is...with that girl.
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I found this over on the JPMC board.
Worth a read.I haven't seen this on this board.
gyspsy Share Monday, August 30, 2010 3:06:48 PM
Re: BullNBear52 post# 1672 Post # of 1688
Jamie Dimon's Assault on the Economy
Zach Carter's picture
By Zach Carter
April 2, 2010 - 11:19am ET
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The latest letter from J.P. Morgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon to his company’s shareholders is a deliberate effort to obfuscate his own bank’s rapaciousness and deflect attention from the enormous sums it has spent lobbying against financial reform. But despite the bank’s history of predatory excess, Dimon’s revisionist economic history carries significant—and unwarranted— political influence with the Obama administration.
Throughout the letter, Dimon portrays himself and his company as an unfairly ridiculed public servant. In Dimon’s version of the financial crisis, J.P. Morgan is a patriotic institution, one which came to its country’s aid during its darkest economic hour, agreeing to acquire failing investment bank Bear Stearns when no other megabank was willing, and providing financing to state and local governments to help them weather the recession.
Nowhwere does Dimon acknowledge his company’s massive subprime mortgage operation, the ghastly practices of their credit card business, or their outright defrauding of local governments during the years leading up to the Great Financial Crash of 2008. Instead, he bemoans how his bank and its too-big-to-fail brethren have been “demonized” in the aftermath of the bailout that saved them all.
Dimon never explicitly states what he means by “demonized,” so it’s not clear exactly what kinds of criticisms he thinks are unfair. My own criticism of the company is simple: Like other large financial institutions, J.P. Morgan derives an extraordinary amount of its “shareholder value” from devouring other productive elements of the economy. There are three major examples of this behavoir, and I’ll start with the subprime mortgage business, since that particular form of predation brought the global economy to the brink of collapse.
Between, 2005 and 2007, J.P. Morgan issued at least $30 billion in subprime mortgages, according to the Center for Public Integrity. In 2007, the bank was issuing over $3 billion in new subprime loans every quarter. The company ended up weathering billions in supbrime losses, but the red ink would have been more prevalent had Dimon and his cohorts not recognized the risk inherent in the subprime business and started selling off their loans as soon as they had issued them. In essence, J.P. Morgan knew its subprime operations were setting families up to fail—but it could still make a lot of money by extending the loans, and then selling them off to other investors.
As a result, when a subprime borrower proved unable to pay back the predatory terms of her mortgage contract, it was no longer J.P. Morgan’s problem—another investor had to eat the losses, while J.P. Morgan paid out big bonuses to its executives. Between 2005 and 2008, Dimon alone took home over $115 million, much of it stripped directly out of neighborhoods around the country.
Not only was J.P. Morgan a major player in the subprime mortgage market, it ran one of the most influential lobbying operations in Washington. Dimon used this lobbying team to protect his booming subprime mortgage business. When state regulators tried to crack down on predatory subprime lending, J.P. Morgan pressured regulators at the federal level to step in and defend his bank. Ulitmately, J.P. Morgan joined six other banking behemoths and the top bank regulatory agency in the country, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, in a lawsuit to defang state regulators. The gambit worked until 2009, when the Supreme Court ultimately overruled the banks. But by then the subprime horse was well past the barn door.
J.P. Morgan’s other major act of consumer predation came in the form of credit card lending– retroactively raising rates on debt consumers had already accumulated and gouging them with undisclosed fees. In 2009, Congress finally approved legislation that would end several of these unfair and deceptive practices, and in November, J.P. Morgan said that it expected to lose between $500 million and $750 million as a result of the new law. The company’s entire credit card division would book a loss for the year— Dimon literally did not know how to turn a profit on the credit card business without resorting to predation.
With Dimon at the helm, J.P. Morgan even went after local governments, bribing public officials to invest in the bank’s toxic securities, and demanding millions of dollars from taxpayers to end the corrupt arrangements.
J.P. Morgan wasn’t the only bank engaged in these financial assaults on the economy—Wells Fargo, Bank of America and Citigroup were all doing roughly the same things. And the reason they were allowed to get away with it—these companies were all, in fact, rewarded for their abusive behavior with the most generous bailout in economic history—is their size. All of these banks are so large that their failure would wreak havoc on the global economy. At the time of its collapse, Lehman Brothers held roughly $700 billion in assets. J.P. Morgan owns over $2 trillion. After witnessing the economic chaos that resulted after Lehman’s demise, the U.S. government simply cannot allow a bank of J.P. Morgan’s scope to collapse if it ever finds itself in trouble. That state of affairs gives the company enormous political clout. Lawmakers know that the big banks and their campaign contributions will be around for the long-haul, and are willing to change the economic rules of the game to suit the banks’ interests.
