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Some thoughts on recent trading and warrants/options...
FWIW, here are my GBN comments from yesterday on the bearforum.com board:
Posted By: amarksp
Date: Thursday, 16 October 2003, at 4:29 p.m.
In Response To: About 800,000 shares traded in GBN today (Bill G.)
Apparently there is a large investor that wants out (a BMO Nesbitt client, who did all the selling today in Canada, not willing to sell below C$1.85 average is my understanding).
Personally, am confident this has nothing to do with the warrants which expire in Dec03 and Jan04 since these are not sufficiently in the money:
2,109,300 expire 12/30/03 @ C$1.70 (management options)
2,800,000 expire 1/31/04 @ C$1.80 (PP warrants)
Don't think GBN management is selling for a miniscule C$.15 profit, not when the following is very likely to happen before 12/30/03:
1) Burnstone #1 scoping study (expected Nov/Dec)
2) Ivanhoe permit approved (expected Nov/Dec)
3) Announcement that 5M warrants (April04 expiry but accelerated due to 20 day clause) have already been placed is my educated guess. (expected Nov)
If the POG holds steady and if GBN can hold $1.38 and if I am right about 1/2/3 above, then GBN management will be selling above C$2.25, IMO.
Also, FWIW, got around to discussing the BLM comment posted earlier:
"Hecla's Hollister Development Block Project is still in the permitting process. Hecla is in the process of redeveloping and redesigning the proposed rapid infiltration basins. The NEPA process has not been completed; an environmental assessment is in the process of being written."
My understanding is HL/GBN remain confident Ivanhoe permit will be received this year..., we'll see...
_____________
also this:
Posted By: amarksp
Date: Thursday, 16 October 2003, at 4:51 p.m.
In Response To: Why do option/warrant sellers have to sell? (The Unknown Bear)
There are about 8 SouthGold warrant holders that have the 5M warrants at US$.75. They already own 10M free shares now plus hold the 5M warrants AND they will get an additional 11M share free shares plus another 5.5M US$.75 warrants by April 04. That's a total of 31.5M shares and warrants for shares; or 33.2% of fully diluted shares.
Now these 8 shareholders are older gentlemen (they are SA miners/geologists) and while they like their GBN investment, they will need to do some warrant selling just to pay their SA tax bills on their SouthGold property capgain would be my guess. In addition, many of them likely believe they have a bit too much of their net worth tied into a single stock, so personally would think that most of these initial 5M warrants will be sold and my understanding/guess is they already have fund/institutions already lined up to take all these initial 5M warrants at a arms length negotiated price. May be wrong here, but this is certainly my understanding...
The other 2.8M warrants are from a Jan03 private placement which expires Jan04. These investors will sell into the market and GBN management will try to generate press releases to make them a tidy profit... Some of this 2.8M shares may have already been sold and/or some of these "sophisticated investors" may have already shorted a portion of these shares so less overhang will remain...
just some thoughts...
http://www.bearforum.com/cgi-bin/bbs.pl?read=304766
stratfor weekly...
Summary
Washington is reformulating its war plans in Iraq – something critics of the Bush administration might view as a sign of weakness. The real weakness lies not in that the United States is shifting strategies, but rather that it has taken so long to make adjustments. However, even with a new strategy, it is unclear whether the United States will succeed.
Analysis
The United States is in the process of reformulating its war plans in Iraq. Such reformulations are normal in war: Every successful war consists of layers of plans that are adjusted as opponents change their strategy and tactics and as lessons are learned. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of the defeated party is the inability to redefine its strategy based on experience. The presence of only one plan is a sign of defeat: The French war plan in World War II never changed and, therefore, never worked; the Japanese, once their initial plan ran into trouble, could never generate a rational strategy. On the other hand, the United States went through multiple plans, developing and discarding strategies on all levels. This is insufficient to guarantee victory (the Germans also went through multiple plans), but it is one of the necessary conditions.
