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This company looks great
Manufacturers that have notified FDA that they have validated and are offering serology tests as set forth in Section IV.D:
Where the Authorization Status is "FDA Authorized," the FDA reviewed and issued an EUA for the test after notification was given. Where the Authorization Status is shown as "Not FDA Authorized," the FDA has not yet reviewed the laboratory's validation and issued an EUA for the laboratory's test, and the test is included in this list to provide transparency regarding the notifications submitted to FDA.
Zhejiang Orient Gene Biotech, Co., Ltd. COVID-19 IgG/IgM Rapid Test Cassette Not FDA Authorized
PER FDA WEBSITE READ IT YOURSELF!!!!!!
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/emergency-situations-medical-devices/faqs-diagnostic-testing-sars-cov-2
SHOW ME WHERE ON ANY OF THE FDA WEBSITE IT SAY AYTU IS APPROVED?
HERE IS THE LINK FOR YOU.
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/emergency-situations-medical-devices/emergency-use-authorizations#covid19ivd
AYTU IS NOT APPROVED!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
A Tangled Balance Sheet and a History of Cash Burn
Aytu’s long-term track record for shareholder value creation is only cause for further concern. Since 2013 the company has burned cash at an accelerating rate while continuing to tap capital markets to raise cash. In my opinion, for pre-revenue companies with clinical pipeline candidates in need of research and development, this is an acceptable dynamic. For a company like Aytu, however, which mostly licenses and acquires marketed products and should be trying to sell them at a profit, this raise-and-burn profile is a problem.
Meanwhile, the current capital structure is difficult to disentangle, as the company has engaged in a series of financing transactions and agreements since its 2/14/2020 10-Q filing. Among the subsequent financing 8-Ks, I identified the following items:
2/14: Innovus merger closed; Aytu acquisition sub merged with Innovus; all outstanding Innovus common stock exchanged for 3.8 million shares of AYTU and $16 million in CVRs; outstanding Innovus stock exchanged for Aytu preferred stock and retired. Cash warrants exchanged for Series H Preferred stock -- 1,997,736 shares. Series H preferred is convertible at the conversion price.
3/13: Aytu entered into a securities purchase agreement with institutional investors pursuant to which the company agreed to sell and issue an aggregate of 16,000,000 shares of common stock at $1.25 and warrants to purchase up to 16,000,000 shares of common stock at an exercise price of $1.25 per share for aggregate gross proceeds of $20 million before fees
3/20: Aytu entered securities purchase agreement with institutional investors -- agreement to sell and issue in a direct offering 12,539,197 shares @ $1.595; warrants to purchase up to 12,539,197 shares of common stock at $1.47 per share, aggregate gross proceeds of $20 million before fees, warrants immediately exercisable -- shelf originally registered 11/22/2017
4/7: Company announces "it has received over the preceding three weeks $23 million in cash proceeds from warrant exercises with prices ranging from $1.25 to $1.50. The warrants had a weighted-average exercise price of $1.35. In total, approximately 17.1 million warrants were exercised." Cash balance $62.5 million.
If the mentioned securities are convertible to common shares on a 1:1 basis, then here is my estimate of the updated share count given the transactions subsequent to the 10-Q.
Seeking Alpha currently lists AYTU’s market cap at $125.51 million. I can’t fully account for the $45 million discrepancy, although you can get close by looking at the warrants issued March 13 and March 20: $1.50 x 28.5 million = $39.6 million. The point is not that my analysis is exactly correct, but instead that given the frequency of shareholder transactions and difficulty understanding terms of preferred stock conversions (or the triggers of such conversions) the market may very well be failing to account for all potential dilution under existing agreements. This is to say nothing of any future financing transactions. Given management’s history, I view further dilution as probable.
As a quick aside, Aytu disclosed in its 10-Q a series of risks associated with ownership of its shares by Armistice Capital, including a scenario where Armistice would own more than 50% of Aytu (while also noting Armistice is restricted from owning more than 40% of Aytu’s outstanding common stock). Armistice, which has a director on Aytu’s board, was a holder in both Aytu and Innovus, a company Aytu finished acquiring earlier this year. In this context, I think it’s simply relevant to know that such a shareholder exerts substantial influence over the company.
