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Todays price action brings a old market adage to mind " Buy the rumor , sell the news ".
Appaloosa's rep did not seem very happy about the new deal. These BOD talking voices were careful almost to the point of being crafty. Edward Jones one time gave me the spill about looking out for the customer and next day another 2% was gone. I hope I live to see a recovery.
Maybe if S and G had a large share holding things would start happening.
The complexity of this fraud is evident by the number of years gone by. Banks like jpmc,wells,gs and hedges will never be punished in this world. However, when the bean is revealed at the shell game end all holders will be joyful with the (spoils) recovers.
WAMU note -
https://livinglies.wordpress.com/2017/11/22/investigator-bill-paatalo-wells-fargo-admits-to-executing-wamu-note-endorsement-in-2013-and-the-arkansas-bankruptcy-court-allows-wamu-to-get-away-with-it/
Investigator Bill Paatalo: Wells Fargo Admits To Executing WaMu Note Endorsement in 2013, And the Arkansas Bankruptcy Court Allows WaMu to Get Away With It!
by Neil Garfield
Editor's note: Great find by investigator Bill Paatalo at BPinvestigativeagency.com.
Arkansas courts are known to be some of the most corrupt bankruptcy and foreclosure courts in the country and the Arkansas Judiciary refuses to follow its own laws while catering to the interests of Foreclosure Mill Wilson and Associates. US bankruptcy trustee Joyce Babin is known for her bank-friendly decisions and has now legitimized fraud-on-the-court as an acceptable practice.
Posted by Bill Paatalo on Nov 22, 2017
https://bpinvestigativeagency.com/wells-fargo-admits-to-executing-wamu-note-endorsement-in-2013-and-gets-away-with-it/
This decision out of an Arkansas Bankruptcy Court has to be one of the most bizarre rulings I have ever read to-date. (See: Schiefer v Wells Fargo – Arkansas). Though the Court appears to get the facts utterly wrong in this case, there is one valuable nugget (FACT) that now exists – Wells Fargo admits to executing an endorsement upon a note by a WaMu Officer in 2013! The endorsements of WaMu officers appearing on notes long after the FDIC Receivership is what I have been attesting to for years now based upon a conglomeration of evidence. But now, we have an actual admission!
(Excerpts from this ruling with my comments in BOLD CAPS)
“Considering all of the evidence and the contradictory testimony by Wells Fargo, the Court can establish the following time line:
3. In 2007, Washington Mutual assigned the mortgage and note to Wells Fargo. (Wells Fargo Ex. D.) [COMMENT: THE EVIDENCE SHOWED NO ASSIGNMENT UPON THE NOTE PRIOR TO THE FDIC RECEIVERSHIP.] In addition, according to Bateman, Wells Fargo obtained physical possession of the note and mortgage at that time. With the assignment, Wells Fargo became either the owner of the note and mortgage or, if Fannie Mae was the owner, then Wells Fargo became the servicer of the note. Regardless, at the time of the assignment, the note was not indorsed either in blank or to Wells Fargo. Under Arkansas law, the assignment would not have been concluded (or negotiated) until the note was indorsed. Ark. Code Ann. § 43-203(c) (“if an instrument is transferred for value and the transferee does not become a holder because of lack of indorsement by the transferor . . . negotiation of the instrument does not occur until the indorsement is made.”).
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FN:
2 Wells Fargo introduced an assignment of mortgage from First Western to Washington Mutual that was filed in December 2004 and Bateman testified that Fannie Mae became the owner of the note in January 2005. However, neither party introduced any document that evidenced transfer of ownership of the note to Fannie Mae. [COMMENT: WHERE’S THE EVIDENCE OF TRANSFER OF THE NOTE TO ANYONE AT THIS POINT?]
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5. According to Wells Fargo’s response to the debtors’ requests for admissions, in February 2013 Wells Fargo added the second indorsement (the indorsement in blank) pursuant to a limited power of attorney from JP Morgan. [COMMENT: SECOND ENDORSEMENT? WHERE IS THE FIRST ENDORSEMENT?] The indorsement in blank was signed by Leta Hutchinson as Assistant Vice President of Washington Mutual Bank, FA. According to Hutchinson’s deposition (Dbs.’ Ex. G), Hutchinson was employed by Washington Mutual in February 2013. [COMMENT: EMPLOYED BY WASHINGTON MUTUAL IN 2013?!] Hutchinson also stated that she previously was an Assistant Vice President of Washington Mutual but ceased that position in May 2006. [COMMENT: EVEN WHEN HER ENDORSEMENT WAS PLACED UPON THE NOTE IN 2013, AND EVEN IF SHE WORKED FOR WASHINGTON MUTUAL LONG AFTER IT DIED, SHE WASN’T AN OFFICER!]When asked in the deposition what her job responsibilities were at Washington Mutual, she stated that she was the department manager for the documentation department but did not state when she held that position or what her job title was in February 2013.
Based on the above time line and the evidence presented at trial, the Court makes the following findings of fact that are relevant to the Court’s decision.
First, at the time the debtors filed their bankruptcy petition, Wells Fargo was either the owner of the note and mortgage (based solely on recorded state court documents) or was the servicer of the note (based on testimony and interrogatories that identify Fannie Mae as the owner).
………
Third, the indorsement in blank was signed by Leta Hutchinson pursuant to a power of attorney between JP Morgan Chase Bank, successor in interest from the FDIC as Receiver of Washington Mutual Bank and Wells Fargo.5 And fourth, at the time the indorsement in blank was added–in February 2013–Hutchinson was not an Assistant Vice President of Washington Mutual but was an employee of Washington Mutual.
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FN:
4 The only evidence before the Court of the receivership is a limited power of attorney dated July 8, 2011, that is attached to the Response to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Dbs.’ Ex. D.) The power of attorney appoints Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as “Servicer” for JP Morgan Chase Bank as “Investor” and “the successor in interest from the FDIC as Receiver of Washington Mutual Bank.” [COMMENT: THE LIMITED POWER IS GRANTED BY JPMORGAN CHASE AS “INVESTOR” TO WELLS FARGO? THE TESTIMONY IS THAT FANNIE MAE OWNED THE LOAN SINCE 2005! HOW IN THE WORLD DOES CHASE GRANT ANY AUTHORITY AS THE INVESTOR?]