Critics of the Bush administration, who see the need to change plans as a sign of weakness, simply don't understand war. In Iraq, where the administration should be criticized is not that it changed plans, but that it took so long to do so. For the United States, the most significant failure in this war has been the length of time it took to recognize that the reality on the ground in Iraq was not the reality Washington had expected -- and worse, the length of time it took U.S. leaders to think through their strategy. Changing plans is the sign of a healthy command structure; rigidly adhering to plans in the face of a changing reality is a sign of real problems.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's problem was that he was unable to publicly confront the fact that the unexpected had happened in Iraq. He might have done so in private, but no shift
in strategy emerged. From early May, when the guerrilla war was launched, until last week, Rumsfeld appeared to be strategically paralyzed. He neither had a plan for crushing the Iraqi
guerrillas, nor did he seem able to conceptualize how the rest of the war would proceed. This should not, actually, be personalized: Even though Rumsfeld was both secretary of defense and the dominant personality in the strategic process, it was a failure of the civilian and military command structures in general.
Rumsfeld has been adamant in arguing that there are no parallels between Iraq and Vietnam. He is correct in all but one sense: One of the fundamental failings in Vietnam was the inability of
senior U.S. civilian and military commanders to recognize that, though individual operations were successful, they did not tie together into a strategy -- or more precisely, that the strategy
was not working. This is why many Vietnam veterans are right in saying that they won the battles but lost the war. It is the job of the strategists to make certain that the battles and strategy
mesh and, when they don't, to make adjustments. In Vietnam, the strategy never meshed with the operations. A similar situation has emerged in Iraq, save that the operations didn't add up
either.
These things happen. The measure of success is how quickly a problem is recognized and how quickly adjustments are made. If we read the creation of the Stabilization Group correctly, we are in
the process of seeing those changes emerge. That means that about six months have elapsed between the start of the guerrilla war and the crafting of a response. That isn't great, but it isn't
catastrophic either. The timeline is bearable, so long as the strategic shifts are effective.
To consider this, we need to recall the two strategic reasons the United States had for invading Iraq -- as opposed to the public justifications:
1. Seizing the most strategic country in the region as a base of operations from which to mount follow-on operations against countries that collaborate or permit collaboration with al Qaeda.
2. Transforming the psychological perception of the United States in the Islamic world from a hated and impotent power to a hated but feared power.
The most significant impact the guerrilla war has had on the United States concerns the second goal. The perception (as opposed to the reality) of the war is that the conventional forces of the occupying power were helpless in the face of the guerrillas. There was certainly truth to that, but only in this
sense. The guerrilla movement has remained well below critical mass -- it in no way threatens either the occupation or the operational capabilities of the United States. Total casualties relative to the force are insignificant from a military point of view.
Nevertheless, the fact that the movement could not be crushed -- but continued to operate for months -- made it appear that the United States had become militarily trapped. The U.S. response
compounded this perception: Rather than pressing forward with regional operations, the United States first tried to crush the guerrillas with search-and-destroy missions, and then seemed to
halt offensive operations and simply take casualties. The result appeared to be paralysis, and this appearance undermined the second goal: It negated the psychological value of the fall of
Baghdad.
The solution for the United States rests in the first goal. The United States has seized control of Iraq and is capable of mounting political, covert and overt operations against neighboring countries. The guerrilla war, though irritating, does not undermine the United States' operational capability: First,
the war is primarily confined to one region; second, the tempo of operations in that region does not constrain military operations.
Therefore, the key is to use the military capabilities obtained through basing in Iraq and exploit the occupation, despite the guerrilla war. In a sense, the guerrilla war is irrelevant -- it will be there whatever the United States does, at least for a while. Whether the United States proceeds with exploitation operations or not, the war is a constant. There is no logical reason to halt operations.
That appears to be just what is happening. The United States, for example, opened a psychological campaign against Syria the weekend of Oct. 11-12 by pointing out that the Israelis have submarine-, air- and land-based nuclear weapons. Two U.S. officials made the point in such a way that the Syrians couldn't miss it. This came just days after Turkish lawmakers voted to send troops into Iraq. Though those troops are important, the real importance of the vote was its declaration of belligerency by Turkey, which has moved from a neutral stance established in March back into active collaboration with the United States.