Taking all this evidence together, I believe Aytu is likely to engage in additional transactions that will dilute shareholders, and there's a risk that such transactions will disproportionately benefit insiders. These deals are opaque (at least to me), making it difficult for outsiders to properly assess shareholder value.
REALISTIC OPINION.
I believe shares in Aytu are worth substantially less than the market currently is pricing in at $1.39 per share. My valuation ranges between $0.35 and $0.75 a share.
Given Aytu has announced around 600,000 tests shipped since it entered the market in mid-March and that the manufacturer has accepted another order of 1 million tests, we can probably assume monthly manufacturing capacity between 600,000 and 1 million tests.
According to Stat, “A recent report from the American Enterprise Institute co-authored by former FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb puts the number of tests needed at 750,000 tests per week.” This means Aytu may have capacity to supply almost half the U.S. market with tests. But given the competition, including several dozen products the FDA has already issued EAUs for, I think a 3% market share would be generous for Aytu, because it would put this unknown player licensing a Chinese product on even footing with established companies marketing tests explicitly authorized by the FDA. (Again, 37 emergency use authorizations have already been listed on FDA's website.)
This New York Times article pegs Medicare payment per test between $36 and $51. We’ll call $45 a nice midpoint.
750,000 tests per week x 52 weeks per year x $45 per test x 3% market share = $52,650,000 in annual revenue.
Big, profitable testing players with long track records, services businesses, and recurring revenue – companies like Lab Corp (LH) and Quest Diagnostics (DGX) – trade at 1.1x and 1.4x sales respectively. Assuming similar profit margins (7% for Lab Corp, 11% for Quest) for Aytu BioSciences and similar long-term repeatability of the testing revenue stream, a 1.4x multiple on $52.7 million in sales gives us a $73.7 million valuation for the COVID-19 testing business. I think that’s a generous valuation given that viral pandemics eventually naturally recede and Aytu is a historical cash burner. The assumption of any annuity cash flows from this business is tenuous at best, but again, we're being generous.
Readers may be curious about Aytu's possible margins on test sales. I don't know the cost to manufacture a test in China, ship it, relabel it, and sell to practitioners (I assume it's well below $45 per test). My assumption is that Quest Diagnostics' 11% net income margin would be the absolute ceiling for Aytu, which has 78 employees listed on LinkedIn (lacking Quest's scale at 45,000 employees), has only one profitable quarter of the last ten, and has consistently shown triple digit negative net margins since 2013 (Quest has a been profitable over the same period and longer).
Aytu's 2019 SG&A, which is unlikely include any efforts related to COVID test sales (the licensing deal was announced in March 2020), was $19.2 million, already a meaningful proportion of our revenue estimates for the test. Meanwhile, in my opinion the announced sale of only 2,750 tests to Denver first responders illustrates a limited go-to-market strategy.
I think it's quite possible Aytu loses money on this venture even if it manages to sell through its test inventory in short order. To put a fine point on it, I expect net margins to range from -50% to 11%, for an implied net income on $52.7 million in sales of between -$26.4 million and $5.8 million. Neither justifies the current market cap, in my opinion.
In light of that, we could also simply assume the company sells through its existing booked test inventory of 1.6 million at a price of $45 per test. We arrive at $72,000,000 in testing sales as a one-time inflow. I would think a 1x sales multiple on a nonrecurring revenue stream would be laughably generous. At this valuation, that’s still around 43% downside.
A very pessimistic but plausible valuation of Aytu BioSciences would assume no profitable sales of its Coronavirus test. Given the market’s repricing of the shares is almost certainly attributable to the testing announcement, that approach yields a per-share pre-announcement price of around $0.35, or 75% downside. While an even lower price target may be justified by the company's lossmaking history and unimpressive pre-COVID product portfolio, I would tend to assume investor speculation would provide a floor to the share price in the $0.30-$0.40 range and would target an exit of a short position if the shares got there.
