BB cold calls 160. We’re about 1000 deep. I call and see a flop of 89J. Asian leads for 240. I shove in for my final 850 on a semi-bluff. Original raiser calls and the Asian thinks and folds KJ face up. Turn A and the original raiser flips up AK. Come onnnnnnn. Luckily the river brought the 10 and I scooped up a good sized pot.
I ended the session up a buy-in. After subtracting the loss I suffered from taking 50% of Lukas’ action in the game, I had a profit of 700 for the day. I'm not concerned with his loss, however, as I would stake him again in a second. He’s definitely a winning investment at 5/10, he just ran relatively cold.
After the session we made our way to the Stratosphere. When I was 11 years old I came to Vegas for the first time. My Uncle took me up to the stratosphere to go on the Giant drop rollercoaster. We waited 2 hours in line. That’s 2 hours to look down on the Vegas skyline. 2 hours to realize that your 1500 feet above ground. 2 hours to think about all the things that could go wrong with the ride. I basically spent 2 hours ****ting my pants. By the time I made it to the front of the line I said **** this and watched as my Uncle went on the ride.
10 years later and finally I have a chance to redeem myself. 8 of us make it to the top of the building and all of a sudden those old fears come back to me. We get in our seats and Sebastian can tell I’m not doing well. “Matt I’ve seen you all-in for 2500 dollar pots this trip, why the hell are you soo nervous.” I don’t reply. I want to get the **** off this stupid rollercoaster. This is not how I’m supposed to die. Eventually the ride starts and shoots us up into the Vegas sky. I’m alive. A couple more times we go up and down. The rush is incredible. Never again will I be nervous at a poker table. Not after that ride.
We go on one more ride that hangs off the building, before heading back to our hotel rooms. I can sleep well tonight. Not because I won a grand at the poker table. Not because I’m sober. Because I conquered the stratosphere.
I'm now up 3200 for the trip and poised for a big day...
After a short breaDay 14
k even session on day 13, I was well rested for a long successful session the next day. But first there was an event I needed to check out. The most prestigious of its kind. Where all the best players in the world gather to determine who holds the most poise under pressure and the greatest precision and concentration amidst countless distractions. An event where the further you advance the more tipsy you become.
I’m talking about the World Series of Beer Pong of course. Let me start off by saying Casey and myself had very low expectations for the WSOBP. We expected to see a bunch of nerds who took an otherwise socially entertaining game and turned it into a no nonsense chess match. That was definitely not the case, at least in the preliminary days. Every team showed up in matching uniforms; whether it was the Asians in their martial arts gear, the girls in their catholic school outfits, the older guys with their handlebar mustaches or the younger kids in the “got foam?” shirts. The atmosphere was out of this world. 2 deejays spinning fresh music, side competitions sponsored by Tucker Max’s book, and fans cheering on their favorite teams. I was minding my own business watching a rather competitive game when one fan turned to me and said “These two in the Red. They got no shot. They’re stackin’ their cups. Look at everybody else in this room, is anyone stacking their cups?” I got a good kick out of learning the superstitions involved in beer pong.
In many ways the game is very similar to poker. It began as a method for social gathering amongst friends (mostly teenagers) and became competitive when certain players realized there was an edge to be pushed. Poker, however, does not have anything close to the two catholic school girls who were competing in Beer Pong. Imagine Jennifer Tilly pulling her shirt down all the way to the nipple or Leann Tweeden completely pulling up her skirt, leaving her ass on the table as Phil Ivey was considering a call. These girls were unreal. If any of you were there you have to know who I am referring to, there is no confusing these two. Anyways for those who weren’t, they were nice enough to take pictures with us after the game, and I will definitely post those once they are developed. The atmosphere was so incredible that Casey and I made a pact, which I hope we keep, to play next year.
After watching for a good 45 minutes we made our ways to the Bellagio for some 5/10. I get seated in the 1, next to a very friendly man who answered virtually all of my questions about City Center (He worked there). I’m starting to like the 1 and 9 seats. I used to like the 3 and 7, but I now enjoy the anonymity of sitting next to the dealer. You’re like a hawk. Watching your prey as they unravel all of their tendencies, but somehow they aren’t able to see you. That’s probably complete bull****, but it’s my impression from my few sessions hidden behind the dealers.
Anyways after C-Betting and winning a couple hundred I’m on the BTN with 44. 4 limps to me and I limp along. My friend in the small blind, whose been experiencing a mild case of tilt makes it 40 and everyone calls. Flop comes 234 and he bets 80. No calls back to me, and I pop it up to 240. He thinks forever. I consider taking off my shirt and using my chest as a distraction, I opt not to. Finally he makes it 200 more. I’m pretty certain he’s making a move thinking I was making a move. Regardless I’m never folding top set so I ship it in for 700 more. He calls. Turn comes a 6 and the river is a 10. I show him my set and he nods his head and mucks. I have no clue what he could’ve had. I’m up about 1200.
After winning a hand with a bluff and showing in a multi way pot I get involved with a very aggressive Black gentleman in the 9 seat. He makes it 70 preflop, as he always does when he opens, and I call with AQ. Flop comes Q98 and he checks it. I check back. Turn comes a 2 and I raise his 100 to 280. He calls and I fire 350 on a 3 river. He calls, presumably with tens or jacks, and I take another big pot. ****, running good is fun.
Now onto the most interesting spot of the day. I limp UTG with A4 and so does half the table. The blinds check and the flop runs out J94. ABG (aggressive black guy) leads for 40 and I make it 120. Short stack sticks it in for 320. Gets back to the small blind who makes it 600 all day. Now the ABG cold calls 600. The SB and ABG still have 1000 back. What the ****????? I’m convinced that neither of them have sets, which probably makes it a shove for me? But with my aggressive/bluffy reputation my fold equity is minimal. Bewildered, I eventually just fold. The turn brings a 9 and the SB ships it in. ABG calls and the river brings an off suit 3. PHEW! ABG’s J9 is good. Other gentleman claims to have had 44, but I saw the 10 as he mucked. So even if he had the Q10 and ABG had J9, I’m still not sure what my play is.
Anyways after a little while longer of getting paid off by the ABG, who NEVER believed me because I showed one bluff (LOL), I called it a day with a 2200 dollar profit. Not necessarily my best day playing wise, but by far economically. I’m only 2 days behind in my reports now, and at this point up 5400 dollars. CES is in town. If they are as reckless with their money in poker as they were playing craps last night, it could be a good couple of days.
PS I’m considering going to the porn convention. Anyone ever been? That could be a good trip report, no?
Written by Matt Moore
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Day 15/16
Days 15 and 16 were composed of one god awful 2/5 session sandwiched in between two pretty well played 5/10 sessions. Day 16 was the last for all of my friends. My poker friends and those from home. We all ventured to the Bellagio for a final session of the trip. Otto and I sat down at a pretty slow 5/10 game.
After a couple hours of up and down poker, I got some chips into a pot. In the BB with 88, a scared money Asian limped in the CO, the BTN followed and I made it 50. Asian calls and we see a flop of J72. I lead for 80 and he calls. I plan on shutting down. That’s until the Ace hits the turn. I fire 140. He thinks, doesn’t want to call, but does. I glance at his stack and see he’s got about 300 remaining. The turn comes another great card, the King. I ask him how much he has, he tells me 320. I bet 270. I read in a CitzenJames post I believe that this is a very intimidating strategy. He doesn’t want to call; I can see it in his eyes. He hates his hand so much, that instead of putting the whole 270 into the pot, he sheepish puts 1 10 dollar chip (anyone who plays live knows this is an indication of a call). I turn over my 88 and he shows J9. Thanks a-****ing-lot CitizenJames.
A little bit later, Aggressive Black Guy joins the table. It’s not long before we get tangled up. I’m in the BB with 77, when UTG opens to 30. ABG calls in MP, as do I. The flop comes 10 4 3 and it’s checked to ABG who fires 80. Him and I see an 8 turn and it goes check check. I know I’m ahead. River comes the J, but I’m not scared, and fire a 200 dollar value bet out. He takes little time in calling, and chuckles to himself when he can’t beat my 77. He spends the next hour promoting his imaginary book he plans on writing. “It’s called, Check raising Value Betting Youngsters, for Value”, he tells us repeatedly. All things considered ABG is actually a really nice guy. He doesn’t spend hours after losing significant pots moaping and complaining like most regulars. He’s very friendly and obviously good to have in the game.
Later on Otto gets involved in a spot where he raised a pre flop raiser with 810 on a Q53 flop. On a 7 turn he shoved in his stack and the aggressive kid folded AQ face up. What the ****??? He can get an aggressive monkey to fold top pair nut kicker, but I can’t get some Asian whose holding onto their money like it’s their god damn first born child to lay down 3rd pair ****-house kicker?? I must really suck.
Around even, I call the table fish’s raise to 30 preflop with k2 on the btn, as does seemingly the whole table. Flop comes A3J. Fish bets 70 and only I call. Turn comes an off suit T and I raise his 80 dollar bet to 250. He calls fairly fast. The 9 hits the river and he insta-calls my 400 dollar bet. He shows the 86 and says “I guess it’s not my day as he leaves.
With 8 o’clock approaching, Otto, Casey, and I head back to our place to get dinner. After eating we’re craving some relaxing poker so we head to Venetian for 2/5. Little did I know that relaxing for me would mean, play like an absolute moron. After playing fairly decent poker for an hour, and just losing a bunch of 50/50’s, I go into monkey mode. Every hand looks good. I’m calling raises to 25 preflop with any decent holding because, hey, that’s only half of what I’d be calling at 5/10. Brilliant logic, I know. The last of my money goes in when I call a turn Bet with QJ on a K1034 board and shove the river on a 7. He snap calls with 10 10, and I’ve officially managed to donate 1,000 dollars back into the fish pool.
After the session I get very angry with myself. That type of play is not okay. If you’re trying to prove you can make a steady income playing poker, mental lapses are just completely unacceptable. There’s enough variance as it is, that adding a mood induced variance variable is simply a death wish for a pro poker player.
At night we head out to NY NY because we’ve heard good things about their piano bar. We were not disappointed one bit. The two piano players are awesome. I’m legitimately surprised at the number of songs that our foreign friends knew the words to. They claimed afterwords that they probably knew 85% of the songs. I guess I never realized how strong our pop culture is worldwide.
The night was going great until Casey decided to run his mouth off to 2 Las Vegas Avenge players (apparently that’s the semi-pro hockey team in town). To Casey’s defense he claims it was the other way around, but either scenario was just bad news. These guys were built, and looked, like barbarians. Not only did they come over to our group and tell us they were going to beat us up, they told us how they were going to beat us up. I believe mine was a right hook that would shatter my nose. We tried to calm them down, as we really didn’t want a fight. But they really didn’t want to listen. Finally the massive bouncer approaches the crowd and I’m relieved. The man must be 6’10 300 pounds. Relieved until I realize it’s not the bouncer, just another one of their friends. Now I’m certain I’m going to die. One of the barbarians (who looked identical to Dirk Nowitski) keeps asking the other two if he should throw a cheap shot. As if he needed their okay??
Finally the girls they were with approach the group and whisper things into their ears. I’m not sure what they said but it works. They tell us continually how lucky we are and disappear into the Las Vegas night…
The next day I wake up and everyone is taking off. I say goodbye. Those feelings of emptiness in a crowded room begin to return to me. Vegas is an amazing place, but not exactly ideal for someone travelling alone (in my opinion). Whatever it’s only 4 more days. I can focus on poker and hopefully make a late trip run.
I walk to the B and get placed in just the perfect seat. Directly to the left of an absolute whale. Not only is he a whale who raises 70% of his hands preflop, but he’s got about 6 grand to give away. I watch in amazement as he calls 400 dollar turn bets with mid-pair, only to trip up. I sit patiently, waiting for my spot, until I realize we are in a must move and he is next up on the list. The anxiety overwhelms me. I start playing impatiently. Calling 70 dollars with pretty marginal holdings (910cc, KJ, A10) because I’m dying to get involved with him. Someway, somehow, I manage to hit absolutely no flops. An hour later they declare our table a “main game” and I can relax.
Unfortunately, at this point I’ve burnt through 600 dollars trying to catch a flop with the beluga whale. Down about 700, I rebuy and finally find my hand, AA on the BTN. As the action slowly makes its way towards the whale, I anticipate the fireworks. I can see the money being shipped my way in my head. Finally it gets to the whale and OF COURSE he folds. Mother ****er. I do get action however as I raise to 50 and get a call out of the BB and 1st limper. Flop comes A63hh. Checked to me I check it back. Turn brings the off suit 8 and the BB leads for 100. Limper calls and I make it 300. Back to the BB, his hands are shaking and I know he’s got a big hand. He ships it in for 500 more and shows me 6 8. Strong yes, any outs, no.
A bit later I see a regular ream out a dealer for counting out a bet without the request of the player. Now usually this would go unnoticed, but it’s maybe the 10th time this trip I’ve noticed this regular go off for the same reason. Anal retentive much? It’s strange because he’s actually a really nice guy. Came to Vegas for vacation 30 years ago and just decided to never go home. Owns a jewelry welding business I believe and does fairly well for himself. But for some reason he cannot get over this miniscule rule. Things get worse when he tries to explain himself. “What if a player wants to call until he realizes that he’s actually faced with a bigger bet than he believed?” Does he realize he just outed himself as an angle shooter, I wonder to myself. Or worse, maybe this type of business is standard in the live Vegas games?
Anyways, I spend a few more rounds in the game and actually do get involved with the whale. Unfortunately he seems to slow down every time I’m in the pot. He looks tired and uninterested, so I decide to rack up, 500 dollars richer than when I sat down.
The win makes up for my mental lapse in the 2/5 game, but unfortunately that episode cost me 2 days of break even poker, when I should’ve been up a buy-in.
Written by Matt Moore
Cheers and may all of you run like me one day,
Matt Moore
Written by Matt Moore
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Day 17/18
Day 17
James van der Beek is a dick. Yeah you know, the guy from Dawson's Creek. Johnny Moxon in Varsity Blues. Okay, fine, maybe he's alright. But some guy whose been frequently playing in the 5/10 game at Bellagio and looks identical to the actor is ruining his reputation. Decent player, maybe a tad overaggressive. But a total douche bag. Real uptight. I tried to loosen him up by asking if he and Katie Holmes had any sexual tension off screen and he responded with "good one. Never heard that before." You know what Dawson, I thought it was a good one. **** you. It's on.
I limp K10h UTG and Dawson raises it up to 50 from mp as he often does. Btn, co, and bb all call before I announce raise and make it 300 all day. Folds around. I show and give Dawson a nice little stare as he soaks it all in.
But it's not over yet, about an hour later he opens again to 50 in MP and I'm the only caller in the sb with KK. Flop comes J52 and I check raise his 80 to 210. The turn is a 3and I bet 350. He thinks for a bit before shipping in for 400 more. I can't fold. Not after showing him nothing the other hand. Expecting to be winning about half the time I call and see a safe 10 river. We look at each other for what seems like minutes. Neither of us wanting to flip over our hands, en epic stare down. After what was probably 6-7 seconds of blank staring I remember that it was actually me who called him and flip up my KK. He lets out some combination of a whine and a gasp that lets me know I'm good. He flashes QQ and tosses them straight where they belong, the muck. Two nothing Matt.
Up about 1200 dollars I prepare to sit back and watch the national championship game, waiting for premium cards to get involved. I head to the sports book and place two bets, Texas and the under, a benjamin on both. I feel like a high stakes sports better. That feeling lasts for roughly the 10 seconds it takes for me to walk back to my seat. When I get back the Asian to my right asks me who I bet. I tell him Texas and he proceeds to tell me that we'll be rooting against each other because he put 5k on Alabama. The old man to my left then chimes in that hes got 2k on the over. 2k! 5k! Jesus Christ I can't even root for my own god damn teams out loud now.
The cards turn pretty cold. For a good two hours I see no premium hands and very few I could even play. With my two bets on the game looking very terrible as usual, I begin to press a smidge.
I limp in mp with A5 and call a raise to 40 from a regular in the sb. We see a flop of K104. Check check. The turn is the Q and I bet 100 when checked to. He calls. JJ or AQ. River is the 3 and I bet 190 thinking he will fold JJ always and AQ maybe half of the time. He calls. KK is good.
From that point on my night went about as well as Colt McCoy’s. KQ I limp UTG. Whale from day 16 makes it 40 from the sb and I call after the tourist from the bb puts his chips in. Flop 368, whale bets 80, BB calls, and I decide to float. Turn is a 5 and they both check to me. I bet 220. The whale immediately folds and the tourist starts thinking. Eventually he shoves for like 550 total and I sheepishly toss my hand towards the muck.
By the end of the session I had successfully bluffed 800 of my 1200 dollar profit back to the table and improved my sports betting record to an impressive 1-5 for the trip.
Day 18
I could never have imagined the action that CES produces without experiencing it for myself. These guys love to gamble. In any given marginal spot they always click raise or call. Though I suppose that's the default move for most fish universally.
On another note they are great guys to play with as most of them have a bunch of money and don't get salty over losing couple hundred dollar pots. I got tangled with one gentleman early on day 18. This particular fish made himself quite easy to find. He wore his CES badge into the poker room. That’s like blood in the water for the local sharks. He may as well have been wearing a Tommy Bahama shirt, drinking a margarita, and trying to discard after the flop.
Anyways early on he called a raise with A6 and raised the pre flop raiser's flop bet on an 356 board, only to lose the pot later on. When analyzing the hand afterwards he believed his mistake was in not raising enough on the flop, not his pre flop call or post flop continue. Point being the man overvalues hands like Chumlee overvalues worthless junk. (If you don't get that one, stop reading right now and go watch Pawn Star on the History channel).
So a bit later I get dealt A9 in the bb and call a raise to 40 by utg, after mp and the btn had already done so. Flop comes 935 and I lead for 80 trying to figure out where I'm at while not giving away any free cards. Original raiser wants to shove but can't pull the trigger and folds. MP does the same and it gets back to the btn, the CES gentleman with the name tag. He counts out 80 and wants to throw it in when all of a sudden he goes back to his stack as if he's had an epiphany and raises to 280. Normally I would fold pretty fast, but not during CES week. Not against this guy. He's got 400 back and I shove. He snap calls. Oh ****. The turn is the 10 and river 4. Great now I'm beating nothing. One pair he says, and I can't believe it. My A9 trumps his K9 and all of a sudden I'm up a buy-in.
A bit later, after showing off my awesome bluffing skills I get involved in a pot with another CES player who by no means is going to be bluffed. He's got the tough guy CES look. He's the king of the nerds.
Some guy raises to 50 in mp, I call on the btn with JJ and nerd king follows suit in the BB. Flop 1075 and the bb leads for 110. MP folds and I pop it up to 300. He not only calls, but open shoves for 400 on a 3 turn. I make the call and get a J on the river. I didn't need it. I had his A10 beat the whole time.
A bit later a guy named Tim from Houston sits down at the table. Not a CES guy, he's just here to play cards. We start chatting it up and he tells me he's a stock trader. I tell him how that's what I want to do and he asks me what I'm majoring in. I tell him I ****ed up my freshman year and ended up doing Psychology and Statistics because I liked it. He gives me a "what the **** are you doing look" and says "yeah well I like whacking off, but it aint gonna make me any money so I didn't major in it." "Look kid, are you trying to work in a field you like, or are you trying to find a job that makes you some money." I didn't know how to answer the question, because I honestly do not know. It got me thinking about my whole trip, graduation, and what's going to happen afterwards. Playing cards is a very enjoyable way to make money for 3 weeks. I've done quite well this trip. Yeah I've probably ran pretty well and haven't really been coolered, but right now it's conceivable that I could make money doing this full time. How high's the ceiling though? Unless you’re in the top .00001 percent of all players and aren't playing higher than 5/10, your potential earnings are never going to be much higher than 100k a year, and most likely ALOT lower. Now I don't want to sound arrogant and act like that's not a lot of money, but knowing that it's the absolute highest I could shoot for the rest of my life is pretty unsatisfying. I feel like I came on this trip looking for answers, closure. But the only thing I gained were more questions and curiosity.
Anyways after coolering a short stack's AA with AK on a flop I ended the day up 2k. With one day to go that leaves me with roughly a 7600 dollar profit for the trip, and a 9k up swong since Christmas.
Written by Matt Moore
Day 19: The Final Day
As often and hard as I was working out during the first part of my trip, that’s as seldom and lazy as my workouts became towards the latter portion. Vegas will do that to you. Late nights at the clubs and craps tables turned into late mornings, and an urgency to get started with my day. The 2pm wake ups left me little time to exercise, write, eat, and get to the poker room at a reasonable time. As some of you probably noticed, sometimes I had to sacrifice the trip reports. Usually, however, it was the workouts getting set aside.
Any logical person trying to stay healthy would forego cheeseburgers, French fries, and cherry cokes during this time of limited physical activity. I however, am not a logical person. I took the liberty to eat at just about every burger joint in the whole town. In N out, Burger Bar at Mandalay Bay, Le Burger Brasserie at the Paris. Animal style, the truffle burger, extra grilled onions at the Paris. I feel like a cheeseburger expert. As a result I also feel like a total fat ass. Whatever sad resemblance of a six-pack I had to begin the trip now would be more easily confused with a keg. I swear to god I even jiggle a little bit when I walk. I guess this is the official initiation to the professional poker world? After all the results don’t lie. 9 days of working out and eating turkey sandwiches on wheat yielded break even poker. 9 days of feeding on booze and burgers and all of a sudden I’m winning 4 figures every day. Hear that kids? Healthy body, healthy mind…bull****. It’s all a big ****ing lie. Kidding, of course…I think.
Well maybe it was my figure, or perhaps the regulars just grew accustomed to me, but my opinion on the Bellagio pros has certainly changed. I used to refer to them as “grumpy, condescending, and pathetic”, but nowadays you won’t hear a bad word about them coming from my mouth. I definitely misunderstood them. I think that once they realized I was not a weekend warrior, or an internet kid coming to spoil the games for a few days, they let down their guard. Poker players are a weird breed. More often than not they are very intelligent people with interesting opinions and stories, but restrict themselves to only social interactions with other poker players. It’s as if they don’t think the typical man will understand. Understand that while you may be wasting time until dinner, they’ve been here all day grinding back from the 3 outer that mercifully took away that 4,000 dollar pot the day before. Understand that while variance may be keeping tourists like you coming back, that same bitch is the reason it’s been 5 years and they still can’t field a bankroll sufficient for 10/20.
The two who I’ve gotten to know over the past couple weeks are Anthony, the short old guy with the high-pitched voice, and Jim, the jewelry welder. First they began to recognize me, then they began to respect me, and finally they began to interact with me. They call me Miami Matt, or just Miami when pressed for time. They talk to me, ask me about Vegas, about my studies, and most importantly ask me about poker. These guys could talk poker for days on end. Whether it’s a hand they witnessed last week or whose been playing in Bobby’s room, these guys really do have a passion for the game. A passion that I’m still trying to figure out whether or not I share. Anyways as nice as it was to finally become “accepted” amongst the regulars in the game, it also had its downsides. It came at a time where I felt I had their games figured out a lot better than they had down mine, but every pot between us now turned into a friendly check, check, check unless someone hit it big.
I sat down on my last day in the must move 5/10. Honestly, my goal was to rack up a few more hours and try not to have a losing session. I was very content with the progress of my trip and how things were winding down. I was forced to change my strategy when my 100BB stack all of a sudden turned into 50BB right when I sat down. “Automatic straddle okay with you man”, asked a young internet kid at the table with most the chips. Ehh, why not. We played this way for about an hour until a few gentlemen sat down who were not completely comfortable with the structure. I managed to play a couple interesting spots. This one produced the most adrenaline.
3 limps and I’m in the BB with K7. I complete and the straddle checks. 568 and I lead for 80. 2 calls and I lead for roughly pot (300) on a 10 turn. Only the straddle calls and I’m pretty certain by his body language that he’s on a pair + draw type hand. The turn is the Q and I need to make a decision. I’ve already gone against my plan to play tight for the day, so I can give up and stomach the loss, or go after those chips in the pot. **** checking, I’m all-in, 580. It takes about 10 seconds for him to fold. Phew.
Without realizing it, I finally accomplished one of my goals on the last day, playing 10/20. Granted it was only 50BB deep, and unintentional, but still, I sat in a fairly large game, felt neither uncomfortable or unmatched, and left with a profit.
Moved to the main game, with no straddle, and I go hours fighting off terrible turn cards and inevitable coolers. One thing I’ve learned in my years of poker is no matter how well you think you’re playing, you can’t beat coolers and you can’t limit the scare cards.
My QQ gets cracked on a 334 flop against a tourist with 56. He tries to apologize, but it’s obviously unnecessary. Later on I have to fold my KK in an 800 dollar multi way pot on a 7 turn card after I’d bet pot on a 378 flop.
Finally, I get a chance to make my money back. KQ in the sb and I call a raise to 40 from the CO, as does the BB. We see a pretty safe flop of K65 and I call a continuation bet of 80. K turn and he bets 100 this time. I think about raising, but it doesn’t feel right. A 10 hits the river and now the guy fires 200. Well I can’t fold and I can’t raise, so I guess I call. 55. Wow. It’s gonna be one of those days, I think to myself. I rack up my chips, waiting for the BB to come so I can call it a day, a trip. However with 6 hands to calm down, I decide I'm not going to call it quits at 7pm on my last night.
I start beating the gentleman who took me down with the 56 of diamonds pretty badly. He plays too many pots with too many marginal holdings. The final hand happens with his chips racked up and his wife waiting on the rail. I raise to 50 in MP with AK and he makes it 150. Another caller in the middle and I join the party. Flop K32 and I lead for 200. The original raiser calls and we see another K on the turn. This time I check and He fires 300. I call. River 4 and I announce all-in. He only has 550 left and confidently shoves them into the pot. Of course that confidence would’ve scared me coming from a regular, but this guy had no idea what a good hand is on that board. His QQ is a loser and now I’m back up for the day. 800 to be exact.
After that pot, either the table got softer, or I got more confident. I began raising about 1/3 of my hands and winning pots without much resistance. My final 5/10 pot of the trip came while getting a massage from the masseuse who jump-started my upswing with the Jude Law look-a-like comment. I flopped top-two, boated on the turn and busted a players’ rivered straight. Up 1600 for the day. **** yes. That’s how a trip should end.
As I’m racking up and about to leave the masseuse asks me what I’m doing for the night and I look at her confused. I always wrote off her flirting and compliments as attempts at better tips. You get very accustomed to that type of treatment after three weeks in this city. She tells me she’s going to a local bar with some friends and wants to know if I want to roll with when she gets off. I had a little bit of a Kindergarten crush on this girl all trip so I tell her that sounds fun.
Instead of leaving like I planned, I sit in the 2/5 game and start working on my buzz while she finishes up work. The table’s great. Everyone’s very friendly, but there’s still a considerable amount of action. As each of my vodka red bulsl goes bottoms-up, more and more people start entering my pots.
One hand I raise to 25 with 66 in mp and get 5 callers. 56Q on the flop. BINGO. I Bet out 65, short stack shoves for 200 and your standard 2/5 donkey over calls. I shove in for like 500 all day and this guy calls again. The turn brings the 7 and the river the 10. ****, I knew it was too good to be true. First guy flips over AQ, but I’m more interested in the big pot. Donkey looks at my 66 starts nodding and then begins to flip over his hand. No ****ing way, you are not going to slow roll me. Not like that. Q….. K. Jesus please don’t scare me like that.
I start getting pretty drunk and go find my friend to see when she’s getting off. “Like 2” she says. ****, I can’t wait that late. I’ll never make my 9am flight. I tell her thanks, but I’m going to have to pass. We exchange numbers and I tell her I’ll call her next time I’m in town.
After another 700 dollar session and 2300 dollar day, my final total for the trip is roughly 9700 dollars. The walk from the poker room to the front door at the Bellagio is usually obnoxiously long. Today it seems far too short. Never in my poker career have I felt this satisfied. I’ve won online tournaments, bluffed Don Cheadle, and cleared out an entire table before. But something about setting out on a 3 week journey, amongst doubt from some family members, friends, and 2p2ers, only to prove that I can beat mid-stakes NL in Vegas fills my soul with joy.
Tomorrow I plan on writing a final recap of my trip, with my answers to everyone’s questions, my future plan/goals, and my opinions on everything that was my trip/Vegas. I want to say thanks to everyone who followed, as believe it or not having people holding me accountable not only motivated me to write every day, but also kept me playing my best poker.
Back to Miami
Been on quite the bender this past week. But just about the whole campus has been too, so I guess that makes it okay. We have this promotion at one of our bars called the “14 day club”. Basically the whole senior class goes to this bar everyday for 2 weeks straight and orders at least 3 drinks (which usually ends up being many more). If you can accomplish this, and in doing so, prove how cool of a person you are and how little you care about your body, you earn the privilege to purchase one of their 20 dollar T-Shirts. I know, a can’t miss deal right? Anyways we’re on day 8 or 9 or something like that, and I’m about ready to throw in the towel. I won’t of course. Because quitters are frowned upon in these parts, especially when it comes to booze.
I continued to sleep through classes during my Vegas adjustment period that was last week. Not really the best start academically to the semester, but now that the grace period is over, I’m gonna get my **** together. Speaking of getting **** together, my roommate dropped out of school last night to do just that. He’s a really genuine, interesting, and smart guy; he just got caught up with some bad stuff (drugs), and made some poor choices. Made me a little bit upset, but I commend him for taking control of the situation before it got too bad. On the same page, it made me realize how easily it is to let your vices spin out of control and to lose focus on what it is I’m here to do. Graduate. Now I choose not to participate in the things that he did, but I’m still aware that if I let poker or partying consume too much of my focus and time, it could very well be me packing up my bags.
On the poker note. I went to the boat for the first time this semester on Saturday. Good old Hollywood Casino in Lawrenceburg Indiana. It’s actually a very nice casino, with a spectacular “WPT” poker room. But coming from playing at the Bellagio, Venetian, and Wynn for three weeks it feels like the minor leagues. I sit down at my 2/5 table (the biggest stakes in the casino) and the chip runner, Jared, comes up to me with a smile and says “Ahh long time no see Chris.” I smile back and ask him how his holidays were. I don’t have the heart to tell him my name is Matt. You see for the 3 years I was playing at Hollywood before I was 21, I was using a California I.D. with the name Chris Horn. With another Chris who regularly played in the game, I became known as California Chris. I think some of them probably knew it was fake, but no one ever mentioned it to me. Anyways, after turning 21 I mentioned to a few of the regulars that my name was actually Matt, but after that I didn’t really bring it up again. It felt kind of cliché, and “Oh look at me I’m so cool for playing in a casino before I turned 21”, every time I brought it up.
The game has a pretty unfamiliar lineup, only 2 regulars that I recognize. There’s Gary, the chronic tilter, and Z, a new Asian regular, whose very aggressive (not that good in my opinion, but definitely a winner). I’m in the 5 seat, my least favorite at the table, and Z Is unfortunately on my left. That doesn’t stop me from raising a good amount of hands pre flop strictly because I was getting the cards to do so. My game feels great, my reads sharper than ever.
After chipping up to 600, I call 15 in the BB with 9?10? after a very tight player in MP raised it up and got 4 callers. Flop comes 8?3?3? and the original raiser bets 40. Everyone folds to me. Now I’m absolutely certain he’s got a big pair, but I also know he tends to put people on bigger hands than they have. A couple orbits earlier he asked a gentleman who folded if he had a straight or set, when it was obvious to anyone who plays the game that he had one pair at best. So I float the flop planning on leading a? on the turn or check raising a blank. Turn brings the 5?. I lead for 60. He checks his cards and calls. River comes the Q?. This time I lead for 125. He shows J?J? and tosses them into the muck.
Up a couple hundred I sit back and watch Ed Reed make two interceptions in 3 plays, yet holding onto possession in neither instance. Can’t do that against Peyton Manning. Finally I pick up the pocket Rockets in MP. I raise it up to 30 and get called by Z, the SB, and the BB goes all in for 40. We all toss in the remaining two chips and see a J52 rainbow flop. Checked to me I check for deception. Z bets 100, SB folds and I just call. The turn brings a 10, completing the rainbow. I lead for 180. He looks confused and calls. The river is a K. An ugly card. However, I still see value and shove in for 320. He shakes his head over and over as he counts up his chips. I know I’m good. He puts them in and flips over AJ. I can beat that I say and show him the goods. For what it’s worth, I check lead, instead of check raise because Z is good enough to fold that hand to a check raise on the flop.
I rack up and head for the exits up about $850, vowing to stay away from this place for a week. Of course, that didn’t hold true. After day 7 of the drunks club, I’m back in action Sunday at Hollywood.
I make my way down the escalators to the poker room and see a few familiar faces at the table. One of them, however, sticks out like a sore thumb. Mark. Or as people know him at the boat, Batman. Mark is everything I admire in a poker player. He is who I was hoping Brad from the Caymans would turn out to be. He’s 35 years old, holds a good job at a bank in Cincinnati, yet still finds the time to come down and play cards 3 to 4 times a week. He’s the best player in the game, not to mention the nicest. I’m not just talking about when he’s winning, even when the cards aren’t falling his way he’s very courteous to the other players. Finally he doesn't look like your typical poker player. He works out if you can believe that. Everyone admires Batman. Luckily for me he’s directly to my right. Unfortunately for me, Kevin, a super agro Asian, is directly to my left. Mark welcomes me back. We bull**** about the holidays. I tell him about my trip, he congratulates me and tells me he’s heading out to the B to play the 10/20 game next weekend.
I always hope to play well when Mark’s in the game. I guess I’m striving to be respected by the best. Unfortunately in this particular game I can’t get anything going. For 3-4 hours I play a pot here and there, but don’t win any of them. I literally mean no pots. The first pot of the day pushed towards me is worth 20 dollars. Kevin’s girlfriend (a cute Asian whose watching him but sitting in between us) starts grabbing my arms and cheering in congratulation. Jesus Christ that’s humiliating. I’m down 400 dollars; drag in my first pot to the tune of $20 and this girl thinks I’m so bad that she acts like I just cured cancer.
During this dry spell, Batman and Kevin have been quite active against each other. Trading 800 dollar pots like it’s nothing. When the dust settles, Batman’s stack is close to 2500 and Kevin has just reloaded for another 5 bills. In for 800, with a stack of 450 I pick up 10 10 in the CO. Random makes it 25, Mark calls, as do I and Kevin makes it 65. This is the 4th time Kevin has 3-bet a small amount in position on Mark. One time he showed 89, another time 910. SB cold calls as do the original raiser and Mark. I obviously have to shove, which I do. Kevin thinks for a while and calls. Everyone else folds. Flop runs 2?5?J?J?8?. I show and he mucks. Boom! Back up for the day.
With a healthy chip stack I limp on a straddle in MP and call a 30 dollar raise from the SB with 7?8?, as do a few others. Flop brings A?5?6?, we all check to the BTN who leads for 40. Original raiser calls in the SB and I make it 220. BTN thinks and calls. If he were super strong he would’ve pushed with all of the draws out there. Original raiser folds and we see a 8? on the turn. Now I’ve broken down his range to either a flush draw or a decent Ace, but not two pair. I shove in for his final 430. He calls pretty quickly. ****, I’m ****ed. The deuce of spades hits the river and before I can tell him I’ve missed, he has tossed his cards into the muck. I show my 8 out of respect and rake in a monster pot.
It’s 11 O’clock, a couple players are racking up and I decide to follow suit. At the cage Mark tells me he was really impressed with the patience I showed in the beginning of the session. “I could tell you couldn’t get anything going”, he says. I thank him and jokingly ask if he’s made more money this year off Kevin or his job. He laughs and we head our separate ways. Up 1050 for the session and 1900 for the weekend, I couldn’t be more happy about my game right now. With the WPT coming to Hollywood in March, I’ve set a goal of 7k profit this semester, so I can play in ten events that I think I have a good shot at making some noise in. $1900 down, $5100 to go.
Written by Matt Moore
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Post Trip
Back home in good ole Oxford, Ohio. Slowly adjusting back to the normal life. I got in Sunday night and had my first class, Psychopathology, the study of abnormal behavior, at 12:30 on Monday. A bit Ironic figuring most people in my life would probably describe my winter “vacation” as a little psychopathic. 12:30 is a reasonably late time for a first class. Unless of course you are used to waking up at 2pm Vegas time, 5pm eastern. Then all of a sudden waking up at noon feels like the crack of dawn. Slept right through that first class. I forget that the real world includes actual responsibilities and obligations. You don’t truly realize the beauty of a free schedule until it’s taken away from you.
As for my trip. Possibly the best experience of my life. Does that make me a degenerate? I suppose, Oh well. I was talking to an Asian fellow at the B one night, who had recently moved from the East coast. I asked him his thoughts on the city after 6 months. He just shook his head. “I thought it would be the ultimate place to live. The city never sleeps! But you know what, the glamour and excitement you feel when you visit wears off pretty quickly,” he told me. I couldn’t have agreed with him less. Granted I was only a tenant for 3 weeks, but **** I love that place. That city was made for people like me.
However, there were a couple things I would do differently. If I could do it again, I wouldn’t stay at the Signature. I stayed there in the first place for three reasons. Number one it had a free gym. Everywhere else I checked charged at least 25 dollars for a day pass. Number two, I wanted somewhere quite, where I could go to relax and not be in the middle of the action 24/7. Finally, they were the only place that could accommodate a long stay with a discounted price. I did not realize that I would pay back a large portion of that rebate to cab fares. I wasn’t all that comfortable carrying large sums of money down Harmon ave late at night, which resulted in a lot of 10 dollar cab rides.
I would’ve done all of my “gambling” at the smaller casinos with the smaller limits. While some people play craps and blackjack and what not for the rush, I usually just do it for the free drinks and the “us against the casino” atmosphere at the table. When you’re gambling at the big name casinos the limits are obviously higher and the money goes a lot faster.
I would’ve hung out downtown. The sidewalk acts, the cheap drinks, and the light show were some of the coolest things I saw in Vegas. I really believe that Freemont st puts the strip to shame.
Piano Bar at NYNY and Jet were my two favorite night life spots. But then again I’m not a big “club” guy, so others would probably enjoy the TAO and XS scene a lot more than I did.
Poker rooms. The nicest looking is at the Wynn. The best service/treatment is at the Venetian. But the most profitable is Bellagio. And let’s face it, when it comes down to it, they could treat me like a Persian Prince at Venetian, but if going to the Bellagio means I’m making an extra couple hundred a day, then you best believe I’ll be at the B.
Food. As far as food went, I was the anti-baller. My friends who visited were not interested in investing the little money they brought in uber-expensive meals (frankly neither was I). And when I was alone, I usually just picked up something quick. I tried eating at a restaurant alone once and just felt really awkward. Like everyone in the restaurant was looking at me. Though from my limited experience, Grand Lux was fantastic and so was the Wolf Gang Puck at the MGM.
Going into my trip, I hadn’t imagined an outcome that would lead me to consider playing poker full-time for money. The idea of spending the majority of my life in a casino was not appealing. Hell even if I wanted to, I didn’t think I was good enough. Post trip, my views have slightly changed. I don’t think I’m any better, I just think the games (5/10) are definitely beatable. The question is how beatable do they need to be to make a decent living.
Let’s look at the rake. I played 126 hours of poker. At roughly $12/hour, that’s $1512 dollars that I signed over to the Bellagio before I even sat down at a table. Add in another 500 in tips for the dealers, and before I knew it I was 2 buy-ins deep and I hadn’t even seen a flop. While maybe that doesn’t seem THAT crazy. Let’s look at it annually. For mathematical purposes let’s say you want to play 40 hour weeks, 50 weeks a year. At $12/hour that’s $560 a week. Add in tipping money for the dealers and it’s a bit closer to 7 bills. Repeat that 50 times, and all of a sudden you owe the Bellagio about 35K. 35 buy-ins. In order to make a salary comparable to the average American (28k), you now need to make 63 buy-ins. 6 figures you say? One hundred and thirty five buy-ins. And so on, you all can do math. Add in the fact that real jobs come with benefits to the tune of dental care, while poker players sometimes get discounts at Snacks and the economic disparity becomes a little more transparent.
With all of that being said, I’m not going to quit poker like I thought I might. I don’t know if I ever honestly believed that I would, but I guess I did write it. I plan on playing the 2/5 NL games at my local casino while searching for a job that I enjoy, whatever that may be.
So after making 10k I must have had to get like a duffel bag for all the money I was bringing back, right? No. Expenses are a bitch when living on the strip for 3 weeks. Here’s the breakdown of roughly how much I spent.
Expenses
Rake- 126 hours. 12 dollars/hour= $1512
Dealer Tips- 25 dollars/day=$450
Cabs-$300
Massages-$1200
Flights/Airport expenses-$500
Hotel-$2000
Food-$600
Shopping/drinks/shows-$800
Gambling losses-Craps$ 500 + Sports betting $500=$1000
Now rake and dealer tipping were deducted prior to my winnings, the others were not. So even though I won about 10k, most of it went back to the city of Las Vegas. Flame on about the massage bill. I openly admit that I am a sucker for those table massages. In fact, there were 3 things that concerned me prior to going to Vegas; my massage bill, my craps losses, and my cherry coke consumption. I’m proud to say that I failed miserably in all three categories.
Some people asked about my writing, if I took any creative writing in college. The answer to that is no. In High school I was an editor and writer of the school paper. Towards the end of high school it was the only area that I really gave full effort to. I loved the challenge of turning an ordinary event into an interesting piece of literature. I loved searching for angles. Somehow amidst all of the booze drinking and women chasing that is college I lost my desire to keep writing. I signed up for the school paper, realized that articles were due every Monday and Thursday and said **** that. As much as I enjoy storytelling, I never realized that people enjoy reading them as much as I enjoy writing them. I have everybody on here to thank for that.
I think I’m going to continue writing stories, if anyone is interested in following the post-Vegas journey. Every Sunday, and they’ll mostly revolve around my trips to the boat, growing my bankroll, school, girls, or whatever the **** I feel like writing about. I don’t really know where or how I’m going to go about posting them but they will be posted. Maybe right here?
Anyways I just wanted to thank everyone again for reading and motivating me to start writing again. If there’s any other questions about my trip that I left unanswered, let me know and I‘ll share the details.
Cheers,
Miami Matt
Written by Matt Moore
Fake Cops and Fake I.D.s
I played poker twice last week. On Tuesday I drove down and had to play 1/3 because the 2/5 wasn’t running. No 2/5? Ah that’s right this is Lawranceburg not Las Vegas. Anyways the game sucked, basically zero action, and after 4 hours of bleeding off a half buy-in I racked up without any real hands of note.
Now I must digress for a second before I continue onto my 2nd session. Anyone who’s ever competed can tell you that rivalries are just as prevalent as competition itself. For every elite competitor, there’s a guy that’s trying to hold him down. A guy who would do anything to see that man fail. Magic had Bird. Ali had Frazier. Sampras had Agassi. I have Bob.
Bob has given me fits ever since I moved to Ohio. I can’t get a read on this particular guy, no matter how many times we battle. And there’s the way he takes my money, with that deviant smile, like a child with a secret. I can honestly say I despise this man. He wears the same ugly blue sweater every fricken day, complimented with those off colored over-sized aviators that he never takes off. It’s as if even he hates what he does, and can’t stand to look his victims in their eyes.
But Bob is not a poker player. He’s not a student, he’s not a golfer. He’s three times my age and I’ve never spoken one word to him. I only know his name from our non-verbal encounters and the name tag he wears over his heart (assuming he has one) on that ugly blue sweater.
Bob is the parking “cop” here at Miami. I put cop in quotations because he doesn’t have a badge, doesn’t have a gun, doesn’t even have one of those sticks that cops use to beat minorities, right before they plant drugs on them. All he has is his black electronic box that he carries around to print out over-priced tickets for broke college students. 65 dollars for parking in a purple zone when your sticker is blue. Or parking at the gym at 5:30 when the lot is empty, yet “restricted” until 6. It’s absurd.
Bob got me the other day. Parking across the street from Scott dining hall, It must’ve been 6 minutes while I ran in to get some of their campus-famous stir fry. But 6 minutes is an eternity for Bob. It’s like giving Brady 2 minutes and 2 timeouts, while only needing a field goal. Rookie mistake on my part.
I could see the ticket hanging between the window shield and wiper right as I opened the dining hall door. “Fricken Bob”, I mutter to myself. I can picture his ugly old mug in my head, smiling as he knows he’s gotten me again. For this wasn’t the first time that Bob and I have tangled. Our rivalry dates back years.
Let’s rewind about 12 months. I was living in my same apartment, about a 15 minute walk from the Psychology building. Usually this is not a problem, as I enjoy a good walk, but anyone who’s lived in Ohio knows that January’s can be awfully brutal weather-wise. When it’s windy, snowing, and 5 degrees outside, that ½ mile walk feels like a ½ marathon. So often times I would find myself driving to class and taking my chances with Bob, while I park illegally.
I ran pretty well for about 5 weeks, no tickets in like 20 opportunities. I was beginning to think that Bob’s schedule had him on the other side of campus every day at this particular time. So like a young internet player who gets a little cocky after bluffing the live nits, I kept bluffing (or parking). Finally in the beginning of February, Bob got me. 50 dollar ticket. Whatever. I went to the Campus building to pay the fine, planning on never driving to class again.
As I was walking into the building I saw a sign that read Guests please have I.D. ready in order to seize payment. Hmmmmmm. Guest’s don’t pay fines? Let’s give it a shot. When I got to the register I explained to the lady that I was visiting my girlfriend and that I did not attend Miami. “I.D. please” she said. “California. That’s a long ways away Christopher, do you visit frequently?” “Whenever I can ma’am, long distance is hard,” I responded with a smile.
Long story short, by the time I left the building not only were my fines voided, but I was given a red sticker, good enough for parking ANYWHERE on campus at ANY TIME. The super-user of parking passes, to be used only when I “came to visit” of course. Well I was visiting fairly frequently. I started driving to every class, the gym, even letting my roommate take my car when they needed it. I knew that Bob knew I wasn’t visiting, but there wasn’t a damn thing he could do about it. Now, every time I saw him roaming campus, I met him with an ear to ear smile, not my usual “get a real job you miserable *******” frown. Life was good.
Then I got careless. I received a ticket in the city of Oxford for not paying the meter. No big deal I thought. Boy was I wrong. A couple days later I’m sitting in class. This particular class had a window viewing the parking lot I chose to park in. I see Bob approaching my car. I laugh mischievously. Then Bob pulls out his phone and makes a call. He’s not leaving my car. I tune out the professor; tune into Bob. All of a sudden a real cop car pulls into the lot. The officer steps out. As he and Bob start chatting they go back to his car and pull out a big black object. What the **** is that? They make their way to my front left wheel and strap on the boot. Uh oh.
They’re gone by the time I make it down to my car, but the damage has been done. $1500 worth of tickets, $200 to have the boot removed, and a personal note from Bob saying the Dean wanted to speak to me. The Dean informed me that upon getting my ticket in the city of Oxford, the registration on the vehicle was traced back to the school who then concluded the car was not owned by 24 year old California resident Chris Horn, but Junior student Matt Moore. “A suspension is certainly warranted for this type of behavior”, he said. Driving to class warrants a suspension? I wonder what this guy would think about my underage gambling habit. “I’m very sorry sir. I made a stupid immature mistake and am certainly paying for it financially. I just hope that you keep in mind my behavior wasn’t intended to harm anyone. It was out of sheer laziness,” I say instead.
Days later, the Dean tells me through email that he’s decided not to punish me as long as I stay out of trouble. Thank the fricken lord. I don’t know if I could’ve lived with getting kicked out of school for a parking scheme. None the less, I still had to pay the fines. On top of other run-ins with Bob, my running tab is somewhere north of 2k. So while I’ve never played a hand of poker with the man, god damn Bob, the fake cop and my most bitter rival, has taken more from my poker bankroll than any opponent at Hollywood.
Anyways, I returned to the boat over the weekend only to find the same nit-tight experience in the 2/5 game. However I managed to win my first two pots, both against a middle-aged man decked out in Full Tilt gear. I ask him if his underwear is logoed too. He doesn’t laugh.
Up a couple hundred, I’m dealt A?J? in the BB. Z makes it 20, 3 people behind him call, as do I. Flop comes 10?J?K?. Z bets 45, everyone folds to me. I make it 150 expecting him to fold AK, but not really thinking much beyond that. He calls fairly quickly. Turn comes an 8? and I move in for 360. He shakes his head. Please fold. He shakes harder, more viciously. Finally, his chips are pushed towards the center. The river pairs the 8 and Z asks if I have a straight. “Nope”. He shows KQ. I go to muck. Old man river asks to “see that hand” before the cards are shoved into the muck. The dealer flips them over. I’m embarrassed. I HATE being embarrassed at the poker table more than anything else. I turn my music up full blast and stare straight ahead to remedy the discomforting feeling, vowing revenge.
A bit later I’m given K?8? in the BB. Z makes it 20, btn calls, I call, as does 1 limper. Flop 10?3?4?, checked to Z he bets 60. I call. The limper joins the party. Turn 10? and I lead for 125. Z insta-calls. I love players who give off timing tells. He may as well flip his hand face up. River 6?, I bet 200 and he pays me off with K 10. It’s not all my money back, but a decent chunk of it. I rack up down another half buy-in, bringing my total for the week to -$400.
The WPT fund is now down to $1500. On the bright side I’m proud of the way I have limited the damage. Before Vegas I had a tendency to force the issue when I was down in an attempt to “get unstuck”, usually leading to losing more money. But after playing for 3 weeks straight I’ve realized that poker is one long session. Whether I end a trip down $200 or even is completely irrelevant to my progress as a player.
Z is definitely turning into a regular and one I believe I can exploit. I’m excited for our future battles. I probably won’t play until Friday because the 45 minute drive is not worth the action-lacking weekday games. But I’m sure I’ll still get two sessions in by sunday, hopefully moving my bankroll in the proper direction. Til then may you all run well, at the tables and in life.
Miami Matt
P.S. If you haven’t tried Rush Poker on full tilt, do it. So much fun.
Written by Matt Moore
Times are Changing
Friday is my off day. It’s been like that since sophomore year. I like it that way. It allows me at least one day a week that I can spend at the boat without worrying about school. My Thursday nights are typically spent with my roommate Dan and our good friend Franzia, watching shows like The Office, Always Sunny, The League, and Jersey Shore (signed for season 2!).
By 11 the box is empty, the shows are over and the bars are just picking up.
Come Friday morning there are two certainties at our apartment. Number 1, I’ll be going to the boat, and number 2 Dan will be going to the laundry mat. Dan has a problem that can only be described as a bladder malfunction or an R Kelly fascination. Either way many of his weekend mornings end with soaked sheets.
This Friday was no different. I woke up at 10 and spent the next hour lying in bed wondering why I still drink boxed wine. Finally at 11, I popped some advil and emerged out of my room. Dan and I opened our bedroom doors simultaneously. He with his piss stained sheets over his shoulder, me with my Ipod and car keys. “Glad to see your night ended well,” I said. “**** you”.
An hour later and I’m walking into the poker room hoping to see action in the elevated area where the high stakes games take place. A few tables are running, a good sign. I head up to Sara to put my name on the 2/5NL list and she says the game’s not running. Confused I double check the high stakes area to make sure I’m not going insane. “That’s PLO” says Sara. “It’s really the only game above 1/3 we’ve been able to get running.” Now I am by no means experienced or good at PLO, but thankfully neither are these guys.
The game is 1/3/5 with a $200-$1000 buy-in, though it plays bigger than most 5/10 games I sat at in Vegas. Not really the type of variance I was looking for, but hey I guess I’ve got no choice. I sit down in the 2 seat with 500, only to see the two best players in the 3 and the 4. I plan on playing tight to avoid pots out of position against the two more experienced opponents.
There is one other player at the table worth mentioning, Mike. Now either Mike (name changed to protect the guilty) makes a hobby out of remembering lines of sporting events and strangers give him hundred dollar bills for fun, or he is a high stakes bookie. Dresses the part, too. Watches, necklaces, earrings, rings. Anywhere on his body he can hang gold, he does. The white Flavor Flav. I’m not sure if Flav has been running poorly in sports or poker, but he’s on massive tilt for this particular session.
First hand of note I pick up J?9?8?7? in the BB. MP opens to 25, half the table calls, as do I. Flop comes J?8?4? and Mike leads for 80. I make it 240. I’m not surprised as he calls. Turn comes another J and the hand ends there as Mike throws his hand into the muck without a bet.
A bit later I get involved again with Q?J?9?T? Mike opens on the BTN to 25 and I call in the SB. The BB decides to 3Bet to 110. He’s been playing extremely tight and I’m pretty confidant he has AAxx. Mike folds to me and I call. Flop comes K?10?2? and I check to the BB who bets 200, I shove in for like 7 bills. He thinks, shakes his head and folds.
Up about 600 my favorite dealer makes her way to our table. A young blonde girl with a healthy chest. She’s cute but it’s her quick whit that really attracts me. It’s strange, for the first time in my life I’ve actually begun to take the personality of the females I meet into consideration. I know that might sound arrogant and immature, but it’s the truth. My dating life since high school has consisted of me falling for the cutest girl that gives me the time of day. Hobbies and interests, these were just irrelevant details. Sure upon dating a girl I would pretend like her personality and characteristics were things that intrigued me, but this was just my way of justifying the relationship.
I realized my shallow ways needed to change after time spent with a girl I was recently seeing. This girl couldn’t count to 4 if you spotted her the 1 and the 2. Very sweet girl, just not all "there" mentally. We were at a party once when someone asked her how many beers were in a dozen. She began counting it out on her fingers…Cue the epiphany! Anyways since then I’ve had a unique attraction to the aspirations and goals of the girls that I meet. I've started caring about their interests, their ambitions. Things that I would’ve laughed at in high school. I guess I’m finally growing up.
Back to the game, my favorite dealer got me involved in a big one almost immediately. Up about $500 and sitting on a $1,000 stack, I’m dealt A?9?9?2? in the BB. After a bunch of limps I checked. The flop came J?9?3? and Mike bets out pot (30 I think?). I’m next to act and make it 120. Mike calls without much hesitation. The turn brings the 5? and after a check by Mike I bet pot again. 280 I believe. After a little deliberation he calls. The 6? falls on the river and Mike checks again. This is where the hand got interesting. 78 got there, but the way Mike is tilting I see him never folding a set, and maybe 2 good pairs as well. I shove. Snap call. $2,000 pot. I know before the cards are turned over. Mike shows KQ78 and all of a sudden I’m broke. **** that game.
After talking about the hand with Kaj and Lukas (Vegas friends) they opened up my mind to a third option on the river, one I didn’t even consider. A small bet, maybe 200; one that could allow me to fold the hand to a raise. I’ve grown so accustomed to the online Omaha games where “bet pot” is seemingly the only button, that I hadn’t even considered anything outside of check or shove.
I left the boat disappointed once again. Down to $1000 on the WPT fund and desperately needing to practice some PLO online. Times are changing and I need to adjust. To quote some rapper somewhere “If your slippin’ your trippin’”.
Miami Matt
PS turns out I'm returning to the city of lights in 5 weeks for my spring break. Not my choice, but I certainly had no complaints. TRs to follow.
Written by Matt Moore
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Chicken Nuggets and Peyton Manning
I woke up Friday morning feeling unusually refreshed. I can’t explain it, but sometimes I manage the perfect mixture of booze and late night Jimmy Johns to actually cancel out the negative effects of both. Bewildered as to how to spend this clear-headed Friday morning, I decide to accompany my roommate Miles to the gym before venturing to Hollywood. Upon hitting the free weight rack to curl some 25’s (Don’t be jealous, I know I’m huge), I flipped on today’s Tony Kornheiser’s podcast. From the get-go Tony becomes obsessed with the snow storm about to hit the east coast, warning those who plan on bringing home hook ups on Friday night “to be picky, because they might be snowed in at your place ‘til Tuesday.” **** I hope it misses us, I need to get my gambol on, I think as I look out the window to see the flakes beginning their descent onto Oxford.
By the time we’re done lifting the snow has staged a full on attack. I can barely see enough of the road to make it back to my apartment, yet alone the boat. So Instead of playing live PLO against guys who think they can use all 4 hole cards, I’m stuck trying to turn my 200k FTP points into some sort of real money bankroll.
Anyways, in between folding my way into the money of an 1800 ftp (that’s full tilt points) sit-n-go, I began chatting online with my fat friend from high school. We’ll call him Fat Fred to protect the obese. Anyways Fat Fred tells me how he recently finished a chicken nugget power hour. I’m in awe. My very own Kobyashi. Anyone who’s been to college (or visited for that matter) knows that a power hour is an hour of drinking beer, one shot at a time, usually accompanied by a music playlist that changes every minute. After the hour it adds up to about 7 ½ beers. Fred simply replaced the shots of beer with chicken nuggets.
My roommate Phil, however, is not impressed. In fact he says he could do both power hours simultaneously. One chicken nugget and one shot of beer a minute. Care to make a bet? By the end of our negotiations we settle on a $100 bet, 2 to 1 odds, and he must hold it all in for an hour after the competition. By 9 o’clock our apartment is filled with our friends, 200 McNuggets, and a keg of Keystone light (Phil’s choice). We even garnered enough interest in the bet to start a pool, 5 dollars a number, wagering on which minute Phil would bow out (minutes 30-60). I draw minute 38.
It’s clearly a pro-Phil crowd, everybody loves the underdog. I’m the villain; the guy betting the “don’ts” at a friendly dice table. He’s cruising early too, feeding off the crowd energy (no pun intended). By minute 20, he looks as if he’s only getting started. That confidence quickly turns to cockiness, as Phil makes a crucial mistake. He starts dipping the nuggets in bar-b-que. Now I’m no eating expert, but I do know there’s a reason that the likes of Kobyashi and Joey Chesnut don’t put ketchup and mustard on their dogs. By minute 35 Phil is visibly struggling. The beer is going down smoothly, but it’s leaving little space in the stomach for nuggets. The crowd can tell too. With every head shake and swallow, the end is becoming more inevitable.
Finally on his 38th minute, my number, Phil heads to the trash can, mouth open, hands on the sides. No way! Not only am I going to win, but I’m gonna hit the number too. Let it all out Phily! Release the demons! As Phil bends over, out comes the longest, most disgusting burp I’ve heard to date. “Game on bitches.” Friends, girlfriends, random drunks, everyone erupts. I’ve been slowrolled, and Phil’s caught his 2nd wind. For the first time in the match, I can envision defeat.
As the nugget box approaches vacancy, and the music becomes more recent (our power hour mix was made in chronological order starting in the 60s), I become more worried. But as is the case with most Cinderella stories, the clock strikes midnight, or in this case 9:51. Phil can’t get the 51st nugget down his throat. The struggle is over. The patrons “golf clap” the effort from a Man who almost accomplished the incredible. But like Tom Watson at last year’s British Open, This underdog story ends in defeat. Phil pays up, makes a not-so-quick trip to the bathroom and we all head to the bar where I gladly buy drinks in celebration.
Come Sunday and it’s time to pick a team to bet my new found fortune on. The choice is easy, the Saints. Yeah it has a lot to do with the feel good story of the “resurrection of New Orleans”, but mostly it has to do with my animosity towards Peyton Manning. In a day and age where Tiger Woods has a different mistress for every day of the week, infidelity obviously isn’t the most unusual vice amongst pro athletes. Still something inside me feels immoral rooting for these cheaters. Peyton Manning is no exception.
Four years ago I was a senior in high school, grinding through the final days of the Party Poker era, when I came across an Instant Message from my ex-girl friend, who I was still very friendly with. A college freshman at the time, she had just returned from a spring break trip to the Bahamas. As a girl who knew little about sports and even less about football, I was surprised to say the least when she asked me if I had heard of Peyton Manning. “Of course”, I responded, “Why?” She went on to tell the steamy details of an encounter she had with the Colts QB.
Apparently after seeing crowds of people surrounding two men at a Bahaman bar, she wondered out loud who it might me. The guys in her group confirmed that it was no other than Peyton Manning and his brother Eli. Not knowing or caring who that was, she proceeded with her night. Two hours later, after Eli had left, Peyton came up and started talking to her. After a little bit of dancing and drinking he asked her if she wanted to check out his golf cart, which apparently they travel by in the Bahamas. She innocently obliged and next thing she knew they were kissing in the woods by the bar. According to her, in the midst of the steamy make out he asked if she wanted to go back to her room. Not wanting to be a “groupie”, she declined and after a little while longer in the woods they headed their separate ways. Peyton married Ashley Manning in 2001. This was 2006.
So take what you want from that 2nd hand story. I personally believe it for a few reasons. The particular girl knows nothing about sports, so if she were to make up a crazy celebrity story, it would’ve involved like Dave Matthews or someone like that. Secondly, for a while I was the only person she told so it wasn’t like she did it for the publicity. Finally after reading this story…http://www.usatoday.com/sports/colum...-brennan_x.htm
about some bizarre incident with a female trainer, I’ve got the idea Peyton isn’t exactly the golden child everyone makes him out to be. But again there’s no hard evidence, so I guess you can be the judge.
Anyways after watching the game it looks like karma prevailed in more ways than one. As 105 million Americans witnessed, Tracy Porter returned Manning’s 4th quarter interception for a 74 yard touchdown, sealing the Saints victory. Great to see a victory from a city that desperately needed it, not to mention a loss from a guy who in my mind deserved it.
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Warrants - YA Global holds warrants to purchase shares of our common stock that were issued in connection with the convertible debentures and the Series C and Series D preferred stock. The warrants are exercisable at a fixed exercise price which, from time to time, has been reduced due to anti-dilution provisions when the Company has entered into subsequent financing arrangements with a lower price. The exercise prices may be reset again in the future if we subsequently issue stock or enter into a financing arrangement with a lower price. In addition, upon each adjustment in the exercise price, the number of warrant shares issuable is adjusted to the number of shares determined by multiplying the warrant exercise price in effect prior to the adjustment by the number of warrant shares issuable prior to the adjustment divided by the warrant exercise price resulting from the adjustment.
11
The warrants issued to YA Global do not meet all of the established criteria for equity classification in FASB ASC 815-40, Derivatives and Hedging – Contracts in Entity’s Own Equity, and accordingly, are recorded as derivative liabilities at fair value. Changes in the fair value of the warrants are charged or credited to income each period.
2012 Financing Transactions – During 2012, we entered into Agreements to issue and sell six debentures to YA Global in the aggregate principal amount of $2,650,000. The debentures are convertible, at the option of the holder, at a conversion price equal to the lesser of (i) $0.10 or (ii) 95% of the lowest closing bid price of our common stock for the 60 trading days preceding the date of conversion. Except for the June 1, 2012 and July 20, 2012 debentures, at inception, all the debentures had an interest rate of 14% per year and had a maturity date of July 29, 2012. Subsequent to the May 25, 2012 modification, all the debentures bear interest at 9.5% and mature on August 1, 2013. We have the right to redeem a portion or all amounts outstanding under the debentures at a redemption premium of 10%, plus accrued interest. We also issued warrants to YA Global in conjunction with the debentures. The warrants were issued with an initial fixed exercise price of $0.15 per share; however, as a result of the anti-dilution protection in these warrants, the issuance of subsequent debentures for a lower price resets the fixed exercise price of the warrants to the lower price and adjusts the number of warrant shares issuable. All warrants issued during 2012 have a term of five years.
The following table provides a summary of the allocation of the components of the new debentures and warrants issued during the three months ended September 30, 2012. The hybrid debt instruments were valued as the present value of the cash flows, enhanced by the fair value of the conversion option valued using a Monte Carlo Simulation valuation method. The warrants were valued using a binomial lattice option valuation method. Significant assumptions used to value the hybrid debt instruments and warrants as of inception of the financings are also provided in the table below.
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At September 30, 2012, financial instruments arising from our financing transactions with YA Global, an accredited investor, included shares of our Series C preferred stock issued in February 2006, Series D preferred stock issued in January 2010, a series of thirty-three secured convertible debentures issued between August 2006 and July 2012 and various warrants to purchase shares of our common stock. All of our assets are pledged to secure our obligations under the debt securities. At various times, YA Global has assigned or distributed portions of its holdings of these securities to other holders, including persons who are officers of YA Global and its related entities, as well as to other holders who are investors in YA Global’s funds.
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Secured Debentures - The underlying agreements for each of the thirty-three debentures are very similar in form, except in regard to the interest rate, conversion prices, and the number of warrants that were issued in conjunction with each of the debentures. The debentures are convertible into our common stock, at the option of the holder, at the lower of a fixed conversion price per share or a percentage of the lowest volume-weighted average price (“VWAP”) for a specified number of days prior to the conversion (the “look-back period”). The conversion is limited such that the holder cannot exceed 9.99% ownership of the outstanding common stock, unless the holder waives their right to such limitation. All of the debentures are secured according to the terms of a Security Pledge Agreement dated August 23, 2006, which was entered into in connection with the first convertible debenture issued to YA Global and which provides YA Global with a security interest in substantially all of our assets. The debentures are also secured by a Patent Security Agreement dated July 29, 2008. On August 13, 2010, our wholly owned subsidiary, NeoMedia Europe GmbH, became a guarantor of all outstanding financing transactions between us and YA Global, through pledges of their intellectual property and other movable assets. As security for our obligations to YA Global, all of our Pledged Property, Patent Collateral and other collateral is affirmed through the several successive Ratification Agreements which have been executed in connection with each of the 2010, 2011 and 2012 financings.
All debentures with YA Global contain provisions for acceleration of principal and interest upon default. Certain debentures also contain default interest rates and conversion prices, as reflected in the table below.
We evaluated the financing transactions in accordance with FASB ASC 815, Derivatives and Hedging, and determined that the conversion features of the Series C and Series D preferred stock and the Debentures were not afforded the exemption for conventional convertible instruments due to their variable conversion rates. The contracts have no explicit limit on the number of shares issuable so they did not meet the conditions set forth in current accounting standards for equity classification. Accordingly, either the embedded derivative instruments, including the conversion option, must be bifurcated and accounted for as derivative instrument liabilities or, as permitted by FASB ASC 815-15-25-4, Recognition of Embedded Derivatives, the instruments may be carried in their entirety at fair value.
At inception, we elected to bifurcate the embedded derivatives related to the Series C and Series D preferred stock and certain debentures, while electing the fair value option for the March 2007, August 2007, April 2008, May 2008 and April 2012 Debentures. FASB ASC 825, Financial Instruments, allows us to elect the fair value option for recording financial instruments when they are initially recognized or if there is an event that requires re-measurement of the instruments at fair value, such as a significant modification of the debt.
On May 25, 2012, the terms of the debentures held by YA Global were modified to extend the stated maturity dates to August 1, 2013 and reduce the interest rates to 9.5% per year, with interest being payable on the maturity date in cash or, provided certain equity conditions are satisfied, in shares of our Common Stock at the applicable conversion price. Because the effect of the modifications exceeded a significance threshold relative to cash flows prescribed by ASC 470-50, Debt Modifications and Extinguishments, the modifications of the amounts due under these arrangements were accounted for as extinguishments, whereby the existing debentures are considered to be retired and new debentures issued. The existing instruments were first adjusted to fair value as of May 25, 2012 using the interest rate and maturity date prior to the amendment. The fair value of the new instruments was then calculated using the modified interest rate and maturity date to determine the fair value of the instrument subsequent to the amendment. The differences in the fair values before and after the amendment were recorded as an extinguishment loss of approximately $27.5 million in the accompanying statements of operations.
As of the date of the modification, we have elected to carry all modified debentures at the fair value of the hybrid instrument with changes in the fair value of the debentures charged or credited to income each period.
The following table summarizes the significant terms of each of the debentures for which the entire hybrid instrument is recorded at fair value as of September 30, 2012:
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make playing full-stacked in about two hours of a normal,
non-wild $2-$5 live game.
I’m guessing that before reading this, if you had found
yourself in this situation holding T-T, you may have been
cursing your luck and wishing you hadn’t raised in the first
place. Should you go with such a vulnerable pair for your
whole stack? Or should you just fold to the wildman’s $100
reraise since you know you’re going to end up in a four-way
pot and you’ll “have to hit a set to win”?
If you would have thought that way, I hope you now see
that you should think again! With T-T, you have one of the
very best possible hands in this scenario. An absolute gem of a
situation for you. You should be eager to get your stack in.
Yes, you are an underdog to win the pot. More than two out
of three times, you’re losing. That’s fine, because you’re
getting 3-to-1 on your money.
In wild games, you have to get away from thinking in terms
of being ahead, being behind, and getting sucked out on.
That’s not really how it works. Instead, everyone has equity. If
the right cards come, any of the players in the pot will win.
But if you start with the right hand, you’ll have a big edge. Big
pairs are the rightest hands there are.
WINNING IN WILD GAMES 165
Also, notice the difference in equity between TT and 55.
TT has a huge edge at 32%. 55 is a small equity dog with just
22%. Since you hit a set about 20 percent of the time, it’s
reasonably fair to say about 55 that you need to hit a set to
win. But you can’t say that at all about TT. Tens can hold up
unimproved even against three opponents in a wild game.
Suitedness is extremely important. Some people
underestimate how important it is for unpaired hands to be
suited. Well, in this particular scenario, being suited makes all
the difference in the world.
People downplay the value of having a suited hand by
saying that you only make a flush a small percentage of the
time. In a way they’re right. You do make a flush only a small
percentage of the time. The thing is, when you make a flush,
you almost always win, even against four or more opponents.
Look at AJs versus AJo. In our chart, AJs comes in at 25%
or exactly fair against this range of hands. AJo, on the other
hand, comes in at 21%. There’s your small percentage chance
to make a flush. But in this case, the difference between being
suited and unsuited is the difference between likely having a
small equity edge (remember, someone will be loose and have
some dumb hands in their range) and being a likely equity
dog.
Put another way, 4 percent may not sound like a big
number, but when you’re scrapping to get up over 25 percent,
that extra 4 percent is huge.
If you assume that most pots have some dead money in
them, then roughly any big suited hands (all the way down to
T9s) can become playable in these pots, whereas even an
offsuit hand as strong as AJo is often unplayable.
The bottom line is that in wild games, you want pocket
pairs and suited hands.
166 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Ace-king is not overrated. I couldn’t help but throw this
in there since I’ve heard the myth a bazillion times. No, aceking
isn’t an overrated, overplayed hand. Ace-king is one of
the best hands in hold’em, and even offsuit it holds a very
solid equity edge against three opponents in a wild game. You
should feel overjoyed to get your money in preflop with aceking
in a wild game.
Good Spot No. 2. Inducing Wild Bluffs
Watch out for this scenario after the flop in a wild game. A
lot of money goes in preflop four ways. But there’s still plenty
of money behind.
Then the flop comes. No one seems willing to put in too
much action. Either it gets checked around, or someone makes
a half-hearted bet of maybe 20 percent of the bloated pot, and
everyone calls.
Something similar happens on the turn.
Then all of a sudden, on the river, someone decides to
shove. This bet is frequently (though obviously not always) a
bluff. Why?
The reason is fairly straightforward. After a bunch of
people put in a ton of money preflop, absolutely no one with a
decent hand is going to let the flop get checked through. The
first player with any hand to protect will make a good-sized
bet. So in a game like this, light flop action means quite
reliably that everyone is weak.
The turn action goes the same way. Again, everyone is
weak. Indeed, even if someone held a decent draw like the nut
flush draw on the turn, you might expect a bet. With $600
sitting in the middle and the nut flush draw to back it up, most
players in these wild games would take a shot with at least a
$200 bet.
WINNING IN WILD GAMES 167
So when the turn also goes through without significant
action, not only do you know most players are fairly weak, but
you can also guess that no one is too proud of a draw either.
Then the river comes, and someone shoves. So after all that
checking, all of a sudden someone has made a hand they are
willing to back for stacks? The fact is, it’s unlikely. It’s hard
to make a hand in hold’em on the final card without having at
least something worthwhile on the turn.
Let’s look at this hand I observed in a wild $2-$5 game in
Las Vegas. Stacks were between $800 and $1,500 for the
participants in the hand, except for one short stack.
A player limped in. The next player raised to $25. Two
players called, and then the big blind shoved for $170. This
player had been making erratic plays. The limper called, the
raiser called, and one of the two callers behind called. The pot
was $707 with one player all-in and no side pot. The
remaining players all had at least $600 behind.
The flop was A? 8? 5? . The limper checked. The original
preflop raiser bet $100 into the $707 pot. Everyone called.
The turn was the 7?. Everyone checked. There’s $1,107 in
the pot.
The river was the J? . The limper checked. The preflop
raiser checked. Then the next player, someone who had been
playing a lot of hands in this wild game and whose stack had
been up-and-down on a huge roller-coaster ride, shoved all-in
for a little over $1,000. The next player folded, the limper
folded, and the original raiser tanked. He had a stack of about
$700. He eventually showed J?J? and folded.
The river bettor triumphantly showed 9?8? for a pair of
eights with no club. “I knew you had no club,” he said with a
smile on his face. “Can’t call,” he said.
This type of play happens fairly frequently in wild games.
The player with the set of jacks absolutely must call in this
situation.
168 PLAYING THE PLAYER
What hand is the river bettor representing? Most $2-$5
players, even in a wild game, will not bet the river thinly for a
large amount of money. So he doesn’t have, for instance, just
the T? (or any weaker club). Really, for an all-in bet, he’s
representing the nuts, the K? . If he held the Q? , I’d expect
him perhaps to bet, but not to shove all-in.
But if he held the K? , why did he play so passively on the
flop and turn? The flop came monotone, so he would have had
the nut flush draw for two betting rounds. It’s perhaps
understandable that he didn’t raise the flop bet, even though
it’s small size screams weakness. But when it got checked to
him on the turn in a $1,107 pot, I would not expect him to
check it through.
I’m not saying it’s impossible that he checked through the
nut flush draw, or that it’s impossible that he is shoving the
river with a value hand that beats three jacks. But it’s
implausible. The story doesn’t add up. Furthermore, wild
bluffs like this one are fairly common in these games, and the
player with three jacks is getting $1,807-to-$700 on his
money, so he has to win less than 30 percent of the time to
make a call correct. It’s a call.
Remember this. Few players will check down a good hand
in a big pot in a wild game. Once the pot gets big, anyone who
has hit the board in a significant way will think, “Gee, I gotta
protect this hand.” Weak betting in a big pot means real
weakness. You can take advantage of the weakness by
plowing through these pots by betting the turn and shoving the
river as a bluff. You can also take advantage of the weakness
by inducing bluffs when you have the likely best (weak) hand.
But, naturally, you have to call the bluffs once you induce
them.
WINNING IN WILD GAMES 169
Good Spot No. 3. Thin Value Betting With A
Pair
No one wants to fold in a huge, bloated pot. If you flop a
pair, you can bet it, and you will get called by worse. Don’t be
shy. Look at the above example hand. The guy bet a A-8-5
monotone flop and got called in all three spots. Granted, his
bet was small compared to the size of the pot, but it still
wasn’t a small bet in an absolute sense. It was a $100 bet,
which represented a good portion of the remaining stacks. And
the board was a scary one that normally people won’t call
loosely.
In a “normal” no limit game, you have to be a little
circumspect with top pair hands, particularly when you have
kicker problems. Even if your hand is best, it can be hard to
get action from worse hands.
That goes out the window in wild games. If you have a
hand that figures to be the best hand out a good percentage of
the time, bet it for value. Slurp up all those $100 and $200
calls you can while you likely have an equity edge.
It’s no big deal if you bet the second-best hand sometimes.
You get so much value for your hands when they are best that
you can be wrong sometimes and still come out ahead on
average. It’s better to bet aggressively and get burned
sometimes than to be too timid, especially in a wild game.
Remember, in wild games you will be gambling. If it makes
you uncomfortable, buy in short. While you derive your edge
in these games by playing hands that have better showdown
potential than your opponents, you can’t be scared money. The
absolute worst thing you can do is to see every monster under
the bed and check too much and fold too much. Just play good
hands, bet your hands, don’t fold easily, and you’ll be fine.
Trait No. 1. Peeling Light
On The Flop And Getting
Sticky At Showdown
Overview
We’re talking bad players here.
This is the most universal fish trait. They play a wide range
preflop, and they like to peel light on the flop. Also, if they get
to the river with a decent pair, they will be unhappy about
folding it.
This trait almost defines the term “calling station. ”
Adjustment Summary
You’re going to do two things against these players. First,
you’re going to go for three streets of value with all your
decent top pair or better hands. Second, you’re going to barrel
the turn on dry boards.
Let’s start with the first adjustment. You go for three streets
of value with decent top pairs. Here’s the easy example.
It’s a $2-$5 game. A player with this trait limps in, and you
make it $25 to go with K?Q? . The big blind calls, and your
target calls.
The flop is K?8?7?. Your opponents check, you bet $50,
and the player with the trait calls. There’s $177 in the pot, and
let’s assume that there’s plenty of money behind.
PEELING LIGHT ON THE FLOP AND GETTING STICKY. . . 171
The turn is the J? . Your opponent checks. You bet $150,
and he calls. There’s $477 in the pot.
The river is the 3? . Your opponent checks. You bet $300
into the $477 pot.
Go for three streets of value. Against tight and nitty
players, you often can’t rely on getting three streets of value
from top pair hands that don’t improve. But against these
guys, top pair is your bread-and-butter, and you go for three
streets.
You may wonder about the bet sizing. Here’s how I do it.
The K-8-7 two-tone flop is one where you will fairly
frequently get drawn out on by the river. But it’s also a flop
where you’ll commonly get called by worse hands. So I make
a medium-sized bet. I don’t have overwhelming equity, so I
don’t want to bomb the pot. But I’m happy to make a solidsized
bet because I will so often get called by worse.
The turn is a great card for getting value. It’s offsuit, so the
flush draws missed. Obviously T-9 gets there, but your
opponent will more likely have a hand like 9-8, 9-7, T-8, K-T,
and so forth. You’re a very nice favorite against these hands
with just one card to come (and you know roughly what the
dangerous river cards are). So I like a big turn bet. You’ll get
called frequently, and you’ll usually be a 2-to-1 favorite or
better.
The river is a beautiful brick. Time for a value bet. You
want to get calls from stray jacks and eights that your
opponent got to the river with, so size your bet so that these
hands might call.
In general I make my largest bets (compared to the size of
the pot) when I expect to be a good favorite over most of the
hands that call me, and when I also expect a fairly wide range
of hands to call. This drawish but not hyper-dangerous turn
board of K-8-7-J with one flush draw is a great example. It’s
easy to have a draw, but not so easy to have me beat. I bomb
172 PLAYING THE PLAYER
boards like this one with top pair against the calling station
types.
Here’s a hand I played at a $2-$5 game in Las Vegas.
Four players limped, and I limped the button with 7?6?.
The blinds called. It was seven ways to the flop, and the pot
was $35.
The flop came A? 9? 8?. Everyone checked to me and I
checked.
The turn was the T?. The calling station guy bet $15, and
there was a caller. I raised to $75. Only the calling station
called.
The river was the 9?. The calling station checked. I bet
$200, and he called. My hand was good.
The river was probably the worst card in the deck for my
hand, but against this player type it’s still a very easy value
bet. I see small stakes players miss these bets a lot when a bad
card comes. No free showdowns to calling stations.
Now let’s talk about the second adjustment. You want to
barrel the turn on dry boards.
These guys peel the flop light. So your continuation bets
will frequently get called. But on many board textures, it’s
very difficult to make a decent hand, so the majority of the
time these players are missing on the turn and then folding.
The ideal board types for this are those that afford a lot of
weak draws and that brick out on the turn. For instance, say
you raise preflop and get called. The flop is Q-9-6 with a flush
draw. You bet and get called. The turn is an offsuit 4. This is a
good barrel card.
This player is going to peel you on the flop with a ton of
different hands: J-T, J-9, J-8, T-8, T-7, 9-8, 9-7, 8-7, 8-6, etc.
Barrel the turn and you can get folds. If you check back the
turn and try to bluff the river, this player type will be
considerably more likely to look you up with the one pair
hands in this range.
PEELING LIGHT ON THE FLOP AND GETTING STICKY. . . 173
Loosely connected boards are the best for this. The more
closely connected the board cards get, the stronger the
available draws become, and the better the chance your
opponent will want to peel the turn as well. For instance, on a
T-8-7 board, hands like J-T, T-9, 9-8, 8-7, and so forth are
much stronger on average than the hands you’re running into
on a Q-9-6 board.
Very dry boards can be ok for this also, but when you get
called on the flop you will fairly frequently have run into a
strong hand that your opponent will be loathe to fold. If you
bet and get called on a Q-7-2 flop, for instance, your opponent
will frequently have a queen or a weaker pair that he may
want to peel the turn with. Same reasoning for a flop like Q-7-
7.
A flop like Q-Q-8 is a little better to barrel because you can
get gutshots, eights, and weak pocket pairs to fold sometimes,
particularly if the turn is a card like an A or K.
Pitfalls To Avoid
Against most players with this trait, you will want to be
bet-folding with most of your value bets. When this type of
player raises, it will rarely be a bluff. For instance, if I had
been check-raised on the river in the hand above where I made
the low end of the straight, I would have folded. Just bet-fold
these players into oblivion.
As for the barreling, board textures are very important.
Remember, you want board textures where your opponents
will peel with weak hands that they’ll fold on the turn. When
boards are too coordinated, draws become too strong on
average. And when boards are too dry, even loose, sticky
players aren’t peeling as often without something they like a
fair bit.
174 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Finally, don’t bluff the river often against these guys. When
it’s just one more bet to see a showdown, these guys more
often than not pay it. And absolutely do not try to bluff these
players off top pairs or overpairs. Quite the opposite, if you
suspect one of these players has top pair, you should rejoice
because it opens up their entire stack to you. We’ll get into
this in the next section.
Who Exhibits This Trait
A zillion live no-limit players. The vast majority of
relatively new poker players tend to play this way. Just look
for guys who are in lots of hands, who peel flops a lot, and
who rarely seem to have anything they’re too proud of.
The Bottom Line
Value bet top pair relentlessly. Go for three streets. Fold to
raises. Barrel the turn when a load of weak draws brick off.
That’s about it.
Trait No. 2. Absolutely
Refusing To Fold An
Overpair
Overview
This one is pretty self-explanatory. There are a lot of players
who simply won’t fold an overpair almost no matter the
action. With these guys, there is absolutely no flopped
overpair that they’ll fold for almost any amount of money.
And even on the river when the board’s turned scary, they
hold on tight to those overpairs.
For example, in a $2-$5 game with $700 stacks, I played
the following hand:
A player whom I suspected to have this trait opened to $20.
This player was limping most of his hands, so I presumed that
the raise likely indicated a strong hand.
A weak player called, and I called on the button with
J?7?. The blinds folded. There was $67 in the pot with $680
behind.
The flop came J?8?7?. The player with this trait bet $40.
The middle player folded. I raised to $150. He reraised to
$300, and we got it in. He had Q-Q.
Here’s another example from a $2-$5 game. This hand
played with $1,200 stacks. The target was a really terrible
player who was on vacation in Las Vegas from Brazil.
This player opened to $20, and I called in the small blind
with 7-7. The blinds folded.
176 PLAYING THE PLAYER
The flop was 9-5-2 rainbow. I checked, he bet $40, and I
called.
The turn was a 9. I checked, and he checked.
The river was a 7. I shoved for $1,140 into the $125 pot. He
called and showed A-A.
Adjustment Summary
Crack and shove. That’s the basic formula. Wait until
you’ve cracked the pair and then stick all the money in. Often
players who exhibit this trait are completely pot-size
insensitive. Don’t necessarily worry that your shove may be a
massive overbet. With some players, actually, it may make
them more likely to call because they’ll figure you’d bet
smaller if you were betting for value.
For instance, I performed the crack and shove recently in a
$2-$5 game. I check-shoved a T?4?3? flop with 4-4. The
guy said, “Flush draw, huh?” as he called with K-K.
A lot of guys make this really easy because they tip their
hand early on. They will raise preflop, for instance, only with
AA-QQ. Or maybe you’re playing really deep and they will 3-
bet only with AA or KK (and they’ll make it a min-3-bet). Or
they will overbet the flop if and only if they’ve flopped an
overpair.
As soon as one of these players tips a big pair to you,
continue as long as you have the implied odds to crack.
Obviously small pocket pairs are the easiest hands to crack
an overpair with. Tend to play all pocket pairs against
someone who goes broke with every overpair unless you have
to pay more than about 8 percent of your opponent’s stack
preflop. (Or your stack if your opponent has you covered.) For
instance, if your target has a $300 stack and he makes it $20
preflop, call with any pocket pair since $20 is only 6.7 percent
ABSOLUTELY REFUSING TO FOLD AN OVERPAIR 177
of your stack. At $30, however, the call becomes marginal.
And at $35 it’s probably no longer profitable at all.
