Register for free to join our community of investors and share your ideas. You will also get access to streaming quotes, interactive charts, trades, portfolio, live options flow and more tools.
Register for free to join our community of investors and share your ideas. You will also get access to streaming quotes, interactive charts, trades, portfolio, live options flow and more tools.
Hi Superbee- if you would really delve into corporate America's documents, you would probably find that many manufacturers do not really make anything. Liability issues are at the core of separation of responsibilities. You may think that the factory you are looking at is owned by XYZ corp and it may even have it's name on it. A closer look at holdings, subsidiaries, related parties etc, documents could reveal that a complete unknown owns the factory. The principles of the corporation may indeed be the same but it is a separate entity. I once looked into opening a bar. Upon talking to my attorney he suggested I form 3 separate corporations. One owns the property, one owns the license, and one runs the bar itself and has all the responsibility and liability. License and property are protected from confiscation in a lawsuit. Just FYI
.........al
Why isn't Henry Paulson in jail serving time for aiding and abetting grand theft? I guess crime does pay as long as you are wearing a suit.
The Real AIG Scandal
Eliot Spitzer is writing about The Real AIG Scandal.
Everybody is rushing to condemn AIG's bonuses, but this simple scandal is obscuring the real disgrace at the insurance giant: Why are AIG's counterparties getting paid back in full, to the tune of tens of billions of taxpayer dollars?
For the answer to this question, we need to go back to the very first decision to bail out AIG, made, we are told, by then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, then-New York Fed official Timothy Geithner, Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein, and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke last fall. Post-Lehman's collapse, they feared a systemic failure could be triggered by AIG's inability to pay the counterparties to all the sophisticated instruments AIG had sold. And who were AIG's trading partners? No shock here: Goldman, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, UBS, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, Barclays, and on it goes. So now we know for sure what we already surmised: The AIG bailout has been a way to hide an enormous second round of cash to the same group that had received TARP money already.
Why nothing will change no matter who runs the ship:
FDIC Criticizes Massachusetts Bank With No Bad Loans for Being Too Cautious
Tuesday, March 17, 2009
Massachusetts bank that has defied the odds and remained free of bad loans amid the economic crisis is now being criticized by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. for the cautious business practices that caused its rare success.
The secret behind East Bridgewater Savings Bank's accomplishments is the careful approach of 62-year-old chief executive Joseph Petrucelli.
"We’re paranoid about credit quality," he told the Boston Business Journal.
That paranoia has allowed East Bridgewater Savings Bank to stand out among a flurry a failing banks, with no delinquent loans or foreclosures on its books, the Journal reported. East Bridgewater Savings didn’t even need to set aside in money in 2008 for anticipated loan losses.
But rather than reward Petrucelli's tactics, the FDIC recently criticized his bank for not lending enough, slapping it with a "needs to improve" rating under the Community Reinvestment Act, the Journal reported.
The problem, according to FDIC data, was that from late 2003 through mid-2008, East Bridgewater Savings made an average of 28 cents in loans for every dollar in deposit — a sharp contrast to the 90 percent average loan-to-deposit ratio among similar banks, the paper reported.
"There are no apparent financial or legal impediments that would limit the bank’s ability to help meet the credit needs of its assessment area," the FDIC wrote in the CRA evaluation.
The agency also faulted the bank, which does not have a Web site, for not promoting its loan products enough, the Journal reported.
Considering his bank is doing well in tanking industry and even the FDIC’s deposit insurance fund is in trouble after paying for an upswing in bank failures, Petrucelli told the Boston Business Journal that the negative rating caught him by surprise.
East Bridgewater Savings ended 2008 with $135 million in assets, deposits of $84 million, $87,000 in profit, and a Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio of 31.6 percent — more than three times higher than many community banks in Massachusetts, the Journal reported.
Its net loans and leases equaled 21 percent of assets, compared with 72 percent among 385 similar banks across the country.
Gee, I spread a lot of that also, but it all goes into a field to help the garden grow. If you are going to bash at least try to give some innuendo or misleading facts taken out of context.