The particulars of the fundamental valuation are not the main point. The main point is that on an estimated price-sales basis the market has valued the company as though it will achieve outsized market share as a new entrant in a highly competitive market; that in short order it will achieve profitability for the first time, at comparable margins to much larger industry incumbents; and that its revenues will recur and possibly even grow – even though the COVID-19 testing market is likely a transitory one, where demand could recede within a year.
Conclusion
Before entering the Coronavirus testing market, Aytu BioSciences was an aggregator of marketed products with little penetration and, in my view, poor growth prospects. Its only existing testing product is an aid in the diagnosis of male infertility that is not approved for sale in the U.S. Management has quickly moved to bring a Chinese COVID-19 test to the U.S. market under emergency relaxed FDA guidelines. In my opinion there is little reason to believe the company will capture meaningful share of the diagnostic market. Even if it does, it will face overwhelming challenges as better-suited industry incumbents bring their the force of their knowhow to bear on the pandemic. The stock is priced for a near-impossibly rosy business scenario, and shares should trade at somewhere between half and a quarter of their current value.
[Update: Aytu has announced on April 20 a license to develop and commercialize Healight Platform Technology, a pre-clinical medical device that shines lights on COVID-19 infections in hopes of treating them. Quoting from the release:
The Healight technology employs proprietary methods of administering intermittent ultraviolet (UV) A light via a novel endotracheal medical device. [...]
Pre-clinical findings indicate the technology's significant impact on eradicating a wide range of viruses and bacteria, inclusive of coronavirus. The data have been the basis of discussions with the FDA for a near-term path to enable human use for the potential treatment of coronavirus in intubated patients in the intensive care unit (ICU).
I don't expect that running a tube down an infected patient's throat to shine radiation on COVID-19 infections is going to be a viable solution to the pandemic, but times are desperate, so we will see. My opinions regarding Aytu's lack of in-house knowhow regarding medical testing also apply to endotracheal UV medical devices. If anything, I believe this additional business activity will strain Aytu's limited resources and distract from its initial focus on sourcing and distributing medical tests - a task I was already concerned would be difficult for Aytu to achieve.]
I believe shares in Aytu are worth substantially less than the market currently is pricing in at $1.39 per share. My valuation ranges between $0.35 and $0.75 a share.
Given Aytu has announced around 600,000 tests shipped since it entered the market in mid-March and that the manufacturer has accepted another order of 1 million tests, we can probably assume monthly manufacturing capacity between 600,000 and 1 million tests.
According to Stat, “A recent report from the American Enterprise Institute co-authored by former FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb puts the number of tests needed at 750,000 tests per week.” This means Aytu may have capacity to supply almost half the U.S. market with tests. But given the competition, including several dozen products the FDA has already issued EAUs for, I think a 3% market share would be generous for Aytu, because it would put this unknown player licensing a Chinese product on even footing with established companies marketing tests explicitly authorized by the FDA. (Again, 37 emergency use authorizations have already been listed on FDA's website.)
This New York Times article pegs Medicare payment per test between $36 and $51. We’ll call $45 a nice midpoint.
750,000 tests per week x 52 weeks per year x $45 per test x 3% market share = $52,650,000 in annual revenue.
Big, profitable testing players with long track records, services businesses, and recurring revenue – companies like Lab Corp (LH) and Quest Diagnostics (DGX) – trade at 1.1x and 1.4x sales respectively. Assuming similar profit margins (7% for Lab Corp, 11% for Quest) for Aytu BioSciences and similar long-term repeatability of the testing revenue stream, a 1.4x multiple on $52.7 million in sales gives us a $73.7 million valuation for the COVID-19 testing business. I think that’s a generous valuation given that viral pandemics eventually naturally recede and Aytu is a historical cash burner. The assumption of any annuity cash flows from this business is tenuous at best, but again, we're being generous.