Without a pocket pair, you really want stacks to be pretty
deep before you try to crack a big pair. With two unpaired
cards below the pair, you will outflop the pair only about 5
percent of the time (give or take depending on how suited and
connected you are). You’ll flop a draw that’s worth continuing
with more often, but that scenario is quite a bit less profitable
since you’re still drawing as an underdog.
Once your target has 200 big blinds or more, however, you
should play lots of hands to try to crack the pair. You can even
start calling some 3-bets to crack at that point.
Don’t be shy about shoving. For instance, look at the
ridiculous hand I played with sevens full against pocket aces. I
made my hand on the river and shoved nearly ten times the
pot. Don’t hold back. If they don’t fold overpairs, they don’t
fold overpairs. Stick all the money in. Even if you aren’t sure
the player has an overpair, it can still make sense to shove
because you make more those times you get called than you
would if you had chosen a smaller bet that your opponent
might call with a weaker hand.
Pitfalls To Avoid
Two pitfalls. First, pay attention to the stack sizes! Your
target’s stack size is the most important. A lot of these guys
who always ship overpairs don’t play very deep. If you try to
crack an overpair at 50 BB stacks, you’re likely giving away
EV, not getting it.
I have brain farts from time to time where I’ll call preflop
with some suited hand trying to crack a guy and then realize
that his stack is only about 10 or 15 times the preflop raise. I
flop middle pair or something, and the guy bombs the pot with
178 PLAYING THE PLAYER
half his stack, and that’s it. Can’t call. Just bled away the
preflop call.
Avoid doing this whenever possible. If the stacks aren’t
deep, then that flop bet will usually be too big to call. And
you’re not very often going to have the pair cracked already
on the flop.
Second pitfall is that you should not semibluff your draws.
A lot of people get jam happy when they flop a decent draw,
but when you have close to zero fold equity, jamming your
draw is usually wrong. Remember, you’re trying to crack the
guy, not get him to fold. So don’t decide to go nuts when you
flop 8?7?2? to J?T?. Your overcard outs are probably no
good, so when you get it in on the flop you’re just a straight up
underdog. It’s much, much better to just call the flop, call the
turn (if the odds are right), and shove whenever you get there.
If you miss, you miss, and you lose.
Maybe it sounds silly to tell you not to try to bluff a guy
who never folds an overpair, but I’ve seen people try more
times than I could possibly count.
Who Exhibits This Trait
Lots of recreational players play this way. In fact, I’ll
generally assume a player who seems to play a recreational
player style will not fold an overpair even if I haven’t seen
direct evidence of it yet.
Ironically, some nits also seem to exhibit this trait as well.
They quite literally wait all day for pocket aces, and they just
plain ain’t folding when they get it. This is particularly true on
the flop. Nits know how hard it is to outflop pocket aces, so
they’ll often call off a huge overshove on a flop like J?8?6?.
What they don’t necessarily realize is that the way they play is
so predictable they are telling you they have pocket aces very
ABSOLUTELY REFUSING TO FOLD AN OVERPAIR 179
early on and leaving too much money behind if they plan to
call it off on any flop.
If you try this play against a nit and he folds instead of calls
(he’ll usually fold face-up just to show you how nitty he is),
then you can obviously abuse these folds in the future by
playing deep and shoving flops without the goods.
The Bottom Line
Lots of players refuse to fold overpairs almost no matter the
circumstances. Exploiting this one is simple. Crack and shove.
The trick is to make sure you have the odds to crack. Then the
next trick is to make sure you shove after—and not before—
you’ve cracked the pair.
PART IV: PUTTING IT
ALL TOGETHER
Finding Holes
I’ve played a lot of small stakes no-limit hold’em in my life.
I’ve played live, and I’ve played online. I’ve played every
level of stakes all the way down to $0.10-$0.25 online.
In all these small stakes games, I can probably count on
two hands the number of truly good no-limit players I’ve run
into. Of course “good” is relative, but I’m talking about
players who can tailor their strategies well to the opponents
they are playing against, players who will adjust if I start
trying to take advantage of them and whose adjustments are
consistently correct.
Well over 99 percent of all the small stakes opponents I’ve
played against have not been good according to this definition.
Most generally play a fairly static strategy and don’t adjust
well either when there’s good money to be made adjusting or
when they are getting brutally taken advantage of.
It never fails, however. Someone will come to me and say,
“Ed, I can’t win in my game. There’s too many good players.
What should I do? ”
If you’ve ever felt that way about your regular game, rest
assured, your opponents are not too good to beat. You just
haven’t found the holes yet. Once you do, you will crash
through the logjam and start raking in the buyins.
This whole book has, to some extent, been about how to
find holes in your opponents’ games and exploit them. But
I’ve written this section for that student who complains that he
can’t win because his opponents are just too good. If you run
into a logjam in your regular game, and you feel like you can’t
184 PLAYING THE PLAYER
beat it, follow the steps in this section and you’ll be on your
way to reclaiming ownership of your game.
Step 1. Target a regular in your game that
you feel is too “good” to beat.
Pick someone. Choose a regular in your game. Look for
someone who wins in the game and whom you consider too
good to beat.
This is your target. You are going to make this person’s
poker life a living hell over the coming days, weeks, maybe
even months.
Yes, normally a good strategy to win at poker is to choose
the softest game available and pick on the weakest players.
But presumably you’re reading this because that formula isn’t
doing it for you anymore. The weak players aren’t as weak as
they used to be, and you’re spinning your wheels. Or maybe
it’s working, but you want to win faster and move up in
stakes.
You’re going to invest in your improvement by choosing to
pick on one of the better players. It may temporarily dent your
winrate, but it will pay long-term dividends.
Choose someone who plays a lot. Every time you play
poker over the next month or so, you want this person to be in
your game. A pro who has to put in a lot of hours to make
ends meet is a great choice. And the better you think this
player is, the better the choice. (Within reason. Phil Galfond
would not be a good choice for this because he’s too good, and
you aren’t going to find the holes you’re looking for. But
chances are Phil Galfond doesn’t play in your game, and
chances also are that anyone who does play in your game is a
fine choice.)
FINDING HOLES 185
Step 2. Gather preliminary data.
Play a few sessions with this player. For now it doesn’t
really matter where you sit relative to your target. Your entire
focus during these sessions should be on your target. Watch
every single hand this person plays. Ignore everyone else,
even if there is some huge fish in your game. (Don’t fret.
There will still be fish playing poker when this exercise is over
and you are back to playing normally.)
You aren’t trying to win money during these sessions. I’d
recommend playing a bit on the nitty side. Playing tight and
ABC will allow you to get through hands without thinking too
much about what you’re doing, helping you to focus on your
target.
Take lots of notes. If you play online, this part is really easy
since your computer will save the hand histories and you can
review them at your leisure. If you play live, I’d say let
appearances be damned and sit there with a notepad and a pen
and just scribble your notes shamelessly. Your neighbors will
undoubtedly comment on what you’re doing. If people ask
you about what you’re writing, just say you’re taking notes on
what cards come, how fast hands get dealt, how much rake
gets taken, how often jackpot hands come up, or anything that
would require you to be scribbling constantly and playing very
little. If you’re playing nitty, eventually everyone will lose
interest in you and what you’re writing.
What are you looking for? Ultimately you are looking for
situations where your opponent has an unbalanced hand range.
Here are some things that you should certainly note:
Write down a history of every hand your target shows
down. Record as much as you can get of the action.
Specifically you want your target’s position in the hand, all
186 PLAYING THE PLAYER
checks, bets, calls, and raises, and all bet sizes. Also get stack
sizes where possible.
Note preflop frequencies. You’re trying to infer the
percentage of hands your target plays preflop. Draw a table on
your notepad. Four columns and three rows. The columns
stand for early, middle, late position, and blinds. The rows
stand for opening pot, limpers, and raisers in front. Every time
your target acts preflop, make a note in one of the twelve
boxes that corresponds to the action your target took.
For example, say a player limped, and your target folded
from three off the button. Put an “F” in the box that
corresponds to middle position and a limper in front. Next
hand your target open-raises to 4× the blind from four off the
button. Put a “4×” in the box that corresponds to early position
and opening the pot. If you get to see the hand, write it down
next to the 4× note.
After perhaps 20 hours of play (four or five sessions of
note-taking), you’ll have about 500 notes in your boxes since
you’re taking a note on literally every hand that your target
gets dealt in. This will give you a rough idea of what your
opponent’s preflop range looks like. If he’s got a zillion “F”s
in his opening the pot from early position box, but he has more
raises in his late position opening the pot and limpers in front
boxes, you know that he’s positionally aware.
After you’ve got your boxes filled, try to write an
approximate range of hands for your opponent for each
situation. For example, say you have 100 notes in your
opening the pot from early position box (this will be one of
your most frequently used boxes). You have 73 “F”s, 8 “L”s
for limp, 14 “4×” raises, and 5 “6×” raises. Plus or minus a
few percent, you can assume that he’s playing about 25
percent of his hands. Of these hands, he’s limping about a
third and opening about two-thirds. Say you noticed that for
FINDING HOLES 187
one of his limps, he showed down 44. He showed KTs for one
of his open-raises, and you saw QQ for one of his 6× raises.
Armed with this data, open up PokerStove. Slide the slider
to a 25 percent range and add and subtract hands that make
sense. (Compared to the range PokerStove will give you, for
any given percentage of hands, most people play some extra
suited hands and pocket pairs at the expense of some of the
weakest offsuit hands.) Then try to figure out what the limping
range looks like. You know 44 is in it, and you can likely infer
that similar hands (66-22 perhaps) are also in it. Keep adding
reasonable hands to the limping range until you get to 8
percent. Write that range down for the limping. Then write
down the hands that are left in the raising range while also
trying to infer if this player sizes raises different based on
hand strength or on other factors.
Repeat this procedure for every box. Now you have a fairly
good picture of what hands your opponent is playing in every
common situation.
If you see something that doesn’t fit in a box, note it
separately. Reraises are the most important of these. Every
time your opponent is involved in a 3-bet pot, whether your
target is the reraiser or not, take a note of what happens. Try to
get a sense of whether this player tends to call 3-bets or fold
and whether this tendency changes based on whether he’s in
or out of position.
Find unbalanced postflop lines. In addition to all the
hands that go to showdown and all the preflop data, you want
to take data on your target’s play postflop. There are a few
things you really, really want to know.
First, how frequently does your opponent continuation bet
the flop after raises preflop? And does this frequency change
based on board texture? Almost everyone will alter their
continuation bet frequency based on the number of players in
188 PLAYING THE PLAYER
the pot, so this is less important to note. Also, even though
they absolutely should, very few players alter their
continuation bet frequency based on the strength of their
preflop hand range. For instance, say you open-raise and get
called by the big blind. You should be betting more frequently
when you’ve raised from early position and less frequently
when you’ve raised from the cutoff. As I said, however, very
few players actually do this. Their continuation betting
strategy is more static than that.
I would assume that your target varies continuation bet
frequency based on the number of players in the pot, hand
strength, and possibly board texture. Within these parameters,
try to figure out which hands your opponent is continuation
betting on what sort of boards.
Most players either continuation bet too frequently, or they
continuation bet too predictably based on hand value. For
instance, many players (particularly ones who play small
stakes games for a living) will continuation bet a flop like Q-
7-5 two-tone nearly 100 percent of the time. And when they
don’t continuation bet, they will have a very specific set of
hands like, perhaps, A-K, A-7, J-J, 8-7, or some other similar
medium-strength hand with showdown value.
You should get an idea early on whether your opponent is a
frequent continuation bettor or not. If he is, pay particular
attention to the flops he doesn’t continuation bet. Note the
circumstance and, if there was a showdown, what hand he had.
If he doesn’t continuation bet as frequently, watch what
happens on the turn. He will frequently get bet into. How does
he respond? If he folds mostly, then he’s checking back air. If
he calls mostly, he’s likely checking back showdown value. If
he raises fairly frequently, he’s possibly slowplaying, but also
possibly taking peculiar bluffing lines.
On the turn and river, watch for two things in particular.
How thinly does this player try to value bet the river? Say
FINDING HOLES 189
your target checks the river in position and shows top pair.
This observation could mean that the player rarely value bets
with just one pair on the river. Note any data that would tend
to reinforce or dispute this notion. You want to have as clear a
picture as possible of the hands your target will and won’t
value bet on the river.
Also watch out for how frequently your opponent tries to
pot control on the turn. If you see him check back top pair on
the turn, this could be a habit. Again, gather data that would
support or refute this conclusion.
Finally, look at your target’s bet sizing. Are there any clear
tells? Any time your opponent makes a particularly large or
particularly small bet, note the situation.
This means you’re writing something down on absolutely
every hand. And whenever your target enters the pot, you’re
potentially writing quite a bit. Let’s go through an example
hand so you know what to write down.
Two players limp in, and your target raises to 6× on the
button. Both limpers call.
Write “6×” in the late position limpers preflop box.
The flop is Q?J?5?. The limpers check, and your target
bets half the pot.
Write down something like “QJ5/F-1/2×.” This means the
flop was Q-J-5 with a flush draw “F” (“R” for rainbow and
“M” for monotone maybe), and the target made a 1/2 pot
continuation bet.
One of the limpers calls. The turn is the 6 of the flush suit.
It goes check-check.
The river is a J. The limper bets 1/2 pot, and the target calls
and shows A-Q.
Write down the rest of the action for the hand:
“Turn 6-flush. X-X. River J. B-C. Showed AQ. ”
Then go back to your preflop note and write “AQo” above
your 6× note in the late position and limpers box. Finally, note
190 PLAYING THE PLAYER
that your opponent took a pot-controlling line on the turn with
top pair when the flush card came.
You don’t have to use my notation. Any way you can get
these notes down that you will understand later is fine.
Obviously if you take notes like these on every single hand
for 20 hours of play you will have a lot of data. Now you’re
ready for the next step.
Step 3. Summarize your target’s strategy.
You’ve gathered your data. Now it’s time to develop a
detailed picture of how your target plays the game. Write
down your target’s preflop limping and raising ranges in
various positions. How frequently does your target 3-bet, and
with what ranges/in what situations? In the 20 hours you’ve
observed, have you seen your target 3-bet preflop and fold to a
4-bet?
What is the postflop strategy? Does this player continuation
bet many flops, pot control some turns, and miss some river
value bets on semi-scary boards? Under what circumstances
does this player check-raise? In particular, what sort of draws
does your target seem to raise the flop with? Will he raise
many draws, only strong draws, or only on certain flop
textures?
Step 4. Brainstorm scenarios where your
opponent’s range will be unbalanced.
Up until now, you’ve basically just been taking notes and
documenting observations. This step requires you to draw
some inferences from your observations, so it’s a little bit
tricky. Fortunately, you can treat this step as the beginning of
FINDING HOLES 191
an iterative process. That is, after you’ve completed all the
steps, you will use your experience at the table to revisit this
step and improve your inferences.
What do I mean by scenarios where your opponent’s range
is unbalanced? You’re looking for situations where your
opponent’s range is dominated either by particularly strong
hands or by particularly weak hands.
Let’s say, for instance, that you observe that your target
raises about 30 percent of hands from late position against
limpers. You also observe that he continuation bets dry flops
nearly 100 percent of the time, and that he frequently checks
medium-strength pairs behind on the turn. With these traits,
say a hand plays out as follows.
Someone limps, and your target raises. You call from the
big blind, and the limper calls.
The flop is J-4-3 with a flush draw. You and the limper
check, and your target continuation bets. You call, and the
limper folds.
The turn is an offsuit K. You check, and your opponent
bets half pot. What does his range look like here?
Well, he’s raising preflop with 30 percent of hands, so with
such a wide range he’s a favorite to miss any given flop. On
top of that, a J-4-3 flop is hard to hit for any hand. Yet he’s
betting it nearly 100 percent of the time.
He usually has air. Say you have A-Q with a backdoor
flush draw. You check-call.
The turn is a K. It’s not a great card for your hand, but you
know that your opponent likes to check pairs back on the turn.
So if he flopped a jack or spiked a king on the turn, he might
check it back. Instead, he bets. What is his betting range here?
It’s air, draws, and a few monster hands like K-J and 3-3. In
other words, it’s mostly weak.
This is a very unbalanced range. Your opponent has
actually marked himself with weakness by betting the turn
192 PLAYING THE PLAYER
because he likes to check many turns with showdown value.
You can check-raise.
Why is the check-raise good? With A-Q you might have
the best hand and actually get value against your opponent’s
draws. Also, even when he’s got air, he’s got a decent shot to
draw out on you on the river, so you gain when he folds. You
have outs to the nuts even if you run into a set. And, finally,
you might get lucky and your opponent might have chosen to
bet-fold the turn with a pair this time. When an opponent likes
to pot control pairs, it indicates an unwillingness to stack off
with a pair. So there’s a decent chance if your opponent is
betting a pair that he’ll be bet-folding.
Brainstorm as many scenarios as you can where your
opponent’s traits will lead to your target betting a primarily
weak hand range. These are the bet-fold spots that I told you
to exploit in the first part of the book. Here you’re just using a
systematic process to find them.
Write down a list of as many bet-fold spots you can think
of. These will be the situations you will look for as you play to
torture your target opponent.
Also look for other unbalanced ranges. Good examples are
when your opponent has limited the strength of his hand by
failing to play in the way he’d play with the nuts. These are
great spots to try thin value bets.
Look through your data to see if your opponent is raising
frequently in situations where you’d expect him to have a
relatively weak hand range. For example, say your target likes
to call relatively frequently out of the blinds, and you find that
he check-raises a lot of flops.
If you’re playing a wide range from the blinds, “legitimate”
flop check-raising spots are few and far between. Your target
could be very unbalanced after check-raising the flop. Look
for spots to shove over the check-raises or to float them.
FINDING HOLES 193
Step 5. Start “bumhunting” your target.
Bumhunting is poker jargon for seeking particular players
out to try to beat them. Most of the time you’d want to
bumhunt particularly poor players. Not you! You’re going to
bumhunt your target. Try to get position on him. Then start
playing and try to create as many exploitable situations as you
can. If he likes to barrel the turn lightly while checking his
showdown strength, float flops to let him bet his unbalanced
range on the turn, then shut him down with a raise. If he
check-raises flops too lightly, whenever you continuation bet
the flop, make sure you have a surprise in store for the bad
check-raises.
The key is to fold when your opponent has strong ranges
and to refuse to fold against your opponent’s weak ranges.
When your opponent is getting out of line with weak ranges,
you are going to linger in hands. You’ll call down light, you’ll
bluff-raise, and so forth. You’re simply not going to let him
bet weak ranges and win pots.
If your opponent is the typical “good” player for your
stakes, this treatment will be absolutely devastating to him.
None of his normal tricks will be working against you.
Continue to take notes. Your opponents will by this time be
used to you taking notes at the table, so it shouldn’t draw
attention. But your notes aren’t going to be nearly as detailed.
You aren’t going to write down every little preflop play or
every flop bet or turn check.
Instead, you’re taking notes on how your exploitative
attempts are working. If you try to exploit something, write
the hand down, and write down if it worked or not. If it didn’t
work, did you get shown a hand you expected or one that
surprised you? For instance, say you raised the turn because
you expected your opponent to have either a nut hand or air,
194 PLAYING THE PLAYER
and he called and showed the nuts. Oh well, bad luck for you,
but it’s actually evidence that you’re doing it right.
On the other hand, say he called and snapped you off with
top pair. This is evidence you might need to change
something. Either your inferences were wrong, or your
opponent is adjusting to you. Take notes on how these hands
work out, and then go back to Step 4 to refine your strategy
and brainstorm new scenarios.
Likely a hand will come up that you didn’t anticipate.
Write it down, then when you get home, figure out if your
opponent will have unbalanced ranges in this scenario. If so,
file it away and if a similar situation comes up again, go on the
attack.
After you do this for a while, your opponent will almost
certainly get frustrated. He’ll probably try to adjust something.
Watch for how he tries to adjust. Usually the adjustment will
be foolish and easily exploitable. For example, your opponent
check-raises you on a 8-4-3 flop, and you 3-bet shove because
you know this to be an unbalanced range. He calls and shows
A-6. Now you can be fairly certain that your opponent is
going to get it in with you on many types of flops with some
very weak hands. So you start playing all your top pair hands
bet-shove on the flop.
Step 6. Extend the lessons you’ve learned to
other “good” players.
By now the poor guy you’ve been chasing around is ready
to kneecap you in the parking lot. It’s time to call it quits on
this particular exercise. Give the guy a break. Stop
bumhunting him. In this stage, you’re going to try the tricks
you’ve learned that work against your former target against all
the “good” players in your game.
FINDING HOLES 195
One of the beautiful things about poker is that there’s a
very strong herd mentality. All the regulars in one particular
game will often tend to play similarly to one another. Peer
pressure and the fear of stepping out of bounds and looking
foolish keep everyone in line. As long as you make the same
play the guy next to you would have made, no one will bat an
eye in your direction.
So the plays that worked against your former target will
likely work against other guys as well. Try them out. Abuse
them until you encounter someone who seems too good to
beat with the plays you’ve devised.
What then, you ask? You say you’ve run up against
someone in your game who seems too good for you to beat?
That’s a tough one. Just buy my next book and I’ll tell you
exactly what to do about that.
Exercise No. 1.
You play the following two hands against someone in a $2-
$5 game. Here’s the first hand.
Your target is a middle-aged man wearing a suit coat and a
gold Rolex watch. He bought in for the table maximum, and
he’s about even so far.
This opponent limps for $5 from UTG+1, and you make it
$25 from two off the button with K?K?. The big blind calls,
and the limper calls. There’s $77 in the pot and over $1,000
behind.
The flop comes J?3? 2?. Your opponents check, you bet
$60, and only the preflop limper calls.
The turn is the A?. Your opponent checks, and you check.
There’s $197 in the pot.
The river is the 2?. Your opponent checks, you bet $120,
and your opponent calls. He shows A? 4?, and he wins.
196 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Part A. What notes would you take on your opponent after
playing this hand? List two or three specific betting lines you
might now be more inclined to make against this player based
on these observations.
Now for the second hand. Your target is in the big blind
this time. You open-raise to $20 with 7?7? . A player calls
behind you, and your target calls from the big blind. The pot is
$62, and there is again over $1,000 behind.
The flop is Q? 8?6?. Your opponents check to you, and
you bet $45. Your target calls from the big blind, and the other
player folds.
The turn is the A?. Your target checks, and you check it
back. There’s $152 in the pot.
The river is the 2? . Your target bets $80. You have 7-7,
and the final board is Q-8-6-A-2 rainbow.
Part B. How can you use some of the notes you took in the
first hand to inform your decision in this one? What should
you do?
Here are my thoughts. I’d note that the player open-limped
in early position with a junk, offsuit ace. I’d also note that he
called a fairly large continuation bet from out of position with
a gutshot and an overcard. Most importantly, I’d note that he
chose not to value bet his pair of aces even after you checked
behind on the turn. I’d likely infer from these observations that
he is limping in with some speculative hands, peeling flops a
bit light, and not value betting top pair appropriately on the
river.
Using the two latter inferences, I would call the river in the
second hand. On a Q-8-6 flop you can expect your opponent
to peel with a wide variety of hands due to all the possible
gutshots. J-T, J-9, T-9, T-7, 9-7, 7-5, and so forth. If he’s
limping junk aces, he may be calling with the offsuit versions
of these hands from the big blind. That’s a lot of hand
combinations.
FINDING HOLES 197
Furthermore, this player has demonstrated a reluctance to
bet just a pair of aces on the river, even from out of position. I
wouldn’t expect him to bet a pair of queens or eights either. So
the only hands I’d really expect him to bet for value would be
two pair or better. Since the river was a deuce (unlikely to
make two pair) and no straights or flushes are possible on this
board, there are more combinations of busted draws than there
are of likely two pair or better hands. Getting nearly 3-to-1 on
a call, this is a great spot to try to pick off a bluff.
This is how you beat semi-competent no-limit players. You
learn their tendencies and then map out where these tendencies
have created unbalanced ranges. In this case, the player has
unwittingly created an unbalanced river betting range by
failing to bet many top pair hands.
Once you’ve identified unbalanced ranges, you can exploit
them whenever they arise. You can also, and this is just as
important, play hands in such a way that your opponents will
turn their hands face up for you.
For instance, say you observe that your opponent will
nearly always bet the turn with top pair when checked to.
Then the following hand arises.
You open to $20 with K?Q?. This player calls from one
off the button, and the blinds fold.
The flop comes A?Q?5?. You bet $35 into the $47 pot,
and your opponent calls. Your opponent calls the flop loosely,
and you think he could have an ace, a weaker queen, a gutshot,
or even a pocket pair below a queen or a five.
The turn is the 7?. Now you can check, and your opponent
will tell you if you’re beaten or not. He’ll bet his aces and
check his queens, fives, and pocket pairs. If he checks back,
you can bet the river for value. If he bets the turn, you can
expect to be behind and check-fold.
More interestingly, instead of check-folding the turn, if the
stacks are deep you can possibly turn your pair into a bluff.
198 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Say your opponent will play a lot of rag aces, and he will bet
all of them when checked to on the turn. That makes his turn
betting range overwhelmingly one pair hands as opposed to
the stronger two pairs and sets that your opponent will stack
off with.
This is an unbalanced turn betting range, a range filled with
hands your opponent will bet-fold. Some players will bet-fold
every ace on this turn except for A-K or aces up.
If you’re curious, the way for your opponent to avoid
getting exploited like this is to mix up the turn betting range.
He should bet his gutshots and some of his small pairs when
checked to, so that you’re sometimes check-folding the best
hand with K-Q. And he should check back a number of his top
pair hands so that the turn betting range is denser overall with
big hands like sets and two pair.
These two adjustments make check-folding and checkraising
closer in value to check-calling. This is the goal of
range balancing—to leave your opponent with no clearly good
line to take.
Exercise No. 2.
You’re $1,500 deep in a $2-$5 game. A loose, gambler
type player limps in from middle position, and a somewhat
nitty player raises to $25 on the button. You call in the big
blind with 7? 6? . The gambler calls. There’s $77 in the pot.
You’ve been taking notes on the loose, gambling player.
He limps in with about 35 percent of his hands from middle
position, while he also raises about 10 percent of the time first
in. Limping in from middle position, you’ve seen him play
K5s, 88, A7o, and 96s.
One of the other things you’ve noted about this player is
that he seems to play draws very hard on the flop. On one
FINDING HOLES 199
hand, he cold-3-bet the flop with just a naked king-high flush
draw. He was called by someone holding a set, and he made
his draw and won. In another pot, he bet an ace-high flush
draw when checked to and won an enormous pot when he
made the nuts on the river.
The flop comes Q?6?4? . You check, the gambler bets
$60 into the $77 pot, and the nit folds.
Part A. What sort of range do you put your opponent on in
this situation? What should you do?
You call. The turn is the 3?. You check, and your opponent
checks it back. There’s $197 in the pot with a ton of money
behind.
The river is the A?.
Part B. Given what you know about your opponent, what
should you do on this river?
Here are my thoughts. This guy is limping in with a ton of
hands, much of which is suited junk. He is raising some
preflop, however, so I would expect him rarely to have a hand
like A-Q after limping.
He likes to jam the flop with draws, and so when he bets
out of turn on the flop into a nit on a relatively disconnected
two diamond board, a lot of his range consists of flush draws
with some straight draws, pairs, and other possible hands
thrown in.
You’ve flopped middle pair without a kicker but with a
backdoor flush draw. With deep stacks against a known bad
player who may be marked with a draw, I think this is an easy
call.
I don’t like raising the flop, because there’s an excellent
chance you’ll get 3-bet. You might say, “But hey, if he’s
going to 3-bet a draw, don’t we want to get value from him?”
The problem is that your small pair is not an equity favorite
against a flush draw and two overcards to your 7 kicker. So
even in the best case you aren’t really getting your money in
200 PLAYING THE PLAYER
good. And it’s possible the guy has you crushed. (I know you
likely wouldn’t be check-raising your middle pair here, but it’s
worth considering even though this time it turns out not to be a
great play.)
The turn is a brick that happens to give you a gutshot. You
check, and your opponent checks. Your opponent’s check
back here likely denies a hand two pair or better. People just
don’t check the turn that often with good hands and deep
stacks when there are obvious draws out there. Flush draw is
the most likely possibility, while a one pair hand is also
possible.
The river is an interesting card, an offsuit ace. There’s no
doubt about it. Your opponent can have an ace. He could have
the ace-high diamonds or he could even have decided to stab
on the flop with a naked offsuit ace.
Still, two pair or better is unlikely after the turn check.
Since we sort of ruled out A-Q preflop (and also with the turn
check), he’d have to have a hand like A?3?, A?4?, or
possibly a random A-6 to have made aces up. None of these
hands is particularly likely.
So your opponent likely has either one pair or a busted
draw. What should you do?
You could check. Unfortunately if your opponent will
value bet an ace—and a loose, gambling live game type
might—then you could have a tough decision. Is he value
betting a better pair or bluffing the busted draw? Depending
on his bet size you might have to flip a coin on the river to
decide whether to call or fold. Guessing on the river is never
good, since there’s almost always a better way.
Check-raising the river is actually a decent idea. Whenever
you think you may be up against a range of hands comprised
mainly of bluffs and thin value bets, always consider bluffraising
the river. (Highlight that sentence. It’s an important
one.) The thing is that if you were to bluff-raise the river,
FINDING HOLES 201
you’d be trying to fold out an ace. Some guys will basically
call any river raise with a pair of aces. A loose gambler type
who likes to jam draws on the flop is just the sort to look you
up.
I’d certainly consider check-raise bluffing here if I were
against a TAG who could be bet-folding. But I suspect you
may not have enough fold equity against this particular type of
player. You’d want to make the river raise nice and big (if you
raise small he’ll surely call), and then you aren’t creating good
odds for yourself, making it that much more important that
you be right about getting the fold.
So checking allows your opponent to play well on the river,
and check-raise bluffing is likely too ambitious. If you just bet
out fairly big, you will get called by all hands that beat you
and likely get folds from all the hands worse than yours.
That’s no good.
Here’s what I’d try. I’d make a tiny river bet, something
like $20 or $40 into this nearly $200 pot. I think this bet will
block most opponents from raising you for value with just one
pair. So if you are up against an ace or queen, you’ll just get
called and lose your mini-bet.
But what if you get raised? I’d snap-call a raise. For this
player type, the draw jammer gambler, it’s intense cognitive
dissonance to meekly fold a busted draw to a tiny river bet. As
soon as he sees the small bet with his busted draw, he will
think, “Can’t win this pot if I don’t bet,” and will put out a
raise.
I love to use this play against the guys who splash money
around and crave action. The small bet causes your opponent
to play his range in an enormously unbalanced way, calling
with all his made hands and raising his busted draws. Yes, you
will occasionally run into two pair or some other oddball hand
when you call, but you will win well more than often enough
to justify the call.
202 PLAYING THE PLAYER
The keys to this hand are realizing that the out of turn flop
bet puts a lot of draws into this player’s range, while the turn
check denies a big hand. You can then use a little trick on the
river to get your opponent to completely unbalance this range
and pay you maximum when you’re ahead while losing the
minimum when behind. Yes, against the right players, this
really works like a charm. Give it a shot
test
.
.
.
134 PLAYING THE PLAYER
For instance, say a tight player limps in for $5 in a $2-$5
game, and a LAG makes it $20 to go on the button. You have
K?Q? in the small blind and call. The tight player folds.
There’s $50 in the pot with about $500 behind.
The flop comes K?7?5?. You check and call a $35 bet.
The turn is the J?. It’s obviously not a great card for your
hand, but you know this LAG can have such a wide range of
hands at this juncture that you still want to induce action.
Against a barreling-happy LAG, I might check here, hoping
that the LAG will bet the scare card.
But in reality, this is a fairly poor card for the LAG to
barrel with air. When you check-call the flop, a lot of your
range will look like kings and heart draws, and so by the turn
your range should be fairly strong.
Try betting $20-$40 into this $120 pot. If your opponent
has air, this bet plays a little psychological trick against him.
Say you bet $20 into the $120 pot. Your range should be fairly
strong. Theoretically with air, your opponent likely should just
fold to the $20 bet. But folding to such a strange, tiny bet is a
little humiliating. No self-respecting LAG will want to be
blown out of a pot by a one-sixth pot-sized bet. So the player
will talk himself into thinking this bet represents weakness and
raise.
Voilà. You now have induced action from your opponent’s
weaker range where a simply check wouldn’t have sufficed.
Checking would have allowed your opponent to check it back
and then keep his dignity by folding to your normal-sized river
bet.
It may feel scary to you to try to induce bluff raises on a
somewhat threatening board like this one. After all, you’re
likely used to playing in games where getting raised on the
turn when the flush comes is a very bad sign for your one-pair
hand. Here’s the thing. A LAG will raise the button and bet
the flop with a ton of hands. Only a small fraction of these
REFLEXIVE WEAKNESS ATTACKING 135
hands contain two hearts or two pair or better. You know this
player will bluff a lot, so if you checked, you’d likely want to
call down anyway. But this way, by inducing the raise, you
make calling down much more profitable for yourself since
you encourage your opponent to add more air to his turn and
river betting ranges.
This trick of underbetting in certain spots (particularly from
out of position) works well against many players to induce
action.
The other adjustment you should make to your play when
you are trying to trigger reflexive aggression is to make
thinner value raises and to size these raises such that your
opponent will perceive the remaining stacks and the pot size
as presenting a tempting bluffing opportunity.
For instance say a bad regular opens to $15 from middle
position. Another bad player calls, and you call on the button
with A? 2? . A LAG calls in the big blind. There’s $62 in the
pot, and you’re playing with $700.
The flop comes J?2?2?. The LAG bets out for $30.
Everyone folds to you. Most players would be inclined to flatcall
here to induce further betting, but I think you have a better
shot to win a nice pot if you make a small raise immediately.
The small raise gets you more action on the off chance your
opponent has the other deuce. It also looks potentially like
you’re making a play or trying to see where you’re at with a
jack or pocket pair, and therefore it might trigger a bluff
reraise.
Obviously this isn’t what I would call thin value, but you
could also extend this principle against a very aggressive
player to a hand like A-J on a A-8-4 rainbow flop when your
opponent is marked with a wide hand range. Since there are
very few hands that are worth a raise on a flop like this one,
when you make a fishy raise, a LAG might convince himself
to put in a bluff reraise.
136 PLAYING THE PLAYER
The bottom line is that you make plays with strong and
fairly strong hands that are atypical of the way you’d generally
play a strong hand and that reopen the betting for the LAG to
go off for a big bluff.
Pitfalls To Avoid
No major pitfalls to trying to exploit this trait. If your
opponent is prone to auto-raising certain kinds of bets, then
make those bets with your value hands.
The main pitfall, I suppose, would be if you are playing
with quite deep stacks and you create a situation where you
induce what you think is a bluff raise on an early street, but
then you find yourself lost in the hand when a scare card
comes on a later street and your opponent bombs the pot. But
this isn’t really a specific pitfall of this trait—it’s merely a
pitfall of playing a LAG who reads hands well with very deep
stacks. The deep stacks make the loose preflop play much
more forgivable, and any opponent who can find the right
spots to apply pressure after the flop with deep stacks will
make life very difficult.
Who Exhibits This Trait
Very aggressive players who read hands fairly well. LAGs
most often have this trait, since by playing loose preflop they
force themselves to learn to read hands keenly and to find
these spots to pick up hanging pots. TAGs can also have this
trait, especially ones who are good for the level you play.
Overall, this is a trait you’ll generally find in good players.
You don’t become one of the biggest winners in your game
without learning to find the auto-raise spots where weaker
REFLEXIVE WEAKNESS ATTACKING 137
players are too often bet-folding. I’ve said it a number of
times, but I’ll say it again. Just because a trait appears in this
book and I offer a way to exploit it, it doesn’t mean that the
trait is one you should avoid in your own game. I auto-raise
weak bets like crazy, and anyone sharp enough to pick up on it
would certainly be able to exploit this tendency a few times
before I adjusted. But overall I don’t get exploited often, and I
can adjust quickly enough that I’m happy to make this
exploitable play because it is a consistent source of profit.
Final Thoughts
In any player pool, there are standard lines that people take
with certain hands. Any LAGs in your game will be keenly
attuned to these standard lines, and they will rely on this
knowledge to help read your hand. When you find a good
hand reader who is a particularly tough nut to crack, you
should look for decidedly non-standard ways to play your
value hands. Making fishy looking probe bets and raises can
help induce action, particularly if these fishy lines are ones
that regular players in your games commonly take to try to
freeze the action with a weak hand.
Loose-Aggressive Player
Review And Exercises
Loose-aggressive players often frustrate the typical ABC
player. Even though an ABC style is better suited to exploit a
loose-aggressive player’s mistakes than a tight player’s
mistakes, ABC players often play too straightforwardly to win
against a good LAG. With shallow stacks, the ABC player
will get the edge on the LAG nearly every time. But once
stacks get deeper, a LAG will have a large information
advantage over the ABC player that can be harnessed to
generate a lasting advantage.
There are no two ways about it. If you want to play deep
against LAGs who read hands well, you will simply have to
develop strong hand reading skills yourself. To get started
with this, if you haven’t already, you should certainly read my
book How To Read Hands At No-Limit Hold’em. But until you
work through that book here are some tips to get you started.
Think about all decisions against a LAG in a range
versus range framework. ABC players are often used to
thinking about their own hands first, the cards on the board
second, and then they look at the betting to assess whether
their opponents are generally strong or weak. This isn’t good
enough against a LAG. Why?
Since LAGs play so many hands, they frequently have a
junk hand. If they played all these junk hands weakly, they’d
never win. So they aggressively represent scare cards and
project a much stronger hand range than they actually have.
LOOSE-AGGRESSIVE PLAYER REVIEW AND EXERCISES 139
You have to cut through the smoke and mirrors and learn to
come up with honest, accurate estimates for the hand ranges
your LAG opponents can have. If a LAG player defends his
blind half the time, he simply cannot have a flush every time
he calls a two-tone flop and raises the flush card on the turn.
You don’t need me to tell you that, but this is where the tricky
part comes in. It’s not enough to say, “He usually doesn’t have
it,” or, “Maybe he’s actually got it this time.” You need to
think in specific terms.
List out in your head the hands your opponent could play
the way he’s playing. What reasonable things could he have
besides the flush? Could he be bluffing a straight draw? Could
he be check-raising bottom pair?
Important in this calculation is the range you can have.
Good LAG players will be trying to read your hand, so they’ll
have a sense of what you might have. Give these guys some
credit. If the only hand you will raise big preflop with and
bomb the flop and turn with is an overpair, then the LAG
knows you’ve got an overpair. You should use that knowledge
to help shape your sense of your opponent’s range. If he’s
made a huge bet on a very scary board, perhaps he expects you
to fold the overpair, and he might be bluffing more frequently.
On the other hand, if he’s made a very callable bet in a
situation where most players wouldn’t fold an overpair, bluffs
are considerably less likely.
This just scratches the surface. But the first thing you
should be thinking about when you encounter a tough LAG is,
“I’ve got to think in terms of his hand range versus mine. ”
Learn how to hide information. If you are playing tight,
LAGs will cede you the advantage of hand strength. They
hope to make it up and more by holding an information
advantage over you. The more straightforwardly you play and
140 PLAYING THE PLAYER
the deeper the stacks, the more damage an information deficit
will do to you.
In order to neutralize the LAG’s potential advantage, you
should focus most on information hiding. If you hide enough
information, then your consistent hand strength advantage will
carry the day.
Check and call with showdownable hands to induce
barreling. Lots of poker players, particularly ones who adopt
an ABC strategy, make their betting decisions more out of a
fear of being drawn out on than anything else. Good LAG
players will absolutely destroy you if you center your strategy
on trying to prevent them from drawing out on you. They will
figure out exactly what you’re doing, hang around in hands
while the betting is still relatively cheap (compared to the
stack sizes), and then put you to tough decisions when
inevitable scare cards come.
When you’re playing against a LAG, getting drawn out on
is part of the deal. Instead of trying to prevent yourself from
getting drawn out on, focus on the mistakes your LAG
opponent is making. A common one is that LAGs will raise
preflop with weak hands and then barrel flop, turn, and river
with frequencies that are higher than optimal. This works
because it’s hard to make a good hand in no-limit hold’em,
most opponents won’t think clearly about the LAG’s hand
range, and most players will tip off a LAG early in a hand
when barreling is not going to succeed.
It’s time for information hiding. Instead of playing checkcall
only with hands you’ll be folding by the river, play your
value hands that way also. Let your opponent try to bluff you
off the nuts.
More specifically, whenever you’re in a hand with the
LAG, think. Think about how you would play hands you plan
to fold by the river and what hands those would be. Then if
LOOSE-AGGRESSIVE PLAYER REVIEW AND EXERCISES 141
you have a stronger hand than that, mimic one of the weak
ones. And with the weak ones, sometimes play them as a
typical player might play a big hand. Your LAG opponent will
be trained to fold to the “big” hands and to keep firing against
“weakness. ”
Slowplaying has a bad name, but against a LAG it’s one of
the main tools you have at your disposal. Whenever you’re up
against someone who likes to bet and raise more than just call
it off, slowplaying is often worth a shot.
Use weak-looking betting lines to induce bluff-raises.
This is similar to the last point. After you check the nuts into a
LAG a few times, he will adjust. He’s going to stop barreling
you as often. At the same time, he’ll begin to suspect bluffs
when you’re aggressive, since he knows you slowplay so
often. So you start playing your value hands more
aggressively, particularly if you can take “fishy” betting lines
that mimic the weak bets many of the other players in your
player pool make.
Don’t forget to value bet. Once you have a LAG offbalance
because you play information hiding betting lines
against him, you have the green light to go for value, value,
value. You play stronger hands than he does, so you’ll
frequently find yourself in situations where you have top pair,
your opponent has a weaker pair, and he’s just not sure
whether he’s good or not. These become critical value bets
once you have some history with a LAG opponent.
Here’s a classic example of this concept in action. It’s a $2-
$5 game with $1,000 stacks.
A LAG opens to $15 from late position, and you’re in the
big blind with A?K?. This is a player with whom you have
history, and he knows you play back at him when you expect a
142 PLAYING THE PLAYER
weak range from him and that you sometimes slowplay strong
hands against him.
You call.
Why not 3-bet? It is, of course, fine to 3-bet AK against a
weak opening range, but in this case you think you can get
more value from the hand postflop rather than preflop.
The flop comes K?7?3?. You check, your opponent bets
$20 into the $32 pot. You check-raise to $70. Since your
opponent opens widely and a K-7-3 rainbow flop hits few
hands, this is a great spot to check-raise as a bluff. Your
opponent knows you take shots at him on flops like this one,
and he calls.
The turn is the 9?. You bet $150 into the $172 pot, and he
calls.
The river is the 3? . You bet $400 into the $472 pot, and he
calls.
You show your hand, and he shows K-Q and mucks.
In most live games, it is very difficult to get this magnitude
of value out of just top pair if you’re playing against anyone
decent. In fact, if you were going in cold (with no history)
against a regular player in a $2-$5 game, I would not advise
taking this line. You simply won’t get paid off by worse
hands. The flop check-raise and huge turn and river bets will
convince your opponent you have a set, and he’ll likely fold
anything worse than your actual hand.
But once you have history with a LAG, and you’ve shown
him that you bluff in this situation, the LAG will feel obliged
to pay you off when he’s near the top of his range (holding a
king in this case).
Do not forget to make this adjustment when you’re up
against LAGs who have seen you play back at them. Playing
your strong hands this way is how you make your edge in
hand strength pay over the long term.
LOOSE-AGGRESSIVE PLAYER REVIEW AND EXERCISES 143
Exercise No. 1.
You’re playing $2-$5 with $500 stacks. There is a new
player in your game whom you’ve never seen before. You’ve
played with him for a few hours now, and he’s very loose.
You’d estimate that he raises the pot preflop about three or
four times an orbit. You’ve never seen him limp in.
He’s also a betting machine. You’ve almost never seen him
miss an opportunity to bet when checked to, and his bet sizes
are typically somewhere between one- and two-thirds of the
pot. He’s been winning a lot of pots uncontested. He won one
big pot where he flopped a set and someone got a flush draw
in against him on the flop. In another pot you noticed that he
bet the turn and then folded to a check-raise.
You’ve played only a handful of pots in this session, and
your opponent likely has few solid reads on you.
He’s three to your right. In this hand, he opens for $20 and
everyone folds to you on the button. You have J?9?. What
do you do?
? ? ? ?
Your hand is too strong to fold in position when you know
your opponent has a wide range, and you also have a sense for
how he approaches postflop play. (I.e., you can expect him to
bet the flop with nearly 100 percent of hands, and you can
expect him to bet-fold with some regularity.)
Both 3-betting and calling are reasonable options. Since
this hand hits flops well and since we expect this player to
make a significant flop error against us (betting 100 percent of
his range from out of position), I prefer calling. I’d prefer 3-
betting with a hand such as Q6s that has less postflop value.
(That is, betting 100 percent of flops from out of position is
144 PLAYING THE PLAYER
less of an error when we hold Q6s than it is when we hold
J9s.)
Incidentally, at this stage where he has few reads on us, and
therefore he likely assumes that we 3-bet tightly like most live
players, I would have no value 3-betting range at all. I would
flat AA, KK, AK, and everything else against him. Why?
Because his penchant for barreling off postflop is a huge error
when we hold one of these hands. If we 3-bet a value hand and
he folds, we’ve exploited him not at all. So while he’s still
readless against us, I suggest playing backwards against him,
flatting all playable hands and 3-betting only as a bluff.
? ? ? ?
You call. The blinds fold, and you’re heads-up. There’s $47
in the pot with $480 behind.
The flop comes T?4? 3? giving you a backdoor
straightflush draw and an overcard. Your opponent bets $25.
What do you do?
? ? ? ?
How do we expect this player to handle a flop like this one?
So far our read is that he plays a wide range of hands and
barrels a lot. Therefore, I’d usually expect him to have air on
this flop, and I’d usually expect him to bet the flop and, if
called, barrel the turn.
This is a great flop to double-barrel. It’s hard for us to have
a strong hand on a flop like this one. Overcards will come
frequently on the turn, and these are slam dunk barreling
cards. Even something like an offsuit 9 or 8 or a board pair
would be a fine barreling card for him.
Thus I’m expecting him to bet 100 percent of his range
here on the flop and then, if called, usually bet again on the
LOOSE-AGGRESSIVE PLAYER REVIEW AND EXERCISES 145
turn. I will therefore call the flop and allow him to bet the turn.
I’m planning to raise most turn cards. Almost no matter the
turn card, this player will be bet-folding the turn most of the
time. I’d therefore like him to stick the dead money out there
before I try to take it.
? ? ? ?
You call the $25. There’s $97 in the pot. The turn is the K?
giving you a gutshot to a queen. Your opponent bets $60.
What do you do?
? ? ? ?
We expected this bet, and we expect him to fold to a raise,
so raise. I’d make it $160 to go. You don’t have to make a big
raise. He’s usually going to have air, and he’ll usually fold.
He’s not going to put you on a play with no history. On this
board, T-4-3-K, he’ll expect you usually to have a set or KT.
Note that J9s is a great hand when we’re taking lines like
these because very frequently we will have at least a gutshot
on the turn. Once the ten flops, any K, Q, 8, 7, or heart on the
turn gives us outs to a big hand. Any J or 9 gives us a solid
pair. With a hand like Q6s, it’s harder to catch a board that
gives you equity on your turn raise which is why I prefer
ending the hand earlier with that holding.
So we floated the flop and raised the turn. Why did we take
this line? Why not raise earlier in the hand? Why not wait to
the river?
Again, I like waiting to make the play because we expect
this player to continue to make errors by barreling off with a
weak range. We want him to make his errors, so we flat
preflop and on the flop.
146 PLAYING THE PLAYER
I don’t like waiting for the river for a couple of reasons.
First, we don’t know if the guy likes to fire three barrels. We
only have a few hours of play with him, and many players will
fire early in a hand but give up by the river. So while we were
almost certain he’d bet the flop, and we expected him to bet
most turn cards, we can’t be nearly as certain as to how he’ll
behave on the river.
Second, this is a fishy line—call, call, raise the river. What
do we have? If the river is a card like another offsuit king, he
may not give us credit for a hand. When we call flop, raise
turn, we’re just representing a garden variety slowplay of a
strong flopped hand or a turned two pair. We’re also
threatening to bet the river, so the odds on calling down look
much worse to our opponent.
Floating two postflop streets to bluff-raise the river is a
play I generally make only with significant history with a
player. First, I need to know the guy bets the river light.
Second, I’d like him to have seen me make at least some nonstandard
plays so that when I take a weird line, he’s worried
I’ve got the nuts.
Call, call, river raise, after all, is precisely how I would
recommend playing a flopped set on this board with no history
against this player type. You’re playing a strong hand this way
because it will confuse him and perhaps gain you extra value.
So I’m not playing bluffing hands this same way until we have
history.
Exercise No. 2.
The LAG folded in the above hand, and now it’s an hour or
so later. Your opponent has continued to play in the same way
you observed before, and you’ve won a couple of small pots
against other players in the meantime without showdown.
LOOSE-AGGRESSIVE PLAYER REVIEW AND EXERCISES 147
The LAG opens to $20 in the cutoff, and it’s folded to you
in the big blind. You have Q?T? . What do you do?
? ? ? ?
Again I’d flat-call. I like 3-betting even less this time
around, since we’re out of position, and I’m less inclined to
expect a fold. While I expect to have more and better postflop
reads on my opponent than he has on me, I’m going to see
flops and try to exploit situations as they arise.
? ? ? ?
You call. There’s $42 in the pot with $600 behind.
The flop comes K?7?7? . You have a backdoor flush draw
and a flimsy backdoor straight draw. What do you do?
? ? ? ?
Again I would expect the LAG to have a weak range that
rarely hits this board, and I would also expect him to bet 100
percent of the time. So I’d check. You want him to make the
mistake of betting a weak range.
Here I’d probably check-raise. It’s a fairly obvious play,
but you have no history with the guy, he’s got no read on you
except for the one hand you played, and he most likely has no
pair and no draw. Again, you don’t have to make a huge raise,
but I’d make it large enough to dissuade him from floating
curiously with a bad ace-high.
The other bet-sizing option is to make a small raise that he
very well might float with ace-high then plan to fire any turn
for about half-pot. With no reads, your opponent will likely
fold anything weaker than a good king. If he’s calling the flop
raise with pocket pairs and ace-high, then he’s got enough
148 PLAYING THE PLAYER
weak hands in his range that he’s folding the turn more than
half the time, and the entire play shows a good profit.
A few points. First, if you are planning to fire the turn, then
you definitely do not want to make the flop raise too big. The
turn bluff becomes more profitable the more hands he floats
you with on the flop. If you make a monster flop check-raise
and follow it up with a huge turn bet, you are risking too much
to win too little.
Second, I wouldn’t try to reverse-float this board without
history. Why? Because very often this player will check back
the turn on you. When you check-call this flop against him,
he’ll put you on a range of roughly ace-high and better. He’ll
therefore check back lots of showdownable hands that beat
weak ace-highs, and he’ll be calling the river with many of
these hands.
Queen-ten is probably just barely strong enough on this
flop to check-call a 100 percent flop betting range for its
showdown value, but the aggressive line should show more
profit overall.
Exercise No. 3.
In the above hand, you chose to check-raise the flop small
and fire the turn. Your opponent folded to the check-raise,
however. The session ended without any further incident.
This hand occurs two weeks later. The two previous hands
you’ve played with the guy weren’t that memorable, and I still
would not expect him to have any strong reads on your
postflop play.
It’s $2-$5 with $500 stacks. The LAG is again playing
loosely preflop and firing a lot postflop, mostly with success.
He opens for $20 from three off the button. You’re next to act,
and you have Q?Q?. The table has been fairly tight as a
LOOSE-AGGRESSIVE PLAYER REVIEW AND EXERCISES 149
whole, and none of the four players behind you have gotten
out of line so far, at least not in an obvious way. They also
have stacks ranging from $200 to $400.
What do you do?
? ? ? ?
Those who have learned to play a traditional TAG style
might be inclined to 3-bet here, but I prefer flat-calling. In the
first example I said I would have no value 3-betting range
against this player until we had history, and since we still
don’t have history, I’m not 3-betting.
To refresh your memory, I’m not 3-betting for value
against this player because the errors he makes tend to be from
barreling too much postflop. You’re more likely to profit by
underrepping your hand and allowing him to try to push you
off it than you are by trying to get value immediately from
worse hands.
? ? ? ?
You call, and everyone folds. There’s $47 in the pot and
$480 behind.
The flop comes T? 7? 4?. The LAG bets $30. What do
you do?
? ? ? ?
There are arguments in favor of raising. The one I like most
is that this is a flop that offers lots of draws, while it’s
somewhat difficult to have a strong hand made already. So
raising looks like you might have a draw.
If the stacks were $180 instead of $480, I would shove for
sure. With those stacks, I would expect the LAG to call with
150 PLAYING THE PLAYER
many worse hands, and by shoving this flop you’re actually
repping a flush or straight draw as much as you are a strong
made hand.
But with the deeper stacks we have, I dislike raising. It’s
$30 to you. Say you make it $100 to go. If this player reraises,
you’re in a tough situation. You’ll typically either be up
against a stronger made hand or a draw. This makes you likely
an equity dog when stacks go in, and you can do better than
that against this player.
The other problem with making it $100 to go is that I don’t
think you can get much more value than that from a hand like
a ten or J-J. If the LAG calls with a hand like K-T, he’s likely
doing so planning to fold if you keep hammering the pot.
Again, you have no history with this player, and the typical
$2-$5 player simply does not raise the flop and then unload
two large barrels as a bluff. So I think it’s optimistic to expect
him to call you down for stacks with a worse hand.
Finally, this is a board that your opponent may be barreling
again as much as half the time on the turn. I like calling.
? ? ? ?
You call. There’s $107 in the pot and $450 behind. The
turn is the 5? making the board T? 7? 4?5?. The LAG bets
$60. What do you do?
? ? ? ?
If you raise now and get shoved on, I think it’s a fold. You
never feel good about giving a LAG the last raise in a big pot,
but without history on a board like this one, I’m not going to
expect any semi-competent player to bluff 3-bet shove the turn
in a typical $2-$5 game.
LOOSE-AGGRESSIVE PLAYER REVIEW AND EXERCISES 151
But I think some percentage of the time, the fold is a bad
one, and that counts as a strike against raising.
The first question about a raise is, “Will you get called by
worse hands?” There are enough draws out there that you very
well might. Any hand with a six and a pair will almost
certainly call you. Flush draws might call. If you thought your
opponent would make few mistakes on the river, then I like a
raise here. A raise protects your hand against weak draws, gets
value from strong draws, might get called by a ten or JJ, and
you can probably fold to a reraise.
Having said that, we don’t know that our opponent will
play the river well. Most $2-$5 players—LAG, TAG, or
otherwise—make huge errors on the river. As a result,
whenever the decision is fairly close, I like to extend hands to
the river to allow my opponent the opportunity to make a big
error.
In this particular situation, I’d likely just call again. I want
to see how this player will handle the river. Does he fire three
barrels, and if so, do I need to make a fairly significant
adjustment to the way I play every future hand against him?
? ? ? ?
You call. The pot is $227 with $390 behind. The board is
T? 7? 4?5?. The river is the 8?. Your opponent checks.
What do you do?
? ? ? ?
It’s time to value bet. Yes, it will be no good if you get
check-raised, but after this action you almost always have the
best hand, and you need to go for value. Also, you could
reasonably be bluffing a busted flush draw, and you’ve
underrepped your hand throughout, so your opponent, if he
152 PLAYING THE PLAYER
has a pair, will likely have uncertainty about whether he’s
good or not.
Finally, many $2-$5 regulars would not value bet one pair
on this four-straight board. This fact will polarize your range
in your opponent’s mind and may give him additional doubt
about whether you are bluffing or not.
How much to bet? You’re trying to get called by one pair,
and, again, you have no history. I wouldn’t try to bomb the pot
to try to represent a bluff. I think you can represent a bluff just
as well with a smaller bet, and overall I think a smaller bet is
considerably more likely to get called.
I’d bet about $100 or $120 on the river.
Your opponent calls and shows K?8? for a rivered pair.
This hand brings up an important concept when playing
against LAGs. LAGs play a wide range of hands and can
easily make hidden two pairs and straights. This fact causes
most people to try to price LAGs out of pots.
But LAGs also frequently get themselves into trouble with
one pair hands. Yes, when you let LAGs linger in hands, they
will sometimes draw out on you and it will sting. But these
losses are partially offset by the times your opponent backs
into a bad pair and gets stubborn with it. As long as you have
honed your hand reading, your hand selection is solid, and you
play your hands in information-hiding ways, you have nothing
to fear from playing turns and rivers with LAG opponents.
Your opponent will be just as in the dark as you are.
Exercise No. 4.
You now have some history with this guy. He knows
you’ve seen him open total trash, barrel twice with it, and then
check it on the river when it paired. He’s also seen you
LOOSE-AGGRESSIVE PLAYER REVIEW AND EXERCISES 153
underrep an overpair and then make a somewhat thin value bet
on the river with that pair.
One of the keys to getting the best of your opponents is to
stay a step ahead of them. When hands that create “history” go
down, you need to learn to anticipate how (if at all) your
opponent will adjust. This is a skill primarily developed with
experience.
Having said that, how do you think your opponent might
adjust his play based on the hand you just played against him?
And, therefore, what changes should you make to your
strategy?
? ? ? ?
Obviously you can’t ever anticipate with 100 percent
accuracy how your opponent will react to something that
happens at a poker table. But you can make an educated guess.
If your guesses become significantly better than random
chance, it will be worth your while to act on them.
So you owned your opponent in this particular hand. He
lost the absolute maximum against you with a hand he knows
he really had no business playing in the first place. Whenever
you own one of your opponents like this, unless they are really
top-notch players, they will typically back off a bit against you
in the future.
This means that I would expect this player to be a little
more willing to fold against you in the near future. Thus, I
would try to do things like 3-bet this player light preflop,
bluff-raise a flop continuation bet (particularly in a 3- or 4-
way pot where this player isn’t solely focused on you in his
decision to bet the flop).
I would also expect this player to barrel against you a little
less frequently than before. Thus, I would expect him to check
154 PLAYING THE PLAYER
back rather than continuation bet some particularly bad flops
and to give up on the turn more often.
Likewise I would expect some more pot-controlling lines
out of this player. Checking will not always mean giving up.
Rather, it will often be a medium-strength pair that your
opponent suspects is good, but that he doesn’t want to value
own himself with (by betting for value into a stronger hand).
Thus, a line you might want to try would be check-call the
flop, check the turn, and if he checks through, with a busted
draw overbet, bluff the river, and with a value hand consider
check-raising for value.
As you master the material in this book, the next step in
your quest to exploit your opponents is to anticipate their
adjustments and thwart them before they even show you that
their strategy has changed. This is an advanced skill, but while
you play you should keep it in mind.
PART III: BAD PLAYERS
Winning in Wild Games
Wild games are some of the most profitable poker games out
there. When money is flying into the middle right and left,
opportunities to get a lot of money in with a big edge abound.
But many people are confused by and scared of wild games,
and as a result, they don’t make what they should from them.
The principles behind exploiting wild games are simple.
You’ve likely already figured it out. Wait until you have a
hand that is more likely to win than your opponents’ hands
and stick your money in. It’s easier said than done, however.
There are two major obstacles to implementing this plan.
1. Identifying a good situation
2. Fear
I plan to help you with both of these. Let’s actually start
with the second one, fear.
When you find yourself in a wild game, you are going to be
gambling. There is no way around it. You can’t reliably
“move people off hands.” And frequently lots of money will
go in preflop and on the flop when the result of the hand is
necessarily in doubt. In fact, what differentiates a wild game
from just a single maniac opponent is that often huge pots will
be built by three or four players all coming along for the ride.
So you’re going to be gambling for stacks, and you’re
going to have some serious swings. The thing is, you can have
such a large edge on this gambling that, even though the
swings may feel huge, your bankroll (if you’re properly
bankrolled for your game in the first place) is never really in
158 PLAYING THE PLAYER
danger. If you were able to flip a 60/40 coin for stacks
repeatedly, and you got the 60 percent side, it would not take
many flips at all until you were virtually guaranteed to be
ahead.
If four players are getting big action in on the flop, usually
one of them will be nearly dead money. This player will have
a small flush draw and be overflushed. Or this player will have
a pair with kicker problems and have almost no shot to win a
showdown. The other players are splitting this stack with their
equity. There’s the flush draw, the best pair, and maybe
another hand with some equity like a gutshot and an overcard.
This means that if you’re correctly in the pot in a wild
game, you’re often getting 3-to-1 on your stack with a 35
percent chance of winning the pot. Or 2-to-1 on your stack
with a 50 percent chance of winning. These are huge edges,
and it won’t take many such pots for you to be ahead for good.
So you’re afraid. Don’t be. You came to the poker table to
gamble, right? These wild scenarios offer some of the best
gambling you’ll find anywhere. Here are some techniques you
can use to increase your comfort level and to learn to
appreciate what wild games have to offer.
Technique No. 1. Buy in short.
Ok, theoretically buying in short cuts your edge in a wild
game. Theoretically you’d like to get tons of money in with
these clowns when it makes sense to do so.
But as a practical matter, many players aren’t comfortable
in wild games. The decisions seem foreign, and the money at
stake can be very large. If you feel this way about wild games,
then the answer is simple. Buy in short.
“But,” you ask, “how am I supposed to know the game is
wild when I buy in? ”
WINNING IN WILD GAMES 159
Well, sometimes there are clues. Unusually large stacks.
Lots of banter.
But even if you don’t see clues, you can make it a habit to
buy into every game short. In a $2-$5 game, just buy in for
$200. Watch a few hands. You can always put more money on
the table, but you can’t take it off.
I’m like a broken record about this, but if you experience
fear while playing no-limit—fear of losing, fear of going
broke, fear of looking silly or dumb, fear of whatever—then
you’re normal. Most people experience some fear while they
play this game. But you must overcome the fear. You can’t
play this game in fear and succeed long term.
The easiest step is to buy in short. There’s less to lose. Less
chance you’ll be put to the sort of decision that will leave you
feeling dumb. When you play short-stacked, you can put the
fear aside and concentrate on making good decisions. I
guarantee that if you feel like you get run over in wild games,
you’ll do considerably better with a short buy in. Sure, if you
win a big pot then you’ll be playing deep again, but most
people get hit less hard by the fear bug when they’re playing
other people’s money.
Technique No. 2. Bring A Bigger Session
Bankroll.
The cash you bring with you to the cardroom is your
session bankroll. Unless you like to hit up the casino ATM
and its huge fees, chances are you won’t be losing any more
money than you bring with you to the casino.
I find that it always helps alleviate fear when you bring
way more cash with you than you ever expect to lose in the
session. This concept can be paired with the first concept to
really help get rid of the fear.
160 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Let’s say you’re going to the cardroom to play $2-$5. The
game is wild sometimes, and it makes you uncomfortable
when the gamblers are out in force. Bring $3,000 with you,
and buy in for $200 at a time. It may sound silly now, but the
feeling of peeling off a few bills from a seemingly
inexhaustible wad of cash can easily reduce the perceived
value of the money in your head. Less perceived value, less
fear. (This is definitely a good thing when you’re playing
poker. Not so good when you’re walking through a Best Buy.)
If you implement this idea, do try to avoid getting mugged
on the way to and from the cardroom.
Technique No. 3. Watch All The Hands.
There’s nothing that diffuses fear better than knowledge. If
you experience fear at the poker table, watch every single
showdown. Look at the hands that get shown down, and watch
the players who lose and don’t show. Look at their reactions
and try to figure out what they had. You’ll quickly realize that
players often have lots of beatable junk at showdown.
In wild games, players show some really wacky hands.
They called a $200 4-bet preflop with Q-J suited, then called a
$200 flop bet on a K-J-4 monotone flop. These guys hang in
there for big bucks with essentially dead hands.
Watch how often money goes in with hands that have
virtually no shot. It’s often enough, I promise, that as long as
you make sure every time your money goes in that you have
something sensible, you will win over the long term.
Ok, you have a fear that you’re putting your money in bad.
Someone might have a bigger flush. Or someone might have a
set. Don’t worry too much about it. It’s a wild game. People
are going to have all sorts of things. The other guys aren’t
making better decisions than you are. They’re gambling. Just
WINNING IN WILD GAMES 161
be sensible, stick your money in, and trust that your unsensible
opponents will put enough dead money in that it will all come
out in the end for you. It doesn’ t matter if you get it in bad on
any one particular hand. It really doesn’t. Just sit in the wild
game, look for reasonable spots to put your money in, and
profit from all the unreasonable plays your opponents make.
So there you have it, my recipe to conquer fear of wild nolimit
hold’em games. Buy in short. Bring a lot of cash. And
watch every hand and every showdown. These guys are
gambling, and they’re gambling badly. Just trust yourself that
if you wade in there with them, you’ll eventually get the
money. And if things turn out badly, hey, you bought in short,
and it’s no big loss.
Ok, so we’ve covered the fear that sometimes pops up in
wild games. Now let’s get to the more technical aspects of
adjusting to these games. What are the good situations that
arise?
Good Spot No. 1. Light Preflop Reraisers
Wild games typically feature an enormous amount of
preflop action. Frequently there will be one or more players
really bloating pots with silly preflop reraises. Often this will
be a short-stacked player who likes to shove over all the
action.
Here’s an example of a hand from a recent $2-$5 game I
played. A player with $115 limped in for $5. Someone made it
$25, and three people called. The limper then moved all-in for
$115. One of the callers folded, and the rest called up to the
last player who put in a $120 raise. (He and his remaining
opponents each had about $1,000 behind.)
So here’s the question. What sorts of hands should you be
entering these huge, bloated three- and four-way pots with?
162 PLAYING THE PLAYER
When so much money goes in preflop, you’re looking for a
preflop equity edge. You want hands that will win more often
than the average hand, thereby giving you an edge on all the
money in the pot. To get a reasonable estimate, I used
PokerStove to calculate some preflop equities. I assigned the
following range to your opponents in the pot
AA-22
AKs-A2s, KQs-KTs, QJs-65s, QTs, JTs
AKo-AJo, KQo
This range represents about 17 percent of hands. If
anything, it’s a bit on the conservative side, and your
opponents in wild games will shovel money in the pot with
even worse hands.
I assigned this range to three players and then sought to
find the hands that held an equity edge. With three opponents,
you need to win one pot in four to break even, so you need
over 25 percent equity to have an edge. Again, since this is a
conservative range, and since I’d assume there’s at least one
significantly looser player in any given four-way pot, I think
you have an edge with any hand that measures out equal
against this range.
Here are some sample hands and the equity against this
range according to a Monte Carlo sim done using PokerStove:
WINNING IN WILD GAMES 163
AA 58% KJs 24.25%
KK 48.5% QJs 24%
QQ 42% 66 23.5%
JJ 36.5% AQo 23.5%
TT 32% JTs 23.5%
AKs 30.5% KTs 23%
99 29.5% ATs 23%
AQs 27.5% QTs 23%
AKo 27% T9s 23%
88 27% 98s 22.25%
KQs 25.5% 55 22%
77 25.25% AJo 21%
AJs 25% JTo 20%
Table No. 1. Preflop equities against three opponents with
semi-tight ranges.
Again, the purpose of this exercise is merely to get a sense
of what hands play well in wild games with tons of preflop
action. If you alter the ranges I used, obviously you’ll get
somewhat different percentages. But from these numbers you
can draw a few important conclusions.
Big pairs play really, really well. Big pocket pairs are the
best hands in no-limit hold’em. Everyone knows that. But
some people seem to think that these hands lose their value in
these wild, multiway scenarios. Nothing could be further from
the truth. The big pairs AA through TT have an absolutely
massive equity edge against the field. These edges are far, far
greater than any unpaired hand.
Say you’re playing $2-$5 no-limit. You have T-T, and
you’ve bought in for $200 like I recommended above. You
164 PLAYING THE PLAYER
raise to $20 and get two calls. Then the player in the big blind
reraises to $100. This player is wild, and you think he could
have any of the hands in the range I estimated above.
Since this player is so wild, you expect the two callers
behind to call even if you go all-in for $200. You expect them
to have ranges similar to reference range as well. You shove.
Everyone calls.
How much is this hand worth to you in expectation?
Per the chart above, you have about 32 percent equity.
There’s $800 in the pot. Thus, your share is $256, or $56 more
than the $200 you invested. This single hand has netted you
$56 in EV, the same amount a good player could expect to
make playing full-stacked in about two hours of a normal,
non-wild $2-$5 live game.
I’m guessing that before reading this, if you had found
yourself in this situation holding T-T, you may have been
cursing your luck and wishing you hadn’t raised in the first
place. Should you go with such a vulnerable pair for your
whole stack? Or should you just fold to the wildman’s $100
reraise since you know you’re going to end up in a four-way
pot and you’ll “have to hit a set to win”?
If you would have thought that way, I hope you now see
that you should think again! With T-T, you have one of the
very best possible hands in this scenario. An absolute gem of a
situation for you. You should be eager to get your stack in.
Yes, you are an underdog to win the pot. More than two out
of three times, you’re losing. That’s fine, because you’re
getting 3-to-1 on your money.
In wild games, you have to get away from thinking in terms
of being ahead, being behind, and getting sucked out on.
That’s not really how it works. Instead, everyone has equity. If
the right cards come, any of the players in the pot will win.
But if you start with the right hand, you’ll have a big edge. Big
pairs are the rightest hands there are.
WINNING IN WILD GAMES 165
Also, notice the difference in equity between TT and 55.
TT has a huge edge at 32%. 55 is a small equity dog with just
22%. Since you hit a set about 20 percent of the time, it’s
reasonably fair to say about 55 that you need to hit a set to
win. But you can’t say that at all about TT. Tens can hold up
unimproved even against three opponents in a wild game.
Suitedness is extremely important. Some people
underestimate how important it is for unpaired hands to be
suited. Well, in this particular scenario, being suited makes all
the difference in the world.
People downplay the value of having a suited hand by
saying that you only make a flush a small percentage of the
time. In a way they’re right. You do make a flush only a small
percentage of the time. The thing is, when you make a flush,
you almost always win, even against four or more opponents.
Look at AJs versus AJo. In our chart, AJs comes in at 25%
or exactly fair against this range of hands. AJo, on the other
hand, comes in at 21%. There’s your small percentage chance
to make a flush. But in this case, the difference between being
suited and unsuited is the difference between likely having a
small equity edge (remember, someone will be loose and have
some dumb hands in their range) and being a likely equity
dog.
Put another way, 4 percent may not sound like a big
number, but when you’re scrapping to get up over 25 percent,
that extra 4 percent is huge.
If you assume that most pots have some dead money in
them, then roughly any big suited hands (all the way down to
T9s) can become playable in these pots, whereas even an
offsuit hand as strong as AJo is often unplayable.
The bottom line is that in wild games, you want pocket
pairs and suited hands.
166 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Ace-king is not overrated. I couldn’t help but throw this
in there since I’ve heard the myth a bazillion times. No, aceking
isn’t an overrated, overplayed hand. Ace-king is one of
the best hands in hold’em, and even offsuit it holds a very
solid equity edge against three opponents in a wild game. You
should feel overjoyed to get your money in preflop with aceking
in a wild game.
Good Spot No. 2. Inducing Wild Bluffs
Watch out for this scenario after the flop in a wild game. A
lot of money goes in preflop four ways. But there’s still plenty
of money behind.
Then the flop comes. No one seems willing to put in too
much action. Either it gets checked around, or someone makes
a half-hearted bet of maybe 20 percent of the bloated pot, and
everyone calls.
Something similar happens on the turn.
Then all of a sudden, on the river, someone decides to
shove. This bet is frequently (though obviously not always) a
bluff. Why?
The reason is fairly straightforward. After a bunch of
people put in a ton of money preflop, absolutely no one with a
decent hand is going to let the flop get checked
test
.
.
.
your hand and you expect your opponent to make the mistake
of calling too often in many situations.
In this case, the fact that KJs is more profitable to 3-bet
with than K5s becomes very significant. When you expect to
see showdowns, the difference between these two hands
grows. Indeed you may now make more money 3-betting KJs
and folding K5s than you do by 3-betting K5s and calling KJs.
(If your target opponent is bad enough, K5s might end up
being worth a call.)
When you’re considering a 3-bet, think about the situation
and decide whether it calls for a polarized or a depolarized 3-
betting range. Then look at your hand and see if it fits the bill.
Also, when you observe opponents 3-bet, look at the hands
they turn over and decide whether they are polarized or
depolarized. (Most of your opponents won’t be sophisticated
enough to switch between the two types of ranges. They’ll
much more likely just have some pet hands they like to 3-bet.
Or they’ll focus purely on the situation and 3-bet any two
cards they happen to hold when it feels right. It helps a lot if
you know what sort of hand to expect when you get 3-bet.)
Reason No. 4. To Force Players Out Of Their
Comfort Zones
This is a bit of a catch-all category. Many players are
uncomfortable in and make consistent mistakes playing 3-bet
pots. Naturally, if you find an opponent who makes regular
mistakes in 3-bet pots, you might want to 3-bet this player
frequently to create more opportunities for your opponent to
make a mistake.
Two common mistakes many players make in 3-bet pots is
that they fold too frequently after the flop and they play too
straightforwardly. Many players combine these errors. Against
UNDERSTANDING PREFLOP 3-BETTING 117
these players, as long as the stacks are deep enough, you can
3-bet many hands just for the purpose of trying to steal pots
after the flop when your opponent appears weak.
Suppose you’re playing $2-$5 with $1,500 stacks. A
regular player opens for $20, and you 3-bet in position to $60.
Your opponent calls. Again, when you are 3-betting for this
reason, you expect your opponent usually to call your 3-bet.
The flop comes J?T? 5?. Your opponent checks, and you
bet $100. Your opponent calls. This call could be any of the
fairly large number of hands that fit this flop.
The turn is the 3? . Your opponent checks, and you bet
$250 into the $320 pot. This is where many players will
become too timid and/or straightforward. The money is now
getting very big for the size of the game. You’ve played the
hand like you have pocket aces (or pocket jacks), and there’s
lots of money behind for a potentially huge river bet.
Here’s how many players will approach this situation. If
they called the flop with a weakish draw or a weak enough
pair, they’ll just fold. For some players, even Q-J or a naked
flush or straight draw would be too weak for them to continue.
If they slowplayed the flop with two pair or a set
(somewhat unlikely as most players would not like the
uncertainty of letting another card come off on this drawish
board), they will certainly raise this safe-looking turn card.
So if they call the turn bet, they will essentially always
have a strong jack, perhaps Q-Q or K-K, or a strong draw like
a pair plus flush draw or a straight plus flush draw.
For the most part, these turn-calling hands will fold if a
blank hits the river and you bet.
If you look at how the hand plays out, you’re eventually
getting a fold from nearly your opponent’s entire range unless
he hits two pair or better. And he’ll tell you, likely at the first
opportunity, if he’s got that strength or not. In other words, it’s
too much folding and played too straightforwardly.
118 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Through this example I didn’t even mention the hand you
had, since you could have two blank cards and still make
profitable betting decisions against someone who plays this
way against a 3-bet. Of course, the fact that you can have hand
value just makes things even better for you.
Without the preflop 3-bet, your opponent might have
played less predictably. With a flush draw, for instance, he
might have decided to check-raise the flop or bet the flop and
barrel the turn. These are unlimited lines, in that he might take
them with the nuts. The money is comfortably small enough
that he feels okay splashing around a little bit.
When you 3-bet, however, you put all of the $1,500 into
play. Your opponent knows that the price of calling you down
three streets could be huge. This causes him to want to end the
hand early if he’s got strong value, to play more cautiously
with draws, and to ultimately fold top pair if you bet enough.
You’ll find that weaker TAG players commonly play
cautiously like this in 3-bet pots when the stacks are deep.
When the pots are “normal”-sized, they play a little better. But
once stacks are in play, they crawl into a protective shell and
take on the trait of refusing to get stacks in without the nuts.
Against these players, you can 3-bet a lot. They won’t
know how to counter it. They’ll know your range is wide to 3-
bet, so they’ll feel like they can’t fold hands like 77 and AJo
and even 98s to you. But they will worry that if they 4-bet
you, you won’t fold, and they’ll have bloated the pot with a
marginal hand. So they’ll just flat-call the 3-bet. But now they
are unwilling to get stacks in without the nuts, and they revert
to the typically nitty style of someone with that trait.
So which hands do you 3-bet? You’re not looking for an
immediate fold to your 3-bet, so card removal isn’t that
important. Instead, you’re setting up situations where you can
barrel your opponent off hands. Here’s where 3-betting the
suited connectors makes some sense. You’ll have equity on a
UNDERSTANDING PREFLOP 3-BETTING 119
lot of flops, giving you plenty of good barreling spots. You
can also 3-bet a number of other hand types. The more fit-orfold
your opponent gets after the flop (and the more confident
you are that you’ll get to play the hand heads-up against your
target opponent), the more hands you can add and the more
often you can throw in these 3-bets.
I suggest a depolarized 3-betting range in this case since
you aren’t expecting immediate folds and you’re relying on
outplaying your opponent postflop to turn a profit. But unlike
depolarized ranges where you rely on high cards because
you’ll be getting to showdown a lot, in this instance you are
often just as well off with small suited cards.
A Quick Summary
By and large, the hands you 3-bet for value tend to be the
same against all opponent types. A typical range is AA-TT,
AK, and AQ. Against some players you want to tighten this
range even further, and against others you want to widen it.
But you’ll be 3-betting these hands more often than not. To
balance your 3-betting strategy, you want to choose some
hands outside this range to 3-bet. Which hands you choose,
however, depends on the mistakes you expect your opponent
to make most often when you 3-bet.
If you expect your opponent to fold too much preflop to
your 3-bet, choose hands that have a high card for card
removal benefits. And it’s better if the hand is suited. Hands
like A6s and K8s fit the bill. Avoid small card hands unless
the stacks are very deep (i.e., 300 BBs or deeper). In this case,
you’re tending to flat call with your non-premium big card
hands like KQo and QJs.
If you expect your opponent to call your 3-bet frequently,
but then generally be a calldown monkey postflop, high card
120 PLAYING THE PLAYER
strength is important. When stacks are shallow, you can 3-bet
with hands like KQo or KJs. (Or you can simply not 3-bet
very often at all if you expect other players not to interfere
much and you expect your target opponent to stack off easily.)
When stacks are a little deeper, you can 3-bet to isolate with
“multiway” hands like 44 and A4s because you have the
potential to win an enormous pot when you get heads-up with
these sorts of hands.
Generally avoid small cards, however. They don’t make
showdownable hands often enough against a showdown
monkey.
So when you’re isolating a weak player, you’re 3-betting a
depolarized range that includes medium-strength high card
hands, weaker pairs, and some suited aces.
Against a player who gets out of his comfort zone when
you 3-bet, you can include small card hands when you’re
deep. The strategy here is somewhat similar to the strategy
outlined in the TAG chapter for how to exploit someone who
limps in light and is unwilling to stack off without the nuts.
On 4-Betting And 5-Betting
The information above is just about all you’ll need to start
3-betting successfully in live games. For the most part, your
opponents won’t understand your 3-betting strategy, nor will
they take the appropriate steps to counter it. So you can just
decide which 3-betting strategy fits best and then just abuse it.
Against most live opponents, if you get 4-bet, you can
expect to be up against a premium hand and respond
accordingly (i.e., fold).
Some tricksters, however, will recognize that you are very
likely to fold to a 4-bet and bluff you. As of the time of this
writing, I’ve been 4-bet bluffed a number of times in live noUNDERSTANDING
PREFLOP 3-BETTING 121
limit games at the $2-$5 and $5-$10 level. I don’t believe I’ve
ever been 4-bet bluffed in a live game at the $1-$2 or $1-$3
level. (Again, this doesn’t happen often, even in $5-$10
games. Online, 4-bet bluffing happens so frequently that it’s
absolutely unremarkable. But live, it’s still fairly rare.)
Since most 4-bet bluffing happens online, most people who
4-bet bluff in live games have significant experience playing
online. Online players often stick out at live games, and
therefore you can gauge how likely a 4-bet is to be a bluff by
how the player looks.
Similarly, before you put in the 3-bet, you should be able to
guess how likely you are to get 4-bet bluffed. In most cases,
you should assume a 4-bet bluff will be very unlikely, and
therefore you should ignore the following advice. But when
you suspect a 4-bet bluff might be on the way, you should
make some changes to your 3-betting ranges.
A preflop 4-bet bluff is one of the primary countermeasures
against someone who 3-bets very lightly. Say your 3-betting
range is composed mainly of weak hands with relatively few
premiums. This is as it should be, for instance, whenever you
expect your opponents to fold to the 3-bet more than 70
percent of the time.
This weak 3-betting range is very vulnerable to the 4-bet
bluff. If you fold all but the premium hands in your range,
now you’ll be the one folding more than 70 percent of the
time, and your opponent will have exploited you. Thus,
whenever you anticipate 4-bet bluffing, you should do three
things to your 3-betting range:
1. Include more premium hands (e.g., TT, AQ, and the
like) that you’re willing to stack off with.
2. Remove some of the light hands to bring the
premium hand-to-light hand balance closer to 50-
50.
122 PLAYING THE PLAYER
3. Include more small pairs and ragged aces
(preferably suited) in your light 3-betting range.
The first two adjustments should make sense. When you
expect bluffs, you can play more hands for value. Say you 3-
bet for value against a very tight player. You might expect
only AA and KK to show a profit when called if the player is
so tight he might fold JJ or AK to the 3-bet. For instance,
reraising JJ for value makes no sense against this player,
because he’s folding all worse hands. Instead, you’d want to
keep a very tiny value range (AA and KK) and then add in lots
of bluffs until this player adjusted.
Now say you 3-bet for value against someone you know 4-
bet bluffs. Your value range would be considerably wider for
two reasons. First, you’re now getting action on hands like JJ
because he’s bluffing at you sometimes. Second, no one aware
enough of your light 3-betting tendencies to start 4-bet
bluffing is going to fold hands like JJ or AK to your 3-bets.
Since he’s calling you with a wider range of hands, you can 3-
bet more hands for value.
So against a 4-bet bluffer hands like TT and AQ certainly
merit 3-bet consideration. It should hopefully go without
saying, but if your opponent does 4-bet you when you 3-bet
any of your value hands, you aren’t folding. You might shove
or you might call and play a flop depending on how you
expect your opponent to play postflop, but you’re absolutely
not folding your value 3-betting range to a 4-bet bluffer.
How should you respond when your opponent 4-bets one of
your light 3-bets? You should 5-bet bluff (usually a shove
with 100BB stacks) sometimes and fold the rest of the time.
When you’re 5-bet shove bluffing, some hands are definitely
better than others.
A hand like 76s, for instance, is pretty bad to make this
play with. Why? Because when you get called, you’re likely
UNDERSTANDING PREFLOP 3-BETTING 123
going to be up against either a big pair, AK, or maybe AQ.
Against this range, a small pocket pair performs strictly better
than a small suited connector. (PokerStove it if you like.)
Small card hands also don’t offer any card removal benefits.
Suited aces are better. They give you card removal, and
they give you about as much equity as the pocket pairs when
you get called.
So against a 4-bet bluffer that you anticipate sometimes 5-
bet bluff shoving against, add some small pocket pairs to your
3-betting range and remove some of the weaker hands like
K6s. Then when you need to break out a 5-bet bluff, you have
small pocket pairs and ace-high hands to do it with.
I should say that most people look at me crosswise when I
suggest 5-bet bluff shoving preflop. But if you want to play
this game well, virtually every time you make a large bet, your
opponent should have to fear that you might be bluffing. If
your opponent is going to open the can by 4-bet bluffing you,
you simply have to respond sometimes with a 5-bet bluff.
3-Betting For Value
I promised that I would get to the first reason to 3-bet, and
here it is. You 3-bet to get worse hand ranges to call you. This
is the one reason to 3-bet that virtually all no-limit players
apply. “Oh, that guy raised and I have pocket aces. Best to
reraise to play a bigger pot. ”
Many players, however, get this value 3-betting thing
completely wrong. I’ll give you an example from a game in
Las Vegas.
It’s $2-$5, and we’re playing $1,000 stacks. A nitty player
limps in, and I make my customary raise to $20 (only $20 in
this circumstance) on the button with two cards. Then another
124 PLAYING THE PLAYER
relatively nitty player makes it $120 to go from the small
blind. The limper folds, and I turbo-muck.
On this occasion, the 3-bettor decided to show his hand. He
had A?Q?.
What a terrible 3-bet. Why? After all, I said above that AQ
should be in your value 3-betting range more often than not.
AQ should be in your value 3-betting range, but it should
be there because you also have a healthy light 3-betting range.
If you don’t have a light 3-betting range, however, it’s a
terrible 3-bet against a player like me.