5 The Court finds as a matter of law that the debtors failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Wells Fargo did not have the authority to indorse the note in blank on behalf of Washington Mutual. [COMMENT: SERIOUSLY?] First Western assigned the note to Washington Mutual [COMMENT: NO THEY DID NOT!] and JP Morgan was the apparent successor in interest from the FDIC as receiver of Washington Mutual. As successor in interest, JP Morgan authorized Wells Fargo under a power of attorney to effectuate “[t]he assignment of any Mortgage or Deed of Trust and the related Mortgage Note, in connection with the repurchase of the mortgage loan secured and evidenced thereby.” [COMMENT: “REPURCHASE?”] The indorsement in blank completed the transfer that began in 2007 when Washington Mutual initially assigned the mortgage and note to Wells Fargo. [COMMENT: I DIDN’T REALIZE THAT DECEASED PARTIES COULD COMPLETE NEGOTIATED TRANSACTIONS AFTER THEIR DEATH. HMM..I’M STILL SCRATCHING MY HEAD ON THIS COURT CONDONED “FIX” OF A FATALLY DEFECTIVE CHAIN OF TITLE.]
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Troubling for the debtors is the validity of Hutchinson’s indorsement in blank. Because Hutchinson never worked for JP Morgan, the debtors argue that JP Morgan would not have had the authority to authorize Wells Fargo to sign Hutchinson’s name to a financial instrument. And, again, without a valid signature, the indorsement would be a nullity. However, two facts work against the debtors’ argument. First, at the time the indorsement in blank was added to the note in February 2013, Hutchinson was an employee of Washington Mutual. Second, at the time the indorsement was added, JP Morgan was acting as successor in interest from the FDIC as Receiver of Washington Mutual. Under the power of attorney given by JP Morgan to Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo was empowered to negotiate the assignment of a note and mortgage. In this case, the indorsement in blank was the final step required to complete the transfer that was begun in 2007. Although Hutchinson was not Assistant Vice President at the time the indorsement was added, she was employed by Washington Mutual and could have been acting in an agency capacity.”
[COMMENT: ABSURD!]
Bill Paatalo – Private Investigator – OR PSID# 49411
BP Investigative Agency
bill.bpia@gmail.com
Neil Garfield | November 22, 2017 at 4:42 pm | Categories: foreclosure | URL: https://wp.me/p7SnH-e7f
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10-Q: WMIH CORP.
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Published: Nov 9, 2017 5:45 p.m. ET
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(EDGAR Online via COMTEX) -- Item 2. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations.
The following discussion should be read in conjunction with our financial statements and the related notes, included in Item 1 of Part I of this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q. The following is a discussion and analysis of our results of operations for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2017 and 2016 and financial condition as of September 30, 2017 and December 31, 2016 (dollars in thousands, except share and per share data and as otherwise indicated).
References as used herein, unless the context requires otherwise, to (i) the "Company," "we," "us," or "our" refer to WMIH Corp. (formerly WMI Holdings Corp.) and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis; (ii) "WMIH" refers only to WMIH Corp., without regard to its subsidiaries; (iii) "WMIHC" refers only to WMI Holdings Corp., without regard to its subsidiaries; (iv) "WMMRC" refers to WM Mortgage Reinsurance Company, Inc. (a wholly-owned subsidiary of WMIH); and (v) "WMIIC" refers to WMI Investment Corp. (a wholly-owned subsidiary of WMIH).
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FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS AND INFORMATION
This quarterly report includes forward-looking statements, within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Securities Act"), and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"). All statements other than statements of historical fact included in this report that address activities, events, conditions or developments that we expect, believe or anticipate will or may occur in the future are forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements give our current expectations and projections relating to our financial condition, results of operations, plans, objectives, future performance and business and these statements are not guarantees of future performance. These statements can be identified by the fact that they do not relate strictly to historical or current facts. Forward-looking statements may include the words "anticipate," "estimate," "expect," "project," "intend," "plan," "believe," "strategy," "future," "opportunity," "may," "should," "will," "would," "will be," "will continue," "will likely result" and similar expressions. Such forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties that may cause actual events, results or performance to differ materially from those indicated by such statements. These risks are identified and discussed in the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2016 under Risk Factors in Part I, Item 1A. These risk factors will be important to consider in determining future results and should be reviewed in their entirety. These forward-looking statements are expressed in good faith and we believe there is a reasonable basis for them. However, there can be no assurance that the events, results or trends identified in these forward-looking statements will occur or be achieved. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made, and we do not undertake to update any forward-looking statement, except as required by law. Therefore, you should not rely on these statements being current as of any time other than the time at which this document was filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
OVERVIEW
Our Business Strategy and Operating Environment
WMIH Corp. ("WMIH") is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware. On May 11, 2015, WMIH merged with its parent corporation, WMI Holdings Corp., a Washington corporation ("WMIHC"), with WMIH as the surviving corporation in the merger (the "Merger"). The Merger occurred as part of the reincorporation of WMIHC from the State of Washington to the State of Delaware effective May 11, 2015 (the "Reincorporation Date").
WMIH, formerly known as WMIHC and Washington Mutual, Inc. ("WMI"), is the direct parent of WM Mortgage Reinsurance Company, Inc. ("WMMRC") and WMI Investment Corp. ("WMIIC"), which has no assets or liabilities. Since emergence from bankruptcy on March 19, 2012 (the "Effective Date"), we have had limited operations other than WMMRC's legacy reinsurance business, which is being operated in runoff mode. We continue to operate WMMRC's business in runoff mode and our primary strategic objective is to consummate one or more acquisitions of an operating business, either through a merger, purchase, business combination or other form of acquisition, and grow our business.
We continue to seek, identify and evaluate acquisition opportunities of varying sizes across an array of industries for the purpose of facilitating an acquisition by WMIH of one or more operating businesses. Our management team meets regularly with our Board of Directors (the "Board" or "Board of Directors"), the Finance Committee of the Board (the "Finance Committee") and the Corporate Strategy and Development Committee of the Board (the "CS&D Committee"), as the case may be, to discuss and evaluate potential acquisition targets. During the nine months ended September 30, 2017 and the year ended December 31, 2016, the Finance Committee, the CS&D Committee and the Board of Directors met formally and informally numerous times to assess various opportunities. We have focused primarily on acquisition targets in the financial services industry, including targets with consumer finance, commercial finance, specialty finance, leasing and insurance operations. We also may review potential targets in other industries, such as information technology, industrials, business services, healthcare and other sectors.