Readers may be curious about Aytu's possible margins on test sales. I don't know the cost to manufacture a test in China, ship it, relabel it, and sell to practitioners (I assume it's well below $45 per test). My assumption is that Quest Diagnostics' 11% net income margin would be the absolute ceiling for Aytu, which has 78 employees listed on LinkedIn (lacking Quest's scale at 45,000 employees), has only one profitable quarter of the last ten, and has consistently shown triple digit negative net margins since 2013 (Quest has a been profitable over the same period and longer).
Aytu's 2019 SG&A, which is unlikely include any efforts related to COVID test sales (the licensing deal was announced in March 2020), was $19.2 million, already a meaningful proportion of our revenue estimates for the test. Meanwhile, in my opinion the announced sale of only 2,750 tests to Denver first responders illustrates a limited go-to-market strategy.
I think it's quite possible Aytu loses money on this venture even if it manages to sell through its test inventory in short order. To put a fine point on it, I expect net margins to range from -50% to 11%, for an implied net income on $52.7 million in sales of between -$26.4 million and $5.8 million. Neither justifies the current market cap, in my opinion.
In light of that, we could also simply assume the company sells through its existing booked test inventory of 1.6 million at a price of $45 per test. We arrive at $72,000,000 in testing sales as a one-time inflow. I would think a 1x sales multiple on a nonrecurring revenue stream would be laughably generous. At this valuation, that’s still around 43% downside.
A very pessimistic but plausible valuation of Aytu BioSciences would assume no profitable sales of its Coronavirus test. Given the market’s repricing of the shares is almost certainly attributable to the testing announcement, that approach yields a per-share pre-announcement price of around $0.35, or 75% downside. While an even lower price target may be justified by the company's lossmaking history and unimpressive pre-COVID product portfolio, I would tend to assume investor speculation would provide a floor to the share price in the $0.30-$0.40 range and would target an exit of a short position if the shares got there.
The particulars of the fundamental valuation are not the main point. The main point is that on an estimated price-sales basis the market has valued the company as though it will achieve outsized market share as a new entrant in a highly competitive market; that in short order it will achieve profitability for the first time, at comparable margins to much larger industry incumbents; and that its revenues will recur and possibly even grow – even though the COVID-19 testing market is likely a transitory one, where demand could recede within a year.
Conclusion
Before entering the Coronavirus testing market, Aytu BioSciences was an aggregator of marketed products with little penetration and, in my view, poor growth prospects. Its only existing testing product is an aid in the diagnosis of male infertility that is not approved for sale in the U.S. Management has quickly moved to bring a Chinese COVID-19 test to the U.S. market under emergency relaxed FDA guidelines. In my opinion there is little reason to believe the company will capture meaningful share of the diagnostic market. Even if it does, it will face overwhelming challenges as better-suited industry incumbents bring their the force of their knowhow to bear on the pandemic. The stock is priced for a near-impossibly rosy business scenario, and shares should trade at somewhere between half and a quarter of their current value.
[Update: Aytu has announced on April 20 a license to develop and commercialize Healight Platform Technology, a pre-clinical medical device that shines lights on COVID-19 infections in hopes of treating them. Quoting from the release:
The Healight technology employs proprietary methods of administering intermittent ultraviolet (UV) A light via a novel endotracheal medical device. [...]
Pre-clinical findings indicate the technology's significant impact on eradicating a wide range of viruses and bacteria, inclusive of coronavirus. The data have been the basis of discussions with the FDA for a near-term path to enable human use for the potential treatment of coronavirus in intubated patients in the intensive care unit (ICU).
I don't expect that running a tube down an infected patient's throat to shine radiation on COVID-19 infections is going to be a viable solution to the pandemic, but times are desperate, so we will see. My opinions regarding Aytu's lack of in-house knowhow regarding medical testing also apply to endotracheal UV medical devices. If anything, I believe this additional business activity will strain Aytu's limited resources and distract from its initial focus on sourcing and distributing medical tests - a task I was already concerned would be difficult for Aytu to achieve.]
The FDA is not aware of an antibody test that has been validated for diagnosis of SARS-CoV-2 infection. While the FDA remains open to receiving submissions for these tests for such uses, based on the underlying scientific principles of antibody tests, the FDA does not expect that an antibody test can be shown to definitively diagnose or exclude SARS-CoV-2 infection.