The United States used the Turkish shift to create a massive coalition against Syria along most of its borders. With the Israelis, Turks and Americans all arrayed along its frontiers, Damascus has no choice but to reconsider its strategy. The alternative is to assume that the United States will be unwilling to use its forces -- and those of Israel -- to compel regime change in Syria. The Syrians might believe that to be the case, but the risk of error is too great.
It is useful to examine Syrian behavior more closely. The Iraq campaign ended with U.S. forces dueling Syrian forces along the Syria-Iraq border. Damascus, clearly surprised by the U.S.
victory, seemed to shift their policies in April and May, suppressing some Palestinian and Islamist activity within the country's borders. Then, as the guerrilla war intensified over the summer, Syria seemed to reconsider. Officials clearly perceived American weakness in Iraq and concluded that so long as the guerrilla war continued, the United States would be exceedingly cautious in expanding the conflict. Indeed, during the six months of U.S. absorption with the guerrilla war, the Syrian perception solidified into the view that the United States was trapped in Iraq in a war it could neither win nor exit. Syria permitted Palestinian and Islamist activity to resume, discounting the U.S. threat.
Thus, the United States' failure to achieve its second strategic goal created a situation in which Syria drew judgments that were not warranted, since the United States had achieved the first goal. The United States was the dominant military power in the region; it simply wasn't perceived as militarily powerful. That perception was driven by the inability to stop the guerrillas. Therefore, the United States had to demonstrate that the guerrilla war did not weaken its ability to coerce its neighbors
in the region.
The United States appears to have decided to treat the guerrilla war as a military side show -- not insignificant, but certainly not militarily decisive. Given this, there is no reason for Washington to halt aggressive actions in the region to force change in behavior toward al Qaeda and associated groups. By doing this, the United States not only exploits the military advantage it has won, but also shifts back the psychological perception to something that more reasonably matches U.S. capabilities.
Therefore, we expect to see more aggressive U.S. moves in the coming months. The situation facing the Syrians is a paradigm created by the U.S. strategy at this point: Washington is using a coalition of regional powers to put Syria in an untenable position. The Bush administration accepts the fact that the United States will be seen as collaborating with Israel -- under the valid theory that whatever the United States does, it will be seen as Israel's collaborator and therefore might as well enjoy the benefits of collaboration. Finally, Washington is using the real threat of action to create a situation in which Damascus either must comply with Washington's wishes or place a life-or-
death bet that the United States will refrain from action.
The Saudis at this point are not an issue for the United States, but Iran is. The United States is open to a deal with Iran, but the Iranian perception that the United States is desperate for a deal must be changed, from Washington's point of view. Iran, like Syria, has perceived the U.S. position in Iraq as causing strategic paralysis for Washington. That has made closing the deal with Tehran impossible. Iran's high expectations of what it would get from the deal kept rising as the sense of American vulnerability increased. Washington's intent is clearly to change that perception and reconfigure the negotiation process. The test case will be Iran's response to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on its nuclear weapons program.
The United States is now trying to accept the guerrilla war as a semi-permanent feature of its occupation of Iraq. It is trying to restart its strategic engines in spite of that reality. From a strictly military point of view, there is no reason why this can't happen. From a strategic point of view, it is a logical necessity. From a domestic point of view, the administration must demonstrate that Iraq was a means toward an end and not an end in itself. It must return to the strategic principles that drove the invasion.
Many things can go wrong with this strategy -- and they might. All strategies are vulnerable to reality, expected and unexpected. The Syrians might not buckle and the United States might not have the ability to coerce them. The Iranians might trigger a massive rising among the Shiites that the United States cannot control. The guerrillas might increase their operations and become strategically significant. And most important, something totally unexpected might happen.
The United States decided to climb aboard the tiger when it invaded Iraq. That is not a bad strategy; the problem is there is no safe way to climb off the tiger. For six months, the U.S. response to the unexpected guerrilla war was to hang onto the tiger and hope he would fall asleep. Hasn't happened. Won't happen. Being on the tiger's back leaves the United States only one option: Ride the tiger.