Why? Because I’m absolutely never calling this guy with a
worse hand. The point of 3-betting for value is to get called by
a worse hand range. But I would guess from watching this guy
play that AQ is probably the very worst hand he ever 3-bets.
Why on earth would I call such a strong 3-betting range for
$100 more (even with position) with any hand worse than
AQ?
Think back to the concept of a polarized 3-betting range.
I’m going to fold reliably to this guy’s 3-bets until he ups his
3-betting frequency. When he 3-bets me like this, he should
expect a fold. Therefore, he’s better off 3-betting A4o and just
calling with AQo than he is folding A4o and 3-betting AQo.
His real problem is that he plays generally like a timid
spazz. He sees a hand like AQ and thinks, “This has got to be
better than whatever that clown Ed Miller is raising on the
button.” Then he thinks, “But if I see a flop, that luckbox will
probably draw out on me and I’ll end up losing a big pot with
the hand.” So he decides to make a raise with his AQ that is so
prohibitively large that he knows I’ll rarely call.
Two problems with this. First, he’s getting absolutely no
value from his “value” 3-betting range. Second, he’s putting
way too much money at risk on the off chance that I happen to
have a hand against him. Now that I’ve seen he’ll do this with
AQ, when I happen to have AK in a similar situation, I’m
UNDERSTANDING PREFLOP 3-BETTING 125
going to call his 3-bet and see a flop. If an ace comes, I’ll
know he can have AQ eight different ways and AA only one
way. I’ll play my hand confidently for value, and he’ll be
absolutely lost because he won’t know if he’s ahead or not.
(Tip: If you reraise preflop with AQ, get called, flop an ace,
and you’re still very worried you’re behind, you haven’t
gotten “value” for your 3-bet.)
Once this guy starts 3-betting to a reasonable bet size (not
two times pot) and starts adding junk to his 3-betting range,
however, I’ll be forced to call him with hands worse than AQ,
and he can now confidently reraise AQ for value.
Whenever you expect a fold more than 70 percent of the
time if you 3-bet, your value 3-betting range should be very,
very tight. Generally you still want to 3-bet AA on the off
chance you catch someone with KK, QQ, or AK. But don’t 3-
bet hands like TT or AQ. If you expect a fold, you aren’t
getting value for these hands, and you should instead 3-bet
with more junk.
It’s when you expect to get called often that 3-betting with
TT and AQ becomes the standard play with these hands.
A Final Note About 3-Betting
Before you start gleefully 3-betting your opponents, there’s
one more thing to point out. When you 3-bet preflop, you
bloat the pot. Unless the stacks are very deep, this means that
there will be limited money behind for postflop play. If you
read hands well, or if you have the privilege of playing against
some real droolers, you likely have a considerable edge on the
postflop betting. Less postflop betting means less of this edge.
So choosing to 3-bet preflop is usually a trade-off. You’re
3-betting to exploit some sort of edge, but often at the expense
of creating some lucrative postflop scenarios.
126 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Say you’re against a sort of nitty player who is likely to
play fit-or-fold against a 3-bet. If you can find an edge 3-
betting this player, fire away. Having lots of money behind
against a player like this usually isn’t very useful, since the big
errors these players make are folding too easily on the flop and
turn.
Now say you’re against a loose calling station who will
reliably pay off a big river raise with just top pair. If you 3-bet
this player preflop with a marginal hand, you stand to lose a
considerable amount of your edge because there often won’t
be enough money behind once you’ve made two pair or better
to put in a huge raise. In essence, you’re trading the chance to
make the occasional big river bet with a huge edge for more
frequent big preflop bets with a much smaller edge.
Against calling station types, you’re often better off
keeping the pot small preflop and waiting to make a hand
before putting in big action. This rule isn’t set in stone,
however. Isolating these players, especially with small-sized
3-bets, can be effective. Just keep in mind that bloating the pot
preflop comes with some tradeoffs.
3-Betting Exercises
In these exercises, you’re playing a $2-$5 game. Stacks are
$500 unless otherwise noted.
Exercise No. 1.
A nitty, predictable player limps in from middle position.
From two off the button, a fairly good regular makes it $25 to
go. You’ve seen him make this raise a few times, but you
haven’t seen him show a hand down yet.
UNDERSTANDING PREFLOP 3-BETTING 127
The next player folds. You’re on the button with A3s. The
players in the blinds seem unremarkable. What do you do?
? ? ? ?
This is a good opportunity to 3-bet light. You could make it
$65 or $70 to go.
Here you’re 3-betting because you expect your opponent to
fold. Even from two off the button, he likely has a fairly wide
range to raise the weak limping player. Unless he really
suspects you of 3-betting light frequently, he’ll likely give up
on most of his hands.
Your suited ace is an ideal hand for this play. You have
card removal working for you, and if your opponent calls with
a pocket pair, you have a decent chance to outflop him.
Furthermore, the limper will nearly always fold, and his
limp seeds the pot with $5 extra to shade the play in your
favor.
Let’s say you had a less ideal hand than A3s in this
situation. Should you still 3-bet? If I had no history with this
player, and if I looked like the unlikely sort to 3-bet light (you
know who you are), I might 3-bet with any two cards. I think
you’ll get enough folds to make this an auto-profit situation.
But if this player has seen me 3-bet a few times already, I’d
stick to the script and pass on 3-betting hands like 97s, KJo,
and the like. This is a somewhat obvious light 3-betting
situation, so if I thought my opponent might be wise to my
strategy, I’d stick to the hands that have something going for
them.
128 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Exercise No. 2.
A loose player opens for $25 from up front. Even though
he’s up front, he can have a fairly wide range to open. Two
other reasonably loose players call, and a nitty player calls on
the button. The small blind folds. You’re in the big blind with
J?2?. What do you do?
? ? ? ?
The vast majority of the time, you should just fold here.
This may look like a “squeeze spot” since there’s already $107
in the pot, and none of the players has shown a strong range.
But I don’t think there’s any raise size here that’s profitable in
a vacuum. With four opponents, many of whom are loose live
players, I think you’re a good favorite to get called if you
make any raise roughly pot-sized or less. You may be up
against fairly weak ranges, but you’re up against three of these
(and a nitty range), and so you’ll be up against the best hand
of the three ranges, which you can expect to be considerably
stronger than the weak ranges might suggest.
Your hand stinks after the flop, and at best you’ll usually be
firing blind into the preflop caller hoping to get a fold. The pot
will be huge compared to the remaining stacks, meaning your
opponent will likely make relatively few errors.
With all the money in the pot, this is also an obvious play.
It may not matter that it’s obvious against many oblivious live
players, but some are getting sharper these days. I wouldn’t
expect you to get 4-bet bluffed, but you might get called light
or 4-bet by a value range that is wider than the player might 4-
bet against a stronger-looking 3-bet.
UNDERSTANDING PREFLOP 3-BETTING 129
Exercise No. 3.
The game has been playing tight for a little while. Stacks
are about $1,000 in this hand. A regular player opens to $15 in
the cutoff. This player skews tight. He seems unwilling to get
a lot of money in the pot without a big hand. But he is capable
of rudimentary hand reading and firing a couple of barrels
after the flop.
The button folds. You’re in the small blind with K?J?.
The big blind is a tourist who hasn’t been playing a ton of
hands. What do you do?
? ? ? ?
This is a fine spot to 3-bet. I’d make it about $50. You
might get an immediate fold. With $22 in the pot already, a
fold would be a nice result with this just okay hand.
But I’m not 3-betting expecting folds. I’m expecting to get
called with most of the hands my opponent would open. For a
$15 open from late position, I expect KJs to be a bit ahead of
this range. I’m also happy to build the pot with plenty of
money behind against this opponent. Since he skews tight,
he’s going to tend to make folding errors rather than calling
errors. A bigger preflop pot makes these mistakes bigger. The
3-bet might also encourage this player to play more
straightforwardly after the flop, which is another bonus.
The downside is obviously that I’m out of position. This is
definitely a problem, but you’re playing the hand out of
position whether you raise or call. If I expected this opponent
to handle the 3-bet expertly and put a lot of pressure on me
after the flop, I likely would choose not to bloat the pot and
just flat-call. But since I don’t expect this player to use
position to its fullest against me, I’m happy to make this pot a
bigger one. With decent hand strength and a good idea of how
130 PLAYING THE PLAYER
to exploit my opponent’s sub-optimal lines, this is a definitely
profitable spot.
You may be concerned about this reraise because KJ is
known as a “trap hand” by some. Frankly, this concerns me
very little in this scenario. First, I expect my opponent to be
calling with many weaker hands like QJ, JT, KT, small pocket
pairs, and suited connectors. So while I may occasionally get
trapped a bit, my opponent will likely also get trapped.
More significantly, however, I don’t expect this hand to get
to showdown all that often. I have an opponent who makes
folding errors and whom I expect to play relatively
straightforwardly. I will, therefore, rarely be in a position
where I’ve made a “trap” second-best hand that I’m tempted
to pay off with. If he wants to put a lot of action in, I’ll likely
find a fairly easy fold. I’m not too likely to value-own myself
since I’m not going to try to get a lot of value against a player
of this sort with just top pair. He makes folding errors, after
all, more often than calling ones.
The bottom line is that with stacks this deep and against a
player of this type, we aren’t very often going to build a
significant pot where we both have top pair and I’m outkicked.
Exercise No. 4.
The game has been playing tight for a little while. Stacks
are about $500 in this hand. A poor player opens to $20 in the
cutoff. This player skews loose, and he’s a bit unpredictable.
He splashes around with draws, and you’ve seen him make
one fairly wild bluff when checked to on the river. He doesn’t
seem to read hands well, though.
The button folds. You’re in the small blind with K?J?.
The big blind is a tourist who hasn’t been playing a ton of
hands. What do you do?
UNDERSTANDING PREFLOP 3-BETTING 131
? ? ? ?
Against this guy, I’d flat call. KJs is likely better than the
range he will call with preflop, but the edge isn’t so large. This
guy is more likely to make mistakes by putting too much
money in the pot rather than folding too often. With stacks of
only $500, you’d really like to leave some money behind for
him to do his thing and get it in bad.
Also, the fact that you’re out of position is worse here. This
player plays erratically and isn’t afraid to be aggressive when
it feels right to him. Your 3-bet is unlikely to encourage him to
play more predictably, and it bloats the pot, making his loose
calling and unpredictable aggression more correct.
You’ll be better off keeping the pot small preflop. You can
expect to win more money if you hit your hand than you
would against the tight player. If you miss, but flop something
like overcards and a backdoor flush draw, you can still
occasionally reverse float or bluff this opponent.
If the stacks were much deeper, say $2,000, then 3-betting
would be fine. With stacks this deep, there’s still enough
money behind after the 3-bet for your opponent to make his
postflop errors. And these errors will now be larger in
magnitude because the pot and all subsequent betting will be
larger. Against this player type, it’s primarily the tradeoff from
artificially shortening the stacks that makes me want to just
call preflop.
Against a player of this type with $500 stacks, I might flat
call nearly all my hands including those as strong as AKo.
This player’s postflop errors will be much bigger in a small
preflop pot, so unless I have a huge edge on the preflop action
(e.g., with AA or KK), I’m happy to keep the pot small and
play for postflop edges.
Trait No. 2. Reflexive
Weakness Attacking
Overview
LAGs often get away with playing loose hand ranges by out
aggressing everyone. One of the tricks of their trade is that
they recognize weak betting patterns and attack this weakness
relentlessly. TAGs do this also, but LAGs do it more reliably.
If they didn’t they would never overcome all the bad hands
they play.
This means that after certain betting triggers—betting
patterns that overwhelming indicate weakness—these players
will raise with nearly their entire ranges. This works because,
against most of the players in a player pool, these raises show
an automatic profit since the weak bets nearly always indicate
the plan to bet-fold.
Unfortunately, I can’t just list what these triggers are,
because they vary from player pool to player pool. Betting
patterns go in and out of fashion. Here’s an example of one
that’s popular in small stakes Las Vegas games nowadays that
nearly always indicates weakness.
A weakish player limps in and calls a preflop raise. The
flop comes semi-coordinated, and the weak player checks and
calls. Then on the turn, a card comes that might complete one
of the possible draws. The weak player then bets a third to half
the pot.
At the time of this writing, in small-stakes Las Vegas
games (please note the heavy qualification), this betting
REFLEXIVE WEAKNESS ATTACKING 133
pattern indicates weakness. The weak player is trying to do
one of two things here: he’s either trying to see where he’s at
with a mediocre hand that he doesn’t want to call down, or
he’s got a so-so draw and he’s trying to set his price for
drawing to it. If you raise this bet, this player will lay down all
the mediocre made hands and also many of the draws. I,
therefore, consider it an auto-raise spot with my entire range
of hands. (I raise even with strong hands because, in the event
that he’s got a draw, I don’t want to give a cheap card.)
Again, these patterns vary from player pool to player pool
and change over time. I look at it like fashion. For a while,
donk betting comes into vogue, and I’ll see all the bad players
in Las Vegas start donk betting all the time. Then it goes out
of fashion, and some other pet line is the new hot play.
You’ll have to pay attention to your games and try to figure
out which lines that bad players take with weak hands are
most popular. They will typically involve some sort of smaller
sized and out-of-order bet, so that’s the first thing I’d look for.
Adjustment Summary
Ok, you’re playing against a LAG. You’ve started to check
hands you want to call down with to exploit this player’s
barreling tendencies. After getting snapped off a time or three
by you, you notice this LAG player begin to back off a little
bit. This player knows that your checking range includes a
number of stronger hands that other players bet and raise with.
The LAG is now playing better against you, and it will be
harder to exploit him. Here’s where I’d try to trigger his autoraising
instincts. Once you know what weak lines the bad
players in your pool use, mimic these lines with hands you
intend to call down with.
134 PLAYING THE PLAYER
For instance, say a tight player limps in for $5 in a $2-$5
game, and a LAG makes it $20 to go on the button. You have
K?Q? in the small blind and call. The tight player folds.
There’s $50 in the pot with about $500 behind.
The flop comes K?7?5?. You check and call a $35 bet.
The turn is the J?. It’s obviously not a great card for your
hand, but you know this LAG can have such a wide range of
hands at this juncture that you still want to induce action.
Against a barreling-happy LAG, I might check here, hoping
that the LAG will bet the scare card.
But in reality, this is a fairly poor card for the LAG to
barrel with air. When you check-call the flop, a lot of your
range will look like kings and heart draws, and so by the turn
your range should be fairly strong.
Try betting $20-$40 into this $120 pot. If your opponent
has air, this bet plays a little psychological trick against him.
Say you bet $20 into the $120 pot. Your range should be fairly
strong. Theoretically with air, your opponent likely should just
test
.
.
.
PART II: LOOSEAGGRESSIVE
PLAYERS
Playing Against Loose-
Aggressive Players
Loose-aggressive players can be annoying. ABC players
dislike other TAGs, since the ABC style doesn’t exploit any of
the errors that TAGs make. But ABC players positively hate
loose-aggressive (LAG) players because the LAG style
naturally exploits all the foibles of an ABC style. Good LAG
players win money from ABC players, and I think deep down
most ABC players know (and resent) it.
The good news is that most LAG players are just as
exploitable as TAGs. They deviate from an optimal style, and
if you make the right adjustments, you will take their money.
The thing is, these guys force you to gamble. Their biggest
mistakes generally involve risking too much money without a
strong enough hand. The only way to exploit this particular
mistake is to put money in the pot—call or raise. You’ve got
to gamble.
This fact is why ABC players often find LAGs so
infuriating. The ABC players don’t have too much trouble
spotting some of the mistakes that the LAG players are
making, but they don’t have the stomach to gamble with the
LAGs when it’s called for. So they just demur and let the
LAGs run rampant. This is a disaster.
Here is my general observation about LAGs. They have
wide (and therefore weak) hand ranges at many points in
hands. This leads to a lot of uncertainty—the feeling that you
“never know where he’s at” because he plays a wide range of
hands.
86 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Many poker players are very uncomfortable with this
uncertainty. They want to know “where they’re at” in hands.
They don’t want to pay off when they’re beaten. They want to
drive the action. They want to bet-fold. They like to make bets
and raises “for information” to try to resolve the uncertainty.
Playing this way simply plays into a LAG’s hands. Why?
Because LAGs live and die by this disparity in information.
They know roughly what you have while you have no idea
what they have. Constant efforts to “find out where you’re at”
are counterproductive, as these efforts themselves tell the
LAG what sort of hand you likely have. And if you’ve played
against a LAG, you’ll know that the “information” you get
back is unreliable, and you often end up guessing anyway in
the end. As long as LAG players can maintain this information
advantage, they can beat you silly.
To beat a LAG, you have to embrace the uncertainty.
You’re not going to find out where you’re at, and you need to
be ok with that. Instead, to close the information gap, rather
than trying to pry information out of your opponent, you need
to deny your opponent information about your hand. Force the
LAG to guess about your hand. Rely on the fact that you are
generally playing a stronger set of hands to give you a
consistent edge. On any given hand, you can (and sometimes
will) get your money in bad. But your LAG opponents will get
their money in bad against you more often, and that’s where
your profit comes from.
Thus, you will use two general techniques to beating
LAGs. First, you will reverse “standard” play against your
opponent to give him false information about your hand
ranges. Then, after you’ve played against the LAG for a while
and he’s made his first adjustment to you, you revert to a tight
strategy of well-balanced, mixed ranges. I’ll show you how
this works.
Trait No. 1. Frequent
Preflop Raising And
Postflop Barreling
Overview
LAGs love to raise preflop. By raising lots of hands, they
accomplish two key things:
1. They steal lots of blinds, limps, and antes.
2. They encourage their opponents to play a reactive, fitor-
fold postflop strategy against them while at the
same time raising the stakes of the pot.
The constant preflop raising steals blinds, limps, and antes.
Yes, people stop giving the LAGs credit after a while, but
even then they’ll still get their share of free pots.
LAGs are often loose from all positions, but they tend to be
particularly loose in position if they can raise a poor-playing
limper. This strategy of “punishing limpers” is ingrained in
many LAGs, and they’ll raise darn near anything remotely
playable in these situations.
This strategy of raising with position works well against a
wide array of opponent types. Nits often just give up, folding
their limps immediately. Other weak players call these raises,
but then revert to a fit-or-fold postflop strategy. In other
words, they call to try to hit a hand, and if they miss, they fold.
This is where the postflop barreling comes in. The LAGs
look at the flop and estimate the strength of their opponents’
88 PLAYING THE PLAYER
ranges on the board textures. Whenever it appears that
opponents are likely to be weak on the board, the LAG will
fire a barrel. If a “bad” turn or river card comes, one that
seems to hurt their opponents’ ranges, the LAG will fire again.
Because players are playing a reactive, fit-or-fold strategy, this
constant barreling wins the majority of pots.
When players finally do hit a hand against a LAG, they
often can’t resist the temptation to bet or raise early in the
hand. “I finally have something against this guy, and I’m
going to make him pay,” they think. Oops. This is exactly the
wrong adjustment. Again, the LAG thrives on an information
advantage, and by betting and raising early, you just give the
LAG good, cheap information.
Adjustment Summary
The strategy of raising too many hands preflop and firing
too many barrels postflop is very exploitable. But to exploit it,
you have to embrace uncertainty and systematically deny your
opponent information about your hand.
The basic outline to exploiting this trait is to call more
preflop, 3-bet more preflop, and then play your hands postflop
in a way that will induce errors from the LAG.
Let’s talk about the postflop adjustment first. Again, let’s
understand the LAG’s strategy after the flop. He’s going to
start out assuming that most of his opponents are playing a
roughly fit-or-fold strategy against him. Thus, he’s going to
have a high barreling frequency, particularly on flops that
don’t connect well with a standard preflop calling range, and
on turns and rivers that don’t connect well with the flop.
He’s going to bet-fold a lot, since he’s frequently going to
have air, and since raises will typically indicate strength.
FREQUENT PREFLOP RAISING AND POSTFLOP BARRELING 89
Finally, he’s going to try to anticipate how most opponents
will react to him. He’s going to assume that opponents will
sometimes make weak attempts to play back at him like donk
betting or making small check-raises on dry flops. He’s also
going to assume that opponents will begin to call him down
lighter, so he’ll increase his bet sizes with strong value hands
and also value bet a little thinner in some situations.
So the LAGs are betting when checked to with a wide
range of hands. They’re continuing to bet on certain turn and
river cards. They’re giving up against aggression in many
circumstances, but they’re playing back against some obvious
bluffs.
Here’s how you beat this. You start checking and calling
with much of your value range. You hold on tight with some
hands you might release against a less aggressive opponent.
You also check and call with some hands you would normally
bet and raise against less aggressive opponents. Here are two
quick examples.
It’s a $2-$5 game with $500 stacks. A loose, bad player
limps in, as does a nitty player. A LAG makes it $35 to go on
the button. You’re in the big blind with Q?T? . You call. The
bad player calls, and the nit folds. There’s $112 in the pot with
$465 behind.
The flop is Q?8?2?. You check, the bad player checks,
and the LAG bets $60. You call, and the bad player folds.
There’s $232 in the pot and $405 behind.
The turn is the K? . You check, and the LAG bets $110.
You call. There’s $452 in the pot with $295 behind.
The river is the 4?. You check, and the LAG bets $200.
Call.
LAGs love to blast at boards like this one. On the flop
there’s a heart draw, and the three cards are all fairly
disjointed. The only possible straight draws are gutshots
between the Q and 8. The LAG will figure that if you don’t
90 PLAYING THE PLAYER
have a queen or a flush draw, you’ll usually fold straight away
on the flop.
From the LAG’s perspective, the turn is a perfect card. It’s
an overcard to the queen, and it doesn’t complete either a flush
or a straight draw. Unless you happen to have K-Q, A-K, or
king-high hearts, the LAG now expects you to fold by the
river.
The river is also good for the LAG. It completes no draws.
Also, you didn’t raise at any point in the hand, so the LAG
thinks it’s unlikely for you to have a set or two pair. He fires
one final barrel, expecting it to convince you to fold nearly
everything you might have. Instead, you call.
“But gee,” you think, “there are so many hands that beat
me by the river. Any king beats me. Two pair. Sets. And he’s
betting so strongly. Maybe I should wait for a better spot? ”
Here’s the thing. Let’s look at our opponent’s hand ranges
at each point in the hand. Preflop we expect a wide range
because this guy raises lots of hands preflop. Wide preflop
ranges miss most flops, and this is a fairly disjointed flop
that’s easy to miss.
So he’s likely weak on the flop. His flop barrel doesn’t
indicate anything other than that he recognizes that this is a
fairly good flop to take a stab at.
Then he catches a good turn card to barrel and also a good
river card. If he’s truly aggressive, I’d expect him to bet both
cards with much of his range. Thus, despite the fact that he’s
shoveled $370 into the pot after the flop, I don’t expect his
hand range to be much stronger than it was on the flop. His
flop range is considerably weaker than a flopped top pair, so
this is a place where it’s usually worth calling down.
What if, instead of Q-T, you held 2-2 on this board. A set.
Against a LAG who barrels very frequently, play exactly
the same way. Check and call down, except raise the river
FREQUENT PREFLOP RAISING AND POSTFLOP BARRELING 91
since you now beat a large portion of the LAG’s value range.
This is where the information denying comes in.
The temptation for most players would be to raise a set
either on the flop or the turn. By the turn, flush and straight
draws abound. “I’ve got him,” they would think, “but if I just
check and call, he might draw out on me. Better to drop the
hammer now. ”
No. Just check and call. Why?
This LAG makes a consistent, exploitable mistake. He
barrels too frequently. When you raise, you deny him the
opportunity to make his mistake. When you check and call,
you leave uncertainty for your opponent. Are you on a draw?
Are you calling with a weak pair, planning to fold to a follow
up bet? He doesn’t know. He might respond to these thoughts
by firing another barrel.
To win at this game, you have to identify the mistakes your
opponents make and then give them lots of opportunities to
make these mistakes. When players barrel too frequently, you
exploit them by checking hands you intend to call with to
showdown. This includes many big hands like two pair and
sets.
You have to embrace uncertainty. If you just call down
with your set, could the river card complete your opponent’s
gutshot? It sure could.
The fear within us tempts us to end hands early when we
flop well. But against this type of LAG, you must face your
fears and play turn and river cards. You simply must allow
them chances to barrel off their money. They will draw out on
you sometimes. But more often they will miss their gutshots
and barrel the river anyway.
To understand this adjustment completely, think about how
your hand ranges look to your opponents. When you call one
of their bets, they will expect you to have a mix of strong
made hands, draws, and weak made hands that you intend to
92 PLAYING THE PLAYER
give up under pressure. They will expect more draws and
weak made hands than strong hands simply because strong
hands are hard to make. Also, they’ll expect you to bet and
raise with strong hands, so when you fail to do so, you deny
holding these hands.
Then they’ll look at the turn (or river) card. They’ll assess
how the card is likely to have affected you. If they still think
you have mostly draws and weak made hands, they’ll bet
again.
Your adjustment is to shift the composition of your calling
range. You will still have strong made hands, weak made
hands, and draws. But you will call down with a few more
hands, effectively turning some weak made hands into strong
ones. Also you will fail to raise with your strong made hands,
also increasing the number of strong hands in your calling
down range. The effect of these adjustments is that you, at all
times, have significantly more strong hands in your calling
ranges than your LAG opponent expects you to have. This, in
turn, will cause your opponent to bluff too frequently and will
earn you maximum value for your good hands.
The first adjustment places more strong and fairly strong
made hands in your calling down range. The second
adjustment has you bluff-raising more frequently on each of
the postflop streets. We said in the section on TAG opponents
that the perfect adjustment to players who bet-fold frequently
is to raise them. LAG players don’t rely as heavily on the betfold
as do TAG players, since LAGs are generally more
willing to get money in with less hand. But LAGs definitely
bet-fold a lot, particularly LAGs who like to play very loosely
preflop and/or LAGs who are trying to exploit an ABC player.
The trick is to identify situations where a LAG is likely betfolding.
One common situation occurs when the LAG starts
the betting round with a wide range of hands, and where you
FREQUENT PREFLOP RAISING AND POSTFLOP BARRELING 93
can look at the board and assume that the LAG expects you to
fold most of your range.
Say a LAG opens for $20 in a $2-$5 game with $1,000
stacks. A player calls, and you call on the button with 9?8?.
The flop comes K?7? 6?. The LAG bets $40, the player in
the middle folds, and you call. There’s $187 in the pot with
over $900 behind.
The turn is the A?, completing the rainbow. The LAG bets
$100. There’s a good chance the LAG will bet-fold in this
situation. Why?
He started the hand with a wide range. The flop, K-7-6
rainbow, is one he would bet with much of that range.
The turn completes the rainbow and puts an ace on board.
What hands would he expect you to call this bet with? On the
flop, from your opponent’s perspective, you likely have a
flopped pair, a pocket pair between K-K and 7-7, or possibly a
straight draw around the 7-6. The ace is a bad card for every
one of these hands, unless you have A-K, A-7, or A-6.
When he bets, he expects you to fold to the ace a lot of the
time. This expectation keeps his range wide. Out of all the
hands he raised preflop, he likely plays a very significant
percentage of them this way. Only a relatively small
percentage of his turn betting range is worth getting serious
money in on a board like this one. Thus, he will be bet-folding
fairly frequently.
Your raise represents aces up or a flopped set. These hands
are all reasonable for you to hold. Furthermore, besides the
draw you happen to have, it’s fairly unlikely that you hold a
draw since no flush draw is possible, and you may not have
called the flop with Q-J, Q-T, or J-T.
Combine all this with the fact that you have outs to the nuts
when called, and it’s a good situation to test the LAG with the
hope that he’s bet-folding.
94 PLAYING THE PLAYER
You’re also unlikely to get reraised in this particular
scenario. To reraise for value, the LAG would realistically
have to hold a set, since your value range represents aces up
and sets. And to reraise as a bluff would require the LAG to
expect bluff-raises to comprise a large portion of your range,
which he likely wouldn’t expect.
As an alternative, you can flat-call the turn, planning to
bluff any river. This line might be a good alternative if you’ve
been calling this opponent down with strong hands (the first
adjustment), as this play balances the calling down line by
adding bluffs.
Pitfalls To Avoid
Playing “backwards.” If you take the advice I’ve given so
far, you’ll be playing backwards against LAGs. That is, you’ll
be checking and calling with your strong made hands, and
you’ll be raising primarily with bluffs and semibluffs.
This is the best way to play against a LAG opponent who is
expecting you to play straightforwardly. Perhaps you have no
history against this player, and therefore he expects you to
play straightforwardly, since most people play
straightforwardly. Or perhaps you do have history—history of
this clown running you over. Under these circumstances, just
flip all the information you give him. Raise with weak hands
and draws (in situations where your LAG opponent would
reasonably expect you to be folding frequently), and just call
down with strong hands in these same situations.
Pretty soon after getting bitten by this a few times, your
LAG opponent will notice that you’re not playing into his
hands. Maybe you will have called down three streets with a
set, and he’ll wonder why you never raised. Or maybe you’ll
bluff-raise a river and accidentally run into the nuts.
FREQUENT PREFLOP RAISING AND POSTFLOP BARRELING 95
Once one of these things happens, your opponent will
likely adjust a little bit. He will have to tone it down a bit
against you. He likely won’t stop being fundamentally loose
or aggressive, but he’ll stop trying to simply steamroll you
with the constant betting. You’ll see him check some streets,
check hands to you that he would have bet before.
This is his way of denying you information. When he’s in
steamroll mode, he actually gives you lots of information. The
information is, “I almost always have a weak hand range when
I bet, and I’ll frequently keep betting if you don’t raise me.”
By slowing down, he’s better balancing his ranges, and it’s not
as easy to exploit with a simple strategy (i.e., call down with
made hands and raise some bluffs). As a response, you should
also balance your play, while keeping your tendency to call
down with made hands and throw in some bluffs.
Your goal when you mix things up should be to place your
LAG opponent in guessing games. The LAG will tend to have
weak hand ranges comprised of weak made hands, weak
draws, air, and some stronger hands. Mixing things up can be
tricky, and since reading this book is likely to be your first real
attempt to outdo the LAGs, I’ll start with some simple,
concrete advice to use as a jumping off point.
Focus on the weak made hand portion of the range—hands
like middle pair. Make it really difficult for your opponent to
know what to do with middle pair against you. Try to force
him into situations where he’s frequently paying off your top
pair hands on at least two streets when he has middle pair.
(Paying you off can involve him betting or you betting. Either
works.) When he begins to check streets against you, you can
continue to play possum sometimes with top pair, checking it
back. But don’t check it twice! Just once. No cheap
showdowns for his middle pairs. And bet draws and other
weak hands in the same situations, so he doesn’t know
whether to pay you off with middle pair or not.
96 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Why is this the adjustment? Because this is how you take
advantage of the fact that your preflop range is stronger than
your LAG opponents’ ranges. You will flop top pair more
often with your tight range, and your opponent will flop many
middle pairs. Top pair versus middle pair is a critical matchup
that obvious favors top pair. If you play ABC against a LAG,
he can make middle pair pay either by steamrolling you with it
or by checking it down (and folding to your value bets). If by
disguising your top pair hands you force him into paying you
on two streets for this matchup, you truly punish the LAG for
the loose preflop range.
Who Exhibits This Trait
Nearly all LAGs will raise frequently preflop and rely on
postflop barreling to overwhelm weaker opponents. This is
one of the defining traits that makes someone a LAG
opponent.
The Bottom Line
LAGs put too much money in the pot with weak hands.
When you raise many hands preflop and barrel a lot, this is
what you’re doing. LAGs make this work by relying on their
opponents to betray too much information with each of their
actions. Thus, even though they are putting too much money
in the pot with weak hands, they are able to do so only when
their opponents will do what they want, and so they get away
with it.
You beat this strategy by denying information to your
opponent. When you check and call, have more strong hands
in your range. When you raise, have more weak hands in your
FREQUENT PREFLOP RAISING AND POSTFLOP BARRELING 97
range. If you play tighter than a LAG and you deny
information well, you will have the upper hand.
Understanding Range
Versus Range Thinking
Most poker players think in terms of individual hands. “How
should I play ace-queen? Should I bet this hand? Should I call
down here? ”
It’s natural to think this way. After all, when you play
you’re presented sequentially with a series of hands and asked
to make a series of decisions on them.
And thinking this way works out fine when you’re playing
an ABC strategy against players who are too loose and pay off
too lightly. Your only major decision against these types of
players is to decide whether this hand, the one you have right
now, is good enough to get value from against the loose
payoff specialists.
Against nits you can think this way also. However, instead
of wondering if the hand is good enough to get value, all you
have to do is figure out if you can get a fold by betting or not.
But more sophisticated opponents force you to think in
terms of hand ranges.
Poker is a gambling game. Against semi-competent
opponents, your goal isn’t to crush their souls hand after hand.
Instead, your goal is simply to try to tilt the odds in your favor.
You’re trying to adjust the game so that, on the aggregate, you
have the edge.
Instead of thinking about things hand by hand, decision by
decision, step back. Consider the big picture. Develop a plan.
How can you structure your play such that you create a
systematic edge against an opponent over thousands of hands?
UNDERSTANDING RANGE VERSUS RANGE THINKING 99
A common way to do this is to throw a wrench into your
opponent’s hand reading. In situations where your opponent
expects you to have one sort of hand, have a different sort
instead and then take advantage of that disconnect.
Think about how I said to play against players who refuse
to felt without the nuts. I said to raise a lot of hands preflop
and then barrel the flop and turn frequently. Say a nit limps in,
and you raise from one off the button. The nit calls. The flop is
A-7-5. The nit checks, you bet, and he calls. The turn is a Q.
The nit checks, and you bet. If you ask most nits what they
think your hand range looks like, what do you think they’ll
say? A lot of them, I guarantee, will say, “He’s usually got at
least an ace. ”
Of course, if you’re playing the way I’ve recommended,
you’ll actually rarely have an ace. Players assume that when
you raise preflop you have a lot of aces and kings in your
range, but when you’re raising so many hands, it’s no longer
true. Then I said not to value bet thinly against a nit. So if you
held, for instance, A-6, you wouldn’t bet both the flop and
turn because you couldn’t expect to get value from worse
hands against a nit. So the reality is that when you raise
preflop and bet the ace-high flop and turn against a nit, you’ll
rarely have an ace.
This is an example of how you paint a misleading picture in
your opponent’s head and then exploit it. Your opponent
assumes you have aces because you raised preflop and you
keep betting. The reality is that you don’t have those hands.
You take advantage of the discrepancy by bluffing.
Now think about how I said to play against LAGs who
barrel a lot. You check and call with your good made hands
rather than betting and raising with them. What have you
done? You’ve created a misconception in your opponent’s
mind about what hands you’re likely to have when you check
and call.
100 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Your opponent assumes you have the normal mix of weak
made hands and draws when you check and call. Your
opponent assumes that when you check and call the turn,
you’ve limited the strength of your range and removed the
best hands from it. (Recall the “limiting turn call” concept I
described in the section on exploiting bet-folds.) This
assumption, however, is wrong, since you are intentionally
checking and calling with strong hands. Thus, your opponent
will make flawed decisions because he’ll misunderstand the
mix of hands you’re likely to have after checking and calling
twice.
Notice that this misrepresented turn calling range dovetails
with the mistakes the LAGs tend to make on their own. They
bluff too much. You create situations that appear to your
opponent to be good bluffing opportunities, and you do so
with hands you intend to call down with.
Doing this well requires that you have, in your own mind,
an accurate and objective picture of your opponent’s range.
For instance, the last thing you want to do is automatically
give a LAG’s turn bet credit for an ace on an A-7-5-Q board.
But LAGs are issued two cards before every hand, and from
time to time, those cards do hit the board. You have to be able
to look at boards and come up with a rough estimate of how
likely your LAG opponent is to have each hand type.
Consider two different boards. The first is a flop of
8?6?4? with a turn of the 2? and a river of the K?.
The second is K?6?2? . The turn is the 8? and the river is
the 4?.
In both hands you hold J-J and the LAG has bet all three
streets. In which situation do you think the final river call will
work out better?
Note that the final board has the exact same five cards on it
in each case. The order of the cards is the only thing that
differs. Thus, if the LAG is betting 100 percent of his range on
UNDERSTANDING RANGE VERSUS RANGE THINKING 101
every street, your chances are precisely equal in both cases.
(And under that assumption I’d call with J-J.)
But most LAGs don’t bet 100 percent of their ranges. They
prefer to bet when they have equity when called, and they also
seek out good barreling spots.
Say the LAG holds 6-5. On the first board, the LAG has
flopped middle pair with a gutshot straight draw. The turn
adds a double gutshot. When the LAG gets called twice, he
will know that much of his opponent’s range will consist of
pairs like eights and pocket pairs like jacks. The K? is the
ultimate scare card for these hands, and the LAG may prefer
to turn the pair of sixes into a bluff rather than take a
showdown and (likely) lose.
On the second board, the LAG flops a pair of sixes on what
starts as a dry flop. The turn doesn’t improve him and doesn’t
change the board much. The river brings in the backdoor
flush. When called on the turn, holding 6-5 the LAG has
relatively little equity. He’s going to be up against a king
much of the time, and few true scare cards can come to get
someone off a king reliably on the river. I’d therefore expect
many LAGs to shy away from betting the turn and simply take
the free card.
In general, the first runout of cards encourages the LAG to
bet three streets with a larger portion of his range while the
second runout encourages him to check at least once with
many of the weaker hands. Thus, if I called with J-J on the
K?6?2? 8?4? board, I’d expect to lose more often to a king
a set, two pair, or a backdoor flush or straight than I would
expect to lose on the 8?6?4?2?K? board. On the latter
board, I’d expect to see more hands like 7-6, 6-5, and so forth
when I call.
The key point here is that if you are skewing your checking
and calling range to encourage your opponent to make bad
bluffs, you should tend to do it most on boards where your
102 PLAYING THE PLAYER
opponent is likely to have many weak hands in his betting
range. When the board runs out in a way that, for whatever
reason, discourages your opponent from having weak hands in
his betting range, you no longer want to skew your checking
and calling range toward medium-strength made hands. This
means your standards for calling down are higher on these
boards, and you also play your big hands faster.
For instance, let’s say you have 2-2 on the K?6?2? flop.
Against a wildly barreling LAG, the clear play with this hand
is to check and call as long as you think doing so will elicit
bad barrels.
But a smarter LAG isn’t going to fire wildly into you when
you call on a K?6?2? flop, especially if you’ve already
adjusted your check-calling range against him to include more
strong hands.
On the other hand, a dry flop like this one is where many
players will try to play back at a LAG. They’ll figure that it’s
unlikely the LAG made much on this flop (which is true), so
they’ll raise or check-raise the LAG’s flop bet. LAGs will be
suspicious of this and may call down light and/or rebluff on
boards like this one. This effect would make me more inclined
to play 2-2 fast on this flop.
In other words, a smart LAG on a K?6?2? flop may be
less likely than usual to make the mistake of bluffing too
much. His betting ranges may be stronger than you might
expect of this player.
Your goal as a player is to anticipate the hand ranges your
opponent will tend to have in various situations. You
anticipate folding ranges, calling ranges, and betting/raising
ranges. Then you look for whether these ranges are
unbalanced and include too many of the “wrong” hands in
them. If you find an unbalanced range, then you construct
your ranges to take advantage of the error. Furthermore, you
recognize that your opponent isn’t a robot, and merely because
UNDERSTANDING RANGE VERSUS RANGE THINKING 103
he has too many weak hands in some of his betting ranges
doesn’t mean that he will always have too many weak hands
in all betting ranges.
When your opponent has too many weak hands in the
betting range, you throw more showdown-worthy hands into
the calling range. Sometimes this will have you calling with
hands that can be drawn out on—and you will in fact get
drawn out on. That’s ok, though. What happens on a particular
hand doesn’t matter. What matters is how your range matches
up against your opponent’s range. If your opponent is
constantly betting a range of weak hands into your range of
showdown-bound hands, he will lose. This range versus range
battle is what determines who wins over time.
Understanding Preflop 3-
Betting
Now that we’re talking about LAG players, and I’ve given you
a brief overview of thinking in terms of ranges playing against
ranges, I think it’s worth discussing preflop 3-betting.
Most people know that modern no-limit has seen a drastic
increase in 3-betting frequency. Most people don’t, however,
understand what 3-betting is supposed to accomplish. Many
players who have added 3-betting to their games actually 3-bet
almost randomly with no clear sense of purpose.
There are a few reasons to 3-bet preflop. Here are the main
ones.
1. To get more money in the pot against a worse hand
range.
2. To win the pot immediately.
3. To isolate a poor player.
4. To force opponents out of their comfort zones.
Students ask me all the time, “What should my 3-betting
range look like?” The answer is that the hands you should 3-
bet with depend (unsurprisingly) on why you’re 3-betting. It
would make no sense for me to tell you to 3-bet with this hand
or that hand without first deciding what the purpose of the 3-
bet is.
I’m not going to give you a hand chart for 3-betting. It’s
way too situational for that. But I will give you some
UNDERSTANDING PREFLOP 3-BETTING 105
examples of why you’re 3-betting and suggest some hands that
work well for the situation.
Reason No. 2. To Win The Pot Immediately
I’m going to start with Reason No. 2. Even though it’s the
most important reason, I’m going to skip over the first reason
for now and return to it later.
When would you 3-bet to win the pot immediately? You’d
do this obviously when you expect your opponents to fold
most of their hands to your raise. Let’s look at the math of
this.
It’s a $2-$5 game with $500 stacks. A tight player limps in.
A TAG-type player makes it $25 to go from the cutoff. You’re
on the button. You reraise to $70, and your main goal is to win
the pot immediately.
There’s $37 in the pot when you raise, and you’re risking
$70 to win that money. So you’re laying approximately 2-to-1
on the bet. If you never won the pot after getting called, then
your raise would have to win immediately about 67 percent of
the time or more to show a profit. Of course, getting called
doesn’t mean you will lose every single pot, so you can relax
that 67 percent number to 60 percent or so and feel confident
that your raise shows a profit.
Therefore, to make this sort of 3-bet, you need to expect the
preflop raiser (and everyone else still in the hand) to fold 60
percent of the time. When can you expect this?
Some TAG players fold this often to 3-bets as a matter of
course. If you play live poker, many players almost never 3-
bet without a pair of jacks or better, so TAGs and other regular
players are trained to fold to 3-bets. This is particularly true
when the 3-bettor has position. It’s no fun at all to play a 3-bet
106 PLAYING THE PLAYER
pot out of position with relatively shallow stacks and a weak
hand, and pitted against a range of super-premium hands.
So if a TAG regular raises, and you have little history of 3-
betting light, you can often assume that you’ll get a fold with
the required frequency.
The example I gave is a prime spot for the play. A tight,
limp-fold-type guy has limped in. This player will rarely offer
resistance to your 3-bet. A TAG has isolated from the cutoff.
This could be a fairly wide range of hands. Then you 3-bet on
the button. The vast majority of the TAG’s hand range won’t
be appropriate to play out of position in a 3-bet pot. You’ll get
your folds.
So what hand do you want for this play? Well, the more
folds you get, the less it matters what your two cards are. If
you can expect 80 percent folds, then any two cards will show
an automatic profit. You will rarely be able to expect an 80
percent fold rate. If you can identify such a situation, then
don’t worry about your hand. Just put the money in. If you get
called, your opponent is at the top of his range, and you should
shut down postflop unless you catch a miracle flop.
Now let’s say that you expect the fold percentage to be
closer to the borderline. You will encounter many situations at
a live no-limit hold’em game where you can expect to get all
folds roughly 55-65 percent of the time if you reraise. If you
were to reraise light in every one of these situations, you
would be doing it all the time, and your opponents would
likely begin to call you more frequently.
It’s better to pick and choose your spots from among these
borderline situations. This is where your hand matters. You
want two things from your hand: card removal and postflop
playability. Card removal means that you hold an ace. If you
have an ace, it’s less likely for your opponent to have AA,
AK, or AQ—hands that your opponent will, obviously, be
likely to call you with. If you hold an ace when you 3-bet, it
UNDERSTANDING PREFLOP 3-BETTING 107
will shade your fold frequency a few percent in your favor
which is enough to turn a borderline play into a solid play. A
king or a queen is also somewhat useful for its card removal
value.
Postflop playability is the other criterion. Suited hands get
the nod over unsuited hands here. Having a high card also
helps. Suited aces, therefore, are ideal hands for this sort of
light 3-betting. Say you 3-bet expecting to get folds the vast
majority of the time, but this time you happen to get a call.
Your opponent is therefore particularly strong.
If you hold J?6?, short of flopping two pair or better, there
may be no board that you want to continue with your hand. If
you have a suited ace, however, then any time you flop the nut
flush draw you have plenty of hand to square off against even
a strong preflop range.
Flopping an ace is also a good escape hatch. You may be
thinking, “I don’t really want to hold ace-four suited on an
ace-high flop in a 3-bet pot. That’s just a trap hand. ”
No, by and large, it’s not a trap hand. Why not? Because
most players will play straightforwardly against you in a 3-bet
pot. If you’ve chosen a 3-betting spot correctly, when you get
called you’re going to be against a range of pocket pairs, big
aces, and a few other miscellaneous suited and connected
hands. When your opponents have Q-Q on an ace-high board,
they aren’t going to put your A-4 to the test. Instead, they’ll
play timidly, trying to check the hand down and get to
showdown.
This is likely also true if your opponent flops a smaller pair
or even flops air. Most players won’t throw big money bluffs
around against a preflop 3-bettor. So if your opponent decides
to put in plenty of action on an ace-high flop, you’re probably
up against a bigger ace (or something even better), and you
can safely fold without getting stacked.
108 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Here’s how it works. A tight player limps in, a TAG makes
it $25 in the cutoff, and you 3-bet to $70 on the button with
A?4?. The blinds fold, the limper folds, and the raiser calls.
There’s $152 in the pot.
The flop comes A? 8?5?. Your opponent checks, and you
check.
The turn is the 3?. Your opponent checks, and you check.
The river is the 9?. Your opponent checks, and you bet
$80. He calls, and your hand is good.
This is how hands will often go down against pocket pairs.
With few exceptions, your opponents aren’t going to try to
bull through you for $100 and $300 bets holding J-J. They’ll
just try to check it down.
After you check the flop through, your opponent with a
pocket pair might throw out a half-hearted turn bet to try to get
you to fold, like, say, $50 to $70 into this $152 pot. Just call
that bet, and your opponent will check the river.
There’s no reason to feel “trapped” against an opponent
who wants to put in hundreds of dollars of action. When that
happens, the vast majority of the time your ace is no good, and
you can just fold.
So suited aces are great for 3-betting light when you are
hoping to win the pot immediately. They have card removal,
suitedness, and the chance to outflop a pocket pair going for
them. Offsuit aces are ok too, since they get two out of three.
Suited kings and queens are also okay, though they don’t get
as much card removal, and their pair potential (particularly
with the queen) is not nearly as valuable.
A class of hands that some people love to 3-bet light with,
but that aren’t particularly well suited for it, are suited
connectors. Some players never met a 7? 6? that they didn’t
3-bet. While these hands are suited (and obviously also
connected), they have no card removal value, and they also
have no pairing value. Usually your best-case scenario with
UNDERSTANDING PREFLOP 3-BETTING 109
these hands is that you flop a draw or medium pair and have
some equity to continue semibluffing with postflop.
But you’re semibluffing into a strong range, which is less
than ideal. Remember, the whole point of making one of these
3-bets is that you’ll usually get a fold. When you don’t get a
fold, your opponent will typically have a strong hand. Suited
connectors are semibluffing hands, but you typically don’t
want to bluff as often into a strong range. You’re usually
better off with the card removal and showdown value a big
card offers.
Let’s summarize. When you’re 3-betting to get an
immediate fold, as a rule of thumb you’re looking for all folds
at least 60 percent of the time. If you encounter a situation
where you think you’ll get a fold much more often than this
(e.g., 70 percent of the time or more), then you can 3-bet with
any two cards. One such situation is if a tight player has
limped in, a TAG has isolated in position (with likely a wide
range of hands), and you have a clean 3-betting image. If you
play online, you can often identify these situations with the aid
of the “Fold To 3-Bet” HUD stat.
If it’s a more borderline case, perhaps where you expect an
immediate win between 55 and 70 percent of the time, you
want some hand value. Waiting for hand value both serves to
limit your 3-betting frequency so you don’t get too far out of
line and also gives you a better chance to win.
In these cases, choose hands with a high card. An ace is
best, because it lowers the chance that your opponent has an
ace, and also because it gives you a reasonable shot to outflop
a pocket pair. Suited hands are better than offsuit hands.
Suited kings and queens can also work, particularly if you
think the situation is on the better end of the 55-70 percent
range.
These rules all apply if you don’t expect your opponent to
4-bet as a bluff very often. When your opponent may well 4-
110 PLAYING THE PLAYER
bet you as a bluff, you want to take into account that you may
respond by 5-betting (possibly all-in) as a bluff. This changes
your hand range composition slightly. I’ll discuss this in more
detail later, but I wanted to mention it here.
Reason No. 3. To Isolate A Poor Player
This is another reason to 3-bet. Say a poor player has
opened a pot. You expect this player to open with a wide
range of hands. If you flat call the player, two or three other
players may call, and you’ll be stuck in the middle of the mix
and nearly forced to hit your hand to win.
Instead, you can 3-bet. This will typically keep the other
players out of the pot, and you can play heads-up against the
poor player. In this scenario, you’re expecting the player to
call, not to fold to your 3-bet. Thus, you want a hand with
some postflop value.
How much value you need and what types of hands you’d
prefer depend on the stack sizes and the sorts of mistakes your
isolated opponent tends to make.
Say you’re playing $5-$10. There’s an absolutely terrible
player on your right with a $5,000 stack. You also have
$5,000. The other players at the table are all fairly tight and
playing $1,000 to $2,000 stacks. This terrible player likes to
open a lot of hands, but you’ve also noticed that he’s willing
to call absolutely enormous bets on the river with just top pair.
(This has worked out for him so far, as he snapped off a huge
three-barrel bluff from one of the other tight players.)
What hands would you like to isolate this player with? The
mistake you’ve identified is that he calls too much,
particularly on the river, and particularly with top pair. You
therefore want to isolate him with a hand that will be most
likely to stack him should he hit top pair. A hand like AK fits
UNDERSTANDING PREFLOP 3-BETTING 111
the bill, since you will always have him outkicked if you flop
top pair. But AK is sort of an obvious 3-betting hand.
Another good option against this player is a small pocket
pair. You could 3-bet him with a hand like 44. You will hit a
set roughly 20 percent of the time by the river. When you hit
your set, you can absolutely bomb the pot and hope he comes
along.
Say this player opens to $35. Choose a small 3-bet size—
the smallest amount that will likely still have an isolating
effect. Choosing a small size helps you in a few ways. First,
you’re usually going to miss your set, so you may not even be
a favorite to win the pot. There’s no need to make a big bet
with no real preflop edge.
Second, your opponent may 4-bet you if he’s got a big hand
like AA or KK. When you 3-bet small, his 4-bet will likely be
small also. If you make it $85 to go, for instance, he might 4-
bet you to $250. With $5,000 stacks and the likelihood that
he’ll go completely broke to you if you flop a set, you have an
easy overlay on a call.
A small 3-bet also protects you if one of your opponents
wakes up with a hand or decides to run a cold 4-bet bluff at
you.
You might think, “Don’t I want to keep the pot small and
multiway with pocket pairs? I could just call and then maybe
three other people will call, and I’ll have multiway action on
my potential set.” That line of thinking is reasonable if all the
players at the table are roughly equal. But in this scenario, the
other players at the table are all fairly tight and shorter
stacked. Your set has much, much more implied value against
the terrible, deep-stacked player than it does against any one
of the tight players.
Even terrible players understand that hand values get
stronger in multiway pots. If a tight player bets the flop and
you raise, the terrible player may realize that his hand has no
112 PLAYING THE PLAYER
shot and find a fold. When heads-up, however, the bad player
will always be suspicious that you’re bluffing him
(particularly if you are 3-betting to isolate frequently), and you
have a much better chance to get paid.
See why you can’t just list out 3-betting ranges? Because a
hand that you typically don’t want to 3-bet with, 44, becomes
a 3-bet in this particular scenario.
Suited aces are also good to isolate this player with. Here
you want to make either aces up or the nut flush. With aces up
you could win a big pot if the player has an ace with a strong
kicker. With the nut flush you could overflush him for stacks
or obviously beat any number of other hands. Good players
tend to know how to get away from hands when they’re up
against the nut flush, but this guy won’t, especially when you
3-bet preflop.
Big card hands are also worth a 3-bet against this player. A
hand like KJs or KQo is fine to 3-bet. The goal is to flop top
pair and then get some value from draws and weaker pairs.
You’re likely not trying to get stacks in with these hands, but
flopping top pair against a loose player who calls too much is
nearly always lucrative.
Small suited connectors are okay, but not great, to isolate
with. Making a small flush will net you much less value on the
end than the nut flush due to the chance of being overflushed.
Making a straight when your opponent makes top pair will be
lucrative, but it won’t happen that often. On top of that, you
often won’t make the straight until the river, so you don’t have
time to build the pot. Small two pair is a quite vulnerable
hand, not that far ahead of someone holding top pair.
Suited connectors with gaps are decidedly bad to isolate
with. No high card value, much weakened straight potential,
and they still make only small flushes and small two pair.
I view small suited hands as primarily postflop bluffing
hands. They hit many flops hard enough to justify firing a few
UNDERSTANDING PREFLOP 3-BETTING 113
barrels. Therefore, when you’re playing against players whose
primary mistake is that they call too much and don’t fold
enough, these hands aren’t as valuable as they may at first
seem. I know people commonly view 54s as a great hand to
“crack” someone with, but the fact is, if I’m up against
someone with a deep stack who calls too much, I’d much
prefer to have A4s to 54s. I’m going to get the stack more
often, and I’m less likely to get my money in bad.
Just as when you’re 3-betting to get folds, some situations
are better than others for this play. If your target raises under
the gun and you’re stuck in the middle of the table, isolating
can be dangerous. You have to get through a lot of players,
and if you do it too frequently, your savvier opponents will
begin to target you.
Stack size also plays a major role. In our example before,
stacks were 500 BB deep. At this depth, the extra money you
put in preflop is almost irrelevant (compared to all the money
that is available to be won). So you can isolate aggressively
even in marginal situations.
With shallower stacks, however, the preflop reraise money
becomes significant compared to what’s to be won. This
creates two problems for you. First, when something goes
wrong, the punishment is greater compared to the potential
reward. Second, it leaves less money behind for your targeted
opponent to misplay. Most of the time, your targets (if you
choose them well) are going to make enormous errors on the
big bet streets of the turn and river. With shallow stacks,
however, the more money you put in preflop, the less money
there is to piss away on the river. Furthermore, a big preflop
pot bloats the pot odds and makes going to showdown more
correct. When you’re up against a player who calls too much,
the last thing you want to do is to make his error more correct
by bloating the pot.
114 PLAYING THE PLAYER
So as the stacks get shallower, the value of isolating a bad
player with a 3-bet drops significantly. With position, 500 BB
stacks, compliant opponents, and a target opponent who calls
way too often postflop, I’d likely isolate nearly every chance I
got with any of the hands I listed above (pocket pairs, suited
aces, big card hands, and small suited connectors) from nearly
any position. These are ideal conditions for the isolation play,
and if I keep hammering away at the guy, eventually I’ll get
the money.
But with only 150 BB stacks, opponents who will interfere
if I get out of line too often, and a target opponent who, while
bad, plays erratically and unpredictably, I’m much less likely
to isolate. I’m not going to try with the marginal hands and
situations (out of position, with suited connectors, etc.). I’ll
save my isolation raises for when I’m on or near the button
and I have a hand that gives me the best chance to win a stack.
Polarized Versus Depolarized Ranges
Ok, now we’ve analyzed 3-betting in two different
scenarios—when you’re going for an immediate win, and
when you’re trying to isolate an opponent.
When you’re going for an immediate win, I recommended
sometimes 3-betting with a hand like K5s, but I specifically
did not recommend 3-betting with KQo or KJs. The latter
hands certainly fit the criteria for 3-betting: they have card
removal benefits, and they can outflop a pocket pair for
instance. So why not 3-bet with these hands?
If 3-betting with K5s is profitable, then 3-betting KJs is
certainly also profitable. There is no doubt about it. But you
may be able to call profitably with KJs, while you likely can’t
call profitably with K5s.
UNDERSTANDING PREFLOP 3-BETTING 115
The number of hands you attempt to 3-bet in borderline
situations is limited. If you go crazy in every borderline
situation, you’ll be 3-betting way too often, and your
opponents may begin to punish you for it. You have to pull
back on the reins a bit.
Let’s suppose that you resolve to 3-bet X percent of the
time you are in a borderline bluffing situation. You count out
hands you’re going to do this with that add up to X percent.
You decide that you can either choose to 3-bet KJs or K5s, but
not both.
You should choose K5s. If you choose KJs, then you will
3-bet with that hand, but you’ll have to fold K5s. If you
choose K5s, however, then you will 3-bet with that hand, and
you’ll call (profitably) with KJs. You’re now profiting with
two hands instead of just the one. Even though KJs is a more
profitable hand to 3-bet than K5s, your overall strategy will be
more profitable if you 3-bet K5s and call with KJs.
This is called a polarized 3-betting strategy. You’re 3-
betting with the very best hands—AA, KK, AK, and so
forth—and you’re 3-betting with relative junk—K5s and the
like. The hands in the middle—KQo, KJs, and so forth—you
aren’t 3-betting. Thus, the hands you are 3-betting are at the
poles, the top and the bottom, of all the hands you’re playing.
Polarized 3-betting ranges often make sense when your
primary goal for 3-betting is to bluff. This can be true if you’re
3-betting to win the pot immediately, as we’ve discussed. Or it
can also be true if you’re 3-betting expecting not to win
immediately, but to get called and to win the pot with a bluff
after the flop.
If you’re isolating an opponent, however, you will choose a
more depolarized strategy. You’re 3-betting AA and AK, you
may be 3-betting A4s and 44, but you’re also 3-betting the
hands in between like KQo and KJs. A depolarized strategy
tends to make more sense when you expect to see flops with
test
.
.
TIGHT PLAYER REVIEW AND EXERCISES 71
No. Don’t bluff like this. Bet-sizing tells tell you two things
about your tight opponents’ holdings. First, they tell you
roughly what sort of hand your opponent likely has. But
second, and more importantly, they tell you how your
opponent feels about the hand.
Generally speaking, tight players like their hands when
they make big bets. A big bet on the flop sometimes indicates
some measure of fear of being drawn out on. But the fear is in
being drawn out on, not in being behind presently.
The bottom line is that tight players are not planning to betfold
when they make large bets. Sure, you might catch a few
players off-guard and spook them enough to get a big
laydown, but this is not a reliable, exploitable bet-fold spot.
It’s just taking a wild shot at someone.
Bluff into weaker ranges and in clear bet-fold situations.
When your tight opponent is showing a lot of strength and
hasn’t yet denied holding big hands through a range-limiting
check or call, bluff rarely.
Exercise No. 1.
This series of exercises all come from the same game. It’s a
Wednesday afternoon $2-$5 live game in Las Vegas.
Everyone has around a $1,000 stack.
The game has been very tight for the last half hour. Most
pots are two to four-handed preflop (only limped pots have
seen more than three players to a flop). There have been no
preflop reraises. Most hands end with a bet on the flop or turn.
The only showdowns have been hands that were bet once and
then checked down the rest of the way.
Most of the players in the game seem like carbon copies of
one another. They exhibit a number of the nit traits. They
limp-fold preflop. They seem unwilling to felt without the
72 PLAYING THE PLAYER
nuts. They exhibit bet-sizing tells. For the purpose of these
exercises, we’ll call these players the nits.
There is one player in the game who is a bit more active.
He’s not loose, but he’s been raising the limpers fairly
frequently and barreling postflop. This player is two to your
right. For the purpose of these exercises, we’ll call this player
the TAG.
You’re on the button. This is your second time on the
button, and you’ve won a single small pot in the first orbit. A
nit limps in from two seats after the under the gun player. The
TAG folds. The nit on your direct right limps. You have
J?6?. What should you do?
? ? ? ?
You should raise. Your hand isn’t good, but these nits are
either going to limp-fold, or they’re going to call and then fold
most of the time after the flop. You are at least suited, so it’s
possible you can luck into a hand.
I’d raise an amount that you think will get a good mix
between calls and folds. You certainly don’t want to raise so
small that the blinds and both limpers will be tempted to come
along. You also don’t want to raise so much that you’re
getting called only by a very tight range of hands. Your
opponents make two mistakes: folding preflop and folding
postflop. Let them make both types of mistakes.
In many tight games, raising to something between $25 and
$35 will fit this bill.
You raise to $30. The blinds fold, the early limper calls,
and the limper to your right folds. There’s $72 in the pot.
The flop is K?Q? 5?
Your opponent checks. What should you do?
? ? ? ?
TIGHT PLAYER REVIEW AND EXERCISES 73
It can be tempting to look at this flop, think it hits a nit’s
range well, and check. But against a nit who makes big folding
mistakes after the flop, I’d bet for two reasons. First, when a
nit (one who limp-folds frequently) limps in early position and
then calls a large raise, his range is very heavy with pocket
pairs. Nits will usually limp-call with any pocket pair JJ or
lower. That’s 60 hands. On this flop I’d expect a nit to fold all
of these except for obviously 55. So he’s folding 54 hands.
That’s a good chunk of his total hands.
Next, think about the other hands the nit can have. He can
have AK, but he can also have AQ. He can have KQ, but he
can also have AJ or QJs or JTs. The point is that even when he
calls the flop, he’s nearly as often going to have a hand he’s
intending to fold to further pressure (AQ, QJs, JTs if it misses,
etc.) as he is to have a hand that he’s intending to call down
with (AK or KQ).
Thus, even if we get called on the flop, we’ll often still
have a profitable barrel on the turn. The combination of the
immediate flop folds plus the chance of winning on the turn
warrants a bet.
You bet $45 into the $72 pot. Your opponent calls.
Ok, he doesn’t have one of the pocket pairs. He’s got a big
card hand, something that meshes with the K and Q—or rarely
55. The turn is the 6?, giving us J?6? on a K?Q? 5?6?
board.
What do you do?
? ? ? ?
This is a great card. Obviously it pairs us. Now a pair is
very likely not to be the best hand, but it gives five outs to
outdraw AK. More importantly, it’s a blank for your
opponent’s entire range. A nit is virtually guaranteed not to
74 PLAYING THE PLAYER
have hit this card. If you bet again, he won’t fold AK or KQ or
55 or probably KJs or even KTs. But he will likely fold AQ or
QJs or QTs or even JTs. On the off chance he decided to take
one off on the flop with JJ or TT or AJ, he’s folding those
also.
If you bet half pot, you’re getting 2-to-1 on your bluff, and
the nit is folding well over 33 percent of the time in this
situation. If he flat-calls, you can be fairly sure you’re up
against specifically AK (because he likely would raise with
top two or a set), and you have five outs.
The pot is $162. You bet $90. Your opponent folds.
This is a very typical example of raising nitty limp-folders
from in position and barreling them until they fold. In this
example, the worst turn cards to try to barrel would be aces,
queens, jacks, and tens. Queens give AQ and QJs trips. Aces,
jacks, and tens improve some of the other hands we hope
would fold (AQ, JTs, KJs, and so forth). In particular, a jack is
a distinctly worse card than a six.
On the other hand, even without pairing, it’s probably
worth barreling any card 2 through 9.
People who want to play like nits and who simply refuse to
give any action are making huge folding errors after the flop.
Against a true nit, it’s hard to find situations where trying a
bluff isn’t worth it.
Exercise No. 2.
A nit open-raises to $20 from early position. Everyone
folds to you in the cutoff. You have A? 4? . What do you do?
? ? ? ?
TIGHT PLAYER REVIEW AND EXERCISES 75
Call. Yes, nits have tight ranges when they open-raise from
early position. But with position, a suited ace, and nearly a
thousand behind, you have plenty of ammunition with which
to go to war. You’re relying on your opponent’s trusty traits to
carry you to victory. He’s going to give off bet-sizing tells,
and he’s going to be unwilling to make big calls against you
when the board gets scary. There’s a reason nits always say
they “hate” hands like AK, QQ, and JJ. It’s because nits often
end up folding these hands to pressure when the board begins
to look bad.
You call, and the big blind calls. There’s $62 in the pot.
The flop is 8? 3?2?. You have flopped a gutshot, an
overcard ace, and a backdoor flush draw on a board with two
hearts.
The big blind checks. the nit bets $100 into the $62 pot.
What should you do?
? ? ? ?
Call. Huge bet-sizing tell here. That bet is enormous. The
nit thinks he has the best hand now, but he fears that he’ll get
drawn out on if another card comes off.
He’s got an overpair. You don’t want to raise. You’ll get
called.
You also have too much hand to fold. First, you likely have
seven outs (aces and fives) to the best hand. If a non-heart five
comes, you have some implied odds as well, even against a
nit.
You also have a number of potential bluff cards. Hearts are
the obvious ones. Your opponent is very unlikely to have a
heart draw. He’s also going to fold his overpair if hearts get
there and you bet big enough. Hearts are the specific hand he’s
afraid of when he bets $100 into the $62 pot.
76 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Hearts plus aces plus fives give you more than a 50 percent
chance to catch one of your cards by the river. You also have
implied odds on some of these cards. You also may catch
other cards that turn out to scare your opponent as well.
You call. The big blind predictably folds. It would have
been worth mentioning that there is a player behind you,
except that the player is a nit who will virtually never raise on
a flop like this one (and will essentially always have a set
when he does raise). There’s $262 in the pot with nearly $900
behind.
The turn is the K?. Your opponent bets $100. What do you
do?
? ? ? ?
I’d call again. You still have your aces, fives, and hearts
working for you. And now you’re getting considerably better
pot odds to stick around.
Also, this looks like another bet-sizing tell to me. On the
flop this guy was terrified that you would outdraw him, and he
overbet the pot to try to force you out. On the turn, however,
he’s slowed down considerably. This most likely means that
he’s worried that you already outdrew him with the king. He
likely has something like Q-Q, J-J, or T-T, and he’s afraid you
called the flop with A-K. (Nits are afraid of the darnedest
things.)
The other option is he’s got K-K and he’s decided to slow
down to allow you to give him action. This is possible, though
I’d expect a bigger bet due to the fact that he’ll almost
certainly put you on hearts after calling the flop. (Yes, he’ll
simultaneously put you on a heart draw and A-K. Whatever
beats or threatens them, that’s what nits will think you have.)
The other, other option is that he’s got A-A and just bet
smaller for whatever reason. Or he’s got ace-high hearts and
TIGHT PLAYER REVIEW AND EXERCISES 77
has played it strangely. While I’d expect to see Q-Q through
9-9 most of the time after this action, it pays to keep in mind a
few less-likely but still possible hands so you aren’t taken
completely by surprise when things go awry.
If the $100 bet looks like he’s scared, and I think it does,
then why not raise? It’s because you get a chance to bluff on
the river, and by waiting around you get another bit of
information before you have to commit. The only downside to
waiting is if your opponent has Q-Q, would have folded to the
raise, and catches a queen on the river. This is unlikely enough
that I think it’s worth waiting to see what your opponent does
on the river.
You call. The pot is $462, and there’s nearly $800 behind.
The river is the 7?, making the final board
8? 3?2?K?7?. Your opponent checks.
Green light. Make a nice-sized bet and you’ll be getting a
fold the vast majority of the time. About $300 should likely
suffice. Bet enough that you’re virtually positive he’ll fold QQ
and not more than that.
Truth be told, the river could have come any card (except
an ace or five) and I would have bluffed after a check. A river
check would confirm in my mind the bet-sizing tell from the
turn that my opponent feared the king.
In fact, I think a bluff is actually probably even better on a
non-heart blank river. On the heart, it’s possible the nit is
checking a hand like K-K that he will eventually call with. On
a non-heart, however, he’d have nothing to fear and he’d
unleash a large bet with K-K. So after a check, you’re almost
guaranteed to be looking at Q-Q through 9-9, and your bluff is
clear to succeed.
If the river had been a non-heart ace, I would likely bet a
small amount, perhaps as small as $50. Your hand is good, so
you should bet for value, but with an ace and king on board,
he’s folding if you do anything more than breathe at the pot.
78 PLAYING THE PLAYER
If the river had been a non-heart five, I would likely bet
slightly more for value. With just the king on board, you can
bet a little larger and perhaps coax a call from a pocket pair.
If the river had been the 5?, I would make my largest value
bet. Why? Because there’s now the chance that my opponent
checked a hand like K-K, 8-8, or A-A on the river fearing the
flush. Even nits sometimes pay off the river in frustration
when they fear they’ve been outdrawn.
The lesson of this hand is that if you have deep stacks and
position on a nitty player, through bet-sizing tells and
generally straightforward betting and checking decisions from
the nit, you can really pin them down to a fairly specific set of
hands. Frequently the board will run out scary for the nit, and
you’ll often be able to take the pot on the river. So it’s often
good to float a nit if you have any sort of draw because you
can represent other draws when the scare cards hit.
Exercise No. 3.
A nit limps in from middle position, and the TAG raises to
$25 on the button. You’re in the big blind with K?T?. What
should you do?
? ? ? ?
This is a hand I could play one of three ways. You’re
probably used to folding in this situation. While it’s a fine
default play to fold KTo in the big blind to a raise, I think the
hand has value in this particular situation. How I proceed
depends on how loosely the TAG will isolate from the button,
combined with how the TAG will likely respond to a 3-bet.
If the TAG is still fairly tight even in this ideal raising
situation, I’d fold. You don’t want to call from out of position
TIGHT PLAYER REVIEW AND EXERCISES 79
getting only a slight subsidy against a range that is
substantially stronger than KTo.
But if the TAG is raising the nit loosely on the button (as I
suggested you do earlier in the book) then KTo will play fine
against his range. It’s a hand that makes top pair often which
lets you bluff catch and/or bet for thin value.
Despite the fact that the hand has some value against the
raiser’s range, if I expect the TAG to fold frequently to a 3-
bet, that’s what I’ll do. If I can get him to fold hands up to, for
instance, KJo and 66, then he’s folding most of his range, and
it’s a profitable bluff. (The nit will play against a 3-bet very
rarely.)
If the TAG is likely to call a 3-bet, however, then I’ll be 3-
betting him with better big-card hands like AJo and KQo, and
suited hands. Thus, I’d just call with the KTo.
I’m not too worried about the nit. He’s dead money, even if
his hand range when he calls is stronger than KTo. Between
the two aggressive players in the pot, he simply isn’t going to
see a showdown very often. And when he does clobber a flop,
rather than risk a free card, he’s as likely as not to do
something obvious like bet pot on the flop.
So let’s say I know the TAG is opening very loosely on the
button, but that he will also defend against a 3-bet with a wide
range of hands. I call. The nit folds.
There’s $57 in the pot. The flop comes 4-2-2 rainbow. How
should you approach this flop?
? ? ? ?
You called preflop because KTo compared reasonably well
against your opponent’s starting range. If you check, your
opponent would likely bet roughly half pot, and you would be
getting 3-to-1 (or possibly slightly worse). Again, an ABC
80 PLAYING THE PLAYER
player would tend to check-fold a flop like this one, but the
TAG’s range is too weak to do that.
If you doubt it, play with PokerStove. Input a “typical”
button raising range. (I chose any ace, any two cards nine or
higher, any suited king, any pocket pair, and an array of suited
and connected hands.) Compare it to KTo on this flop. You’ll
find that KTo likely has at least 40 percent equity, which is
way too much to fold getting 3-to-1 or even a little worse.
So what should you do? There are a few options. It depends
on the sort of mistakes your opponent is likely to make.
Consider what might happen if your opponent were prone to
bet-fold on a flop like this one.
Obviously, most of his range will have air-balled this flop.
Pocket pairs are a small part of his preflop range. So the TAG
likely has two unpaired cards like you. But he’s going to want
to fight for this pot. When your opponent plans to fight for a
pot, it means he plans to bet-fold at some point.
The first thing you can try is check-raising the flop. I say
it’s the first thing to try because it’s a fairly obvious ploy. It’s
such an obvious ploy that your opponent may not be planning
to fold to a raise as often as you presume when he bets the
flop. Instead, he may be checking back some of his mediumstrength
hands on the flop like ace-high and king-high,
choosing to bet a more polarized range of hands he’s happy to
play a big pot with as well as queen-high or worse. And with
the queen-high hands, he may not fold all of these to your
raise, choosing instead to try to rebluff you.
Another thing you can try is donk betting the flop. This can
work for you in two ways. First, your opponent might simply
give up immediately. Second, it can elicit a bluff-raise on a
board like this. Now this bet, the bluff-raise, is much more
likely to be a bet-fold. The chance your opponent has a
legitimate raising hand on a board like this one is small, yet
TIGHT PLAYER REVIEW AND EXERCISES 81
some players will raise a donk bet very frequently. So you can
consider bet/3-betting the flop.
Yet another thing you can try is to simply check-call the
flop. Check-calling is a perfectly reasonable play if you
assume that your opponent will bet most of his air. As I said
above, getting 3-to-1 on a call, you would have to be certain
that your opponent is betting only strong hands for the call to
be wrong. I would virtually never assume that for a TAG
opening a wide range on the button.
Why check-call the flop? Well, it does a few things. First, it
gives you a shot to pair up. Second, it sets your opponent up
for a situation where he’s considerably more likely to be betfolding—
on the turn.
Say you check and call the flop. Then a nine comes on the
turn. You check, and your opponent bets again. What hands is
your opponent legitimately betting twice for value on a board
like this one?
Not much. Big pocket pairs, maybe a good nine, and
obviously trips or a full house. It’s a small portion of his
preflop raising range. This means that the TAG should be
checking either the flop or the turn a good portion of the time.
But some players won’t do that. They’ll keep firing their air,
hoping you called the flop with a hand like KTo that you plan
to release on the turn.
If you suspect your opponent is barreling recklessly on a
board like this one, you can check-raise the turn.
Here’s the bottom line on paired, rag flops like this one.
1. Usually both players miss the flop, so both players have
two unpaired cards.
2. Hand values shift considerably from what they are on a
“normal” flop, such that ace-high and king-high are
reasonable hands, both for their showdown value and
also for their chance to pair.
82 PLAYING THE PLAYER
3. Playing flops like this one is often a game of chicken,
where your goal is to put in the first credible bet that
represents a hand range stronger than just a smattering
of unpaired hands.
4. Your tight-aggressive opponents will often stumble,
planning to bet-fold in predictable places. They’re
betting because they want to fight for the pot, but
they’re then folding because they incorrectly give you
credit for an overly strong range when you raise.
5. You have a number of options for how to play the hand.
You can be aggressive early in the hand, or you can
wait and see what happens. Think about the bet-folding
mistakes your TAG opponent will make. Then
maneuver the hand so you get the bet-folds at the right
time.
test
.
.
Trait No. 5. Pot-Controlling
Overview
Ah, pot control. The no-limit concept most abused by tight
and nitty players.
The idea is simple. You have a made hand of some sort. It’s
not such a good made hand that you can make three big bets
and expect someone with a worse hand to pay all three. No,
it’s just an ok made hand. Since you can’t just bet, bet, bet and
get called by worse hands, you check a street instead. You
check to disguise your hand. You check to avoid getting
bluffed. And you check to avoid ending up on the short end of
the risk-reward stick.
It’s a legitimate concept. But it’s one that has a little bit too
much appeal for all the nitty players of the world. “You mean
all those times I’m scared to death that my opponent has me
beat or that I’m going to get bluffed out of a big pot, I can just
check it down and that’s okay? Think of how much variance
I’ll cut out! I’m going to start checking everything. ”
Tight players are positively addicted to pot-controlling
lines. Unfortunately, pot-controlling is not all it’s cracked up
to be in small stakes games. Pot-controlling is intended to
maximize value against tight players who bluff intelligently.
After all, the basic assumption of pot-controlling is that your
opponents aren’t calling you with many worse hands, but they
are willing to put you to the test in big pots when scare cards
come.
In small stakes games, however, players call too much and
don’t bluff enough. So by pot-controlling you’re often just
54 PLAYING THE PLAYER
shooting yourself in the foot. Better than pot-controlling in
many small stakes situations is bet-folding. We’ve already
talked about bet-folding.
So now let’s talk about pot-controlling. Your tight
opponents will do it frequently. In position, your opponents
will check back flops or turns (and usually also rivers) with
good showdown value. Out of position, your opponents may
try to control the pot by making small blocking bets.
Adjustment Summary
Here’s the thing about pot-controlling lines. They tend to
deny a strong hand. This means that tight players who are potcontrolling
tend to be unwilling to play big pots with their
hands. (This is, after all, the primary reason these players are
pot-controlling in the first place—fear of losing a big pot with
their hand.)
You can thwart pot-controlling lines with overbets. Here’s
how it works.
It’s a $1-$2 game with $300 stacks. A player limps in, and
a tight player raises to $10 on the button. You call in the big
blind, and the limper calls also.
The flop is A?T? 8?. You check, the limper checks, and
the preflop raiser checks.
The turn is the 7?. You bet $30 into the $31 pot. The
limper folds, and the tight player calls.
The river is the 8?. You bet $150 into the $91 pot.
Say you have Q?J? and therefore you’re bluffing. By
betting $150 to win the $91 pot, you have to succeed over 62
percent of the time for the bluff to be profitable. You’ll find,
however, that this river bluff succeeds considerably more
often than that against most tight players. Why?
POT-CONTROLLING 55
By playing this way, the tight player is either pot
controlling or drawing. He raises preflop, but then checks back
the flop and merely flat calls the turn. On this coordinated
board, by failing to “protect his hand” on either the flop or
turn, he denies a strong hand. He’s likely got either a busted
draw, a hand like K-K, Q-Q, J-J, 9-9, or perhaps even an ace
with a kicker he’s not particularly proud of.
He doesn’t want to lose a big pot. He’s trying to control the
pot size by taking the line he’s taken. So just overbet the river
and force him to make a big call. He won’t—at least he won’t
call 40 percent of the time.
Why the overbet? Tight players use pot controlling lines
because they are worried about getting bluffed. So opponents
in pot control mode are naturally suspicious of bluffs. If you
throw a half-pot bet out there, you’re going to get snapped off.
It plays directly into the tight player’s plans: Keep the pot
small. Prevent big bluffs. Induce small bluffs. Snap them off.
The overbet pulls a tight player away from the plan. Also, it
mimics lines that typical small stakes players take only with
strong hands. For instance, if I were playing as the button in
the hand above, and I held A-K, I would snap-fold to the $150
bet against the vast majority of $1-$2 players. This is a betting
line they would take only with the J-9 straight or a full house.
So you can use your tight opponents’ hand reading skills
against them because whenever they’ve seen this line in the
past, it’s meant strength.
This adjustment takes advantage of a particular trait of
many tight players. They play too straightforwardly—not
bluffing enough, taking lines that eliminate strong hands from
their ranges too often—which means that they betray too
much information with each action. Furthermore, tight players
tend to have folding thresholds for most of their hands. They
will endure a certain amount of action with a hand of a given
strength, but fold when the action gets heavier than that.
56 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Exploiting this is easy. Process the information the tight
player gives you, then bet more than they’re likely to be
willing to call. Because no-limit allows you to overbet at any
time, it’s impossible to truly control the size of the pot, and
you can pull tight players out of their comfort zones on nearly
any hand. Furthermore, even though a tight player knows
they’re being pulled from their comfort zone, rarely will one
make the correct counter-adjustments.
Pitfalls To Avoid
There aren’t too many common pitfalls with this play. It
frankly drives tight players crazy. They hate calling big bets
with pot-controlling hands.
Obviously, don’t overuse it. Part of the power of this play
is that it convincingly represents strength. If you’re
overbetting three times an hour, even the nits will notice and
give it less credit.
And don’t use it against calling stations who specialize in
calling big bets in ridiculous spots. Hopefully you wouldn’t
look for plays to use against calling stations in the section
about adjusting to tight players.
Occasionally you will happen upon tight players who are so
suspicious of getting bluffed that even though they want
desperately to fold to this bet they’ll call anyway. Usually
these are tight players on tilt.
Who Exhibits This Trait
Nearly every no-limit player takes pot control lines
sometimes. Nitty players tend to take them more frequently
than TAGs (who use the bet-fold more than nits do).
POT-CONTROLLING 57
I would say I use this play against small stakes “regs” more
than I do against any other player type. These are players who
have enough hand reading skills to see the overbet as both out
of the ordinary and as likely strong. The nittier regs are the
best targets.
You can also catch LAG players with this play. It comes up
in pots where a LAG has been uncharacteristically passive,
checking one or two streets. This line from a LAG often
indicates weak showdown value. The LAG plans to snap off a
normal-sized bet, but the overbet makes them think twice.
The Bottom Line
Your opponents will take pot control lines to get to
showdown and to avoid being bluffed when they hold
marginal made hands. Pot control lines are often not well
balanced and contain too many hands the player is unwilling
to felt (or play a big pot with). You can exploit this
unwillingness by forcing the issue with an overbet. Unless
your opponents know to expect this play from you, if you
choose your spots reasonably well, you’ll see a high success
rate.
Trait No. 6. Refusing To
Fire A Second Or Third
Barrel
Overview
An optimal strategy for no-limit involves a lot of multi-street
bluffing. You fire a bluff on one street, and then if called,
some percentage of the time you fire again. Then, if called,
some percentage of the time you fire yet again.
I call this multi-street bluffing process running your
opponent through the gauntlet of bluffs. When your opponent
tries to get to showdown against you when you bluff with
near-correct frequencies, each successive call becomes harder
and harder. Your opponent should know that your bluffing
frequency goes down with each bet, so therefore every time
you bet the chance his hand is good drops. But your bluffing
frequency should never be so low that your opponent can ever
know for relative certain whether his hand is good or not.
It takes a certain amount of guts, however, to bluff
correctly. In a number of circumstances, you have to be
willing to play bluffs in the same way you’d play the nuts.
This means following up a routine flop bet with a large turn
bet and a quite large river bet.
Many players simply don’t have the guts to do this—or
worse than that they don’t even think to do it when the proper
situations arise. When you’re against someone who refuses to
follow up bluffs at the correct frequency with bigger bluffs,
you have a huge hole to exploit. In the extreme case, the entire
REFUSING TO FIRE A SECOND OR THIRD BARREL 59
principle of stack leverage, with early small bets threatening
later large bets, goes completely out the window. This allows
you to make many more speculative calls and also to steal a
lot of pots you shouldn’t normally be allowed to steal.
Adjustment Summary
First let’s look at someone who doesn’t fire second barrels.
This player will raise preflop and get called. Then this player
will fire a continuation bet on the flop and get called. On the
turn, however, this player bets again only with value hands
and almost never as a bluff. With all marginal made hands and
with draws and air, this player checks back the turn.
Boy, is this trait easy to exploit. The simple adjustment is
to call nearly all flops. Here’s how it works.
This player opens in a $2-$5 game to $15 from three off the
button. The button calls, and you call in the big blind with
Q?J?.
The flop is K?9?3? . You check, the preflop raiser bets
$25, and the button folds. You’ve got a gutshot and a
backdoor flush draw.
Call and check the turn. Your opponent’s turn action will
tell you what sort of hand you’re up against. If he makes a big
turn bet, he’s likely got something like A-A, A-K, or a set. If
he checks it back, he’s likely got something like T-T, 7-7, AQ,
or worse.
If he checks the turn, you’ll usually bluff the river. On this
relatively draw-free board, your hand looks like a king to your
opponent. Most tight players with this trait will give you credit
for the king and lay down lesser hands. (Folding the river, in
fact, is part of the strategy many players use when they have
this trait. They are trying to “lose the minimum” on all their
marginal hands.)
60 PLAYING THE PLAYER
If he bets the turn, you just give him credit and fold. Unless
you make your straight, of course, in which case I would tend
to bet fairly large on the turn and river. The reason to bet
rather than to check the turn is that, because of your
opponent’s trait, you aren’t inducing bluffs when you check.
So your opponent, by and large, is betting or calling your bets
with roughly the same set of hands. And this way, by betting,
you get to control the bet sizes rather than allowing your
opponent to possibly bet smaller than you would have. (Of
course you could check-raise, but you run the risk of blowing
your opponent off a one pair hand. You’ll typically make more
against your opponent’s entire range of hands if you simply
bet big on the turn and river.)
Why is this line profitable? You’re getting nearly 3-to-1 on
the flop call, and then you’re getting almost perfect
information on the turn about whether you’ll be able to win
the pot or not. Since your opponent will hold less than top pair
on this flop more than half the time, you can very profitably
call getting 3-to-1, knowing that the turn will get checked
through more than half the time and that you can often have a
very profitable river bluff.