On January 5, 2015, we announced that WMIH had completed an offering (the "Series B Preferred Stock Financing") of 600,000 shares of its 3% Series B Convertible Preferred Stock, par value $0.00001, liquidation preference $1,000 per share (the "Series B Preferred Stock") in the amount of aggregate gross proceeds equal to $600 million. Net proceeds of $598.5 million were deposited into an escrow account and have been, and will be, released from escrow to us from time to time in amounts needed to finance our efforts to explore and fund, in whole or in part, certain acquisitions, whether completed or not, including reasonable attorney fees and expenses, accounting expenses, due diligence and financial advisor fees and expenses. For further information on the Series B Preferred Stock Financing, see Note 9: Capital Stock and Derivative Instruments, to the condensed consolidated financial statements in Item 1 of Part I of this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q.
WMIH continues to evaluate acquisition opportunities and work with our strategic partner, an affiliate of KKR & CO. L.P. (together with its affiliates, "KKR"), to identify, consider and evaluate potential mergers, acquisitions, business combinations and other strategic opportunities. As of September 30, 2017, and through the date of the filing of this Form 10-Q, we had not entered into definitive documentation relating to an acquisition or consummated an acquisition. If we have not entered into definitive documentation relating to an Acquisition (as defined below), or consummated a Qualified Acquisition (as defined below), on or prior to January 5, 2018, we will be required to redeem all of the outstanding Series B Preferred Stock on January 5, 2018 (the "Series B Redemption Date"). A "Qualified Acquisition" means an Acquisition (as defined below) that, taken together, with prior Acquisitions (if any), collectively utilizes aggregate net proceeds of the Series B Preferred Stock Financing of $450 million. "Acquisition" means any acquisition by the Company (or any of its direct or indirect wholly-owned subsidiaries), in a single transaction or a series of transactions, whether by purchase, merger or otherwise, of all or substantially all of the assets of, or equity interests in, or a business line, unit or division of, any person.
Assuming all 600,000 shares are outstanding on the Series B Redemption Date, the aggregate redemption cost will be $600.0 million, plus accrued and unpaid dividends, if any, whether or not declared. If, prior to the Series B Redemption Date, we publicly announce that we have entered into a definitive agreement for an Acquisition, the Series B Redemption Date will be extended to the earlier to occur of (i) July 5, 2018, and (ii) the day immediately following (x) the date such definitive agreement is terminated or (y) the date such Acquisition is closed. The consummation of an Acquisition would result in the mandatory conversion of some or all of the Series B Preferred Stock into common stock in accordance with provisions set forth in Article VI of the Certificate of Incorporation.
While we remain focused on identifying an Acquisition and executing definitive documentation relating to or consummating an Acquisition on or prior to the Series B Redemption Date we can provide no assurance that we will be able to do so and, if so, on what terms. In the event we are required to redeem the Series B Preferred Stock, our available cash, absent a new financing, will be substantially depleted and our ability to (i) utilize our net operating loss ("NOL") carry-forward, (ii) access significant alternative uses of capital and
As previously disclosed, the Finance Committee is authorized, among other things, (i) to review the long-term financial structure, objectives and policies of the Company, and to make recommendations to the Board regarding such structure, objectives and policies, if appropriate, (ii) to evaluate the financing requirements of the Company and management's proposed financing and refinancing plans and to recommend to the Board those actions, authorizations, filings and applications necessary and appropriate to enable management to execute such plans and (iii) to consider and make recommendations to the Board regarding the terms, timing, amount and other material factors (e.g., potential dilution of existing shareholders and the impact of any financing or restructuring on the Company's tax attributes under Section 382 of the Code), related to the possible restructuring or amendment of the Company's outstanding equity securities, issuance of new equity securities in one or more private or public transactions, redemption of outstanding securities, or other transactions related to the Company's outstanding securities, capital structure or fundraising to meet the Company's future liquidity and capital resources needs, in each case as the Finance Committee deems appropriate.
In connection with the foregoing, and as has previously been disclosed, the Finance Committee has retained financial advisors to help the Company assess its overall capital structure and liquidity requirements and to develop potential financing alternatives. As part of these efforts, as of the date of this report, the Finance Committee and its advisers are engaged in discussions relating to, among other things, a possible restructuring or amendment of the Series B Preferred Stock. We can provide no assurance we will be able to restructure, amend or refinance the Series B Preferred Stock and, if so, on what terms.
With respect to our current operations, the Company currently operates a single business through its subsidiary, WMMRC, whose sole activity is the reinsurance of mortgage insurance policies. WMMRC has been operated in runoff mode since September 26, 2008. Since that date, WMMRC has not underwritten any new policies (and by extension any new risk). WMMRC, through predecessor companies, began reinsuring risks in 1997 and continued reinsuring risks through September 25, 2008.
All of WMMRC's reinsurance agreements are on an excess of loss basis, except for a reinsurance treaty with Genworth Mortgage Insurance Corporation during 2008, which is reinsured on a 50% quota share basis. Pursuant to the excess of loss reinsurance treaties, WMMRC reinsures a second loss layer which ranges from 5% to 10% of the risk in force in excess of the primary mortgage insurer's first loss percentages which range from 4% to 5%. Each calendar year, or book year, is treated separately from other years when calculating losses. In return for accepting a portion of the risk, WMMRC receives, net of ceding commission, a percentage of the premium that ranges from 25% to 40%.
WMMRC previously commuted three reinsurance agreements, one each, in 2009, 2012 and 2014, respectively, and the related trust assets were distributed in accordance with the commutation agreements. On October 23, 2017, the reinsurance agreement with Radian was commuted and the related trust assets were released to WMMRC. On September 13, 2017, the Insurance Division of the State of Hawaii approved this commutation and a distribution of up to $10.7 million to WMIH. As of the date of the filing of this Form 10-Q, this distribution has not yet been completed. For more information see Note 14: Subsequent Events to the condensed consolidated financial statements in Item 1 of Part I of this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q. We also may seek opportunities to extract excess capital through commutation of one or more of WMMRC's remaining reinsurance agreements or otherwise, with a view toward accelerating the distribution of trust assets in excess of the amounts needed to pay claims.
Beginning in 2006, the U.S. housing market and related credit markets experienced a multi-year downturn. During that period, housing prices declined materially, credit guidelines tightened, delays in mortgage servicing and foreclosure activities occurred, and deterioration in the credit performance of mortgage loans occurred. In addition, the macro-economic environment during that period demonstrated limited economic growth, stubbornly high unemployment, and limited median wage gains. Beginning in 2012, home prices began to rise again. The current outlook for the housing market is optimistic with low interest rates, steady employment growth, increased household formation rates and less restrictive credit conditions. Nevertheless, WMMRC's operating environment remains somewhat uncertain as much of its results over the next two years will be directly affected by the inventory of pending defaulted mortgages at its ceding companies arising primarily from mortgages originated in calendar years 2007 and 2008. However, its financial exposure to that environment has been materially reduced as the remaining net aggregate risk exposure has decreased due to the runoff nature of its operations.