It is interesting to note the paradox in Rumsfeld. Having been perceived as an enormously aggressively strategist, he turned out to be remarkably passive in the face of unexpected countermoves. This has happened to many strategic planners: Effective in planning a war, they become ineffective in dealing with the unplanned and unexpected. The most dangerous point in a war comes when the unexpected happens and the old plan must be thrown away and a new one devised on the fly. That's what happened in Iraq. The challenge facing the United States is defining a plan to deal with the unexpected and unwelcomed. If the United States succeeds in doing so -- and in a long war, it will have to do this over and over again -- it can succeed. If the United States behaves as France did in 1940 -- paralyzed by an opponent behaving unexpected -- the outcome can be grim.
It is unclear whether the United States will succeed. The issue is not to deal with the guerrillas in Iraq, but to redefine the entire strategy of the war against al Qaeda -- to revive the link between the Iraq campaign and the effort to destroy the primary adversary. It appears to us that the United States now has begun to do that. However, it is unclear whether it will succeed. The first crisis of the war that began Sept. 11 is being addressed, but it is unclear whether it will be solved.
no it was not, my fault and sent jrhana a long "mea culpa" private message to apologize and explain my rationale, or lack therof.
Frank: in regard to Case Resources....
this is of interest...
http://www.sepac.ca/Investment%20Symposium/Case.pdf
jrhana: in regard to your message on GBN board:
http://m1.mny.co.za/85256C3A0052D01E/0/80256D8D0039603C42256DB1005C5D7B?Open&Highlight=2,harmony
FWIW, trying to prevent board clutter on the GBN board, so deleted your post since it asked a question (answered with link above) without really any comment or analysis on GBN...
correction, and yes sure do appreciate them keeping their share structure up to date...
FWIW, prior post has a timing error:
original
"Worth mentioning that only 1.77M warrants expired on Oct 11 yet 2.65M were exercised during this period... Would appear a good portion of those 1.25M warrants expiry April 04 have been exercised well before their expiration date..."
corrected...
There were 2,562,500 0.90 October 11, 2003 warrants, so 2.65M being exercised is about right...
updated share structure:
Wed Oct 15, 2003
Share Capital Information as of October 15, 2003
Issued and Outstanding Share Capital: 48,545,758
Warrants Outstanding: 6,494,644
Options Outstanding: 2,647,381
___________________
Fully Diluted Share Capital: 57,687,783
Working Capital: 11,425,000
On Exercise of Outstanding Warrants: 9,654,000
On Exercise of Outstanding Stock Options: 2,624,000
___________________
Working Capital - Fully Diluted: 23,703,000
AGI shares......Sept 30..... Oct 15...... Diff
issued..........45,894,664... 48,545,758... 2,651,094
warrants........9,230,771... 6,494,644... -2,736,127
options.........2,647,381... 2,647,381... 0
fully diluted...57,772,816... 57,687,783... -85,033
Worth mentioning that only 1.77M warrants expired on Oct 11 yet 2.65M were exercised during this period... Would appear a good portion of those 1.25M warrants expiry April 04 have been exercised well before their expiration date...
oil & gas - purchased CAZ @ US$.91, initial position...
new Haywood research report out...
http://www.alamosgold.com/i/pdf/agi-oct032003.pdf
natgas - Robry graphs and comments
includes comments on Buckingham Research...
http://www.amarks.homestead.com/RobryNGModel.html
These SA Laws deal with SA based companies that have minority interests in countries outside SA. The SA Laws require that they either obtain a majority interest or sell the investment.
GBN is a Canadian based company with a mine in SA. My understanding would be these SA Laws would not apply to GBN. That said, GBN transferring its Burnstone profit out of SA back to Canada could potentially be a problem. However, I do not think it will be since SA likely desires to encourage other countries like Canada to invest in SA. Also, have heard of no problems with PDG transferring its profits from SA back to Canada.