Furthermore, you have a gutshot to the nuts to outdraw
your opponent when he does have a king or better, and when
the turn gets checked through, you have two chances to make
at least a pair of jacks which could well be the best hand once
the turn is checked through.
You can also check-call with pocket pairs like 88 on a flop
like K-9-3 rainbow. If your opponent bets the turn, your hand
is no good. If he checks, you’re probably good. Or you can
possibly throw out a little blocking river bet to get nittier
players to fold hands like T-T.
Against players with rudimentary hand-reading skills, you
can fairly easily represent top pair by check-calling from out
of position on uncoordinated flops. For instance, if you checkREFUSING
TO FIRE A SECOND OR THIRD BARREL 61
call on a A?7?4? flop, these players will tend to give you
credit for an ace. If the turn gets checked through, you can
maybe half-pot the river and expect to get well more than
enough folds to justify the play.
If you want to try to run this play as a bluff on a more
coordinated board, and a scare card comes on the turn, you can
often check the turn, let your opponent check it through, and
then overbet the river. Once the scare card comes, your
opponent’s check doesn’t deny top pair as strongly, but an
overbet is often enough to get them off even top pair on a
scary board.
There are a number of different possibilities, but when
you’re up against a player who doesn’t double barrel, you can
call a lot more flops, even from out of position, and then use
the information you get on the turn to play as perfectly as
possible against your opponent’s range.
Now say your opponent will fire the turn, but he almost
never follows up on the river if called. This trait is not as
thoroughly exploitable as refusing to even fire the turn, but
again you can call more frequently on the turn since you’ll
rarely have a tough river decision.
For instance, say someone raises preflop to $20, one fairly
loose player calls behind, and you call in the big blind with
Q?T?.
The flop is T?3?2?. You check, the preflop raiser bets
$40 into the $67 pot, the loose player folds, and you call.
The turn is the K?. You check, and your opponent bets $80
into $147 on this obvious turn barreling card. You can fairly
safely call now and check-fold the river. If your opponent was
barreling the turn, he’ll just check the river back, and you’ll
win. If he bets, you can expect that at least he caught the king,
and you can safely fold.
If your opponent didn’t have this trait, and you’d have to
fear a river barrel, then the turn call becomes much dicier.
62 PLAYING THE PLAYER
This is what stack leverage does in no-limit hold’em—it
makes trying to call down with medium-strength but very
beatable hands a tricky proposition. But when a player simply
refuses to fire barrels on the turn or the river, stack leverage all
but disappears because you never have to fear losing a big pot
with your marginal hand.
When you have position, you can call even lighter in these
spots, floating the flop with all sorts of junk, and calling quite
light on the turn. You can call especially lighter on the turn,
since position gives you the opportunity to turn your hand into
a bluff should your opponent check the river.
For instance, say you have 6?5? on the button. You’re
playing $2-$5 with $1,200 stacks. A tight player who barrels
turns but not rivers opens for $15, and you call. The big blind
calls.
The flop comes J? 5? 4?. The preflop raiser bets $30 into
the $47 pot. You call, and the big blind folds.
The turn is the K?. The preflop raiser bets $80. This is a
thoroughly reasonable card to bluff-raise, given that it’s one I
would expect your opponent to barrel with many hands, and it
also gives you a flush draw. But when your opponent will tell
you on the river whether he has a value hand or not, strongly
consider just calling to delay your decision until you get the
information.
The river is the 7? . Your opponent checks. I think you can
turn your hand into a bluff here. Assuming your bet is large
enough, you’re unlikely to get called by any hand of a pair of
jacks or weaker. And your opponent is a fair dog to have a
king or better after this action.
I would indeed fire the bluff rather than try to rely on the
showdown value of the pair of fives, because if you check it
down, you’ll frequently lose to hands like 9-9 and J-T.
REFUSING TO FIRE A SECOND OR THIRD BARREL 63
Pitfalls to Avoid
This line (failing to barrel the turn) can mimic a pot-control
line. If you decide you want to bluff the river when the turn
gets checked through, weigh the chance your opponent is
giving up versus the chance he’s pot-controlling.
For instance, say a player opens for $20, and you call in the
big blind.
The flop is K?8?3?. You check, he bets, you call.
The turn is the 9? . You check, he checks.
In addition to checking back his air, does this player also
check back hands like K-T, K-J, and K-Q for pot control? If
so, you may still have a profitable river bluff since your
opponent will have air more often than top pair, but when you
size the bluff, you might want to make it a small bet (to mimic
a thin value bet with a king) that will get your opponent off
hands less than a king, but will concede a call to a king. Or
you possibly might try an overbet to get your opponent off the
pot-controlled top pairs (particularly if the river card is
potentially scary).
In any event, the more your opponent checks back top pair
or better hands, the less valuable the information you get on
the turn becomes. This dynamic may favor check-raise
bluffing the flop over check-calling the flop and waiting for
the river to bluff.
Also it’s important, if you do start to call these flop and
turn bets lighter due to the lack of barreling, that you
recognize which of your hands can tolerate a showdown and
which hands are too weak to show down and will require you
to bluff.
For instance, if you hold Q-Q on a J-4-3-K board, you can
call the turn and check the river confident that your hand will
usually win a showdown when your opponent checks the river
back.
64 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Whereas, say you check-call a K-5-3 flop with A-4. Your
opponent checks back a T on the turn. You catch a 4 on the
river. Despite pairing, you may want to throw out a bluff
anyway to avoid losing to hands like 8-8 and T-9.
Who Exhibits This Trait
Nits and many TAGs are limp about firing barrels. They
can muster some aggression on the cheap streets, but when
bluffing begins to cost them a quarter or half of their stack,
they just can’t pull the trigger.
Most small-stakes live regular players exhibit this trait to
one degree or another. Ironically, you’ll hear them grumble
about the loose, fishy players who check-call the flop with
bottom pair and then win a showdown with it. But because of
the way these regulars play, giving up so easily when called,
calling them with “junk” on the flop is often the correct play.
The Bottom Line
When your opponents won’t barrel you on the expensive
streets, they lose their stack leverage. This lets you call them
lighter on the streets they will barrel. You can bluff-catch
them lighter when appropriate, safe in the knowledge that they
are not going to subsequently bluff you off your hand with a
huge bet. You can also float them both in and out of position,
planning to bluff when they check. You need to watch board
textures and your opponent’s pot-controlling tendencies to try
to tell the difference between checks that give up on the pot
and checks designed to induce bluffs. But overall when your
opponents won’t barrel for the big bucks, they become much,
much easier to play against.
Tight Player Review And
Exercises
I hear poker players complain about tight opponents and tight
games all the time. The reason many players find tight games
so frustrating is that they like to play an ABC style, and the
ABC style performs poorly against tight players.
The reality is that optimal no-limit hold’em play involves
quite a bit of bluffing, getting stacks in frequently. (If you
doubt this, watch a nosebleed stakes online game for a while.
The regular players in these games play closer to an optimal
style than any other no-limit players. These are some of the
most aggressive games on the planet.)
When your opponents are unwilling to put money in the
pot, when they’re unwilling to get stacks in without a very
strong hand, they are making systematic mistakes (compared
to the optimal strategy) of folding too much and bluffing not
enough. You can exploit the error of not bluffing enough by
refusing to pay off the big bets of tight players. You can
exploit the error of folding too much by anticipating these
folds and betting/raising your air and marginal hands and
draws.
Unfortunately, the rake is your enemy as you try to exploit
too-tight players. You’ll be winning lots of small and medium
pots, and these are the ones that are raked most heavily.
Nevertheless, I recommend ignoring the rake, playing as if it
weren’t a concern. The rake will only “kill” you at the small
stakes where your goal should be to learn, not to maximize
winrate. Feel free to evaluate your small stakes results by
66 PLAYING THE PLAYER
subtracting out the extra rake you pay versus playing in a
bigger game. Bigger live games tend to be time charge rather
than rake, which completely nullifies the extra rake burden.
Bigger online games feature rakes that are small compared
even to the small pots you’ll be winning.
A willingness to get stacks in when the outcome is
uncertain is required at no-limit. When your opponents seem
unwilling to do this, exploit it in the following ways.
Loosen up preflop in position. You are planning to avoid
showdowns and force your opponents to fold too much.
Whenever you don’t see many showdowns, your hand strength
becomes much less important. It’s more important that you be
able to identify situations where your opponent is likely to
fold by examining board texture and bet-sizing tells. Thus, a
weak hand in position is often preferable to a somewhat
stronger hand out of position.
Raise frequently in limped pots. Tight players limp-fold
too often. You exploit this obviously by raising preflop to
force the folds. Tight players also fold too easily in mediumsized
pots. You exploit this by building pots preflop so that
when your opponents incorrectly fold, you win more money.
You may have heard of the strategy of “punishing limpers” by
raising mediocre hands preflop. These tight players are the
correct players to so punish. (When you raise with mediocre
hands against very loose, showdown-bound limpers, however,
you often punish no one but yourself.)
Up your barreling frequency. Barreling means betting
with the initiative. A flop barrel is also known as a
continuation bet. A turn barrel is a bet made after someone
calls your flop continuation bet. A river barrel is similarly
defined. A delayed barrel is a bet made after electing to check
TIGHT PLAYER REVIEW AND EXERCISES 67
a previous street. Against tight players, you should up your
barreling frequency on all streets in nearly all situations. Tight
players fold too much, and barreling is how you get them to
fold incorrectly. Barreling is extremely effective against
players unwilling to get stacks in without the nuts.
Give up easily against committing bets and raises. The
converse to this is that you should give up easily when your
opponent makes a large bet or raise that commits stacks. These
will rarely be bluffs, and they’ll also rarely be speculative in
nature. This adjustment is otherwise known as, “Don’t pay off
the nits. ”
Bet-fold frequently. Combine the last two directives, and
you’ll be bet-folding a lot. You’ll be betting the turn, but
nearly always folding if raised. As I pointed out earlier in the
text, this adjustment is extremely exploitable. But players who
hate getting stacks in won’t be exploiting it. Do it as long as
you can get away with it.
Seek out game structures with increased dead money.
Game structures with increased dead money like antes, button
antes, third blinds, straddles, and the like will work against
tight players. Tight players tend to know this and avoid games
with these structures when possible, but frequently tight
players will be stuck playing with these rules. Know that you
can use these rules against them. For instance, when stacks are
deep, playing with the Mississippi straddle rule is absolutely
devastating to overly tight players, especially as the game goes
shorthanded. Some tight players will naïvely agree to this rule
assuming it benefits them if the straddle is voluntary. It
doesn’t benefit them, however, since it intensifies the
positional advantage and helps to build those medium-sized
pots that overly tight players love to abandon.
68 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Against TAG players who are a little sharper, but who still
play tighter than optimal, try the following adjustments.
Anticipate bet-folds and raise them. TAGs rely heavily
on the bet-fold to exploit opponents. Turn the play around on
them by anticipating situations for bet-folds and raising these
bets. There are two easy ways to anticipate bet-folds.
First, look for situations early in hands where your
opponent bet-folds with a high frequency. Preflop steal
attempts are a common example. TAG players typically try to
steal the blinds with a wide range of hands. Many of these
hands they fold to a reraise. If you play online, you can use the
Fold To 3-Bet stat to get a sense of how frequently a given
player bet-folds preflop. In live play, you can just use your
judgment after watching someone play for a while—if you see
someone aggressively opening pots, try 3-betting. If you get a
fold, you may have found an exploitable weakness. (If you get
a call, you may have found a different weakness—too much
willingness to call 3-bets out of position.)
In addition to reraising preflop, you can raise flop
continuation bets and even turn barrels against opponents who
overuse barreling. Donk bets (bets made into a preflop raiser
from out of position on the flop) are also often bet-folds. If
you find a player who likes to donk bet, try raising and see
how frequently your opponent folds.
The other way to find bet-folds is to look for limited hand
ranges. Players limit their hand range when they flat call on
drawish boards when the pot is already getting big. This
happens most often on the turn. The call limits the top end of a
player’s range, and it most often indicates a range of top pairs,
overpairs, and good draws.
If the river doesn’t improve this range, but your opponent
bets anyway, this bet is often a bet-fold.
TIGHT PLAYER REVIEW AND EXERCISES 69
Predicting your opponents’ bet-folds and raising them is a
hugely profitable play. If you learn to attack your TAG
opponents this way, you will likely become one of the top
winners at your level.
Thwart pot-control lines. TAG players frequently use potcontrol
checks to try to make sure they are always winning the
maximum when ahead and losing the minimum when beat
with their marginal and medium-strength made hands. These
pot-control checks typically indicate an unwillingness to play
a big pot. You can use overbets to force your opponent out of
the pot-controlling line. A TAG will typically give your first
few overbets credit, since bluff overbetting is a somewhat rare
trait at small stakes. But if you use the play a lot, TAGs may
adjust and start “pot-controlling” with hands they are
comfortable calling an overbet with. Once this happens,
quickly counter-adjust and begin to overbet against this player
frequently for value. Most TAGs aren’t comfortable playing
this overbetting game, and you will induce mistakes.
Here are general pitfalls to avoid against tight players
Don’t pay off the nits. In the heat of the moment, it can be
hard to let go of good hands when you get raised. You may
suffer from this even against the nits who only put big money
in the pot with a lock. But you must gain control of your
paying off. You simply cannot pay nits off. Believe me, the
old guy across the table with cobwebs in his ears is not
bluffing when he raises you $300 on the river. He has the nuts.
Whatever hand you have that you thought looked pretty is no
good. Fold.
Don’t go for much thin value. Tight players don’t pay off
very much. That’s what makes them tight. So it generally
70 PLAYING THE PLAYER
doesn’t pay to bet your value hands too aggressively. I
frequently hammer home how important it is to bet the river,
but this is because most small stakes players play too loosely
for the big bets on the end. Against players who play too
tightly once the big bets come out, you ease up on your value
betting and replace these bets with more turn and river barrels.
Tight players who feel like they’re being pushed around
sometimes decide to flip a switch and become payoff
monkeys. This phenomenon is commonly called “spazzing
out.” Naturally if you detect this change, stop trying to fold
out made hands and instead commence thin value betting.
Bluff sparingly into tight, strong ranges. Tight players
often (but not in every situation) have tight ranges. I don’t
know how many students have brought hands to me where
they went for a big semibluff against a tight player and got
snapped off. The problem in most of these hands is that my
students didn’t correctly assess the strength of their
opponents’ ranges. Or they did correctly assess the strength,
but were wildly optimistic about their fold equity.
For example, I remember one hand where a student of mine
called a tight player’s early position raise from the big blind
with K-Q. The flop came 8-8-5 rainbow. My student checked,
and the tight player slightly overbet the pot. My student
shoved for about twice the size of the pot. The tight player
called with K-K, and the turn and river didn’t come running
queens.
I was a little shocked by the hand. I said, “When your
opponent raised in early position and then overbet the flop,
what did you think he had? ”
“An overpair,” my student said.
“So why did you bluff?” I asked.
“I thought he’d give me credit for trips and lay it down. ”
test
.
.
.
Pitfalls To Avoid
These bet-sizing tells are very natural. Bet big with big
hands. Bet smaller with smaller hands and with bluffs.
Because they are so natural, many players exhibit them
faithfully. When I play live no-limit, I see these tells in every
session, and they frequently help me to find the right play.
The main pitfall, obviously, is that some players may
reverse these tells on you. In particular, many hands arise
where it becomes clear by the river that neither player is likely
to have a strong hand. Some savvy players have learned to
overbet the pot in these situations, knowing that the
uncommonly large bet looks like strength. Likewise, some
players have learned to make small bets when they perceive
their opponent to have a weak range of hands. The small bet is
designed to look like a blocking bet and induce a bluff-raise.
You’re unlikely to see either of these plays if your main
game is $1-$2, $1-$3, or $2-$5 live no-limit hold’em. But
there are players around who will try them, so be aware.
It might have occurred to you at this point that you should
be making these plays (overbet bluffing and betting small to
induce bluff-raises). I caution against making either play.
Betting small to induce a bluff raise, in particular, is a fool’s
errand at small stakes live games because the vast majority of
players won’t even consider taking the bait. The overbet bluff
has somewhat better prospects, but many small stakes players
call too often when “obviously” beaten, so be careful.
Against tough opponents these two plays should absolutely
be part of your playbook. (Later in the book I discuss the
players you should be trying these plays out against.)
The other pitfall is that sometimes an overbet shove on the
flop (or less commonly the turn) from a tight player means a
big draw rather than a big made hand. It’s something to be
aware of.
TIGHT PLAYER BET-SIZING TELLS 39
Who Exhibits This Trait?
Most small stakes regulars who play on the tight side show
these bet-sizing tells. These players tend to be risk-averse, so
it comes naturally to them to bet more when they think they’re
likely ahead. Large bets early in a hand are often intended to
end the hand, and this desire to end hands prematurely stems
from a generalized fear of being outdrawn or outplayed.
Players who play from fear tend to be a bit nitty.
These tells are universal enough that I will expect any tight
regular-type player to exhibit them until I observe otherwise.
(E.g., I see the player make a large bluff or a bold value bet
with a marginal hand.)
The Bottom Line
Amateur players betray a lot of information in their bet
sizes. Big bets in an absolute sense are unlikely to be bluffs
and quite likely to be very big hands. Big bets in a relative, but
not absolute, sense are likely to be good hands the player fears
getting outdrawn. Small bets frequently don’t tell you much,
but a small bet made in a situation that would usually elicit a
big bet from a big hand often indicates a willingness to fold.
Trait No. 4. Bet-Folding
NOTE: The information in this section is extremely important.
Reread it two dozen times if you have to.
So far the tight player traits we’ve discussed have been fairly
straightforward. Tight players don’t like to felt without the
nuts. They like to fold weak hands early on, even after they’ve
put a little money in the pot. And tight players often vary their
bet sizes according to their hand strength due to the fear of
getting outdrawn and the fear of betting the worse hand.
Altogether these traits point to the same set of adjustments.
Don’t call their big bets. The big bets are saved for big hands,
so calling it off becomes very bad. Don’t value bet too thinly
either. Tight players’ threshold for calling down is higher than
most players, so you can’t get much value from mediumstrength
hands.
Bluff more on the small and medium bets. These players
will abandon small pots frequently, so take lots of stabs. Use
preflop raises with weak hands to build pots before you steal
them.
With very tight, or nitty, players, this is nearly the entire
recipe to destroying them. Never pay them off. In fact,
basically never play a big pot with them even if you’re the one
betting. Instead, play lots of hands preflop and take frequent
stabs at the small and medium pots. Since these players aren’t
actively competing for the small pots, you’ll pick up far more
than your share. And because you’re not losing big pots in the
process, you’ll have a strong, consistent edge.
BET-FOLDING 41
TAG, or tight-aggressive, players are a little tougher to
beat. Why? Because they are also taking frequent stabs at the
small and medium pots. Like nits, TAGs are tight early in
hands, and you can steal blinds and win pots on the flop with
continuation bets. But these players also try to steal blinds and
make continuation bets. Without taking things to the next
level, it’s hard to get an edge. They won’t spew in big pots,
and they’ll at least compete for the small pots.
To get an edge, you have to understand a key TAG
concept, the bet-fold.
Overview
Bet-folding is simple. It’s betting with the intention of
folding to a raise. It’s raising preflop with the intention of
folding to a 3-bet. Continuation betting the flop with
overcards, planning to fold if raised. Or it’s betting top pair for
value on the turn, again intending to fold to a raise.
Bet-folding is the TAG’s bread-and-butter play. In fact, it
nearly defines the archetype. These players are aggressive.
They bet frequently. But they’re also tight. They fold
frequently. The only way to simultaneously bet frequently and
fold frequently is to bet-fold. If you replace the bet-folds with
bet-calls, you become loose. If you replace the bet-folds with
check-folds, you become a nit.
Theoretically, bet-folding is a perfectly legitimate line.
Why would you choose to bet-fold a hand? Well, let’s separate
the two actions. First comes the bet. Why would you bet a
hand?
There are three reasons to bet in no-limit hold’em, but the
most important one is to get worse hands to call. The value
bet. You think you have the better hand, and you want your
opponent to call with a worse hand. A worse hand can be a
42 PLAYING THE PLAYER
weaker made hand. It can be a draw. Or it can even be a float
or a bluff. (If you’re hoping to get bluffed, then you are
betting not to get called by a worse hand, but to get raised by a
worse hand. It’s theoretically similar.)
Say you bet top pair on the turn. Generally you would do so
only if you thought you would be called the majority of the
time by a worse hand. For instance, if you bet A-K on a A-7-
3-Q board, you would be expecting that more than half the
time you are called, your hand is ahead.
Why is this? Because you’re proposing an even-money bet
with your opponent. I’ll put up $100. You put up $100. We’ll
see another card and see who wins. This bet is profitable if
you win it more than half the time. (With cards to come, this
half the time threshold is not hard-and-fast because there are
other considerations that affect the total value of the bet. But
50 percent is still a decent place to start analyzing a bet.)
Note that you’re merely proposing a bet. Your opponent
has the option to accept or reject it. To be profitable, you have
to win more than half the time your opponent accepts. The
times your opponent rejects it are not relevant.
(Again, when your opponent rejects the bet, i.e., folds, you
eliminate the chance you’d have been outdrawn which, of
course, has some value. But in no-limit hold’em, this chance
usually doesn’t affect the value of the bet too much. In nolimit,
bets tend to be fairly large compared to the size of the
pot. And in hold’em, because it’s a community card game,
hands that are ahead on the turn usually don’t get outdrawn.
So in no-limit hold’em, you’re making a large bet to secure
against a small chance of being outdrawn in a pot that’s
roughly the same size as the bet. It has value, but the average
player overestimates the value. Put another way, for most nolimit
players, the emotional impact of getting outdrawn looms
larger than the financial reality of it.)
BET-FOLDING 43
So we’re betting because we think that roughly more than
half the time we’ll get called by a worse hand.
Then we get raised. With most players, this raise carries a
ton of new information. Against many small-stakes players, it
means we’re beaten with near certainty. Thus, a fold. With the
information we started the betting round knowing, we had a
bet. But then with the new information of a raise, we have a
fold. Bet-fold.
Bet-folding is an incredibly valuable tool against loose,
non-aggressive opponents. Loose players love to call bets with
weak hands. They also tend to raise only with strong hands. So
there’s a wide range of bad hands that they’ll call value bets
with. But when they raise, they really mean business. The betfold
perfectly exploits the predictable traits of this common
bad player archetype.
In fact, it performs so well that TAGs often learn to live on
the bet-fold line alone. They have developed essentially two
poker skills. First, they’ve learned not to overplay marginal
hands. They play tight preflop, and they don’t build big pots
with iffy hands. Second, they abuse the bet-fold line to exploit
lesser players. In most no-limit hold’em games, these two
skills alone are enough to generate a consistent edge.
If you are like most people whom I expect to read this
book, these are likely your two greatest poker skills as well.
You know how not to aimlessly spew off your stack. And you
know how to bet and fold to a raise. Pay attention, because
you’re about to learn how to exploit yourself and the legion of
other players who play just like you do.
Adjustment Summary
An over-reliance on bet-fold lines creates unbalanced hand
ranges. What’s an unbalanced range?
44 PLAYING THE PLAYER
At any given point in a hand, your opponent should be able
to name a range of hands you could have based on your action
to that point. Say you raise preflop and someone calls. The
flop comes Q-9-4 rainbow. Your opponent checks, and you
bet two-thirds of the pot. From your opponent’s perspective,
what can you have?
You can have top pair or an overpair. Less likely (but,
critically, not ruled out by your actions thus far), you can have
a set or two pair. You can have an unimproved pocket pair or
a pair of nines. You can have a straight draw—open-ended or
gutshot. You can have a missed hand such as A-8 or an even
weaker one like 7-6.
Now for the $64,000 question. Is this range balanced, or is
it unbalanced?
The answer is that it could be either, and it depends on
exactly how many weak hands you tend to play this way (raise
preflop, bet on this flop). An unbalanced range is one that is
too heavily weighted toward one hand type or another.
Specifically, it’s a range that can be exploited by taking a
single, simple action with nearly any hand.
What do I mean by that?
Let’s assume that instead of being a TAG, you are a loose
and maniacal player. You will raise preflop with any two
cards, and your opponents know that about you. And when
checked to on the flop, you will bet every time. If you play
this way, then your range on the flop is extremely unbalanced.
You might say to yourself, “Unbalanced? If a guy can have
any two cards at any time, isn’t that balanced? You can never
put him on a hand.” This would be true, except for one simple
fact. Most hands miss the flop. When you’re up against
someone who can have two random cards on any flop, the vast
majority of the time, your opponent will have a hand that most
players would consider to be weak—no pair or one small pair.
BET-FOLDING 45
So if you were to put this player’s hands into one of three
buckets—weak, medium, and strong—you’d have a lot hands
in the weak bucket, some in the medium bucket, and a
relatively small percentage of hands in the strong bucket.
Any range that is unbalanced in this way is guaranteed to
be exploitable, and the exploit is simple. You bet or raise
frequently against the range. If the player has weak hands and
tends to call with them, then you value bet very thinly and
relentlessly. If the player has weak hands and tends to fold
them, you bluff a lot.
Ranges can also be unbalanced in the other direction, with
too many strong hands. When your opponent has too many
strong hands, the exploit is also simple. You fold. This is the
problem nitty players have. They create hand ranges that are
unbalanced to strong hands, and as a result you can simply
fold whenever they want to put money in the pot. Keep in
mind that to create an overly strong range, you must
necessarily fold most of your weak and medium hands. Hence,
nitty players fold too much in small and medium pots, and the
strong ranges that remain are unbalanced and exploitable.
Balanced ranges contain a mix of weak, medium, and
strong hands. The exact weighting among these buckets
depends on how much money is in the pot. Generally
speaking, early in the hand and in small pots, your ranges
should have higher weightings of weak hands. And later in
hands when there’s been a lot of action, your ranges should
have higher weightings of strong hands.
And so the bottom line. Early on and in small pots, more
weak hands. Late and in big pots, more strong hands. But to
build a balanced range, you want the mix to be unexploitable.
You want to have enough strong hands in your range early on
to deter opponents from simply bluffing like crazy. And you
want enough weak hands in your range late that you can be
46 PLAYING THE PLAYER
bluffing and therefore can force your opponents to pay you
off.
So that’s the gist of the difference between balanced and
unbalanced ranges. When your opponent’s range is
unbalanced, you can nearly always take one particular action
and expect it to be right. When your opponent’s range is
balanced, you can’t do that.
And now back to what I said in the first sentence of this
section. An over-reliance on bet-fold lines creates unbalanced
ranges. Why is that?
The bigger the pot, the stronger your hand range should be
to remain balanced. Betting makes the pot bigger. Thus, your
betting hands should be, on average, stronger than your
checking hands. Duh, you say, right?
Here’s the thing. TAGs have learned that they can exploit
players who fold too much by reversing this basic principle. In
many situations they bet virtually all of their hands that have
no value whatsoever, relying on all the folds to turn a profit.
The only hands they check are ones that have some showdown
value. Here’s a specific example.
It’s a tight $1-$2 game like one you might find online.
Everyone folds to a TAG who raises to $6 from one off the
button. You call in the small blind.
The flop is K? 7?5?. You check. The TAG bets $10. What
does this bet tell you about the hand the TAG might have?
Very little. Most TAGs would look at a flop of this
texture—rainbow with two low cards and a single, disjointed
high card—and think, “Great flop to continuation bet.” TAGs
will bet this flop with hands like 9-8, A-6, 3-3, and so forth.
In fact, if such a TAG were to actually check this flop, I
would give him some credit for a hand. While he might be
sandbagging with a monster like K-K, more likely I’d expect a
check to be a medium-strength pair like 7-6 or A-5. Betting
these medium pairs rarely folds out better hands and also
BET-FOLDING 47
rarely gets calls from weaker hands. So checking makes a
good bit of sense.
Back to the betting range, the TAG has a mix of strong
hands (kings mostly) and a lot of junk (total air). Couple this
with a wide preflop opening range from one off the button,
and we’re looking at mostly junk. That is, an unbalanced
range.
The TAG is planning to bet-fold many, if not most, of his
betting hands on the flop. So what should you do? (Hint: It
starts with an ‘r’.)
I remember a time when raising continuation bets was a
cutting edge play. The TAG regulars in the online games were
all merrily continuation betting the flop, relying on their fold
equity against unthinking players and other TAGs to make the
play profitable. And then some sharp cookie would come
along and start raising continuation bets. For a while, these
sharpies absolutely cleaned up. They vacuumed up pots on the
flop like crazy.
This play is not cutting edge anymore. The best players all
know about it and use it, and they have adopted countermeasures.
But just because it isn’t cutting edge doesn’t mean it
isn’t still profitable when used intelligently.
More importantly, every time one of your opponents makes
a continuation bet, you should be thinking, “Is his range
unbalanced? Do I have an auto-raise here?” More often than
you might expect, the answer to both questions is yes.
Raising continuation bets isn’t the only play here. TAGs
bet-fold in many other situations as well. On the turn, TAGs
learn to bet-fold with top pair. They bet top pair, but then
assume when raised that top pair is no good. They bet-fold the
river too. Any time your opponent can be bet-folding many
hands, you have a potential auto-raise situation.
48 PLAYING THE PLAYER
How do you identify bet-fold situations, besides the fairly
obvious example of the player who raises a wide range preflop
and then continuation bets all of the air?
It requires some hand reading skills.
You’re looking for situations where your opponents have a
fairly weak betting range. One easy way to spot these
situations against some TAGs is to use bet-sizing tells.
Remember that many players will make extra-large bets on the
late streets when they have a monster. Therefore, when these
players don’t make a large bet, their betting range is weighted
more toward weaker hands.
You can find these situations even against players who
don’t exhibit bet-sizing tells. Here’s an example.
In my book How To Read Hands At No-Limit Hold’em, I
talk about the limiting turn call. The idea is that a flat call,
rather than a raise, on the turn often denies a very strong hand.
This is because the board is usually at least a little scary on the
turn, and most players with strong hands will want to charge
opponents to draw out.
It’s a $2-$5 game with $1,500 stacks. You raise to $20
from early position with A?J?. Two players call from behind,
and the big blind calls.
The flop comes Q?8?7?. The blind checks, and you bet
$60 into the $82 pot. One player calls behind, and the other
two players fold. The caller is a TAG player who bets rivers
for value thinly when checked to.
The turn is the T? . You bet $150 into the $212 pot. Your
opponent calls.
The river is the 7?, making the final board
Q?8?7?T? 7?. You check, and your opponent bets $200 into
the $512 pot. After the $200 bet, there’s still over $1,000
behind.
What does this betting range look like? Except for
specifically 8-7, it’s unlikely to include a full house. Why?
BET-FOLDING 49
Because he almost certainly would have raised either the
flop or the turn if he held a set. The board on the turn is
getting scary. There’s a possible flush draw out, and lots of
straight draws are available. Most players would want to
“charge the draws” with a big hand on a board like this one.
Yet he didn’t raise. This turn call limits the top end of his
range. Unless he’s a little bit crazy, he doesn’t have Q-Q, T-T,
8-8, 7-7, J-9, or Q-T.
He’s more likely to have a hand like A-Q, K-Q, Q-J, or a
draw. All the draws missed, which makes this a relatively
weak betting range on the river. He’s almost certainly
planning to bet-fold the river with a lot of his range.
This is a situation where betting out as a bluff on the river
might be less effective than check-raise bluffing. If you simply
bet the river, I’d often expect to be called by hands like A-Q
and K-Q. But if you check the river, you can likely get your
opponent off these same hands with a big check-raise. And
checking A-J isn’t too bad since it’s conceivable you might
even win a showdown with the hand.
The key to the play is that our opponent has done
something in the hand that denies the strongest holdings. Any
bets our opponent makes after that point will frequently be
bet-folds.
If you haven’t done so, and you’d like more help
identifying bet-fold situations, read my book How To Read
Hands At No-Limit Hold’em.
Pitfalls To Avoid
There are a few pitfalls here. First, some players simply
don’t bet-fold very often. Once they put money out there, they
like to defend it. Bet-folding frequently is not at all a universal
50 PLAYING THE PLAYER
trait, so don’t go running these plays on any old tight player
expecting a lot of folds.
Second, attacking bet-folds is a leveling play. By that, I
mean that this play isn’t designed to work against weak and
unthinking players (those who think on level zero or level one,
if you are familiar with these terms). It’s designed to work
against players who are trying to exploit weak and unthinking
players. These players tend to be smarter than your average
bear, and they might catch on to what you’re doing.
Many people have learned to play a TAG game from
reading books and watching videos without having put too
much thought into why they’re playing the way they are. They
just make the plays they do because they know they work—or
at least other players have made them work. These are the
ideal players to attack, because they won’t catch on quickly to
what you’re doing. All they know is that they’re supposed to
bet the river with top pair and fold to a raise, and so they do,
faithfully.
Other TAGs are sharper. If they notice that they are having
to bet-fold against you more than they expect, they’ll adjust.
They’ll start bluffing less and bet-calling lighter. These two
changes together will have the effect of sharply reducing the
percentage of time they are folding to your raises. In the
extreme, some players will stop bet-folding to you almost
entirely, while they continue to bet-fold against weak players.
Fortunately if you’re paying attention, you can pick up on
this adjustment fairly quickly. If you get called and your
opponent shows up with a hand that seems far weaker than
you’d expect, the jig is up. Now it’s time to exploit your
opponent’s new bet-calling fetish by raising thinner for value.
Also you can get hints that your opponent is adjusting if he
starts checking down some hands that don’t have showdown
value. If you happen to win a small checked-down pot against
BET-FOLDING 51
a TAG holding, say, ace-high, then it means your opponent
chose not to bet-fold with a hand he otherwise might have.
Despite the pitfalls, however, don’t be shy. Exploiting betfolds
is one of the surest ways to beat a TAG, and if you want
to win playing online, it’s a skill you simply must master.
Who Exhibits This Trait
TAGs. The tighter and the more aggressive players get, the
more bet-folding they have to do. There’s no way around it. If
you want to be both tight and aggressive, you have to bet-fold.
Now you may be thinking, “Don’t I want to be tight and
aggressive? Isn’t that the right way to play?” Sure. Being a
TAG is a perfectly good way to win money at no-limit
hold’em. Which means you’ll be bet-folding.
I bet-fold all the time. As I said before, it’s a play that
nearly perfectly exploits the errors many amateur players
make. But when I’m playing hands against smarter players, I
have to watch how I use the play. If I overuse it, I just might
get exploited.
But don’t be paranoid about being exploited. As I said at
the start of the book, playing to win is a lot more lucrative
than playing not to lose. You want to exploit your opponents
as thoroughly as possible, even though it leaves you wide open
to counter-exploitation from smart opponents.
Most of the time, you’ll never have to worry about it, since
your opponents won’t be sharp enough to make the right
adjustments. When you finally come upon someone who you
think is trying to punish you, adjust. You either switch tables
to one where you can exploit your opponents without fear of
reprisal, or you switch up your strategy to protect yourself.
But don’t adjust until someone forces you to. Doing so just
gives away edges you don’t have to give up.
52 PLAYING THE PLAYER
The Bottom Line
Bet-folding is the TAG player’s bread-and-butter. It’s also
thoroughly exploitable if you can predict when your
opponents are doing it. Raise your tight opponent’s bets when
their ranges are full of weak, potential bluffing hands. Also
raise their bets when they have removed the top hands from
their range by checking or calling in a meaningful situation.
test
,
.
.
INTRODUCTION
What makes a poker player good?
It’s a harder question to answer than you might imagine.
In other games, the answer to this question is simpler. A
good tennis player is someone who wins many matches and
tournaments. We can expect that such a player would have a
good fitness level, would have strong fundamentals—
footwork, serve, forehand, backhand, and so forth—and would
have at least a passable psychological game.
A good chess player is someone who wins many games and
tournaments. We can expect that such a player would have an
excellent knowledge of the game, good positional and tactical
skills, and at least passable concentration and psychological
control.
But what makes a good poker player? Is it someone who
wins many tournaments? Not really. If someone were to win
tournament after tournament, this would almost certainly
indicate an excellent poker player. But there’s so much luck in
poker that you can’t look at the winner of any single
tournament or short series of tournaments and say, “That
player is a good poker player. ”
Is a good poker player one who understands well the
fundamentals of the game? Perhaps, though I’d say that the
vast majority of poker players misunderstand which skills are
“fundamental” to poker.
Most people I think would say that a good poker player is
one who wins at a high rate, as measured in dollars per hour
(or per 100 hands played), over a long period of time.
Winrate. It’s the ultimate measuring stick of a poker player.
Here’s the thing. Most students of poker learn to play in a
particular, static style that is designed to play well enough in a
variety of game environments, but will rarely maximize
8 PLAYING THE PLAYER
winrate in any particular game. In other words, poker players
learn how not to lose at poker (thereby winning at a modest
rate). They don’t learn how to win.
Why is this? There are two reasons. Poker players are a
lazy lot. Now, nearly all humans are lazy by this definition, so
I don’t intend to malign poker players in particular. Most
players want a plug-and-play strategy—one they can use in
nearly any game type to hold their own. After all, poker is
risky enough as it is. Why add further risk to the equation by
making adjustments that could backfire?
Specifically, most poker players look for “standard lines”
to take. With top pair, I bet the flop, fold to a raise, check the
turn, and bet the river for value. With a combo draw on the
flop, I bet and get it in if raised. These standard lines are often
designed to win in many common game environments, while
also often managing variance. Standard lines allow you to play
poker without fully engaging your brain. You can watch TV,
chit-chat, play on your phone, or do whatever else while still
playing a winning poker game.
The other reason players learn not to lose is that it’s a much
lower bar to reach than learning to maximize winrate. In order
to maximize winrate, you have to adapt aggressively to your
game conditions. Adapting requires you to do a few things
right all at the same time.
? You have to identify correctly how your opponents are
playing. This is not always simple, as hot and cold runs
of cards can skew your perception of your opponents’
play styles.
? You have to identify the correct adjustment to make
against your opponents.
? You have to implement the adjustments. You have to
have the presence of mind to identify situations that call
for an adjustment, and then you have to pull the trigger.
INTRODUCTION 9
? You have to identify when an opponent makes an
adjustment based on your play and readjust.
This requires much more mental effort than playing not to
lose. It requires much more work away from the table. And it
also requires you to have very strong tilt control. But if you’re
looking for a breakthrough in your play, it’s the only option.
So what’s this book about? It’s about taking the first two
steps toward learning to win at poker rather than playing not to
lose. I will help you to identify how your opponents are
playing and to identify the correct adjustments to make. I will
show you example hands where the adjustment may be
appropriate.
You will not be a poker master after reading this book.
Poker mastery requires thousands of hours of study—and the
right kind of study at that—to achieve.
My goal with this book is more humble, but it’s still very
powerful. I want to open your eyes. You probably know a bit
about how to play poker already. I want to show you how
much more there is to the game that you aren’t taking
advantage of. I want to show you the sorts of things that the
players with the monster winrates are doing that you aren’t.
And I want to start your journey into the unknown on a
good footing. I will show you a few simple adjustments that
are relatively safe and easy to apply and that will give you a
taste of what it feels like to be truly awesome at poker.
If you’re ready to move beyond ABC poker to see what
more is out there, keep reading.
What is ABC Poker?
Before I teach you how to move beyond ABC poker, I need to
define it.
If I were to ask most poker players what it means to pay
“ABC,” I’d expect answers like this. Solid poker. Patient
poker. Poker by the fundamentals. Good poker.
I think these answers reflect a general misunderstanding
most players have about how to play poker well.
Here’s what I mean when I talk about ABC poker. It’s a
strategy defined by
? Tight play on the first betting round
? Tight play on later betting rounds with marginal
holdings
? Fast play of strong holdings on early betting rounds
? Betting aggressively for value and bluffing infrequently
? Folding to uncommon aggression
Basically you start with good hands and bet them hard until
you get raised. When that happens, you fold or sometimes call
down. You do a little bluffing, but not a whole lot of it.
This strategy wins in most small stakes poker games. It
wins because there are enough players in these games who
make gross errors understanding hand values. Basically, they
call too often with bad hands.
Here’s the thing. There is nothing that is “fundamental”
about ABC play. It is a non-optimal strategy designed to
exploit the most common mistakes that really bad players
WHAT IS ABC POKER? 11
make while simultaneously not losing too much to good
players.
Basically, ABC play seeks to trade making lots of small
and consistent mistakes to good players in hopes of benefiting
from much larger mistakes from bad players. Since there are
more bad players in small stakes games than good ones, ABC
players make money over time.
But stick an ABC player in a $25-$50 online 6-max game
with five sharp opponents, and it will be a bloodbath. This is
because an ABC strategy is markedly non-optimal, and it also
doesn’t exploit any of the mistakes that sharp players tend to
make.
Here’s the bottom line. ABC play is a simple, non-optimal,
exploitative strategy that makes money in soft games. ABC
play loses consistently in tough games.
Playing to win makes more profit than ABC play in soft
games. And it’s the only way to try to win in a tough game.
Most poker players simply don’t understand this reality.
They view ABC play in a much more positive light. It’s
“solid.” It’s “fundamental.” Deviating from ABC play is
“fancy play.” They think that if only they could control the
emotional aspect of the game better—tilt, boredom, etc.—and
play ABC all the time, they’d do great at poker.
Before I move on, I don’t want you to think that I’m
trashing ABC play completely. ABC play is a (relatively)
simple strategy that wins at small stakes poker. That’s
remarkable. It’s a strategy that provides many players with
everything they want from the game—an enjoyable way to
pass the time, grinding out a little spending cash to boot.
But don’t misunderstand ABC play for something it isn’t.
And if your goals are to win more and move up faster, you’ll
need something else.
Optimal Poker
Poker is a math problem.
That doesn’t mean that you have to “do math” to be good at
poker. But poker is a problem that can be solved
mathematically.
It’s too complex a math problem to solve completely with
today’s technology. But we can solve similar, but simplified,
problems and then generalize the answers to actual poker.
Many people have done this, and this analysis is a major
reason that the best poker players have gotten much, much
better in recent years.
If we were able to solve poker completely, the solution
would be what I will call “optimal poker.” A theoretical player
playing optimal poker would break even against another
player playing the same strategy. Optimal poker would win
money from every other, non-optimal strategy.
What would optimal strategy look like? In no-limit
hold’em, it would be much more aggressive than most players
play. It’s hard to make a good hand at no-limit hold’em, and
therefore the fold equity from aggression is valuable.
The optimal strategy would also involve calling down with
hands most players would tend to fold. Since an optimal
player is playing very aggressively, it’s required to call down a
lot to stay competitive.
Two optimal players would be betting and raising a lot,
getting the money in a lot, and frankly trading money back
and forth at a rate that would alarm most no-limit players.
What if you were to play this theoretical optimal strategy in
a regular small stakes game? You would win over time, that’s
OPTIMAL POKER 13
for sure. After all, poker is a math problem, and it’s
impossible to beat an optimal strategy over the long haul.
But you’d also be doing some things that, to a casual
observer, might look a little silly. You’d sometimes be
launching big bluffs into calling stations. You’d sometimes be
calling down nits with marginal hands. These are plays that
are required to protect yourself against another optimal player.
But small stakes players don’t play optimally. They make
large, consistent, and most importantly, predictable errors.
What if you played the optimal strategy, but you reduced
the frequency of bluffing into calling stations and also of
calling down nits? You’d win even more than an optimal
player would. These are adjustments designed to exploit the
predictable mistakes that bad players make.
Now let’s get back to the real world. You don’t know what
the optimal strategy is. But you can identify mistakes other
players make and exploit them. The more mistakes you
identify and exploit, the more you will win. If you do it well,
you can win even more than if you played an optimal strategy
and win far more than with an ABC strategy.
Playing The Player
Now we get to the main subject of the book. If you want to
play to win, you have to play your opponents. You want to
identify the consistent mistakes they make and then put them
in situations to make these mistakes repeatedly.
On poker message boards, I often see people ask how to
play a LAG style. LAG stands for loose-aggressive, and the
idea these people have is that loose-aggressive players win
more money than TAG, or tight-aggressive, players. Basically
they have the idea that one can improve upon ABC play, and
that playing LAG is the answer.
It is a fact that excellent no-limit hold’em players often
play quite loose and register high winrates. But it’s not the
loose preflop style that is the key. Playing bad preflop hands is
always a handicap, no matter how good you are.
These guys have identified mistakes their opponents make.
These mistakes usually come after the flop. The good players
are playing lots of hands because they want to create as many
situations as possible for their opponents to make these
mistakes. They are willing to fade the weak preflop hands, as
long as they can generate enough advantageous situations after
the flop to offset.
So playing loose is not the point. The point is the mistake
and the related adjustment. If the mistake is big enough, one
can play loosely to exploit it fully.
Here’s a simple example. Say you encounter an opponent
who loves to steal the blinds. With nearly any hand on the
button, he will raise. If called and checked to on the flop, he’ll
PLAYING THE PLAYER 15
nearly always bet. But after this flop bet, he’ll tend to give up
with all of his bad hands.
If someone is raising most hands preflop and betting every
flop, the vast majority of the time he’ll be weak. You can
exploit this weakness by check-raising the flop or by checkcalling
and betting the turn or river with a wide range of
hands.
Someone who plays ABC no-limit hold’em rarely defends
blinds against a steal. Since playing out of position is a
disadvantage, this player folds preflop in these marginal
situations. But you can do much, much better against this
aggressive blind stealer. You can call with lots of hands and
then check-raise the flop often. It’s an exploitative adjustment
to a player who is making consistent errors.
You could make this same exploitative adjustment without
calling with more hands preflop. You could keep a tight
preflop calling range, but simply check-raise the flop with
more of your missed hands.
But why restrict yourself like that? If check-raising the flop
with air is profitable, then why not play more hands? Doing so
will increase your winrate.
You’re not playing more hands just to play more hands.
Instead, first you’re identifying a mistake. To exploit some
mistakes you must have a hand at showdown. Others you can
exploit with any hand. When you can exploit the mistake with
any hand, loosening up will frequently supercharge your
winrate.
What’s the moral of the story? I think it’s this. Don’t focus
on how tight or loose you play. Trying to play looser just for
its own sake is not a winning recipe. Don’t ditch ABC just
because you know something better is out there.
Focus on trying to improve, one play at a time. Look for a
single mistake your regular opponents routinely make. Think
16 PLAYING THE PLAYER
about how you can exploit it. Then run your counter-play as
often as you can.
Do it again. Find another mistake they make. Think about
how you can exploit it. Then run that counter-play as often as
you can.
Do it again. And again. And again.
Don’t try to overhaul your current strategy. If you play
ABC right now, that’s fine. It’s a good, winning starting point.
Refine your game bit by bit by searching for and executing
these exploitative plays. It’s an incremental process. And it’s
how you get really good at this game.
I could end the book right here. Look for the specific things
your opponents are doing wrong and exploit them. The more
you find and exploit, the more money you’ll make.
But you could probably use some examples to get the ball
rolling, right? That’s what the rest of the book is. I’m going to
list a number of traits that are common among small- and
medium-stakes no-limit hold’em players. I’ll tell you what the
trait is. I’ll tell you what sorts of players commonly exhibit the
trait. I’ll tell you, if I can, why I think these players show this
trait.
Then I’ll talk about the mistakes a player will make due to
having this trait. I’ll give example hands and show why it’s a
mistake. Then I’ll suggest ways to adjust your game to exploit
the mistake.
Again, these are just examples. Poker evolves. Any given
trait or mistake may be common now, but uncommon in a few
years. Memorizing the specifics in this book won’t make you a
great player. Instead, understand the process behind it so that
you can find mistakes and develop counter-strategies on your
own. If you learn to do that, this book will have done its job.
A Note About Balance And
Exploitability
Before I get on with all the examples, I have a final point to
make.
I said before that poker is a math problem. It’s also a game
of information hiding.
Whenever you act on a poker hand, you betray information.
If you raise under the gun in a no-limit game, you are more
likely to have AA than you are to have 93o, even though
you’ll be dealt 93o twice as often as AA. This is because you
tend to fold 93o while you tend to raise AA. Thus, your raise
betrays information.
You could perfectly hide information about your hand by
playing everything the same way. For instance, you could
simply move all-in with every hand, and you’d be perfectly
unreadable. Unfortunately, you would also be risking way too
much money with way too weak a range of hands, and you
would quickly lose.
The goal is to balance the amount of information you
betray with the amount of money you are putting at risk. Sure,
generally you will risk more money with better hands. But
within that framework you want to give up as little specific
information as possible. If you always have a strong hand
when you make a big bet, your opponents can exploit you by
simply folding. By always having a strong hand when you bet
a certain amount, you are betraying far too much information
with your betting. Poker players call this “unbalanced. ”
18 PLAYING THE PLAYER
A betting line is “unbalanced” when an opponent can
identify too specifically the sort of hand you’ll have and can
make a play different from the optimal strategy that exploits
your tendency. Your line is balanced when you have hidden
information well, and your opponent is guessing as much as
practicable.
Many players focus on having balanced betting lines. They
think things like, “I can’t bet here as a bluff because I would
never bet here with a value hand.” In theory, this is a strong
way to think about how to play poker. If one were attempting
to play near-optimal poker, it would be a critically important
way to think.
In practice, your goal is to play poker against people who
aren’t as good as you. Being not as good as you, they will be
much less able to identify and exploit your mistakes than you
are able to identify and exploit theirs. This means that you
should spend your time trying to identify and exploit your
opponents’ unbalanced lines without worrying too much about
your own.
Why not worry about your own unbalanced lines? Because
doing so at small stakes will have you tripping over your own
feet and not winning the maximum.
Think about it this way. Say you watched a boxing match
between a champion and the top challenger. How would you
expect it to go? You’d expect the fighters to give each other
respect. To feel each other out. To jab and probe, looking for
weaknesses without exposing themselves to a knockout punch.
This is analogous to playing poker with an eye toward keeping
balanced lines.
Now say you watched a boxing match between the
champion and your humble author. How do you think this one
would go? I hope it never happens, but I’d bet the champ
would come right at me, slug me a few times, and that would
be it. If instead the champ decided to dance and probe with
A NOTE ABOUT BALANCE AND EXPLOITABILITY 19
me, you’d be thinking, “What the heck? Why doesn’t he just
finish this?” Coming right at a weaker opponent is analogous
to ignoring your own unbalanced lines and just going on the
attack.
With weak small stakes players, you don’t have to worry so
much about where you open vulnerabilities in your game. Just
go on the attack. Sure, a savvy opponent could counter-punch
you where it hurts, but that will happen rarely. Most of the
time your attacking play will get the money much more
efficiently than balanced play would.
Bottom line? Go ahead and think about where you are
balanced and unbalanced. But when you see a mistake your
opponent is making, pounce on it, even if it makes you
unbalanced. Chances are high that no one will notice your
vulnerability. At all but the very toughest online games,
attacking your opponents full bore will get the money much
faster than keeping up a good defense.
thank you Sean
say does anyone know where i can find the last neom shareholder conference call that i could listen to, would appreciate any help in this area
hello can anyone answer this for me?
I here that bar code reading is done by almost everyone in japan that it is very popular there.
Neomedia is the owner of the bridge that takes you from the barcode to the internet Why is Neomedia not making alot of money from all those Japanese users?
Would appeciate any useful info on this
thanks
Wongyal
test
.
.
.
.
you’d be trying to fold out an ace. Some guys will basically
call any river raise with a pair of aces. A loose gambler type
who likes to jam draws on the flop is just the sort to look you
up.
I’d certainly consider check-raise bluffing here if I were
against a TAG who could be bet-folding. But I suspect you
may not have enough fold equity against this particular type of
player. You’d want to make the river raise nice and big (if you
raise small he’ll surely call), and then you aren’t creating good
odds for yourself, making it that much more important that
you be right about getting the fold.
So checking allows your opponent to play well on the river,
and check-raise bluffing is likely too ambitious. If you just bet
out fairly big, you will get called by all hands that beat you
and likely get folds from all the hands worse than yours.
That’s no good.
Here’s what I’d try. I’d make a tiny river bet, something
like $20 or $40 into this nearly $200 pot. I think this bet will
block most opponents from raising you for value with just one
pair. So if you are up against an ace or queen, you’ll just get
called and lose your mini-bet.
But what if you get raised? I’d snap-call a raise. For this
player type, the draw jammer gambler, it’s intense cognitive
dissonance to meekly fold a busted draw to a tiny river bet. As
soon as he sees the small bet with his busted draw, he will
think, “Can’t win this pot if I don’t bet,” and will put out a
raise.
I love to use this play against the guys who splash money
around and crave action. The small bet causes your opponent
to play his range in an enormously unbalanced way, calling
with all his made hands and raising his busted draws. Yes, you
will occasionally run into two pair or some other oddball hand
when you call, but you will win well more than often enough
to justify the call.
202 PLAYING THE PLAYER
The keys to this hand are realizing that the out of turn flop
bet puts a lot of draws into this player’s range, while the turn
check denies a big hand. You can then use a little trick on the
river to get your opponent to completely unbalance this range
and pay you maximum when you’re ahead while losing the
minimum when behind. Yes, against the right players, this
really works like a charm. Give it a shot.
Top 10 Plays To Try That
You Aren’t Using Today
Presumably you’re reading this book because you want to
become a more dangerous no-limit hold’em player. Instead of
playing always a conservative, ABC style, you want to open
up in the right spots. Instead of playing mostly to your cards,
you want to find plays that exploit the particular opponents
you’re up against.
I hope you’ve gotten some ideas already about how you’re
going to make changes to your game. In this section, I’m
going to distill the ideas in the book down to the top 10 plays
you should try to incorporate into your game.
Play No 1. Raise junk in position preflop.
Barrel flop and turn.
Your targets for this play are nits. When you see a game
where most pots are over by the turn, and no one is putting
much money in the middle, it’s time to break this one out. Just
start raising your button and firing the flop and turn. Some
board textures are better to fire twice (e.g., high card below a
king, loosely coordinated) and others are better to fire once
and then give up (e.g., ace-high disconnected). But in many of
these rockfest games, if you just raise preflop and fire blindly
on the flop, turn, and sometimes even river, you’ll show an
insta-profit on every hand.
204 PLAYING THE PLAYER
If this play isn’t already part of your playbook, then when
you try it and succeed, you’ll get a very liberating feeling. It
feels good to win because you’ve outfoxed your opponents
rather than just because you ran good.
Play No. 2. 3-Bet light preflop to induce a
fold.
Your targets for this play are TAGs. TAG players like to
bet-fold, and the only real way to get the best of them is to
anticipate when they are likely to bet-fold and then raise them.
This theme will return a few times in the top 10, but it all
starts preflop.
Look for situations where you expect TAGs to be raising a
good chunk of their total hands, say 25 percent or more. This
could be when the TAG seems to be isolating someone with
position or even if the TAG seems to be attempting to pull off
the play above (raise preflop, barrel, barrel). It could also be
when the TAG might be raising to try to steal the blinds.
When you see one of these raises, 3-bet light. At first try to
stick to the “good” hands that I outlined in the 3-betting
section for this play. But as you get more used to it you’ll be
able to identify the spots ripe enough to try it with any two
cards.
Play No. 3. Flat-call with big hands preflop
and on the flop and turn.
Your targets for this play are hyper-aggressive LAGs.
LAGs put too much money into pots with too many weak
hands. They often make up for this problem by consistently
winning the information battle. Opponents are constantly
TOP 10 PLAYS TO TRY THAT YOU AREN’T USING TODAY 205
confused by what the LAG can have, and the confusion
freezes these players up. As a result, they play against the
LAG in a very straightforward way by waiting for big hands
and then raising them early.
The LAG can then exploit this information gap by going
for thin value, applying pressure against weakness, and so
forth. Your goal against these players is simply to close the
information gap. Ok, they can have lots of hands and are
difficult to hand read. Focus on making yourself similarly
difficult to hand read. Do this by refusing to give away your
big hands with early raises.
LAGs often rely on the fact that players want to “protect
against draws” by raising early on semi-coordinated boards.
Refuse to do that. You don’t need to “charge” LAGs to draw
against you. Their mistake is that they voluntarily shovel way
too much money into the pot with bad hands. In other words,
they’re going to charge themselves better than you can
possibly charge them. Just let them make their mistake.
Slowplay hands that you intend to take to showdown. Before
you make any play, think, “What information am I giving the
LAG by playing my hand this way?” In general, choose
actions that betray the least information.
If you focus on closing the information gap, then the LAG
will lose his edge, and you’ll just be playing a stronger set of
hands against his weaker set of hands. This will give you the
edge over the long term.
I’m not going to lie. The swings will be significant. But it’s
the right adjustment to make.
Play No. 4. Raise continuation bets.
Your targets for this play are TAGs and LAGs. Most
players know that firing a continuation bet on the flop after
206 PLAYING THE PLAYER
raising preflop shows a profit in many situations. The problem
with continuation betting, however, is that you miss more
flops than you hit even when you raise a fairly tight range of
hands. So when typical TAG or LAG players continuation bet
a flop, often they are planning to bet-fold more than half the
time.
Whenever you can peg someone as bet-folding more than
half the time, you’ve got a nice bluffing opportunity. So just
start raising continuation bets. This used to work extremely
well. While modern TAGs and LAGs have gotten a little wise
to the play and will sometimes play back, raising the
continuation bet should still be a staple of your exploitative
strategy against aggressive player types.
A great flop to try this play is one like K?7?4?. Most
aggressive players love to continuation bet these flops because
they are hard to hit and because they can “represent ace-king”
by betting. But the reality is that even a fairly tight preflop
opening range misses this flop more than half the time. If your
opponent starts playing back at you when you make these flop
raises, just start playing AK, KQ, and KK the same way (flat
call preflop, raise the K-high flop) and you will quickly find
again that you can raise continuation bets on boards like these
with near impunity.
Play No. 5. Barrel the turn when the flop
was loosely coordinated and the turn bricks.
Your targets for this play are darn near everyone. Though
in particular, use it against nits, TAGs, and loose-passive fish.
You raise preflop. The flop comes J-8-5 with a two-suit.
You bet and get called. The turn is a brick (e.g., an offsuit K,
3, 2, also slightly less ideally an A, J, 8, 5, or 4). Bomb the
turn. It’s just hard for your opponent to have a good hand in
TOP 10 PLAYS TO TRY THAT YOU AREN’T USING TODAY 207
this situation. The flop hits a lot of hands, but generally
doesn’t hit many of them very hard. A brick turn card
devalues most of these weak fit hands.
Also some players will be loathe to slowplay a big hand on
the flop because they will feel they need to “charge the
draws.” These players’ check-calling range on this type of flop
will be quite weak, and barreling a brick will nearly always
get you a fold.
Play No. 6. Semibluff raise the turn when
your opponent bets a good barreling card.
Your targets for this play are TAGs and LAGs. This flips
the above play on its head. Say you check-call a J-8-5 two-suit
board with 7-6 for an open-ended straight draw. The turn is an
offsuit king. You check, and your opponent bets. If you
suspect that your opponent is aware of board textures and likes
to barrel good barreling cards (a la Play No. 5) then checkshove
the turn.
The beauty of this play is that most small stakes no-limit
players don’t make this sort of bluff, so against many
opponents you will elicit a fold from nearly every hand in their
range up to and including A-K. TAGs in particular are betfolding
this sort of situation very frequently.
This is a good place to make a general observation about
semibluffing. Most no-limit players choose when to semibluff
by looking at their own cards. That is, they think something
along the lines of, “I flopped a flush draw. I should raise! ”
While not an absolutely terrible way to think about it (hey,
it’s better than “I flopped a draw, let’s check and call until I
get there”), you can improve on this significantly if you look
at board textures and think about what your opponent is doing.
You are going to have a lot more success semibluff raising
208 PLAYING THE PLAYER
that draw against a TAG who continuation bets 100 percent of
the time than you are against a nit who continuation bets only
when he flops top pair or better. Likewise, if you bluff-raise
certain turn cards, you’re just begging to get snapped off,
because your range looks strong and your opponent is likely
betting with the hope of getting the money in.
For instance, say your TAG opponent opens to 3× the big
blind, and you call from the blind. The flop comes Q-J-9 with
a two-suit. You check, your opponent bets pot, and you call.
The turn is a J. You check, and your opponent bets threequarters
pot.
This is an absolutely rotten time to decide to check-raise
your A-K flush draw. Why? Because on this board your
opponent obviously expects to get action a lot, and
nevertheless he’s making large bets. I’m not saying it’s
impossible that he’s planning to bet-fold, but you would be
quite lucky to get a fold if you were to check-shove this turn.
Furthermore, you will be drawing dead sometimes when you
get called, and often some of your straight and/or flush outs
will be dead to a boat. (Your overcard “outs” are barely worth
mentioning when you get the money in on this turn.)
There’s a world of difference between this situation and the
one I mentioned before, where the board came J-8-5-K. On
this board, your opponent can easily be barreling with many
hands, and even if he’s made something it’s usually just one
pair. You have much, much better fold equity in this spot.
It takes some trial and error to get this play down, but it’s a
fabulous one once you get the hang of it. Look for spots where
your opponent may be bet-folding the turn and semibluff
shove over the top.
TOP 10 PLAYS TO TRY THAT YOU AREN’T USING TODAY 209
Play No. 7. Bet top pair for value on the
river when the draws brick out.
Your main targets for this play are fish. Do not miss these
bets against showdown-bound players. You flop top pair.
Your kicker is good, but maybe it’s not top kicker. There are
draws on board. You bet and get called. The turn bricks. You
bet and get called. The river bricks (or it completes one of the
less likely draws). Value bet!
Often your opponent will have been drawing, but will have
made a pair by the river and will call. Or your opponent will
have started with a hand that made a pair and a draw and now
has just one pair on the river. Or your opponent will just have
flopped a pair, put you on a draw, and called all the way
down.
Regardless, please bet these hands for value. It’s an
enormous source of profit against bad players.
Play No. 8. Bet-fold the flop and turn with
your decent made hands.
Your main targets for this play are TAGs and all weaker
player types. It’s tempting to “pot control” one pair hands
when the board gets a little scary. Don’t! At least don’t do it
against players who you know won’t be bluff-raising you very
often. It’s nearly always better to bet-fold your made hands
rather than pot control them.
The whole idea behind pot controlling is that you can avoid
a situation where your opponent will bluff with a very
annoying frequency (raising the turn, for instance) and trade it
for a situation where your opponent will bluff too frequently
(on the river after checking through the turn in this example).
210 PLAYING THE PLAYER
The reason the turn raise is annoying is that when you get
raised on the turn, you’re usually no good, but you know your
opponent is still bluffing a good percentage of the time. That’s
bad for you.
If you know that you will induce too many bluffs by
underrepping your hand on the turn, then by pot controlling,
you’ve avoided a situation where your opponent plays well
and created a situation where your opponent makes mistakes.
This is to your advantage.
But if the preceding assumptions don’t apply, then pot
controlling is just another way of saying, “giving a free card.”
If you know against a given player that you’re beaten the vast
majority of the time if you get check-raised, then go ahead and
bet-fold your hand. This is doubly true if you can’t anticipate
your opponent giving you any extra action on the river if you
pot control on the turn.
TAGs often fall into these latter assumptions. They won’t
check-raise bluff that often, so it’s fairly safe to bet-fold
against them. And they are observant enough to recognize
when you are pot controlling the turn, and they therefore will
refrain from bluffing wildly into you on the river. Against
these guys, just bet your hand and fold when you get raised.
You’ll win more pots, get more value for your good hands,
and make fewer bad calls on the river.
Play No. 9. Overbet the river when you can
anticipate your opponent will respond in a
very unbalanced way.
This play goes both ways, so it can be good against any
player type. Let’s start when you expect your overbet to get
called too frequently. For this, your targets are typically fish,
TOP 10 PLAYS TO TRY THAT YOU AREN’T USING TODAY 211
but they can also be LAGs against whom you have a bit of
aggressive history.
Here’s the scenario. You’re fairly certain you have the best
hand. It’s the river. You have several times the pot left in your
stacks. You think that for whatever reason your remaining
opponent may call a shove. Shove!
Fish often call shoves badly on the river because they have
an overpair. These players commonly vastly overvalue
overpairs and will simply go broke with them. If you suspect
an overpair, make sure you break your opponent.
LAGs sometimes level themselves into calling a shove.
They like to bluff a lot, so they also like to sniff out bluffs. An
overbet where you aren’t “supposed” to have the nuts (due to
the previous betting) may look like a bluff, and you just might
get called. The beauty of sniffing out these situations is that
your LAG opponent might not be tempted to call a normal bet,
but the fact that you overbet might arouse suspicion and elicit
the call.
Now the flipside, overbetting when you want a fold. Your
main targets for this are TAGs and particularly nits. This one
is fairly simple. Your opponent by checking back the turn on a
draw-heavy board or merely flat calling your bet on such a
board has marked himself with a medium-strength one pair
hand. Say you play the following hand.
You raise to 3× preflop, and your target calls in the big
blind. The flop comes Q-T-6 with a two-flush. Your opponent
checks and calls your flop bet. The turn is an 8 that puts a
second flush draw out there. Your opponent checks and calls
again.
On a drawish board like this, nits and TAGs will generally
want to check-raise the turn with any strong hand to “charge
you” to draw. When they don’t raise, they typically either
have a draw themselves, or they have a one pair hand that
they’re scared to reopen the betting with.
212 PLAYING THE PLAYER
The river is a 3 that completes the backdoor flush. Your
opponent checks, and you have 1.8× the pot in your stack.
This is a spot where you can overbet shove and get a fold from
a hand like K-Q (a strong possibility given the action), A-Q, or
even perhaps K-K. From your opponent, the TAG or nit’s
perspective, there’s just too much out there to call you down
with just one pair.
Experiment with overbets both for value and as bluffs
against the appropriate player types. This is a very valuable
tool.
Play No. 10. Bluff-raise the river when your
opponent’s range is comprised mainly of
busted draws and thin value hands.
Your targets for this play are TAGs and LAGs.
Occasionally hands will go down where your opponent will
deny a strong hand on either the flop or turn (by missing a bet
or raise in a spot where your opponent would bet or raise
nearly 100 percent of the time with a good hand), but then
decide to bet the river anyway. These are the situations to
bluff-raise the river.
I was on the receiving end of this in a $2-$5 hand. My main
nemesis in this hand had about a $300 stack. I opened to $15
and was called in both blinds.
The flop came Q?9?9?. My opponents checked to me,
and I checked it back.
The turn was the 3? . My opponents checked to me again,
and I bet $20 into the $47 pot. The small blind called, and the
big blind folded. I figured the big blind could be calling with
draws, a pocket pair below a queen, or maybe something like
Q-T. I expected a turn raise if she held a 9.
TOP 10 PLAYS TO TRY THAT YOU AREN’T USING TODAY 213
The river was an offsuit K. My opponent checked to me. I
bet $80 into the $87 pot. I thought this large bet would get my
opponent off most of her range. She would fold all the pocket
pairs and flush draws unless perhaps a K-high draw. I thought
she would fold a hand like Q-T. Really I was most worried
about K-Q or J-T.
She shoved, and I folded. I suspect she had J-T. But
nevertheless, it would have been a great bluffing spot for her,
since she should know that I am bet-folding that river with
nearly my entire range.
My flop check is very telling in this hand. On this board
type, I’m betting all my queens, all my nines, all my full
houses. I’m also betting hands like K-J, K-T, J-T, and possibly
A-K as well.
So on the river, pretty much the only value hand I can have
is A-K, and I might even bet-fold that.
I doubt this player was bluffing, as I doubt she recognized
the situation. But if she did, kudos to her.
Hand Quizzes
Everyone likes a good quiz. Here are a few hands to test your
player adjustment skills. I’ll give you some background and a
situation, and then you come up with the appropriate
adjustment.
I’m just giving you a brief history for each situation
because a longer history would spill too much ink. So it’s
valid to react to some of these situations with the thought, “I
don’t really have enough information to make an adjustment
yet.” But I’m not going to present situations where that’s the
answer I’m intending. The important skills this quiz tests are
whether you can use observations to build a model of how
your opponent plays and then use that model to build your
own counter-strategy.
In my opinion, if you’re “getting it,” you’ll know it.
Quiz No. 1.
It’s a $2-$5 game with $1,000 stacks. Your opponent in this
hand plays fairly tightly preflop and played the following hand
against you a few days back. You’ve also noticed that he open
limps roughly as often as he opens for a raise.
He opened for $20, you called on the button, and the big
blind called. The flop came A?8?4?. The blind checked, he
bet $30, you called, and the big blind folded.
The turn was the Q?. He bet $60, and you folded. He
showed you the ace of spades after you mucked. He also at
one point during that day described himself as a “nit and proud
HAND QUIZZES 215
of it.” (Note: This is just what he said to you. I think there’s
information here in what the player has said, but you shouldn’t
necessarily take it at face value. I’m certainly not trying to tell
you that you should approach him as if he’s a classic nit.)
Different day, same opponent, same stacks. He opens for
$20 from two seats after under the gun. A player calls in the
middle, and you call on the button with 9?8?.
The flop comes J?9?3?. Your opponent bets $30, and the
middle player folds. There’s $127 in the pot and over $900
behind. What do you do?
? ? ? ?
Here I strongly suggest calling. Your pair could be the best
hand, and with so much money behind and with position, even
if your pair isn’t best, there’s plenty you can possibly do on
future streets.
You call. The turn is the 7?. Your opponent bets $60 into
the $127 pot. What do you do?
? ? ? ?
Since the player open limps frequently as well as open
raises, the preflop raises (like in this hand) will tend to be
weighted toward pairs and high card hands. I would assume
that the raise takes some of the speculative suited hands like
A4s and 76s out of his preflop range.
This means that after betting the turn, your opponent will
tend to have air, a big pair, or possibly a set, but not two pair,
a straight, or a flush. The flush draws are limited to just a few
combos—i.e., A?K?, A?Q?,A?T?, K?Q?, K?T?,
Q?T?. All of the flush draws made with weaker preflop
hands—e.g., A?6?, 7?6?, etc.—your opponent might have
limped in with preflop.
216 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Compared to the perhaps six combos of flushes in your
opponent’s range, there are 12 combos of AJ, 6 combos each
of AA, KK, and QQ, and also some more combos of weaker
jacks.
The bottom line is that your opponent is simply unlikely to
have made a big hand or to hold a flush draw.
Your opponent has already showed willingness to bet one
pair into a scary board (presumably intending to fold to a raise
either on the turn or river). And the comment about being a
nit, in my mind, solidifies the notion that he’s willing to fold a
pair to pressure on a board like this one. I don’t take “nit” at
face value, but the comment shows the awareness of at least a
regular player.
I’d raise the turn and barrel the river. Including your
opponent’s bet, there’s $187 in the pot currently. I’d make it
$200 to go or so, giving you nearly 1-to-1 odds on the bluff.
Holding a pair and a gutshot, you do potentially have some
equity if your opponent gets stubborn on the turn with AA or
if he calls with a set.
But the equity is thin when called—this is almost a pure
bluff. The thing is, I think you can potentially get your
opponent to fold all one pair hands and possibly even a set to a
river barrel. Because your opponent’s range is so heavily
weighted toward high cards, you will catch your opponent
with one pair significantly more often than not, making a 1-to-
1 bluff show a clear profit.
If called, you could be up against a flush, a set, or one pair
plus a flush draw. (Rarely your opponent can also have a
straight or two pair.) If the river bricks and you bomb it,
betting $500 or so into the $527 pot, I would expect this player
to fold everything except a flush. Just going by hand
combinations, he’s going to have more pair plus flush draw
hands in his turn calling range than any other hand type. If he
folds these hands to the river barrel, and if he sometimes folds
HAND QUIZZES 217
sets also, then again this bluff profits, getting about 1-to-1.
Throw in the fact that sometimes you get 3-bet on the turn if
he’s got a flush (giving you cheap warning when your river
bluff won’t work), and this is a solid bluffing spot.
What makes this bluff work? Two things. First, our
opponent is giving us information about his preflop range by
playing a strategy of sometimes limping and sometimes
raising. (Yes, he theoretically could be mixing up his preflop
play expertly to deny us information. No, he’s in fact not
doing that.) Second, he’s willing to bet-fold the turn. This is a
classic example of exploiting a TAG player making a turn betfold
with one pair.
Bet-folding one pair into a scary board is a great tactic
against weak players who will raise only when you’re beat.
Bet-folding one pair with deep stacks out of position against
someone like you who has read this book and who is trying to
exploit every vulnerability is—well, it’s dangerous.
Note that this theme will come up frequently as you play,
especially if you play with 200 BB stacks or deeper. You can
beat likely all of the regular TAG players in your game by
calling their raises liberally preflop, floating flops where you
catch a little something, and then bombing the turn and river
when scare cards come. Your opponent will usually be a big
dog to have the hands you’re repping, and you’ll get the folds
you need.
And if, for some reason, these bluffs begin not to show a
strong profit against a particular player, that player is now
very susceptible to being value bet into oblivion. If he wants
to stop losing money to you, the only way is if he stops betting
so frequently from out of position. The longer he clings to his
bet-fold lines, the longer he’s going to get owned.
I started the quizzes off with this example because it’s
absolutely a bread-and-butter play for creative no-limit
players. If you take one thing from this book, learn how to do
218 PLAYING THE PLAYER
this to someone. I know it might feel like jumping off a cliff to
many of you, but you’re reading this book to challenge
yourself and to improve, and I’m telling you that in this play
lies massive improvement if you are willing to jump down the
rabbit hole with me.
Quiz No. 2.
Your opponent in this hand is a common regular in your
$2-$5 game. He’s unimaginative. He doesn’t bluff much. He
doesn’t value bet thinly, and he doesn’t like to play big pots
without a hand. He doesn’t read hands well, and he is
suspicious of aggressive players. Basically, he’s a run-of-themill,
not very good live no-limit hold’em player.
It’s $2-$5 with $500 stacks. Two players limp. You’re in
the small blind with K?T?, and you call. (This is a borderline
raise in some situations, but you didn’t raise it here.) The big
blind, your main opponent, checks.
The flop is K?Q?3?. You bet $20 into the $20 pot, and
only the big blind calls.
The turn is the 4?. What do you do?
? ? ? ?
Here comes the flush card. In the last example hand, we
punished someone who bet-folded the turn from out of
position with top pair. We used the scare card and the leverage
of our stack to put to the sword someone who essentially got
out of line by betting too thinly.
Our opponent in this hand, however, is putting no one to
the sword. He’s never bluff-raising to represent the flush. He’s
also not going to go off for a big number now with less than a
HAND QUIZZES 219
flush. Therefore, we bet small to medium, planning to fold to a
raise.
You bet $30 into the $60 pot on the K?Q?3?4? board.
The river is the A?. What do you do?
? ? ? ?
Well, you didn’t get raised on the turn, so you’re more
often than not leading going into the final card. This final card
might look scary, but relatively few hands your opponent
could hold have now outdrawn you. He’s not calling $20 on
the flop with just the naked A?. He could possibly have
A?Qx or A?Jx or A?Tx or A?3x. These represent just 12
combinations of hands. On the other hand, K-9 and K-8
represent 16 combinations just by themselves.
Since your opponent started the hand in the big blind, he
could have any side card with a king. You beat most of these
hands. If you bet a lot, your opponent will fold on this board
that has rolled out quite scary for his hand. But he’ll pay off a
small bet. I’d bet around $30 or $40 on this river and expect to
get called somewhat more than half the time by a worse hand.
I actually played this hand. I bet $30 on the river and my
opponent whined about paying me off and then called and
showed K-7.
What’s the moral of this hand? Against players who are
unimaginative and who will call down small bets with any
reasonable piece of the board, value bet, value bet, value bet.
You aren’t getting bluff-raised. So you can safely bet-fold
each street. (I would have folded to a raise on all three streets.)
Yes, when you bet a hand like this on the turn and river,
you will sometimes get raised or called and shown a better
hand. But sometimes, in this case, is less than half the time,
which makes these bets profitable. You are trying to make bets
than win more than half the time. If you do that correctly, you
220 PLAYING THE PLAYER
will make bets that lose nearly half the time. This is how it
should be.
Here’s how I look at it. Whenever I have a good pair
against someone who’s going to call down a lot and bluff-raise
rarely, I’m going to look to bet the hand three times on most
boards. The cards that roll out on the turn and river mainly
affect my bet sizing. The scarier the cards, the less value I can
get for my hand, and I need to size smaller bets. But against a
guy like this, I could size my river bet down all the way to the
$5 minimum and still get called by worse and raised only by
better. When that’s the case, checking is rarely right.
Quiz No. 3.
A tight regular limps in during a $2-$5 game. A young kid
who has been griping about not being able to play online
anymore raises to $20 from two off the button. You have
K? J? and call on the button. The blinds fold, and the regular
also folds. There’s $52 in the pot. You’re roughly $700
behind.
The flop comes Q? 9?4?. Your opponent bets $35. What
do you do?
? ? ? ?
More often than not, I’d raise here to perhaps about $80 or
$90. Raising continuation bets from TAG players is quite
profitable until your opponents adjust by checking more flops
(especially when they are out of position).
You’ve got a gutshot, an overcard, and a backdoor flush
draw. To raise a tight limper from relatively late position, this
internet player doesn’t need much hand. So you can expect,
HAND QUIZZES 221
given that he likely has a wide range of hands, that on most
flop textures he’s missed more often than not.
To survive in online games, this player would have needed
to learn to check some flops to avoid having his weak range
abused. But he may not respect live players enough to check
flops. With no information to the contrary, I’d expect this
player to be betting nearly his entire range in this situation.
His weak range combined with my equity when called
makes this a fairly standard bluff-raise.
If you’ve never seriously experimented with it, please try
raising flop continuation bets. You may be astounded by how
well it works. The more TAGish an opponent plays, the more
frequently it succeeds.
(With position and deep stacks, you can also raise flop
continuation bets against players whom you expect to call
more frequently. If they are willing to call with relatively
weak hands from out of position with lots of money behind,
you can really put the screws to them on many turn and river
cards.)
Quiz No. 4.
This one is a three-part quiz. You’re in three different game
types with the same hand. In each situation, you’re playing $2-
$5 with $800 stacks. In each of these games, you are in the
cutoff, and you have been dealt J?7?.
The first game is one of the best games you’ve been in for a
long time. There are three guys at the table who all have been
making ridiculous calls—against each other, against the
regulars—and by and large have been winning. They’ve been
sucking out left and right, and when they haven’t been sucking
out, they’ve been getting lucky at picking off ill-considered
bluffs. Of course, despite their successes, each of them is up
222 PLAYING THE PLAYER
only about a buyin since they give the money back almost as
fast as they make it.
Four players limp to you, two regulars and two of the
players described above. The other of the three players is
sitting in the small blind. Remember, you have J?7? in the
cutoff. What do you do?
? ? ? ?
I think any answer besides limping is clearly wrong.
Make no mistake, J?7? is not a good hand. You’re not
entering this pot planning to steal it. You’re playing poker the
way your average donk does—limping in with a weak hand,
hoping lightning strikes. You want to flop big and win a big
pot.
This is usually a losing strategy because you can’t count on
playing that big pot when you do happen to make a hand. But
in this game where these crazy buffoons are throwing money
around, you’re welcome to buy your $5 lottery ticket. If you
make a flush (which will happen about 6 percent of the time),
you’ll likely have the best hand, and very possibly you’ll be
able to win a few hundred for your trouble. Throw in the
chance of making two pair or trips, or of winning the pot in
some other unexpected way, and you have enough expected
return to justify the $5 limp.
I don’t like raising. It just bloats the pot in a situation where
you are almost certain not to be an equity favorite. This is a
case where you’re playing a hand almost purely for the
implied odds. (Playing a hand purely for the implied odds isn’t
something I recommend you do often, so enjoy the gamble.)
? ? ? ?
HAND QUIZZES 223
Now you’re playing in a tight Wednesday afternoon game
in Las Vegas. All the players are regulars save for one loose
tourist who is away from the table taking a phone call. These
guys hate to put their stack in without the nuts.
Two players limp to you. What do you do?
? ? ? ?
Now you raise. Make it $25 or $30. You’ll often see
everyone fold, which nets $17. While I don’t think you’ll pick
up the pot often enough to make this raise an instant profit,
you will win enough pots postflop when you get called to
make the entire play profitable.
When you get called, remember the range of hands you’ll
likely be up against. These are guys who often limp-fold, but
decided to limp-call this time. You’ll see a lot of pocket pairs,
big card hands like AQ and AJ and strong suited hands like
QJs. With this in mind, attack the flops that figure to miss this
range.
T?9?3?
K?3?3?
6? 3? 2?
Basically any flop without two cards ten or above on it.
Your opponent won’t hit boards like this very often, so you
can steal on these flops.
? ? ? ?
Third scenario. A tight regular limps in, and a TAG makes
it $25 to go from four off the button. It’s folded to you. Again,
you’re in the cutoff, and you have J?7?. There’s a Internet
kid in the small blind. What do you do?
224 PLAYING THE PLAYER
? ? ? ?
In this situation I’d usually fold while perhaps occasionally
3-betting as a bluff. Your hand is weak. Given his position and
the preflop raise, the TAG likely has a better hand than you
do. It’s ok to enter pots with position and a weaker hand if you
have a plan to exploit systematic postflop errors your
opponents make. But against a generic, competent, TAG
opponent I think you don’t have enough to exploit to make up
for all that can go wrong if you were to call.
If you were to call, the button could call behind you
robbing you of position. The internet kid in the small blind
could 3-bet—either light or for value—and you’ll be forced to
fold.
Or you could call, everyone else could fold, and you’d go
heads-up with the TAG. What boards are you planning to steal
on? High boards likely hit your opponents’ range, so
presumably you’ll be looking for low and medium boards to
steal. But what if your opponent expects you to try to steal on
these boards? How much edge do you think you have with a
weak hand like J7s?
Against a competent player with a legitimate preflop
raising range, I don’t think you can squeeze in a profitable call
here. Thus it’s usually a fold, though a bluff 3-bet may be
worth considering if you think the gameflow would allow you
to have a high enough success rate.
? ? ? ?
Same hand, three different ways to play it. Against guys
who are payoff monkeys, you keep the pot small preflop and
look to hit a hand and exploit your opponents’ huge errors of
calling large bets when they’re beat. Against guys who are
HAND QUIZZES 225
nitty and refuse to put money in the pot without a big hand,
you raise preflop and fire the flop (and possibly also the turn)
to exploit their errors. And against a competent player marked
with a strong range with a wildcard player behind you, it’s a
fold.
In no-limit hold’em, whether a hand has value preflop often
depends relatively little on what the cards are. It depends far
more on the type and magnitude of mistakes the other players
in the pot may make. When these players make consistent
folding errors, a strategy of raising pots and firing barrels will
often work. When these players make consistent calling errors,
a strategy of slipping into pots and playing for implied odds
works better. And when these players make relatively few
errors, you often have to pass on the weak hands and wait for
either good cards or for specific situations where your
opponents are marked with relatively weak hand ranges.
Quiz No. 5.
It’s a $2-$5 game with $600 stacks. A nit opens from early
position to $20. This player typically open-limps, and when he
does open-raise, you’ve seen him always make it the same
amount.
A loose player who is a candidate to stack off with top pair
calls. You’re on the button with Q?T?. What do you do?
? ? ? ?
The nit likely has a strong preflop hand. It therefore makes
little sense to 3-bet. You’re likely to get called, possibly in two
spots given the loose player also in the hand.
You’re almost certainly behind here, but I’d call anyway.
Your implied odds are nice in this situation. You’ve got two
226 PLAYING THE PLAYER
players in the hand who might well stack off to you with just
one pair. The nit could have AA or KK, and if you outflop
either of those hands with two pair or trips, you can likely get
him to stack off. (Nits don’t like to stack off without the nuts,
but say this player has AA or KK and you catch a Q-T-3 flop
with a two-suit. Your opponent will bet the flop, and if you
shove you’ll almost certainly get a call. Nits are more likely to
fold these hands once scary turn and/or river cards come.)
Now you’re a big dog to outflop AA or KK with your hand,
but you’re getting almost 30-to-1 implied odds from the nit’s
stack to try.
Beyond this, you can flop a draw and stay in the hand. You
can also catch the nit with unimproved AK and beat the loose
player for a nice score. There’s enough upside to this hand to
risk $20 with position.
Before we move on, I want to point out that the way I
discussed this preflop call is the same way you should
evaluate all of your preflop plays. I didn’t say, “You can call
with Q-T suited, it’s a good hand and you have position.” This
is bad poker thinking. To justify a preflop play, you have to
determine how you are going to make money with the holding.
Here we made some assumptions about things that could
happen. We could outflop AA or KK and get a flop shove
called. We could catch a draw, get there on the turn, and
possibly have some implied odds. This gives you a plan for
the hand and keeps you from pissing away aimless preflop
calls.
? ? ? ?
You call, and the big blind calls. There’s $82 in the pot
with $580 behind.
The flop comes K?J?7?. You’ve flopped a flush draw
with an open-ender. The big blind checks, and the nit bets
HAND QUIZZES 227
$100 into the $82 pot. The loose player folds, and it’s your
turn. What do you do?