Our Financial Information
The financial information in this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q has been derived from our condensed consolidated financial statements.
Critical Accounting Policies
Our condensed consolidated financial statements are prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in the United States ("GAAP"), which requires management to make estimates and assumptions that affect reported and disclosed amounts of assets and liabilities and the reported amounts of revenues and expenses during the reporting period. We believe that the critical accounting policies set forth in the accompanying condensed consolidated financial statements describe the more significant judgments and estimates used in the preparation of our condensed consolidated financial statements. These accounting policies pertain to premium revenues and risk transfer, valuation of investments, loss and loss adjustment expense reserves, our values under fresh start accounting, the resulting loss contract reserve and the valuation of the derivative instrument relating to the embedded conversion feature of the Series B Preferred Stock. If actual events differ significantly from the underlying judgments or estimates used by management in the application of these accounting policies, there could be a material effect on our results of operations and financial condition.
Recently issued accounting standards and their impact on the Company have been presented under "New Accounting Pronouncements" in Note 2: Significant Accounting Policies to the condensed consolidated financial statements in Item 1 of Part I of this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q.
Segments
The Company manages its business on the basis of one operating segment, mortgage reinsurance, in accordance with GAAP. Within the mortgage reinsurance segment, our current risks arise solely from the reinsurance of mortgage insurance policies that were placed on certain residential mortgage loans prior to the bankruptcy of WMI. The majority of these policies were required by mortgage lenders as a stipulation to approve the mortgage loans. The mortgage insurance policies protect the beneficiaries of the policy from all or a portion of default-related losses.
Overview of Revenues and Expenses
Because WMIH has no current significant operations of its own, its cash flow is derived almost entirely from earnings on its investment portfolio, and payments it receives from, and dividends paid by, WMMRC. All dividends received by WMIH from
WMMRC that constituted Runoff Proceeds, historically, were required to be distributed to holders of WMIH's Second Lien Notes in accordance with the terms of the Second Lien Indenture as described below in this Item 2 under "Notes Payable." As of September 29, 2017, the Second Lien Notes were fully redeemed by the Company and the Second Lien Indenture was satisfied and discharged, therefore future distributions from WMMRC to WMIH will be available for general corporate purposes.
WMMRC's revenues consist primarily of the following:
net premiums earned on reinsurance contracts;
positive changes to (and corresponding releases from) loss reserves; and
net investment income and net gains (losses) on WMMRC's investment portfolio.
WMMRC's expenses consist primarily of the following:
underwriting expenses; and
general and administrative expenses.
Results of Operations for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2017 and September 30, 2016
For the three and nine months ended September 30, 2017, we reported a net operating loss of $0.3 million and net operating income of $3.5 million, respectively. This compares to net operating losses of $0.4 million and $1.3 million for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2016, respectively. The components that gave rise to a net operating loss for the three months and net operating income for the nine months ended September 30, 2017 and net operating losses for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2016 are summarized in the tables below under the Net Income (Loss) section. The most significant variances between the comparative three month periods ended September 30, 2017 and September 30, 2016 include (i) increased revenue of approximately $1.0 million, (ii) an increase in general and administrative expense of $0.8 million, (iii) a minimal change in interest expense of $0.1 million, (iv) a net decrease in underwriting expense of $0.2 million and (v) a reduction of the loss contract reserve of $0.2 million during the three months ended September 30, 2017 versus a reduction of $0.5 million during the same period in 2016. The loss contract reserve decrease, during the three and nine months ended September 30, 2017, is attributed primarily to changes in the expected timing of assets being released from trust accounts held at WMMRC which are discounted to present value. When assets are expected to be released from trust earlier than anticipated, a smaller present value discount is applied to the loss contract reserve, thus reducing the reserve. For more information see Note 14: Subsequent Events to the condensed consolidated financial statements in Part I, Item 1 of this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q. The most significant variances between the comparative nine month periods ended September 30, 2017 and September 30, 2016 include (i) an increase in revenue of approximately $1.7 million, (ii) an increase in general and administrative expense of $1.0 million
For the three months ended September 30, 2017, we reported net income attributable to common and participating stockholders of $33.9 million compared to a net loss attributable to common and participating stockholders of $21.1 million for the three months ended September 30, 2016. This $55.0 million reduction in net loss attributable to common and participating stockholders, when comparing the three months ended September 30, 2017 to the three months ended September 30, 2016, is primarily the result of the change in fair value of an embedded derivative. This embedded derivative was recorded as a result of the variable conversion feature in our Series B Preferred Stock and the change in fair value is reflected on our condensed consolidated statements of operations as the other income or expense item, "change in fair value of derivative - embedded conversion feature" which resulted in $38.6 million of other income for the three months ended September 30, 2017, compared to other expense of $16.2 million for the three months ended September 30, 2016. This item is solely attributable to a change in fair value of the derivative-embedded conversion feature and is a non-cash item. Fluctuations in the price of WMIH's common stock directly impact the fair value of the derivative instrument. The fair value of this derivative instrument is analyzed each period and should not be relied upon to produce changes of this magnitude on an on-going basis as it could also result in a non-cash expense or benefit in future periods. The fair value of the embedded conversion feature will become equity upon conversion of the Series B Preferred Stock, or be reduced to zero upon redemption of the Series B Preferred Stock, as the case may be. For additional details on the derivative-embedded conversion feature, see Note 9: Capital Stock and Derivative Instruments and Note 13: Fair Value Measurement to the condensed consolidated financial statements in Part I, Item 1 of this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q. In addition to this change, several other items had a favorable impact on earnings for the three months ended September 30, 2017, including net revenues and decreased interest expense. Our revenues increased primarily due to improved earnings on our investment portfolio including the restricted cash equivalents. Interest expense decreased as a result of the reduction in our Runoff Note balances discussed further below. The loss contract reserve decreased by $0.2 million in the three months ended September 30, 2017, as compared to $0.5 million in the three months ended September 30, 2016, resulting in a positive improvement to operating income. Underwriting expenses were lower on a comparative basis, primarily due to smaller increases in premium deficiency reserves in the three months ended September 30, 2017 as compared to increases in premium deficiency reserves during the three months ended September 30, 2016 as further described below in this Item 2 of Part I, under "Losses or Benefits Incurred and Losses and Loss Adjustment Expenses."