Recommendations
The FDA recommends health care providers:
Continue to use serological (antibody) tests, as appropriate, and be aware of their limitations.
Do not use serological (antibody) tests as the sole basis to diagnose COVID-19 but instead as information about whether a person may have been exposed.
Be aware that not all marketed serological tests have been evaluated by the FDA. The FDA’s authorized tests, including serological tests, are listed on the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) page. Tests being offered under a policy outlined in the FDA’s COVID-19 Diagnostic Policy Guidance are listed on our FAQ page. Such tests have not been reviewed by the FDA, unless an EUA has also been submitted and reviewed by FDA.
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/letters-health-care-providers/important-information-use-serological-antibody-tests-covid-19-letter-health-care-providers
Approved by FDA found here. AYTU not ON THIS LIST.
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/emergency-situations-medical-devices/emergency-use-authorizations
REAL FACTS.
The Trouble With Serologic Tests
The trouble with serologic tests like Aytu's is well known to the FDA. Aytu’s test is a whole blood/serum/plasma test “used in … detection of IgG and IgM antibodies to the 2019 novel coronavirus in human whole blood, serum or plasma.” Aytu has said its relabeling process was designed to comply with FDA guidance on COVID-19 serology test kits.
On April 7, FDA warned about the limits of serological testing, which measures the “amount of antibodies or proteins present in the blood when the body is responding to a specific infection, like COVID-19.” The agency said that such tests can miss an early infection when the body has not yet created an immune response. This type of test “should not be used as the sole basis to diagnose COVID-19.”
In March, the FDA issued a policy to allow developers of certain serological tests to begin to market or use their tests once they have performed the appropriate evaluation to determine that their tests are accurate and reliable. This includes allowing developers to market their tests without prior FDA review if certain conditions outlined in the guidance document are met. The FDA issued this policy to allow early patient access to certain serological tests with the understanding that the FDA has not reviewed and authorized them.
The FDA can also authorize tests for COVID-19 under an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA). To date, FDA has authorized one EUA for a serological test that is intended for use by clinical laboratories.
Since the FDA issued the policy, over 70 test developers have notified the agency that they have serological tests available for use. However, some firms are falsely claiming that their serological tests are FDA approved or authorized, or falsely claiming that they can diagnose COVID-19. The FDA will take appropriate action against firms making false claims or marketing tests that are not accurate and reliable.
I think Aytu has been walking a fine line with its claim about the COVID-19 test, and if FDA determines Aytu has been overly optimistic in its presentation of the test’s regulatory status, there could be negative consequences for Aytu.
COVID 19 pump. This is all. Only lawsuits are from the FD AND PD. what a joke by aytu for serving our ppl these fake test.
Never going to happen. I guess they will sue FDA TOO!
This is a a joke of a company. No pr. Then the facts tell all.
AYTU Going to court for SELLING OUR PD AND FD FALSE TEST
Again no pr. No fda approvals. No sales. This is a pump and dump
Made 60 million. Lmao. That’s unaudited. Show me sec filings. Last filing they lost 8 million. 2018.
To date, 37 emergency use authorizations have been issued for COVID-19 tests. https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/emergency-situations-medical-devices/emergency-use-authorizations.
Please read my previous post date 2-3 weeks back. I told everyone this is a scam, exclusive rights bs. Pump by Dragon lady.
False negatives??. Not approved. 12,500,00.00 is lose. Tax right offs and dilutions. Here is the correct PR.
Well this is the much needed PR. I told everyone 2–3 weeks ago, this company is pumping up the COVID testing. So much for exclusives rights with bad testing. Dragon lady was the one pumping this up. Lol pump and dump.
No covid test is approved by FDA It’s only approved through the EUA during this crisis.
Pump and dump. No PR. MAJOR DILUTION
Lost your mind. Lol.
Dude you lost your mine. The market is up on gains, 4 days in a roll. Cruise line GC will be on average again. Time is on our side.
I been tested. It was free for me. So why should I pay AYTU for this test lol.