Frank: natgas follow up on Buckingham...
this post is reply to original post at: http://www.investorshub.com/boards/read_msg.asp?message_id=1591111
"3. “Contango” in the NYMEX futures price curve for natural gas has induced extraordinary storage refill rates as of late-- this is completely disregarded by the “storage bears.” The near term shape, and overall level, on the NYMEX futures curve is bullish in our opinion and a much more solid indicator of U.S. supply/demand fundamentals. A month ago U.S. natural gas prices were at $4.34 per Mcf the cheapest price seen in nearly 10 months. We maintain that this low price and the worry over depressed wellhead field supplies kicked off a buying spree late in the storage refill season. This buying spree, which in turn led to greater than expected weekly refills, we think was misinterpreted by the “storage bears” as natural gas “demand destruction” in the industrial sector. The “storage bears” see industrial demand having slumped by 4 Bcfd in the last month. We do not think this is the case. It is important to note in mid September, the January 2004 natural gas NYMEX gas future contract was at $5.50 per Mcf. The difference allowed gas marketers and financial trading/commodity players to buy physical mid-September gas, store it for a small fee, and sell it forward via the January futures contract locking in a $1.25 per Mcf price spread. This spread was two and half times the spread ($0.50 per Mcf) offered for most of the 2003 refill season (April through September). This profit inducement, plus the fact that unregulated financial /trading players now dominate the control of the nation’s storage fields (instead of being controlled by regulated, local gas distribution utilities which have no profit potential related to gas inventory management) have been completely omitted in the thinking of the “storage bears.”
Exhibit 1 illustrates the profit inducement from buying physical gas throughout the 2003 storage refill season and selling the January 2004 futures contract. Notice the profit spike available beginning in mid September. For most of the storage refill season only $0.50 per Mcf of profit potential was available but by mid September it shot up to $1.25 per Mcf. We think this goes a long ways to explaining the large than expected storage injections at the end of the 2003 refill season.
Investment Conclusion
We are re-iterating our bullish stance on the E&P sector in light of what we would characterize as a sophomoric view on underground storage inventories put forth by the natural gas bears. This view looks at the weekly change in inventories (released Thursday’s at 10:30 EDT) adjusted by any weather related demand and says that the difference (usually an excess build in storage) relates solely to lost demand e.g., either fuel switching or reduced industrial gas demand. We take exception with this analysis as it does not take into account other important storage related determinants, principally the shape of the forward price curve of natural gas and the severely depressed state of North American wellhead or field supplies. We believe that investors would be well served at looking at these other factors that relate more to the fundamental wellhead supply picture rather than storage. We remind investors that storage, after all, is inventory which by its very definition is transitory in nature. We are maintaining our $4.75 per Mcf 2004 U.S. natural gas price forecast on which our stock ratings are premised. With E&P stocks off 15% from their mid-June high we would use any weakness created by the storage bears here at the end of the of the re-fill season to purchase E&P stocks. Such purchases may provide near-term outperformance and an attractive entry point into the long-term story for North American natural gas."
MOY would have to drop below C$1.54 (cash value of NEM distribution + existing C$9M cash) before I could be interested, even then I have a long memory about MOY investor relations...
Also, remember MOY may well be delisted from Toronto and begin trading on Vancouver...
Keep it simple IMO, you are too smart trying to factor in LIBOR and contango...!!!
My simple hypothesis:
1) Short commercial desires to knock down POG so they can cover their futures position. Thus, they need to lease physical gold so they can sell into the market. This is demand.
2) Central/Bullion Bank or other holder of physical gold would not mind leasing some gold, but not at a .4% interest rate, that's a bit too cheap. However, with a rate of .54% (the lease rate spike today), well they can be convinced .54% is somehow adequate... (and besides they would not mind a lower POG anyway). This is supply.
3) Thus, here lately (over past 12 months or so), when lease rates spike significantly I have noticed that POG often gets whacked. That is, new physical gold supply (via lease) is sold into the market driving POG down.
Now contango, LIBOR, and backwardization may well come into play sometime later in the future. My thinking is if we see a HUGE SPIKE up in lease rates (e.g. over 1.5%), then forget the simple hypothesis above. It will be the short commercials paying whatever they can to obtain physical because some of those gold futures holders have the audacity to demand delivery...
just my opinion...
let's get physical...
bought some foreign gold coins today, good price IMO for this assorted collection, about 2.7% over melt...