By contrast, the economy receives no substantive benefits from banks of J.P. Morgan’s size. As Simon Johnson and James Kwak note in their new book, 13 Bankers, we had plenty of large corporations in the early 1980s, and all of them had no trouble obtaining financing when the largest bank in the country was Citigroup, worth just $114 billion, or roughly 3 percent of the U.S. economy. Today, J.P. Morgan is 14.7 percent of the U.S. economy.
Any public policy that presents a massive economic downside with no economic upside is simply irrational. But Dimon argues that targeting the too-big-to-fail crowd is actually a form of ignorant prejudice. Here’s Dimon, from his shareholder letter:
“When we reduce the debate over responsibility and regulation to simplistic and inaccurate notions, such as Main Street vs. Wall Street, big business vs. small business or big banks vs. small banks, we are indiscriminately blaming the good and the bad – this is simply another form of ignorance and prejudice.”
The point, of course, is that all of our nation’s largest banks did truly awful things in the years leading up to the crisis. And if they had not been so big, policymakers would not have allowed them to get away with it.
But despite his bank’s active role in fueling the financial crisis, Dimon remains a highly respected figure in Washington. Last July, The New York Times ran a story referring to him as “Obama’s favorite banker,” and he continues to be a frequent guest at the White House. When asked about the size of Dimon’s 2009 bonus earlier this year, Obama praised the CEO’s “savvy.” It’s easy to understand the affinity—Dimon himself has been a big donor to the Democratic Party over the years, while J.P. Morgan spent more money on lobbying in 2009 than any other financial institution. And Republicans are eager for Dimon to switch teams—in February, House Minority Leader John Boehner took Dimon out for drinks to try and coax campaign contributions from the executive.
All of that lobbying has allowed the U.S. economy to work very well for Jamie Dimon. But he has enough money. Economic policy is supposed to work for everyone. Where Wall Street is concerned, that means making sure that the financial system actually furthers useful economic development, and that taxpayers, consumers and small businesses aren’t held hostage to whatever giant banks believe to be in their own short-term self-interest. The only way to do that is to remove the political clout of megabanks like J.P. Morgan. And the only way to do that is to break up the behemoths into smaller banks that can fail safely.
JPMC is not going to write any big checks on their own voilition. It goes against their nature. They will fight with everything they have. IMO
Did Wamu ever realy fail? I thought it was bought by the bad guys.
I think this is the competition. Inferior product to MOP.
MOP Environmental's 5 Point Strategic Plan to Achieve Globally Preeminent Oil Spill Absorbent Manufacturer Status:
I. Secure Global Manufacturing -- (in process -- via licensing of
technology to other manufacturers).
II. Global Distribution -- (in process -- with contract signed for 52
additional countries in the past month).
III.Vertical Corporate Structure -- (in process -- with signed agreement
with established On Scene Hazwoper Certified Spill Response and Training
Company).
IV. Obtaining Revenue from Recovery of Oil from Oil Spills on Land and on
Water -- (2 patents filed in 2010, equipment sourced and identified with
funding required to implement).
V. Conversion of used MOP and up to 90% of waste stream hydrocarbons into
carbon, (removed as a soil amendment providing 200% to 400% higher
agricultural yields) and into Green Energy (from what remains as a
hydrogen based fuel). -- (equipment sourced and identified with funding
required to implement).
"Larry Oakley's Opinion" editorial column at www.WallStreetCorner.com
Nothing here about absorbing just oil and no water. MOP is unique in that aspect. That is why it is superior to anything else on the market.
Just checked out Homeland Environmental Logistical Partners, LTD. It looks like a little kid set up their website. I don't have much confidence in MOP hanging their hats with these guys. MOP comes across a little amaturish also. They don't need to be going with Fly by Night outfits like this. They need to be in the deep end not the kiddy pool. Why don't people spend the money to get a real website? Setting up a website with a kit that somebody can buy at Office-Max for $49.99 is pretty indicative of who they are. Maybe they spent all their Federal grant money on flyers they put out on their mailing list.lol.
Whatever happened to the FDIC extending the settlement date?
Is this normal to have a conference call/webcast after a hearing? Can I read anything into this. Or is it going to be boohoo for Arena and the shortest webcast ever?