As of April 7, we list 536 testing sites nationwide.
Scroll down type in your state and here you go. Free testing
https://www.goodrx.com/blog/drive-thru-coronavirus-testing-near-me/
Why pay $25 per test if
CVS,Target,Walmart, Walgreens, and are supplying multiple states with a rapid test for FREE. Now in 15 states.
On March 31, a petition was filed in the Supreme Court seeking a direction to the Centre and authorities concerned to provide free testing facilities for COVID-19 to all citizens in the country.
https://www.google.com/amp/s/mobile.reuters.com/article/amp/idUSKBN21O1A4
https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.dailyherald.com/amp-article/20200407/business/200409331/
So still no sec filing for new cash balance everyone is talking about. So another rumor in thin air. Facts are the last sec filling.
Show the sec filing to prove balance surplus?
Balance sheet. In debt 8 million
http://filings.irdirect.net/data/1385818/000165495420001622/aytu_10q.pdf
Your right AYTU debt can’t be stopped. Lol
Balance sheet. Not 50 million
http://filings.irdirect.net/data/1385818/000165495420001622/aytu_10q.pdf
REAL FACTS SEC FILING. 2019 hasn’t been filed with the sec. so. NEXT....
AYTU Does not have 50 million in the bank. https://irdirect.net/AYTU/financials Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows (Unaudited) - USD ($) 6 Months Ended Dec. 31, 2018 Dec. 31, 2017 Cash flows from operating activities Net loss $ (8,104,145) $ (7,917,720) Adjustments to reconcile net loss to cash used in operating activities Stock-based compensation expense 106,671 275,688 Issuance of restricted stock 239,505 103,635 Depreciation, amortization and accretion 1,230,671 1,315,063 Issuance of common stock to employee 11,690 0 Derivative (income) (67,989) (817,785) Changes in operating assets and liabilities: (Increase) in accounts receivable (903,708) (849,397) (Increase) in inventory (305,888) (67,585) (Increase) in prepaid expenses and other (504,757) (454,595) Increase in accounts payable and other 252,113 1,124,558 Increase (decrease) in accrued liabilities 746,808 (524,905) Increase in accrued compensation 203,160 497,586 Increase in interest payable 36,164 0 Increase in deferred revenue 13,990 0 (Decrease) in deferred rent (1,450) (3,337) Net cash used in operating activities (7,047,165) (7,318,794) Cash flows used in investing activities Deposits 2,888 0 Purchases of property and equipment (12,954) (12,195) Contingent consideration payment (50,221) 0 Purchase of assets (800,000) 0 Net cash used in investing activities (860,287) (12,195) Cash flows from financing activities Issuance of preferred, common stock and warrants 15,180,000 11,839,995 Issuance costs related to preferred, common stock and warrants (1,479,963) (1,402,831) Issuance of debt 5,000,000 0 Net cash provided by financing activities 18,700,037 10,437,164 Net change in cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash 10,792,585 3,106,175 Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash at beginning of period 7,112,527 877,542 Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash at end of period 17,905,112 3,983,717 Fair value of warrants issued to investors and underwriters 1,888,652 0 Issuance of preferred stock related to purchase of asset 519,600 0 Contingent consideration 8,833,219 0 Warrants issued to investors and underwriters (see Note 6) 0 4,117,997 Revenue share payment to Jazz included in accounts payable 0 7,385 Earn-out payment to Nuelle Shareholders 0 250,000 Fixed assets included in accounts payable $ 0 $ 62,512 Plus DILUTION If you invest in this offering, your ownership interest will be immediately diluted to the extent of the difference between the offering price per share of common stock and the as adjusted net tangible book value per share of common stock after this offering. As of December 31, 2019, we had a net tangible book value of $17,090,240, or $0.82 per share of common stock. Our net tangible book value per share of common stock represents total tangible assets less total liabilities, divided by the number of shares of common stock outstanding at December 31, 2019 (20,733,052 shares of common stock were outstanding as of December 31, 2019). After giving effect to the issuance and sale by us of 16,000,000 shares of common stock in this offering and Warrants to purchase up to 16,000,000 shares of common stock in the aggregate amount of $20.0 million in this offering at an offering price of $1.25 per share of common stock deducting placement agent fees, our as adjusted net tangible book value as of December 31, 