? ? ? ?
This is an important decision, and I believe the correct
answer is clear-cut. With the big combo draw, many players
would auto-ship this flop, but it’s a poor play in this situation.
Why?
When a nit makes a huge bet like this into three opponents
after having raised preflop, he’s got top pair or an overpair. I’d
narrow his range down to one of four possible hands: A-A, AK,
K-K, and J-J. He almost never has any other hand. Due to
the size of the bet, as well as the combinatorics, I think A-A
and A-K are by far the most likely hands.
So why is shoving so bad? I think you have zero fold
equity. Even a nit will snap-call your shove on a flop like this
one with the hands he can have. When you shove a draw, even
a big one like this, you are relying on fold equity to make the
play profitable. If you never get a fold, you’re just getting your
money in bad.
“But,” you say, “we have a fifteen out draw which is a
favorite over one pair!” Yes, in general a fifteen out draw is a
favorite over one pair. However it’s not a favorite over these
one pair hands. Some of your ace outs are likely sitting in your
opponent’s hand, and if you do catch an ace, your opponent
will nearly always have a redraw to a boat.
Your opponent could also have the A?, which gives him a
redraw to beat your flush. If you PokerStove your hand on this
flop against a range of A-A, A-K, K-K, and J-J, you’ll see that
you’re in fact an underdog.
The other factor is that you know what your opponent has,
but he doesn’t know what you have. Plus you have position.
This means that you will play perfectly for the remainder of
228 PLAYING THE PLAYER
the hand, but your opponent can still make mistakes. This
means you should prefer to play a turn and possibly also a
river.
You’re getting a little worse than 2-to-1 on your turn call,
which is just about the direct odds you need to see if you hit
your draw. On top of that, you have significant implied odds
on a number of turn cards.
If the turn is an ace, you can shove over your opponent’s
bet and expect to get called 100 percent of the time. The worst
hand he’s going to have in that situation is top two. In that
case, you’re getting it in as a big favorite rather than as a slight
dog on the flop.
If the turn is a nine, you also have implied odds, though if
your opponent has A-A or A-K he might begin to slow down
on you.
If the turn is a heart, you might get a probing blocking bet
out of your opponent. If you raise this bet, your opponent may
fold, but you can flat-call it and leave your opponent in
uncertain territory to the river. And if your opponent makes a
bigger bet, you can raise it with fair confidence that your
opponent has a redraw and therefore will call you.
The point here is the same point I’ve been making
throughout the book. Hands in this game have little inherent
value, and they don’t demand to be played one way or the
other. How you play certain hands depends far more on your
opponent’s hand ranges and how you expect your opponent to
play as the hand proceeds.
Before you think about making any bet or raise, whether
with a made hand or a draw, think about how strong your
opponent’s range is. What is the purpose of the bet? Are you
trying to get worse hands to call or better hands to fold? If
you’re trying to get worse hands to call, which hands
specifically are you trying to get calls from? What portion of
HAND QUIZZES 229
your opponent’s entire range is composed of these hands, and
do you in fact think your opponent will call with them?
If you’re trying to get better hands to fold, which hands
specifically will fold? What portion of your opponent’s range
consists of these hands? Only after you’ve answered that
question can you look at your hand and ask, “Should I bluff?”
If zero better hands in your opponent’s range fold, then the
answer is, “No, you shouldn’t bluff,” no matter how strong a
draw you might have.
Far too many people look at their cards first when deciding
how to play. That’s exactly backwards and just begs to get you
into hot water. “Ooh, big draw. I shove!” Or, “Darn, missed
the flop. I fold.” If your opponent is bet-folding zero percent
of the time, you never raise a draw. If your opponent is betfolding
70 percent of the time, then you always raise no
matter how weak your hand is!
Hopefully you can see through this example how a
decision-making approach that first looks at your hand
strength and goes from there will not succeed if your goal is to
move beyond ABC poker to become one of the biggest
winners in the game.
Final Thoughts
If you’re like most people, after one read-through of this book,
you will feel swamped with information. This may be a
completely new way of thinking about no-limit hold’em, and
you may feel lost about how to begin to apply this information
in your everyday game.
Here’s the thing. I did not write this book in a day. I wrote
it little by little, day after day, until it was done.
In the same way, you cannot expect to read and absorb this
book in a day.
Fortunately, everything you’ve learned in this book can be
applied bit by bit. Here’s my suggestion for how you should
get started applying what you’ve learned.
Look for a single mistake that your regular opponents
make. Just one. They don’t barrel the turn often enough. They
continuation bet the flop too often. They don’t value bet the
river thinly enough. Whatever you notice and want to try to
exploit. But just pick a single mistake for now.
Then sit down and brainstorm the ways you can exploit that
error. Your opponents continuation bet the flop too often. Ok,
you’re going to bluff-raise these bets more frequently.
Then do it. Sit in a game and play your normal way, except
whenever you think you see an opponent make your error, you
try the counter-strategy. Keep at it.
If it works, great. You’re now a better poker player. Do it
again. Pick another mistake, brainstorm a counter-strategy,
and try it.
FINAL THOUGHTS 231
If it doesn’t work, rethink it. Did you just get unlucky? Is
there something you missed? After you rethink it, decide
either to give it another shot, or just scrap it and start over.
The key is this iterative process. You make a small change
to your game, try it out, and either keep it or scrap it. Then you
make another small change and do the same. Then another
small change.
When you make changes in small steps, you keep things
understandable. After all, your goal shouldn’t be to read this
book and go out and play like Phil Galfond tomorrow. That’s
unrealistic, and if you try, you’ll come up short. Your goal
should simply be to play a little bit better tomorrow than you
did today. And then a little bit better the next day.
If you pledge to add a little bit to your game each day for
the next year then in twelve months you will be a much
improved no-limit hold’em player.
And when you’re thinking about everything that’s going on
while you play, when you’re engaging all of your brain, all of
the time, looking for errors to exploit, you’ll find that playing
poker is also a whole lot more fun.
test
.
.
.
.
Pitfalls To Avoid
Two pitfalls. First, pay attention to the stack sizes! Your
target’s stack size is the most important. A lot of these guys
who always ship overpairs don’t play very deep. If you try to
crack an overpair at 50 BB stacks, you’re likely giving away
EV, not getting it.
I have brain farts from time to time where I’ll call preflop
with some suited hand trying to crack a guy and then realize
that his stack is only about 10 or 15 times the preflop raise. I
flop middle pair or something, and the guy bombs the pot with
178 PLAYING THE PLAYER
half his stack, and that’s it. Can’t call. Just bled away the
preflop call.
Avoid doing this whenever possible. If the stacks aren’t
deep, then that flop bet will usually be too big to call. And
you’re not very often going to have the pair cracked already
on the flop.
Second pitfall is that you should not semibluff your draws.
A lot of people get jam happy when they flop a decent draw,
but when you have close to zero fold equity, jamming your
draw is usually wrong. Remember, you’re trying to crack the
guy, not get him to fold. So don’t decide to go nuts when you
flop 8?7?2? to J?T?. Your overcard outs are probably no
good, so when you get it in on the flop you’re just a straight up
underdog. It’s much, much better to just call the flop, call the
turn (if the odds are right), and shove whenever you get there.
If you miss, you miss, and you lose.
Maybe it sounds silly to tell you not to try to bluff a guy
who never folds an overpair, but I’ve seen people try more
times than I could possibly count.
Who Exhibits This Trait
Lots of recreational players play this way. In fact, I’ll
generally assume a player who seems to play a recreational
player style will not fold an overpair even if I haven’t seen
direct evidence of it yet.
Ironically, some nits also seem to exhibit this trait as well.
They quite literally wait all day for pocket aces, and they just
plain ain’t folding when they get it. This is particularly true on
the flop. Nits know how hard it is to outflop pocket aces, so
they’ll often call off a huge overshove on a flop like J?8?6?.
What they don’t necessarily realize is that the way they play is
so predictable they are telling you they have pocket aces very
ABSOLUTELY REFUSING TO FOLD AN OVERPAIR 179
early on and leaving too much money behind if they plan to
call it off on any flop.
If you try this play against a nit and he folds instead of calls
(he’ll usually fold face-up just to show you how nitty he is),
then you can obviously abuse these folds in the future by
playing deep and shoving flops without the goods.
The Bottom Line
Lots of players refuse to fold overpairs almost no matter the
circumstances. Exploiting this one is simple. Crack and shove.
The trick is to make sure you have the odds to crack. Then the
next trick is to make sure you shove after—and not before—
you’ve cracked the pair.
PART IV: PUTTING IT
ALL TOGETHER
Finding Holes
I’ve played a lot of small stakes no-limit hold’em in my life.
I’ve played live, and I’ve played online. I’ve played every
level of stakes all the way down to $0.10-$0.25 online.
In all these small stakes games, I can probably count on
two hands the number of truly good no-limit players I’ve run
into. Of course “good” is relative, but I’m talking about
players who can tailor their strategies well to the opponents
they are playing against, players who will adjust if I start
trying to take advantage of them and whose adjustments are
consistently correct.
Well over 99 percent of all the small stakes opponents I’ve
played against have not been good according to this definition.
Most generally play a fairly static strategy and don’t adjust
well either when there’s good money to be made adjusting or
when they are getting brutally taken advantage of.
It never fails, however. Someone will come to me and say,
“Ed, I can’t win in my game. There’s too many good players.
What should I do? ”
If you’ve ever felt that way about your regular game, rest
assured, your opponents are not too good to beat. You just
haven’t found the holes yet. Once you do, you will crash
through the logjam and start raking in the buyins.
This whole book has, to some extent, been about how to
find holes in your opponents’ games and exploit them. But
I’ve written this section for that student who complains that he
can’t win because his opponents are just too good. If you run
into a logjam in your regular game, and you feel like you can’t
184 PLAYING THE PLAYER
beat it, follow the steps in this section and you’ll be on your
way to reclaiming ownership of your game.
Step 1. Target a regular in your game that
you feel is too “good” to beat.
Pick someone. Choose a regular in your game. Look for
someone who wins in the game and whom you consider too
good to beat.
This is your target. You are going to make this person’s
poker life a living hell over the coming days, weeks, maybe
even months.
Yes, normally a good strategy to win at poker is to choose
the softest game available and pick on the weakest players.
But presumably you’re reading this because that formula isn’t
doing it for you anymore. The weak players aren’t as weak as
they used to be, and you’re spinning your wheels. Or maybe
it’s working, but you want to win faster and move up in
stakes.
You’re going to invest in your improvement by choosing to
pick on one of the better players. It may temporarily dent your
winrate, but it will pay long-term dividends.
Choose someone who plays a lot. Every time you play
poker over the next month or so, you want this person to be in
your game. A pro who has to put in a lot of hours to make
ends meet is a great choice. And the better you think this
player is, the better the choice. (Within reason. Phil Galfond
would not be a good choice for this because he’s too good, and
you aren’t going to find the holes you’re looking for. But
chances are Phil Galfond doesn’t play in your game, and
chances also are that anyone who does play in your game is a
fine choice.)
FINDING HOLES 185
Step 2. Gather preliminary data.
Play a few sessions with this player. For now it doesn’t
really matter where you sit relative to your target. Your entire
focus during these sessions should be on your target. Watch
every single hand this person plays. Ignore everyone else,
even if there is some huge fish in your game. (Don’t fret.
There will still be fish playing poker when this exercise is over
and you are back to playing normally.)
You aren’t trying to win money during these sessions. I’d
recommend playing a bit on the nitty side. Playing tight and
ABC will allow you to get through hands without thinking too
much about what you’re doing, helping you to focus on your
target.
Take lots of notes. If you play online, this part is really easy
since your computer will save the hand histories and you can
review them at your leisure. If you play live, I’d say let
appearances be damned and sit there with a notepad and a pen
and just scribble your notes shamelessly. Your neighbors will
undoubtedly comment on what you’re doing. If people ask
you about what you’re writing, just say you’re taking notes on
what cards come, how fast hands get dealt, how much rake
gets taken, how often jackpot hands come up, or anything that
would require you to be scribbling constantly and playing very
little. If you’re playing nitty, eventually everyone will lose
interest in you and what you’re writing.
What are you looking for? Ultimately you are looking for
situations where your opponent has an unbalanced hand range.
Here are some things that you should certainly note:
Write down a history of every hand your target shows
down. Record as much as you can get of the action.
Specifically you want your target’s position in the hand, all
186 PLAYING THE PLAYER
checks, bets, calls, and raises, and all bet sizes. Also get stack
sizes where possible.
Note preflop frequencies. You’re trying to infer the
percentage of hands your target plays preflop. Draw a table on
your notepad. Four columns and three rows. The columns
stand for early, middle, late position, and blinds. The rows
stand for opening pot, limpers, and raisers in front. Every time
your target acts preflop, make a note in one of the twelve
boxes that corresponds to the action your target took.
For example, say a player limped, and your target folded
from three off the button. Put an “F” in the box that
corresponds to middle position and a limper in front. Next
hand your target open-raises to 4× the blind from four off the
button. Put a “4×” in the box that corresponds to early position
and opening the pot. If you get to see the hand, write it down
next to the 4× note.
After perhaps 20 hours of play (four or five sessions of
note-taking), you’ll have about 500 notes in your boxes since
you’re taking a note on literally every hand that your target
gets dealt in. This will give you a rough idea of what your
opponent’s preflop range looks like. If he’s got a zillion “F”s
in his opening the pot from early position box, but he has more
raises in his late position opening the pot and limpers in front
boxes, you know that he’s positionally aware.
After you’ve got your boxes filled, try to write an
approximate range of hands for your opponent for each
situation. For example, say you have 100 notes in your
opening the pot from early position box (this will be one of
your most frequently used boxes). You have 73 “F”s, 8 “L”s
for limp, 14 “4×” raises, and 5 “6×” raises. Plus or minus a
few percent, you can assume that he’s playing about 25
percent of his hands. Of these hands, he’s limping about a
third and opening about two-thirds. Say you noticed that for
FINDING HOLES 187
one of his limps, he showed down 44. He showed KTs for one
of his open-raises, and you saw QQ for one of his 6× raises.
Armed with this data, open up PokerStove. Slide the slider
to a 25 percent range and add and subtract hands that make
sense. (Compared to the range PokerStove will give you, for
any given percentage of hands, most people play some extra
suited hands and pocket pairs at the expense of some of the
weakest offsuit hands.) Then try to figure out what the limping
range looks like. You know 44 is in it, and you can likely infer
that similar hands (66-22 perhaps) are also in it. Keep adding
reasonable hands to the limping range until you get to 8
percent. Write that range down for the limping. Then write
down the hands that are left in the raising range while also
trying to infer if this player sizes raises different based on
hand strength or on other factors.
Repeat this procedure for every box. Now you have a fairly
good picture of what hands your opponent is playing in every
common situation.
If you see something that doesn’t fit in a box, note it
separately. Reraises are the most important of these. Every
time your opponent is involved in a 3-bet pot, whether your
target is the reraiser or not, take a note of what happens. Try to
get a sense of whether this player tends to call 3-bets or fold
and whether this tendency changes based on whether he’s in
or out of position.
Find unbalanced postflop lines. In addition to all the
hands that go to showdown and all the preflop data, you want
to take data on your target’s play postflop. There are a few
things you really, really want to know.
First, how frequently does your opponent continuation bet
the flop after raises preflop? And does this frequency change
based on board texture? Almost everyone will alter their
continuation bet frequency based on the number of players in
188 PLAYING THE PLAYER
the pot, so this is less important to note. Also, even though
they absolutely should, very few players alter their
continuation bet frequency based on the strength of their
preflop hand range. For instance, say you open-raise and get
called by the big blind. You should be betting more frequently
when you’ve raised from early position and less frequently
when you’ve raised from the cutoff. As I said, however, very
few players actually do this. Their continuation betting
strategy is more static than that.
I would assume that your target varies continuation bet
frequency based on the number of players in the pot, hand
strength, and possibly board texture. Within these parameters,
try to figure out which hands your opponent is continuation
betting on what sort of boards.
Most players either continuation bet too frequently, or they
continuation bet too predictably based on hand value. For
instance, many players (particularly ones who play small
stakes games for a living) will continuation bet a flop like Q-
7-5 two-tone nearly 100 percent of the time. And when they
don’t continuation bet, they will have a very specific set of
hands like, perhaps, A-K, A-7, J-J, 8-7, or some other similar
medium-strength hand with showdown value.
You should get an idea early on whether your opponent is a
frequent continuation bettor or not. If he is, pay particular
attention to the flops he doesn’t continuation bet. Note the
circumstance and, if there was a showdown, what hand he had.
If he doesn’t continuation bet as frequently, watch what
happens on the turn. He will frequently get bet into. How does
he respond? If he folds mostly, then he’s checking back air. If
he calls mostly, he’s likely checking back showdown value. If
he raises fairly frequently, he’s possibly slowplaying, but also
possibly taking peculiar bluffing lines.
On the turn and river, watch for two things in particular.
How thinly does this player try to value bet the river? Say
FINDING HOLES 189
your target checks the river in position and shows top pair.
This observation could mean that the player rarely value bets
with just one pair on the river. Note any data that would tend
to reinforce or dispute this notion. You want to have as clear a
picture as possible of the hands your target will and won’t
value bet on the river.
Also watch out for how frequently your opponent tries to
pot control on the turn. If you see him check back top pair on
the turn, this could be a habit. Again, gather data that would
support or refute this conclusion.
Finally, look at your target’s bet sizing. Are there any clear
tells? Any time your opponent makes a particularly large or
particularly small bet, note the situation.
This means you’re writing something down on absolutely
every hand. And whenever your target enters the pot, you’re
potentially writing quite a bit. Let’s go through an example
hand so you know what to write down.
Two players limp in, and your target raises to 6× on the
button. Both limpers call.
Write “6×” in the late position limpers preflop box.
The flop is Q?J?5?. The limpers check, and your target
bets half the pot.
Write down something like “QJ5/F-1/2×.” This means the
flop was Q-J-5 with a flush draw “F” (“R” for rainbow and
“M” for monotone maybe), and the target made a 1/2 pot
continuation bet.
One of the limpers calls. The turn is the 6 of the flush suit.
It goes check-check.
The river is a J. The limper bets 1/2 pot, and the target calls
and shows A-Q.
Write down the rest of the action for the hand:
“Turn 6-flush. X-X. River J. B-C. Showed AQ. ”
Then go back to your preflop note and write “AQo” above
your 6× note in the late position and limpers box. Finally, note
190 PLAYING THE PLAYER
that your opponent took a pot-controlling line on the turn with
top pair when the flush card came.
You don’t have to use my notation. Any way you can get
these notes down that you will understand later is fine.
Obviously if you take notes like these on every single hand
for 20 hours of play you will have a lot of data. Now you’re
ready for the next step.
Step 3. Summarize your target’s strategy.
You’ve gathered your data. Now it’s time to develop a
detailed picture of how your target plays the game. Write
down your target’s preflop limping and raising ranges in
various positions. How frequently does your target 3-bet, and
with what ranges/in what situations? In the 20 hours you’ve
observed, have you seen your target 3-bet preflop and fold to a
4-bet?
What is the postflop strategy? Does this player continuation
bet many flops, pot control some turns, and miss some river
value bets on semi-scary boards? Under what circumstances
does this player check-raise? In particular, what sort of draws
does your target seem to raise the flop with? Will he raise
many draws, only strong draws, or only on certain flop
textures?
Step 4. Brainstorm scenarios where your
opponent’s range will be unbalanced.
Up until now, you’ve basically just been taking notes and
documenting observations. This step requires you to draw
some inferences from your observations, so it’s a little bit
tricky. Fortunately, you can treat this step as the beginning of
FINDING HOLES 191
an iterative process. That is, after you’ve completed all the
steps, you will use your experience at the table to revisit this
step and improve your inferences.
What do I mean by scenarios where your opponent’s range
is unbalanced? You’re looking for situations where your
opponent’s range is dominated either by particularly strong
hands or by particularly weak hands.
Let’s say, for instance, that you observe that your target
raises about 30 percent of hands from late position against
limpers. You also observe that he continuation bets dry flops
nearly 100 percent of the time, and that he frequently checks
medium-strength pairs behind on the turn. With these traits,
say a hand plays out as follows.
Someone limps, and your target raises. You call from the
big blind, and the limper calls.
The flop is J-4-3 with a flush draw. You and the limper
check, and your target continuation bets. You call, and the
limper folds.
The turn is an offsuit K. You check, and your opponent
bets half pot. What does his range look like here?
Well, he’s raising preflop with 30 percent of hands, so with
such a wide range he’s a favorite to miss any given flop. On
top of that, a J-4-3 flop is hard to hit for any hand. Yet he’s
betting it nearly 100 percent of the time.
He usually has air. Say you have A-Q with a backdoor
flush draw. You check-call.
The turn is a K. It’s not a great card for your hand, but you
know that your opponent likes to check pairs back on the turn.
So if he flopped a jack or spiked a king on the turn, he might
check it back. Instead, he bets. What is his betting range here?
It’s air, draws, and a few monster hands like K-J and 3-3. In
other words, it’s mostly weak.
This is a very unbalanced range. Your opponent has
actually marked himself with weakness by betting the turn
192 PLAYING THE PLAYER
because he likes to check many turns with showdown value.
You can check-raise.
Why is the check-raise good? With A-Q you might have
the best hand and actually get value against your opponent’s
draws. Also, even when he’s got air, he’s got a decent shot to
draw out on you on the river, so you gain when he folds. You
have outs to the nuts even if you run into a set. And, finally,
you might get lucky and your opponent might have chosen to
bet-fold the turn with a pair this time. When an opponent likes
to pot control pairs, it indicates an unwillingness to stack off
with a pair. So there’s a decent chance if your opponent is
betting a pair that he’ll be bet-folding.
Brainstorm as many scenarios as you can where your
opponent’s traits will lead to your target betting a primarily
weak hand range. These are the bet-fold spots that I told you
to exploit in the first part of the book. Here you’re just using a
systematic process to find them.
Write down a list of as many bet-fold spots you can think
of. These will be the situations you will look for as you play to
torture your target opponent.
Also look for other unbalanced ranges. Good examples are
when your opponent has limited the strength of his hand by
failing to play in the way he’d play with the nuts. These are
great spots to try thin value bets.
Look through your data to see if your opponent is raising
frequently in situations where you’d expect him to have a
relatively weak hand range. For example, say your target likes
to call relatively frequently out of the blinds, and you find that
he check-raises a lot of flops.
If you’re playing a wide range from the blinds, “legitimate”
flop check-raising spots are few and far between. Your target
could be very unbalanced after check-raising the flop. Look
for spots to shove over the check-raises or to float them.
FINDING HOLES 193
Step 5. Start “bumhunting” your target.
Bumhunting is poker jargon for seeking particular players
out to try to beat them. Most of the time you’d want to
bumhunt particularly poor players. Not you! You’re going to
bumhunt your target. Try to get position on him. Then start
playing and try to create as many exploitable situations as you
can. If he likes to barrel the turn lightly while checking his
showdown strength, float flops to let him bet his unbalanced
range on the turn, then shut him down with a raise. If he
check-raises flops too lightly, whenever you continuation bet
the flop, make sure you have a surprise in store for the bad
check-raises.
The key is to fold when your opponent has strong ranges
and to refuse to fold against your opponent’s weak ranges.
When your opponent is getting out of line with weak ranges,
you are going to linger in hands. You’ll call down light, you’ll
bluff-raise, and so forth. You’re simply not going to let him
bet weak ranges and win pots.
If your opponent is the typical “good” player for your
stakes, this treatment will be absolutely devastating to him.
None of his normal tricks will be working against you.
Continue to take notes. Your opponents will by this time be
used to you taking notes at the table, so it shouldn’t draw
attention. But your notes aren’t going to be nearly as detailed.
You aren’t going to write down every little preflop play or
every flop bet or turn check.
Instead, you’re taking notes on how your exploitative
attempts are working. If you try to exploit something, write
the hand down, and write down if it worked or not. If it didn’t
work, did you get shown a hand you expected or one that
surprised you? For instance, say you raised the turn because
you expected your opponent to have either a nut hand or air,
194 PLAYING THE PLAYER
and he called and showed the nuts. Oh well, bad luck for you,
but it’s actually evidence that you’re doing it right.
On the other hand, say he called and snapped you off with
top pair. This is evidence you might need to change
something. Either your inferences were wrong, or your
opponent is adjusting to you. Take notes on how these hands
work out, and then go back to Step 4 to refine your strategy
and brainstorm new scenarios.
Likely a hand will come up that you didn’t anticipate.
Write it down, then when you get home, figure out if your
opponent will have unbalanced ranges in this scenario. If so,
file it away and if a similar situation comes up again, go on the
attack.
After you do this for a while, your opponent will almost
certainly get frustrated. He’ll probably try to adjust something.
Watch for how he tries to adjust. Usually the adjustment will
be foolish and easily exploitable. For example, your opponent
check-raises you on a 8-4-3 flop, and you 3-bet shove because
you know this to be an unbalanced range. He calls and shows
A-6. Now you can be fairly certain that your opponent is
going to get it in with you on many types of flops with some
very weak hands. So you start playing all your top pair hands
bet-shove on the flop.
Step 6. Extend the lessons you’ve learned to
other “good” players.
By now the poor guy you’ve been chasing around is ready
to kneecap you in the parking lot. It’s time to call it quits on
this particular exercise. Give the guy a break. Stop
bumhunting him. In this stage, you’re going to try the tricks
you’ve learned that work against your former target against all
the “good” players in your game.
FINDING HOLES 195
One of the beautiful things about poker is that there’s a
very strong herd mentality. All the regulars in one particular
game will often tend to play similarly to one another. Peer
pressure and the fear of stepping out of bounds and looking
foolish keep everyone in line. As long as you make the same
play the guy next to you would have made, no one will bat an
eye in your direction.
So the plays that worked against your former target will
likely work against other guys as well. Try them out. Abuse
them until you encounter someone who seems too good to
beat with the plays you’ve devised.
What then, you ask? You say you’ve run up against
someone in your game who seems too good for you to beat?
That’s a tough one. Just buy my next book and I’ll tell you
exactly what to do about that.
Exercise No. 1.
You play the following two hands against someone in a $2-
$5 game. Here’s the first hand.
Your target is a middle-aged man wearing a suit coat and a
gold Rolex watch. He bought in for the table maximum, and
he’s about even so far.
This opponent limps for $5 from UTG+1, and you make it
$25 from two off the button with K?K?. The big blind calls,
and the limper calls. There’s $77 in the pot and over $1,000
behind.
The flop comes J?3? 2?. Your opponents check, you bet
$60, and only the preflop limper calls.
The turn is the A?. Your opponent checks, and you check.
There’s $197 in the pot.
The river is the 2?. Your opponent checks, you bet $120,
and your opponent calls. He shows A? 4?, and he wins.
196 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Part A. What notes would you take on your opponent after
playing this hand? List two or three specific betting lines you
might now be more inclined to make against this player based
on these observations.
Now for the second hand. Your target is in the big blind
this time. You open-raise to $20 with 7?7? . A player calls
behind you, and your target calls from the big blind. The pot is
$62, and there is again over $1,000 behind.
The flop is Q? 8?6?. Your opponents check to you, and
you bet $45. Your target calls from the big blind, and the other
player folds.
The turn is the A?. Your target checks, and you check it
back. There’s $152 in the pot.
The river is the 2? . Your target bets $80. You have 7-7,
and the final board is Q-8-6-A-2 rainbow.
Part B. How can you use some of the notes you took in the
first hand to inform your decision in this one? What should
you do?
Here are my thoughts. I’d note that the player open-limped
in early position with a junk, offsuit ace. I’d also note that he
called a fairly large continuation bet from out of position with
a gutshot and an overcard. Most importantly, I’d note that he
chose not to value bet his pair of aces even after you checked
behind on the turn. I’d likely infer from these observations that
he is limping in with some speculative hands, peeling flops a
bit light, and not value betting top pair appropriately on the
river.
Using the two latter inferences, I would call the river in the
second hand. On a Q-8-6 flop you can expect your opponent
to peel with a wide variety of hands due to all the possible
gutshots. J-T, J-9, T-9, T-7, 9-7, 7-5, and so forth. If he’s
limping junk aces, he may be calling with the offsuit versions
of these hands from the big blind. That’s a lot of hand
combinations.
FINDING HOLES 197
Furthermore, this player has demonstrated a reluctance to
bet just a pair of aces on the river, even from out of position. I
wouldn’t expect him to bet a pair of queens or eights either. So
the only hands I’d really expect him to bet for value would be
two pair or better. Since the river was a deuce (unlikely to
make two pair) and no straights or flushes are possible on this
board, there are more combinations of busted draws than there
are of likely two pair or better hands. Getting nearly 3-to-1 on
a call, this is a great spot to try to pick off a bluff.
This is how you beat semi-competent no-limit players. You
learn their tendencies and then map out where these tendencies
have created unbalanced ranges. In this case, the player has
unwittingly created an unbalanced river betting range by
failing to bet many top pair hands.
Once you’ve identified unbalanced ranges, you can exploit
them whenever they arise. You can also, and this is just as
important, play hands in such a way that your opponents will
turn their hands face up for you.
For instance, say you observe that your opponent will
nearly always bet the turn with top pair when checked to.
Then the following hand arises.
You open to $20 with K?Q?. This player calls from one
off the button, and the blinds fold.
The flop comes A?Q?5?. You bet $35 into the $47 pot,
and your opponent calls. Your opponent calls the flop loosely,
and you think he could have an ace, a weaker queen, a gutshot,
or even a pocket pair below a queen or a five.
The turn is the 7?. Now you can check, and your opponent
will tell you if you’re beaten or not. He’ll bet his aces and
check his queens, fives, and pocket pairs. If he checks back,
you can bet the river for value. If he bets the turn, you can
expect to be behind and check-fold.
More interestingly, instead of check-folding the turn, if the
stacks are deep you can possibly turn your pair into a bluff.
198 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Say your opponent will play a lot of rag aces, and he will bet
all of them when checked to on the turn. That makes his turn
betting range overwhelmingly one pair hands as opposed to
the stronger two pairs and sets that your opponent will stack
off with.
This is an unbalanced turn betting range, a range filled with
hands your opponent will bet-fold. Some players will bet-fold
every ace on this turn except for A-K or aces up.
If you’re curious, the way for your opponent to avoid
getting exploited like this is to mix up the turn betting range.
He should bet his gutshots and some of his small pairs when
checked to, so that you’re sometimes check-folding the best
hand with K-Q. And he should check back a number of his top
pair hands so that the turn betting range is denser overall with
big hands like sets and two pair.
These two adjustments make check-folding and checkraising
closer in value to check-calling. This is the goal of
range balancing—to leave your opponent with no clearly good
line to take.
Exercise No. 2.
You’re $1,500 deep in a $2-$5 game. A loose, gambler
type player limps in from middle position, and a somewhat
nitty player raises to $25 on the button. You call in the big
blind with 7? 6? . The gambler calls. There’s $77 in the pot.
You’ve been taking notes on the loose, gambling player.
He limps in with about 35 percent of his hands from middle
position, while he also raises about 10 percent of the time first
in. Limping in from middle position, you’ve seen him play
K5s, 88, A7o, and 96s.
One of the other things you’ve noted about this player is
that he seems to play draws very hard on the flop. On one
FINDING HOLES 199
hand, he cold-3-bet the flop with just a naked king-high flush
draw. He was called by someone holding a set, and he made
his draw and won. In another pot, he bet an ace-high flush
draw when checked to and won an enormous pot when he
made the nuts on the river.
The flop comes Q?6?4? . You check, the gambler bets
$60 into the $77 pot, and the nit folds.
Part A. What sort of range do you put your opponent on in
this situation? What should you do?
You call. The turn is the 3?. You check, and your opponent
checks it back. There’s $197 in the pot with a ton of money
behind.
The river is the A?.
Part B. Given what you know about your opponent, what
should you do on this river?
Here are my thoughts. This guy is limping in with a ton of
hands, much of which is suited junk. He is raising some
preflop, however, so I would expect him rarely to have a hand
like A-Q after limping.
He likes to jam the flop with draws, and so when he bets
out of turn on the flop into a nit on a relatively disconnected
two diamond board, a lot of his range consists of flush draws
with some straight draws, pairs, and other possible hands
thrown in.
You’ve flopped middle pair without a kicker but with a
backdoor flush draw. With deep stacks against a known bad
player who may be marked with a draw, I think this is an easy
call.
I don’t like raising the flop, because there’s an excellent
chance you’ll get 3-bet. You might say, “But hey, if he’s
going to 3-bet a draw, don’t we want to get value from him?”
The problem is that your small pair is not an equity favorite
against a flush draw and two overcards to your 7 kicker. So
even in the best case you aren’t really getting your money in
200 PLAYING THE PLAYER
good. And it’s possible the guy has you crushed. (I know you
likely wouldn’t be check-raising your middle pair here, but it’s
worth considering even though this time it turns out not to be a
great play.)
The turn is a brick that happens to give you a gutshot. You
check, and your opponent checks. Your opponent’s check
back here likely denies a hand two pair or better. People just
don’t check the turn that often with good hands and deep
stacks when there are obvious draws out there. Flush draw is
the most likely possibility, while a one pair hand is also
possible.
The river is an interesting card, an offsuit ace. There’s no
doubt about it. Your opponent can have an ace. He could have
the ace-high diamonds or he could even have decided to stab
on the flop with a naked offsuit ace.
Still, two pair or better is unlikely after the turn check.
Since we sort of ruled out A-Q preflop (and also with the turn
check), he’d have to have a hand like A?3?, A?4?, or
possibly a random A-6 to have made aces up. None of these
hands is particularly likely.
So your opponent likely has either one pair or a busted
draw. What should you do?
You could check. Unfortunately if your opponent will
value bet an ace—and a loose, gambling live game type
might—then you could have a tough decision. Is he value
betting a better pair or bluffing the busted draw? Depending
on his bet size you might have to flip a coin on the river to
decide whether to call or fold. Guessing on the river is never
good, since there’s almost always a better way.
Check-raising the river is actually a decent idea. Whenever
you think you may be up against a range of hands comprised
mainly of bluffs and thin value bets, always consider bluffraising
the river. (Highlight that sentence. It’s an important
one.) The thing is that if you were to bluff-raise the river,
test
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Winning in Wild Games
Wild games are some of the most profitable poker games out
there. When money is flying into the middle right and left,
opportunities to get a lot of money in with a big edge abound.
But many people are confused by and scared of wild games,
and as a result, they don’t make what they should from them.
The principles behind exploiting wild games are simple.
You’ve likely already figured it out. Wait until you have a
hand that is more likely to win than your opponents’ hands
and stick your money in. It’s easier said than done, however.
There are two major obstacles to implementing this plan.
1. Identifying a good situation
2. Fear
I plan to help you with both of these. Let’s actually start
with the second one, fear.
When you find yourself in a wild game, you are going to be
gambling. There is no way around it. You can’t reliably
“move people off hands.” And frequently lots of money will
go in preflop and on the flop when the result of the hand is
necessarily in doubt. In fact, what differentiates a wild game
from just a single maniac opponent is that often huge pots will
be built by three or four players all coming along for the ride.
So you’re going to be gambling for stacks, and you’re
going to have some serious swings. The thing is, you can have
such a large edge on this gambling that, even though the
swings may feel huge, your bankroll (if you’re properly
bankrolled for your game in the first place) is never really in
158 PLAYING THE PLAYER
danger. If you were able to flip a 60/40 coin for stacks
repeatedly, and you got the 60 percent side, it would not take
many flips at all until you were virtually guaranteed to be
ahead.
If four players are getting big action in on the flop, usually
one of them will be nearly dead money. This player will have
a small flush draw and be overflushed. Or this player will have
a pair with kicker problems and have almost no shot to win a
showdown. The other players are splitting this stack with their
equity. There’s the flush draw, the best pair, and maybe
another hand with some equity like a gutshot and an overcard.
This means that if you’re correctly in the pot in a wild
game, you’re often getting 3-to-1 on your stack with a 35
percent chance of winning the pot. Or 2-to-1 on your stack
with a 50 percent chance of winning. These are huge edges,
and it won’t take many such pots for you to be ahead for good.
So you’re afraid. Don’t be. You came to the poker table to
gamble, right? These wild scenarios offer some of the best
gambling you’ll find anywhere. Here are some techniques you
can use to increase your comfort level and to learn to
appreciate what wild games have to offer.
Technique No. 1. Buy in short.
Ok, theoretically buying in short cuts your edge in a wild
game. Theoretically you’d like to get tons of money in with
these clowns when it makes sense to do so.
But as a practical matter, many players aren’t comfortable
in wild games. The decisions seem foreign, and the money at
stake can be very large. If you feel this way about wild games,
then the answer is simple. Buy in short.
“But,” you ask, “how am I supposed to know the game is
wild when I buy in? ”
WINNING IN WILD GAMES 159
Well, sometimes there are clues. Unusually large stacks.
Lots of banter.
But even if you don’t see clues, you can make it a habit to
buy into every game short. In a $2-$5 game, just buy in for
$200. Watch a few hands. You can always put more money on
the table, but you can’t take it off.
I’m like a broken record about this, but if you experience
fear while playing no-limit—fear of losing, fear of going
broke, fear of looking silly or dumb, fear of whatever—then
you’re normal. Most people experience some fear while they
play this game. But you must overcome the fear. You can’t
play this game in fear and succeed long term.
The easiest step is to buy in short. There’s less to lose. Less
chance you’ll be put to the sort of decision that will leave you
feeling dumb. When you play short-stacked, you can put the
fear aside and concentrate on making good decisions. I
guarantee that if you feel like you get run over in wild games,
you’ll do considerably better with a short buy in. Sure, if you
win a big pot then you’ll be playing deep again, but most
people get hit less hard by the fear bug when they’re playing
other people’s money.
Technique No. 2. Bring A Bigger Session
Bankroll.
The cash you bring with you to the cardroom is your
session bankroll. Unless you like to hit up the casino ATM
and its huge fees, chances are you won’t be losing any more
money than you bring with you to the casino.
I find that it always helps alleviate fear when you bring
way more cash with you than you ever expect to lose in the
session. This concept can be paired with the first concept to
really help get rid of the fear.
160 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Let’s say you’re going to the cardroom to play $2-$5. The
game is wild sometimes, and it makes you uncomfortable
when the gamblers are out in force. Bring $3,000 with you,
and buy in for $200 at a time. It may sound silly now, but the
feeling of peeling off a few bills from a seemingly
inexhaustible wad of cash can easily reduce the perceived
value of the money in your head. Less perceived value, less
fear. (This is definitely a good thing when you’re playing
poker. Not so good when you’re walking through a Best Buy.)
If you implement this idea, do try to avoid getting mugged
on the way to and from the cardroom.
Technique No. 3. Watch All The Hands.
There’s nothing that diffuses fear better than knowledge. If
you experience fear at the poker table, watch every single
showdown. Look at the hands that get shown down, and watch
the players who lose and don’t show. Look at their reactions
and try to figure out what they had. You’ll quickly realize that
players often have lots of beatable junk at showdown.
In wild games, players show some really wacky hands.
They called a $200 4-bet preflop with Q-J suited, then called a
$200 flop bet on a K-J-4 monotone flop. These guys hang in
there for big bucks with essentially dead hands.
Watch how often money goes in with hands that have
virtually no shot. It’s often enough, I promise, that as long as
you make sure every time your money goes in that you have
something sensible, you will win over the long term.
Ok, you have a fear that you’re putting your money in bad.
Someone might have a bigger flush. Or someone might have a
set. Don’t worry too much about it. It’s a wild game. People
are going to have all sorts of things. The other guys aren’t
making better decisions than you are. They’re gambling. Just
WINNING IN WILD GAMES 161
be sensible, stick your money in, and trust that your unsensible
opponents will put enough dead money in that it will all come
out in the end for you. It doesn’ t matter if you get it in bad on
any one particular hand. It really doesn’t. Just sit in the wild
game, look for reasonable spots to put your money in, and
profit from all the unreasonable plays your opponents make.
So there you have it, my recipe to conquer fear of wild nolimit
hold’em games. Buy in short. Bring a lot of cash. And
watch every hand and every showdown. These guys are
gambling, and they’re gambling badly. Just trust yourself that
if you wade in there with them, you’ll eventually get the
money. And if things turn out badly, hey, you bought in short,
and it’s no big loss.
Ok, so we’ve covered the fear that sometimes pops up in
wild games. Now let’s get to the more technical aspects of
adjusting to these games. What are the good situations that
arise?
Good Spot No. 1. Light Preflop Reraisers
Wild games typically feature an enormous amount of
preflop action. Frequently there will be one or more players
really bloating pots with silly preflop reraises. Often this will
be a short-stacked player who likes to shove over all the
action.
Here’s an example of a hand from a recent $2-$5 game I
played. A player with $115 limped in for $5. Someone made it
$25, and three people called. The limper then moved all-in for
$115. One of the callers folded, and the rest called up to the
last player who put in a $120 raise. (He and his remaining
opponents each had about $1,000 behind.)
So here’s the question. What sorts of hands should you be
entering these huge, bloated three- and four-way pots with?
162 PLAYING THE PLAYER
When so much money goes in preflop, you’re looking for a
preflop equity edge. You want hands that will win more often
than the average hand, thereby giving you an edge on all the
money in the pot. To get a reasonable estimate, I used
PokerStove to calculate some preflop equities. I assigned the
following range to your opponents in the pot
AA-22
AKs-A2s, KQs-KTs, QJs-65s, QTs, JTs
AKo-AJo, KQo
This range represents about 17 percent of hands. If
anything, it’s a bit on the conservative side, and your
opponents in wild games will shovel money in the pot with
even worse hands.
I assigned this range to three players and then sought to
find the hands that held an equity edge. With three opponents,
you need to win one pot in four to break even, so you need
over 25 percent equity to have an edge. Again, since this is a
conservative range, and since I’d assume there’s at least one
significantly looser player in any given four-way pot, I think
you have an edge with any hand that measures out equal
against this range.
Here are some sample hands and the equity against this
range according to a Monte Carlo sim done using PokerStove:
WINNING IN WILD GAMES 163
AA 58% KJs 24.25%
KK 48.5% QJs 24%
QQ 42% 66 23.5%
JJ 36.5% AQo 23.5%
TT 32% JTs 23.5%
AKs 30.5% KTs 23%
99 29.5% ATs 23%
AQs 27.5% QTs 23%
AKo 27% T9s 23%
88 27% 98s 22.25%
KQs 25.5% 55 22%
77 25.25% AJo 21%
AJs 25% JTo 20%
Table No. 1. Preflop equities against three opponents with
semi-tight ranges.
Again, the purpose of this exercise is merely to get a sense
of what hands play well in wild games with tons of preflop
action. If you alter the ranges I used, obviously you’ll get
somewhat different percentages. But from these numbers you
can draw a few important conclusions.
Big pairs play really, really well. Big pocket pairs are the
best hands in no-limit hold’em. Everyone knows that. But
some people seem to think that these hands lose their value in
these wild, multiway scenarios. Nothing could be further from
the truth. The big pairs AA through TT have an absolutely
massive equity edge against the field. These edges are far, far
greater than any unpaired hand.
Say you’re playing $2-$5 no-limit. You have T-T, and
you’ve bought in for $200 like I recommended above. You
164 PLAYING THE PLAYER
raise to $20 and get two calls. Then the player in the big blind
reraises to $100. This player is wild, and you think he could
have any of the hands in the range I estimated above.
Since this player is so wild, you expect the two callers
behind to call even if you go all-in for $200. You expect them
to have ranges similar to reference range as well. You shove.
Everyone calls.
How much is this hand worth to you in expectation?
Per the chart above, you have about 32 percent equity.
There’s $800 in the pot. Thus, your share is $256, or $56 more
than the $200 you invested. This single hand has netted you
$56 in EV, the same amount a good player could expect to
make playing full-stacked in about two hours of a normal,
non-wild $2-$5 live game.
I’m guessing that before reading this, if you had found
yourself in this situation holding T-T, you may have been
cursing your luck and wishing you hadn’t raised in the first
place. Should you go with such a vulnerable pair for your
whole stack? Or should you just fold to the wildman’s $100
reraise since you know you’re going to end up in a four-way
pot and you’ll “have to hit a set to win”?
If you would have thought that way, I hope you now see
that you should think again! With T-T, you have one of the
very best possible hands in this scenario. An absolute gem of a
situation for you. You should be eager to get your stack in.
Yes, you are an underdog to win the pot. More than two out
of three times, you’re losing. That’s fine, because you’re
getting 3-to-1 on your money.
In wild games, you have to get away from thinking in terms
of being ahead, being behind, and getting sucked out on.
That’s not really how it works. Instead, everyone has equity. If
the right cards come, any of the players in the pot will win.
But if you start with the right hand, you’ll have a big edge. Big
pairs are the rightest hands there are.
WINNING IN WILD GAMES 165
Also, notice the difference in equity between TT and 55.
TT has a huge edge at 32%. 55 is a small equity dog with just
22%. Since you hit a set about 20 percent of the time, it’s
reasonably fair to say about 55 that you need to hit a set to
win. But you can’t say that at all about TT. Tens can hold up
unimproved even against three opponents in a wild game.
Suitedness is extremely important. Some people
underestimate how important it is for unpaired hands to be
suited. Well, in this particular scenario, being suited makes all
the difference in the world.
People downplay the value of having a suited hand by
saying that you only make a flush a small percentage of the
time. In a way they’re right. You do make a flush only a small
percentage of the time. The thing is, when you make a flush,
you almost always win, even against four or more opponents.
Look at AJs versus AJo. In our chart, AJs comes in at 25%
or exactly fair against this range of hands. AJo, on the other
hand, comes in at 21%. There’s your small percentage chance
to make a flush. But in this case, the difference between being
suited and unsuited is the difference between likely having a
small equity edge (remember, someone will be loose and have
some dumb hands in their range) and being a likely equity
dog.
Put another way, 4 percent may not sound like a big
number, but when you’re scrapping to get up over 25 percent,
that extra 4 percent is huge.
If you assume that most pots have some dead money in
them, then roughly any big suited hands (all the way down to
T9s) can become playable in these pots, whereas even an
offsuit hand as strong as AJo is often unplayable.
The bottom line is that in wild games, you want pocket
pairs and suited hands.
166 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Ace-king is not overrated. I couldn’t help but throw this
in there since I’ve heard the myth a bazillion times. No, aceking
isn’t an overrated, overplayed hand. Ace-king is one of
the best hands in hold’em, and even offsuit it holds a very
solid equity edge against three opponents in a wild game. You
should feel overjoyed to get your money in preflop with aceking
in a wild game.
Good Spot No. 2. Inducing Wild Bluffs
Watch out for this scenario after the flop in a wild game. A
lot of money goes in preflop four ways. But there’s still plenty
of money behind.
Then the flop comes. No one seems willing to put in too
much action. Either it gets checked around, or someone makes
a half-hearted bet of maybe 20 percent of the bloated pot, and
everyone calls.
Something similar happens on the turn.
Then all of a sudden, on the river, someone decides to
shove. This bet is frequently (though obviously not always) a
bluff. Why?
The reason is fairly straightforward. After a bunch of
people put in a ton of money preflop, absolutely no one with a
decent hand is going to let the flop get checked through. The
first player with any hand to protect will make a good-sized
bet. So in a game like this, light flop action means quite
reliably that everyone is weak.
The turn action goes the same way. Again, everyone is
weak. Indeed, even if someone held a decent draw like the nut
flush draw on the turn, you might expect a bet. With $600
sitting in the middle and the nut flush draw to back it up, most
players in these wild games would take a shot with at least a
$200 bet.
WINNING IN WILD GAMES 167
So when the turn also goes through without significant
action, not only do you know most players are fairly weak, but
you can also guess that no one is too proud of a draw either.
Then the river comes, and someone shoves. So after all that
checking, all of a sudden someone has made a hand they are
willing to back for stacks? The fact is, it’s unlikely. It’s hard
to make a hand in hold’em on the final card without having at
least something worthwhile on the turn.
Let’s look at this hand I observed in a wild $2-$5 game in
Las Vegas. Stacks were between $800 and $1,500 for the
participants in the hand, except for one short stack.
A player limped in. The next player raised to $25. Two
players called, and then the big blind shoved for $170. This
player had been making erratic plays. The limper called, the
raiser called, and one of the two callers behind called. The pot
was $707 with one player all-in and no side pot. The
remaining players all had at least $600 behind.
The flop was A? 8? 5? . The limper checked. The original
preflop raiser bet $100 into the $707 pot. Everyone called.
The turn was the 7?. Everyone checked. There’s $1,107 in
the pot.
The river was the J? . The limper checked. The preflop
raiser checked. Then the next player, someone who had been
playing a lot of hands in this wild game and whose stack had
been up-and-down on a huge roller-coaster ride, shoved all-in
for a little over $1,000. The next player folded, the limper
folded, and the original raiser tanked. He had a stack of about
$700. He eventually showed J?J? and folded.
The river bettor triumphantly showed 9?8? for a pair of
eights with no club. “I knew you had no club,” he said with a
smile on his face. “Can’t call,” he said.
This type of play happens fairly frequently in wild games.
The player with the set of jacks absolutely must call in this
situation.
168 PLAYING THE PLAYER
What hand is the river bettor representing? Most $2-$5
players, even in a wild game, will not bet the river thinly for a
large amount of money. So he doesn’t have, for instance, just
the T? (or any weaker club). Really, for an all-in bet, he’s
representing the nuts, the K? . If he held the Q? , I’d expect
him perhaps to bet, but not to shove all-in.
But if he held the K? , why did he play so passively on the
flop and turn? The flop came monotone, so he would have had
the nut flush draw for two betting rounds. It’s perhaps
understandable that he didn’t raise the flop bet, even though
it’s small size screams weakness. But when it got checked to
him on the turn in a $1,107 pot, I would not expect him to
check it through.
I’m not saying it’s impossible that he checked through the
nut flush draw, or that it’s impossible that he is shoving the
river with a value hand that beats three jacks. But it’s
implausible. The story doesn’t add up. Furthermore, wild
bluffs like this one are fairly common in these games, and the
player with three jacks is getting $1,807-to-$700 on his
money, so he has to win less than 30 percent of the time to
make a call correct. It’s a call.
Remember this. Few players will check down a good hand
in a big pot in a wild game. Once the pot gets big, anyone who
has hit the board in a significant way will think, “Gee, I gotta
protect this hand.” Weak betting in a big pot means real
weakness. You can take advantage of the weakness by
plowing through these pots by betting the turn and shoving the
river as a bluff. You can also take advantage of the weakness
by inducing bluffs when you have the likely best (weak) hand.
But, naturally, you have to call the bluffs once you induce
them.
WINNING IN WILD GAMES 169
Good Spot No. 3. Thin Value Betting With A
Pair
No one wants to fold in a huge, bloated pot. If you flop a
pair, you can bet it, and you will get called by worse. Don’t be
shy. Look at the above example hand. The guy bet a A-8-5
monotone flop and got called in all three spots. Granted, his
bet was small compared to the size of the pot, but it still
wasn’t a small bet in an absolute sense. It was a $100 bet,
which represented a good portion of the remaining stacks. And
the board was a scary one that normally people won’t call
loosely.
In a “normal” no limit game, you have to be a little
circumspect with top pair hands, particularly when you have
kicker problems. Even if your hand is best, it can be hard to
get action from worse hands.
That goes out the window in wild games. If you have a
hand that figures to be the best hand out a good percentage of
the time, bet it for value. Slurp up all those $100 and $200
calls you can while you likely have an equity edge.
It’s no big deal if you bet the second-best hand sometimes.
You get so much value for your hands when they are best that
you can be wrong sometimes and still come out ahead on
average. It’s better to bet aggressively and get burned
sometimes than to be too timid, especially in a wild game.
Remember, in wild games you will be gambling. If it makes
you uncomfortable, buy in short. While you derive your edge
in these games by playing hands that have better showdown
potential than your opponents, you can’t be scared money. The
absolute worst thing you can do is to see every monster under
the bed and check too much and fold too much. Just play good
hands, bet your hands, don’t fold easily, and you’ll be fine.
Trait No. 1. Peeling Light
On The Flop And Getting
Sticky At Showdown
Overview
We’re talking bad players here.
This is the most universal fish trait. They play a wide range
preflop, and they like to peel light on the flop. Also, if they get
to the river with a decent pair, they will be unhappy about
folding it.
This trait almost defines the term “calling station. ”
Adjustment Summary
You’re going to do two things against these players. First,
you’re going to go for three streets of value with all your
decent top pair or better hands. Second, you’re going to barrel
the turn on dry boards.
Let’s start with the first adjustment. You go for three streets
of value with decent top pairs. Here’s the easy example.
It’s a $2-$5 game. A player with this trait limps in, and you
make it $25 to go with K?Q? . The big blind calls, and your
target calls.
The flop is K?8?7?. Your opponents check, you bet $50,
and the player with the trait calls. There’s $177 in the pot, and
let’s assume that there’s plenty of money behind.
PEELING LIGHT ON THE FLOP AND GETTING STICKY. . . 171
The turn is the J? . Your opponent checks. You bet $150,
and he calls. There’s $477 in the pot.
The river is the 3? . Your opponent checks. You bet $300
into the $477 pot.
Go for three streets of value. Against tight and nitty
players, you often can’t rely on getting three streets of value
from top pair hands that don’t improve. But against these
guys, top pair is your bread-and-butter, and you go for three
streets.
You may wonder about the bet sizing. Here’s how I do it.
The K-8-7 two-tone flop is one where you will fairly
frequently get drawn out on by the river. But it’s also a flop
where you’ll commonly get called by worse hands. So I make
a medium-sized bet. I don’t have overwhelming equity, so I
don’t want to bomb the pot. But I’m happy to make a solidsized
bet because I will so often get called by worse.
The turn is a great card for getting value. It’s offsuit, so the
flush draws missed. Obviously T-9 gets there, but your
opponent will more likely have a hand like 9-8, 9-7, T-8, K-T,
and so forth. You’re a very nice favorite against these hands
with just one card to come (and you know roughly what the
dangerous river cards are). So I like a big turn bet. You’ll get
called frequently, and you’ll usually be a 2-to-1 favorite or
better.
The river is a beautiful brick. Time for a value bet. You
want to get calls from stray jacks and eights that your
opponent got to the river with, so size your bet so that these
hands might call.
In general I make my largest bets (compared to the size of
the pot) when I expect to be a good favorite over most of the
hands that call me, and when I also expect a fairly wide range
of hands to call. This drawish but not hyper-dangerous turn
board of K-8-7-J with one flush draw is a great example. It’s
easy to have a draw, but not so easy to have me beat. I bomb
172 PLAYING THE PLAYER
boards like this one with top pair against the calling station
types.
Here’s a hand I played at a $2-$5 game in Las Vegas.
Four players limped, and I limped the button with 7?6?.
The blinds called. It was seven ways to the flop, and the pot
was $35.
The flop came A? 9? 8?. Everyone checked to me and I
checked.
The turn was the T?. The calling station guy bet $15, and
there was a caller. I raised to $75. Only the calling station
called.
The river was the 9?. The calling station checked. I bet
$200, and he called. My hand was good.
The river was probably the worst card in the deck for my
hand, but against this player type it’s still a very easy value
bet. I see small stakes players miss these bets a lot when a bad
card comes. No free showdowns to calling stations.
Now let’s talk about the second adjustment. You want to
barrel the turn on dry boards.
These guys peel the flop light. So your continuation bets
will frequently get called. But on many board textures, it’s
very difficult to make a decent hand, so the majority of the
time these players are missing on the turn and then folding.
The ideal board types for this are those that afford a lot of
weak draws and that brick out on the turn. For instance, say
you raise preflop and get called. The flop is Q-9-6 with a flush
draw. You bet and get called. The turn is an offsuit 4. This is a
good barrel card.
This player is going to peel you on the flop with a ton of
different hands: J-T, J-9, J-8, T-8, T-7, 9-8, 9-7, 8-7, 8-6, etc.
Barrel the turn and you can get folds. If you check back the
turn and try to bluff the river, this player type will be
considerably more likely to look you up with the one pair
hands in this range.
PEELING LIGHT ON THE FLOP AND GETTING STICKY. . . 173
Loosely connected boards are the best for this. The more
closely connected the board cards get, the stronger the
available draws become, and the better the chance your
opponent will want to peel the turn as well. For instance, on a
T-8-7 board, hands like J-T, T-9, 9-8, 8-7, and so forth are
much stronger on average than the hands you’re running into
on a Q-9-6 board.
Very dry boards can be ok for this also, but when you get
called on the flop you will fairly frequently have run into a
strong hand that your opponent will be loathe to fold. If you
bet and get called on a Q-7-2 flop, for instance, your opponent
will frequently have a queen or a weaker pair that he may
want to peel the turn with. Same reasoning for a flop like Q-7-
7.
A flop like Q-Q-8 is a little better to barrel because you can
get gutshots, eights, and weak pocket pairs to fold sometimes,
particularly if the turn is a card like an A or K.
Pitfalls To Avoid
Against most players with this trait, you will want to be
bet-folding with most of your value bets. When this type of
player raises, it will rarely be a bluff. For instance, if I had
been check-raised on the river in the hand above where I made
the low end of the straight, I would have folded. Just bet-fold
these players into oblivion.
As for the barreling, board textures are very important.
Remember, you want board textures where your opponents
will peel with weak hands that they’ll fold on the turn. When
boards are too coordinated, draws become too strong on
average. And when boards are too dry, even loose, sticky
players aren’t peeling as often without something they like a
fair bit.
174 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Finally, don’t bluff the river often against these guys. When
it’s just one more bet to see a showdown, these guys more
often than not pay it. And absolutely do not try to bluff these
players off top pairs or overpairs. Quite the opposite, if you
suspect one of these players has top pair, you should rejoice
because it opens up their entire stack to you. We’ll get into
this in the next section.
Who Exhibits This Trait
A zillion live no-limit players. The vast majority of
relatively new poker players tend to play this way. Just look
for guys who are in lots of hands, who peel flops a lot, and
who rarely seem to have anything they’re too proud of.
The Bottom Line
Value bet top pair relentlessly. Go for three streets. Fold to
raises. Barrel the turn when a load of weak draws brick off.
That’s about it.
Trait No. 2. Absolutely
Refusing To Fold An
Overpair
Overview
This one is pretty self-explanatory. There are a lot of players
who simply won’t fold an overpair almost no matter the
action. With these guys, there is absolutely no flopped
overpair that they’ll fold for almost any amount of money.
And even on the river when the board’s turned scary, they
hold on tight to those overpairs.
For example, in a $2-$5 game with $700 stacks, I played
the following hand:
A player whom I suspected to have this trait opened to $20.
This player was limping most of his hands, so I presumed that
the raise likely indicated a strong hand.
A weak player called, and I called on the button with
J?7?. The blinds folded. There was $67 in the pot with $680
behind.
The flop came J?8?7?. The player with this trait bet $40.
The middle player folded. I raised to $150. He reraised to
$300, and we got it in. He had Q-Q.
Here’s another example from a $2-$5 game. This hand
played with $1,200 stacks. The target was a really terrible
player who was on vacation in Las Vegas from Brazil.
This player opened to $20, and I called in the small blind
with 7-7. The blinds folded.
176 PLAYING THE PLAYER
The flop was 9-5-2 rainbow. I checked, he bet $40, and I
called.
The turn was a 9. I checked, and he checked.
The river was a 7. I shoved for $1,140 into the $125 pot. He
called and showed A-A.
Adjustment Summary
Crack and shove. That’s the basic formula. Wait until
you’ve cracked the pair and then stick all the money in. Often
players who exhibit this trait are completely pot-size
insensitive. Don’t necessarily worry that your shove may be a
massive overbet. With some players, actually, it may make
them more likely to call because they’ll figure you’d bet
smaller if you were betting for value.
For instance, I performed the crack and shove recently in a
$2-$5 game. I check-shoved a T?4?3? flop with 4-4. The
guy said, “Flush draw, huh?” as he called with K-K.
A lot of guys make this really easy because they tip their
hand early on. They will raise preflop, for instance, only with
AA-QQ. Or maybe you’re playing really deep and they will 3-
bet only with AA or KK (and they’ll make it a min-3-bet). Or
they will overbet the flop if and only if they’ve flopped an
overpair.
As soon as one of these players tips a big pair to you,
continue as long as you have the implied odds to crack.
Obviously small pocket pairs are the easiest hands to crack
an overpair with. Tend to play all pocket pairs against
someone who goes broke with every overpair unless you have
to pay more than about 8 percent of your opponent’s stack
preflop. (Or your stack if your opponent has you covered.) For
instance, if your target has a $300 stack and he makes it $20
preflop, call with any pocket pair since $20 is only 6.7 percent
ABSOLUTELY REFUSING TO FOLD AN OVERPAIR 177
of your stack. At $30, however, the call becomes marginal.
And at $35 it’s probably no longer profitable at all.
Without a pocket pair, you really want stacks to be pretty
deep before you try to crack a big pair. With two unpaired
cards below the pair, you will outflop the pair only about 5
percent of the time (give or take depending on how suited and
connected you are). You’ll flop a draw that’s worth continuing
with more often, but that scenario is quite a bit less profitable
since you’re still drawing as an underdog.
Once your target has 200 big blinds or more, however, you
should play lots of hands to try to crack the pair. You can even
start calling some 3-bets to crack at that point.
Don’t be shy about shoving. For instance, look at the
ridiculous hand I played with sevens full against pocket aces. I
made my hand on the river and shoved nearly ten times the
pot. Don’t hold back. If they don’t fold overpairs, they don’t
fold overpairs. Stick all the money in. Even if you aren’t sure
the player has an overpair, it can still make sense to shove
because you make more those times you get called than you
would if you had chosen a smaller bet that your opponent
might call with a weaker hand.
Pitfalls To Avoid
Two pitfalls. First, pay attention to the stack sizes! Your
target’s stack size is the most important. A lot of these guys
who always ship overpairs don’t play very deep. If you try to
crack an overpair at 50 BB stacks, you’re likely giving away
EV, not getting it.
I have brain farts from time to time where I’ll call preflop
with some suited hand trying to crack a guy and then realize
that his stack is only about 10 or 15 times the preflop raise. I
flop middle pair or something, and the guy bombs the pot with
test
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Winning in Wild Games
Wild games are some of the most profitable poker games out
there. When money is flying into the middle right and left,
opportunities to get a lot of money in with a big edge abound.
But many people are confused by and scared of wild games,
and as a result, they don’t make what they should from them.
The principles behind exploiting wild games are simple.
You’ve likely already figured it out. Wait until you have a
hand that is more likely to win than your opponents’ hands
and stick your money in. It’s easier said than done, however.
There are two major obstacles to implementing this plan.
1. Identifying a good situation
2. Fear
I plan to help you with both of these. Let’s actually start
with the second one, fear.
When you find yourself in a wild game, you are going to be
gambling. There is no way around it. You can’t reliably
“move people off hands.” And frequently lots of money will
go in preflop and on the flop when the result of the hand is
necessarily in doubt. In fact, what differentiates a wild game
from just a single maniac opponent is that often huge pots will
be built by three or four players all coming along for the ride.
So you’re going to be gambling for stacks, and you’re
going to have some serious swings. The thing is, you can have
such a large edge on this gambling that, even though the
swings may feel huge, your bankroll (if you’re properly
bankrolled for your game in the first place) is never really in
158 PLAYING THE PLAYER
danger. If you were able to flip a 60/40 coin for stacks
repeatedly, and you got the 60 percent side, it would not take
many flips at all until you were virtually guaranteed to be
ahead.
If four players are getting big action in on the flop, usually
one of them will be nearly dead money. This player will have
a small flush draw and be overflushed. Or this player will have
a pair with kicker problems and have almost no shot to win a
showdown. The other players are splitting this stack with their
equity. There’s the flush draw, the best pair, and maybe
another hand with some equity like a gutshot and an overcard.
This means that if you’re correctly in the pot in a wild
game, you’re often getting 3-to-1 on your stack with a 35
percent chance of winning the pot. Or 2-to-1 on your stack
with a 50 percent chance of winning. These are huge edges,
and it won’t take many such pots for you to be ahead for good.
So you’re afraid. Don’t be. You came to the poker table to
gamble, right? These wild scenarios offer some of the best
gambling you’ll find anywhere. Here are some techniques you
can use to increase your comfort level and to learn to
appreciate what wild games have to offer.
Technique No. 1. Buy in short.
Ok, theoretically buying in short cuts your edge in a wild
game. Theoretically you’d like to get tons of money in with
these clowns when it makes sense to do so.
But as a practical matter, many players aren’t comfortable
in wild games. The decisions seem foreign, and the money at
stake can be very large. If you feel this way about wild games,
then the answer is simple. Buy in short.
“But,” you ask, “how am I supposed to know the game is
wild when I buy in? ”
WINNING IN WILD GAMES 159
Well, sometimes there are clues. Unusually large stacks.
Lots of banter.
But even if you don’t see clues, you can make it a habit to
buy into every game short. In a $2-$5 game, just buy in for
$200. Watch a few hands. You can always put more money on
the table, but you can’t take it off.
I’m like a broken record about this, but if you experience
fear while playing no-limit—fear of losing, fear of going
broke, fear of looking silly or dumb, fear of whatever—then
you’re normal. Most people experience some fear while they
play this game. But you must overcome the fear. You can’t
play this game in fear and succeed long term.
The easiest step is to buy in short. There’s less to lose. Less
chance you’ll be put to the sort of decision that will leave you
feeling dumb. When you play short-stacked, you can put the
fear aside and concentrate on making good decisions. I
guarantee that if you feel like you get run over in wild games,
you’ll do considerably better with a short buy in. Sure, if you
win a big pot then you’ll be playing deep again, but most
people get hit less hard by the fear bug when they’re playing
other people’s money.
Technique No. 2. Bring A Bigger Session
Bankroll.
The cash you bring with you to the cardroom is your
session bankroll. Unless you like to hit up the casino ATM
and its huge fees, chances are you won’t be losing any more
money than you bring with you to the casino.
I find that it always helps alleviate fear when you bring
way more cash with you than you ever expect to lose in the
session. This concept can be paired with the first concept to
really help get rid of the fear.
160 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Let’s say you’re going to the cardroom to play $2-$5. The
game is wild sometimes, and it makes you uncomfortable
when the gamblers are out in force. Bring $3,000 with you,
and buy in for $200 at a time. It may sound silly now, but the
feeling of peeling off a few bills from a seemingly
inexhaustible wad of cash can easily reduce the perceived
value of the money in your head. Less perceived value, less
fear. (This is definitely a good thing when you’re playing
poker. Not so good when you’re walking through a Best Buy.)
If you implement this idea, do try to avoid getting mugged
on the way to and from the cardroom.
Technique No. 3. Watch All The Hands.
There’s nothing that diffuses fear better than knowledge. If
you experience fear at the poker table, watch every single
showdown. Look at the hands that get shown down, and watch
the players who lose and don’t show. Look at their reactions
and try to figure out what they had. You’ll quickly realize that
players often have lots of beatable junk at showdown.
In wild games, players show some really wacky hands.
They called a $200 4-bet preflop with Q-J suited, then called a
$200 flop bet on a K-J-4 monotone flop. These guys hang in
there for big bucks with essentially dead hands.
Watch how often money goes in with hands that have
virtually no shot. It’s often enough, I promise, that as long as
you make sure every time your money goes in that you have
something sensible, you will win over the long term.
Ok, you have a fear that you’re putting your money in bad.
Someone might have a bigger flush. Or someone might have a
set. Don’t worry too much about it. It’s a wild game. People
are going to have all sorts of things. The other guys aren’t
making better decisions than you are. They’re gambling. Just
WINNING IN WILD GAMES 161
be sensible, stick your money in, and trust that your unsensible
opponents will put enough dead money in that it will all come
out in the end for you. It doesn’ t matter if you get it in bad on
any one particular hand. It really doesn’t. Just sit in the wild
game, look for reasonable spots to put your money in, and
profit from all the unreasonable plays your opponents make.
So there you have it, my recipe to conquer fear of wild nolimit
hold’em games. Buy in short. Bring a lot of cash. And
watch every hand and every showdown. These guys are
gambling, and they’re gambling badly. Just trust yourself that
if you wade in there with them, you’ll eventually get the
money. And if things turn out badly, hey, you bought in short,
and it’s no big loss.
Ok, so we’ve covered the fear that sometimes pops up in
wild games. Now let’s get to the more technical aspects of
adjusting to these games. What are the good situations that
arise?
Good Spot No. 1. Light Preflop Reraisers
Wild games typically feature an enormous amount of
preflop action. Frequently there will be one or more players
really bloating pots with silly preflop reraises. Often this will
be a short-stacked player who likes to shove over all the
action.
Here’s an example of a hand from a recent $2-$5 game I
played. A player with $115 limped in for $5. Someone made it
$25, and three people called. The limper then moved all-in for
$115. One of the callers folded, and the rest called up to the
last player who put in a $120 raise. (He and his remaining
opponents each had about $1,000 behind.)
So here’s the question. What sorts of hands should you be
entering these huge, bloated three- and four-way pots with?
162 PLAYING THE PLAYER
When so much money goes in preflop, you’re looking for a
preflop equity edge. You want hands that will win more often
than the average hand, thereby giving you an edge on all the
money in the pot. To get a reasonable estimate, I used
PokerStove to calculate some preflop equities. I assigned the
following range to your opponents in the pot
AA-22
AKs-A2s, KQs-KTs, QJs-65s, QTs, JTs
AKo-AJo, KQo
This range represents about 17 percent of hands. If
anything, it’s a bit on the conservative side, and your
opponents in wild games will shovel money in the pot with
even worse hands.
I assigned this range to three players and then sought to
find the hands that held an equity edge. With three opponents,
you need to win one pot in four to break even, so you need
over 25 percent equity to have an edge. Again, since this is a
conservative range, and since I’d assume there’s at least one
significantly looser player in any given four-way pot, I think
you have an edge with any hand that measures out equal
against this range.
Here are some sample hands and the equity against this
range according to a Monte Carlo sim done using PokerStove:
WINNING IN WILD GAMES 163
AA 58% KJs 24.25%
KK 48.5% QJs 24%
QQ 42% 66 23.5%
JJ 36.5% AQo 23.5%
TT 32% JTs 23.5%
AKs 30.5% KTs 23%
99 29.5% ATs 23%
AQs 27.5% QTs 23%
AKo 27% T9s 23%
88 27% 98s 22.25%
KQs 25.5% 55 22%
77 25.25% AJo 21%
AJs 25% JTo 20%
Table No. 1. Preflop equities against three opponents with
semi-tight ranges.
Again, the purpose of this exercise is merely to get a sense
of what hands play well in wild games with tons of preflop
action. If you alter the ranges I used, obviously you’ll get
somewhat different percentages. But from these numbers you
can draw a few important conclusions.
Big pairs play really, really well. Big pocket pairs are the
best hands in no-limit hold’em. Everyone knows that. But
some people seem to think that these hands lose their value in
these wild, multiway scenarios. Nothing could be further from
the truth. The big pairs AA through TT have an absolutely
massive equity edge against the field. These edges are far, far
greater than any unpaired hand.
Say you’re playing $2-$5 no-limit. You have T-T, and
you’ve bought in for $200 like I recommended above. You
164 PLAYING THE PLAYER
raise to $20 and get two calls. Then the player in the big blind
reraises to $100. This player is wild, and you think he could
have any of the hands in the range I estimated above.
Since this player is so wild, you expect the two callers
behind to call even if you go all-in for $200. You expect them
to have ranges similar to reference range as well. You shove.
Everyone calls.
How much is this hand worth to you in expectation?
Per the chart above, you have about 32 percent equity.
There’s $800 in the pot. Thus, your share is $256, or $56 more
than the $200 you invested. This single hand has netted you
$56 in EV, the same amount a good player could expect to
make playing full-stacked in about two hours of a normal,
non-wild $2-$5 live game.
I’m guessing that before reading this, if you had found
yourself in this situation holding T-T, you may have been
cursing your luck and wishing you hadn’t raised in the first
place. Should you go with such a vulnerable pair for your
whole stack? Or should you just fold to the wildman’s $100
reraise since you know you’re going to end up in a four-way
pot and you’ll “have to hit a set to win”?
If you would have thought that way, I hope you now see
that you should think again! With T-T, you have one of the
very best possible hands in this scenario. An absolute gem of a
situation for you. You should be eager to get your stack in.
Yes, you are an underdog to win the pot. More than two out
of three times, you’re losing. That’s fine, because you’re
getting 3-to-1 on your money.
In wild games, you have to get away from thinking in terms
of being ahead, being behind, and getting sucked out on.
That’s not really how it works. Instead, everyone has equity. If
the right cards come, any of the players in the pot will win.
But if you start with the right hand, you’ll have a big edge. Big
pairs are the rightest hands there are.
WINNING IN WILD GAMES 165
Also, notice the difference in equity between TT and 55.
TT has a huge edge at 32%. 55 is a small equity dog with just
22%. Since you hit a set about 20 percent of the time, it’s
reasonably fair to say about 55 that you need to hit a set to
win. But you can’t say that at all about TT. Tens can hold up
unimproved even against three opponents in a wild game.
Suitedness is extremely important. Some people
underestimate how important it is for unpaired hands to be
suited. Well, in this particular scenario, being suited makes all
the difference in the world.
People downplay the value of having a suited hand by
saying that you only make a flush a small percentage of the
time. In a way they’re right. You do make a flush only a small
percentage of the time. The thing is, when you make a flush,
you almost always win, even against four or more opponents.
Look at AJs versus AJo. In our chart, AJs comes in at 25%
or exactly fair against this range of hands. AJo, on the other
hand, comes in at 21%. There’s your small percentage chance
to make a flush. But in this case, the difference between being
suited and unsuited is the difference between likely having a
small equity edge (remember, someone will be loose and have
some dumb hands in their range) and being a likely equity
dog.
Put another way, 4 percent may not sound like a big
number, but when you’re scrapping to get up over 25 percent,
that extra 4 percent is huge.
If you assume that most pots have some dead money in
them, then roughly any big suited hands (all the way down to
T9s) can become playable in these pots, whereas even an
offsuit hand as strong as AJo is often unplayable.
The bottom line is that in wild games, you want pocket
pairs and suited hands.
166 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Ace-king is not overrated. I couldn’t help but throw this
in there since I’ve heard the myth a bazillion times. No, aceking
isn’t an overrated, overplayed hand. Ace-king is one of
the best hands in hold’em, and even offsuit it holds a very
solid equity edge against three opponents in a wild game. You
should feel overjoyed to get your money in preflop with aceking
in a wild game.
Good Spot No. 2. Inducing Wild Bluffs
Watch out for this scenario after the flop in a wild game. A
lot of money goes in preflop four ways. But there’s still plenty
of money behind.
Then the flop comes. No one seems willing to put in too
much action. Either it gets checked around, or someone makes
a half-hearted bet of maybe 20 percent of the bloated pot, and
everyone calls.
Something similar happens on the turn.
Then all of a sudden, on the river, someone decides to
shove. This bet is frequently (though obviously not always) a
bluff. Why?
The reason is fairly straightforward. After a bunch of
people put in a ton of money preflop, absolutely no one with a
decent hand is going to let the flop get checked through. The
first player with any hand to protect will make a good-sized
bet. So in a game like this, light flop action means quite
reliably that everyone is weak.
The turn action goes the same way. Again, everyone is
weak. Indeed, even if someone held a decent draw like the nut
flush draw on the turn, you might expect a bet. With $600
sitting in the middle and the nut flush draw to back it up, most
players in these wild games would take a shot with at least a
$200 bet.
WINNING IN WILD GAMES 167
So when the turn also goes through without significant
action, not only do you know most players are fairly weak, but
you can also guess that no one is too proud of a draw either.
Then the river comes, and someone shoves. So after all that
checking, all of a sudden someone has made a hand they are
willing to back for stacks? The fact is, it’s unlikely. It’s hard
to make a hand in hold’em on the final card without having at
least something worthwhile on the turn.
Let’s look at this hand I observed in a wild $2-$5 game in
Las Vegas. Stacks were between $800 and $1,500 for the
participants in the hand, except for one short stack.
A player limped in. The next player raised to $25. Two
players called, and then the big blind shoved for $170. This
player had been making erratic plays. The limper called, the
raiser called, and one of the two callers behind called. The pot
was $707 with one player all-in and no side pot. The
remaining players all had at least $600 behind.
The flop was A? 8? 5? . The limper checked. The original
preflop raiser bet $100 into the $707 pot. Everyone called.
The turn was the 7?. Everyone checked. There’s $1,107 in
the pot.
The river was the J? . The limper checked. The preflop
raiser checked. Then the next player, someone who had been
playing a lot of hands in this wild game and whose stack had
been up-and-down on a huge roller-coaster ride, shoved all-in
for a little over $1,000. The next player folded, the limper
folded, and the original raiser tanked. He had a stack of about
$700. He eventually showed J?J? and folded.
The river bettor triumphantly showed 9?8? for a pair of
eights with no club. “I knew you had no club,” he said with a
smile on his face. “Can’t call,” he said.
This type of play happens fairly frequently in wild games.
The player with the set of jacks absolutely must call in this
situation.
168 PLAYING THE PLAYER
What hand is the river bettor representing? Most $2-$5
players, even in a wild game, will not bet the river thinly for a
large amount of money. So he doesn’t have, for instance, just
the T? (or any weaker club). Really, for an all-in bet, he’s
representing the nuts, the K? . If he held the Q? , I’d expect
him perhaps to bet, but not to shove all-in.
But if he held the K? , why did he play so passively on the
flop and turn? The flop came monotone, so he would have had
the nut flush draw for two betting rounds. It’s perhaps
understandable that he didn’t raise the flop bet, even though
it’s small size screams weakness. But when it got checked to
him on the turn in a $1,107 pot, I would not expect him to
check it through.
I’m not saying it’s impossible that he checked through the
nut flush draw, or that it’s impossible that he is shoving the
river with a value hand that beats three jacks. But it’s
implausible. The story doesn’t add up. Furthermore, wild
bluffs like this one are fairly common in these games, and the
player with three jacks is getting $1,807-to-$700 on his
money, so he has to win less than 30 percent of the time to
make a call correct. It’s a call.
Remember this. Few players will check down a good hand
in a big pot in a wild game. Once the pot gets big, anyone who
has hit the board in a significant way will think, “Gee, I gotta
protect this hand.” Weak betting in a big pot means real
weakness. You can take advantage of the weakness by
plowing through these pots by betting the turn and shoving the
river as a bluff. You can also take advantage of the weakness
by inducing bluffs when you have the likely best (weak) hand.
But, naturally, you have to call the bluffs once you induce
them.
WINNING IN WILD GAMES 169
Good Spot No. 3. Thin Value Betting With A
Pair
No one wants to fold in a huge, bloated pot. If you flop a
pair, you can bet it, and you will get called by worse. Don’t be
shy. Look at the above example hand. The guy bet a A-8-5
monotone flop and got called in all three spots. Granted, his
bet was small compared to the size of the pot, but it still
wasn’t a small bet in an absolute sense. It was a $100 bet,
which represented a good portion of the remaining stacks. And
the board was a scary one that normally people won’t call
loosely.
In a “normal” no limit game, you have to be a little
circumspect with top pair hands, particularly when you have
kicker problems. Even if your hand is best, it can be hard to
get action from worse hands.
That goes out the window in wild games. If you have a
hand that figures to be the best hand out a good percentage of
the time, bet it for value. Slurp up all those $100 and $200
calls you can while you likely have an equity edge.
It’s no big deal if you bet the second-best hand sometimes.
You get so much value for your hands when they are best that
you can be wrong sometimes and still come out ahead on
average. It’s better to bet aggressively and get burned
sometimes than to be too timid, especially in a wild game.
Remember, in wild games you will be gambling. If it makes
you uncomfortable, buy in short. While you derive your edge
in these games by playing hands that have better showdown
potential than your opponents, you can’t be scared money. The
absolute worst thing you can do is to see every monster under
the bed and check too much and fold too much. Just play good
hands, bet your hands, don’t fold easily, and you’ll be fine.
Trait No. 1. Peeling Light
On The Flop And Getting
Sticky At Showdown
Overview
We’re talking bad players here.
This is the most universal fish trait. They play a wide range
preflop, and they like to peel light on the flop. Also, if they get
to the river with a decent pair, they will be unhappy about
folding it.
This trait almost defines the term “calling station. ”
Adjustment Summary
You’re going to do two things against these players. First,
you’re going to go for three streets of value with all your
decent top pair or better hands. Second, you’re going to barrel
the turn on dry boards.
Let’s start with the first adjustment. You go for three streets
of value with decent top pairs. Here’s the easy example.
It’s a $2-$5 game. A player with this trait limps in, and you
make it $25 to go with K?Q? . The big blind calls, and your
target calls.
The flop is K?8?7?. Your opponents check, you bet $50,
and the player with the trait calls. There’s $177 in the pot, and
let’s assume that there’s plenty of money behind.
PEELING LIGHT ON THE FLOP AND GETTING STICKY. . . 171
The turn is the J? . Your opponent checks. You bet $150,
and he calls. There’s $477 in the pot.
The river is the 3? . Your opponent checks. You bet $300
into the $477 pot.
Go for three streets of value. Against tight and nitty
players, you often can’t rely on getting three streets of value
from top pair hands that don’t improve. But against these
guys, top pair is your bread-and-butter, and you go for three
streets.
You may wonder about the bet sizing. Here’s how I do it.
The K-8-7 two-tone flop is one where you will fairly
frequently get drawn out on by the river. But it’s also a flop
where you’ll commonly get called by worse hands. So I make
a medium-sized bet. I don’t have overwhelming equity, so I
don’t want to bomb the pot. But I’m happy to make a solidsized
bet because I will so often get called by worse.
The turn is a great card for getting value. It’s offsuit, so the
flush draws missed. Obviously T-9 gets there, but your
opponent will more likely have a hand like 9-8, 9-7, T-8, K-T,
and so forth. You’re a very nice favorite against these hands
with just one card to come (and you know roughly what the
dangerous river cards are). So I like a big turn bet. You’ll get
called frequently, and you’ll usually be a 2-to-1 favorite or
better.
The river is a beautiful brick. Time for a value bet. You
want to get calls from stray jacks and eights that your
opponent got to the river with, so size your bet so that these
hands might call.
In general I make my largest bets (compared to the size of
the pot) when I expect to be a good favorite over most of the
hands that call me, and when I also expect a fairly wide range
of hands to call. This drawish but not hyper-dangerous turn
board of K-8-7-J with one flush draw is a great example. It’s
easy to have a draw, but not so easy to have me beat. I bomb
172 PLAYING THE PLAYER
boards like this one with top pair against the calling station
types.
Here’s a hand I played at a $2-$5 game in Las Vegas.
Four players limped, and I limped the button with 7?6?.
The blinds called. It was seven ways to the flop, and the pot
was $35.
The flop came A? 9? 8?. Everyone checked to me and I
checked.
The turn was the T?. The calling station guy bet $15, and
there was a caller. I raised to $75. Only the calling station
called.
The river was the 9?. The calling station checked. I bet
$200, and he called. My hand was good.
The river was probably the worst card in the deck for my
hand, but against this player type it’s still a very easy value
bet. I see small stakes players miss these bets a lot when a bad
card comes. No free showdowns to calling stations.
Now let’s talk about the second adjustment. You want to
barrel the turn on dry boards.
These guys peel the flop light. So your continuation bets
will frequently get called. But on many board textures, it’s
very difficult to make a decent hand, so the majority of the
time these players are missing on the turn and then folding.
The ideal board types for this are those that afford a lot of
weak draws and that brick out on the turn. For instance, say
you raise preflop and get called. The flop is Q-9-6 with a flush
draw. You bet and get called. The turn is an offsuit 4. This is a
good barrel card.
This player is going to peel you on the flop with a ton of
different hands: J-T, J-9, J-8, T-8, T-7, 9-8, 9-7, 8-7, 8-6, etc.
Barrel the turn and you can get folds. If you check back the
turn and try to bluff the river, this player type will be
considerably more likely to look you up with the one pair
hands in this range.
PEELING LIGHT ON THE FLOP AND GETTING STICKY. . . 173
Loosely connected boards are the best for this. The more
closely connected the board cards get, the stronger the
available draws become, and the better the chance your
opponent will want to peel the turn as well. For instance, on a
T-8-7 board, hands like J-T, T-9, 9-8, 8-7, and so forth are
much stronger on average than the hands you’re running into
on a Q-9-6 board.
Very dry boards can be ok for this also, but when you get
called on the flop you will fairly frequently have run into a
strong hand that your opponent will be loathe to fold. If you
bet and get called on a Q-7-2 flop, for instance, your opponent
will frequently have a queen or a weaker pair that he may
want to peel the turn with. Same reasoning for a flop like Q-7-
7.