"ONE LOT ONLY!! 20 pc Foreign Gold lot totaling 9.23oz. Includes 1oz. and 1/2oz. Isle of man Angel,1oz. Britania,1oz. California Gold,Austrian 100 Corona,Canada 20.00 Comm, Austrian 4 Ducat,Neth 1 Ducat,Neth 10 Guider,French & Swiss 20 Franc, Russia Chervonetz,Columbia 5 Peso,2 1/2 Mex Peso, Russia 5 Rubel,African 1 Rand, Iran 1/2 Pahlevi ALL PRICED CHEAP AT LESS THAN 382.00 per ounce 3,524.00 DELIVERED."
gold - my take on what happened today...
lease rates up, da boyz got some physical to sell into the market this morning...
da boyz let the market ride up during London/US trading, but when London closes da boyz start dumping that physical and thus get the hard spike down after London close at 12 noon:
da boyz hit the Euro:$ exchange rate about the same time, i.e. about 11:45AM (16:45 London time):
The fact that gold held $370 appears positive, IMO, i.e. da boyz likely sold all their leased physical and POG did not breach $370
just some thoughts...
NatGas-Robry graphs updated...
http://www.amarks.homestead.com/RobryNGModel.html
Frank:
here is a post of interest...
Buckingham Research on nat gas
by: umgower 10/16/03 12:50 pm
"Our Expanded, and More Bullish Thoughts on Gas Storage
1. The 80% to 20% ratio of wellhead or field supplies to storage supplies in meeting winter time gas demand is sacrosanct and key to our more bullish view. During winter approximately 80% of U.S. gas demand is met from flowing wellhead field supplies while only 20% is met from local storage. In other words wellhead or field supplies are four times more important than storage to meeting demand in this period Therefore the condition of U.S. wellhead or field supplies is in our view is paramount to that of storage supplies. We feel that this ratio and the condition of U.S. wellhead supplies have been lost on the “storage bears.”
2. With U.S. wellhead supplies down significantly, there is a chance the U.S. may be “under stored” on natural gas going into 2003/2004’s winter. The “storage bears” skirt the lower and distressed situation of U.S. wellhead gas supplies. Since late 2001, U.S. wellhead supplies have fallen an estimated 7-9% (6-7% in 2002 and 1-2% year-to date 2003). This translates to U.S. wellhead supplies being down an estimated 3.9 to 4.9 Bcfd (billion cubic feet a day) on a base of 55.0 Bcfd over the past 24 months. With 151 days of winter (Nov. to Mar.), U.S. storage levels should therefore be technically built out by an extra 590 to 740 Bcf over what is seen as the norm or adequate (3.1 Tcf) going into winter (Nov. 1) to compensate for this. This can not happen as that would imply storage being filled to 3.7-3.8 Tcf by Nov.1 -- a physical impossibility as U.S underground. storage capacity is estimated to be at most 3.4 Tcf. Presently, U.S. gas storage is on track for a 3.0-3.1 Tcf fill level by Nov.1 2003. Depending on the outcome of 2003/2004’s winter weather, the U.S. could therefore be ‘under-stored”.
3. “Contango” in the NYMEX futures price curve for natural gas has induced extraordinary storage refill rates as of late-- this is completely disregarded by the “storage bears.” The near term shape, and overall level, on the NYMEX futures curve is bullish in our opinion and a much more solid indicator of U.S. supply/demand fundamentals."
also, not reply from rdesroch:
http://finance.messages.yahoo.com/bbs?.mm=FN&action=m&board=7081371&tid=cwei&sid=708...
added INM @ C$.68 = US$.53
will update the INM board with my market cap per resource ounce calc... showing about $14/per ounce assuming 500K ounces there... (should be more than that...)