For the nine months ended September 30, 2017, we reported net income attributable to common and participating stockholders of $21.4 million compared to net income attributable to common and participating stockholders of $47.8 million for the nine months ended September 30, 2016. This $26.4 million decline in net income attributable to common and participating stockholders, when comparing the nine months ended September 30, 2017 to the nine months ended September 30, 2016, is primarily the result of the change in fair value of an embedded derivative. This embedded derivative was recorded as a result of the variable conversion feature in our Series B Preferred Stock and the change in fair value is reflected on our condensed consolidated statements of operations as the other income or expense item "change in fair value of derivative embedded conversion feature" which resulted in $31.2 million of other income for the nine months ended September 30, 2017, compared to other income of $62.6 million for the nine months ended September 30, 2016. This item is solely attributable to a change in fair value of the derivative embedded conversion feature, which is further described above. In addition to this change, the other large variance was the positive impact from the loss contract reserve decreasing by $5.6 million for the nine months ended September 30, 2017, as compared to $2.3 million in the same period in 2016.
The total revenue for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2017 was $2.3 million and $5.9 million, respectively, compared to revenue of $1.3 million and $4.2 million, respectively, for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2016. The increase in revenue is attributable to improved earnings on our investment portfolio including the restricted cash equivalents, however, WMMRC continues to experience decreasing premium revenue due to operating in runoff mode. In addition, because WMMRC is operating in runoff mode, we expect premiums-earned revenue to continue to decrease, as no new business is being undertaken.
Underwriting expenses (defined as losses and loss adjustment expenses and ceding commission expenses) decreased by $0.2 million to a $0.1 million expense for the three months ended September 30, 2017 compared to an expense of $0.3 million for the three months ended September 30, 2016. Underwriting expenses decreased by $0.6 million to a $0.3 million expense for the nine months ended September 30, 2017 compared to an expense of $0.9 million for the nine months ended September 30, 2016. This decrease was primarily the result of the $0.5 million and $1.0 million additional premium deficiency reserves which were recorded during the three and nine months ended September 30, 2016, respectively, compared to a minimal change and a $0.2 million increase in the premium deficiency reserve during the three and nine months ended September 30, 2017, respectively. These changes in expense are related to the operation of WMMRC in runoff mode and the corresponding decrease in revenues and the change in premium deficiency reserves as further described below in this Item 2 of Part I under "Losses or Benefits Incurred and Losses and Loss Adjustment Expenses." As more fully described in Note 2: Significant Accounting Policies to the condensed consolidated financial statements in Item 1 of Part I of this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, due to the current condition of the mortgage insurance market, WMMRC has recorded reserves based on ceded case reserves and incurred but not recorded ("IBNR") loss levels established and reported by the primary mortgage guaranty carriers as of each reporting period. Management believes that its estimate of aggregate liability for unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses as of September 30, 2017 represents its best estimate, based upon the available data, of the amount necessary to cover the current cost of losses.
As of September 30, 2017, the loss contract reserve was analyzed and determined to have a value of zero compared to $5.6 million at December 31, 2016. The value of the loss contract reserve decreased by $0.2 million and $5.6 million, respectively, during the three and nine months ended September 30, 2017 and decreased by $0.5 million and $2.3 million during the three and nine months . . .
Nov 09, 2017
(c) 1995-2017
New positive article (
Northern Dynasty Minerals: Signs Of EPA News On The Horizon
Oct. 26, 2017 3:46 PM ET
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22 comments
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About: Northern Dynasty Minerals Ltd (NAK)
Nic Harvey
Nic Harvey
Long/short equity, Deep Value, hedge fund analyst, value
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(75 followers)
Summary
•Northern Dynasty Minerals may have already received a positive outcome from the EPA.
•Changes to the corporate presentation and fact sheet were on October 25th that infer a positive EPA outcome.
•Public news could come anytime in the next two weeks, likely before the end of the month.
•Partnership news will be close behind a positive outcome from the EPA.
In my last article, I explained the thesis of why I am long Northern Dynasty Minerals (NYSEMKT:NAK), with factual evidence and raw data. I would like to make the point early in this article that I am still long and continue to increase my long position at every opportunity the short traders provide to me.
Yes, you have seen this stock yo-yo over the last couple of months, and many, many months before that. It is no secret that NAK is one of the most shorted stocks on Wall Street. However, those of us who are long and have been long for quite some time may be close to reaping the benefits we have been so patient for, and here is why:
On October 25th, Northern Dynasty Minerals did some updating to the content on its website. Specifically, it has taken its most recent presentation material and fact sheet, published on its site and made some very interesting and important changes.
Click to enlargeNAK Previous Corp. Presentation NAK Previously, the material stated several times throughout that the removal of the EPA settlement was a primary goal, along with partnering. Anyone who has followed this stock knows that getting a fair permitting process for the Pebble Mine has been a long, painful road. Naturally, making this a goal and posting it on the company website makes sense to ensure investors are fully aware of the company's intentions.
However, the updated corporate presentation has been changed to remove all mentions of this particular goal. This is extremely important because it tells the investor the goals and priorities of NAK have changed. One could speculate that this seemingly important, but subtle change could have a negative connotation about it if it were not for the company making a certain update to their corporate fact sheet. Recently, the fact sheet stated that there was "A rigorous defensible path to a timely mine permit". Now, the fact sheet reads "Stable and predictable path to a timely permit".
Not only does this indicate to me positivity about the EPA settlement and subsequent partnering process from NAK, but it may very well indicate that NAK has already been told by the EPA the outcome from the most recent evaluation. Just to be clear, the EPA is known to alert the company of its findings and decisions ahead of making any sort of statement to the public. Hence, the changes to NAK's corporate website, where the Pebble Partnership is concerned, are likely tactical in nature, making sure to convey the correct message to investors as to not be misleading. Of course, this information can be seen as somewhat speculative. However, it is supportive of NAK's two main goals: 1. EPA settlement for a fair permitting process 2. Locking in a partner or consortium of partners.
