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That says it was on May 7, doesn't it?
Thanks :)
Thanks. :)
Just being sure. Is this not part of our case...
Set/Reset Hearings: Fairness Hearing set for 9/5/2024 at 11:30 AM before Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald. Associated Cases: 1:11-md-02262-NRB, 1:11-cv-02613-NRB
I think I read somewhere that a fairness hearing is scheduled for September.
I believe that was one of the defendants' settlement portion in the case. When I saw it, I was quite disappointed until I realized it was just one of the defendants.
Was 4/4 even a court date? I thought it was the last day of depositions/discovery.
Re : Why keep shorts?
Don't forget that there are index funds that short the Nasdaq as a whole. These funds will take the money invested in them and short the individual stocks on a pro rata basis. Because of this, there will always be shorts against all of the stocks.
These shorts generated by index funds will not be as likely to cover on a day like Friday because the index (as a whole) is diversified and the losses from the COOP stocks will not be as painful.
By the way, thanks for the information you provide!
Not just the Ps. Commons need to be part of that process. Issuing preferred stock for the WMI commons (in some ratio) would be great. Issuing common stock for the WMI commons would be acceptable as well.
IF the price (i.e. ratio of conversion) is fair, there should be no long lasting dilution of price once the initial rush for the doors is over.
I don't remember THJMW saying that we wouldn't get anything.... I thought that was Rosen.
In fact, I remember her saying that we were riding the coat tails of others.
She may have not had jurisdiction over JPM's receipt of things conveyed by FDIC but she DID refuse the pierce the corporate veil during the 'great FIRREA' argument.
IMO, it is inappropriate for you (of all people) to accuse someone of making posts that 'don't add anything'.
I appreciate AZ's posts and if anyone on this board posts 'spam', IMO it is you.
You have made hundreds of posts about any big transaction whether it has anything to do with COOP, WAMU, escrows, LIBOR, or not.
Every time there is a big move of money, you claim 'THIS IS IT!' Do you not have the capacity to be embarrased?
If it weren't for THJMW, we might just be SOL and would never have even gotten the stock in COOP (WMIH), so if you please, don't denigrate her.
If you don't remember, it was she who uttered the phrase 'colorable charges' and forced common's participation.
We got more than anyone 'in the game' wanted us to. Because of HER.
As I recall, the 4B was part of the agreement with OTS to keep the bank solvent.
And, IMO, it apparently was the piece to the puzzle that would secure WMB to the point it could not be seized. Otherwise, why would the FDIC strongarm OTS into the seizure and do it on a Thursday (for the first time in history).
THJMW didn't give it to JPM. FDIC gave it to JPM. Also, it came back and was used to pay taxes.
Such corruption! - Agreed
Rot in hell? - God will judge.
I looked at that document... I can't say I read all of it, but this jumped out at me.
Certainly something needs to be done to limit exposure.
You are absolutely correct that the insurance industry cannot adequately cover that kind of risk.
I still remember the first time someone explained swaps and swaptions (which are insured as opposed to exchange traded) to me in 1999. My immediate reaction was 'this is not sensible'.
It seemed to me (even then) that swaps and swaptions were just a way to get around CFTC & NFA regulations and limits.
At least with exchange traded futures and options, both parties are required to maintain margins in the accounts. If someone can't make margin, the position is closed before things get totally out of hand. Furthermore, in extreme situations, the exchanges are allowed to asymmetrically refuse orders based on position size. That is to say they can, will, and have told investors/speculators that the exchange will no longer accept buy orders for a particular commodity from a particular account. For proof, research what happened when the Hunt brothers tried to corner the silver market.
It is clear that the crash of 2008 was due to unfettered exuberance of people that should have known better but either did not or believed in the death knell of many large scale traders -- 'This time is different.'
To be sure, every time is different... but only in detail. The big picture is always the same... every raging bull market ends suddenly. When this happens, there are never enough exits. To quote an adage from the commodities market - 'The market has a paddle big enough to whip anyone's ass.'
I cannot believe that there is not enough computing power to ensure insurance portfolios are not overexposed. Apparently no one involved is interested in being sure that the correlations of insured securities do not add up to disaster as one failure causes another and another until, like lined up dominoes falling, everything collapses at once.
On a personal note, HOLY SMOKES! 350 lb machine approaching a corner at 150MPH? Sounds like a good way to learn to fly! LOL!