2019 would have been approximately $35,590,240, or approximately $0.97 per share of common stock (assuming 36,733,052 shares of common stock outstanding as of December 31, 2019 after giving effect to the issuance of 16,000,000 shares of common stock in this offering). This amount represents an immediate increase in net tangible book value of $0.15 per share of common stock to our existing shareholders and an immediate dilution in as adjusted net tangible book value of approximately $0.28 per share of common stock to new investors purchasing securities of in this offering. Dilution per share of common stock to new investors is determined by subtracting as adjusted net tangible book value per share of common stock after this offering from the offering price per share of common stock paid by new investors. The following table illustrates this dilution on a per share of common stock basis: Offering price per share of common stock $ 1.25 Net tangible book value per share of common stock as of December 31, 2019 $ 0.82 Increase in net tangible book value per share of common stock attributable to this offering 0.15 As adjusted net tangible book value per share of common stock after this offering $ 0.97 Dilution per share of common stock to new investors participating in this offering $ 0.28 Assuming the Warrants and Placement Agent Warrants were immediately exercised, this would result in an as adjusted net tangible book value as of December 31, 2019 would have been $57,215,240 or approximately $1.06 per share of common stock (assuming 53,773,052 shares of common stock outstanding as of December 31, 2019 after giving effect to the issuance of 16,000,000 shares of common stock in this offering, the exercise of the Warrants for 16,000,000 shares of common stock issued in this offering and the exercise of the Placement Agent Warrants for 1,040,000 shares of common stock issued in this offering),which represents an immediate dilution per share to new investors of $0.19 per share of common stock, and an increase in net tangible book value per share to existing shareholders of $0.24 per share of common stock. The discussion of dilution, and the table quantifying it, assumes the sale of all shares covered by this prospectus supplement and no exercise of any outstanding options or warrants or other potentially dilutive securities. The exercise of potentially dilutive securities having an exercise price less than the offering price would increase the dilutive effect to new investors. The above discussion and table are based on 20,733,052 common shares outstanding as of December 31, 2019, which does not include the following: ? 1,482 common shares issuable upon the exercise of stock options outstanding as of December 31, 2019 at a weighted average exercise price of $325.54 per share of common stock. As of March 10, 2020, there were 13,937 common shares issuable upon the exercise of stock options outstanding as of March 10, 2020 with a weighted exercise price of 34.69. ? 26,459,663 common shares issuable upon the exercise of warrants outstanding as of December 31, 2019, at a weighted average exercise price of $2.92 per share of common stock, of which 17,030,191 remain outstanding at March 12, 2020 with a weighted average exercise price of $3.76. ? an additional 403,209 common shares that are available for future issuance under our stock option plan, which was subsequently increased by 2,000,000 shares upon receiving shareholder approval on February 13, 2020. ? 17,040,000 shares issuable upon the exercise of the 1,040,000 Placement Agent Warrants or the 16,000,000 Warrants. ? 4,450,000 shares of common stock to be issued in connection with the expected closing of the First RD Offering on March 13, 2020. ? 3,376,087 shares of common stock issuable upon the exercise of the pre-funded warrants to be issued in connection with the First RD Offering on March 13, 2020. ? 508,696 shares of common stock issuable upon the exercise of the warrants issued to H.C. Wainwright & Co., LLC or its assignees in connection with the First RD Offering on March 13, 2020. ? To the extent any of these outstanding options or warrants are exercised, there will be further dilution
Another pump and dump.
All test kits are needed to save lives. Ppl pray for your friends,family,neighbors.
No comments on portfolios I may or may not own.
Abbott is 160 countries 107k employees 30 billions sales. Manufacturing 5 million test per month in one plant. Not count if they ramp up other plants. Made us USA.
AYTU. Colorado. Loss of 8 million
Not manufacturing/ buying from third party.