This information points to positive news coming down the pipeline for NAK. In addition, AlphaGroup, author of the post NAK valuation views and considerations – LONG READ, provides insight that helps keep in perspective why NAK is a tremendous opportunity for long buyers. AlphaGroup’s post reminds us that the Pebble Mine is the largest undeveloped copper and gold mine in the world, where the demand for copper is only set to continue increasing. He reinforces the fact that positive news for this company will increase institutional investment, leading to further increase in stock price, and again that shorts will no longer be able to keep this stock down from realizing its potential. In addition to these fundamental points, AlphaGroup provides a valuation estimate strikingly close to what I have provided in my last article and also what Seeking Alpha contributor Paul Lebo provided in his article Northern Dynasty Minerals Is A Multi Bagger. AlphaGroup forecasts $2.5 billion equity contribution from a JV for 50% equity (slightly more conservative than my $2.9 billion estimate for the same equity share). Forecasting a total equity valuation of $5 billion for 100% equity, AlphaGroup values the unadjusted share price at $8.25 per share and the adjusted price up to $9.49 per share. This is a reasonable forecast, using fairly conservative inputs to arrive at a valuation estimate that supports the long thesis for NAK.
In closing, the activity on October 24th regarding the corporate presentation and fact sheet for Northern Dynasty Minerals is deliberate and telling in nature. It points to a positive EPA outcome and a bullish move in the very short term for the stock. The EPA will release news no later than around November 11th, but could likely happen before the end of the month. Upon a positive outcome from the EPA, expect partnership news to be very close behind. This time frame gives just a couple of weeks at a maximum before longs start to see the uptick we have been so patient for.
Disclosure: I am/we are long NAK.
I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this )
The fdic,jmpc,rosen,and THJMW have all sworn not to reveal the secret which The Honorable McMahan caused to be known with exigent importance. All that know the secret ( especially fdic ) will lie before letting the truth be out. The fdic boasting not enough $s for distribution to equity is just another cruel action meant to delay and confuse. The secret has to be either $s or crimes against the people of America or both. Soon all will be known.
projection from Alpha article - The amount of shorting seen on Friday, October 6, was the highest level of short sales as a percent of total sales that this stock has ever seen. In essence, Friday’s trading activity demonstrates that almost no longs were selling and, even with 95% of sales sold short, the stock was still up 10%. This likely signifies that the shorts are working diligently to suppress the stock price in order to protect their position. This trend continued on October 11, which saw a 1.3 million increase in short interest despite NAK notching an 8% gain. The conclusion that I draw from this data is that in recent days the stock price has continued rising despite the increase in short interest to a massive ~34 million, which shows that longs are in general no longer selling, and consequently the shorting game could be coming to an abrupt end. On October 11, the stock crossed the important $2.00 psychology threshold again and began to break out without any partnership or EPA news, furthering my viewpoint that the shorting thesis may be on life support.
NAK also released news early on October 12 regarding two key positions that were filled for the Pebble Limited Partnership (PLP). Stephen Hodgson, formerly the leader of engineering for Northern Dynasty and Hunter Dickinson Inc. has been repurposed to fill the role Senior Vice President of Engineering and Project Director. As such, he will be responsible for project design, engineering, and maybe most importantly regulatory compliance. He is aided by the new hire James Fueg, who has been named Vice President of Permitting. It seems that NAK and the Pebble Partnership are continuing to gain traction in the permitting process and have clearly demonstrated they are ready to take the next step per their additions to senior leadership. Not only do these two newly hired PLP members have extensive experience in mine engineering, resource development and the permitting process, but they also both have a long history of operations in Alaska; a key point that could help win over skeptical Alaskans as well.
Related to the long-term investor perspective, the goal of the Pebble Mine is to achieve production by early 2024. The long-term investor will ignore the daily volatility and focus on this seven-year production goal. Intermediate steps for NAK include imminent partnership announcement, permit filing by end of Q4 , and permit approval by end of 2020. I agree with the $6 - $9 price target proposed by Lebo and would argue that we will see this price range upon imminent partnership announcement. I also anticipate a rally in the final two weeks of October to coincide with the end of the comment period for the EPA lift, which is October 17th. With events such as the hiring of senior technical leadership and the de-scaling of the Pebble Project, it is likely that we could hear news regarding a consortium of partners around November 10th (close to the time NAk will be reporting earnings), if not earlier.
In conclusion, I would not be surprised to see a moderate rally prior to formal partnership announcement. However, the stock price suppression by the high short interest may mute the pre-announcement gains. Another important consideration is the potential for a consortium partnership with greater buy-in than the market expects. For these reasons, instead of a 'buy the rumor, sell the news event', any partnership news in today's marketplace may very well be a buy the rumor, buy the news event.
Disclosure: I am/we are long NAK.
KKR is not in the charity business. KKR's business is making money and lots of it. WMIH was seen as a unique opportunity for making untold $$$$$$$$$s.
The drop today may have been a Ross Hook. Many times before a rise in price there will be a manipulated drop. Days ahead will prove or not.
One question. With reported monies of around 2.7 billion, how were payments of totalling around 3.5 billion made to DB and jpmc ?
Nelson's statement for the court record of existance of 30 Billon is a puzzle.
Continues ( correction )
KKR is probably an expert at manipulation and shorting for purpose of gathering more shares. This game of gathering shares co tongues. Hold on to your shares cause they are going to be very valuable soon.
It is always good to see "HTB" noted on the brokerage page. By setting a high "GTC" order , maybe even harder to range round shares !
The CBS story was a hit piece for sure. Interesting the timing. The network seems happy at slanting against the President and any capitalist advancements.
No link which I can find as of yet. Story started with the bears and a few observers in the rain. Slant was definably not for the project. The run offs were mentioned several times.
CBS ran a story at around 8:50 this morning about Pebble and enviroment.
Least we forget. Nelson spoke of 30 billion above all debts.Whereas b r said no monies for equity ( while the w/s machine thought all could be stolen ). Also b r has thought it is ok to Bill 24/7. I chose to trust Nelson's assessment and not to trust b r.
KKR in news.
KKR's second-quarter earnings soar to a record
6:30 AM ET, 07/27/2017 - Reuters
By Greg Roumeliotis
July 27 (Reuters) - KKR & Co LP said on Thursday its second-quarter after-tax profit almost quadrupled to a record, as the private equity firm marked up the value of several of its investments to reflect their strong performance amid a market rally.
The strong earnings follow a surge in KKR's own stock, which has risen more than 60 percent in the last 18 months. Activist hedge fund ValueAct Capital LP disclosed a stake of close to 5 percent in KKR in April, arguing the stock is still undervalued.
KKR said that after-tax economic net income, which takes into account mark-to-market gains or losses in its investment portfolio, came in at 89 cents per share, up from 23 cents per share a year ago and more than the 67 cents per share that analysts on average forecast in a Thomson Reuters poll.
The value of KKR's private equity funds rose 7.3 percent in the second quarter, while some of its credit funds, as well as it own investments funded by its balance sheet, also saw gains. By comparison, peer Blackstone Group LP last week disclosed a 2.8 percent appreciation in its private equity funds in the quarter.