Sure sounds like fun!
Yes, it discussed the Derivative Market.
I recognize that quote from Buffet. I think it was in the book as well.
As I am posting this, I reread your post. I want to make one thing clear. I believe JPM was in trouble. I was just trying to convey that the book played things as if JPM is the only reason things actually survived.
When I read "The Big Short", I found myself nodding and thinking "Yes, this is what happened."
When I read "Too Big To Fail", I found myself thinking, I don't disagree with any of these facts but DAMN, they are missing the story.
Yep - Blue Tarp - Do I sense a NASCAR fan?
Agreed.
The hedgies will call the plays for their own benefit. As long as we are aligned with them (and we are), we will do as well as we can, IMO.
Possibly. I would say even probably.
Nothing is certain.
Walrath leveraged them to the table by pointing out in court and on the record that the accusations of insider trading was colorable.
I would not have expected that to happen quite so publicly.
Many years ago, I predicted that the date this would all be done was preordained. I still think that might be a possibility. I will admit to never thinking it would take this long.
Agreed.
I just found it bizarre that the biggest S&L failure in history was barely mentioned in a book about failure of large companies. In fact, unless I am badly mistaken, the purchase of WAMU by JPM was never mentioned in the book.
And has the power to unredact and /or unseal them if she so desires.
Nothing is forever.
Since we are going down memory lane...
SEIU (Service Employees International Union) was reported to be a large holder of WMI (perhaps it was their pension fund... I don't remember).
SEIU was a big time Democratic contributor at that time.
I always felt that one of our Aces in the Hole was that we were in the same boat with SEIU - at least during Democratic Party control.
Only time will tell for sure.
As for Holder getting a good job with JPM, there are lots of other ways he could have earned their favor.
I finally got around to reading "Too Big To Fail" and was surprised at two things...
1) WAMU was only mentioned in passing
2) When WAMU was mentioned, It was to say that the Government Players in the crisis were pissed off at Bair for having seized WAMU.
There were however many times where JPM was contacted to see if they would bail out this or that failing investment bank. JPM was depicted as the 'Knight in Shining Armor' that saved things at least once and was instrumental in the saga. Never was JPM depicted as being about to fail or even being in serious trouble (not my opinion, just a book report).
Except for the 2.5% that should travel to WMIH/COOP
On the other hand, I won't sell mine in case something weird happens and it all goes to WMIH/COOP. Stranger things have happened.
Yes, I agree...
A gap requires the latter day's low to be higher than the prior day's high -OR-
The latter day's high to be lower than the prior day's low.
Yes, I predicted this a loooong time ago.
FDIC is waiting for remote assets to be released while the remote assets are waiting for FDIC to close before releasing.
Sooner or later someone will have to blink. It may take an act of congress.
You are such a sad dissembler.
You said
I ask you again
WHO put YOU in charge of what people can say here?
As for Kool Aid, well it is simple. We might as well believe that something wonderful will happen because there is precious little else we can do about it. Why not hope?
It's not like we spout option advice like nothing can EVER go wrong.
I'm not going to engage with you today over this.
Yes, it is if that is what someone wants to do.
Who appointed you as 'thought police'.
Feel free to disagree and state your disagreement as often as you like....
BUT
You don't get to say what people think OR what they say!
Sincere thanks. My original point was that all underwriters are not necessarily going to sell anything. In fact, I have also hear the term underwriters to refer to those selling options. I guess Lodas is an underwriter too, LOL.
IF they were distributing them
See your link, page 3
That I do not know.... BUT
It seems to me (i.e. IMO) that would not be the case. Many investment firms 'broker' the sale of bonds. The prospectus is what it is and for them to take over the job of 'recommending' said bonds to their clients for a fee still, as always, carries the 'buyer beware' logo.
If that is so, it would be interesting to see the rule.
I'm fact checking you, not arguing with you.
To reiterate:
You said
First, ANYONE who buys a bond can be considered an underwriter.
Second, NOT ALL underwriters sell ALL of the bonds they buy.
See Investopedia - specifically the first takeaway
Yes, that would be a 'bull put spread'. To protect the covered calls would need a 'bull call spread'. The possibilities are endless.
Like I said, options are wonderful tools - IF you understand them.