Guess we will find out Friday or Thursday. Took a big hit today. The guys at ARENA must be freaking out right about now.
So what is new?
I am suspicious of all sell offs before the openning bell and before the release of the negative sounding report. Is't the timing on this one suspect? One more reason I am investing overseas. Why didn't anyone here at I-Hub know about this report being released today? Why do the results vary from what is on the Arena website and what is being released here today.
Now is the time to buy.
All up from here until the hearing. GLTA.
DH has more shares than the Hammer. If Hammer gets paid DH gets paid more.
This is only the beginning of the JPMC two step.
So isn't this what everyone has been waiting for? A refusal to submit financials to the examiner. How can there be no records of the morgtages that they received/thieved from WaMu? Is this the tip of the iceburg of what is to come? IMO I believe that the documentation that JPMC does divulge will be suspect. Why wouldn't they just insert the numbers they want to show and say that is what they got from WaMU. Also nobody is mentioning that Lehman Bros. was helping the FDIC by looking at WaMu's books in the auditing of WaMu in regards to the possibilty of a seizure by the FDIC. These guys at JPMC have some explaining to do. They had better come up with an alibi quick because their inactions now are speaking louder than they are.
Lets see how the Germans handle pain.
I got this from Scottrade:
Hearings before a Senate panel, however, have revealed that not all regulators believed WaMu was in such bad shape that it needed to be seized. By Peg Brickley
of DOW JONES DAILY BANKRUPTCY REVIEW
Who are the Regulators? They seem to have all the power.
That posting showed up on my Scotttrade account as news for wamu.
I hope all hell breaks loose tomorrow.
Do you think you can get one of the new phones that let you live video stream to the internet? I would love to see Rosen's face when he comes out of the Judges chamber. It will be hard for him to have a pokerface in the heat of battle. Imagine how many hits you will have on YouTube.lol.
exactly
is the market open in Frankfurt?
Doesn't this tie in somewhere?
Should the FDIC actually need to dissolve a complex nonbank financial company, it's also likely the agency would seek outside help, as it did in the case of Washington Mutual Inc. (ironically, hiring two entities that subsequently dissolved -- Lehman Brothers for investment banking advice and Thacher Proffitt & Wood for legal assistance).
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202471686189
Should the FDIC actually need to dissolve a complex nonbank financial company, it's also likely the agency would seek outside help, as it did in the case of Washington Mutual Inc. (ironically, hiring two entities that subsequently dissolved -- Lehman Brothers for investment banking advice and Thacher Proffitt & Wood for legal assistance).
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202471686189
Is this right?
Should the FDIC actually need to dissolve a complex nonbank financial company, it's also likely the agency would seek outside help, as it did in the case of Washington Mutual Inc. (ironically, hiring two entities that subsequently dissolved -- Lehman Brothers for investment banking advice and Thacher Proffitt & Wood for legal assistance).
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202471686189
Is this right?
This was my concern about a week ago. Why is no one on the board paying attention to this developement. All I got was it isn't retroactive for this case. But if the deal hasn't been settled, then it sounds to me that Bair can do whatever she want since the sale has maybe never been finalized.I think one of the heavy hitters on this board needs to address this. Wednesday will reveal more I suppose.
Maybe Bair should get a pass and everyone should focus on the real evil ones: JPMC.
Redistribute the wealth already Mr. Dimon. Can you imagine what this will do for the economy if we all score?
Do you mean to say that the MMs are playing with themselves?
What is that letter from Germany about. Are they seriously expecting the guys over there to sell at .13usd or .10eur?
Before this goes too far, don't you think that somebody should run this idea of a full page ad in the WSJ by Susman to get his opinion? Hypothetically of course. Afterall he is the shot caller.
Also the question needs to be asked about past history with other groups placing ads and if they received the desired results?
Look at the date it was signed 6/18/2010
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html
This is what I saw. Maybe the other banks that failed at the same time will have more info on there extensions.