Nevertheless, after-tax distributable earnings, representing actual cash available to pay dividends, dropped 37 percent to $321.9 million, as asset sales slowed down. KKR declared a second-quarter dividend of 17 cents per share, in line with its fixed cash distribution policy.
KKR's assets under management reached $148.5 billion as of the end of June 30, 2017, an increase of $10.9 billion from the end of March. During the quarter, KKR completed raising the biggest private equity fund ever to be launched in Asia, amassing $9.3 billion.
Earlier this month, KKR appointed two of its veteran dealmakers, Joseph Bae and Scott Nuttall, as co-presidents and co-chief operating officers, setting them up as its future leaders.
The move represented the biggest shakeup in the 41-year-old firm's history since KKR's other co-founder, Jerome Kohlberg Jr, left it in 1987. It positions Bae and Nuttall to take over from Henry Kravis and George Roberts when the 73-year-old co-founders and co-chief executives of KKR decide to step down. (Reporting by Greg Roumeliotis in New York; Editing by Muralikumar Anantharaman)
Future value ? The Judge thought of the future value when the cap was removed on distributions for common and preferred. The Hedge Funds thought of future value when they employed tactics resulting in a colorable claim. Sussman was thinking of future value when he related a good deal was achieved. Nelson named a value in court in the Billions which I do still believe is realizable. Hold strong. A GOOD DAY is in the shareholders future !
It is still my hopeful belief that our Hedge fund holders will be the saving grace for us all.
Unraveling of WAMU / chase relationship
New post on Livinglies's Weblog
The Neil Garfield Show Tonight at 6PM Eastern: The Unraveling of WAMU/Chase
by Neil Garfield
Thursdays LIVE! Click in to the The Neil Garfield Show
Or call in at (347) 850-1260, 6pm Eastern Thursdays
Tonight, Connecticut Attorney Stephen Wright will join Neil Garfield to discuss the Florida Court of Appeals destroying the Christiana Trust, its fake documents and the likelihood that it will get traction in other states. The unraveling of the WAMU/Chase relationship is close at hand, and why you may not want to refer to yourself as a Borrower unless you possess evidence that the parties on the Note actually had a legal contract including consummation.
Neil Garfield will explore the concept of "Moot Borrowers" to complement his theory of Pretend Lenders. Since it is almost impossible to determine who loaned the borrower money at origination, and the ownership of the loans can't be traced- the homeowner can ONLY be a “borrower” if they executed a loan contract and the contract became enforceable because there was offer, acceptance and consideration flowing both ways. Without all four legs of the stool it collapses.
In the Christiana Trust case- a successor plaintiff failed to demonstrate that its predecessor (JPMC) had standing at the time the action was commenced. Although the bank eventually filed a blank-indorsed note, the note attached to the complaint did not contain the indorsement, and the bank failed to present any other evidence demonstrating standing at the time the complaint was filed. The Appeal court reversed due to lack of standing, any decided that any remaining issues such as proof of damages were moot.
See Septimus v. Christiana Trust/JPMC
Stephen P. Wright
Wright Law Firm
324 Elm Street
Suite 103B
Monroe, CT 06468
203-261-3050 (O)
spwrightlawfirm@gmail.com
>par. The mind set of The Honorable Judge Mary at time of colorable claims is important to observe. The Judge removed the cap for all classes of equity. Logical meaning was and is that there are funds exceeding par for equity holders.
Be the $$$s 10 billion , 30 billion , 86 billion or other - the real force of persuasion shareholders have is that some immoveable hedge funds are standing watch.
It is difficult to believe that the agents of colorable claims before the court dealing with insider knowledge and trading would take such risk of prison ,possible fines and loss of stature for only the NOL values. Those that know are not talking but are waiting and are very patience. These agents are usually not a patience group when $$$s are at stake. The amounts must be considerable for such patience.
The loans -
New post on Livinglies's Weblog
About That Chase-WAMU Deal
by Neil Garfield
Imagine my surprise when I recently went to the FDIC website, clicked on FOIA at the bottom of the page, then went to Reading Room and looked again at the Chase-WAMU-FDIC-US Trustee Purchase and Assumption Agreement. Having previously read and studied it I was attempting to direct someone to the language that showed that no loans were purchased from WAMU basically because there were no loans in WAMU's inventory. Staring me in the face was an entirely different document bearing the same date as the one that I had previously seen. Anyone who has an explanation of this is invited to write to me at neilfgarfield@hotmail.com.
In the interim between my first reading of the agreement and now, I had several conversations including the FDIC receiver who was appointed to "resolve" the WAMU bankruptcy. The receiver (Schoppe) told me that no loans had been purchased or listed as part of the Purchase and Assumption Agreement. He also told me that an assignment did not exist and that no other document from the Trustee in the WAMU bankruptcy or the FDIC receiver existed showing the purchase of any loan. And he told me that the effective consideration paid by Chase was less than zero because Chase received around $2 billion in tax refunds due WAMU, which more than offset the purchase price. In fact, in the version I previously read, the consideration was stated as "Zero."
With that in hand I disseminated information and used it in court to show that Chase had not in fact purchased loans but had instead purchased servicing rights. As the plot thickened, it turned out that those servicing rights were granted by Pooling and Servicing Agreements for REMIC Trusts that never acquired any loans. With no loans in the trust, the PSA grant of servicing rights was meaningless.
And if you look at the statements from Chase to their shareholders and press releases there is no evidence they acquired the loans. Nonetheless tens of thousands of people, perhaps hundreds of thousands of people, lost their homes on the presumption that Chase was in fact the creditor. They were threading a nonexistent needle with nonexistent facts. And in litigation it became apparent that this was the case because they tried to introduce "Powers of Attorney" in lieu of the PSA to support their contention that SPS was now the servicer of most of those loans. But they didn't quite make out their case when it came to determining whether the Plaintiff in the foreclosure action was ever a creditor. So they lost. But for every one they lost, less astute judges were granting them foreclosures by the thousands.
And if you look at articles like the one in the link below you will see that while it looks like they are talking about loans they are actually talking about securities from "securitizations" that do not exist --- i.e., the loans were never acquired by the REMIC Trusts.