TO THOSE CONSIDERING OPTION PLAYS
First, I am not a broker and suggest that unless you fully understand options that you talk to one before making such a trade.
I used to write software (professionally) that modeled options for brokers. Options can be wonderful tools. They can also bite you on your genitals if you didn't understand the ramifications of your trade.
If you are considering selling options be sure you understand the following...
IF you sell a call and the price goes up past the strike price, you may be forced to sell the stock AT the strike price no matter how high the stock goes. If the price remains above the strike price until expiration you WILL be forced to sell the stock AT the strike price no matter how high the stock goes. You may be able to buy the option back, but most of the time, this will only lessen the pain, not remove it.
IF you sell a put and the price goes down past the strike price, you may be forced to buy the stock AT the strike price no matter how low the stock goes. If the price remains below the strike price until expiration, you WILL be forced to buy the stock AT the strike price no matter how low the stock goes. You may be able to buy the option back, but most of the time, this will only lessen the pain, not remove it.
In other words:
DON'T sell calls unless you are sure you are a willing seller at the strike price (until expiration) no matter what happens.
DON'T sell puts unless you are sure you are a willing buyer at the strike price (until expiration) no matter what happens.
Someone posted estimates of their expected probability of success in some option plays. Their stated logic is (IMO) simplistic, naïve, and flawed. When selling options, the amount you can earn is set in stone at the beginning (i.e. the premium less any commissions). The possible losses, however, are considerably less limited.
Short Puts are limited to the Strike Price (imagine a company declares bankruptcy and the price goes to near zero).
Short Calls are limited only by the thin air (imagine a company whose stock price doubled on some extraordinary news).
A reliable estimate of the likelihood of a successful option play MUST include calculations representing an estimate of the market bias (up or down) as well as (and more importantly) how bad the losses are.
For example, if you are flipping coins, it seems like a 50/50 proposition. However, if things are structured so that when you win, you get a fixed amount and when you lose the amount could be anything from $0.01 to multiples of that fixed amount, over time you may very well get burned.
I'm not trying to talk anyone out of trading options. As I said before, they are wonderful tools. I am simply reminding the group that if you don't understand them fully, consult a broker first and make sure you understand what can go wrong.
Good Luck & Happy Trading
Lodas, I can't reply to your message because it was removed. I didn't report it. In fact, I can't see anything wrong with it. Did you have 2nd thoughts about your remarks?
Either way, here are some things to think about.
You said
I suspect they are limited by the amount of calls/questions they expect to get from moving all of the accounts.
Those questions will likely need to be answered by a licensed broker and staffing extra qualified workers may be a problem - both now and at the end of the process when the layoffs will begin.
Just my opinion.
Mine moved months ago, FWIW.
Snowflake, the world is not fair. Man up!
If you want people to talk to you, be nicer.
Yep! And the FDIC also said that WMB was insolvent even though OTS had a WRITTEN agreement with WMB & WAMU outlining transfers of capital from WAMU to WMB to sustain solvency.
(Apologies, I have triggered myself - this is not directed at anyone, I just need to vent)
Don't EVER forget that for the first time in history the FDIC closed a bank on a Thursday (in fact, the only time FDIC closed a bank on any other day than Friday to my knowledge). IMO, this was done to prevent the $4B in transit from actually arriving at WMB and disrupting their 'narrative' that WMB was about to fail.
The following is a paraphrased history that we can NEVER FORGET!
OTS said 'here is a problem'
WAMU said 'we are prepared and capable of solving it...here is a solution'
OTS said 'Yes, that will solve the problem'
FDIC said 'We need to close WMB'
OTS said 'No, everything is fine'
FDIC said 'CLOSE THE DAMN BANK'
FDIC put WMB up for auction within a 24 hour period.
Several banks bid - some even bid more than JPMC.
JPMC won the auction because FDIC declared the other bids as 'nonconforming'
No one has explained to me (or likely ever will) how due diligence can be done in less than 24 hours on a business the size of WMB.
Why rush the auction? For crying out loud, at least give prospective bidders the weekend!
Clearly the fix was in.
Furthermore, wasn't there something said in open court about how JPMC ended up with WAMU's books (not just WMB).
I still believe (again, IMO) that FDIC pierced the corporate veil inappropriately. They (again, IMO) thought they could bully their way through using FIRREA and end up with WAMU, not just the bank.
ARRRRRRGH!