natgas +81
Storage Highlights:
Working gas in storage was 2,944 Bcf as of Friday, October 10, 2003, according to EIA estimates. This represents a net increase of 81 Bcf from the previous week. Stocks were 184 Bcf less than last year at this time and 8 Bcf below the 5-year average of 2,952 Bcf. In the East Region, stocks were 27 Bcf below the 5-year average following net injections of 48 Bcf. Stocks in the Producing Region were 3 Bcf above the 5-year average of 802 Bcf after a net injection of 26 Bcf. Stocks in the West Region were 17 Bcf above the 5-year average after a net addition of 7 Bcf. At 2,944 Bcf, total working gas is within the 5-year historical range.
jump in gold lease rates, for the past year usually a negative..., portends phsyical coming into the market...
general stock market..., but Prechter would likely think gold stocks would get hit up as well... do not have access to this report, just posted the snippet...
IMO, you would be better off following Templeton advice...
Sir John Marks Templeton...
http://www.heraldtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/artikkel?SearchID=73150372261645&Avis=SH&Dato=200...
Prechter special interim report today ...
Given the accuracy of prechter's calls here lately, likely time to go long...
from bearforum:
the report is a must read....to quote prechter.. not hochberg or associates.. prechter....."understand that i am not nervously bearish or on the fence. I am all-out, no-holes-barred,shout-from-the-rooftops, yet-another-opportunity-of-a-lifetime bearish. wave patterns, cycles and technical indicators have developed into an astonishingly one-sided message. a market analyst dreams about a confluence of indications this extreme."
natgas: Robry up to +96 build this week...
appears EIA just getting around to let folks know it has revised operators which started 4 weeks ago...
*** MODEL REVISIONS: Both daily & full gas flow models, and the baseline model, have been revised as several operators have been swapped within the model to correct a shift in the model away from the EIA that began four weeks ago (EIA may have juggled its weekly respondant list & added/swapped respondants). Earlier problems with under-reporting of daily model are also fixed, and it now scores nearly as accurate as the full model. THURSDAYS EIA ESTIMATE REVISED FROM 90 TO 96 BCF INJECTED.
of gold and cattle...
http://www.sortweb.com/cwsv3/trial530369/MiscFiles/Portrait.pdf
Since first week of Oct, Gold has been appreciating in ALL currencies it appears..., hope that is the start of a trend...
http://www.investorshub.com/boards/read_msg.asp?message_id=1521301
US$ to SA Rand up to 7:1
purchased a bit of GBN at the $1.42 lows...
John A. Mendelson
Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. Member NYSE/SIPC
The Oil group has lagged the market this year with the AMEX Oil Index (XOI 504), a price- weighted composite of 13 leading companies in the exploration, production, and development of petroleum, rising 12.9% year-to-date against the 18.8% gain in the S&P 500 Index. However, things appear to be looking up for the oils.
As seen above, the XOI Index has formed a series of higher lows since March and recently broke out to a new 52-week high. Three stocks in this index, in particular, strike me as interesting on a technical basis. Exxon Mobil Corp (XOM 38) rose to a 52-week high yesterday as it broke out of a five month trading range. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (RD 47) moved above a three-month trading range yesterday, but remains below its mid-June high. Essentially, the stock has been in a high 30s 50 trading range for fifteen months. A move above 50 on a closing basis would be viewed here as an important upside breakout. Finally, Marathon Oil Corp. (MRO 30)2 reached a new 52-week high yesterday; its basic trend appears to be higher but it currently appears somewhat extended to the upside after a strong move since early August. The major oil stocks look like they are attempting to narrow the 2003 gap between them and the S&P 500 Index and may well show improved relative strength over the next several months.
share structure updated:
http://www.northair.com/international/corpdata.html
NatGas - Raymond James
http://beacon1.rjf.com/researchpdf/iEne101303b_0632.pdf
natgas-reason for weakness...
DJ Lehman Sees High Prices Siphoning Demand For Natural Gas
By Michelle Rama Of DOW JONES NEWSWIRES NEW YORK (Dow Jones)--Lehman Brothers Inc. expects a buildup of natural gas inventories to exceed demand and weigh on gas prices into the heating season, a view that prompted the Wall Street firm to lower its natural gas price forecast and its investment opinion on several names in the sector.