And THAT leaves us with the question of where did the alleged loans go? The trust doesn't have it, the certificate holders in the empty trust don't have it and neither does Chase. Judges have been inclined to simply say that all this complexity is irrelevant, in an attempt to clear their docket. But they have done both the borrowers and the investors a disservice. And they did the government a big disservice. My answer to the question I pose is that the loans didn't go anywhere because, in the legal sense, they never got started in the first place. (No consummation). If the party who funded the "loan" was not present in the documents or by proxy, then the party who funded the loan is not "in privity" (i.e., part of the loan contract) with the borrower. And since the party whose name appears on the loan documents was neither a lender or a creditor of the borrower, they were merely the "holder" of the document subject to borrower's defenses to the "transaction" --- namely no consideration.
And THAT my friends is the reason for all the fabricated, forged, back-dated and "found" documents and notes. The banks had to invent what the courts wanted to see.
So the overall answer is that Chase is neither a creditor nor the authorized servicer of anyone because nobody actually "owns" the loan. Pension funds and other investors clearly have a right of action against the Investment banks that sold them bogus mortgage backed securities that were neither securities nor mortgage backed. And those investors might have some action in equity against borrowers, but not a right of enforcement of the mortgage which never should have been recorded in the first place. Of course that probably will never happen because the investment bank pocketed the money that was supposed to go into the REMIC Trusts. Huge groups of investors in multiple "REMIC Trusts" had their money commingled by the investment bank who now has no way of figuring out whose money is in what "loan." Thus there is no loan contract, and there could never be standing by anyone other than either a true creditor, which does not appear to exist, or a holder in due course, which cannot exist.
The reason why the banks are doing everything to resist proof of payment is that there was no payment anywhere in their chain. In a word, there was nobody to pay because nobody in their chain had anything to sell. Hence there were no purchases and there were no sales, making the assignments and endorsements fraudulent documents. If they had evidence of a purchase they would claim to be holder in due course which enables the holder to enforce against the party who signed the note and mortgage regardless of any defenses the borrower might have had against the "lender" or the "successors."
And THAT, my friends, is why nobody from Wall Street is filing a lawsuit to vacate rescissions that might be years past the three year limitations. They have no standing --- i.e., they don't have a credible party who can claim to be a creditor and they can't use the note and mortgage because they are void by operation of law. It is the absence of such lawsuits that corroborates what I am saying. In a flash they could easily vacate the rescission if they could only show that they had any right to be in court by reference to real transactions instead of the fake ones they are using in foreclosures.
The correction for this is simple to say: create new servicers that have full authority to interact with the defrauded investors and the hapless borrowers who were pawns in the securitization scam that was eventually dubbed "Securitization Fail" by Adam Levitin.
Just look at the following article and see how Chase twisted itself and the government into a mental pretzel:
see http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2013/03/jpm-wamu/
Neil Garfield | November 10, 2015 at 8:48 am | Tags: Chase, Purchase and Assumption Agreement, WAMU | Categories: foreclosure | URL: http://wp.me/p7SnH-7o1
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To think - WAMU was acquired honestly ?
The cost of lying, cheating and stealing -
https://livinglies.wordpress.com/2015/10/09/chase-33-billion-in-fines-and-settlements-and-its-business-as-usual/
Settlement Note Holders and jpmc divided up the spoils with POR-6 and called the plan a DEAL. Deals are deals. A firm like jpmc must honor a deal or its a trip to the east river. We ,the share holders , are grafted into the DEAL. The fullness of the DEAL is yet to be revealed. Many deals are 50/50 in the world of high finance. If NOLs are but a part of the total package for the SNHs then a glorious day awaits.
These holders will help ensure that all is as should be !
Top Institutional Holders
Holder
Shares
% Out
Value*
Reported
Locust Wood Capital Advisers, LLC 5,426,063 2.68 14,162,024 Jun 30, 2015
Tipp Hill Capital Management LLC 2,741,000 1.35 7,154,010 Jun 30, 2015
Akanthos Capital Management, LLC 1,675,000 0.83 4,371,750 Jun 30, 2015
Selz Capital, LLC 360,000 0.18 939,600 Jun 30, 2015
Geduld, Emanuel, E. 125,000 0.06 326,250 Jun 30, 2015
Ameriprise Financial, Inc. 75,263 0.04 196,436 Jun 30, 2015
Glenmede Trust Co Na 135 0.00 352 Jun 30, 2015
Vantage Investment Advisors, LLC 85 0.00 221 Jun 30, 2015
Estabrook Capital Management 36 0.00 93 Jun 30, 2015
Joel Isaacson & Co., LLC 31 0.00 80 Jun 30, 2015
Top Mutual Fund Holders
Holder
Shares
% Out
Value*
Reported
Neuberger & Berman Absolute Return Multi Manager Fund 318,628 0.16 700,981 Mar 31, 2015
Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Securities Income Fund 240,577 0.12 685,644 May 31, 2015
Third Avenue Focused Credit Fund 216,382 0.11 558,265 Apr 30, 2015
Royce Value Trust, Inc. 77,742 0.04 202,906 Jun 30, 2015
Columbia Fds Ser Tr I-Columbia Intermediate Bond Fd 53,957 0.03 139,209 Apr 30, 2015
Fidelity Advisor High Income Advantage Fund 17,318 0.01 44,680 Apr 30, 2015
Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Opportunity Fund Inc 17,821 0.01 50,789 May 31, 2015
Columbia Fds Ser Tr I-Columbia Corporate Income Fd 21,286 0.01 54,917 Apr 30, 2015
Saratoga Advantage Tr-James Alpha Glbl Enhanced Real Return 27,759 0.01 79,113 May 31, 2015
Fidelity Advisor Balanced Fund 4,454 0.00 12,693 May 31, 2015
KKR in the news -
KKR & Co.’s Samson Resources Corp. plans to file for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection by mid-September after finalizing a restructuring plan with key creditors Friday, according to people familiar with the matter.
The Tulsa, Okla.-based oil and gas producer agreed to hand ownership to its lenders in bankruptcy, a move that would wipe out the roughly $4.1 billion investment of KKR and its partners in the buyout, the people said. The private-equity firm led a $7.2 billion leveraged buyout of Samson in 2011, the biggest-ever such deal for an oil and gas producer.
Samson’s board approved the restructuring agreement Friday afternoon, one of the people said.
Such a exchange for LTI may be future . The present reappearing of the escrow markers show much the same wording as before .It would be good if any transactions future be preceded by full explanation .
The share distribution was not a waterfall distribution ( note that piers have yet to be paid fully per ). Schwab reversed their decision of canceling the escrows on 8/4 after many phone calls and discussions. Maybe have your broker contact Schwab about the issue .
Escrow shares back in account. A relief after a frustrating day.