A flop like Q-Q-8 is a little better to barrel because you can
get gutshots, eights, and weak pocket pairs to fold sometimes,
particularly if the turn is a card like an A or K.
Pitfalls To Avoid
Against most players with this trait, you will want to be
bet-folding with most of your value bets. When this type of
player raises, it will rarely be a bluff. For instance, if I had
been check-raised on the river in the hand above where I made
the low end of the straight, I would have folded. Just bet-fold
these players into oblivion.
As for the barreling, board textures are very important.
Remember, you want board textures where your opponents
will peel with weak hands that they’ll fold on the turn. When
boards are too coordinated, draws become too strong on
average. And when boards are too dry, even loose, sticky
players aren’t peeling as often without something they like a
fair bit.
174 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Finally, don’t bluff the river often against these guys. When
it’s just one more bet to see a showdown, these guys more
often than not pay it. And absolutely do not try to bluff these
players off top pairs or overpairs. Quite the opposite, if you
suspect one of these players has top pair, you should rejoice
because it opens up their entire stack to you. We’ll get into
this in the next section.
Who Exhibits This Trait
A zillion live no-limit players. The vast majority of
relatively new poker players tend to play this way. Just look
for guys who are in lots of hands, who peel flops a lot, and
who rarely seem to have anything they’re too proud of.
The Bottom Line
Value bet top pair relentlessly. Go for three streets. Fold to
raises. Barrel the turn when a load of weak draws brick off.
That’s about it.
Trait No. 2. Absolutely
Refusing To Fold An
Overpair
Overview
This one is pretty self-explanatory. There are a lot of players
who simply won’t fold an overpair almost no matter the
action. With these guys, there is absolutely no flopped
overpair that they’ll fold for almost any amount of money.
And even on the river when the board’s turned scary, they
hold on tight to those overpairs.
For example, in a $2-$5 game with $700 stacks, I played
the following hand:
A player whom I suspected to have this trait opened to $20.
This player was limping most of his hands, so I presumed that
the raise likely indicated a strong hand.
A weak player called, and I called on the button with
J?7?. The blinds folded. There was $67 in the pot with $680
behind.
The flop came J?8?7?. The player with this trait bet $40.
The middle player folded. I raised to $150. He reraised to
$300, and we got it in. He had Q-Q.
Here’s another example from a $2-$5 game. This hand
played with $1,200 stacks. The target was a really terrible
player who was on vacation in Las Vegas from Brazil.
This player opened to $20, and I called in the small blind
with 7-7. The blinds folded.
176 PLAYING THE PLAYER
The flop was 9-5-2 rainbow. I checked, he bet $40, and I
called.
The turn was a 9. I checked, and he checked.
The river was a 7. I shoved for $1,140 into the $125 pot. He
called and showed A-A.
Adjustment Summary
Crack and shove. That’s the basic formula. Wait until
you’ve cracked the pair and then stick all the money in. Often
players who exhibit this trait are completely pot-size
insensitive. Don’t necessarily worry that your shove may be a
massive overbet. With some players, actually, it may make
them more likely to call because they’ll figure you’d bet
smaller if you were betting for value.
For instance, I performed the crack and shove recently in a
$2-$5 game. I check-shoved a T?4?3? flop with 4-4. The
guy said, “Flush draw, huh?” as he called with K-K.
A lot of guys make this really easy because they tip their
hand early on. They will raise preflop, for instance, only with
AA-QQ. Or maybe you’re playing really deep and they will 3-
bet only with AA or KK (and they’ll make it a min-3-bet). Or
they will overbet the flop if and only if they’ve flopped an
overpair.
As soon as one of these players tips a big pair to you,
continue as long as you have the implied odds to crack.
Obviously small pocket pairs are the easiest hands to crack
an overpair with. Tend to play all pocket pairs against
someone who goes broke with every overpair unless you have
to pay more than about 8 percent of your opponent’s stack
preflop. (Or your stack if your opponent has you covered.) For
instance, if your target has a $300 stack and he makes it $20
preflop, call with any pocket pair since $20 is only 6.7 percent
ABSOLUTELY REFUSING TO FOLD AN OVERPAIR 177
of your stack. At $30, however, the call becomes marginal.
And at $35 it’s probably no longer profitable at all.
Without a pocket pair, you really want stacks to be pretty
deep before you try to crack a big pair. With two unpaired
cards below the pair, you will outflop the pair only about 5
percent of the time (give or take depending on how suited and
connected you are). You’ll flop a draw that’s worth continuing
with more often, but that scenario is quite a bit less profitable
since you’re still drawing as an underdog.
Once your target has 200 big blinds or more, however, you
should play lots of hands to try to crack the pair. You can even
start calling some 3-bets to crack at that point.
Don’t be shy about shoving. For instance, look at the
ridiculous hand I played with sevens full against pocket aces. I
made my hand on the river and shoved nearly ten times the
pot. Don’t hold back. If they don’t fold overpairs, they don’t
fold overpairs. Stick all the money in. Even if you aren’t sure
the player has an overpair, it can still make sense to shove
because you make more those times you get called than you
would if you had chosen a smaller bet that your opponent
might call with a weaker hand.
Pitfalls To Avoid
Two pitfalls. First, pay attention to the stack sizes! Your
target’s stack size is the most important. A lot of these guys
who always ship overpairs don’t play very deep. If you try to
crack an overpair at 50 BB stacks, you’re likely giving away
EV, not getting it.
I have brain farts from time to time where I’ll call preflop
with some suited hand trying to crack a guy and then realize
that his stack is only about 10 or 15 times the preflop raise. I
flop middle pair or something, and the guy bombs the pot with
178 PLAYING THE PLAYER
half his stack, and that’s it. Can’t call. Just bled away the
preflop call.
Avoid doing this whenever possible. If the stacks aren’t
deep, then that flop bet will usually be too big to call. And
you’re not very often going to have the pair cracked already
on the flop.
Second pitfall is that you should not semibluff your draws.
A lot of people get jam happy when they flop a decent draw,
but when you have close to zero fold equity, jamming your
draw is usually wrong. Remember, you’re trying to crack the
guy, not get him to fold. So don’t decide to go nuts when you
flop 8?7?2? to J?T?. Your overcard outs are probably no
good, so when you get it in on the flop you’re just a straight up
underdog. It’s much, much better to just call the flop, call the
turn (if the odds are right), and shove whenever you get there.
If you miss, you miss, and you lose.
Maybe it sounds silly to tell you not to try to bluff a guy
who never folds an overpair, but I’ve seen people try more
times than I could possibly count.
Who Exhibits This Trait
Lots of recreational players play this way. In fact, I’ll
generally assume a player who seems to play a recreational
player style will not fold an overpair even if I haven’t seen
direct evidence of it yet.
Ironically, some nits also seem to exhibit this trait as well.
They quite literally wait all day for pocket aces, and they just
plain ain’t folding when they get it. This is particularly true on
the flop. Nits know how hard it is to outflop pocket aces, so
they’ll often call off a huge overshove on a flop like J?8?6?.
What they don’t necessarily realize is that the way they play is
so predictable they are telling you they have pocket aces very
ABSOLUTELY REFUSING TO FOLD AN OVERPAIR 179
early on and leaving too much money behind if they plan to
call it off on any flop.
If you try this play against a nit and he folds instead of calls
(he’ll usually fold face-up just to show you how nitty he is),
then you can obviously abuse these folds in the future by
playing deep and shoving flops without the goods.
The Bottom Line
Lots of players refuse to fold overpairs almost no matter the
circumstances. Exploiting this one is simple. Crack and shove.
The trick is to make sure you have the odds to crack. Then the
next trick is to make sure you shove after—and not before—
you’ve cracked the pair.
Finding Holes
I’ve played a lot of small stakes no-limit hold’em in my life.
I’ve played live, and I’ve played online. I’ve played every
level of stakes all the way down to $0.10-$0.25 online.
In all these small stakes games, I can probably count on
two hands the number of truly good no-limit players I’ve run
into. Of course “good” is relative, but I’m talking about
players who can tailor their strategies well to the opponents
they are playing against, players who will adjust if I start
trying to take advantage of them and whose adjustments are
consistently correct.
Well over 99 percent of all the small stakes opponents I’ve
played against have not been good according to this definition.
Most generally play a fairly static strategy and don’t adjust
well either when there’s good money to be made adjusting or
when they are getting brutally taken advantage of.
It never fails, however. Someone will come to me and say,
“Ed, I can’t win in my game. There’s too many good players.
What should I do? ”
If you’ve ever felt that way about your regular game, rest
assured, your opponents are not too good to beat. You just
haven’t found the holes yet. Once you do, you will crash
through the logjam and start raking in the buyins.
This whole book has, to some extent, been about how to
find holes in your opponents’ games and exploit them. But
I’ve written this section for that student who complains that he
can’t win because his opponents are just too good. If you run
into a logjam in your regular game, and you feel like you can’t
184 PLAYING THE PLAYER
beat it, follow the steps in this section and you’ll be on your
way to reclaiming ownership of your game.
Step 1. Target a regular in your game that
you feel is too “good” to beat.
Pick someone. Choose a regular in your game. Look for
someone who wins in the game and whom you consider too
good to beat.
This is your target. You are going to make this person’s
poker life a living hell over the coming days, weeks, maybe
even months.
Yes, normally a good strategy to win at poker is to choose
the softest game available and pick on the weakest players.
But presumably you’re reading this because that formula isn’t
doing it for you anymore. The weak players aren’t as weak as
they used to be, and you’re spinning your wheels. Or maybe
it’s working, but you want to win faster and move up in
stakes.
You’re going to invest in your improvement by choosing to
pick on one of the better players. It may temporarily dent your
winrate, but it will pay long-term dividends.
Choose someone who plays a lot. Every time you play
poker over the next month or so, you want this person to be in
your game. A pro who has to put in a lot of hours to make
ends meet is a great choice. And the better you think this
player is, the better the choice. (Within reason. Phil Galfond
would not be a good choice for this because he’s too good, and
you aren’t going to find the holes you’re looking for. But
chances are Phil Galfond doesn’t play in your game, and
chances also are that anyone who does play in your game is a
fine choice.)
FINDING HOLES 185
Step 2. Gather preliminary data.
Play a few sessions with this player. For now it doesn’t
really matter where you sit relative to your target. Your entire
focus during these sessions should be on your target. Watch
every single hand this person plays. Ignore everyone else,
even if there is some huge fish in your game. (Don’t fret.
There will still be fish playing poker when this exercise is over
and you are back to playing normally.)
You aren’t trying to win money during these sessions. I’d
recommend playing a bit on the nitty side. Playing tight and
ABC will allow you to get through hands without thinking too
much about what you’re doing, helping you to focus on your
target.
Take lots of notes. If you play online, this part is really easy
since your computer will save the hand histories and you can
review them at your leisure. If you play live, I’d say let
appearances be damned and sit there with a notepad and a pen
and just scribble your notes shamelessly. Your neighbors will
undoubtedly comment on what you’re doing. If people ask
you about what you’re writing, just say you’re taking notes on
what cards come, how fast hands get dealt, how much rake
gets taken, how often jackpot hands come up, or anything that
would require you to be scribbling constantly and playing very
little. If you’re playing nitty, eventually everyone will lose
interest in you and what you’re writing.
What are you looking for? Ultimately you are looking for
situations where your opponent has an unbalanced hand range.
Here are some things that you should certainly note:
Write down a history of every hand your target shows
down. Record as much as you can get of the action.
Specifically you want your target’s position in the hand, all
186 PLAYING THE PLAYER
checks, bets, calls, and raises, and all bet sizes. Also get stack
sizes where possible.
Note preflop frequencies. You’re trying to infer the
percentage of hands your target plays preflop. Draw a table on
your notepad. Four columns and three rows. The columns
stand for early, middle, late position, and blinds. The rows
stand for opening pot, limpers, and raisers in front. Every time
your target acts preflop, make a note in one of the twelve
boxes that corresponds to the action your target took.
For example, say a player limped, and your target folded
from three off the button. Put an “F” in the box that
corresponds to middle position and a limper in front. Next
hand your target open-raises to 4× the blind from four off the
button. Put a “4×” in the box that corresponds to early position
and opening the pot. If you get to see the hand, write it down
next to the 4× note.
After perhaps 20 hours of play (four or five sessions of
note-taking), you’ll have about 500 notes in your boxes since
you’re taking a note on literally every hand that your target
gets dealt in. This will give you a rough idea of what your
opponent’s preflop range looks like. If he’s got a zillion “F”s
in his opening the pot from early position box, but he has more
raises in his late position opening the pot and limpers in front
boxes, you know that he’s positionally aware.
After you’ve got your boxes filled, try to write an
approximate range of hands for your opponent for each
situation. For example, say you have 100 notes in your
opening the pot from early position box (this will be one of
your most frequently used boxes). You have 73 “F”s, 8 “L”s
for limp, 14 “4×” raises, and 5 “6×” raises. Plus or minus a
few percent, you can assume that he’s playing about 25
percent of his hands. Of these hands, he’s limping about a
third and opening about two-thirds. Say you noticed that for
FINDING HOLES 187
one of his limps, he showed down 44. He showed KTs for one
of his open-raises, and you saw QQ for one of his 6× raises.
Armed with this data, open up PokerStove. Slide the slider
to a 25 percent range and add and subtract hands that make
sense. (Compared to the range PokerStove will give you, for
any given percentage of hands, most people play some extra
suited hands and pocket pairs at the expense of some of the
weakest offsuit hands.) Then try to figure out what the limping
range looks like. You know 44 is in it, and you can likely infer
that similar hands (66-22 perhaps) are also in it. Keep adding
reasonable hands to the limping range until you get to 8
percent. Write that range down for the limping. Then write
down the hands that are left in the raising range while also
trying to infer if this player sizes raises different based on
hand strength or on other factors.
Repeat this procedure for every box. Now you have a fairly
good picture of what hands your opponent is playing in every
common situation.
If you see something that doesn’t fit in a box, note it
separately. Reraises are the most important of these. Every
time your opponent is involved in a 3-bet pot, whether your
target is the reraiser or not, take a note of what happens. Try to
get a sense of whether this player tends to call 3-bets or fold
and whether this tendency changes based on whether he’s in
or out of position.
Find unbalanced postflop lines. In addition to all the
hands that go to showdown and all the preflop data, you want
to take data on your target’s play postflop. There are a few
things you really, really want to know.
First, how frequently does your opponent continuation bet
the flop after raises preflop? And does this frequency change
based on board texture? Almost everyone will alter their
continuation bet frequency based on the number of players in
188 PLAYING THE PLAYER
the pot, so this is less important to note. Also, even though
they absolutely should, very few players alter their
continuation bet frequency based on the strength of their
preflop hand range. For instance, say you open-raise and get
called by the big blind. You should be betting more frequently
when you’ve raised from early position and less frequently
when you’ve raised from the cutoff. As I said, however, very
few players actually do this. Their continuation betting
strategy is more static than that.
I would assume that your target varies continuation bet
frequency based on the number of players in the pot, hand
strength, and possibly board texture. Within these parameters,
try to figure out which hands your opponent is continuation
betting on what sort of boards.
Most players either continuation bet too frequently, or they
continuation bet too predictably based on hand value. For
instance, many players (particularly ones who play small
stakes games for a living) will continuation bet a flop like Q-
7-5 two-tone nearly 100 percent of the time. And when they
don’t continuation bet, they will have a very specific set of
hands like, perhaps, A-K, A-7, J-J, 8-7, or some other similar
medium-strength hand with showdown value.
You should get an idea early on whether your opponent is a
frequent continuation bettor or not. If he is, pay particular
attention to the flops he doesn’t continuation bet. Note the
circumstance and, if there was a showdown, what hand he had.
If he doesn’t continuation bet as frequently, watch what
happens on the turn. He will frequently get bet into. How does
he respond? If he folds mostly, then he’s checking back air. If
he calls mostly, he’s likely checking back showdown value. If
he raises fairly frequently, he’s possibly slowplaying, but also
possibly taking peculiar bluffing lines.
On the turn and river, watch for two things in particular.
How thinly does this player try to value bet the river? Say
FINDING HOLES 189
your target checks the river in position and shows top pair.
This observation could mean that the player rarely value bets
with just one pair on the river. Note any data that would tend
to reinforce or dispute this notion. You want to have as clear a
picture as possible of the hands your target will and won’t
value bet on the river.
Also watch out for how frequently your opponent tries to
pot control on the turn. If you see him check back top pair on
the turn, this could be a habit. Again, gather data that would
support or refute this conclusion.
Finally, look at your target’s bet sizing. Are there any clear
tells? Any time your opponent makes a particularly large or
particularly small bet, note the situation.
This means you’re writing something down on absolutely
every hand. And whenever your target enters the pot, you’re
potentially writing quite a bit. Let’s go through an example
hand so you know what to write down.
Two players limp in, and your target raises to 6× on the
button. Both limpers call.
Write “6×” in the late position limpers preflop box.
The flop is Q?J?5?. The limpers check, and your target
bets half the pot.
Write down something like “QJ5/F-1/2×.” This means the
flop was Q-J-5 with a flush draw “F” (“R” for rainbow and
“M” for monotone maybe), and the target made a 1/2 pot
continuation bet.
One of the limpers calls. The turn is the 6 of the flush suit.
It goes check-check.
The river is a J. The limper bets 1/2 pot, and the target calls
and shows A-Q.
Write down the rest of the action for the hand:
“Turn 6-flush. X-X. River J. B-C. Showed AQ. ”
Then go back to your preflop note and write “AQo” above
your 6× note in the late position and limpers box. Finally, note
190 PLAYING THE PLAYER
that your opponent took a pot-controlling line on the turn with
top pair when the flush card came.
You don’t have to use my notation. Any way you can get
these notes down that you will understand later is fine.
Obviously if you take notes like these on every single hand
for 20 hours of play you will have a lot of data. Now you’re
ready for the next step.
Step 3. Summarize your target’s strategy.
You’ve gathered your data. Now it’s time to develop a
detailed picture of how your target plays the game. Write
down your target’s preflop limping and raising ranges in
various positions. How frequently does your target 3-bet, and
with what ranges/in what situations? In the 20 hours you’ve
observed, have you seen your target 3-bet preflop and fold to a
4-bet?
What is the postflop strategy? Does this player continuation
bet many flops, pot control some turns, and miss some river
value bets on semi-scary boards? Under what circumstances
does this player check-raise? In particular, what sort of draws
does your target seem to raise the flop with? Will he raise
many draws, only strong draws, or only on certain flop
textures?
Step 4. Brainstorm scenarios where your
opponent’s range will be unbalanced.
Up until now, you’ve basically just been taking notes and
documenting observations. This step requires you to draw
some inferences from your observations, so it’s a little bit
tricky. Fortunately, you can treat this step as the beginning of
FINDING HOLES 191
an iterative process. That is, after you’ve completed all the
steps, you will use your experience at the table to revisit this
step and improve your inferences.
What do I mean by scenarios where your opponent’s range
is unbalanced? You’re looking for situations where your
opponent’s range is dominated either by particularly strong
hands or by particularly weak hands.
Let’s say, for instance, that you observe that your target
raises about 30 percent of hands from late position against
limpers. You also observe that he continuation bets dry flops
nearly 100 percent of the time, and that he frequently checks
medium-strength pairs behind on the turn. With these traits,
say a hand plays out as follows.
Someone limps, and your target raises. You call from the
big blind, and the limper calls.
The flop is J-4-3 with a flush draw. You and the limper
check, and your target continuation bets. You call, and the
limper folds.
The turn is an offsuit K. You check, and your opponent
bets half pot. What does his range look like here?
Well, he’s raising preflop with 30 percent of hands, so with
such a wide range he’s a favorite to miss any given flop. On
top of that, a J-4-3 flop is hard to hit for any hand. Yet he’s
betting it nearly 100 percent of the time.
He usually has air. Say you have A-Q with a backdoor
flush draw. You check-call.
The turn is a K. It’s not a great card for your hand, but you
know that your opponent likes to check pairs back on the turn.
So if he flopped a jack or spiked a king on the turn, he might
check it back. Instead, he bets. What is his betting range here?
It’s air, draws, and a few monster hands like K-J and 3-3. In
other words, it’s mostly weak.
This is a very unbalanced range. Your opponent has
actually marked himself with weakness by betting the turn
192 PLAYING THE PLAYER
because he likes to check many turns with showdown value.
You can check-raise.
Why is the check-raise good? With A-Q you might have
the best hand and actually get value against your opponent’s
draws. Also, even when he’s got air, he’s got a decent shot to
draw out on you on the river, so you gain when he folds. You
have outs to the nuts even if you run into a set. And, finally,
you might get lucky and your opponent might have chosen to
bet-fold the turn with a pair this time. When an opponent likes
to pot control pairs, it indicates an unwillingness to stack off
with a pair. So there’s a decent chance if your opponent is
betting a pair that he’ll be bet-folding.
Brainstorm as many scenarios as you can where your
opponent’s traits will lead to your target betting a primarily
weak hand range. These are the bet-fold spots that I told you
to exploit in the first part of the book. Here you’re just using a
systematic process to find them.
Write down a list of as many bet-fold spots you can think
of. These will be the situations you will look for as you play to
torture your target opponent.
Also look for other unbalanced ranges. Good examples are
when your opponent has limited the strength of his hand by
failing to play in the way he’d play with the nuts. These are
great spots to try thin value bets.
Look through your data to see if your opponent is raising
frequently in situations where you’d expect him to have a
relatively weak hand range. For example, say your target likes
to call relatively frequently out of the blinds, and you find that
he check-raises a lot of flops.
If you’re playing a wide range from the blinds, “legitimate”
flop check-raising spots are few and far between. Your target
could be very unbalanced after check-raising the flop. Look
for spots to shove over the check-raises or to float them.
FINDING HOLES 193
Step 5. Start “bumhunting” your target.
Bumhunting is poker jargon for seeking particular players
out to try to beat them. Most of the time you’d want to
bumhunt particularly poor players. Not you! You’re going to
bumhunt your target. Try to get position on him. Then start
playing and try to create as many exploitable situations as you
can. If he likes to barrel the turn lightly while checking his
showdown strength, float flops to let him bet his unbalanced
range on the turn, then shut him down with a raise. If he
check-raises flops too lightly, whenever you continuation bet
the flop, make sure you have a surprise in store for the bad
check-raises.
The key is to fold when your opponent has strong ranges
and to refuse to fold against your opponent’s weak ranges.
When your opponent is getting out of line with weak ranges,
you are going to linger in hands. You’ll call down light, you’ll
bluff-raise, and so forth. You’re simply not going to let him
bet weak ranges and win pots.
If your opponent is the typical “good” player for your
stakes, this treatment will be absolutely devastating to him.
None of his normal tricks will be working against you.
Continue to take notes. Your opponents will by this time be
used to you taking notes at the table, so it shouldn’t draw
attention. But your notes aren’t going to be nearly as detailed.
You aren’t going to write down every little preflop play or
every flop bet or turn check.
Instead, you’re taking notes on how your exploitative
attempts are working. If you try to exploit something, write
the hand down, and write down if it worked or not. If it didn’t
work, did you get shown a hand you expected or one that
surprised you? For instance, say you raised the turn because
you expected your opponent to have either a nut hand or air,
194 PLAYING THE PLAYER
and he called and showed the nuts. Oh well, bad luck for you,
but it’s actually evidence that you’re doing it right.
On the other hand, say he called and snapped you off with
top pair. This is evidence you might need to change
something. Either your inferences were wrong, or your
opponent is adjusting to you. Take notes on how these hands
work out, and then go back to Step 4 to refine your strategy
and brainstorm new scenarios.
Likely a hand will come up that you didn’t anticipate.
Write it down, then when you get home, figure out if your
opponent will have unbalanced ranges in this scenario. If so,
file it away and if a similar situation comes up again, go on the
attack.
After you do this for a while, your opponent will almost
certainly get frustrated. He’ll probably try to adjust something.
Watch for how he tries to adjust. Usually the adjustment will
be foolish and easily exploitable. For example, your opponent
check-raises you on a 8-4-3 flop, and you 3-bet shove because
you know this to be an unbalanced range. He calls and shows
A-6. Now you can be fairly certain that your opponent is
going to get it in with you on many types of flops with some
very weak hands. So you start playing all your top pair hands
bet-shove on the flop.
Step 6. Extend the lessons you’ve learned to
other “good” players.
By now the poor guy you’ve been chasing around is ready
to kneecap you in the parking lot. It’s time to call it quits on
this particular exercise. Give the guy a break. Stop
bumhunting him. In this stage, you’re going to try the tricks
you’ve learned that work against your former target against all
the “good” players in your game.
FINDING HOLES 195
One of the beautiful things about poker is that there’s a
very strong herd mentality. All the regulars in one particular
game will often tend to play similarly to one another. Peer
pressure and the fear of stepping out of bounds and looking
foolish keep everyone in line. As long as you make the same
play the guy next to you would have made, no one will bat an
eye in your direction.
So the plays that worked against your former target will
likely work against other guys as well. Try them out. Abuse
them until you encounter someone who seems too good to
beat with the plays you’ve devised.
What then, you ask? You say you’ve run up against
someone in your game who seems too good for you to beat?
That’s a tough one. Just buy my next book and I’ll tell you
exactly what to do about that.
Exercise No. 1.
You play the following two hands against someone in a $2-
$5 game. Here’s the first hand.
Your target is a middle-aged man wearing a suit coat and a
gold Rolex watch. He bought in for the table maximum, and
he’s about even so far.
This opponent limps for $5 from UTG+1, and you make it
$25 from two off the button with K?K?. The big blind calls,
and the limper calls. There’s $77 in the pot and over $1,000
behind.
The flop comes J?3? 2?. Your opponents check, you bet
$60, and only the preflop limper calls.
The turn is the A?. Your opponent checks, and you check.
There’s $197 in the pot.
The river is the 2?. Your opponent checks, you bet $120,
and your opponent calls. He shows A? 4?, and he wins.
196 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Part A. What notes would you take on your opponent after
playing this hand? List two or three specific betting lines you
might now be more inclined to make against this player based
on these observations.
Now for the second hand. Your target is in the big blind
this time. You open-raise to $20 with 7?7? . A player calls
behind you, and your target calls from the big blind. The pot is
$62, and there is again over $1,000 behind.
The flop is Q? 8?6?. Your opponents check to you, and
you bet $45. Your target calls from the big blind, and the other
player folds.
The turn is the A?. Your target checks, and you check it
back. There’s $152 in the pot.
The river is the 2? . Your target bets $80. You have 7-7,
and the final board is Q-8-6-A-2 rainbow.
Part B. How can you use some of the notes you took in the
first hand to inform your decision in this one? What should
you do?
Here are my thoughts. I’d note that the player open-limped
in early position with a junk, offsuit ace. I’d also note that he
called a fairly large continuation bet from out of position with
a gutshot and an overcard. Most importantly, I’d note that he
chose not to value bet his pair of aces even after you checked
behind on the turn. I’d likely infer from these observations that
he is limping in with some speculative hands, peeling flops a
bit light, and not value betting top pair appropriately on the
river.
Using the two latter inferences, I would call the river in the
second hand. On a Q-8-6 flop you can expect your opponent
to peel with a wide variety of hands due to all the possible
gutshots. J-T, J-9, T-9, T-7, 9-7, 7-5, and so forth. If he’s
limping junk aces, he may be calling with the offsuit versions
of these hands from the big blind. That’s a lot of hand
combinations.
FINDING HOLES 197
Furthermore, this player has demonstrated a reluctance to
bet just a pair of aces on the river, even from out of position. I
wouldn’t expect him to bet a pair of queens or eights either. So
the only hands I’d really expect him to bet for value would be
two pair or better. Since the river was a deuce (unlikely to
make two pair) and no straights or flushes are possible on this
board, there are more combinations of busted draws than there
are of likely two pair or better hands. Getting nearly 3-to-1 on
a call, this is a great spot to try to pick off a bluff.
This is how you beat semi-competent no-limit players. You
learn their tendencies and then map out where these tendencies
have created unbalanced ranges. In this case, the player has
unwittingly created an unbalanced river betting range by
failing to bet many top pair hands.
Once you’ve identified unbalanced ranges, you can exploit
them whenever they arise. You can also, and this is just as
important, play hands in such a way that your opponents will
turn their hands face up for you.
For instance, say you observe that your opponent will
nearly always bet the turn with top pair when checked to.
Then the following hand arises.
You open to $20 with K?Q?. This player calls from one
off the button, and the blinds fold.
The flop comes A?Q?5?. You bet $35 into the $47 pot,
and your opponent calls. Your opponent calls the flop loosely,
and you think he could have an ace, a weaker queen, a gutshot,
or even a pocket pair below a queen or a five.
The turn is the 7?. Now you can check, and your opponent
will tell you if you’re beaten or not. He’ll bet his aces and
check his queens, fives, and pocket pairs. If he checks back,
you can bet the river for value. If he bets the turn, you can
expect to be behind and check-fold.
More interestingly, instead of check-folding the turn, if the
stacks are deep you can possibly turn your pair into a bluff.
198 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Say your opponent will play a lot of rag aces, and he will bet
all of them when checked to on the turn. That makes his turn
betting range overwhelmingly one pair hands as opposed to
the stronger two pairs and sets that your opponent will stack
off with.
This is an unbalanced turn betting range, a range filled with
hands your opponent will bet-fold. Some players will bet-fold
every ace on this turn except for A-K or aces up.
If you’re curious, the way for your opponent to avoid
getting exploited like this is to mix up the turn betting range.
He should bet his gutshots and some of his small pairs when
checked to, so that you’re sometimes check-folding the best
hand with K-Q. And he should check back a number of his top
pair hands so that the turn betting range is denser overall with
big hands like sets and two pair.
These two adjustments make check-folding and checkraising
closer in value to check-calling. This is the goal of
range balancing—to leave your opponent with no clearly good
line to take.
Exercise No. 2.
You’re $1,500 deep in a $2-$5 game. A loose, gambler
type player limps in from middle position, and a somewhat
nitty player raises to $25 on the button. You call in the big
blind with 7? 6? . The gambler calls. There’s $77 in the pot.
You’ve been taking notes on the loose, gambling player.
He limps in with about 35 percent of his hands from middle
position, while he also raises about 10 percent of the time first
in. Limping in from middle position, you’ve seen him play
K5s, 88, A7o, and 96s.
One of the other things you’ve noted about this player is
that he seems to play draws very hard on the flop. On one
FINDING HOLES 199
hand, he cold-3-bet the flop with just a naked king-high flush
draw. He was called by someone holding a set, and he made
his draw and won. In another pot, he bet an ace-high flush
draw when checked to and won an enormous pot when he
made the nuts on the river.
The flop comes Q?6?4? . You check, the gambler bets
$60 into the $77 pot, and the nit folds.
Part A. What sort of range do you put your opponent on in
this situation? What should you do?
You call. The turn is the 3?. You check, and your opponent
checks it back. There’s $197 in the pot with a ton of money
behind.
The river is the A?.
Part B. Given what you know about your opponent, what
should you do on this river?
Here are my thoughts. This guy is limping in with a ton of
hands, much of which is suited junk. He is raising some
preflop, however, so I would expect him rarely to have a hand
like A-Q after limping.
He likes to jam the flop with draws, and so when he bets
out of turn on the flop into a nit on a relatively disconnected
two diamond board, a lot of his range consists of flush draws
with some straight draws, pairs, and other possible hands
thrown in.
You’ve flopped middle pair without a kicker but with a
backdoor flush draw. With deep stacks against a known bad
player who may be marked with a draw, I think this is an easy
call.
I don’t like raising the flop, because there’s an excellent
chance you’ll get 3-bet. You might say, “But hey, if he’s
going to 3-bet a draw, don’t we want to get value from him?”
The problem is that your small pair is not an equity favorite
against a flush draw and two overcards to your 7 kicker. So
even in the best case you aren’t really getting your money in
200 PLAYING THE PLAYER
good. And it’s possible the guy has you crushed. (I know you
likely wouldn’t be check-raising your middle pair here, but it’s
worth considering even though this time it turns out not to be a
great play.)
The turn is a brick that happens to give you a gutshot. You
check, and your opponent checks. Your opponent’s check
back here likely denies a hand two pair or better. People just
don’t check the turn that often with good hands and deep
stacks when there are obvious draws out there. Flush draw is
the most likely possibility, while a one pair hand is also
possible.
The river is an interesting card, an offsuit ace. There’s no
doubt about it. Your opponent can have an ace. He could have
the ace-high diamonds or he could even have decided to stab
on the flop with a naked offsuit ace.
Still, two pair or better is unlikely after the turn check.
Since we sort of ruled out A-Q preflop (and also with the turn
check), he’d have to have a hand like A?3?, A?4?, or
possibly a random A-6 to have made aces up. None of these
hands is particularly likely.
So your opponent likely has either one pair or a busted
draw. What should you do?
You could check. Unfortunately if your opponent will
value bet an ace—and a loose, gambling live game type
might—then you could have a tough decision. Is he value
betting a better pair or bluffing the busted draw? Depending
on his bet size you might have to flip a coin on the river to
decide whether to call or fold. Guessing on the river is never
good, since there’s almost always a better way.
Check-raising the river is actually a decent idea. Whenever
you think you may be up against a range of hands comprised
mainly of bluffs and thin value bets, always consider bluffraising
the river. (Highlight that sentence. It’s an important
one.) The thing is that if you were to bluff-raise the river,
FINDING HOLES 201
you’d be trying to fold out an ace. Some guys will basically
call any river raise with a pair of aces. A loose gambler type
who likes to jam draws on the flop is just the sort to look you
up.
I’d certainly consider check-raise bluffing here if I were
against a TAG who could be bet-folding. But I suspect you
may not have enough fold equity against this particular type of
player. You’d want to make the river raise nice and big (if you
raise small he’ll surely call), and then you aren’t creating good
odds for yourself, making it that much more important that
you be right about getting the fold.
So checking allows your opponent to play well on the river,
and check-raise bluffing is likely too ambitious. If you just bet
out fairly big, you will get called by all hands that beat you
and likely get folds from all the hands worse than yours.
That’s no good.
Here’s what I’d try. I’d make a tiny river bet, something
like $20 or $40 into this nearly $200 pot. I think this bet will
block most opponents from raising you for value with just one
pair. So if you are up against an ace or queen, you’ll just get
called and lose your mini-bet.
But what if you get raised? I’d snap-call a raise. For this
player type, the draw jammer gambler, it’s intense cognitive
dissonance to meekly fold a busted draw to a tiny river bet. As
soon as he sees the small bet with his busted draw, he will
think, “Can’t win this pot if I don’t bet,” and will put out a
raise.
I love to use this play against the guys who splash money
around and crave action. The small bet causes your opponent
to play his range in an enormously unbalanced way, calling
with all his made hands and raising his busted draws. Yes, you
will occasionally run into two pair or some other oddball hand
when you call, but you will win well more than often enough
to justify the call.
202 PLAYING THE PLAYER
The keys to this hand are realizing that the out of turn flop
bet puts a lot of draws into this player’s range, while the turn
check denies a big hand. You can then use a little trick on the
river to get your opponent to completely unbalance this range
and pay you maximum when you’re ahead while losing the
minimum when behind. Yes, against the right players, this
really works like a charm. Give it a shot.
test
.
.
.
.
,
.
I put tight players up front because these are the main players
that an ABC strategy fails against. An ABC strategy is
designed to exploit mistakes where people put too much
money in the pot with weak hands. Tight players rarely do
this, so ABC players will struggle against them.
No doubt you’ve heard people complain about how there’s
“no action” in a game, or that it’s “just a bunch of nits.” The
implication is that it’s hard to win money at a tight game. If
you insist on playing an ABC strategy, then it will indeed be
very difficult to win.
But tight players usually deviate significantly from an
optimal no-limit strategy, which makes them thoroughly
exploitable. This section is devoted to common traits you’ll
find among tight players (nits and TAGs) and how to get the
best of them.
Trait No. 1. Refusing To
Felt Without The Nuts
Overview
This trait is both very common and extremely exploitable.
You’ll find this trait mostly among nits. (In fact, this is in
many ways the defining trait of a nit.). It’s simple. Players
with this trait will rarely put their entire stack at risk without a
nutted hand.
Generally these players will be slightly more likely to call
all-in without the nuts than they’ll be to bet all-in without the
nuts. For instance, if there is a three flush on board and no
pair, they will likely shove all-in on the river (assuming a
shove is more than half the pot or so) with only the nut flush.
With smaller flushes they’ll make smaller bets or even check
it down.
They’ll call an all-in shove on the river with non-nut
flushes, however. But a shove might get them to lay down two
pair or a set without much internal debate.
Refusing to felt any hand that isn’t the nuts will generally
have you folding far too often to a very aggressive player. It
will also fail to get reasonable value for many strong but not
nutted hands.
Specifically, these players tend to fold too much of their
hand range to good-sized turn barrels.
For example, it’s a $2-$5 live no-limit hold’em game with
$1,000 stacks. You open to $20, get a call behind you, and a
nit who exhibits this trait calls in the big blind.
REFUSING TO FELT WITHOUT THE NUTS 25
The flop comes Q?T?4?. You bet $40, the player behind
folds, and the big blind calls.
To make both the preflop and flop call, the nit likely has a
hand range that looks like
QQ-TT, 44
AQs, ATs, KQs, QJs, AdXd, KdJd, Jd9d, 9d8d-6d5d
AQo, KQo
Overall it’s a strong range that well represents the nit’s
overall tight play. Now the turn is the 4?. He checks, and you
bet $100. Which of these hands will the nit fold? It could be as
many hands as these
JJ
ATs, KQs, QJs, AdXd (not Ad3d), 9d8d-8d7d
KQo
This has him folding any made hand weaker than AQ and
any draw weaker than a combo straight and flush draw. For
players with this trait, this turn folding range is reasonable.
That means he’s continuing only with
QQ,TT,44
AQs, KdJd, Jd9d, Ad3d, 7d6d-6d5d
AQo
If you count the hand combinations, this player is folding
34 hand combos while continuing with 24 of them. On the
turn you’re betting $100 to win the $140 pot, and the nit is
folding over half of his range to the bet. It’s an auto-profit bet
with any two cards.
Here’s the other thing. If the river comes a non-ace
diamond or a king, you might have another profitable bluff. Of
26 PLAYING THE PLAYER
the 24 hands that are calling the turn bet, half of them are acequeen.
A scare card could get a nit off of that hand for less
than a pot-sized bet, giving the river bluff an overlay.
And on a non-diamond, non-straightening river, the nit
could be folding nearly his entire range on the river to an
overbet. If you assume that this player likely would have
raised either the flop or turn with a set, then his calling range
on the turn is mostly ace-queen with a few combo draws.
These players don’t like to felt one-pair hands, even those as
strong as ace-queen is on this board. So if all the draws brick,
you could consider making a massive river bet to win the pot
nearly every time.
Adjustment Summary
To take advantage of a player who is reluctant to felt nonnutted
hands, you do a few things. First, you tend to raise pots
preflop. Since you expect many situations postflop where you
will be able to steal the pot even when you bloat it preflop,
you might as well bloat it to win a bigger pot.
Second, you up your turn barreling frequency. The key
difference between this sort of player and looser players is that
these players are much more willing to fold draws and top pair
on the turn than a typical player is. On many boards,
particularly ones that brick on the turn, you will get these
players to fold more than half of their hand ranges to a turn
barrel.
Finally, even when you get called on the turn, you may be
able to leverage a scare card on the river to complete the bluff.
Or if the stacks are very deep, you may be able to use an
overbet to get the player off of nearly their entire range. The
success of the overbet relies on the assumption that your
opponent would tend to raise earlier in the hand with a
REFUSING TO FELT WITHOUT THE NUTS 27
monster like a set or top two. If this assumption holds, then
this player’s turn calling range tends to consist of top pair/top
kicker, overpairs, and very strong draws.
So you bloat pots preflop, and then steal more on the turn
and river.
Pitfalls to Avoid
First, absolutely don’t make big calls against players who
exhibit this trait. Obviously big bets are going to be nutted
hands more often than against a typical player.
Some players with this trait may begin to call down more
often against you if you keep pounding on them. They may
call down with strong top pairs rather than release, and they
may also call down with monster hands rather than raise early
in the hand. This is a good counter-adjustment, and if you
suspect your opponent may be making it, you should back off
a bit.
Who Exhibits This Trait
I see this trait most commonly in small stakes live players.
It’s rarer among online players.
Watch your game. If few hands are going to showdown and
most seem to be ended by a turn bet, there’s a good chance a
few players at your table are reluctant to felt without the nuts.
If people are grumbling about how there’s no action at the
table, that’s a good cue. If you see someone check down a
very strong hand on the river, also suspect this trait. Checking
a strong hand can also indicate a general ignorance of hand
values, but players ignorant of hand values tend to play more
loosely and make bad calldowns. If you see a player who is
28 PLAYING THE PLAYER
making a lot of folds check a big hand down, it’s a great
indicator that this trait is present.
The Bottom Line
Open up your preflop game. Raise limpers with a wide
range of suited hands in position. Then barrel the flop. Barrel
again on many good turns. And consider overbet bluffs on the
river.
Trait No. 2. Limp-Folding
Preflop
The first trait, refusing to felt non-nutted hands, applies at
least to some extent to nearly every tight player. Tight players
are more or less defined by an unwillingness to get the money
in bad. This unwillingness makes them vulnerable to bluffing
and semibluffing strategies.
Better tight players find semibluffing spots and call down
light sometimes, making them less predictable and tougher to
play against. But, overall, tight players profit by having the
best hand more often than not when money goes in.
After refusing to felt non-nutted hands, the other tight traits
are less universal. Some tight players exhibit them, and some
don’t.
Overview
The first of these traits is limp-folding preflop. You’ll know
this one when you see it. A player habitually limps into a pot
and folds to raises behind.
Every once in a while, in certain specific game conditions,
limp-folding can be an ok play. But some tight players do it
over and over again, day in and day out. This is really bad and
exploitable.
When everyone is playing optimally, the blind (and ante, if
applicable) money shapes strategy. Without dead money,
30 PLAYING THE PLAYER
there’d be no incentive to play any hand. If you’re opening the
pot, you want the fold equity from raising.
Basically, limping plays little to no role in an optimal
preflop strategy.
This isn’t to say that limping is always a bad play. It’s
simply not an optimal play. Limping can, in some scenarios,
be the best option to induce and exploit the mistakes your
opponents make.
Limping in, first into the pot, and then folding to a normalsized
raise is usually a mistake. Game conditions would have
to be extraordinary to make it correct.
Adjustment Summary
The adjustment should be obvious. Raise these players
frequently preflop. They’re leaving money hanging out to dry.
When these players limp in, I tend to raise roughly half of my
button and cutoff hands. I raise all “playable” hands, and then
I raise weak suited or connected hands like Q?6?, 8?5?, or
9?8?.
The beauty of the limp-folders is that they often carry their
folding tendency with them to the flop. First, think about what
sorts of hands they’re limping in with and then folding. For
most of these players, it’s speculative suited hands—suited
connectors, suited gapped hands, perhaps weak suited aces
and some suited kings. It’s also weak high-card offsuit hands
like QJo, up to and including AJo and KQo for some players.
What’s left when they call? Pocket pairs, big suited hands,
AK, and AQ. Specifically, pocket pairs are a big part of the
remaining range, and these players are calling preflop with
pairs with a no-set-no-bet strategy.
So what are they likely to have on a J-9-2 flop? AK and
AQ missed. Most pocket pairs missed. Unless they have AJs,
LIMP-FOLDING PREFLOP 31
KJs, or a set, they’re folding. That’s most hands. So even if
you get called preflop, you’ll still have an easily profitable
continuation bet on many flops.
You may think, as some people do, that winning a limp or
two isn’t worth it, and you shouldn’t risk a 5× preflop raise on
a bluff just to win one or two extra blinds. But that’s very
flawed logic, especially since, as I mentioned above, the sort
of player who limp-folds preflop will often check-fold on the
flop even when the preflop steal attempt fails.
The fact is that limp-folding a lot is very bad play, and it’s
exploited by upping your preflop raising frequency. The more
they fold, the more hands you can likely get away with raising.
Pitfalls To Avoid
You’re going to get limp-reraised occasionally as a
counter-measure. This will often represent a big pair or AK.
This is nothing to be worried about, since you’re often just as
happy to know early in the hand when your opponent has one
of these monster hands.
You may get limp-reraised with a suited connector or some
other hand that you would normally expect your opponent to
fold. This is bad for you, but it’s unlikely your opponents will
begin to do this with the frequency required to deter you from
attacking their limps.
Savvy players behind you may pick up on what you’re
doing and begin to 3-bet you. This is bad. It forces you to get
somewhat back into line, though you can take
countermeasures against light 3-betting (described later in the
book).
Beware of letting these steal attempts blossom into big
pots. You’re playing these hands because your opponents are
nitty and fold too much. When they don’t fold, and especially
32 PLAYING THE PLAYER
when they seem to want to put money in the pot, stay away. It
can be tempting to push a hand like bottom two for the
surprise factor. “He can’t know I’m raising eight-five, so he’ll
never guess I have two pair.” No, he won’t guess you have
two pair. But he’s only putting big money in the pot when
bottom two is clobbered. That’s the point. Don’t level yourself
into playing a big pot against a nit from a steal situation.
The rake. There’s no question that tight games are
considerably tougher to beat at low stakes than a similar game
would be at high stakes because of the rake. In tight games
you get your edge by winning more small and medium pots
than your opponents do. The rake structure often punishes this.
Here are my thoughts about adjusting your play for the
rake.
Don’t.
If you’re playing at small stakes, it’s either because you’re
a recreational/casual player, or it’s because you’re trying to
get better and move up. Either way, learning how to play
poker better is more important than the $5 per hour you could
generate by tweaking your play for the rake. I find that people
who obsess about the rake also tend to obsess about variance.
Both of these obsessions convince these players to fold many
marginal hands and “pass” on profitable situations. When you
do that, you’re back to ABC. Which, as I said before, is a valid
way to play. But presumably if you’re reading this book, you
want more out of poker.
So just forget about the rake. It sucks. High rakes will
definitely make it harder to build up a bankroll from smaller
games. But I promise that you’re much better off long term
with good skills and a light bankroll than with weak skills and
a little bit more cash. So just forget the rake, concentrate on
getting good at poker, and then find a solution for any bankroll
problems later.
LIMP-FOLDING PREFLOP 33
Who Exhibits This Trait?
Nits. Live nits, mostly. Many at the $1-$2 and $2-$5 levels
in Las Vegas. You can’t miss them, since they’re the only
ones limp-folding.
Also some weaker regular and non-regular players will
limp-fold from time to time, particularly if the preflop raiser is
someone who has been winning in the game. When you’ve
limped in with Q? 7? , the hand looks more hopeless when
the preflop raiser is someone who has just stacked three
people than someone who has just been stacked three times.
The Bottom Line
Limp-folding is bad. When people in your game are doing
it, start raising relentlessly preflop until they do something
about it.
Trait No. 3. Tight Player
Bet-Sizing Tells
Overview
Tight players often have a cluster of bet-sizing tells that are
fairly consistent from player to player.
In all cases, a large bet indicates a strong hand that the tight
player doesn’t want to fold. There’s a difference between what
large absolute bet sizes mean versus large relative sizes.
A large absolute size means a bet that is large for the game,
regardless of the current pot size. This varies with stakes and
from game to game, but I’m talking about a bet large enough
that you’ll see only one or two of similar size for the next fifty
hands or so.
A large relative bet size is one that’s large for the size of
the pot, but not necessarily large in an absolute sense. An
abnormally large preflop raise, for instance.
A large absolute bet means a huge hand. In virtually all
cases you have zero fold equity when your tight opponent
makes a bet like this. On the river it means a lock hand (i.e.,
the nuts or a big full house). On the flop it means a hand the
player wants to get all-in with. A set, maybe top two, maybe
even just an overpair of aces on a dry board in a bloated
multiway pot.
Sure, tight players like to fold. But when they have a hand
they’re willing to make a large bet with, they rarely fold.
Large relative bets are a little different. Tight players make
large relative bets when they have a strong, but vulnerable,
TIGHT PLAYER BET-SIZING TELLS 35
hand. Queens or jacks preflop is the most obvious example.
Top pair on a coordinated flop is another one. The player is
thinking, “My hand is likely best, but I don’t want anyone to
draw out on me, so let me just bet big and take it down now. ”
Small bets are more the norm for most small stakes players.
A typical live small stakes player will make bets (relative to
the pot size) that are smaller than they probably should be. As
the norm, small bets often don’t tell you a lot about your
opponent’s hand. But a small bet made in a situation where a
tight player would have made a large bet with a big hand is
telling. It denies a big hand, and it often marks the intention to
fold to a raise.
Adjustment Summary
The main adjustment is that you fold most hands to
unusually large bets. Since large absolute bets mean very large
hands, you rarely have to pay off on the river against a tight
player with these bet-sizing tells.
Here’s an example of a hand a student of mine played
where he used this bet-sizing tell to find a fold in what might
otherwise have been a tough situation.
It was a $2-$5 live game with $1,500 stacks. My student
opened for $20 with J-J. There were a few folds, and then a
tight player 3-bet to $60 from one off the button. The blinds
folded, and my student called.
A preflop 3-bet from a tight player usually means business,
but with stacks this deep, it’s easily worth $40 to see a flop.
With shallow stacks, (less than $500) I might consider folding
the jacks.
The pot is $127. The flop came 9-6-3 rainbow. My student
checked, and then this player bet $150.
36 PLAYING THE PLAYER
This bet size is unusually large. Sure, one could argue that
the deep stacks might call for larger bet sizes early in the hand,
but it’s unlikely the player was thinking this way. This bet is
both relatively large (bigger than pot) and fairly large in an
absolute sense. It strongly indicates an overpair, and likely a
fairly good one.
My student folded, and the fellow showed K-K.
If you think about it, this should have been a dream
scenario for the guy with K-K. He flopped an overpair on a
dry board against a slightly smaller overpair. If the player
were playing a balanced strategy free from bet-sizing tells and
with appropriate bluffing sprinkled in, my student would have
been forced to call some bets with his second-best hand. But
because the bet-sizing tell is quite reliable (combined with a
strategy that doesn’t include enough bluffing), my student was
able to make this “tight” fold quite easily.
The key here really is the bet size. With a hand like A-K,
the tight player may still have bet the flop, but he would
undoubtedly have bet less than the pot size. I would expect a
bet size closer to $70 with A-K from this type of player.
While folding to the big bets is the most useful adjustment,
and it’s the one that will arise most frequently, you can also
adjust in two other ways against a player who gives off so
much information with his bet sizing.
The first adjustment only works when you’re very deep.
The $1,500 stacks of the above example are about the right
size for this play. When the big bet comes relatively early in
the hand, such that there’s still a lot of money behind, you can
call knowing that you’re behind, but expecting to be able to
bluff successfully enough cards to show a profit.
Let’s change the above example slightly. Instead of a 9-6-3
rainbow flop, let’s say it was T? 7?5? with two spades. With
a $150 flop bet my read doesn’t change—it’s still likely an
overpair. But instead of J-J, let’s suppose you held 5? 4? .
TIGHT PLAYER BET-SIZING TELLS 37
This gives you bottom pair, a bad backdoor straight draw, and
a backdoor club draw. Your draws themselves don’t really
warrant calling such a large bet (unless you were 100 percent
certain you could stack your opponent if you improved). But
you have some fairly important information about your
opponent’s hand—namely, he’s likely to have an overpair and
fairly unlikely to have a flush draw, straight draw, or a set.
The preflop 3-bet combined with the oversized flop bet
screams overpair.
If the turn is a spade, you can represent a flush. If the turn
is a 5, you can likely win a big pot. If the turn is 6 or 8, you’ll
pick up outs, and the card may be scary enough (particularly
in conjunction with a scary river card like one that puts a
possible flush or four to a straight on board) that you can force
a fold.
So it’s the fact that your opponent is marked with likely at
most one pair, along with the fact that the board can turn
scary, along with the fact that you have plenty of money
behind that makes playing against the big bet worthwhile.
The final adjustment you can make against an opponent
with these bet-sizing tells is to bluff-raise small bets in
situations where your opponent almost certainly would have
made a bigger bet with a big hand.
For example, you are in position, and your opponent has
been betting a king-high board. The third flush card comes in
on the river, and your opponent makes a bet that is quite small
both in an absolute sense and especially in comparison to the
pot size. You’ve seen this player make big bets with big hands
in the past. This bet is, therefore, likely to be a blocking bet
with a hand like A-K. Your opponent doesn’t want to check
his hand, because he fears that you will make a big bet and he
won’t know whether you’re bluffing or not. So instead, he
makes a small bet, reasoning that you would raise only with
the goods.
38 PLAYING THE PLAYER
Pitfalls To Avoid
These bet-sizing tells are very natural. Bet big with big
hands. Bet smaller with smaller hands and with bluffs.
Because they are so natural, many players exhibit them
faithfully. When I play live no-limit, I see these tells in every
session, and they frequently help me to find the right play.
The main pitfall, obviously, is that some players may
reverse these tells on you. In particular, many hands arise
where it becomes clear by the river that neither player is likely
to have a strong hand. Some savvy players have learned to
overbet the pot in these situations, knowing that the
uncommonly large bet looks like strength. Likewise, some
players have learned to make small bets when they perceive
their opponent to have a weak range of hands. The small bet is
designed to look like a blocking bet and induce a bluff-raise.
You’re unlikely to see either of these plays if your main
game is $1-$2, $1-$3, or $2-$5 live no-limit hold’em. But
there are players around who will try them, so be aware.
It might have occurred to you at this point that you should
be making these plays (overbet bluffing and betting small to
induce bluff-raises). I caution against making either play.
Betting small to induce a bluff raise, in particular, is a fool’s
errand at small stakes live games because the vast majority of
players won’t even consider taking the bait. The overbet bluff
has somewhat better prospects, but many small stakes players
call too often when “obviously” beaten, so be careful.
Against tough opponents these two plays should absolutely
be part of your playbook. (Later in the book I discuss the
players you should be trying these plays out against.)
The other pitfall is that sometimes an overbet shove on the
flop (or less commonly the turn) from a tight player means a
big draw rather than a big made hand. It’s something to be
aware of.
TIGHT PLAYER BET-SIZING TELLS 39
Who Exhibits This Trait?
Most small stakes regulars who play on the tight side show
these bet-sizing tells. These players tend to be risk-averse, so
it comes naturally to them to bet more when they think they’re
likely ahead. Large bets early in a hand are often intended to
end the hand, and this desire to end hands prematurely stems
from a generalized fear of being outdrawn or outplayed.
Players who play from fear tend to be a bit nitty.
These tells are universal enough that I will expect any tight
regular-type player to exhibit them until I observe otherwise.
(E.g., I see the player make a large bluff or a bold value bet
with a marginal hand.)
The Bottom Line
Amateur players betray a lot of information in their bet
sizes. Big bets in an absolute sense are unlikely to be bluffs
and quite likely to be very big hands. Big bets in a relative, but
not absolute, sense are likely to be good hands the player fears
getting outdrawn. Small bets frequently don’t tell you much,
but a small bet made in a situation that would usually elicit a
big bet from a big hand often indicates a willingness to fold.
Trait No. 4. Bet-Folding
NOTE: The information in this section is extremely important.
Reread it two dozen times if you have to.
So far the tight player traits we’ve discussed have been fairly
straightforward. Tight players don’t like to felt without the
nuts. They like to fold weak hands early on, even after they’ve
put a little money in the pot. And tight players often vary their
bet sizes according to their hand strength due to the fear of
getting outdrawn and the fear of betting the worse hand.
Altogether these traits point to the same set of adjustments.
Don’t call their big bets. The big bets are saved for big hands,
so calling it off becomes very bad. Don’t value bet too thinly
either. Tight players’ threshold for calling down is higher than
most players, so you can’t get much value from mediumstrength
hands.
Bluff more on the small and medium bets. These players
will abandon small pots frequently, so take lots of stabs. Use
preflop raises with weak hands to build pots before you steal
them.
With very tight, or nitty, players, this is nearly the entire
recipe to destroying them. Never pay them off. In fact,
basically never play a big pot with them even if you’re the one
betting. Instead, play lots of hands preflop and take frequent
stabs at the small and medium pots. Since these players aren’t
actively competing for the small pots, you’ll pick up far more
than your share. And because you’re not losing big pots in the
process, you’ll have a strong, consistent edge.
BET-FOLDING 41
TAG, or tight-aggressive, players are a little tougher to
beat. Why? Because they are also taking frequent stabs at the
small and medium pots. Like nits, TAGs are tight early in
hands, and you can steal blinds and win pots on the flop with
continuation bets. But these players also try to steal blinds and
make continuation bets. Without taking things to the next
level, it’s hard to get an edge. They won’t spew in big pots,
and they’ll at least compete for the small pots.
To get an edge, you have to understand a key TAG
concept, the bet-fold.
Overview
Bet-folding is simple. It’s betting with the intention of
folding to a raise. It’s raising preflop with the intention of
folding to a 3-bet. Continuation betting the flop with
overcards, planning to fold if raised. Or it’s betting top pair for
value on the turn, again intending to fold to a raise.
Bet-folding is the TAG’s bread-and-butter play. In fact, it
nearly defines the archetype. These players are aggressive.
They bet frequently. But they’re also tight. They fold
frequently. The only way to simultaneously bet frequently and
fold frequently is to bet-fold. If you replace the bet-folds with
bet-calls, you become loose. If you replace the bet-folds with
check-folds, you become a nit.
Theoretically, bet-folding is a perfectly legitimate line.
Why would you choose to bet-fold a hand? Well, let’s separate
the two actions. First comes the bet. Why would you bet a
hand?
There are three reasons to bet in no-limit hold’em, but the
most important one is to get worse hands to call. The value
bet. You think you have the better hand, and you want your
opponent to call with a worse hand. A worse hand can be a
42 PLAYING THE PLAYER
weaker made hand. It can be a draw. Or it can even be a float
or a bluff. (If you’re hoping to get bluffed, then you are
betting not to get called by a worse hand, but to get raised by a
worse hand. It’s theoretically similar.)
Say you bet top pair on the turn. Generally you would do so
only if you thought you would be called the majority of the
time by a worse hand. For instance, if you bet A-K on a A-7-
3-Q board, you would be expecting that more than half the
time you are called, your hand is ahead.
Why is this? Because you’re proposing an even-money bet
with your opponent. I’ll put up $100. You put up $100. We’ll
see another card and see who wins. This bet is profitable if
you win it more than half the time. (With cards to come, this
half the time threshold is not hard-and-fast because there are
other considerations that affect the total value of the bet. But
50 percent is still a decent place to start analyzing a bet.)
Note that you’re merely proposing a bet. Your opponent
has the option to accept or reject it. To be profitable, you have
to win more than half the time your opponent accepts. The
times your opponent rejects it are not relevant.
(Again, when your opponent rejects the bet, i.e., folds, you
eliminate the chance you’d have been outdrawn which, of
course, has some value. But in no-limit hold’em, this chance
usually doesn’t affect the value of the bet too much. In nolimit,
bets tend to be fairly large compared to the size of the
pot. And in hold’em, because it’s a community card game,
hands that are ahead on the turn usually don’t get outdrawn.
So in no-limit hold’em, you’re making a large bet to secure
against a small chance of being outdrawn in a pot that’s
roughly the same size as the bet. It has value, but the average
player overestimates the value. Put another way, for most nolimit
players, the emotional impact of getting outdrawn looms
larger than the financial reality of it.)
BET-FOLDING 43
So we’re betting because we think that roughly more than
half the time we’ll get called by a worse hand.
Then we get raised. With most players, this raise carries a
ton of new information. Against many small-stakes players, it
means we’re beaten with near certainty. Thus, a fold. With the
information we started the betting round knowing, we had a
bet. But then with the new information of a raise, we have a
fold. Bet-fold.
Bet-folding is an incredibly valuable tool against loose,
non-aggressive opponents. Loose players love to call bets with
weak hands. They also tend to raise only with strong hands. So
there’s a wide range of bad hands that they’ll call value bets
with. But when they raise, they really mean business. The betfold
perfectly exploits the predictable traits of this common
bad player archetype.
In fact, it performs so well that TAGs often learn to live on
the bet-fold line alone. They have developed essentially two
poker skills. First, they’ve learned not to overplay marginal
hands. They play tight preflop, and they don’t build big pots
with iffy hands. Second, they abuse the bet-fold line to exploit
lesser players. In most no-limit hold’em games, these two
skills alone are enough to generate a consistent edge.
If you are like most people whom I expect to read this
book, these are likely your two greatest poker skills as well.
You know how not to aimlessly spew off your stack. And you
know how to bet and fold to a raise. Pay attention, because
you’re about to learn how to exploit yourself and the legion of
other players who play just like you do.
Adjustment Summary
An over-reliance on bet-fold lines creates unbalanced hand
ranges. What’s an unbalanced range?
44 PLAYING THE PLAYER
At any given point in a hand, your opponent should be able
to name a range of hands you could have based on your action
to that point. Say you raise preflop and someone calls. The
flop comes Q-9-4 rainbow. Your opponent checks, and you
bet two-thirds of the pot. From your opponent’s perspective,
what can you have?
You can have top pair or an overpair. Less likely (but,
critically, not ruled out by your actions thus far), you can have
a set or two pair. You can have an unimproved pocket pair or
a pair of nines. You can have a straight draw—open-ended or
gutshot. You can have a missed hand such as A-8 or an even
weaker one like 7-6.
Now for the $64,000 question. Is this range balanced, or is
it unbalanced?
The answer is that it could be either, and it depends on
exactly how many weak hands you tend to play this way (raise
preflop, bet on this flop). An unbalanced range is one that is
too heavily weighted toward one hand type or another.
Specifically, it’s a range that can be exploited by taking a
single, simple action with nearly any hand.
What do I mean by that?
Let’s assume that instead of being a TAG, you are a loose
and maniacal player. You will raise preflop with any two
cards, and your opponents know that about you. And when
checked to on the flop, you will bet every time. If you play
this way, then your range on the flop is extremely unbalanced.
You might say to yourself, “Unbalanced? If a guy can have
any two cards at any time, isn’t that balanced? You can never
put him on a hand.” This would be true, except for one simple
fact. Most hands miss the flop. When you’re up against
someone who can have two random cards on any flop, the vast
majority of the time, your opponent will have a hand that most
players would consider to be weak—no pair or one small pair.
BET-FOLDING 45
So if you were to put this player’s hands into one of three
buckets—weak, medium, and strong—you’d have a lot hands
in the weak bucket, some in the medium bucket, and a
relatively small percentage of hands in the strong bucket.
Any range that is unbalanced in this way is guaranteed to
be exploitable, and the exploit is simple. You bet or raise
frequently against the range. If the player has weak hands and
tends to call with them, then you value bet very thinly and
relentlessly. If the player has weak hands and tends to fold
them, you bluff a lot.
Ranges can also be unbalanced in the other direction, with
too many strong hands. When your opponent has too many
strong hands, the exploit is also simple. You fold. This is the
problem nitty players have. They create hand ranges that are
unbalanced to strong hands, and as a result you can simply
fold whenever they want to put money in the pot. Keep in
mind that to create an overly strong range, you must
necessarily fold most of your weak and medium hands. Hence,
nitty players fold too much in small and medium pots, and the
strong ranges that remain are unbalanced and exploitable.
Balanced ranges contain a mix of weak, medium, and
strong hands. The exact weighting among these buckets
depends on how much money is in the pot. Generally
speaking, early in the hand and in small pots, your ranges
should have higher weightings of weak hands. And later in
hands when there’s been a lot of action, your ranges should
have higher weightings of strong hands.
And so the bottom line. Early on and in small pots, more
weak hands. Late and in big pots, more strong hands. But to
build a balanced range, you want the mix to be unexploitable.
You want to have enough strong hands in your range early on
to deter opponents from simply bluffing like crazy. And you
want enough weak hands in your range late that you can be
46 PLAYING THE PLAYER
bluffing and therefore can force your opponents to pay you
off.
So that’s the gist of the difference between balanced and
unbalanced ranges. When your opponent’s range is
unbalanced, you can nearly always take one particular action
and expect it to be right. When your opponent’s range is
balanced, you can’t do that.
And now back to what I said in the first sentence of this
section. An over-reliance on bet-fold lines creates unbalanced
ranges. Why is that?
The bigger the pot, the stronger your hand range should be
to remain balanced. Betting makes the pot bigger. Thus, your
betting hands should be, on average, stronger than your
checking hands. Duh, you say, right?
Here’s the thing. TAGs have learned that they can exploit
players who fold too much by reversing this basic principle. In
many situations they bet virtually all of their hands that have
no value whatsoever, relying on all the folds to turn a profit.
The only hands they check are ones that have some showdown
value. Here’s a specific example.
It’s a tight $1-$2 game like one you might find online.
Everyone folds to a TAG who raises to $6 from one off the
button. You call in the small blind.
The flop is K? 7?5?. You check. The TAG bets $10. What
does this bet tell you about the hand the TAG might have?
Very little. Most TAGs would look at a flop of this
texture—rainbow with two low cards and a single, disjointed
high card—and think, “Great flop to continuation bet.” TAGs
will bet this flop with hands like 9-8, A-6, 3-3, and so forth.
In fact, if such a TAG were to actually check this flop, I
would give him some credit for a hand. While he might be
sandbagging with a monster like K-K, more likely I’d expect a
check to be a medium-strength pair like 7-6 or A-5. Betting
these medium pairs rarely folds out better hands and also
BET-FOLDING 47
rarely gets calls from weaker hands. So checking makes a
good bit of sense.
Back to the betting range, the TAG has a mix of strong
hands (kings mostly) and a lot of junk (total air). Couple this
with a wide preflop opening range from one off the button,
and we’re looking at mostly junk. That is, an unbalanced
range.
The TAG is planning to bet-fold many, if not most, of his
betting hands on the flop. So what should you do? (Hint: It
starts with an ‘r’.)
I remember a time when raising continuation bets was a
cutting edge play. The TAG regulars in the online games were
all merrily continuation betting the flop, relying on their fold
equity against unthinking players and other TAGs to make the
play profitable. And then some sharp cookie would come
along and start raising continuation bets. For a while, these
sharpies absolutely cleaned up. They vacuumed up pots on the
flop like crazy.
This play is not cutting edge anymore. The best players all
know about it and use it, and they have adopted countermeasures.
But just because it isn’t cutting edge doesn’t mean it
isn’t still profitable when used intelligently.
More importantly, every time one of your opponents makes
a continuation bet, you should be thinking, “Is his range
unbalanced? Do I have an auto-raise here?” More often than
you might expect, the answer to both questions is yes.
Raising continuation bets isn’t the only play here. TAGs
bet-fold in many other situations as well. On the turn, TAGs
learn to bet-fold with top pair. They bet top pair, but then
assume when raised that top pair is no good. They bet-fold the
river too. Any time your opponent can be bet-folding many
hands, you have a potential auto-raise situation.
48 PLAYING THE PLAYER
How do you identify bet-fold situations, besides the fairly
obvious example of the player who raises a wide range preflop
and then continuation bets all of the air?
It requires some hand reading skills.
You’re looking for situations where your opponents have a
fairly weak betting range. One easy way to spot these
situations against some TAGs is to use bet-sizing tells.
Remember that many players will make extra-large bets on the
late streets when they have a monster. Therefore, when these
players don’t make a large bet, their betting range is weighted
more toward weaker hands.
You can find these situations even against players who
don’t exhibit bet-sizing tells. Here’s an example.
In my book How To Read Hands At No-Limit Hold’em, I
talk about the limiting turn call. The idea is that a flat call,
rather than a raise, on the turn often denies a very strong hand.
This is because the board is usually at least a little scary on the
turn, and most players with strong hands will want to charge
opponents to draw out.
It’s a $2-$5 game with $1,500 stacks. You raise to $20
from early position with A?J?. Two players call from behind,
and the big blind calls.
The flop comes Q?8?7?. The blind checks, and you bet
$60 into the $82 pot. One player calls behind, and the other
two players fold. The caller is a TAG player who bets rivers
for value thinly when checked to.
The turn is the T? . You bet $150 into the $212 pot. Your
opponent calls.
The river is the 7?, making the final board
Q?8?7?T? 7?. You check, and your opponent bets $200 into
the $512 pot. After the $200 bet, there’s still over $1,000
behind.
What does this betting range look like? Except for
specifically 8-7, it’s unlikely to include a full house. Why?
BET-FOLDING 49
Because he almost certainly would have raised either the
flop or the turn if he held a set. The board on the turn is
getting scary. There’s a possible flush draw out, and lots of
straight draws are available. Most players would want to
“charge the draws” with a big hand on a board like this one.
Yet he didn’t raise. This turn call limits the top end of his
range. Unless he’s a little bit crazy, he doesn’t have Q-Q, T-T,
8-8, 7-7, J-9, or Q-T.
He’s more likely to have a hand like A-Q, K-Q, Q-J, or a
draw. All the draws missed, which makes this a relatively
weak betting range on the river. He’s almost certainly
planning to bet-fold the river with a lot of his range.
This is a situation where betting out as a bluff on the river
might be less effective than check-raise bluffing. If you simply
bet the river, I’d often expect to be called by hands like A-Q
and K-Q. But if you check the river, you can likely get your
opponent off these same hands with a big check-raise. And
checking A-J isn’t too bad since it’s conceivable you might
even win a showdown with the hand.
The key to the play is that our opponent has done
something in the hand that denies the strongest holdings. Any
bets our opponent makes after that point will frequently be
bet-folds.
If you haven’t done so, and you’d like more help
identifying bet-fold situations, read my book How To Read
Hands At No-Limit Hold’em.
Pitfalls To Avoid
There are a few pitfalls here. First, some players simply
don’t bet-fold very often. Once they put money out there, they
like to defend it. Bet-folding frequently is not at all a universal
test
.
.
.
.
.
.
test
.
.
testing testing
.
.
.
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and a bet on the flop will easily pick up the pot. More often than
not, they’ll bet the flop. What you can do when you don’t flop
a hand is to min-raise your opponent on the flop. This forces
your opponent to have a hand that he’s willing to go all-in with
or your flop raise will take down the pot. As we’ve touched on
plenty of times before, forcing your opponent to have the very
strong hand he is representing is more often than not a good
thing to impose upon him.
For some of the very aggressive players you may face, it’s often a
good idea to just call an active 3 bettor when you have a hand like
AA or KK. Many aggressive players will bet nearly every flop after
their opponents call their 3 bet. Oftentimes, they’ll do the same
on the turn, as well. I don’t recommend making it your default
play to just call with hands like AA and KK, but trapping with
those hands and letting your opponent hang himself is definitely
a move worth adding to your arsenal.
You should also be able to just leave the table. Many pros have
too much ego to admit this, but unless the game has a mega-fish
or two at the table, why even be at the table?
I’m not ashamed to admit that I’ve walked away from countless
games where the weaker player at the table wasn’t bad enough to
make it worthwhile to deal with the aggressive 3 bettor. Some
may say that doing such a thing makes you a lesser player.
But this is just not true. Think of it in terms of owning a small
business. You have a minor client who frustrates you immensely
despite his representing a very small piece of your revenue pie.
Is he worth the aggravation? Probably not.
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It’s no different at the poker table when you have an aggressive
3 bettor who is annoying you. If you count the extra energy you
have to put into that table which can distract you from making
better decisions at your other tables, it can even be a highly
unprofitable situation. It’s best to simply set your ego aside and
move on to a more enjoyable and profitable table.
The most important thing to realize is aggressive 3 bettors are
representing strength when statistically they can’t be that strong.
People’s first reaction is to become timid and even scared when
they are facing an opponent who is very aggressive. Or the
opposite happens and they take it personally and wind up quickly
on tilt.
In either of these scenarios, you should say to yourself, “Here
this guy goes again trying to represent something we all know he
can’t have. This is too funny. I’ll just start making him pay for
this by putting the onus on him to have a hand.”
5. Keeping the pot small pre-flop
Keeping the pot small can be beneficial in many ways. For
instance, it can keep you from getting gray hair, a rapid heart
beat, a sweaty brow, nausea and a condition known as “busted
computer equipment.”
Keeping the pot small is something I like to do against better
opponents for two reasons:
• First, there aren’t too many occasions where you really want
the pot to become overly large.
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• Second, when you are in a pot against another strong
opponent, you are ultimately just passing money back and
forth (and paying rake for the privilege), so why introduce
larger swings into your game?
Keeping the pot small starts before the flop. If you make a raise
pre-flop to 4 or 5 times the size of the big blind, the pot will
swell rather quickly after the flop. Raising to 3 or 3.5 times the
size of the big blind before the flop is pretty common.
But I like to make raises of only 2 times the big blind, on
occasion. I typically do this when I am raising the players in the
blinds who also happen to be good players. If I’m against a poor
player, I’ll typically make a much larger pre flop raise because I
want to play bigger pots against opponents over whom I have a
substantial edge.
One reason why I like to make my raises only 2 times the big
blind is it’s a cheap attempt to take down the pot pre-flop. If
you’re only risking 2 blinds to win the 1.5 blinds already in the
pot (the small and big blinds combined), your steal attempt
only needs to work about 57 percent of the time to show an
immediate profit.
While I don’t have hard evidence that proves or disproves how
often a steal attempt works, from experience I can confidently say
your steal will work at least this often, given that some percentage
of the time you’ll have a very strong hand that will take down
the pot pre-flop by making an additional re-raise after your
opponent re-raised you.
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Another reason I like to keep the pot smaller against tough
opponents is it takes away from their interest in the pot and they
are less likely to play you as tough as they might otherwise. It’s
human nature to expend more mental energy on situations that
are important to people. When the pot is small, most opponents
seem much less inclined to take the pot seriously post-flop. As
a result, you have the advantage of playing someone who isn’t
focusing as well as they could. Meanwhile, you’re giving it 110
percent, so there’s a built in advantage to keeping the pot small.
Keeping the pots small cuts down on variance, which is always
something you should strive for when treating your poker like a
business. But I don’t recommend passing up edges for the sake of
reducing your variance. If you’re following my recommendation
of playing on a conservative bankroll, there’s no need to concern
yourself with taking less profitable steps to reduce variance. But
if you can cut down on your variance in a way that also doesn’t
hurt your win rate, you should.
I definitely recommend looking for spots where you can keep
the pot small, but never at the expense of your win rate or your
strategy as a whole. Keeping the pot small is a nice tool to have
against tougher opponents, but don’t let this concept seep into
your overall game.
6. Utilizing position post-flop
At this point everyone knows that being in position is critical to
being successful at the poker tables. There’s a ton of information
on the subject — perhaps too much.
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It’s easy to get bogged down with too much information on the
subject, so my intent is to simplify things. Let’s just reduce things
down to a few powerful tips that can help make you a much
tougher player.
Here are my top 5 ways to utilize position:
A. Don’t give up easily on the flop. Too often, lower stakes
players have a tendency to lose hope when they don’t flop
a strong hand or strong draw on the flop. They’ll call a
pre-flop raise in position with a hand like AhTh, and if
they miss the flop, they’ll fold to a continuation bet from
the pre-flop raiser. This is far too weak and is not utilizing
position very well.
One thing to remember is that if you have a hand like AhTh
and the flop comes down as all under cards, there are still a
lot of good things that can happen by simply calling the flop
if your opponent bets.
First, your opponent may decide to check the turn to you,
in which case you can usually pick up the pot with a twothirds-
pot turn bet. Second, you may hit an ace or a 10 on
the turn and improve to the best hand. Sometimes you’ll
hit an ace or a 10 and will still not have the best hand. In
these cases you may wind up paying off hands that have you
beat. But the risk of this is not so high that I would advocate
folding to a flop bet when you miss.
You may also decide to raise the flop when your opponent
continuation bets into your hand. This play is very effective
when in position because your opponent now has to risk
most of his stack by making a re-raise on the flop if he
does not have a strong hand himself and wants to contest
the pot. If he simply calls your flop raise, he will be doing
so with the fear that you may bet the turn and river. This
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will make even some of his stronger hands appear to shrink
up. When your opponent is out of position and facing a
flop raise, it is not a fun position for him to be in unless
he has a strong hand or a strong draw. And let’s not forget
that it’s much easier for him to have a weak hand than a
strong hand from a mathematical standpoint. In poker,
people are unlikely to have the hand they are representing
(especially on the flop) so it’s almost never a bad idea to
put your opponents to a tough decision by raising them
on the flop when in position.
B. Force your opponents to tighten up pre-flop. The best way
to keep your opponents from becoming the table captain is
to re-raise them frequently pre-flop. If you have position
on a loose and aggressive player, making re-raises pre-flop
will discourage him from trying to run over the table.
I recommend re-raising your opponents with most of the
playable hands you’re dealt. Here is the range I would most
likely re raise with: 22+, all suited connectors (no gaps) and
any two cards 10 or higher.
Additionally, if for meta-game reasons you determine that
it would be a good time to re-raise your opponent, you can
broaden this range to any two cards. I wouldn’t recommend
broadening your range that wide on more than an occasional
basis, however.
You want to be careful not to get carried away with this or
your opponent will likely begin to suspect you are getting
out of line and make adjustments. It’s a balancing act. You
rarely want to be obviously loose or tight. One of the best
compliments you can get is when some of your peers say you
are tight, while others say you are loose. That’s when you
really know you are a mystery to your opponents.
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C. Run more multi-street bluffs. When you’re the preflop
raiser and you have position in the hand against your
opponent, you may want to consider betting all three streets
if your opponent appears weak. Too often people will not
put your average tight/aggressive player to the real test. They
will bet the flop, and if called, shut down from there unless
they have a big hand or a big draw.
When out of position, most tight-aggressive players will
simply check and then call your flop bet. They are unlikely to
call all three streets unless they improve their hand. Against
these types of opponents, it’s important to frequently bet
all three streets as a bluff.
Far more often than not, when someone who is out of
position checks and then calls your bet on the flop, he does
not intend to call a bet from you on all three streets. They
typically are calling a flop bet and sometimes a turn bet in
an attempt to “keep you honest.” But they are very unlikely
to check and then call all three streets. Take advantage of
this leak in their games and make them pay for their lack of
a better strategy.
D. Value bet thinner on the river. One huge advantage of
being in position is that you get to make the last move in the
hand. Getting to act after your opponent is a huge advantage
because the size of the pot on the river makes it by far the
most important street to play well.
Too often, people will timidly check the river even though they
know down deep they probably have the best hand. For many,
the fear is they will get check raised on the river and not know
what to do. For others, they simply dread being put to a difficult
decision. Because the pot is typically large by the time you reach
the river, they’ll become afraid of making a mistake.
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You have to turn the fact that many people become scared
on the river into an advantage. After all, if you are scared,
chances are so is everyone else in those situations. If you can
come to grips with your fears and confidently play the river,
you will by default have an advantage on the river.
When I have a good-but-not-great hand on the river (like a
top pair, top kicker), I ask myself, “Does my opponent have
a hand like two pair or better, and if he did, would he play
it this way?”
Chances are that if you’re confident that, given the action
in the hand, your opponent is unlikely to have a hand worse
than yours, you should bet. Betting thinly also has the added
advantage of balancing your range. Playing the river out
of position is a ton of fun against opponents who only bet
the nuts and bluffs on the river. Those who do this make
decisions a heck of a lot easier.
Remember, the river is the street where the pot is the
largest. If you’re going to utilize position in the hand to
your maximum advantage, you need to learn to play the
river well. Position is good to have pre- flop. It’s very good
to have on the flop. It’s great to have on the turn. And it’s
outstanding to have on the river.
There is no more important time to have position than on
the river. Take some deep breaths, get focused, and if you
have the best hand, don’t be afraid to release the hounds on
your opponent.
E. Utilize turn raises to get to showdown: Oftentimes you
flop a medium-strength hand and will choose not to make
a continuation bet. This is a perfectly reasonable option,
especially against aggressive opponents who like to check
raise you on the flop. There’s nothing more frustrating than
flopping a medium-strength hand only to get check raised
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by an aggressive opponent and not having any great options
to look forward to.
After checking the flop back, your opponent will almost
always bet the turn. One way I utilize position is to make
a smallish raise on the turn. A raise of about 2- 2.5x your
opponent’s bet is about right.
This play accomplishes a couple of things. First, it can
sometimes induce a fold from a better hand if your
opponent fears he is beat and will have to face an additional
bet on the river. It also typically freezes up your opponent
and he will be unlikely to put in further action without the
nuts or near nuts.
Had you simply called the turn, your opponent would’ve been
able to make a bet the size of his choosing on the river. Not
only will you be facing a larger bet than the size of your small
turn raise, but you lose the chance of folding out a better hand
or charging a draw. Additionally, you are now faced with a
situation where you have to make a less informed decision.
But since you raised the turn, he is unlikely to bet the river
without a very strong hand. Since you have no idea where
you are at in the hand by calling the turn, this is a good way
to get information on the cheap.
It also can serve as a means of extracting value when you have
the best hand. Sometimes your opponent will lead the turn
with a draw and call your turn raise hoping to improve. If
they don’t improve, you can show down your weak made
hand and feel glad you made a turn raise when he shows you
a busted draw.
If you’re going to be a successful poker player, you have
to know how to effectively utilize position. Playing pots in
position is statistically proven to be the main source of profit
in poker.
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When I was first learning the game, I was watching poker
on TV, trying to pick up some tips. The broadcaster asked
Phil Ivey about the importance of position. Ivey said, “It’s
everything. If I had to play every hand out of position, I
couldn’t beat my grandmother.”
7. Finding good board textures to steal the pot
on the flop
Against opponents who do not think on a world-class level, you
can increase your win rate by stealing the pot on board textures
that make it unlikely they will have a strong hand.
Stealing the pot when you have nothing is not only a lot of fun,
but also an essential element to becoming a professional. All top
players take away a lot of pots that most players do not. That is a
big reason why they’re able to make so much money.
You want to look for boards where it’s unlikely your opponent
has a hand that can withstand a lot of pressure. My favorite
boards to steal the pot are:
• Ace high flops: You may not win them right away by bluffing
the flop, but if you have the heart to bet all three streets,
you are likely to induce a fold from your average TAG (tight
aggressive) opponent.
• Flops with one face card and two little cards: A good
example of this is a Q62 rainbow flop. When you’re out
of position, a check raise will work often enough to be
profitable. When in position, a flop or turn raise will usually
be enough to take them off all their marginal holdings.
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• Draw heavy boards when in position: The pre-flop raiser
bets into you on a 7h8hTh board and you look to steal by
raising the flop. This will often induce folds from hands as
strong as an over-pair against TAG opponents.
• Paired boards: Any time there is a pair on the board, it
becomes highly unlikely your opponent has a strong hand.
Flops like 994 present a great opportunity to take away the
pot with a flop raise or check raise.
Remember, you don’t want to try and steal every single time
on these types of boards. These are the types of boards where I
recommend tossing in a raise maybe every third or fourth time
you come across them, unless your opponent is noticeably weaktight.
If you try and steal too often, you risk being too inclined
to bluff and therefore becoming exploitable.
I never recommend doing anything in poker that makes
your game obvious for people to identify the type of player you
are. If your opponents are able to easily identify you as a tight
player, then they’re easily going to make good decisions against
you. Same goes for playing too loose. The trick is to find that
perfect balance.
It can be very frustrating when you try and steal pots on these
types of boards, yet your opponents keep having strong hands
and won’t fold. But it is important to continue to apply the
pressure to your opponents and not let a few failed attempts
cause you to lose heart.
This is one of the biggest mental hurdles to overcome in poker.
It’s easy to slip into a passive style when things are going poorly
at the tables and you keep running into big hands. Always
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remember that math will not let you down in the long run.
Raising your opponents on these types of boards will show a
profit in the long run. You are generally getting a pretty good
price on your bluff and your opponents simply will not have a
strong enough hand to withstand the pressure of a flop raise on
these types of boards.
Say the pot is $90 on the flop and your opponent bets $60. If you
raise to $180, you will be risking $180 to win $150 (the pot size
plus your opponent’s bet). Assuming you have no outs, you only
need him to fold 54.5 percent of the time. {($180)/($180+$150)}
= 54.5%. When you consider your opponents are highly unlikely
to have a hand on these types of boards, and you can sometimes
get bailed out with a favorable turn or river card, it is easy to see
why fighting for pots is such a good idea in these situations.
8. When to C bet as a bluff
and when to give up.
One of the most important aspects of no-limit hold ‘em is simply
knowing when to continuation bet and when to surrender the pot.
One sure way to leak a lot of money on the flop is to make a
continuation bet that has very little hope of working. There is
more to this game than knowing when to hold ‘em and when to
fold ‘em — you also need to know when it is best to simply punt.
Here is an example of when it is best to punt:
Let’s assume you are playing a 5/10 NL game, everyone has 100
big blind stacks and you raise from early position with Ah3h. The
button calls, everyone else folds and you go to the flop heads up.
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The flop comes 7s8s9c. You have ace high on a board that hits
a large portion of your opponents’ range and you have a three
out draw to top pair.