The link will not work any more
Failed Bank Information
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK - Receivership Balance Sheet Summary (Unaudited)
Fund Code: 10015
Failure Date: 09/25/2008
For Period Ending June 30, 2010
(in $000's)
Assets Current
Balance
Cash / Investments $ 1,928,848
Assets in Liquidation 0
Estimated Loss on Assets in Liquidation (1) 0
Total Assets $ 1,928,848
Liabilities Current
Balance
Administrative Liabilities $ 60,834
FDIC Subrogated Deposit Claim 0
Uninsured Deposit Claims 0
Other Claimants 13,814,915
Liabilities at Inception - Unproven 0
Total Liabilities (2) $ 13,875,749
Net Worth (Deficit) (11,946,901)
Total Liabilities and Net Worth $ 1,928,848
. Proven Deposit Claims Claim
Balance %
FDIC Subrogated Claim $ 151,150,664 100%
Uninsured Depositors 0 0%
SubTotal - Proven Deposit Claims $ 151,150,664 100%
Less: Dividends Paid to Date 151,150,664 100%
Total Unpaid Deposit Claims $ 0 0%
Other Claimants Claim
Balance %
General Creditor $ 16,527 0%
Senior Debt Holders 6,077,557 44%
Subordinated Debt Holders 7,720,831 56%
SubTotal - Other Claimants $ 13,814,915 100%
Less: Dividends Paid to Date 99 0%
Total Unpaid Other Claimants $ 13,814,816 100%
(1) Valuation of Assets/Loss Allowances: Assets of the receivership are shown at values representing cash on deposit or the book value of amounts invested; the principal balance of loans, notes, other debt instruments or receivables (note that interest on these assets is not accrued after failure but is recognized when received); the foreclosed value of real and/or personal property or the book value of assets (cost less depreciation or amortization through date of the institution’s failure); and the historical cost of the net investment in subsidiaries, partnerships or joint ventures, adjusted where appropriate to reflect the receivership’s portion of the underlying net earnings or losses. An Estimated Loss on Assets is provided when anticipated future asset disposition proceeds, including associated expenses, are less than recorded amounts. Future asset disposition proceeds are generally estimated by determining, via sampling or recent disposition activity, the recovery rates for similar assets across all receiverships. However, actual recovery rates for this receivership may differ according to the quality and type of individual asset, as well as over time with changing market conditions. Accordingly, the gains or losses ultimately realized for this receivership will likely vary from amounts estimated.
(2) The Total Liabilities line item reflects those actual and accrued liabilities recorded on the accounting records of this receivership as of the date of this report. The Total Liabilities line item may not include other liabilities arising from Estimated Interest on Claims and Income Taxes, as these liabilities may not be recognized as of the report date, in accordance with current receivership accounting practices.
does this help?
http://www2.fdic.gov/drrip/bal/balancesheet.asp
Failed Bank Information
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK - Receivership Balance Sheet Summary (Unaudited)
Fund Code: 10015
Failure Date: 09/25/2008
For Period Ending June 30, 2010
(in $000's)
Assets Current
Balance
Cash / Investments $ 1,928,848
Assets in Liquidation 0
Estimated Loss on Assets in Liquidation (1) 0
Total Assets $ 1,928,848
Liabilities Current
Balance
Administrative Liabilities $ 60,834
FDIC Subrogated Deposit Claim 0
Uninsured Deposit Claims 0
Other Claimants 13,814,915
Liabilities at Inception - Unproven 0
Total Liabilities (2) $ 13,875,749
Net Worth (Deficit) (11,946,901)
Total Liabilities and Net Worth $ 1,928,848
. Proven Deposit Claims Claim
Balance %
FDIC Subrogated Claim $ 151,150,664 100%
Uninsured Depositors 0 0%
SubTotal - Proven Deposit Claims $ 151,150,664 100%
Less: Dividends Paid to Date 151,150,664 100%
Total Unpaid Deposit Claims $ 0 0%
Other Claimants Claim
Balance %
General Creditor $ 16,527 0%
Senior Debt Holders 6,077,557 44%
Subordinated Debt Holders 7,720,831 56%
SubTotal - Other Claimants $ 13,814,915 100%
Less: Dividends Paid to Date 99 0%
Total Unpaid Other Claimants $ 13,814,816 100%
(1) Valuation of Assets/Loss Allowances: Assets of the receivership are shown at values representing cash on deposit or the book value of amounts invested; the principal balance of loans, notes, other debt instruments or receivables (note that interest on these assets is not accrued after failure but is recognized when received); the foreclosed value of real and/or personal property or the book value of assets (cost less depreciation or amortization
It was extended 8-27-10. I saw it on the list of extensions on the FDIC website.
This might be a stupid question. But if JPMC can see that they are going to lose and lose big. Then why wouldn't they be buying more shares themselves? Wouldn't every share save them a lot of money?
And you guys are starting to sound like Rosen's crew discussing vacation plans before the trip to the Judge's chamber
Is this good or bad?