"We are lowering our natural gas price estimates for 2004 and 2005 by 50 cents and 25 cents" per million British thermal units, Lehman analyst Thomas Driscoll wrote in a research note Tuesday.
A long period of high prices has weakened demand for natural gas, the analyst said, noting that, "prices have averaged over $5.50 so far this year vs. $3.04 for the first 10 months of 2002."
Driscoll recalls the winter of 2000-2001 when very high prices early in the season slackened demand to such an extent as to push prices to $2 in late 2001. He doesn't expect such a marked decline this year but sees prices falling to $3, particularly if this winter is mild.
Meanwhile, Lehman maintained its oil price estimates of $30.25 for 2003, $25 for 2004 and $23 for 2005.
The analyst who covers the mid-cap stocks, Jeffrey Robertson, explained that he kept his mid-cap rating while Robertson cut his view on large-caps to negative because large caps are "trading a little above historical norms in terms of valuations, and we left our rating as neutral in mid cap sector because those companies are little smaller and do see some production growth in a number of those, which should help to offset decreased gas price view."
In a research note Tuesday, analyst Thomas Driscoll downgraded several large-cap oil and gas companies, among those were Burlington Resources (BR), Devon Energy Corp. (DVN) to equal-weight from overweight and EOG Resources Inc. (EOG) and EnCana (ECA) to underweight from equal weight.
However, he upgraded Talisman Energy Inc. (TLM) to overweight from equal weight, saying it has an improved near-term production growth outlook and an "attractive relative valuation."
Meanwhile, analyst Jeffrey Robertson cut Quicksilver Resources (KWK) to equal-weight from overweight, and Comstock Resources Inc. (CRK) and Magnum Hunger (MHR) to underweight from equal weight.
He touted as favorites XTO Energy Inc. (XTO), Chesapeake Energy Corp. (CHK) and Newfield Exploration Co. (NFX), citing strong balance sheets and "proven ability to execute."
Robertson explained that gas is produced year-round, but given sharp seasonal demand changes, energy companies use storage to help balance the market. Gas is put into storage in the summertime, and winter demand is generally more than what can be produced, so companies use storage to help fill the gap.
Robertson doesn't own shares of any companies he covers. Driscoll couldn't be reached for disclosure information.
Gold - Turk
http://goldmoney.com/en/commentary.php
Had a small 600 share TESCO position and it took 3 fills to get it all sold at US7.84... And the trading is simply wild in this stock... Just seconds after my last tranche of $7.84 executed (high of the day), it drops to $7.68 (low of the day) for no apparent reason whatsoever..., literally seconds... When the price drops on TESCO, it appears all the market makers just move out of the way, rather than honoring their posted bids...
If someone put in a 100,000 share order, this stock would be down to US$6 in no time flat, and likewise a 100K buy order would likely take it to US$10. Way too much volatility and no market maker support it appears..., may be different on the Canadian side, but the US side is treacherous...
out of my Tesco at US$7.84
this stock way too thinly traded for my liking...
natgas: pretty wide spread between Dec 03 and Dec 04 futures...
http://www.futuresource.com/quotes/quotes.asp?type=future,index&symbols=ng
NatGas: Robry comments updated...
http://amarks.homestead.com/RobryNGModel.html
Metallic Ventures (MVG : TSX : $6.21) - Buy - 12-month target $7.00
Brian Christie
Comment: Developing generative exploration program for Nevada gold properties
Metallic signs a two-year exploration deal with privately owned Cordex Exploration for US$1 million. The principals of Cordex are John Livermore, and Andy Wallace, both of whom have played key roles in several significant Nevada discoveries. Under the deal, Cordex will supply Metallic with a pipeline of gold and silver prospects in Nevada. The main targets will be high-grade epithermal hot spring gold/silver vein-type deposits and high grade Carlin-type disseminated gold deposits. We believe that the Cordex deal will serve the company well given that the next leg up in the gold market is likely to have an exploration focus. We have reviewed our valuation on the company and have raised our target to C$7.00 from C$6.50, based on market comparables. The shares remain a BUY.
thanks JackC, keep us updated...
I got it on my radar screen...