In this situation, I recommend punting to your opponent, no
questions asked. Here’s why:
• First, you have ace high with no draw to any hand that you’re
going to be excited about. Even an ace on the turn won’t
leave you feeling overly confident.
• Second, the types of hands your opponent will float your
pre-flop raise with are going to be excited to see a flop like
this. His typical hand range is going to consist of pocket
pairs and suited connectors. All of these hands are not going
anywhere on a flop like this.
• Third, even if he doesn’t have a hand that likes this flop,
there is a very good chance that if you did C bet, the button
will call your flop bet and look for a scary turn card so he
can represent a very big hand with a bet or a raise.
No matter how you slice it or dice it, your continuation bet is
not likely to work on this type of board.
The same principles apply whether you are in position or out
of position. But you should be more inclined to punt when
out of position in the hand. When you are in position, you
can expand slightly the number of boards on which you can
profitably continuation bet; however, it’s likely best to err on the
side of punting when the board is well-coordinated and highly
likely to have hit your opponents’ range of hands.
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The types of boards you definitely want make a continuation bet
on are boards where you have at least one of three things going
for you:
• The flop is dry and very unlikely to have hit your opponents’
range. A textbook example of this would be a K72 rainbow
flop.
• You have at least a 6 out draw to a hand you can be relatively
confident should you hit one of your 6 outs, that it will
improve to the best hand.
• The flop is ace high.
I don’t recommend these criteria as absolutes. There are certain
types of opponents where it may make sense to deviate from these
recommendations. There may also be game flow or meta-game
reasons that argue for deviating, as well.
But this should serve as a basic starting point and you can expand
the number of flops you continuation bet when it makes sense.
9. My philosophy on bluffs
When I’m trying to figure out if my opponent is bluffing, my
philosophy is simple: the earlier in the hand, the more likely
your opponent is bluffing; the later it is in the hand, the more
likely he is to have the hand he is representing.
Most successful players will play about 25 percent of the hands
they are dealt. When they play those 25 percent, they will typically
be raising or re-raising before the flop. Once upon a time, a
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raise of any kind — even pre-flop — meant you probably had a
strong hand. In fact, in some home games I have played in over
the years, it was viewed as unseemly to raise with a less-thanpremium
hand. I was actually told I would be asked to leave if
I continued to raise with hands that weren’t large pairs. They
said it was “proper” to just call pre-flop if I wanted to enter the
pot with anything less than a premium pocket pair. But a raise
nowadays can mean anything.
On the flop, a bet from the pre-flop raiser can still mean just
about anything, but it certainly carries more weight than a preflop
raise. Even a flop raise carries some weight, but it would
certainly be pretty weak if you assumed that every flop raise meant
that your opponent has a strong hand.
On the turn, the likelihood your opponent is bluffing goes down
sharply. There are many players (especially at the higher stakes)
who will bet the turn seemingly automatically, but a turn bet
should certainly be given respect from most opponents. Typically
opponents are betting the turn with their strong hands, their
strong draws and cards that offer good bluffing opportunities
like an ace. A turn raise generally means great strength, or at the
very least, the raiser picked up a very strong draw.
Once the river comes, no winning player will bluff as a standard
practice. Bluffs become much less frequent and strong hands
become the norm. There is plenty of room in poker to make wellconceived
and creative river bluffs, but they occur infrequently
at this stage in the hand.
People like to make bluffs when they are cheap, but are less
inclined to want to risk a significant portion of their stack with
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a late street bluff. No matter what else changes in poker, I feel
it will always hold true that bluffs are less and less likely as the
hand progresses.
10. Playing from early position
Playing hands from early position is something that is really
difficult to do profitably. I’m not sure anyone will ever truly be
able to quantify exactly how much better it is to have position in
a hand, but trust me when I tell you it is incredibly important.
Having position is so vital, in fact, that there are very few early
position hands that can be played profitably by anyone but the
world’s best players.
Here’s my breakdown of the most important things to keep in
mind when deciding what to do from early position:
A. You will be out of position to any opponent who calls you
pre-flop except the blinds. It’s very important to remember
that when you raise from early position, unless you steal the
blinds, you will almost always be out of position in the hand.
The small and big blinds typically will just fold. There is just
no reason for them to take a flop against someone with a
strong range while out of position unless they have a strong
hand themselves.
B. Play tight from early position unless the table is soft.
It’s typically best to play tight from early position unless
there’s at least one — and preferably two or more — very
weak opponents at the tables. An even better scenario would
be if the weak players are positioned in either the small or
big blind when you are deciding on whether or not to play
a hand from early position.
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If the table is pretty tough, and you’ll be out of position
against the only other weak opponent at the table if your
early position raise is called, you’re going to want to stick to
a tight range of pairs 77+ and suited connectors where both
cards are a ten or higher.
If you have a very weak (or several weak) opponents at the
table, you can consider playing a similar range of hands
that you would play from late position. While being out
of position is no fun, if you have an opportunity to get
involved with a playable hand against a very weak opponent,
I recommend taking that opportunity.
C. Respect your opponent’s re-raises. Most players tend
to get too involved in pots where they open raise from early
position and get re-raised by a tight-aggressive opponent.
They either overvalue their hand and are too willing to play
for stacks, or they tend to call too much and are forced to
play a marginal hand out of position which is almost surely
going to be a losing proposition for them.
You’ll come across savvy opponents who realize that early
position raisers have to have a very strong hand to play back
at them, and will re-raise them lightly. But those opponents
are few and far between, so I’m going to omit them from
this discussion.
With that in mind, you can put yourself in your opponent’s
shoes when you’re being re-raised after an early position
raise. Ask yourself, would I re-raise someone with a lessthan
premium hand a significant percentage of the time?
For most people the answer is no.
Apply that same logic to when you’re getting re-raised from
early position, and think about how many hands it really
makes sense to continue playing the pot with. For me, the
answer is not very many. Most people are re-raising a very
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strong range of AQ+ and QQ+. After you factor in the
positional disadvantage, it typically doesn’t make sense to
continue with any hands other than QQ-AA.
I know tossing a hand like AK or JJ to a mere re-raise may
sound incredibly weak, but my database of several million
hands of high- stakes poker has shown I can’t make money
with those hands after being re-raised from early position.
If you try and get all the money in pre-flop in these
situations, too often you run into aces and kings. If you just
call the re raise, you are out of position and cannot make
a confident decision post-flop unless you flop a monster
hand.
Keep in mind, this advice is being given under the
assumption you are being re-raised by a tight-aggressive
opponent. If the opponent is a very weak and/or loose
player, then you can play a hand like JJ or AK profitably. But
against a very tough and/or tight opponent, I recommend
just folding your hand and living to fight another day.
D. Don’t fall in love with small pairs. Unless the table has a
particularly weak opponent or several weak opponents, just
fold all pairs 22-66 from early position.
E. Bluffing gets more credit. If you are ever going to run
multi-street bluffs, early position is the time to do it. If
you sense your opponent is unlikely to have a strong hand,
I recommend firing all three streets. Any time you bet all
three streets, you’re going to make your opponents nervous.
This is especially so when your opponent factors in that
you raised from early position. The credibility of your
bluff jumps through the roof in these cases and I highly
recommend taking advantage.
You must be cognizant of the significance of playing hands
from early position, which will not put food on your table,
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but can take food off it. People lose a lot of money trying to
play too many pots and make too much happen from early
position.
Approach early position hands in the same way a football
team would approach playing defense. You’re rarely going
to win the game with defense, but you can sure lose it if you
aren’t careful.
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Chapter 2
FIVE EFFECTIVE PLAYS
THAT A!RE UNDERUTILIZED
1. Checking with a chip
One of my favorite plays is one I call, “checking with a chip.”
This play doesn’t come up very often. But when it does, it can be
a great way to get to a showdown or gain a wealth of information
on the cheap.
Let’s say we’re playing a 5/10 NL table and you are dealt AcJd
in the big blind. Your opponent raises from the button to $40.
Everyone else folds and you call in the big blind.
The pot is $85 and you go to the flop heads up, each with 100
big blind stacks. The flop comes down 6dJsQd. You decide to
lead out for $60 and your opponent calls. With the pot at $205
the turn brings a 2h and you again decide to bet the turn. You
bet $150 on the turn and your opponent calls.
The river brings a 3h and now you are in a very tricky spot on
the river. Your opponent can have any number of hands, and
all of your standard options don’t sound very good. If you make
a standard two-thirds pot bet on the river, you may very well
just be value betting yourself, as it’s a distinct possibility your
opponent has a better hand than you.
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If you check the river and your opponent bets, you have no idea
whether he has a busted draw like KT, T9, or a flush draw. He
might also be value betting a top-pair type of hand that narrowly
beats your second-pair top kicker. You may end up making the
right decision by either calling or folding, but it certainly won’t
be made with any great deal of confidence.
But what if you simply bet one chip ($10) on the river? If you
are called by a hand like KQ, then you only lost one big blind.
If he calls with a worse-made hand, he likely would’ve checked
the river if checked to, or folded to a two-thirds pot bet on the
river. You end up $10 richer in those cases.
Given the action in the hand so far, it is very unlikely that your
opponent is slow-playing a very strong hand. Very rarely do
players slow play in spots when the board is so draw heavy. So the
top end of his range of hands that he can have is almost certainly
a hand like KQ or QT. These two hands are very unlikely to raise
the river for value, so you can be nearly certain that if you bet
one chip on the river and get raised, it is because he has one of
his busted draws. In that case you should beat him into the pot
and call his river raise no matter what size he makes it — even if
it’s an all-in wager.
The following counter-argument could be made: Some very
good players at the higher-stakes games will look to value raise
a hand like KQ against your one-chip river bet. But it is very
likely that, had you checked the river, he would’ve bet a hand like
KQ for value anyway. Given the large number of busted draws
he could be bluffing the river with, it would be very difficult to
find a fold anyway. Furthermore, I still am not convinced there
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are too many people who will value raise a hand like KQ in this
spot. If you do come across players who are capable of that, then
you can always start leading with sets and two-pair type of hands
and wait for them to value raise lightly.
Using a single chip as a means of extracting value and/or gaining
information is one of my favorite plays. Because it’s a river play,
it’s so much more valuable than many of the other plays where
the pot is smaller. The pot is medium-to-large sized by the time
the action is complete. There just aren’t any downsides to speak
of with this play, unless you are facing some of the better players
in the world.
You will virtually never pay off a big river bet with the worst hand.
You also have the chance to win a very large pot, because most
opponents will simply never be able to help themselves when they
see you bet one measly chip on the river. It will look like red meat
to a lion, and they will raise (sometimes all in) with most of their
range, with the exception of the hands you beat. That is the real
beauty of this play: the pot only grows large when you want it to.
2. Weak leading to induce a raise
Oftentimes you may have a hand that you’ve determined is best,
but feel your opponent doesn’t have a strong enough hand to call
so much as a half-pot bet. Too often in these situations, people
will either check and hope their opponent bluffs, or they will
make a two-thirds (or greater) bet that has virtually no hope of
ever being called.
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A good example of this play is the following:
You are in the big blind with AcJs at a 5/10 NL table where
everyone has 100 big blind stacks. The cut off raiser bets $40,
everyone else folds and you re-raise to $125. The cut-off raiser
calls and you go to the flop heads up with the pot totaling $255.
The flop comes down Jc2s7d.
Unless your opponent flopped a set or is slow playing a big pair,
you have the best hand. You decide to bet out $175 and your
opponent calls. While it is certainly possible your opponent
could be continuing to slow play, this really shouldn’t be at the
forefront of your mind. On a flop like this, you are simply not
going to be able to get away from your hand unless you have an
incredible read on your opponent or he has a reputation for
being extraordinarily tight. Since there are no draws on this
board, the overwhelming majority of the time your opponent
will have a marginal made hand like 88-TT or JT-KJ.
With the pot at $605, with both you and your opponent having
$700 remaining in your stack, an ace of hearts comes on the
turn. While this may seem like a great card, it is an action killer.
Prior to the ace coming on the turn, his range consisted of
hands that either have only two or three outs and a board that
still looked appealing to his hand.
Now that an ace arrived on the turn, your opponent will usually
have between zero and two outs and not a lot of confidence in his
holding. The trick now will be extracting value from his range.
I have found the best way to do this is to simply make a very weak
bet on the turn that induces action. A bet of $125 into the $605
pot should do the trick.
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This turn bet accomplishes a lot. First, it gives poor odds for your
opponent to draw to his hand. Second, the bet will instinctively
make an aggressive player want to raise your bet and try to blow
you off of your hand. Finally, it’s confusing and will make your
opponent very frustrated and not know what to do. He may not
be able to fold any type of hand given that he is getting such a
good price on his call.
This is another one of those plays that has no real downside.
You were never going to be able to extract value from his range
with a bet. He was also very unlikely to start turning his made
hand into a bluff, as he fears you are going to check raise all in
on the turn if he bets.
Another huge benefit of this play is you can mix in some bluffs
with your range. Let’s say we use the exact same scenario, but
instead of AcJs, you have 5s6s. You can bet $125 on the turn
and will be risking only $125 to win the $605 in the pot with a 6
high bluff. He only needs to fold about 17.1 percent of the time
for your bet to be profitable. This can be a great way to balance
your range in these spots.
3. The Killer Blow
Hands down, my favorite is one I call “The Killer Blow.” This
is a two-part play that involves both a turn and river bet, and I
feel it’s one of the most effective plays I’ve ever devised.
Let’s assume you are playing a 5/10NL table where everyone
has at least 100 big-blind stacks. You get dealt 7c8c in the small
blind. The cut-off position raiser makes it $40, and everyone
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folds to you. You decide to call and the big-blind folds. The pot
is $90 and the flop comes down Kc9s4h. You check and your
opponent checks. From my experience, your opponent will have
either a weak made hand or a hand that completely missed the
board once he checks the flop.
Once in a great while your opponent will have a big hand like a
set. But the overwhelming majority of the time this will not be
the case, because if he had a set he would want to make the pot
large, which is something you cannot do by checking.
At this point, I’m thinking, “How can I take the line that would
make him the most likely to fold his hand?” In a perfect world,
I’ll also choose the line that extracts the most value from a hand
he will ultimately fold. This may sound a little greedy, but this
is a rare occasion where greed is a good thing, based on my
experience.
The turn comes a 2d and I again check to my opponent. I do this
because I’m assuming he has what I believe he has at this point,
and he should bet the turn. If he has a weak made hand, he is
going to want to protect it. If he has nothing, two checks from
me will make him feel confident that a bluff will work.
Your opponent bets $60 on the turn. At this point I have my
opponent right where I want him and check raise the turn to
$240, leaving $720 behind. I typically make my raises three
times my opponent’s bets. But I want to tell him I am looking
to play for stacks and put the maximum pressure on him, so I
make this raise four times his bet.
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At this point in the hand, you will often induce a fold from
your opponent. Occasionally, your opponent will sense that your
check raise seems a little fishy and call after much deliberation. I
am glad when he does. I am rooting for a call on the turn because
I know that he is never going to call the river.
Let’s assume your opponent decides to call your turn check raise.
With the pot size at $570 the river is a Jd. This is the point in the
hand where you deliver the killer blow and shove all in for your
last $720. What you have essentially done is put your opponent
to a decision for all of his chips in a spot where we know he
almost never has a strong hand based on the action. This is
also where you need to have a strong heart, because while this
play works an astronomically high percentage of the time, my
opponent usually folds after a minute or more of deliberation.
That minute can feel like an hour, but take my word for it, he
will nearly always fold.
A few important things to remember: First, you need the board
to be somewhat dry. It doesn’t have to be completely void of
draws. But if you make a turn check raise when a card comes
that presents a variety of different draws on the turn, your
opponent will call much more frequently on the turn because
he is drawing to a big hand (that is completed on the river) or
he will put you on a draw. If the river does not complete any of
the draws, he may find the heart to call your river all in with a
bluff-catching type of hand. So definitely be cognizant of the
draws on the board.
This is a scenario where it’s especially helpful to have information
on your opponent. There are those opponents who absolutely
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love to make heroic calls so be careful not to pull this trick on
them too often.
As is the case with any play I advocate, it’s important to not use
this every time or you will become massively exploitable. It is
important to keep this one in your arsenal, but don’t make a
habit of using it at every opportunity.
4. The delayed C bet
A play that isn’t talked about or utilized enough is one I like to
call the “delayed C bet.” It’s best used against players who are on
the aggressive side, especially those who show a lot of aggression
on the flop. We’ve all experienced those who’ll call your raise out
of position and check raise you on seemingly every flop.
This is tough to combat because it’s hard to flop hands that can
withstand a flop-check raise. If your hand is good enough to
withstand a check raise on the flop, it is even less likely to be able
to withstand a turn bet from your opponent, as your entire stack
may be in jeopardy at that point in the hand.
Let’s assume you are playing a 5/10 NL table where everyone
has 100 big blind stacks. You raise to $40 from early position
and your opponent calls out of the big blind, bringing the total
pot to $90.
The cards are irrelevant. Your opponent checks. Rather than
continuation betting, check back the flop. You know he was
very likely to check raise you and the onus would then be on
you to make a tough decision. You will likely have to commit
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a significant portion of your stack to re steal the pot with no
guarantees your efforts won’t be in vain.
Instead, put the onus on him. When he inevitably bets $60 on
the turn, raise him to $180. This will put him to the test and
force him to have a hand. If you bet the flop and get check raised,
the onus is on you. This play is an excellent way to turn the
tables on him and make him have to make a play for a significant
portion of his stack if he is going to win the pot.
Remember, like any play you make in no-limit hold ‘em, be
careful about overdoing it. If you do it too often, you become
exploitable. In this particular scenario, I recommend a sensible
balance between C betting the flop, using the delayed C bet,
and even giving up on coordinated types of flops that are very
likely to have hit your opponent’s range of calling hands from
the small blind.
5. Shoving when they can’t have it
This play is a great one. Proper execution of this play will make
you feel like Phil Ivey — at least for a second.
When determining whether or not to utilize this play, it’s critical
the flop be completely dry. There can’t be any draws whatsoever,
or this play is not good at all. Here is the best example: Let’s
assume you are playing a 5/10 NL table and everyone at the table
has 100 big blind stacks. You’re in the small blind and the button
raises to $40, you call and the big blind folds. You go to the flop
heads up and the pot is $90. (The cards you or your opponent
has are irrelevant. The flop comes Kh7c2s. You check and your
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opponent bets $60. You decide to check raise to $180, because
this is the type of board that doesn’t hit very many hands and
you are hoping to take down the pot with a bluff. Your opponent
re-raises you to $425, leaving himself $575 behind.
From my experience, if your opponent has a big hand, he never
re-raises the flop in this situation. The reason why he never reraises
a big hand here is that it really does not make very much
sense for him to do so. If he has a big hand like a set or AK, he
will simply call your flop check raise because he will feel that
either: A) You are bluffing and he does not want to discourage
you from continuing your bluff; or B) He has a monster hand
and knows that if you have the big hand you are representing,
all of the money will go in eventually.
So if your opponent re-raises you on the flop, it is probable he
did so because he has nothing. But he knows that unless you have
the unlikely set that you are representing, you don’t have a hand
that can withstand a re-raise, and he’s looking to re-steal the pot.
This is your golden opportunity to make a great play and shove
the rest of your stack in the middle. After you scoop the pot you
can tell your friends you “read your opponent’s soul.”
Trust me, there are few plays you can make that are more fun
than this one.
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IN C!ONCLUSION …
I know this book will be unpopular with those who like their
poker books to be math-dense, and those who like their poker big
and bold. For whatever reason, a humble, methodical approach
does not jibe with accepted norms in the poker world.
But as I said in the beginning, you can have all the poker skill in
the world, but if you don’t know how to monetize that ability,
you’re sunk. Much more skilled players than I am have gone
broke. There is a vast difference between poker skill and actually
making money. I truly believe that a total commitment to a slowand-
steady plan is the way to long-term riches, and my record
supports that I’m right.
There’s a saying that goes, “Let there be change, and let it begin
with me.” Ironically, I feel like I’ve become a much better player
for having written this book. It’s crystallized so many loose
thoughts that I’ve had over the years. Soon after putting all of
these thoughts down on paper, I sensed that I was playing at a
level I’d not achieved before. Truly, I felt as though there were
very few people who could match my performance hand-tohand.
So, in a way, I have to thank my readers for inspiring me
through this process. It’s made me a richer man, figuratively
and literally!
Before I exit, I’d like to draw your attention to some key points
from the book. Had I known these things, I’d have been a more
profitable player from the get-go.
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• Take advantage of rakeback. As I said earlier, this can sustain
you through lean months, and turn good months into great
ones. If you learn nothing else from this book, please know
that you should take advantage of this opportunity that, for
some reason or other, is far less popular than it should be
in poker circles. Rakeback is found money.
• Manage your bankroll conservatively. You don’t want to
be the restaurant that runs out of food just as a big group
comes through the door. Invest — then reinvest — in your
small business.
• Make peace with variance. You will invariably go through
hard-luck patches. Recognizing those times when you have
good luck makes the bad times tolerable. Understanding
variance is an essential building block to managing tilt.
• Set process-oriented goals. Being process oriented is a trait
possessed by every successful poker player, businessperson
or athlete I’ve ever met. Bottom line: if you put in quality
time, money will follow.
I’d like to leave you with some quotes that I keep near me at all
times. These act as a compass for me and get me focused.
“To give anything less than your best is to sacrifice the gift.”
— Steve Prefontaine
I’m a volunteer assistant coach for the University of Oregon’s
men’s golf team, and the only poster on the wall of our offices
has this quote on it. Prefontaine was a legendary track athlete
at Oregon whose career and life were cut short in 1975 when he
died in a car accident at the age of 24. He was a rock-star athlete
who won 120 of the 153 races he ran — an astonishing 78 percent.
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“Pre,” as he was called, believed talent is a myth; that there was
a higher standard than victory. What I admire about him is the
integrity of the effort he put forth every single day.
“It ain’t about how hard you hit. It’s about how hard you can get hit, and keep
moving forward. That’s how winning is done.” — Rocky Balboa, Rocky
Balboa (2006)
Like this fictional character, I’ve been knocked down. I’ve been as
low as most people could get in life. I was on the verge of realizing
my dream of making the PGA Tour when it all ended suddenly
at the age of 23 due to a massive heart attack. I’ve been broke, in
horrible health (due to a mysterious cause), and had no one to
whom I could turn. That’s when my poker career began. There is
opportunity in even the greatest tragedy, to know ourselves better,
if nothing else. The bad times make the good times sweeter. Don’t
listen to people who’d rather be second worst than try to elevate
their own circumstances. Whatever bad situation you’re in is only
temporary. Just put your head down, outwork everyone else. I dare
you to tell me someday that you regret having done so.
“The greatest thing about tomorrow is that I will be better than I am today. I have
no understanding of why people hit the snooze button. I don’t know how you could
think any other way.” — Tiger Woods
You have just one life. One. Don’t waste it. Do you want your
tombstone to read, “Here lies John. He could have been great,
but he felt like sleeping in”? There is greatness in the struggle;
in the trying to be great. Every day is an opportunity to put more
distance between you and everyone else.
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“To be yourself in a world that is constantly trying to make you something else is the
greatest accomplishment.” — Ralph Waldo Emerson
I, too, confront pressures all the time to be the person others
want me to be. I grew up in Orange County, Calif., where
superficiality reigns supreme, then entered the ego-driven world
of professional poker. Ever since I committed myself to being
myself, it is amazing how much easier my life has become. I’ve
probably never had more people dislike me, and at the same
time I’ve never had so many amazing friends. Emerson also said,
“People only see what they are prepared to see.” Outside-thebox
thinking is a trait of nearly every successful person, so by
default such a mindset will put you at odds with others. This is
the reality of thinking for yourself and doing things the way you
know is best.
“Change will not come if we wait for some other person or some other time. We are
the ones we’ve been waiting for. We are the change that we seek.” — President
Barack Obama
Put your politics aside for a moment as I explain the relevance
of this quote. I cannot tell you the number of times I’ve been
at a social gathering where I’ve met someone who is absolutely
fascinated by what I do for a living — not because they, too,
dreamt of being a poker player, but because they’re amazed at
the nature in which I achieved it. I took a risk. I put my world
on the line — I risked having to crawl back to a family and a job I
loathed — to change my circumstance. I went “all in” in a quest to
chase my dreams of financial independence, and independence
overall. Most people tell me they thought about taking risks, too,
the same way I did. But they didn’t, usually because they were
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scared of disappointing others around them. I understand this
completely. Going out on my own caused many people to simply
give up on me. I can only imagine what they said about me when
I wasn’t around. But I knew I couldn’t risk being manacled to the
expectations of others, because I’d drown under their weight.
I gave in to grand possibilities. I was the change I sought. You
are the change you seek.
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AFTERWORD
!By Nick Grudzien
Just as there are 400-pound offensive linemen who don’t have
to hit the weight room, there will be poker players with 200
IQs who can get away without working hard. For the rest of us,
there’s Dusty Schmidt. His approach applies to the everyman,
which is most of us.
I may be in a unique position to attest to the soundness of Dusty’s
business sense. Before becoming a full-time poker pro in 2005,
I worked for nine years for a respected boutique investment
firm on Wall Street called Allen & Co., trading equities for
institutional clients and high net-worth individuals. I traded a
number of high-flying IPOs during the NASDAQ technology
bubble, and had good practice using split-second judgment to
weigh risk vs. reward. We had a seven-man desk with a solid team.
I was especially proficient with new technology, which made my
position particularly secure.
Prior to 2003, the sum total of my gambling experience away
from the stock market was getting in on a $1,000 prop bet that
a guy on our desk couldn’t eat a baseball-sized piece of wasabi.
(The bet never ended up happening, by the way.)
Late that year, I was at my in-laws’ house with nothing to do, and
was playing hearts on my computer when a poker site came up. I
put $50 in the cashier and was immediately hooked. Before long,
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poker was producing better dividends than the stocks were. One
year later, I was playing 300/600 and winning at a decent clip,
and by 2005 I was averaging $5 a hand. The skills I’d developed
on Wall Street served me well, in particular money management
and discipline, as well as emotional control.
I decided to leave Wall Street that December. The decision was
borne out of our desire to be back in California where I grew
up so our children could grow up near their grandparents and
extended family. I played poker full time as I went through
the process of selling our house and looking for a job in San
Francisco’s financial district. Things continued to go so well that
by the time we were ready to head west in Oct. 2006, I’d decided
to forego a desk job in favor of life as a poker pro/stay-at-home
dad while living in gorgeous wine country an hour north of the
Bay Area.
A few months prior to our move, I was waiting for a flight and
killing time when I pulled out my laptop to see if there were
any good games happening online. Eight hands and 15 minutes
later, I’d won $35,000. News of this spread across the poker
community. It wasn’t long after that I heard from Dusty and his
friend Matt Amen, looking for private instruction. I said I’d be
willing to provide it, but at my hourly rate and only if it could
be done online. Dusty and Matt said they wanted to meet in
person, and they were insistent. I asked them to tell me about
themselves, and they sent me a synopsis that included their huge
background in golf.
“I LOVE golf,” I wrote back.
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In truth, I did love the game but was terrible at it. I sensed a trade
was in the offing. If they could get to New York, we’d golf during
the day and play poker at night. They were on the next flight out.
It was a great match. They were beautiful people and we’ve been
close friends ever since.
My initial impression of Dusty was that he was quiet and reserved
(not to mention a phenomenal golfer). Still, his work ethic and
the clarity of his focus were incredibly obvious. I monitored his
progress in the weeks that followed, and his tenacity was mindboggling.
He was playing eight tables at a time for 100 hours a
week — four tables on his desktop and four on his laptop with a
touchpad, which was exactly as miserable as it sounds.
Dusty clearly has strong business instincts, but initially he solved
problems through brute force. He needed to pay the rent, so
he played 400 hours of poker in a month. He did it nonstop,
which is how he got the name “Leatherass.”
At the end of the day, it’s true that Dusty is simply willing to
outwork everyone else, plain and simple. But sometimes his
legendary work ethic does him a disservice. People fail to see
the science that he’s come to apply to his poker and his life.
In the months and years that followed our meeting, I saw him
become the best out there at approaching poker like a business. Now
he’s way out on the leading edge as a poker player and a businessman,
with no stone left unturned. Our relationship has evolved from
student-teacher to one where we’re peers. In fact, I’m proud to
have him as a partner in Stoxpoker.com, which I founded in 2006.
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Dusty has a tremendous ability to emotionally detach from his
decisions about money and work. He looks at things from an
expectation standpoint.
I can also speak to the quality of life his process and mine have
lead to for the two of us and our families. Working at home
allows me to take my two kids to camps and school, eat lunch with
them and do other fun things. I get in about 200 rounds of golf
a year, and our life is very fulfilling. Likewise, Dusty’s been able
to spread his wings into a variety of business interests, including
starting 10thGreen.com, the first social network for golfers. He
also is able to participate actively in the life of his wife and child.
This book is concrete evidence of Dusty being ahead of the
curve, because it for the first time teaches poker players how to
monetize the abilities they hone on sites like Stoxpoker.com.
Much of his advice runs counter to the bluster that accounts for
a lot of poker discourse these days, and Dusty wouldn’t have it
any other way. There is a great life waiting for those who truly
commit to the process.
Nick Grudzien is the founder of Stoxpoker.com. His book, Winning In Tough
Hold’em Games, can be purchased at Pokertrainingstore.com.
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test
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test
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test
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testing testing
Chapter 41
TELLING THEM WHAT YOU
DO! FOR A LIVING
I recently made a fairly sizable donation to a non-profit
organization near my home in Portland, Ore. The foundation’s
executive director was kind enough to thank me by inviting me
to golf one afternoon. The round took place a few weeks before
the birth of our first child, Lennon.
As we strode to the tee box, the director asked me, “So, when
your daughter is old enough, what are you going to tell her you
do for a living?”
“What do you mean?” I asked, a bit dumbfounded.
“I mean, you can’t tell her you’re a pro poker player,” he replied
laughingly. “You can’t tell her you’re a gambler.”
The question took me aback. Apparently my “ill-gotten” money
was good enough for him to accept my donation, but dirty
enough that I couldn’t tell my daughter how I’d earned it.
Although the perception of a poker professional has drastically
improved since the time I first began playing, it’s inevitable that
people will not always be thrilled with the idea of you being a
professional poker player. (I can only imagine what it must’ve been
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like for guys like Doyle Brunson and Chip Reese, who undoubtedly
took a lot of flak from people for what they did for a living.)
Thanks to the World Series of Poker virtually running on an
endless loop on ESPN, poker is now thought of in a much higher
regard than it used to be. But things are still not where we’d like
them to be in terms of mass acceptance.
When I first started playing for a living in 2005, virtually
everyone I talked to thought I was out of my mind. I hated it
when people asked me what I did for a living. I used to reply
sheepishly, “Well, believe it or not, I actually play online poker
for a living. I know, it’s weird, right? But, hey, it’s paying the
bills so far.”
I would cringe while I said it and pray the person I was talking
to wouldn’t lecture me. I soon realized that a tentative reply was
the exact opposite of what you want to say.
My advice — same as my wife’s — is to say it loud and proud.
It’s important to believe in what you are saying. After all, if you
don’t make it sound like it’s a good job, why would you expect
anyone else to think it?
If you say with a smile on your face, “I play online poker for a
living and it’s the best job in the world to me,” your chances of
getting a favorable response increase a hundredfold. Rather than
being the guy people are quick to make fun of, you’ll be the envy
of the room. Ultimately, people admire the independent spirit
that it takes to strike out on your own in such a bold way, and
they generally wish they had a bit more of it inside themselves.
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I’ll end this section as I began it, by reminding you that the man
dignifies the job; the job doesn’t dignify the man.
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SECTION 2
STRATEGY
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Chapter 1
TEN COMMON SITUATIONS —
AND H!OW TO PLAY THEM
1. Playing drawing hands in position
Few things are more exciting than when you flop a flush draw
or a two-way straight draw in no-limit hold ‘em. No-limit hold
‘em is a game where you can take every last chip away from your
opponent. One of the most recurring ways you can accomplish
this is to make a big hand, like a straight or a flush, and break
someone holding a set or an over-pair to the board.
The age-old question pertains to how you should play your draw.
Should you fast-play the hand by raising the flop with a willingness
to play for all of your chips? Or should you play your draw slowly
by checking or simply calling a bet from your opponent?
In Position with a draw to the nuts:
Assuming you are up against only one opponent, there are a
variety of ways to play a hand like a flopped two-way straight or
flush draw.
One rule of thumb I follow is to always play a nut-flush draw
fast on the flop. Let’s assume we’re in a 5/10NL table where
both you and your opponent have 100 big blind stacks. You call
a $40 pre-flop raise in position with Ad5d, the blinds fold and
the pot size is $95.
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The flop comes down Kd2dTh and your opponent leads out for
$70. I virtually always raise my opponent on these types of flops.
I will likely make it triple his bet size or $210.
There are several good things that can happen by doing this,
including your opponent folding to your flop raise and you
take down the pot right there. Your opponent may also call the
flop re-raise and you will have to play some poker on the later
streets. But from my experience, this is the least likely outcome.
Most opponents will make a decision on the flop to either reraise
back and go all in with their hand, or simply fold and live
to fight another day.
If your opponent does re-raise back and go all in, you are almost
never in bad shape. In fact, one of the main reasons I advocate
always raising the flop with a draw to the nuts is because of the
chance to get all of the money in against a worse drawing hand.
Hands like QJ or a worse flush draw are very likely to come back
over the top to your flop raise, and that presents the opportunity
to get all of your chips in the middle with 79% equity versus a flush
draw like 7d8d. Against a hand such as QhJc, you have 70% equity.
If they do flat call the flop raise and the turn brings a card
insignificant to you or your opponent’s range (such as 6 of
clubs), I advocate showing further aggression by betting around
two-thirds of the pot on the turn in an attempt to pick up the
pot. There will be $515 in the pot, and a two-thirds pot bet
would be risking approximately $345 to win the $515, so your
turn bet only needs to succeed 40.1 percent of the time — [$345/
($345+$515) = 40.1%] — if you had no equity in the pot. At that
point, you are committed to the hand and have to call.
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The worst-case scenario is you get all of your money in against
a hand such as KcKh, in which case you still have 26 percent
equity. Not a good situation, but not a huge blunder either.
In position with a draw to a flush or straight:
When you are in position with a two-way straight draw or a flush,
there are a variety of ways I advocate playing your hand.
Let’s assume we’re playing a 5/10NL table where both you and
your opponent have 100 big blinds stacks. You call a $40 raise
in position from one opponent with a hand such as 7d8d.
The blinds fold and the pot size is $95. The flop comes down
Jd3d6h. Your opponent leads out for $70 so the pot is $165
at this point.
I advocate playing your draw in one of several ways in these
situations. When your flush draw is not a draw to the nuts, I’m
inclined to play the hand a little slower, but with the intent
to look for spots to take the pot away on a later street. But I
like to throw in a mixture plays, including making raises with a
willingness to get all of the money in against opponents I face
regularly. You are going to take the worst of it when they do play
back at you, but it’s important to not become too predictable to
opponents you face on a routine basis.
Let’s say you decide to call the $70 bet and the pot is now
$235. The turn is a 2c and your opponent checks. This puts
you in a pretty difficult spot because if you check you are passing
up a good opportunity to take away a medium-sized pot with a
bet on the turn.
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If you bet, you risk getting check raised and priced out of a
draw that likely would’ve won a large pot off of your opponent.
I prefer betting here. Though you risk getting check raised, the
frequency with which your opponent will price you out of your
hand and force you to fold, pales in comparison to the number
of times you can pick up the pot with a turn bet.
Another possibility is that your opponent bets the turn. If your
opponent bets, it will typically be in the two-thirds pot range.
Using the above example, two thirds of the pot would be $155,
which sends the total pot amount to $390.
You are getting about 2.5-to-1, and your draw will come in
approximately 1 out of 5 times on the river, assuming all flush
card outs will give you the best hand. So while this may not seem
like a profitable call, remember that should you complete your
draw on the river, there is a very good chance you will be able
to get another large river bet out of your opponent or possibly
even his entire stack.
There is also a chance your opponent is bluffing, and even if
you miss your draw on the river, you can still pick up the pot
with a river bet. Some of the time you will make a pair of sevens
or eights on the river, which may also end up being the winning
hand.
Another reason to call the turn, even though you are only getting
2.5-to-1 on a draw that only comes in 1 time out of 5, is for
balancing your range against opponents who you face frequently.
If you are only calling on the turn when you have a marginal hand
relative to the board such as pocket 8s or ace six, your opponents
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will be able to much better judge your range of hands and make
more accurate assumptions because your game will be somewhat
transparent.
2. Playing drawing hands out of position
Here are my thoughts on the best ways to play a drawing hand
when you’re out of position.
Out of position with a draw to the nuts:
Much like playing nut draws in position, I also advocate
playing nut draws out of position fast. There are a few
different ways to play nut draws out of position that I advocate.
Let’s say you’re at a 5/10NL table and both you and your
opponent have 100 big blind stacks. You are in the big blind
and call a $40 raise from the cut-off position raiser with AhTh.
The pot is $85 and the flop comes down Jh5h6c.
I have the nut flush draw and I’m looking to play my hand fast.
I’m not married to one particular play here. Fifty percent of the
time I like leading into the pre-flop raiser with a bet of around
$60 with the intent of being comfortable getting raised on the
flop. This will allow me to come back over the top with an all-in
re-raise. The other 50 percent of the time I will check to my
opponent with the intent of putting in a check raise.
Ideally the mission is to play my opponent off of his hand and
win the money from him that he bets post flop. By leading out,
three things can happen, two of which are good and one that is
not necessarily bad.
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• If you lead out for $60 and your opponent raises your flop
lead to $180, you can come back over the top, and if he
folds, you win a nice medium sized pot. If you shove and
he folds, you win $325. If you shove and he calls and you
win, you get $1,105. If you shove and he calls and you lose,
you’re out $900. If he calls you your equity would be 40.78
percent versus the range of hands I have assigned him. In
this case, your opponent would have to fold approximately
20 percent of the time to break even.
• If you check, your opponent will likely bet around $60. You
can then check raise to $180, which will often force him to
fold and you will take down a medium sized pot.
• If he simply calls your flop lead or flop-check raise, you
typically can continue to profitably show aggression in hopes
that he will lay down his hand at some point against most
opponents.
The great thing about having a draw to the nuts is that it frees
you up to make confident semi-bluffs providing your outs
stay clean. Using the above example, let’s assume our flopcheck
raise gets called and the turn brings an irrelevant card
like a 2 of spades. It’s very unlikely this card improved his
hand, and while it didn’t improve yours either, a bet of
two-thirds the pot on the turn may take your opponent off
a marginal hand he is now getting the sense he may have to
play for his entire stack.
In this scenario, there is $445 in the pot and you and your
opponent will have $780 behind. There are three ways to play
this situation, all of which have merit.
• You can bet very small on the turn, somewhere in the
quarter-pot range. What you are essentially doing is setting
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the price for your draw if your opponent calls as well as
giving yourself a cheap bluff. Say you bet $110 into the $445
pot. He only needs to fold approximately 20 percent of the
time — [($110)/($445+$110) = ~ 20%]. Experience tells me
your opponent will fold at least that often. Combine that
with the chance that you can hit a heart, may have the best
hand against a worse draw of his and an ace or a ten may
also improve your hand to the best hand, makes this a very
profitable play. That being said, this may also inspire him
to make a large re-raise and price you out of the hand, but
I believe it is worth the risk that he will do that.
• A second option is to bet close to pot, which will commit
you to the hand in the event your opponent comes over
the top with an all-in re-raise. Say you bet $400 into the
$445 pot, and your opponent shoves for $780. There‘s
$1,625 in the pot after his shove, and you would have to
call $380. You would be getting 4.3-to-1 and would need to
win approximately 19 percent of the time. On this Jh5h6c2s
board against the range I have assigned him, your AhTh has
24.3% equity and should call. This play has some validity to
it, as well, because it puts your opponent to a decision for all
of his chips. At this point, your opponent has not shown that
he is strong enough that he will want to play for his entire
stack. It’s no fun when you get shoved on and are forced to
call with just a flush draw, but you will be getting the right
price to do so and you gave yourself an opportunity to take
down a $445 pot with just a draw.
• A third and much trickier option is to check the turn
and check raise all in if your opponent bets. This is a play
you may not want to use as often as the other two plays I
mentioned previously, but it has merit when used sparingly.
First off, if it is used sparingly, then it will get a lot more
credit and will work a much greater portion of the time.
Secondly, you may be value check raising some portion of
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the time given hands like 78 and worse flush draws are very
likely to bet the turn as a semi bluff. This is quite a coup
because he will be priced in to call your check raise assuming
he bets in the neighborhood of 2/3 pot with his semi bluff.
When this happens you will be a 4 to 1 favorite to win the pot
heading into the river against his straight and flush draws.
For example, against KhQh you have 86 percent equity and
against 87 off suit you have 77 percent equity.
Out of position with a draw to a flush or a straight:
When you are out of position with a flush or a two-way straight
draw against just one other opponent, there are a few different
ways to play a flush or straight draw.
Let’s assume that you are playing a 5/10NL table where both you
and your opponent have 100 big blind stacks. The button raises
to $40 and you call in the small blind with Th9h. Everyone else
folds, you’re heads up with the button and the pot is $90. The
flop comes down JdQc5s.
Many of the same concepts as playing a nut-drawing hand out
of position apply, except you will never get all of the money in
against a weaker draw. There are a few ways to tackle this situation.
• One way would be to simply lead right out. If your opponent
raises you, shoving all in as a semi-bluff is certainly a worthy
option. This will force your opponent to have a very strong
hand if he is going to commit his entire stack. When he does
have a hand he can call an all-in shove with, your equity is
going to be in the range of 25 to 33 percent. This is not a
great spot to get your money in the middle, but given that
there is a reasonable likelihood that your opponent will fold
to an all in shove, he only needs to fold to an all-in around
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half the time. For example, say you lead for $60 and your
opponent raises to $180. If he calls your shove with the
range of hands I suspect he will call with, then you have 28.5
percent equity with Th9h. If you shove and he folds, you win
$330. If you shove and he calls and you win, you win $1,110.
If you shove and he calls and you lose, you lose $900. Given
that you have 28.5 percent equity vs. his calling range, we can
find the break-even folding frequency by solving for X in the
following equation: (X)($330)+(1-X)[(.285)($1110)+(.715)
(-$900)] = 0. Now we know that he needs to fold 49.8
percent of the time. From my experience, your opponent
will fold at least that often and this play will yield a profit.
Even if I am wrong and he doesn’t fold that often, there is
long term value in letting your opponent know that you will
play back at him very lightly. Sending this message may keep
him from making other profitable plays against you out of
fear that you will play back at him with a wide range of hands.
• For those looking to take a small-ball approach — which I
think is perfectly reasonable — I would recommend simply
playing your draw passively, while intending to look for spots
to take away the pot if your opponent shows weakness. One
approach would be to check the flop to your opponent and
call his flop bet. From there, lead any turn that does not
complete your hand. (You can also lead the turn when your
hand is completed.) At that point in the hand, the pot will
likely be $210 assuming your opponent bets two-thirds the
pot on the flop and you call him. Leading the turn for twothirds
of the pot (or appr. $140) would only need to work
40 percent of the time — [(140)/(140+210) = 40%]. Even
if you had no equity in the pot, it is very likely your bet will
work at least that often. But given you will likely have at least
15 percent equity in the pot with one card to come, that
means 15 percent of the time you may still win not only a
turn bet, but potentially your opponent’s entire stack when
you consider the pending river action.
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• If your opponent calls the turn and you again miss your
draw, more often than not you’re probably wise to simply
surrender the pot. If you are playing against someone who
you have a lot of history with and you think he thinks you’re
not going to bet the river without a very strong hand, you
may consider bluffing the river. If you sense your opponent
likely has a weak hand himself, then it is probably best to
bluff the river. There are cases to be made for bluffing the
river, but I would typically recommend surrendering the
pot on the river in this scenario.
• Your last sensible option is to check-raise the flop an
amount three times greater than your opponent’s flop bet.
If you do get re-raised at that point, you have no choice but
to fold. This is because you’ll be priced out of your draw
with virtually no chance your opponent will fold to an allin
shove with so few chips behind. However, it is perfectly
reasonable to check-raise the flop and, if called, bet the
turn using the same concepts explained in the section.
3. Playing small pairs in and out of position
Playing small pairs profitably is one of the most difficult things
to do in poker. It’s exciting to get dealt a pair, and we know that
unless our opponent has a bigger pair, we are a favorite against
his hand before the flop.
The thought of flopping a set and cracking your opponents’
overpair is one of the bigger thrills you can have in poker. That’s
the good news.
The bad news is that you only flop a set about one time in eight,
and typically when you don’t flop a set, you are reduced to an
underpair to the board and your opponent will come out betting.
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Of all the questions people have asked me over the years, the
dilemma over playing a small pair seems to arouse the greatest
emotion. It can be frustrating — especially against aggressive
opponents — and no one likes getting outplayed.
If you surrender the pot every time you don’t flop a set, you feel
like you’re getting outplayed far too often (and you’re right).
If you call down your opponents too often with your small pair,
it feels like you’re hemorrhaging money. Trust me, we have all
been there.
While I am not going to pretend there are a lot of great options,
there are some reasonable ones that will at least allow you to show
a profit with these hands.
Whether you are in position or out of position — providing
stacks are 100 big blinds or more (the deeper the stacks
the more inclined you should be to play a pocket pair) — I
recommend playing small pocket pairs from any position as
long as there is at least one very weak player at the table. Once
you have decided to play them, one thing to remember is to
not be disappointed if you do not flop a set. Flopping sets is
nice, but is not essential to picking up the pot. What is essential
is that you look for ways to pick up the pot even when you do
not flop a set.
If you call a raise pre-flop in position, I like to raise most flops
with my small pocket pair. I like to use small pairs as a way to
remind myself to balance my ranges. If the only time you are
raising the flop is with strong hands and strong draws, the
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opponents you play with regularly will have a much better idea
how to combat your play.
But if you decide to raise your opponent on the flop when you
have a small pair that does not flop a set, that will help you
balance your range by adding in some hands that are not strong
hands or strong draws.
The same concept applies when you are out of position. I
recommend using small pairs that do not flop a set as a reminder
to balance your range by check raising your opponent on the
flop. It’s very easy to find yourself not making very many bluffs
against your opponents, especially if you are playing a lot of
tables. That’s why I recommend using small pairs as a way to
throw in a few bluffs here and there that will help balance your
range a little better.
Sometimes you will make a check raise on the flop and your
opponent calls, but the turn brings an excellent bluffing card like
an ace or some other card that you feel is likely to look scary to
your opponent. In these cases you may want to consider betting
the turn in an attempt to pick up the pot.
If you are the pre-flop aggressor, I recommend making a
continuation bet with your small pair and then proceeding
throughout the hand the same way you would with any other
situation. I don’t think you need to try and do anything you
wouldn’t normally do in those cases.
The reason I like using small pairs to balance your range is that it
is a really simple way to remind yourself to toss in what basically
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amounts to a bluff. If the flop brings 3 Broadway cards and
you have pocket 4s, you are essentially bluffing if you are check
raising the flop against the pre flop aggressor.
The other reason I like to use small pairs as my bluff reminders
is that every so often you will spike a set on the turn or river (if
you get a free card) and now you are going to be eyeing your
opponent’s stack.
There are few things in poker sweeter than tossing in a check
raise with small pair on a hopeless flop only to hit your set and
bust your opponent. It isn’t a great back-up plan for the times
your check raise or flop raise fails to work, but it does bail you
out every so often. Occasionally, the hand may get checked down
after a flop raise or check raise and your opponent shows down
a busted draw and you will still win the pot which is also a nice
little surprise.
Against thinking opponents, playing small pairs with the intent
of giving up on the pot when you do not flop a set is a losing
proposition. I used to be horrible at playing small pairs until
I adopted this strategy. Today, I’m profitable with all my small
pairs and I owe it all to simply using them as a means to balance
my range and keep my opponents on their toes.
4. Handling aggressive pre-flop 3 bettors
There is a ton of advice on how to handle aggressive pre-flop 3
bettors. But most of the literature fails to keep things simple.
Much of it contains elaborate charts that detail 3-betting
frequencies, shoving ranges and calling ranges. While I am well
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aware of the value of these complex equations and charts, most
of that stuff just confuses me — I just want some quick and easy
tips on how to handle more aggressive players.
I like to keep my approach to this situation simple. If someone
frequently 3-bets me pre-flop, I will begin 4-betting him
repeatedly. Sometimes I will wait to get 3-bet several times before
I begin 4-betting him, and other times I will do it the very first
time an opponent 3-bets me. You don’t always have to fight back
instantly, nor do you have to wait until you have been 3-bet over
and over again. Finding a balance is a good idea.
It’s important you make your 4 bets just enough to get respect,
but not so much that you’re risking more than you need to take
down the pot pre-flop.
For example, let’s say we’re playing a 5/10NL table and you raise
first on the button to $30. The aggressive small blind re-raises to
$95. If you decide to 4-bet your opponent, a mistake many people
make is to make their bet size too large. They’ll make raises to $350,
and now they’ve committed way too much money to the pot in an
attempt to re-steal from their opponent. A 4 bet to $215 should
suffice. It’s large enough to induce a fold from your opponent if
he doesn’t have a big hand, but not so small that you’re unlikely
to get any credit. Always remember to make your 4 bets the same
size, whether you have AA or 27 off-suit. You certainly don’t want
to create a tell that your opponents may pick up on.
Another way to handle aggressive 3 bettors is to call their 3 bet
and play some poker with them post-flop. Sometimes your
opponent will shut down post-flop once you’ve called his 3 bet
test...
1
1
ist prt
Chapter 1
A GAME O!F SKILL, NOT LUCK
For someone known as a professional gambler, I have very little
gamble in me. About two years into my poker career, I got a
tip that the quarterback in an upcoming college football game
was injured and was not going to play — something that was not
common knowledge. I was in Las Vegas at the time, and laid down
the one and only substantial bet I’ve ever made on a sporting
event. The next three hours were some of the most grueling
of my life, and I was completely disgusted that I’d put myself
through the agony over an outcome I couldn’t control.
I ultimately won the bet, but felt as though I’d lost for having laid
the wager in the first place. This event also defined for me the
essential difference between poker and conventional gambling.
Before you dedicate yourself to turning your poker into a
significant income stream, it’s important you understand why
being a poker player qualifies as a profession in the first place.
For something to be considered a profession it must contain two
vital components: The game must be beatable, and it must be a
game where skill is the predominant factor.
This question has become more than an academic one in recent
years, as in October 2006, Congress barred the use of credit
22
cards for online wagers. Horse racing and stock trading were
exempt, but otherwise the new law hit any “game predominantly
subject to chance.” Included among such games was poker.
To me, defining poker as a game of skill is actually quite
simple. To do so, you just need to forget about winning at
poker and think for a moment about losing. Is it possible to
intentionally lose a poker game? Yes, of course. But is it possible
to intentionally lose a game like roulette or craps? No, it’s not.
In games of chance, the participant cannot control the outcome.
Whether your intent is to win or lose the lottery, your odds
remain the same. The superstitious may disagree, but no matter
how many times you pull the handle on a slot machine, your
odds remain the same each time you put your coins in the slot.
But in poker, your actions can influence the outcome of a hand.
You will absolutely lose if you choose to fold every single hand
no matter what cards you hold. If you call bets with a hand that
cannot win the pot, you will also lose every time. This is the
difference between a game of chance and a game of skill.
It’s common knowledge among poker players that chance is a
factor in any given hand, but over many hands poker skill will
even things out, with the more expert players making a profit.
At the higher stakes games I play now, I win approximately 55
percent of the time. If I play 20 tables at once, I expect to show
a profit at 11 and lose at nine. This is a slim profit margin, but a
profit nonetheless. If I were playing quarter games, my win-loss
ratio would be about 80-20, meaning that if I played 20 tables,
I could expect to win at 16 of them and lose at four.
23
There are some games that are skill games, but are not necessarily
profitable. Take blackjack for example: It is most definitely a
skill game because the outcome can easily be influenced through
your actions. You can lose every single hand to the dealer if you
just keep on hitting until you bust. Conversely, you can play
mathematically perfect blackjack and do much better; however,
the odds are stacked against any person who doesn’t count cards,
and the game cannot be beaten in the long run.
In poker, we’re competing against other people in what I feel
is the perfect marriage of chance and skill. A poker player
is frequently all in with a card or two to come (and possibly
several more cards to come if there’s an agreement to “run it
twice”). There’s certainly a rush that comes when you are all in,
especially given the aspect that chance will ultimately dictate in
which direction the chips slide.
But if you’re a skilled poker player — or at least more skilled than
the opponents you’re facing — you’ll more often than not have a
mathematical edge on your opponent because you’ll have a hand
or run a high percentage bluff that will have a better chance of
winning the pot.
In poker, if you continually make good decisions and risk chips
with the best hand more often than not, skill will be the primary
factor in whether or not you win or lose money. Games of chance
cannot make that claim.
24
Chapter 2
WHY! I KEPT IT SIMPLE
Treat Your Poker Like A Business is pretty slight compared to many of
the poker books out there. The chapters are short; the language
is straightforward. It is this size on purpose, yet my greatest
insecurity is that you’ll attribute its simplicity to laziness on my
part, or that its lack of charts, graphs and equations will make
you feel insecure, thinking “There should be more, shouldn’t there?”
What I can tell you is that as one of the all-time leading money
winners in online poker history, this book is a highly accurate
representation of my thought process. It’s the closest I can come
to putting on paper exactly how my poker business grew to be so
profitable. This is how I did it.
I could have written a thousand-page manual. I considered doing
it, but ultimately decided a far shorter book would be more
faithful to the truth about what goes through my mind. I feel
I’m basically pouring water on seeds. My only goal is to get your
mind stimulated and thinking about important subjects that go
into win rate.
One thing I’ve learned from communicating with literally
thousands of online poker players in person or online is that
you are smart people. You deserve the latitude to interpret and
assimilate the information I’m giving you however you want.
25
Much as I believe in the principles you’ll find here, I am an even
bigger believer in intuition. A virtuoso poker player will have an
almost artistic flair for the game, and that can’t happen unless I
give you room to breathe.
As I often do, let’s equate this to golf. I felt like giving you a
thousand-page book would have been like giving you 100
simultaneous swing thoughts. The more detailed the instruction
becomes, the more the likely it is the athlete will disappear in
favor of something more mechanical. What’s the fun in that?
One size does not fit all, in golf, business or poker.
Matt Bolt is a great example of this philosophy at work. He started
as my student, and in the beginning he did well to mimic my
style of play. But as he grew, our games diverged. I play more
hands per hour, while he plays fewer but is more inclined to play
at slightly higher stakes. This is where he feels confident and
secure. There is a common denominator between us, though,
and that is a faithful application of the notion that we must treat
our poker like a business. We share a commitment to long-term
profitability based on forethought and purpose. Having a sound
business foundation provides each of us with a liberating sense
of security. That foundation allows the intuition to come out.
Further along, you’ll read chapters on how much I think you
should play vs. practice. I come down heavily on the side of
“play,” because I think winning is its own skill, and nothing
sharpens skill like time at the tables. To give you a poker bible
would be disingenuous, because frankly that’s just not the sort
of book I’d read.
26
Just as successful poker pros can come from any walk of life,
there is also room for a variety of poker books.
To write more would have hurt you more than it would have
helped. I strongly believe that all the information you need to
be successful is in this book.
27
Chapter 3
COMPARABLE ! PROFESSIONS
A live poker player can come from nearly any walk of life. They
play by feel — one guy might play a little tight, while another
might bluff like crazy. One might be a computer programmer,
the other an artist.
Online pros are different. The top-end players are far more
plugged into a system. We’re technically perfect, like golfers with
perfect swings. Our goal is precision and total efficiency. We
might not be able to scramble like a live player could, but we
control the ball better and therefore decrease the need to recover
in the first place.
I’m not saying we’re better. We’re just different. I play 1,200
hands an hour, while a live player only gets 25 or 30. Both
represent solid career choices for those with the right skill sets.
Most up-and-coming online pros are dialed into a similar
mechanism: they have a coach, they visit the same pokertraining
sites, they read the same blogs and sit in on the same
forums. It’s as though someone took all of the best junior-high
basketball players in the country and sent them to the same
summer-long training camp: come the first day of school,
those players are going to have great similarities in their games.
The top 100 online players probably play 95 percent the same
28
way, with the remaining 5 percent representing little deviations
that make us unique.
True, some of the best online players are MIT math majors
or securities traders who’ve figured out how to beat the game.
Nick Grudzien, the founder of Stoxpoker.com who wrote the
afterword for this book, worked on Wall Street. But the reality
is that top players come from all walks of life. I was a would-be
PGA Tour player who worked for the family business. Matt Bolt
sold pest-control. No one should feel discouraged from making
poker a serious pursuit.
In actuality, stockbrokers and traders do the exact same thing I
do: Based on hard data and intuition, I consider the possible
variations of a deck of cards and I wager on those potential
outcomes. They do the same, with businesses taking the place
of the deck of cards. The difference is that with poker — save the
small percentage of online players who are problem gamblers
— you’re mainly just taking money out of a system that’s largely
recreational. The vast majority of online poker players are
spending money on what they consider to be entertainment.
Though I’ve never been a broker or trader, I can only imagine
I’d sleep better at night knowing I took money out of someone’s
recreational fund rather than his life-savings — in some cases
betting on the outcome of companies that are cutting back jobs
to look better to the people wagering on them. I don’t think
either is an unethical profession, but I’d argue online poker
has the cleanest lines.
29
Chapter 4
!ARE YOU IN?
I’ve had quite a few friends who’ve come to me wanting to cultivate
their poker into a significant revenue stream. Despite being given
the very same system you’ll read about in the following chapters
— along with my private coaching — they lost money. The culprit
in these cases was invariably not their poker-playing ability, but
their ability to manage life away from the tables.
So I’ll ask you the following: Before you so much as turn one
more page, are you totally committed? As they said in Ocean’s
11, “Are you in, or are you out?” Poker is not a get-rich-quick
scheme. It is not a money tree growing in your computer. But it
is something that can liberate your from the shackles of 9-to-5
life, so long as you’re disciplined in honing your skill.
Everything in this book is extremely valuable, but means nothing
without commitment. You might have the desire, the passion and
the vision. You can want to crush the game, to wear that World
Series of Poker bracelet. But day to day, there are distractions
that are part of the equation. You have to work through them,
or not work at your poker at all.
Your heart, your mind and your goals have to be congruent. Ask
yourself, am I committed to the following:
30
• Creating realistic expectations. How much time can you
realistically put into poker? Some people overvalue how
much time they have to play. You'll say, “I can play 6 hours
every night when I get home from work, seven days a week.
So that’s 42 hours per week to play poker.” But you’re
not accounting for those nights when you have to stay at
work late, your social life or evenings when you’re simply
exhausted. So maybe it’s 10-20 hours you can contribute
to poker, not 42. Just as with any business plan, it’s better
to be conservative.
• Making a business plan that is very detailed. Spend a good
amount of time on it. If you’re going to spend six hours a
week on poker study, how will that time be allotted? Is it
two hours on books, two hours on videos and two hours
on Stoxpoker.com threads? You want to be very specific so
you’ll have something to which you can hold yourself. If you
set broad goals, it’s very easy to deviate from them.
• Calling a forum. I’ll tell you right now there is a repetitive
element of this book. Over and over again, I mention the
importance of communicating clear goals to your friends
and family so that boundaries and expectations are set early.
You have to have an open and honest conversation about
what you’re trying to achieve, why it’s good for the entire
family, and that they’re still your priority. To do the inverse
— going off and playing poker without the conversation —
can be destructive and make an already stressful pursuit even
more so. But saying it aloud makes the whole venture more
real. This helps build accountability. It also allows your
friends and family to pull for you and become sources of
inspiration.
• Knowing what’s best. Your kids are very right to want to
spend time with you, and you’re right to want to be with
them. It’s great your friends want you to spend time on
31
Sunday afternoon. Those are healthy things. But a balance
needs to be struck. You have to know what’s best for all
concerned. It’s to their advantage that you ultimately
become prosperous. The money, the confidence, and the
experiences you have will benefit everyone. If you’re unclear
about what’s right, then you’ll be pulled in all directions and
your poker business will fall apart.
• Forgoing temptation. Creating a poker business with kids
might seem hard, but doing it without them can be harder.
The distractions are ample. There’s going out drinking,
partying, spending what’s seemed like easy money on things
you don’t need. All of this will derail your long-term
prosperity.
• Being proud of what you do. I’ve heard it a million times: I
can’t tell my father what I do for a living because I don’t want
to let him down. This is a self-inflicted wound. Any man
who spends 40-50 hours a week providing for himself and
his family in a completely legal fashion should not feel guilty
for two seconds. People are generally not consistent with
their logic. When I was a mini-tour player, people would say,
“You’re my hero. You’re doing something besides the 9-to-5.
You’re following your dream.” But as soon as I started doing
the same in poker, I was castigated even though there was
no difference between the mechanics of the two pursuits.
I would show up, pay an entry fee, play a game I was skilled
at, and was paid based on the outcome. The only standard
that matters is your own. You’ll hear me say it over and
over again in this book: The man dignifies the job; the job
doesn’t dignify the man.
• Being the toughest boss you ever had. You have to demand
a level of commitment from yourself that no one else could.
Think about an athlete you admire who’s in the gym right
now trying to get just a little bit stronger, or the policy maker
who’s working late solving a critical problem. You’re trying
32
to build a future, a career, a new life. Poker can be the job
of your dreams if it works out. People who achieve great
things know how to fully commit to a process. Mastery is its
own skill, and you have to commit to nothing less as you set
forth on this journey.
Are you in?
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Chapter 5
STAR!TING THOUGHTS
Now that you’ve wrapped your mind around the total
commitment that’s essential to taking poker to the next level,
there are several hard-and-fast strategies in which to ground
yourself as your new business gets up and running:
• Dedicate yourself to one game. Otherwise, you’ll
find yourself spread out over limit, no limit, Omaha,
tournaments, etc., all with mediocre results. It’ll take much
longer to get good if you’re too diversified — you might as
well be trying to achieve simultaneous success in baseball,
soccer and hockey. It’s better to be a one-trick pony,
especially at the beginning. That’s how winning decisions
become automatic.
• Set studying goals (and limits). A proper ratio for playingto-
studying is 80/20. For every four hours you spend
playing, you should spend one studying. (I’ll get into this
more in a subsequent chapter). Many conscientious players
ask me, “In the beginning, shouldn’t I be studying 80
percent of the time and playing 20 percent?” While these
people have good intentions, I think they’re wrong. It’s like
spending 80 percent of your time at the driving range and
20 percent playing golf. At the end of the day, golf is about
getting the ball in the hole, which is something you can only
learn to do by playing. Actual time at the tables gets your
attention because it’s for real money. Poker is ultimately
about beating your opponents. Winning is its own skill, one
that you can only learn by competing.
34
• Be patient and start at the stakes where you belong.
Remember, this is not Las Vegas. If you’ve played poker
there, you know that 1/2 NL is about the cheapest game you
can find, and most of those tables are filled with people who
don’t know what they’re doing. But if you go online and
play the 1/2 game, it’s probably as tough as the high-stakes
tables — like playing 25/50 NL live. Vegas limits and online
limits are completely different. You might say, “Topping out
at $35 on a great night online at the 5 cent/10 cent tables
doesn’t exactly get my juices flowing!” That’s a gambler’s
mindset, and it doesn’t belong here. You’re not getting into
this to brag to your buddies. You’re in it to make long-term
money. We’re trying to make skill relevant in a world filled
with chance, and to acquire that skill you need repetition,
which you get by learning from the ground up. It’s like
elementary school, middle school, high school, college,
master’s degree, PhD. Be patient and start at the start.
• You are investing start-up capital in your small business
when you put money in your poker account. And when
you make your first “sale,” you reinvest that money in
your company, too. Don’t run to Best Buy to get yourself
something cool the second you win your first big pot. Again,
this is not Vegas, where it’s all funny money. This is serious
business. You need to remind yourself of this fact every 15
minutes: this is business, not a game.
35
Chapter 6
ASSIGNING A VALUE
T!O YOUR TIME
Here is one of the single-most important concepts you need to
understand as you develop your poker business: Money should
not be your primary focus. Money will come your way if you
improve your poker skill over time. Money ultimately takes care
of itself.
Time is what matters most.
Every time you sit down to play poker, it should be an exercise
in aggregating the most quality hours possible. When you get
away from your “A” game or spend time in the wrong game
or at an unproductive table, you are wasting hours. If you’re a
good player making five big blinds per 100, whenever you make
a careless mistake costing you five big blinds, that’s an hour of
your time that you can never get back.
You have two commodities your business can consider as
inventory: time and money. This chapter is about assigning value
to your time. A future chapter called “Managing Your Bankroll”
will tell you how to assign value to your money.
Think of a salesperson who works on 100 percent commission.
He wakes up every morning with no guarantees. He could go out
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there and close every prospect he has, or he could get destroyed.
There are no guarantees. But he has a certain talent that makes
him better than the norm, and that talent shows up every day. If
he goes on enough appointments, his talent — his “edge” over
his competition — shows up enough times to become statistically
significant. It’s a numbers game.
Your poker business is no different. Your specific windfall on
any given day depends on how many poor players are playing,
how you’re feeling, the quality of your decisions, etc. But the
core of your ability is going to stay constant.
You basically need to look at your time as though you’re clocking
in at an hourly rate. It’s not sexy to think of poker that way, but
it’s true. Some days you’re thinking clearly and the games are
good, so you make $1,000 an hour in that ideal circumstance.
Other days might not run nearly as well, and on those days you
may lose $500 an hour.
Overall, your average is $250 an hour. So if you spend 30
minutes watching a sitcom when you were supposed to be playing,
you paid $125 to do so. The 10 minutes you spent following a silly
Internet forum cost you about $42 (one sixth of $250.) I look at
my poker business in exactly these terms. If I’m doing something
else during the time I’ve set aside to play, it is absolutely costing
me money.
I feel the best approach is to set a foundation for a schedule. For
example, “I’ll play from 7 p.m.-midnight Wednesday through
Friday, and 4 p.m.-midnight Saturday and Sunday. I’ll study
from 8 p.m.-10 p.m. Monday and Tuesday.” This foundation
37
has me on the tables when it’s most valuable to play — typically,
those hours when the American worker is off.
But you have to be adaptive. Maybe every fifth or sixth day, I’ll
log on to check my email or look up the score of a ball game and
see the games are outstanding. I want to take advantage of that,
so I’ll play and do the best I can during that time. Maybe it’ll
turn into a marathon day if it stays good, or I’ll just play until
the tables aren’t good anymore. If the games are good, I’ll tape
my eyelids open if it keeps me at the tables.
You have to accept the good games aren’t necessarily going to
happen on your schedule. They’re not always going to cooperate
with what you want to do. At the same time, if you kill it at a
time when you hadn’t expected, you can reward yourself down
the line.
People often ask me if there are a minimum number of hours
they should be playing. Without giving a specific number, I’ll
say you absolutely must be playing a handful of hours every week
if you’re to consistently bring in any money and stay in touch
with your game.
Again, if you have the skill that gives you an edge at a particular
level, you need to play enough to make that edge statistically
significant. For example, with all things being equal, let’s say that
you’ll win 55 percent of your hands and lose 45 percent. That 10
percent gap between your wins and losses represents your profit.
How much that profit grows depends on how much you play.
Also, the more you play, the more you compensate for variance
38
and hone your skill. You need repetition week after week. Like
any sport, you need to keep striving to improve.
This brings us to the question of how much time you should
spend practicing and analyzing your own game. Studying does
absolutely have long-term benefits and I think you should do it.
But I also think you need to keep studying in perspective. (I
discuss effective practice in the next chapter.) I refer to winning
as being its own skill several times in this book. Winning requires
improvisation, on-the-fly calculation, and management of
time and emotion. This ability can only be honed by playing. I
always preferred playing golf to hitting balls on the range, and
my success seemed to support that decision.
I value the time I spend on poker as being worth a particular
dollar figure; thus, when I spend time studying and not playing,
it’s as though I paid a certain amount to learn that information.
Here’s an example: I make an average of $800 per hour. If I
spend five hours per week practicing poker and not playing, that
time is costing me $4,000 a week, or $208,000 a year. That’s
a significant sum. If I’m going to devote those five hours to
practice each week, I better be doing some significant improving.
If you spent 100 percent of your time playing and not practicing,
you could improve 2-3 percent each month. If you played 80
percent of your time and practiced 20 percent, you might
improve 5-10 percent every month — but you lost 20 percent
of your playing time. Is that practice going to make up for the
money you didn’t make when you could’ve been playing? For
39
some the answer may be yes. But it is critical that you approach
the situation with this mindset. With some experimentation, in
time you will figure out the best balance for you.
For the player whose win rate is nonexistent or relatively low, I
absolutely advocate that 80/20 play/practice split. This is your
business and we are trying to improve its efficiency, and the
best way to do that in the early days is through practice. For
every four hours you play, you should practice or study one
hour. By doing so, you’re improving the overall value of your
business, training yourself to make money five, 10, 20 years
from now. That time spent practicing will have a compounding
effect over time. Practice will build the long-term foundation
for your business.
As your win rate improves, I recommend dialing back the practice
in favor of more play. An awareness of your hourly rate will help
you do an accurate cost/benefit analysis of the time you spend
practicing and studying.
40
Chapter 7
PRACTICING ! EFFECTIVELY
Time is inventory when it comes to your poker business.
Your goal is to improve the value of that time. While it’s hard
to go wrong when you’re trying to improve your game, some
opportunities are more valuable than others.
In other businesses, there are symposiums, trade publications
and seminars. Some are better than others. If you choose to go
to a local chamber of commerce lunch when you could have had
lunch with Warren Buffett, that’s an opportunity cost. You may
have learned a thing or two at the chamber luncheon, so it wasn’t
a total waste of time. But it was the least best use of your time.
In the previous chapter, I said I recommend an 80/20 percent
split in time spent playing vs. practicing for those with lower
win rates. As your win rate increases, your practice time should
decrease.
Here are ways to maximize your practice time:
• Watch videos actively: Go to Stoxpoker and CardRunners,
which are by far the most reputable teaching sites on the
Internet. Watch videos from the coaches who specialize in
the game you want to master. Diligently take notes while
you’re watching. I’ve noticed people watching videos who
are treating it as though they’re just putting in time. They’re
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like those students who show their faces in college and take
C-minuses. That might get you your diploma, but it won’t
get you anywhere in poker. You’ll get eaten alive. You need
to hang on to every word these coaches are saying.
• Simplify: Now what do you do with your notes? You review
them, and simplify them when you go to play. In reality,
you can only focus on one or two ideas when you’re playing.
When you can get everything mentioned by the coach
ingrained in your game, you move on, but not before. It’s
like a golfer who reads an article and tries to implement eight
swing thoughts his next time on the course. Good luck! More
than likely, his swing will look like a guy falling out of a tree.
I once had a guy write to me who said, “Hey Leatherass, when are
you going to do a new video? You haven’t done one in a couple
weeks.” I wrote back and said, “I have a new video coming out
in a week or two, but in the meantime I have 70 other videos on
the site that can tide you over until my next release.”
“I watched those, too,” he wrote.
“How long have you been a member,” I asked.
“Two months,” he replied.
Don’t get me wrong, I felt extremely flattered that he watched
more than one of my videos a day for two months. My best
friends don’t even want to spend that much time with me. But
there’s no way he could have digested even 20 percent of what I
told him, let alone be able to implement it. It’s much better to
take notes and slowly install what you’ve learned.
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• Use forums effectively: One of my most common bits of
advice is to suggest people study the situations they most
commonly struggle with. That’s one thing that Tiger
Woods does better than anyone: attack his weaknesses. He’s
extremely honest with himself about where he’s falling short,
and he practices that weakness until it’s a strength. These are
commonalities among all greats, regardless of their field:
they are unfailingly honest with themselves, and they address
the areas where they’re coming up short.
If you look at 90 percent of forum posts, they’ll focus on
these “cooler situations,” like a hand where they got set oversetted.
I’ve got news for you: I’m going broke there. Phil
Ivey and Doyle Brunson are going broke there. You are most
definitely going broke there.
Instead, you should be focusing on the fact that you flopped
middle pair or a draw on 50 percent of the pots you played,
you had somebody betting at you, and you didn’t know what
to do. You’re continually making that error. Most players
make a dozen or so small mistakes every hour, and that is
what’s holding them back from what they can be.
After every session, you should write down the smaller
situations that bothered you, then post those things in the
forums. Keep your eyes peeled for the response. Sure, you’ll
get some jackasses who will poke fun at you, but who cares?
You’re in the business of making money. If you wanted to
make friends you’d be on Match.com. Don’t worry about the
dummies.
• Organize groups: You should get people together who share
your passion. I’m still in daily contact with my original group.
They’re some of the best players around today, and we still
email each other hand questions and get opinions. We live in
Southern California, Northern California, New York, South
Carolina and Oregon. That’s the beauty of the Internet.
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If you really want to improve, go into the forums on
Stoxpoker or Cardrunners and write a heartfelt letter to
the community. Say, “I’m not very good, but I work really
hard and I want to get better and learn. Who’s interested in
joining me in an email chain, or IM group, or conference
call twice a week?” You can cover more ground working as
a group. One guy can watch one of my videos, another can
watch Jared Tendler’s, another can watch Nick Grudzien’s,
etc. You distill those videos down to their core two or three
ideas, and pass the knowledge around.
You might end up improving and making some great friends
— at least I did. Having that communication makes it a more
exciting and less-lonely endeavor. You have a buddy system
where you’re dragging each other up and working like a
team. It’s not a long shot by any means that you could get
this up and going. Trust me, if you pour your soul out there,
you’re going to get more back than the sound of crickets
chirping.
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Chapter 8
MANAGING ! YOUR BANKROLL
We’ve discussed time as inventory. Now let’s talk about money
as inventory.
If you owned a widget business, you’d want to have enough
widgets in your warehouse that you could fulfill a big order.
Money is the inventory that allows you to sit down at a table
when a fish is there and the odds are in your favor. Without that
inventory, all else is moot.
My family’s toy business is a good example of ineffective inventory
management. My dad would only keep 400 cap guns on hand
because he wanted to keep our inventory low for the purposes of
overhead. But once a month, someone would call to buy 1,000 cap
guns in one shot, and we’d either have to turn that person down or
turn something around really quickly. Most often we missed out
on the sale. Similarly, if you’re cashing out your bankroll all the
time, you could potentially not have the inventory to play a poor
player when he sits down at a table, especially in the case of a fish
who has decided to move up in stakes. That’s a big sale on which
you’ve missed out. It’s found money, basically, and you don’t want
to miss out on the opportunity to pick it up.
Maybe your regular game is a $100 buy in, and you saw a megafish
in the lobby for a $200 game. Now he’s got $400 down and
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the seat next to him is open. You could have position on him.
But without the inventory, you’ve missed out on a big sale.
If you keep a constant-but-inadequate bankroll, you will go
broke — of this I am 100 percent certain. Spending pieces of
your accumulating bankroll because a long losing streak seems
unlikely is a recipe for total disaster.
I’ve known many a winning poker player to go broke. They
may start with $5,000, win $100,000 in three months, spend
$80,000 and lose back $25,000. Now they’re broke despite
having won $80,000.
I have a good friend who’s notorious for this. He’s been trying
to be a pro for five years. But he has a few kids, and every time
he wins $1,000, he says, “Wow, I could pay for my daughter’s
music lessons or my son’s summer camp with this.” So he hits the
“cash out” button, and he’s back to where he was at the beginning
of the day.
True, he can pretend that day didn’t exist and start fresh
tomorrow, and that theoretically works for the days he wins.
But if you do that every time you win, and take your licks when
you lose, you end up broke.
You need to ask yourself, “What’s my ultimate goal here?” Your
goal is to make as much money as possible playing poker. You
need the bankroll to play at the stakes for which you’re aiming.
You need a six-figure bankroll to play at the high stakes, so if
you only have $1,000 in your account, you have a long way to
go. It’s a step-by-step progression.
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You obviously don’t want to over-do it. You don’t want $50,000
in your poker account and $50 in your savings account. But
you give yourself the best chance to succeed by having enough
inventory to make the big sale when one comes along. Finding
a balance that works for your situation is essential.
You want enough so your career can gradually progress up the
stakes. If you have a comfortable balance in your poker account,
you can more easily justify taking shots at higher-stakes games. If
you cash out and are always on a short bankroll, it’s easy to fall
into a scenario where you say, “There’s a great shot for me at
the bigger games …,” and you deposit money from your savings
online. Now you have your real-life money in there, and it feels
like you’re losing a lot more than just the ups and downs you
need to withstand as a poker pro.
When can you feel comfortable cashing out? There’s no perfect
answer for everybody, because everyone’s financial picture is
different. You might have extenuating circumstances where you
really need the money, which is totally understandable.
Again, we get back to looking at this as a business. Statistics say
that most businesses don’t make money for five years. We don’t
want that, of course, so let’s reduce that figure to one year. We
won’t expect our poker business to make money for one year,
so for that period, you will not take money out of your poker
account. This allows you to comfortably progress through the
limits as your skills dictate.
As a conservative estimate, you want to have 100 buy-ins in
your bankroll at all times. If you’re playing $100 buy-ins, you
47
want to have $10,000 in your account. This is a minimum. A
more aggressive coach might tell you 20 buy-ins is sufficient.
But I’m conservative, because I like to have plenty of money
in my account in case I see somebody I like at a higher-stakes
table. It also gives me a peace of mind similar to someone who
just paid off his home. Is it the best way to invest your money?
Probably not, but peace of mind should be a huge factor in your
decision because you can only really play your best when you are
comfortable.
I suspect many poker professionals will disagree with my
conservative bankroll suggestions. Make no mistake about it,
this is some of the most conservative advice you will ever hear.
But I tell you this as someone who’s never had a losing month,
never gone broke, and is one of the all-time money winners
in online poker: I have never taken a shot at a limit for which I
didn’t have at least 100 buy-ins.
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Chapter 9
KNOWI!NG YOUR MARGINS
You’ll need to stick with me a bit on this chapter. I promise you
that I’ll get there, but I have to go around the bend a bit to bring
the point home.
Growing up in my family business, I learned finding
opportunities to increase our profit margins even the slightest
bit could have an enormous impact on our bottom line. Say I
increased our profit margin on a $4.99 doll from 10 percent
to 11 percent by cutting down on our shipping costs. A 1
percent up-tick of roughly 5 cents doesn’t sound like anything
significant, until you consider that we sold nearly 100,000 of
them every year. Suddenly that 1 percent increase is netting you
an additional $4,990. Not too bad. If we could make enough
of those small increases to our profit margin, suddenly we’re
maybe able to hire that one extra employee who could free us
up to focus on long-term growth. If you focus on finding small
edges here and there, pretty soon you’re looking at big profits.
Many people have criticized me because I tend to focus on things
that were once considered peripheral. Increasing my profit
margins 1 percent here and 2 percent there is a far cry from
a poker game in the Wild, Wild West. But those incremental
improvements, which I still seek today, are what made my poker
business as healthy as it is today.
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Poker is a game where we have to bet a lot to win a little, making
it a thin-market business. But consider the following:
On a given day, I’ll have 20 tables going at once, and I play 20
percent of my hands at an average of one hand per table, per
minute. So I’m playing four hands per minute. The average
pot size for those hands is $300 or so, which means I’m playing
$1,200-worth of pots per minute. That’s $70,000-worth of
pots in an hour. If I play for 10 hours, that means I’ve played
for a total of $700,000 in a day. I’ve chanced that I’ll lose or
win $10,000, even though I’ve technically risked $700,000.
To me, poker these days is like golf was a century ago. Back then,
no one thought about having your equipment just right, having
a ball to suit your game, the importance of a pre-shot routine,
etc. They just said, “Here’s the ball. Here’s the club. Swing.”
These days every aspect of your game is broken down — driving
distance, driving accuracy, greens in regulation, scrambling,
putts per round — and to succeed, you need to fare well in just
about every one of those facets. A century ago, you just needed
raw talent.
In poker, I feel as though I’m advancing the nuances — which,
if studied, can increase your profit margin — that will someday
become the norm. There are lots of guys more talented than I am
at poker, but I’m striving to be the “poker player of the future,”
if you will, who focuses and measures himself based on how well
he does in these smaller areas. A guy could steal a pot from me
and say, “I outplayed Leatherass. So how does he make $1 million
a year and I make $40,000?” My answer: look in the margins.
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Margins are a mindset. Everything that you have read and will
read in this book is not meant to affect a gargantuan shift in
your game. They’re meant to increase your profit margin an
unknown percent.
My advice might yield 1 percent here, 2 percent there. But when
you add those things up, it makes for a very profitable poker
player. Mine is not sexy advice — I’m not promising you that I
know five ways to swoop in and steal a pot from Phil Ivey. But
maybe you’ll learn a new play you didn’t have in your arsenal
before, and maybe that play only comes up once an hour. But if
that wins you a hand an hour, you’ll be looking at a new profit
source that’s contributing to your bottom line. Also factor in
that you have this new play, which detracts from your opponents’
ability to make decisions against you. That’s yet another profit
source. Add another table and apply my advice — you get the
picture. You’re gaining margin points where you’d not have
before.
If you always keep your wheels turning and have your mind on
margins, it will yield significant profit down the line.
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Chapter 10
METR!ICS THAT MATTER
Every company must choose specific metrics by which it can evaluate
its progress month-over-month, year-over-year, and so on.
Your poker business is the same.
The single most important metric is hours played, and the
second is dollars won. I’m a very process-oriented person. We’re
in the business to make money, but we can’t always control that
figure because there’s luck involved. But you can control the
number of hours you spend on the game. If you commit to
applying a process time and again over a number of hours, the
dollars will follow.
This is your own business, and as such, you won’t have a boss
telling you what time to be there or what time to leave. Most
people struggle with this — if you play 40 hours a week, you’re
a beast in the poker industry.
I commonly hear that poker is too intense to play it for a
significant number of hours at a time. I buy this argument to
an extent, because in terms of intensity, I’ve found little else
that matches what a poker player experiences. You’re constantly
being put through decision-making that matters, across multiple
tables.
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That said, it’s not life and death. Raise the bar little by little, and
eventually you’ll become adapted to playing poker for extended
periods. To start at 9 a.m. and quit at noon is simply not a hard
day’s work.
Set time goals, and keep a log to make sure you’re meeting them.
I’ll say it again and again in this book: You should have an 80/20
split for time spent playing vs. practicing. Practice time should
decrease as you become more proficient; likewise, if your game
is in dire straits, a 50/50 split might be in order. But you have
to make yourself accountable for a total number of hours spent
on poker.
Those hours must be filled entirely with quality time. If you’re
capable of playing eight hands at once at your peak efficiency, you
need to be there at all times. Saying, “I don’t feel like focusing
today. I’ll just play two or three tables,” is totally unacceptable.
Would you tolerate an employee coming to you and saying, “I
just wasn’t feeling it today, so I only went on two sales calls and
blew off the other six”? If you normally play eight hands at once,
but dial that down to two, you have to commit to play four times
as much to make up for the difference.
Your whole life doesn’t need to revolve around making money. I
certainly understand that. But if you’re reading this book, you’re
interested in maximizing the value of your time, in which case
you need to strive to work at peak efficiency.
Besides time played and money won, dollars per hour is the best
metric, because it takes into account more factors than dollar
per hand. I could achieve a great per-hand figure by playing
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only when fish are at the table, or only playing one or two hands
at a time. Dollars per hour better encompasses what I want to
achieve. As I learn to play more and more tables at once, my
dollars per hour should increase. But if my play diminishes
because I’m adding too many tables, I’ll know that, too.
Some metrics can be destructive. Any metric that gets you
thinking too near-term can take you totally off-course. It’s like a
company that’s too beholden to its stock price and less concerned
about its long-term health. Say you’re a shareholder in Apple,
and the stock loses ground one day. You read an article that
questions if Apple’s reign is over, and you sell your stock the
next day. Lots of people manage their investments that way. But
you should be comparing solid information grounded in actual
company data against firmly established metrics.
Some people compare their performance against established
pros. This is a common mistake. You might read that an average
pro plays 23 percent of pots, and you only play 15 percent. You
tell yourself, “I should be playing more pots. I’m too tight.”
You start playing more hands, and pretty soon you’re finding
yourself in positions you’re not comfortable playing. Let your
game evolve and expand at its own pace.
Expanding our vision a bit, a metric that is incredibly destructive is
peer recognition. Poker players are often jerks, plain and simple.
You’re playing at a table against a bunch of people with their own
money on the line. It’s not a friendly environment; it’s war. They
will tear you down. Most of us will absorb that criticism. It’s human
nature, particularly when you’ve not been running well. Stick to your
guns and the metrics that matter to you. Everything else is just noise.
54
Metrics are your compass. They let you know if you’re getting
closer to or farther from your goals. A good suggestion is to
always spend 15-20 minutes before or after each session analyzing
what went right and wrong during the previous session. Do the
same thing at the end of each week, evaluating the previous seven
days against your most important metrics.
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Chapter 11
DEALING ! WITH VARIANCE
Of all the articles that have been written about me, my favorite
was a piece that was done by John Garrity for Sports Illustrated in
February 2009, because it included the following passage:
“Schmidt has acquired a mathematician’s detachment, a focused tranquility that
allows him to manage tens of thousands of dollars on a constantly changing digital
landscape. ‘I’ll go a hundred thousand hands without making money, but I’ve never
had a losing month,’ he said.”
The tranquility Garrity mentions here was the grail I chased
for the first few years of my poker career. You’ll read about the
roots of my psychological turnaround in subsequent chapters,
but suffice it to say, tilt was a significant issue in my life. What
was leading me to tilt was a feeling of failure when I’d suffer a
bad beat, when in fact that beat was just the normal variance that
is part and parcel of poker. To make peace with poker is to come
to terms with variance.
Variance is basically that which deviates from the norm, be it
good or bad. In baseball, if a player has proven himself to be a
.300 hitter three years running, then it’s reasonable to assume
that in his fourth year he’ll also hit .300, with his hits being
derived from a mixture of bunts, ground balls, line drives, fly
balls and home runs. If that hitter has two hits in nine at bats,
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and on his tenth at bat hits a line drive that is caught by the
second baseman, that is bad variance. If he has three hits in nine
at bats, and on the 10th at bat hits a blooper that falls between
three fielders, that’s good variance.
Say you’ve historically won 20 cents a hand over a million-hand
career. Minus any significant changes to your game or the poker
landscape, you are probably going to win 20 cents over your next
million hands, as well.
It stands to reason then that if you play 3,000 hands in a day, and
you’re a 20 cent/hand winner on average, you should win $600
a day. If you somehow win $1,200, you’ve had good variance. If
you break even or lose $600, you’ve had bad variance.
For some reason, we in the poker community tend to only look
at the word variance as one that describes a bad run. But in
truth, variance is both good and bad. For every 10 hands you
play, two might invariably run well, two might run badly, and
the remainder will be consistent with your skill level. Dealing
with the two that run badly will have a lot to do with your longterm
success.
When we cool off, our first instinct is to presume that something
is wrong: “I’ve lost three days in a row. It’s my fault. I’m no good
anymore.” Nothing could be less true. Great poker players can
go 100,000 hands or more and not make money.
The newer you are to the game, the harder it is to deal with
variance because you have a much smaller sample size. There
have been a lot of guys who’ve quit their job after a couple hot
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months, only to discover they were experiencing good variance.
Likewise, many a poker career that would’ve been profitable
never got off the ground because of bad variance at their outset.
In hindsight, I was very fortunate at the outset of my career
because I ran OK off the bat. I had $1,000 between me and the
streets, and I put it online thinking, “I guess we’ll find out if I’m
any good or not.” If I’d run badly, God only knows where I’d be
today. I was lucky to not be unlucky, that’s for sure. I was also
fortunate that I didn’t run so hot that I got ahead of myself. All
in all, I got a fair shake, which is all you can hope for.
How can you tell if you're running good or bad? There’s no
way to know definitively. But there are some tools you can use.
Hold’Em Manager has a statistic called “$ (EV adjusted.)” The
statistic essentially calculates your equity percentage of the total
pot when you go all in, and compares it to what you actually won.
Here is how $ (EV Adjusted) is calculated:
Let’s say I go all in pre-flop with AA and my opponent has TT.
I’m 80.5% to win a $400 pot.
80.5% x $400 = $322, so what it’s saying is on average I should
win approximately $322 of the $400 pot when I go all in with
AA vs. his TT.
• If I win, I would take the entire $400 pot, so I’ve won $78
more than I would have on average, in which case I’ve been
pretty lucky. I’ve won $78 more than I should have in this
spot (even though I might feel like this should have happened
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because my hand held up. At the outset of my career, I always
thought I ran badly because I never recognized when I ran
well.)
• If I lose, I win $0, so I’m running $322 less than I would
have on average, in which case I’ve been unlucky. Maybe,
though, I’ve not been as unlucky as I feel because I wasn’t
entitled to the $400, just the $322. I’m like the driver who
gets in the first fender bender of his life at the age of 65, and
feels unlucky. In fact, he’s been lucky, because statistically
he should have been in an accident a long time ago. He’s
been driving for about 50 years and this mild accident with
no injuries is the worst accident he’s been involved in.
$ (EV Adjusted) tells you what should have happened. It is
signified directly to the right of the money-won column in your
copy of Hold’em Manager.
This isn’t a perfect statistic, nor is it the sole determination
of if you’ve been lucky, unlucky or normal. But it’s certainly a
useful tool in determining whether or not you’ve been running
good or bad.
I’m also a huge believer in hiring a poker coach who is or has
been a big winner in the game you’re playing. It’s a great thing
to do when you are running poorly (or running really well) so
you can receive a professional assessment of if you’re playing
well and running badly, or vice versa. Beyond just that, you will
surely pick up some helpful concepts that will result in improved
play — and an improved bottom line — for your poker business.
He’ll be able to give you a pretty good evaluation of where you
are with your game. The best coaches are at Stoxpoker.com.
59
Private message them and they’ll quote you their hourly rates,
which generally range from $50-$750.
60
Chapter 12
DON’T LO!OK AT THE CASHIER
I have a good friend who was a longtime sales manager in the
advertising field. He once told me that one common trait among
his top salespeople was that they never looked at their numbers
until the end of the month. That way, their effort stayed constant
when times were good, and when times weren’t so good, they
weren’t unduly pressured by the winding down of the monthly
clock.
Though I’m not in sales, this is something I apply to my poker
business. I am one of the few people I know in online poker
who does not look at the cashier until the end of the month.
I just don’t see the advantage in looking. If I’m playing well,
there’s a good chance I’ll become protective of my money, just
as a football team that’s ahead might go into a prevent defense,
as opposed to playing with the abandon that got them the lead
in the first place.
By not looking at the cashier, I stay committed to the thought
process and what I’m trying to achieve. Results have been known
to interfere with that thought process. Those who are running
really badly, for example, might go up in stakes to chase their
losses.
Even worse, a bad trend might make you feel like you need to
61
keep playing on and on, regardless of the stakes. If you’re losing,
it might just be bad luck, or it might be bad play. Chances are
certainly greater that your game is off when you’re losing money.
Ironically, this is when people tend to play the longest. Because
they’re down, they play longer when they’re not at their best.
Conversely, there’s an instinct to quit when we’re ahead, as if to
say, “I just made $10,000 in my first 20 minutes. Why don’t I
go play golf?” But this is exactly when you should keep playing.
That’s how you get to days where you make $20,000-$30,000.
You keep going.
Strangely enough, when the games are bad and we’re thinking
badly, we’re inclined to keep playing. But when the games are
best and we’re thinking our best, we’re inclined to stop. Most of
us play our longest sessions in the worst environments. I once
heard a guy say, “You know why I never lose at poker? I play until
I’m not losing anymore.” Come to think of it, I hear comments
like this all the time.
We’ve all known guys who’ve played 30 hours at a time until they
get unstuck. That is completely unnecessary — you’d have won
at the beginning of your next session if you’d taken some time
to rest.
There have been months that have begun with me getting down
$30,000. But I ignore the cashier. I don’t want to have to deal
emotionally with the loss. Two or three weeks go by, and I’ll
finally check the cashier, only to discover that I’m up $35,000.
I’ll look at the history graph, and sure enough I was down
$30,000, only to go on a $65,000 tear.
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By not looking at the cashier, I always feel like a winner. This
may be a psychological crutch, but it works.
As opposed to your cashier’s balance, the figure you have to
keep in mind is your hourly rate. If that’s constant or trending
upward, you know you’re improving as a player and your overall
strategy is sound.
This advice applies so long as you’re following what I said
previously of keeping 100 buy-ins in your bankroll. If you’re
not to that threshold yet, you may have to check the cashier to
make sure you’re not in any serious bankroll trouble.
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Chapter 13
KNOWING YOUR RISK
!TOLERANCE
Part of growing your business is coming to an understanding of
how much risk you can tolerate. Are you willing to take a step
back in order to ultimately take two steps forward?
A lot of my answer to the question of risk tolerance has put me
at odds with some in the poker community, because it gets to
the essential core of what differentiates a gambling mentality
from my own.
You should know that I’m conservative when it comes to poker
and risk tolerance. The risk in being too conservative is that I
might not move up in stakes fast enough. But it’s unknown if
I’m going to succeed at those higher stakes. I’d rather make the
mistake of netting only $60 an hour when I could have been
making $80, than chasing that $80 and going down to zero.
Ultimately, I am making money doing something I enjoy. I have
no boss. I make my own hours. I don’t want to risk that so I can
have bragging rights with my online peers.
If you have a mindset that you must move up quickly, and you
manage your bankroll liberally, you’re setting yourself up for a
really big mistake in the long run. That is a gambler’s mentality
with which few people can succeed long term.
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I look at poker not as a gamble, but as a skill. (And as you read
in Ch. 1, I can prove that winning poker is a skill.) I want to
make a small business out of that skill, and like most businesses,
I don’t want to risk having to close up shop. Staying open is the
goal first and foremost; maximizing profit is second.
I’ve seen people making deep six figures a year playing 5/10
NL and 10/20 NL games online, but who nonetheless have a
mentality that they haven’t succeeded until they’ve made it up to
the nosebleeds. They’ll risk crippling their businesses and their
entire lives by getting greedy for money, notoriety, or both. In
one bad night they could lose everything.
You could be setting yourself up for disaster.
I understand the allure of the nosebleed games. They’re
positioned as being at the pinnacle of what we want to achieve.
Maybe two years ago you were dreaming of a day you could take
your shot at Phil Ivey, and now here’s your chance. It’s awfully
tempting. I’d be lying if I said I didn’t dream about them myself.
I’ve watched those games and thought about how cool it would
be to win a hand and pay off my mortgage.
I have the skill to do that. But I don’t want to lose my house,
either, and to me that’s a hell of a lot more important.
It’s entirely possible you might have the skill to take that shot at
the nosebleeds. But that doesn’t make it the right thing to do.
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Chapter 14
PIC!K A STRATEGY
You have to have a strategy for success when you open a business.
The idea of being in business for yourself is a nice one, but until
you have a plan for how you’re going to convert your idea into
cash, it will remain just that — an idea.
You would never start a business where you bought an apple
for a dollar and then sold it for 95 cents. You’d never make it.
This is the equivalent of playing poker without a weaker player
at the table.
If you’re at a table with five other pros of roughly similar ability,
you are playing to lose money. You basically will trade money
back and forth between equal players, while paying 5 percent
rake for the privilege. That’s the equivalent of buying a product
and selling it for a lower price point.
You might make money by accident if you’re just playing for
entertainment, or just blowing off steam for an hour. But you
cannot make an argument that — unless you are an absolutely
superb player — it will ultimately be profitable to consistently sit
at a table without weaker players.
Here is the counter-argument to what I’m saying: While those six
players of equivalent ability may just be passing money around,
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they are gaining valuable experience playing against top-level
competition. Iron sharpens iron, as they say. You are also
learning things about that competition.
My argument to that argument: First, you may be learning about
them, but they’re learning about you, too. So it’s a wash. Second,
there are good pros at every table. Why not play against them
while there’s also fish at the table? Fish make it more exciting,
in fact, because of the competition to get at that one guy.
Here are the best ways to tell if your table has a fish at it:
• You are a regular in your games and you do not recognize
a new opponent. Nine times out of 10, if you are a regular
in your games and do not recognize an opponent, he’s a
recreation player.
• You have that player marked as weak. It’s very important
to take notes on your opponents. The reality is you are very
likely to see that person again and you should prepare for
that moment by marking him as a weak player.
• You notice an opponent whose stack size is greater than
20 big blinds, but less than 100 big blinds. There are
two types of people who play for a living: Those who play
a short-stack style (they buy in for 20 big blinds and leave
when they reach 40 big blinds), and those who play with
a maximum buy in. With rare exception, if you notice an
opponent who is sitting with a stack size not indicative of
either a short stacker or someone who buys in for the table
maximum, they are a recreational player. If you notice one
of these players, grab a seat.
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• You notice someone limp in pre-flop to open the action.
There are a handful of good players with whom I’ve sat who
make it a practice to limp in pre-flop, but that’s about it.
Other than a few players here and there, my basic rule is if I
see someone limp in, they are a fish until proven otherwise.
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Chapter 15
TIME! FOR EXPANSION
The question over moving up in the number of tables you’re
playing at one time is akin to a company considering if the time
is right for expansion. Will more locations equal more revenue?
Or is less more, and will more be less?
When I was working for my family business, I remember having
great business opportunities laid at my feet and getting excited
about them. Then I’d look at our eight employees and realize
— much as it broke my heart — that there was no way to grow
intelligently to meet the demand.
So how do you know when adding tables equals smart growth?
I’m constantly encouraging people to push the envelope. If you
are able to play five tables as well as your can four, then you
should; otherwise, you’re giving up 20 percent of your potential
profit margin, which would be a huge mistake.
But adding tables can also be a slippery slope because if you
keep adding one more and one more with abandon, you’ll
eventually arrive at a point of diminishing returns where you’re
not playing profitable poker anymore. It’s akin to someone
having three hamburger joints that are doing great. So he says
to himself, “This is going so well, let’s open seven more.”
But do you have the capital and manpower needed to run 10
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restaurants? If not, it won’t be long until you’re not making
any money at all.
There are a couple of ways to view expansion, poker-wise.
Assuming you have the skills to do it, you can play more tables
at stakes where you know you’ll do well and expect slightly less
of a win rate. This enables you to reach the “long run” more
quickly. This is key. If your results per hand are consistent and
your goal is to play 100,000-150,000 hands in a month, playing
more hands will hasten that yield. The fewer hands you play, the
more subject you are to variance. By playing more hands, you
start to minimize the impact of variance and skill wins the day.
The profit margin you can expect by virtue of your skill level
becomes statistically more significant the more hands you play.
The downside is you might be playing lesser stakes than you could
be playing. You are probably not improving and thinking about
situations as well as a guy playing less tables is doing. A lot of
improvement comes from playing smaller tables and grinding
on decisions. If you have 12-16 tables going on, life becomes
more difficult — though it will take you a longer time to reach
the “long term.”
It’s a virtual certainty that your win rate will suffer incrementally
as you move up in hands. But if your dollars-per-hour metric
remains steady or improves, you’ll know that your move up in
simultaneous hands played has been a smart one.
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Chapter 16
DETERMINING ! YOUR STYLE
Every company should have a mission statement — a brief
encapsulation of core values to which the company should be
tethered as it grows and changes. One thought — or in this case,
one question — that I try to keep in mind as my game evolves
is this: If I only had one table to play, and from that table I
had to extract all of the potential money I could make from
poker, what style of play would I choose? What would make me
the most profitable? Would I be a tight-aggressive player, or a
loose-aggressive one?
Here’s my answer: If I could play just one table, I would probably
play around 30 percent of my hands.
At my present stakes, I play about 20-23 percent of my hands,
spread over 12-16 tables — and sometimes as many as 20 tables.
My rationale for playing 7-10 percent fewer hands is that I’m
better off ditching the bottom third of the hands I’d customarily
play in favor of seeking more profitable situations over a greater
number of tables being played at once.
What you ultimately want to achieve is the perfect balance
between playing too many hands and too few.
For example, let’s say you average a profit of $1 per hand playing
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one table. You could probably continue to make that $1 a hand
over four tables. You can play that increased number of pots and
still focus clearly. But if you increase to five tables and beyond,
things might start to feel chaotic and your performance will
suffer.
In order to play more tables, you need to throw out those hands
that are the least profitable. You might go from $1 to 75 cents per
hand, because you ditched some of your hands, but it’s worth it
if you play twice as many tables.
Let’s say your ideal poker strategy yields $1 per hand. That’s
playing 30 percent of your hands, which you consider optimal.
But you can only play that style on five tables at the most. Each
table is yielding 100 hands per hour, so you’re playing 500
hands — and making $500 — per hour.
Your second-most ideal style is to play fewer hands with a
simplified strategy Your decisions are more automated, so there’s
less risk and less reward. Now you’re yielding just 75 cents per
hand, but you can play 10 tables. Now you’re playing 1,000
hands per hour, and making $750 an hour as a result.
So you see, a more simplistic style might make you less profitable
per table, but could make you more profitable per hour.
This style of play has put me at odds with much of the poker
community. I view poker as a business, and this is the safest and
most profitable way for me to grow my business. But it’s a less
audacious style, and that doesn’t square well with a lot of people
in the poker community.
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At the outset of my career, I chose to play my ideal style over
fewer hands. I was throwing out $1-per-hand averages over
samples of nearly 700,000 hands while playing 5/10 NL and
above — and this was in the post-UIGEA (Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006) era, when the games got
much tougher. When I posted my graph on Twoplustwo.com,
some called it the greatest in online history.
(The nosebleed games came around two years ago and changed
everything. Now some guys make $200 a hand, but hardly get
any action. Most make less than I do netting 75 cents a hand, as
the games are far more abundant at the stakes I play.)
I still felt I could become more profitable per hour, but
knew I’d need to forsake style to do it. I adopted the style I’ve
described here, and as a result, began making less per hand —
which made me look like I was getting worse as a player. But
now I’m playing up to 20 tables and my hourly rate has steadily
increased.
There are some pitfalls to the conservative style I’ve described
here. Those who play more tables tend to play fewer hours, either
because they get a sense they’ve accomplished what they need to
in less time, or more commonly because of the intensity that
comes with multi-tabling. Also, some players fall into the trap
of making their games too automated. When these decisions
get easier, they challenge themselves less and fail to scrutinize
their decision-making process; thus, they don’t improve as
players. I constantly keep this in mind as I move toward a style
that maximizes my profit potential per hour.
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I encourage people to experiment. Try playing a little tighter
over a large sample of tables and see how it feels to you. Then
try playing less tables than you are used to, but become more
involved in pots and watch the action closely. Remember that the
earlier you discover your optimal playing style, the more money
you will make over the course of your career. You may sacrifice
some money at the outset by experimenting, but you’re building
toward a sound business practice that will serve you for the rest
of your time in the poker business.
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Chapter 17
A SIMPLE APPROACH TO
AD!DING TABLES
As one of the only successful mass multi-tablers at high stakes,
I’m probably uniquely able to help you in negotiating the process
of adding tables. How many you play really boils down to how
you process information. Looking at a screen with tables flashing
everywhere is not unlike being a quarterback. You need to be able
to see the field and make quick decisions in a dynamic game. The
field in this case is the cards you are being dealt. You need to
develop an eye for which decisions are a priority in the moment.
Your focus should be first and foremost on the hands you have
going that represent important decisions. When you see pocket
aces or a flush draw or a fish limp into the pot, your attention
should go straight to that spot. All of the other hands can wait,
and once you make those important decisions, you can dart your
mouse across the table to quickly go fold, fold, fold, fold, fold,
fold, fold, fold across the tables for the hands that are obvious
folds (like being dealt 2 7 offsuit). If you accidentally time out
on a hand you were folding anyway, it’s no big deal. From there,
just rinse and repeat.
Once you attend to your important decisions, you must not rush
them. You typically have a lot more time than you realize, and you
can always click the time bank if necessary (or download a script
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that automatically clicks it for you, which is what I recommend).
I use a simple mental checklist that I have on my computer screen
for when I arrive at an important decision:
• What do my opponent's actions mean?
• What is the best action to take vs. his range of hands?
• Consider all of your options carefully before deciding and
make sure to take lots of deep breaths
While these tips will help you, the single greatest way to add
tables is through sheer repetition. If you play full-time for 2-3
years, you will have seen so many of the same situations that your
decisions will become mostly automated. Once decisions become
automated, you will spend less time them, which will free you up
to add even more tables.
If you treat your poker like a business, you wouldn't want to
spend that time any other way.
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Chapter 18
KNOWING ! YOUR EXPENSES
One terrific aspect of poker as a business is the low overhead.
There are several investments that I recommend making, but
even with those included, it’s a business where the margins can
be 99 percent. Not bad.
It’s much like being a day trader. If you have the capital and a
computer, you can trade all day. And if you’re trading billions,
that $9.95 Ameritrade fee doesn’t affect your margins much.
In terms of equipment, I (strongly) recommend getting a
comfortable chair, which will pay for itself and then some. You
also want a computer monitor that is big enough to handle what
you’re trying to do. If you’re just playing four or five tables, a
conventional laptop or desktop monitor is fine. But if you get
into serious multi-tabling, you’ll want to get a high-resolution,
30-inch monitor. Playing 12-20 tables as I do, I have a dualmonitor
set up with two 30-inch screens with a resolution of
2560x1600. (It’s important you get the highest-resolution
monitor possible if you’re looking to effectively multi-table.)
In terms of software, Hold’Em Manager (which costs $80
for the professional version) is an absolute must. It’s a fully
featured hand-history program that provides statistics on
yourself and your opponents. Another necessity is a membership
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with a training site like Stoxpoker.com or CardRunners.com.
Memberships run around $299 for the year. But if you play on
Full Tilt and go to TrulyFreePokerTraining.com, they will pay
for your membership to Stoxpoker or CardRunners.
The brevity of this chapter is good news for you. There are very
few costs associated with playing online poker for a living. Other
than taxes, you get to keep everything you earn for the most part.
Not many businesses can say that.
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Chapter 19
PROTECTING ! YOUR CAPITAL
The American businessperson’s increased awareness of the
fallibility of our financial institutions mirrors what poker players
have long known: you must keep your money with someone
reputable. I say this from personal experience, as I was burned
for a five-figure sum when a fly-by-night poker site I frequented
dissolved overnight.
Your capital is your inventory, and there’s a huge risk not only
in losing money, but also your time invested if the site you’re
on shuts down tomorrow. You’ve invested time getting reads on
other players and getting acquainted with new software.
Having to migrate from a site you were comfortable with to a
new one is something you really don’t want to do in your career
if you don’t have to. It’s not unlike having to move storefronts if
you own a retail business. In poker, the notes you’ve developed,
the time you’ve invested developing reads on your opponents,
your familiarity with the software and the financial loss make
having to switch sites a much bigger deal than you might realize.
A handful of decent-sized sites go under every year, as do
countless others that were start-ups. Personally, I’m not
comfortable playing anywhere besides Poker Stars and Full
Tilt. A few years ago, a site popped up called Eurolinx and my
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friend swore by it. I put $10,000 on there, got a funny feeling
and cashed out. My buddy was stuck for $250,000 when they
eventually shut their doors.
You could be forgiven for taking up a new site on its enticement
offers, but you’re taking a big risk.
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Chapter 20
MANAGING ! YOUR EMOTIONS
“We’re shutting it down! Everybody go home, we’re shutting it
down!”
When I worked for my family business, my dad was famous for
losing his cool over setbacks small and large, which would lead
him to storm through our warehouse, waving his arms and yelling
the aforementioned order at the top of his lungs. Production
would come to a screeching halt and there were big financial
ramifications, all over a temper tantrum.
Based on that experience, I came to pride myself — be it in
business or golf — on not making a bad decision as a result of
being angry or frustrated. But that veneer started to crack a bit
when I got seriously into poker. While not as bad as most, I still
had big issues with tilt. I virtually reverted back to my early days
as a kid golfer, when it was not uncommon for me to toss or
snap a club.
Playing poker, I busted two laptops and at least 25-30 mice. I
put a small hole in my wall, and nearly made a much bigger one
when I threw a chair across my office. This wasn’t fair to my wife,
nor to myself — particularly given that I was only a couple years
removed from the heart attack I experienced at 23.
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I was playing poker 8-10 hours a day, 29 or 30 days a month for
three years. During that period I probably blew up 30 times. While
that was maybe only one blowup a month, it was one too many,
because it was costing me money, my sanity and my dignity.
My breakthrough came in 2007, the year I was going for
SuperNova Elite status on Poker Stars. Heading into Fall, I was
coming off four or five months in a row when my computer was
a virtual ATM. I might have experienced three or four losing
days each month, but I was otherwise winning around $3,000-
$5,000 a day.
Then the wheels came off.
I hadn’t started going for SuperNova Elite status until April,
which gave me three fewer months with which to work. Even
with my success earlier in the year, I knew it was going to come
down to the final days of December, and the grind was starting
to get to me.
Three weeks into the month of October, I was down $30,000
— a totally uncommon position for me, as I’d never experienced
a losing month in my entire career. I looked within and
realized much of the reason for my collapse had to do with the
diminishing quality of my hours spent playing poker.
This is where my experience as an athlete paid off. I knew there
was a huge correlation between the mental game and physical
performance in golf. Why wouldn’t the same be true for poker?
I remembered a great guy I’d met during a golf trip to Bandon
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Dunes earlier that year. His name was Jared Tendler, and he was
a specialist in mental performance for golfers. I asked if he could
apply some of the same principles to poker, and though he didn’t
know the game well at the time, we began work immediately.
The impact of his lessons blew me away. I sensed myself becoming
so much more productive, and felt I wasn’t alone in the
emotions I experienced over the game. I’d been wrestling with
understanding what was luck and what was skill in poker. Jared
helped me reconcile myself with the fact that this job is one in
which my fate is not entirely in my hands — an unfamiliar notion
for a guy who’d willed himself to become one of the top junior
golfers in the country despite a lack of otherworldly ability.
More than anything, Jared taught me acceptance. If I was to play
so much as one more hand of poker, I had to get it through my
head that there would be good luck and bad, but if I played long
enough with a clear head, skill would eventually win the day.
Prior to working with Jared, my perception of loss was so much
more heightened than that of victory. Almost every time I played,
I walked away feeling as though I’d lost. When I’d win, I’d say,
“Well, that should have happened.” But when I’d lose several
all-in pots, well, that sense of despair would linger for hours, if
not days or weeks. It was not uncommon for me to go an entire
month without looking at the cashier. At the end of that month,
I’d guess I’d won maybe $20,000 at best, only to discover I’d
actually won in excess of $100,000.
The results were off the charts. I came out ahead in October,
had $100,000 months in November and December, and
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made SuperNova Elite status with three days to spare. The
improvements just kept coming, and in Jan.-Feb. 2008, I made
$350,000 combined for a total of more than $600,000 in
winnings over the first four months of working with Jared.
People always ask me, what specifically did Jared do for you?
Can you teach me what he taught you? My response is to draw
yet another parallel to golf: I know how to swing the club, but I
can’t teach you to swing like I do. Some people are born teachers,
and Jared is one.
So while I considered trying to relate the things he taught to me
about the mental game, I decided instead to simply turn the next
five chapters over to Jared, himself. What you’ll read here are
some general concepts that will not only help you get over your
problem with tilt, but will also give you an edge in turning your
mental game into an advantage.
Without further ado, here’s Jared Tendler:
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test
1
1
Chapter 21
WHY PSY!CHOLOGY MATTERS
Treat Your Poker Like a Business is all about finding edge where players
don’t often look. Dusty knew psychology was one of those places
from his days playing professional golf and hired me for help with
tilt. Realizing how much the mental part of the game was costing
him (money and otherwise), he got in touch with me and put in
the work. The results, as he mentions above, were dramatic.
Psychology is a frontier with huge potential for your game. Plus,
since there are so few players really taking psychology seriously,
in a sense this part of the game is juicy.
Whether reducing tilt, improving focus or training for the zone,
improvement in psychology actually happens in the same way
as poker strategy. When you first started in poker, so much was
unknown and you probably couldn’t imagine how much could
be learned. But the more you played and studied the game,
the more advanced and involved it got. The key is having the
right information, and since matters of the mind are not always
obvious, I’ll try to make it really easy for you.
While mental and emotional skill cannot replace actual skill in
the game, it does give you a new set of options to improve and
gain an edge. Here are eight (of many) things you’ll learn as you
focus on poker psychology:
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• The Tilt Opportunity. Few players realize that mistakes
made on tilt, be they strategic or mental, are not caused
by tilt itself. Tilt simply reveals them. Essentially it strips
your skill set naked and provides evidence of weakness. Many
players blame tilt, when tilt is just telling you what to work
on. Dusty didn’t know this at first, either.
• Variance Happens. The question isn’t whether variance
will knock on your door; it’s how you’ll react when it does.
Whether it shows up as a cooler, bad beat, downswing or
heater, variance can mess with your mind and toy with your
emotions. Responding to the (un)certainty of variance is
tricky, and that’s why I have a job!
• Making Progress. Taking one step forward and one step back
is actually how progress goes. While frustrating as all hell, it’s
only made worse by expecting something different. The key
is to make each step back shorter by eliminating weakness, so
when you naturally step forward again it actually takes your
farther.
• The Zone Isn’t Random. The holy grail of performance
isn’t some mystical place that comes to you out of nowhere; it
happens for good reason. The Zone — that place of ultimate
focus, perfect presence, and great play — can be boiled down
to its essential ingredients and served up at will. Dusty was
shocked by how often it happened once tilt was out of the
picture.
• Being CEO. Working for yourself can be tough. On the
surface it seems easier to not have anyone to answer to, but
that’s what makes it hard. Learning the skills of running your
poker business starts with responsibility for every decision
you make. It is a skill to learn like any other, and taken that
way helps you avoid thinking it should be easy.
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• Rise of the Emotions. When you know how to use it,
emotion becomes an asset to your game and not a liability.
Emotions have a language of their own. Think of me as your
interpreter. Players often think emotion is irrational, but as
it turns out emotion shows up for predictable reasons. This
doesn’t necessarily mean some deep-seeded issues from your
past; it can be as simple as just hating mistakes. There are
hundreds of other simple reasons where your logic is what
turns out to be irrational, and you have emotion to thank
for pointing that out.
• Moving Up. A move up in stakes is often seen as a sink-orswim
scenario, but it doesn’t have to be so stressful. The
solution is in the strategy. Consider taking shots not just to
prove that you can hang, and instead: 1) Use the pressure to
identify your weakness; 2) Study other players to learn what
they do; 3) Figure out how to play better. Since it is your
skill that matters most, focus on gaining it rather than just
the end result.
• Life and Poker. When I first met Dusty’s wife, some
six months after our work began, she thanked me. With
Dusty no longer tilting like before, she could barely tell
the difference between days when he lost money from days
he won. Their life wasn’t radically different. There were
just more good times to enjoy. Plus, with Dusty’s anger no
longer impacting his life, the thought of having to quit poker
never came up again as it had in the past.
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Chapter 22
BECO!MING A GRINDER
Dusty is the ultimate grinder, and he’s constantly asked how he
can possibly play so much poker. (Over 1 million hands a year
and 7 million in the past four years). Some see his as a freakish
talent, like some sideshow act at a carnival; others want to be
taught.
Ask Dusty to explain it and you’ll get half an answer — and not
because he’s holding back. He just doesn’t know entirely how
he does it. Dusty is like top performers in other sports who
have tremendous ability, but lack the full picture of what makes
them so.
If you want to grind like he does, it’s not enough to understand
what Dusty can do now. You need to know what got him here.
It didn’t just happen; it was something on which he worked day
after day.
Grinding is a skill reserved for those willing to do the work. It
isn’t something that Dusty, nor anyone else was born with. It was
learned. Here are some characteristics you’ll find in grinders:
1. Dedication. Few realize that Dusty’s ability to grind out
monster poker sessions came from his days in golf. Hitting
thousands of golf balls a day requires the same level of
dedication that poker does, only he’s been practicing golf
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since age 8. Dedication requires consistency, especially when
things get hard. Whether you’re running great or terribly;
whether you’re tilted and can’t focus, confused and full of
doubt, or moving up and feeling the heat, dedication means
plowing through day after day no matter what comes your
way.
2. Drive. Dusty was willing to work his “leather ass” off because
he had dreams of being great. Whether in golf or poker,
when he put his mind to something, he wanted to succeed
at the highest level. Drive like that lead him to grind like few
others. You don’t need to shoot that high to grind, but you
damn well better be driven by what you want.
3. Endurance. Grinding requires mental endurance
comparable to the physical endurance needed for running
a marathon. It’s important to look at developing mental
endurance in much the same way that you would do it
physically. When Dusty burst into poker, he already had
the mental muscle for marathon sessions. Too often players
think grinding is easy, expect too much, and burn out
quickly. If you expect too much too soon, your mind will
crash just as your body would if you tried to run 26.2 miles
when you comfortably could run only five.
Instead, think about building your mental muscle steadily
from what you can do, not what you should be able to do.
So if it’s easy to play a 90 minute session, then increase it by
10-15 minutes. Once 100 minutes becomes easy add another
15. Repeat.
The word “grind” makes it sound like something that’s hard.
It isn’t for Dusty and that’s the point. Grinding is easy once
you get there.
4. A willingness to be pushed. Building mental muscle means
you have to push yourself through times when you’re tired,
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tilted, distracted, or for whatever reason having a tough
time. Few realize these times are where the learning to grind
happens. Quitting is easy. Learning to grind is hard. Push
yourself like a coach would to get over the hump, and then
grinding gets easy.
5. Getting rest. To run farther you need bigger muscles, to
grind longer you need more neurons (the brain’s muscles).
Muscles and neurons grow bigger when resting, not when
training. If you want a bigger brain, you need to train. Then
you need rest.
Rest means taking time away from poker and getting proper
sleep. And after days where you really push yourself, get even
more rest. Your brain needs it.
6. Being automatic. Of all the decisions Dusty makes at the
table, less than 3 percent require thought. With 7 million
hands to work from, there are few situations that challenge
him. Most are automatic.
Decisions that require thought use mental energy. Dusty
grinds hands easily because he’s like an energy-efficient light
bulb, using just a fraction of the energy that most other
players do. He can play longer, play more tables, play more
hands without nearly the energy that it takes you to.
Making your decisions automatic without playing 7 million
hands is complex. Two easy ways to get there: 1) Continually
be focused on eliminating easy mistakes; 2) Review hard
decisions. They have a lot to teach you.
7. Removing mental mistakes. Issues like tilt, anxiety, focus,
motivation, etc, can be pushed aside to grind, but only for
a short time. Aside from the havoc they create in your game,
they are colossal wastes of energy. If you want to play massive
amounts of hands, they have to be gone.
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Chapter 23
M!ISTAKE HATE
Players often hate mistakes because they are a sign of failure, lost
money and lost confidence.
In reality, mistakes are part of learning. If you already know
what’s correct, you aren’t learning.
Mistakes are made when you are learning. When you are learning,
you are improving. If you aren’t making mistakes you aren’t
improving.
And in poker, if you aren’t improving, you’re getting caught by
players who were previously weaker than you.
Mistakes are necessary. The question isn’t whether you’ll make
mistakes, it’s how often you make the same one before you learn
what is correct.
Dusty has learned to love mistakes. He knows that mistakes are
opportunities to improve. Improving means more money, more
confidence and more enjoyment. It wasn’t always this way. He
just needed to know the truth.
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Chapter 24
THE TEN MOST
OVERL!OOKED MISTAKES
Among the many mistakes players make, these ones most
frequently fly under the radar. Eliminate them and poker gets
surprisingly easier.
• Premature realization of skill. Like the other premature
problem, this one also blows. Skill is only proven when it
shows up in big pots, tilt sessions, running bad, higher
stakes, or whatever is the toughest spot for you. Otherwise,
keep working. You haven’t learned it yet.
• Missing the small positives. Big improvements are a result
of hundreds of small ones. You’ll stop working on something
if you don’t see progress. Often it’s there; you just have to
look smaller.
• Pressure to improve fast. A car stuck in the mud sinks faster
the more you step on the gas. Better to be accurate than to
go faster.
• High expectations. This is a problem only because of how
bad you feel when falling short. Rather than just expect
something to happen, figure out how to get it.
• Blaming emotion for poker mistakes. Emotion reveals
mistakes in your game. It doesn’t cause them. Sure emotion
needs to be dealt with, but it’s not an excuse to skip out on
work.
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• Confusing winnings with earnings. Stick money in your
pocket too soon and poker is likely to take it back. Avoid this
fight by deciding when you’ve actually made a profit, and
not just had a temporary victory. This management issue is
something Dusty discussed earlier in the chapter “Bankroll
Management,” but it can’t be stressed enough.
• Being a baller in your own mind. Believe the hype in
your own mind and you’ll have no motivation to work
your way up. Do you really think you’re the only one who
imagines being a top player? The ones that are there stopped
dreaming long enough to prove it.
• Bluffing yourself. There are hundreds of ways you can lie
to yourself. Make poker simple for yourself and stick to
bluffing others.
• Quitting instead of tilting. Quitting is a mistake if you
then pretend you didn’t tilt. Cashing out before you have
a blow out means you actually tilted. Thinking otherwise is
an illusion.
• Mistakes fix themselves. Knowing what not to do doesn’t
mean you know what to do. Decide what is correct and focus
on playing that way.
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Chapter 25
A NEW! SET OF RESULTS
Being overly influenced by results can cause a rollercoaster of
emotion that seems perfectly aligned with your graph. Knowledge
of variance isn’t enough to stop the emotional ups and downs
that some say is just a fact of poker. This chaos is maddening,
confounding, and downright vicious. It takes some to the brink,
while others go over.
Desperate to break this cycle, players use strategies that numb,
detach or desensitize them to the emotion tied to money or
results.
Still, removing emotion from poker is not an option. In fact,
it’s a colossal mistake that fails to consider the real problem,
and may cause unforeseen and potentially long-term damage.
Dusty was a master at avoiding, but the rage buried within him
eventually became hard to ignore. With a growing pile of broken
computer equipment in his closet, he knew something had to
change or he might bust out of the game.
Breaking this habit really wasn’t that hard. It just required a small
change in how he viewed results.
Results provide feedback so you know how you’re doing. Without
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feedback, learning is impossible. It’s not whether you need
results. It’s which ones to consider.
To most people, the word “results” means something tangible,
like money, wins and losses, win rate, hourly rate or any other
statistics that are easy to calculate. While clearly important, to
break out of this cycle, as Dusty did, requires a set of results that
measures skill and improvement.
In the long run, it’s the quality of your mindset, emotions, focus,
strategy and others that produce your profit, so evaluating your
game along these lines matters more than short-term money.
Focusing on these factors doesn’t remove the importance of
money, but it does broaden the definition of results to include:
• How well you played overall
• Quality of your thinking
• Quality of decisions
• Number and size of mistakes
• Quality of focus (“The Zone,” autopilot, distractions,
boredom)
• Length of time spent focused and playing well
• Length of the session
• Ability to manage emotions, focus and thinking
• Ability to work through a tough mental or emotional spot
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Take these or others that are important to you, and after each
session take a few minutes to review and write out how you
performed. At first they will be hard to measure, but with
practice you’ll get better. Before the next session, taking a few
minutes to focus on the factors you’re measuring ensures you’ll
care about more than just money.
For Dusty, recognizing the quality of his decision making, focus,
and emotional stability was especially important on days when he
lost money. It gave him a broader measure of the results from
the day, which taken with progress previously made along these
lines, made losses seem temporary. The victory of the day wasn’t
measured by profit, but by the quality of play.
By shifting Dusty’s focus to skill and improvement, two-outers
and coolers hurt much less, and his overall play improved. He is
one of hundreds of players I’ve worked with directly or through
my videos who have made significant improvement. I realize this
may seem too good to be true, but the progress is real. It does
take work, but if you try it for a month, I know you’ll at least
make some progress.
For more information about Jared and his coaching visit him at Jaredtendler.com.
You can also go to Stoxpoker.com to watch his videos and ask him questions in the
forum.
Poker psychology, like all of psychology, has parts that are universal to all players
and many more that are individual. To get a more detailed sense of how to make
poker psychology a profitable part of your game, watch Jared’s videos, and keep an
eye out for his forthcoming book.
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Chapter 26
PRESSU!RE CAN BE GOOD
One thing that I’d like to add to Jared’s comments is this: the
purpose of his advice and mine is not to eliminate pressure from
your game. Rather, it’s to put pressure in its proper context
so when it does arrive, you can identify it and use it to your
advantage. Winston Churchill said, “A kite flies highest against
the wind, not with it.” I believe that when greeted properly,
pressure can elevate the performance of just about anyone,
including poker players.
As Jared said, you can train your mind so you have a psychological
advantage on most of your opponents every time you sit at a
table. I’d venture that 90 percent of all people experience a
performance decline when under pressure. You can have an edge
in all phases of life if you can somehow see yourself into that 10
percent whose performance rises under pressure.
Chip Kelly, the football coach at University of Oregon, says,
“Pressure is what you feel when you don’t know what you’re
doing.” I agree with him to the extent that for that 90 percent,
pressure probably descends into chaos. But that is not a universal
truth.
Take Tiger Woods, for example. For as much as he’s
accomplished, I feel he’s done nothing relative to his ability.
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His skill level dictates that he should win every tournament like
he did the 2000 U.S. Open at Pebble Beach, where he won by
15 strokes. But I think it’s more fun for him to need to birdie
two of the last three holes to win, or to have to protect a two-shot
lead on Sunday.
I would venture that if you looked at Woods’ performance on
closing holes (which are the most difficult on the course) when
he must perform to win, his scoring average would actually be
better than on the holes prior. In other words, if he somehow
sensed his back was against the wall from the first hole Thursday
to the last hole Sunday, I’d venture to say he’d shoot in the 62-
65 range every day.
So how does this relate to poker? Much of this book looks at
things objectively, as though we’re experiencing the game in
a pressure-free vacuum. But that is not the case; in fact, most
of us probably experienced a heightened sense of pressure the
moment we made that first deposit online.
I feel the ability to cope with that pressure is an actual skill that, if
honed, can separate you from the competition in the near term,
and will keep you in the game long term. With practice, you can
become one of the elite 10 percent who lives by the mantra of
NBA player Stephen Jackson: “I make love to pressure.”
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Chapter 27
HAVING A SUCCESSFUL
R!ELATIONSHIP
We’ve all heard it said, “Don’t take your work home with you.”
But what if you work from home? And what if that work happens
at odd hours, is immensely stressful, and features financial swings
of your own money?
Needless to say, maintaining a relationship as a poker pro (and
with a poker pro) requires some adjustment. On this front, I
find myself in the same position I was in when discussing poker
psychology, in that my perspective probably isn’t as valuable as
that of the person who helped me through this phase of my life.
My wife, Nicole, is infinitely wiser and more articulate than I
am in all cases, and specifically on this point. In fact, she wrote
her graduate thesis on having a relationship with a poker pro
en route to getting her Master’s degree in conflict resolution.
So here — for one chapter only — is the lovely and talented Nicole
Schmidt, otherwise known as “Leatherwife”:
I’d like to start by saying that I can’t speak for all women or
say what works for all relationships. What I can say for certain
is that sitting down with your significant other is the key to
success. Every couple should allow for an open forum for each
of you to say what your hopes, expectations, and needs are in the
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relationship. Dusty and I were very lucky to find each other, but
we didn’t have everything figured out on day one. We trudged
our way through, tried some solutions that didn’t work, got in
a couple of fights, and after two years finally found what works
for us.
I can say with confidence that when we did get into fights or
came to a solution that didn’t work, we figured out that there
was a big miscommunication. The miscommunication is often
times someone not being forthright about his or her needs. Why
waste your time on trying to appease the other person when, in
a month’s time, neither of you will be happy and you’ll be back
to square one?
If your dominant conflict resolution style is to accommodate,
compete, or avoid, you are respectively ignoring your needs,
ignoring the other person’s needs, or ignoring the issues
altogether. The preferred way to deal with these conflicts is
to collaborate together and make sure that the issues and the
relationship are valued equally to achieve a “win/win” solution
you can both be happy with. You guys like graphs, right?
Now to the specifics. Like I said, I can only tell you what worked
for Dusty and I. I’ll go in some sort of chronological order one
might experience in a poker-playing relationship…
“So what do you do for a living?”
I know I’ve said you can come up with all sorts of fun job titles
to make yourself sound more “respectable” or “reliable” to
other people. While I think that can work to get you through
awkward social situations by telling white lies to acquaintances,
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I do not recommend this for dating. You need to see the other
person’s honest reaction to your honest job title: online poker
player. Say it loud, say it proud, and explain what that means
to you.
Having confidence when you talk about it is key. If you sound
ashamed of being an online poker player she’ll read “degenerate”
right from the start. I had my doubts when Dusty told me this
was his job. I really thought he was just getting by on some trust
money or his parents paid his bills, etc. In fact, I thought this
for quite a while.
He didn’t have much of a track record at the time, and of course
he didn’t show me his graph on the first date. But I thought he
was a great guy regardless; there was no need for me to end the
relationship because I was unclear on his career. Second thoughts
about a poker player are normal, but dumping a guy purely for
that reason is not cool. It’s not like he said he was unemployed
and he’s still paying the bills somehow, so I stuck around, got to
know him better, then I saw the graph.
I don’t recommend putting on a front or buying a car just
to prove your wealth. You wouldn’t want the kind of girl who
cares about that stuff anyway, in my opinion. As far as a girl
asking how much you make — that’s insane and she wouldn’t
ask a stockbroker/fireman/school teacher that question. I would
question the girl’s motives if she’s that forward about your
income. I think you can be honest about your lifestyle without
giving specific dollar amounts.
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Understanding Poker as a Career
This is the toughest spot, especially when you are just starting
poker as a full-time job. When you don’t have Hold’em Manager
stats to back you up, how do you explain variance, win rates, etc?
Outside of drawing-up elaborate math equations and projected
dollar amounts, take it one step at a time. I remember when I
was 11 years old and my uncle and grandpa started explaining
football to me. They started with the basics, but then continued
with “passinterferenceoffsidesfalsestartfacemaskhorsecollar”
practically in one breath. I got really frustrated and didn’t like
football very much. When my aunt explained it, she said, “All
you need to know is you get four chances to make 10 yards. If
you keep doing that, you’ll make it all the way to the end zone
and get points.” I learned the rest from there, but it was nice to
have a simple base of knowledge to work from.
It’s also difficult to marry/date a poker player when you are
naturally risk averse. I had this idea before I met Dusty that
the safest way to live your life and pay your bills was to go to
school, get a steady 9-to-5 and never let it go. I understand this
mentality because I’ve been there.
But if I’ve learned anything in the last few years, it’s that nothing
is a sure thing. Stock markets crash, businesses go bankrupt, and
9-to-5s can disappear from layoffs and downsizing. Once you
understand that poker is as sure a thing as any other job, it’s great
to sit down and consider the positives of being a professional
poker player. Happiness in a career is so monumental for longterm
success; if you enjoy poker you will work harder, play
longer, and be more successful with a smile on your face at the
end of the month - most of the time. The flexibility in schedule,
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being able to work from home, and being your own boss are very
nice luxuries most don’t have.
Getting through the tough times
If you follow Dusty’s blog at all, you probably know that he is
“the unluckiest online poker player ever.” He “gets so shafted”
and it’s “worse than any other online pro that ever walked the
face of the earth.” It can be scary and emotionally draining to
hear about every single bad beat, every single day.
Wives and girlfriends often experience a verbal thrashing; even
if Dusty isn’t mad at me, he just needs to vent to someone. Even
when I didn’t understand poker very well, it helped him to talk
about the hands, and I would say, “Ugh, that’s ridiculous, what
a donkey,” and he would eventually calm down. I will say, at least
in our case, there is absolutely nothing you can say to make a
poker pro feel better. I am a fixer and problem solver, but when
you try and boost their ego or confidence it can really backfire.
I learned early on not to give advice or encouraging words; just
commiserate and disarm. This is something to discuss with your
significant other. Perhaps you have a specific way you’d like her
to deal with bad beats or bad sessions. Maybe you’re the type
of person who needs encouragement, or maybe you just need
someone to listen. This is specific to the individual and it would
help to give him or her a game plan when you’re about to throw
yourself off a building. How can they best talk you off the ledge?
Spending time together
Spending time together is another issue that requires a
collaborative effort on both sides of the table. If specifying poker
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time works best for everyone’s schedules, then by all means try it.
There will always be the need for flexibility on everyone’s part —
if poker time is over at 8 pm, wives can’t stand at the door tapping
their feet at 8:05. Also, be realistic about the timeframes you
give to your significant other. Don’t try to make me feel better
in the short-term by telling me poker will end at 10 pm, only
to find you giggling at 2+2 forums at 11:30. Certainly forums,
posts, and studying hand histories are very important, but make
sure this is added into your projected work time for the day and
be honest about it.
It’s very clear to me that when Dusty is on tables, he is out of
commission. I know firsthand that, although he would love to
multitask and have a fulfilling conversation with me about my
day, he won’t remember a word I said after his poker session. I
can’t ask him to do anything but play poker when he’s on tables.
Just because he’s at home and readily available in the next room
does not mean I have the right to go in there and bitch at him
about leaving the toilet seat up. It’s just not the time, and the
conversation won’t sink in, even if I wanted it to. This is very
important. I’m no Suzie B. Housewife, but the only thing I
ask Dusty while he’s on tables is what he wants for lunch. Any
pressure outside of that is negative EV for both of you. You’re
welcome to bitch about the toilet seat later.
As far as how much time we spend together, it’s negotiable. I
pretty much let him know when big events are going on and he
won’t be able to play that day at all. If that’s the case, sometimes
he’ll play extra hours for a day or two in order to take an extra
day off. I have my own life and my own friends, so it’s pretty
easy for me to make my own plans if he is going to play poker all
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night. Just be forthright with each other about how much time
you need to spend to be happy, and you’ll make it work.
Sometimes that changes. When Dusty was going for SuperNova
Elite in 2007, I knew I wasn’t going to see him much at all that
year and it was really depressing for me. But I knew it was an
investment and we spend a lot more time together now.
Do whatever works for your family. Like any other job, you have
to find the sweet spot between time and money. Even when you
are playing a lot of poker, it is nice to know that you are doing
it for the two of you to have a nice life together. I used to think
Dusty was playing a ton of poker (especially during Elite) for
some sort of personal gain or recognition, but when we talked
about it, I realized he’s just working hard so we can take those
vacations together and enjoy each other in the future.
You really just need to be firm about your hours. The time
away is negotiable, but here’s a scenario: There are 168 hours
in a week; 56 hours are spent sleeping and 50 hours are spent
working (figuring for eight hours of sleep a night and a 10-hour
work day five days a week). That leaves around 60 hours a week
for free time. After you’ve spent some time pursuing whatever
recreational activities make you happy, you should leave it up to
your significant other as to how she would like the rest of the
hours spent. If she wants you to run errands with them, ask her if
that’s how she wants to spend your time off, or would she rather
do dinner and movie later that night. You don’t know what the
answer will be, but you’re getting your poker time in while being
flexible and fair to her needs.
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Chapter 28
THE IMPORTANCE OF
A! GOOD DIET
Should you become a poker pro, your body will effectively
become the machinery for your new business. If you want to
maximize your machinery’s effectiveness, you’ll want to give it
premium fuel.
Playing extensive amounts of poker lends itself to a bad diet. It’s
a sedentary life, filled with long hours playing late at night and
in the wee hours of the morning. You need a strong will to not
fall into bad habits.
A poor diet can have a massive impact. My diet was exceptionally
poor at the beginning of my career — pizza, Cheetos, Cheese-Its,
Pop Tarts, you name it — and my income suffered significantly. I
was unable to play effectively after the first 2-3 hours of a given
session, which meant I either wasn’t playing at my best, or it was
necessary to take breaks to regroup before my next session.
Not insignificant was the blow a poor diet laid on my psyche.
I quickly ballooned from a 170-pound athlete to 210 pounds
of pure sludge. No one can possibly feel good about himself
when his body is headed in that direction, and that influences
everything, including poker performance.
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My poker career (and overall quality of life) really turned around
when I started consulting with a professional dietician near where
I live in Portland. He gave me the following advice:
• First, decide for how long you intend to play. This dictates
how you go about planning your meals. If your intention is
to play an extended session of 5-6 hours or more, preparing
your eating schedule is crucial. If that’s the case, have a big
meal before you play. (A big meal doesn’t mean super-sizing
your drive-thru order, but rather should include a lot of
quality food that is filled with protein, natural sugars and
good fats. Such a meal would include eggs, avocados, peanut
butter, nuts, turkey, chicken, fruits and vegetables.
• When you go to the market, only shop the perimeter of the
store. The aisles are typically where the junk food is located,
and that type of food won’t do your poker game any favors.
Processed foods are going to make you sluggish. The edges
of the store are where you find fresh food.
• Prepare all of the snacks you will need to sustain your energy
levels while playing, including water. Make sure you have
plenty of food next to you while you play. I recommend
fruits, vegetables, nuts, cottage cheese, smoothies, and
protein shakes.
• Eat periodically while you play to sustain your energy level.
Remember, every decision you make is important, and “the long
run” doesn’t care if you were tired or hungry or even starving.
Poker is one long session and you need to play your best each
and every time for best results.
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Chapter 29
G!OAL SETTING
A business is only as good as its goals. If you’re not setting goals,
then success is just a happy accident. Your goals are the bullseye
that your company is heading toward. Without goals, you’re
aiming with your eyes closed.
There is bad news and good news when it comes to being a poker
pro. The bad news is the competitive standard has risen immensely
over the years. A guy who made $50,000 playing online poker
today would have been top 20 in the world 15 years ago. Doyle
Brunson and Johnny Chan, who held sway 20 years ago, probably
sit back and laugh at the game they were playing back then. They
used to get 200 entries for the World Series of Poker; now they
get a million people just trying to qualify.
If I were to liken it to golf, there were not very many people
breaking 80 in poker two decades ago. Now a pro has to shoot
68 every day or not even bother.
The good news is that it’s never been easier to ramp up your
poker game to a competitive level. There might have been only a
few books on competitive poker as recently as 10 years ago, none
of which stack up to the quality of information available today.
Trying to get information was brutally difficult, so most players
had to figure things out on their own.
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Now you can plug into a system. You can take a beginner’s course
on Stoxpoker.com; meanwhile, Full Tilt Poker has 9 million
games you can get into on any level and they’ll pay for your
instruction if you sign up through Trulyfreepokertraining.com.
So the information and opportunity is out there, but you’ll have
competition. The victors are ultimately the ones with the selfmotivation
to stay up an extra two hours to play, and maybe
miss out on chasing girls on Friday or watching an NFL game
on Sunday. Those who set goals and are personally accountable
to them are the ones who succeed.
In the beginning, you have to set studying goals. For example,
commit two hours a night to studying after work, and to
ultimately study one hour for every four you play. When you’re
not making money, poker success feels like a pipe dream. But
studying is what you need to do.
Once you get in a good rhythm as far as playing goes, you should
set goals for hands played, managing your bankroll, not tilting, etc.
But so much about poker success is a function of time. In his
book Outliers: The Story of Success, Malcolm Gladwell wrote that
someone can’t be considered a master in his craft until he has
spent 10,000 hours in its application. Nothing can hasten those
10,000 hours for a poker player like playing.
I find the most effective goals to be time-related. When I play,
I set goals for time and hands played. For example, if I want to
play 15,000 hands in a given week, and I average 1,000 hands
per hour, I need to play 15 hours per week.
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There’s no driving range for poker. In golf, you can hit two
buckets a day and spend an hour on putting. That practice has
a vague resemblance to actual competition. The same can’t be
said for poker. Once you’ve wrapped your mind around the
concepts, it’s really just time playing at actual tables that will net
the most success.
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Chapter 30
STAY!ING DISCIPLINED
You’re effectively self-employed as far as your poker business
goes. You are your own boss, and if you’re going to be successful,
your boss needs to be the biggest jerk in the world. Discipline
is everything.
Not only is this your own business, but it’s also one in which you
work from home, where your wife, kids, and roommates share
your workspace. To make matters worse, you’re conducting your
business on a platform that doubles as an entertainment system.
In addition to poker, you can be playing video games, streaming
video, checking scores, reading emails, or instant messaging.
No one can succeed and be distracted. If you’re going to make
a go at this poker thing, it needs to be just you and the tables —
period, end of story. It is illogical to indulge in distractions. If
you want to be a success, why would you look at that stuff?
Here are some elements of my process that I use to stay focused.
• Push the envelope on the number of tables you play. If
you have time to look at websites, you can probably add more
tables.
• Take notes. Write down what other players are doing when
you’re not in the pot. Watch them as intently as if you were
playing the hand.
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• Shut it down. Don’t even bring your phone into your room.
Disable your IM account, and refuse the temptation to open
your email. You can’t expect others to respect what you do if
you don’t respect it yourself. By going into an environment
where you can’t be reached, you’re telling others that this is
serious business to you.
• Tell people in advance not to distract you. Set boundaries.
You have to make others respect what you’re doing. If your
wife, girlfriend or buddies are interrupting you, it must be
because they think it’s a reasonable thing to do. Establish this
boundary clearly in the beginning, and they’ll understand
quickly that you’re serious.
You don’t just want to be a basic player. You want to be great,
and to be great, poker has to win the battle over everything else
that competes for your attention.
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Chapter 31
TO CHA!T OR NOT TO CHAT
The best employees are those who are the last to know who said
what about whom, who’s sleeping with whom, or who’s looking
for a new job. That’s because they’re too busy working.
I have a similar sensibility about turning on the chat at tables while
I’m playing. The dialogue can be hilarious and even informative.
But on the balance it amounts to office gossip, which means it’s
a distraction. Knowingly introducing distractions to your small
business is illogical.
Any sort of crosstalk can steal your attention. Throw into the
equation that A) You took money from these people, and B) It’s
an anonymous forum, and you have a recipe for negative energy.
What is the upside to turning the chat on? You could pick up
some valuable information if your opponent is talking a lot.
And if he doesn’t usually chat a lot and now he’s a motormouth
typing in all caps, there’s a decent chance he’s on tilt and you
can take advantage of his state of mind.
But even this upside can be a downside, strange as that may
sound. Let me explain. Let’s say you run into an opponent who
you’ve identified through the chat box as someone who’s on tilt.
As a result, you keep the chat box open to see what he is saying.
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While you are paying attention to him, you’re missing events
on your other tables. Is there more value in your preoccupation
with one tilting player than there is in the potential losses you’ll
probably suffer at your other tables? The answer is likely no.
I’ll sometimes turn on the chat just for fun, and I’ll often get
around 100 people trying to talk with me. Twenty might be pros
wishing me luck that day, or telling me they watch my videos.
Another 20 are telling me they hope I have another heart attack,
or just simply that they hate me. It’s very difficult to take anything
positive from that.
There’s just no way to know for certain what you’re going to get
when you chat, so it’s best to just turn it off when you’re at a
regular table.
My advice changes when you’re playing heads up, however. I
always have the chat on when I play heads up, because there’s a
decent chance my opponent will be asking me to play him at one
more table, or to move up in stakes. If I’m playing him heads up,
that means he’s probably a weaker opponent and so I definitely
want that action. And if that sort of player is going to move on
because I’m not keeping him entertained, then by all means, I
chat. I don’t want him to leave, so I’ll encourage him, and when
he loses, I’ll say, “Oh, man. I’m sorry. That was a tough beat.”
It might make him inclined to stay.
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Chapter 32
LOCA!TION, LOCATION
A universal truth in business is “location is everything.”
A universal truth in poker is “your weakest opponents are your
best customers.”
How do these two truths fit together? Every time you take a seat
in poker, you’re picking a location for your business. One of the
great things about poker as a business is you get to pick the best
location for your business every time you play. Say you opened a
steakhouse in what you perceived to be the best location, but that
same day a Morton’s and Ruth’s Chris both opened in spots with
better traffic and their prices were better than yours. Wouldn’t
it be great if you could just move that restaurant somewhere else
tomorrow? This is the beauty of poker.
Choosing which tables to join is the foundation of poker success.
In the old days, you put your name on a waiting list for a table
with bad players, and your turn came around quickly. But
today there are 12 people piled up on the waiting list before you
even know what happened. That’s because there’s now software
that lists bad players and will tell you when they come online.
Everyone has this software.
I’ve read in forums on TwoPlusTwo.com that say I’ve somehow
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created a proprietary software that’s quicker and more nimble
than anyone else’s, because “no one gets to fish faster than
Leatherass.” The funny thing is, I don’t use any software at all.
In fact, if you ask anyone at Stoxpoker.com, I am notoriously
bad with computers, which makes the supercomputer rumor all
the more laughable.
I just look to the lobby and have a good system for monitoring it.
I keep a really keen eye on the lobby, because the table selection
software has a delay on it of several minutes, so I can usually beat
people to position by doing it manually. You know what they say:
If you want a job done right, do it yourself.
Here is how I monitor good and bad players:
• I put a note on every bad player so they’re marked when they
show up on the screen. Full Tilt has a color-coded system,
so you can mark them with a different color based on if
they’re tight, aggressive, good, bad or really, really bad. But
I only mark the bad players so they pop out to me right away.
I assume everyone else is a professional, and I’m generally
right. Keep in mind, this system works especially well for me
because I’m at higher stakes, where there are fewer players
I have to track. I’d recommend taking notes on all of your
opponents at the lower levels where there are more players
to monitor. At a bare minimum, keep track of those who
are fish.
• I’m not afraid to walk away from a table when I don’t have
position. Ideally you want to sit to the immediate left of the
bad player. You want to isolate him. Fish tend to fold or call,
and it’s just you and him playing the pot. You want to play
him head-to-head as often as possible. You want to act as he
acts. But if you’re not in position, and another good player
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is, chances are he is going to re-raise you every time you get
to the fish. These situations are incredibly unproductive, so
I just get up and leave. Success in business is as much about
the opportunities to which you say no as those to which
you say yes. Wasted effort is wasted time, and wasted time is
wasted money.
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Chapter 33
HOUR!S OF OPERATION
A business essential is that you be open when you’re bound to
experience the most commerce. A coffee shop wouldn’t open its
doors at noon; nor would a bar close up shop at 6 p.m.
A general rule of thumb is to strive to play poker when Americans
are not at work. True, poker is a worldwide enterprise, so you
can technically play at any time of day. But the United States
contributes by far the most players to the online game, and so
afternoons, nights and weekends — on the American clock — are
prime poker hours.
Sunday is the best day because that is when Poker Stars and Full
Tilt Poker host their tournaments. They put up millions in
guaranteed prize money each weekend, which attracts tens of
thousands of people to just those tournaments alone. When you
factor in cash games, there tend to be 250,000-500,000 people
on both Poker Stars and Full Tilt Poker on Sundays.
That’s almost double the traffic of a typical Tuesday afternoon,
which means double the amount of recreational players, and
probably more. True, it works both ways. There are more pros
playing Sunday, so you’ll have more competition — and more
pie, too.
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The harsh reality of this business is that to achieve optimum
performance, you need to play at times you’d rather be doing
something else. I’m no different. After work and on weekends,
I’d love to be out with my wife or buddies, or just hanging out
watching a football game and checking my fantasy team.
But it’s a sacrifice worth making. You’re trying to make lots of
money, and the weakest opponents are going to be online at
those hours when you’d rather be doing other things.
I recommend reorienting your schedule so your “weekends” just
happen on another day. Make Tuesday night your night out with
your girlfriend, and Wednesday the day you golf and hang out
with your friends.
This may not always be practical of course, but the for some a
compromise of playing poker half of the time on traditional
weekends and spending time with family and/or friends the other
half may make sense. The overall idea is that you want to, at the
very least, strive toward playing the bulk of your poker when the
games are at their peak.
I learned this concept very early in my career by reading a book
called Theory of Poker by David Sklansky, who wrote, “You should
prop open your eyelids with toothpicks if the game is good
enough.” David is right. This is the type of dedication you need
if you are going to be the best poker player you can be.
That structure can actually be comforting, because you can rest
assured your life will have balance. There are ways to have your
cake and eat it, too.
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An added note: Holidays are hands-down the best time to play.
There is typically more traffic than on a typical Sunday, plus
there tend to be more recreational types online who are playing
while sipping a cocktail. Christmastime is the best holiday to
play, probably because people have received their end-of-year
bonuses.
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Chapter 34
TOURNAMENTS OR
C!ASH GAMES?
Every business needs to know where to invest its time and money,
which represent its two key commodities. As far as my poker
business goes, I invest my time and money in cash games.
I’m often asked, how do you overcome the allure of tournaments?
It’s not easy. As a cash-game player, you’re grinding out hard
decisions all day, every day. There’s no glamour to it. True, I
play high stakes, where you can say, “Hey, I won $20,000 today.”
But for most small stakes grinders who are just trying to make a
few hundred dollars each day, it’s not terribly glamorous at all.
Tournaments are where the glory is. If a lot of people get
into a weekend tournament, first place might be $300,000-
$400,000. That’s a ton of money — a house, basically. That
type of day is not remotely possible playing cash games. If you
start as I did, with only $1,000 to my name, it’s really hard to
turn away from the pull of the tournaments.
But success in tournaments is almost entirely predicated on luck.
Chance is a factor in any given poker hand, but over many hands
poker skill will prevail and make a profit. That’s good news for
the cash-game player, who gets thousands of repetitions online.
But what does it mean for tournament players?
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Unlike cash games, tournament blinds and antes go up every
round. This forces players to play hands to keep increasing their
stack sizes. If they fail to build their chip stacks, eventually the
blinds and antes will be very large in comparison to the chips
the player holds. When this happens, chance becomes more of
a factor than skill. The player will usually need to select a hand
to go all in with pre-flop (skill) and hope (chance) it holds up.
In other words, he’s looking to get lucky.
The one-day structure only heightens the need for luck to win.
If it’s a large-field tournament or if the rounds have a short time
limit, luck becomes an increasingly large factor.
Skill does not count for enough in a tournament. If there are
10,000 players in a tournament, a great player’s odds of winning
are better than 1-in-10,000. World Series of Poker champion
Dan Harrington once made a great analogy: “Tournaments are
basically a lottery,” he said. “Some players are so poor, they’re
in the lottery but don’t have a ticket. Maybe the average player
has one ticket. A really good player has two or three tickets, and
a great one has five or six. But you’re still in a lottery.”
This means you’re leaving too much up to chance in a
tournament. In business, would you waste your time and
investment on a sales call where chance was the primary factor
in the success of the call? No, you wouldn’t. That’s why I’m a
cash-game pro. My skill wins out more often than it doesn’t,
which makes me consistently profitable.
Tournaments detract from the main goal, which is to make a
consistent income. I spoke earlier of the importance of becoming
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a specialist, a one-trick pony. If you’re playing tournaments,
you’re focusing on different types of poker. There’s a lot that can
go wrong, and the only thing that can go right is you get lucky.
The thing about being a tournament pro is your entire year boils
down to a small number of events. A cash-game players’ graph
will go up and down a lot, but it’s most likely always trending
upward. A tournament player’s graph is all over the place.
Over the period of a year, a cash player who won $300,000
would have a graph that’s always going slightly upward. He’ll lose
$8,000, then win $10,000 — slow and steady. A tournament
player’s graph is going to usually trend slightly downward with
an occasional massive spike. Ultimately chance will play a huge
role in how often and to what degree his spikes occur.
For live players, tournaments are the pinnacle and the allure only
increases. The fame is incredible. If you can bluff Phil Ivey on
national television, you’re a hero for life. But for me, anyway, it’s
just not worth it. You won’t become well known doing what I do,
but the objective here is to make a living, not to have everything
at risk. If we’re talking about running a business as efficiently as
we can, it’s best that you stay in cash games.
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Chapter 35
EQUIPPING YOUR COMPUTER
FOR M!AXIMUM PROFIT
When a business is considering the purchase of new equipment,
it evaluates whether or not that equipment will make the company
more profitable, and how soon that will happen. If the benefit
of having the equipment outweighs the cost, then it is generally
smart to proceed with the purchase.
Equipment (including software) purchased for poker generally
has an exponential return on investment — and fast.
Consider the purchase of a new computer, which might cost
$1,500. The speed of the new computer might make it possible
for you to play six tables instead of four — a 50 percent increase
which will enable you to quickly recoup your investment.
Investing in your equipment is investing in your game. It doesn’t
take a big number to get paid back.
I strongly suggest you also invest in a software program called
Hold’em Manager (www.holdemmanager.net). It’s a poker
analytics tool that will help you increase your win rate and get you
moving up in limits. It’s incredibly useful because it essentially
tracks every single aspect of the game you could possibly imagine.
It’s a super-stats machine that measures not only your game, but
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your opponents’ as well. If it were somehow applied to golf, HEM
would be able to tell you with what frequency you’d hit a ball on
the green from a buried, downhill lie 36 yards from the cup.
Should you have a question like “If I bet into this guy, how often
will he fold,” HEM will tell you. It calculates the odds of every
potential outcome. I feel it’s the single best tool to monitor the
progress of your game, as well as to keep the records you’ll need
at tax time and when you check your income against the cashier.
I use HEM a little different than most. I feel that no software
can make decisions as well as a human can. If I play poker against
guys for three years, no computer is going to tell me something
I don’t already know about them. I still use HEM to monitor
my own game, and I also use it to test a certain hypothesis I have
about a guy. Poker is a dynamic game, and when push comes
to shove, I always rely on my own instincts over computer data.
The small-stakes version of Hold’em Manager costs $55, and
the pro version costs $80.
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Chapter 36
THE IMPORTANCE
O!F RAKEBACK
Online poker rooms take a small portion of each pot to finance
their operations. This is referred to as the “rake.” Rakeback is a
portion of this that you, as a consumer, can claim back through
an affiliate. This is essentially like adding 30 percent to your
bottom line. It is a no-brainer — found money, essentially.
For people who play frequently, rakeback can keep you going.
The full-time player can net between $4,000-$7,000 in
rakeback each month — enough to cover living expenses if you go
30 days with just a break-even performance. This is what kept me
going in the beginning when I was playing 400-hour months.
Here is the key: In order to get rakeback, you need to set up
your account with Full Tilt or whomever through a rakebackreferral
website. Do not get a new account at a poker site by going
through the site directly. You will not get rakeback this way. You
have to go through a rakeback site. Below I have details about
how you can sign up for rakeback at my site, DustySchmidt.net.
But first, a bit more information.
The following analysis is done by my good friend, Michael
Skelton. A native of Australia, Michael’s played Limit
Hold’em professionally, coached numerous players, written
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many a forum post, and currently works as the production
manager for Stoxpoker.com. He also writes a killer blog:
www.rolledontheriver.com.
Here’s Michael:
To figure out how much rake you have paid and, in turn, how
much rakeback you will receive, poker sites use a formula called
Monthly Gross Revenue (commonly referred to as MGR).
MGR is your rake paid, minus any deductions. Deductions vary
from site to site: Some sites deduct bonuses, others deduct a
portion for store purchases (FTP), and others deduct payment
processing fees (FTP, Cake, and AP/UB for US based players).
Poker rooms fall into two categories for calculating MGR: Dealt
and Contributed.
The ‘Dealt’ Method
When a poker site uses the dealt method, they are splitting the
rake earned from each pot amongst each player that was dealt into
the hand. Because of this, the amount of MGR earned from any
particular hand can be calculated quite simply, using:
(AmountRaked) / (PlayersInHand)
So, for example, in a hand where $10 was raked, and six players
were dealt in, this formula would be:
10/6 = ~1.66
Assuming that this hand played out on Full Tilt, where the typical
(and maximum) amount of rakeback a player is entitled to is
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27% of the calculated amount, then the return is worked out
using the following:
(AmountRaked) / (PlayersInHand) * .27
So our previous example becomes:
10/6 * .27 = 0.45
The ‘Average Contributed’ Method
The contributed method, as you may have already figured out,
only credits us if we actually contributed money to the pot (and,
therefore, the rake). Essentially, the MGR is split evenly amongst
each player that contributed to the pot. From this information
we derive a new formula:
(AmountRaked) / (PlayersWhoContributedRake)
As an example, let’s assume we were in a hand where we folded
in the small blind. The rake for the pot came to a total of $10,
and there were three people that contributed. Our MGR for
the hand would be:
10/3 = ~3.33
and based on this, our rakeback for the hand (at a rate of 27%)
would be:
10/3 * .27 =0.9
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The ‘Weighted Contributed’ Method
Although this is by far the least popular way of calculating MGR,
it does exist, so I felt it should be included. This method of
calculating MGR is not favorable for tight players because they’re
not involved in enough hands to make it work for them.
With the weighted contributed method, each player receives
a portion of the rake that is proportional to how much they
contributed. A player who folds pre flop (and who wasn’t in the
blinds) gets nothing, while the player(s) that put in the most
money get the largest percentage of the rake.
Should I choose a site using the dealt or contributed method?
Whether a site offers dealt or contributed rakeback shouldn’t
influence your decision too much (you should focus more
attention on the quality of play, software, etc); however, if you
were to use this as a deciding factor, then as a basic guide dealt
rakebacks favour tight play (the typical tight-aggressive player),
and contributed rakebacks favor those playing lots of hands
(heads up play, for example).
A summary of sites and the method they use for calculating MGR
is shown below:
Betfair Contributed
Bodog Dealt
Cake Poker Dealt
Cereus Contributed
Entraction Contributed
Full Tilt Dealt
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IPN/Boss Contributed
Ipoker Dealt
Merge Network Contributed
Ongame Network Contributed
PKR Contributed
PokerNexus Contributed
Poker Stars — No rakeback, but FPPs calculated via dealt method
Prima Contributed
Deductions:
Full Tilt
Typical deductions from Full Tilt include bonuses, Full Tilt
store purchases, allocated values of freerolls, and Ironman store
purchases.
Spending Full Tilt Points (FTP’s)
Every 200 Full Tilt points spent incurs a $1 deduction (or
$0.005 per point) from our MGR. If we purchased an item
from the store for 7000FTP’s, the deduction from our MGR
would be:
7000 / 200 = 35
This should not be confused with rakeback, which is the direct
cost to us, the consumer. To work out how much rakeback we
would lose on this purchase we need to multiply this value by
27% (in this case the actual amount of rakeback you would lose
is $9.45).
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The Ironman Promotion and Ironman Store
Everything in the Ironman store incurs a MGR deduction of
some kind, except for the purchase of $26 and $75 tokens. Using
Ironman medals to purchase Full Tilt points will not affect MGR
or rakeback; however, our MGR will be affected when we use
those Full Tilt Points.
The mid-year Ironman bonus awarded by Full Tilt is not
deducted from our MGR, and purchasing a bonus from the
store will not incur an immediate deduction. However, as we
clear the bonus purchased from the store, the cleared bonus
money is deducted from our MGR.
Boss Media
Boss media, another popular network, uses the contributed
method for calculating MGR. They don’t deduct bonuses, and
tournament/SnG fees are added onto MGR. However, spending
FPP’s will incur a deduction of 0.25 per FPP from our MGR.
In addition to this, a player must clear €100 in MGR to be
eligible for rakeback in any given month. So if a player has
cleared €100 in rake, but had spent 1FPP within the month,
then they might fall below the €100 MGR requirement and
not receive any rakeback for that month. It is also worth noting
that this total does not carry over to the following month, and
will be lost if you don’t clear the minimum requirement in
any given month.
Cake Poker
As a relatively new policy, Cake Poker uses the dealt method, and
doesn’t make any deductions from MGR. It should be noted;
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however, that Cake Poker does not allow the use of a heads up
display, which may discourage some users from playing this
room.
Microgaming / Prima
The 30 percent offer currently on offer from Microgaming/
Prima is based on gross rake, without any deductions. Prima
uses the dealt method.
Now for the fun part:
I have a special program through Hold’Em Manager’s
proprietary rakeback site, which connects to about a dozen
rooms. (Obviously, there’s a portal to purchase HEM
software, as well.)
Just go to www.dustyschmidt.net, and click on our Hold’Em
Manager Rakeback promotion. If you sign up for rakeback
through our site, we’ll send you a free copy of “Treat Your
Poker Like A Business, Vol. 2,” due out in Summer 2010.
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Chapter 37
TAXES, RECORD KEEPING AND
THEIR IM!PACT ON BANKROLL
A key in transitioning poker from a hobby to something more
serious is your record keeping. Not only does this keep you
prepared when tax time comes, it also lets you see how you did
month-over-month and year-over-year.
I keep records for all of my hands on Full Tilt and Poker Stars,
and flow them into Hold‘em Manager, which is a dual-purpose
software. It breaks my play down from a statistical standpoint,
and it also provides me with all of the tax information I might
otherwise keep in Quicken or similar software.
Tax codes differ, and obviously vary considerably outside the
United States. I’m in no position to give tax advice. But I can
tell you about tax preparation insofar as it impacts your bankroll
management.
It’s easy to look at your poker-account balance and think you
get to take all of that money to your bottom line. No, you don’t.
When you work for someone else, your paycheck comes complete
with taxes taken out of it. That’s not the case when you have your
own business.
I advocate having two bank accounts. When you cash out from
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your poker account, take out the appropriate amount for taxes
and put it in one account, with the balance going in the other.
For example, if you cash out $10,000, and your tax bracket
dictates you get to keep $7,000, then you need to put the
$3,000 for taxes in a separate account and do not touch it until
tax-time comes.
So how does this affect bankroll management? We talked in an
earlier chapter about needing to have enough money for 100
buy-ins in order to move up in limits. If you’ve just reached that
threshold, but have not yet paid your taxes, it means you don’t
yet have enough money to move up in limits. This may be viewed
by many as being exceedingly conservative, but it’s the way I’ve
done things throughout my career and I have no regrets.
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Chapter 38
DON’T LISTEN
TO! THE CRITICS
There’s a saying in business that goes, “The higher you climb,
the more you show your ass.” The better your business does,
the more people are going to be gunning for you, and the more
exposed your faults will be.
A lot of we online players forget that we’re playing poker, a game
that used to incite players to shoot one another in the Wild, Wild
West. The game was a macho thing, a guy thing.
Over the course of more than a century, it’s evolved from the
“Tombstone-esque,” gold-rush era into the present, where
players are pushing the edges like day traders. It’s increasingly
become an intellectual pursuit. The common denominator
between the two eras is there’s big money involved, and in the
end you’re playing against real people, not screen names.
The more professional you are, the less inclined you’ll be to
engage in banter. When I get bluffed, I say, “Oh, man, I better
revisit my EV calculations to see if I made a mistake. Maybe I
need to adjust my equation. Did I misjudge this guy’s range?”
But my opponent might very well be saying, “That’s right, I
bluffed you, you son of a bitch.”
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There’s one critical thing you have to remember: you have one
person rooting for you, and that’s you. As you become more
successful, it’s going to be at the expense of the guy sitting next to
you. He’s not going to like it — and he’s got a means of expressing
that displeasure that is immediate and anonymous.
In the poker community, there seems to be one specific
way of going about your business that’s cool, and all other
methodologies are distinctly uncool. The cool way is to log on,
play loose, be aggressive, talk trash, try to put your opponent
on tilt, and make great calls on big pots. You move up in stakes,
you get in ego contests, you go broke once in awhile and build
it all back.
My method — slow and steady, with an emphasis on sound
business principles — falls very much into the uncool category.
I’ve suffered the slings and arrows for it, almost from the second
I appeared on the poker radar. I was putting up numbers no
one had seen before at my stakes: 10 big blinds per 100 over
massive sample sizes. I was mass-multi-tabling and still putting
up the best win rate of anyone ever, even those who played fewer
tables at once. Rather than seek to imitate what I was doing, the
critics were deafening in trying to tear me down. It was the exact
opposite of anything I’d experienced before, as a pro golfer or
as a businessman.
The advice in this book will invariably make you the most money
— I’ve proven that over 7 million hands — but it’s not cool advice,
at least to the poker mainstream.
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The online poker culture is a strange one. You have to
understand going in there will be criticism along the way, and
that criticism will only increase as you get better at what you do.
It’s driven by jealousy.
Don’t waste a lot of time on forums and block all the chat.
Chasing credibility online is a losing proposition. Just stay the
course.
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Chapter 39
!MUST READS
As in all businesses, your time is money. Everything you do
outside of poker must be examined against the standard of what
you could be making playing poker. The considerable time it
takes to read a poker book can cost you exponentially because
it took you away from the tables. Because we’re striving for
maximum efficiency, that book can no longer be considered a
diversion — it’s an investment.
I read a number of poker books as I was beginning to learn
the game, some of which helped me immensely. Others weren’t
worth the paper they were printed on.
For a book to be valuable, it must first and foremost be written
by someone credible. There are many books out there by players
who simply had a good tournament that happened to be televised
by ESPN, and they became famous as a result. These players
should not be considered authorities on the game. Ask the
instructors at Stoxpoker.com or Cardrunners.com if they would
recommend a particular player’s book. You want a book written
by someone who has been a long-term winner in the game that
is featured in the book.
Along those lines, make sure the book is about the specific game
or games you are trying to learn. Early on, I made the mistake
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of buying books focused on cash games when I should have been
focused on tournament poker or vice versa.
(The same thing applies to watching poker on TV. If you are a
cash-game player, I would not advise you to watch a tournament
on TV with the intent of learning new strategies. Cash-game
poker and tournament poker are two entirely different beasts,
and trying to bring a play you saw on TV to your cash game is
rarely going to be a good idea.)
My favorite poker author is Ed Miller, who’s an owner and
instructor at Stoxpoker.com. He’s an absolute genius (with
degrees in both Physics and Electrical Engineering from MIT),
and is a former software developer for Microsoft.
All of Ed’s books are good, but I’d especially recommend Small
Stakes No-Limit Hold ‘em, Professional No-Limit Hold ‘em, and No-Limit
Hold ‘em: Theory and Practice.
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Chapter 40
HOW WILL I KNOW
I’M G!OOD ENOUGH?
How will you know you’re successful enough to make this your
full-time profession? It’s important to define success — and
then re-define it.
My definition was unique. I was coming off a heart attack at
the age of 23, waking up at 3 a.m. to drive a truck and make
deliveries to ungrateful clients in horrible neighborhoods.
Meanwhile, I was barely making ends meet financially, and was
at the mercy of a boss/father for whom I was losing respect by
the hour. For a guy who just months before was on the cusp of
the PGA Tour, this was not the life of independent means that
I’d sought for myself, or for which I’d worked so hard. Instead,
I had $1,000 in the bank and no prospects of improving my
situation significantly by way of my existing job — yet every day
I worked there was a pride-swallowing, soul-devouring exercise
in futility. I was at the desperate hour.
At that point, simply having a white-collar job where my mind
was valued would have been considered a success. To make money
working at home on my computer was pure bliss. If I could make
just a bit more money than I had been working with my family
— well, that was off the charts.
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But a funny thing happened. Once I started doing it, the job
didn’t seem that great after awhile. There were 10 more steps
to climb to get where I am today. I wanted to be the best, and
once I got there, I started reconsidering my definition of success
again. Now my success benchmarks are based on how much I can
do for other people. You should constantly be re-evaluating the
meaning of success as it applies to you.
Specifically, when will you know you’re good enough to leave
your job and make poker a full-time profession? You have to be
a little careful about being too high or too low in relation to the
goals you set, because luck is a major factor in poker. You can
get very lucky for weeks. If you have a job making $500 a week,
and you get on a run and make $5,000 in one week, don’t walk
away from your job. You always want to assume it’s luck until
proven otherwise. That’s called minimizing your risk. What you
don’t want to be is the village idiot who burns his bridges after
two good months of poker, only to realize he’s not good enough
yet to support himself playing the game. That could crush your
confidence forever.
Being a poker pro is not an easy thing to do, and it can seem like
much more fun than it ends up being. Patience is the strongest
virtue. There is a big difference between playing for an hour
or two a night, and playing every day for eight hours — at odd
hours — along with all the other adjustments you have to make
to your lifestyle.
Nothing can pull you down like failing at something that was
perceived as stupid in the first place. If you’re a great college
football player and you take a shot at the NFL, people understand
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that progression. But when you take a chance on something as
poorly understood as online poker, failure can result in ridicule.
You need to be humble, and you need to be damn sure you’re
good enough before leaving your 9-to-5 behind.
So how do you quantify “good enough”? If you’re a tournament
player, you have to have some very good results for a year or more
before you leave your day job. Because of the way tournaments
are structured, you can get lucky and collect a $60,000 check
on any given weekend. You could make more in a day than you
could in a year at your job. But it should take you a long time to
sort out what is luck and what is not. You need to consistently be
getting good tournament results, making money over a period
of a year or more.
Cash games are different. Slow and steady wins the race. As a
means of setting the bar, I’d recommend you be playing .50/$1
or above, with a win rate according to Hold’em Manager of four
big blinds per 100 over a period of 100,000 hands.
It’s not a perfect science, but this can serve as a general guideline.
There are many factors you will need to consider, namely your
lifestyle. How much you need to earn from poker will vary greatly
from person to person. If you are a bachelor living in Thailand
your nut is a lot smaller than someone with a spouse and three
kinds living in Manhattan. But if you can beat your games for at
least four big blinds per 100 over a period of 100,000 hands,
you will typically be ready for a jump into the pros.