.......al
You really can't be seriously expecting a reply to that question. LOL
.......al
Hi airdale- do you have a reference for that information from TDA? Thanks
........al
Hi LC, thank you for your kind words. At least someone pays attention. Like yourself I try to bring a little reality on board when it looks like it is needed, altho sometimes I just like to hear myself talk, LOL. And I don't mind at all if anyone disagrees with my opinions. That's what discussion boards are all about. No great entities thruout history from nations to simple interpersonal relationships have been borne without disagreements. If everyone agrees there leaves no room for stimulating thought. On the loan, I am only going by a timeline that has been put out by the company on the releases. I do hope that our company officers and not Mr Swetel were the ones that negotiated that loan package. If it was the new consultant they better get rid of him fast. I can accept an inexperienced management getting shafted in a bind for cash flow. I cannot accept a "professional" in loans and financing allowing their client to accept such poor terms even in a tight money market like we are in now.
Quick question for you. If the company did start doing $100 million in sales each year, where do you think the stock price would be?
........al
Yes it did cost a lot to pay off that loan. I'm sure management realized it as well. Another misstep. OK what did they learn and how to go about fixing it so it doesn't happen again? Relate to the previous release on hiring a financial firm to obtain future financing when needed, which I'm sure they antcipate needing as production ramps up. Anyone feel free to disagree, but IMHO, it sounds like a company eager to learn from their mistakes and to continue growth. I wish I could give solid answers on why the pps is so dismal but I assume (yes an ass followed by you and me) this will be taken care of as the company grows showing revenues and profits. Why would a market maker accumulate millions of shares if anything was amiss? They are a lot smarter than we are and are usually the first to act upon news.
.......al
Yes, I've been watching that precious metals trend since the late 70s- yup I'm an old codger, LOL. I saw the rise starting around the beginning of 2003. Bought heavy in gold and silver then and haven't sold any yet. This trend to me promises a long time running. Given the macro effects of gov't printing presses running all out, I see very little risk ahead.
........al
LOL,You just found that out? Goldman alumni have long been in influential positions within gov't and treasury. You didn't think Paulson wanted that money for wall street for the good of the people? It was the last great theft of a corrupt administration.
..........al
4G- some may disagree but I see the trend lines on the charts as very positive. Follow the trend.
.......al
Long-Term Outlook: Slow Growth And Deflation
(excerpted from the March 2009 edition of A. Gary Shilling's INSIGHT)
From 1982 until 2000, the U.S. economy enjoyed rapid growth with real GDP rising at a 3.6% average annual rate. Furthermore, this 18-year expansion, which cumulated to an 89% rise in inflation-adjusted economic activity, was interrupted by only one recession, the relatively mild 1990-1991 downturn, which depressed real GDP by only 1.3% from peak to trough.
Extended Expansion
From a fundamental standpoint, the growth spurt ended in 2000 as shown by basic measures of the economy's health. The stock market, that most fundamental measure of business fitness and sentiment, essentially reached its peak with the dot com blow-off in 2000 and has been trending down ever since (Chart 1). The same is true of employment, goods production and household net worth in relation to disposable (after-tax) income.
S&P 500 Index
Nevertheless, the gigantic policy ease in Washington in response to the stock market collapse and 9/11 gave the illusion that all was well and that the growth trend had resumed. The Fed rapidly cut its target rate from 6.5% to 1% and held it there for 12 months to provide more-than ample monetary stimulus. Meanwhile, federal tax rebates and repeated tax cuts generated oceans of fiscal stimulus.
As a result, the speculative investment climate spawned by the dot com nonsense survived. It simply shifted from stocks to housing (Chart 2), commodities, foreign currencies, emerging market equities and debt, hedge funds and private equity. Investors still believed they deserved double-digit returns each and every year, and if stocks no longer did the job, other investment vehicles would. Thus persisted what we earlier dubbed the Great Disconnect between the real world of goods and services and the speculative world of financial assets.
Real Quality-Adjusted Home Prices
Not Sustainable
Even before these final speculative binges, the forces driving the economy in its long expansion were unsustainable, as we've been stressing for years in Insight. These forces included the decline in the consumer saving rate and jump in consumer debt, the vast leveraging of the financial sector, increasingly freer trade and loose financial regulation, all of which are now being reversed.
In the 1980s and 1990s, American consumers were more than willing to cut their saving rate because they believed stock portfolios would continue to grow rapidly and take care of all their financial needs. Then, when stocks collapsed in 2000-2002, house appreciation (Chart 3) seamlessly took over to continue the push down the household saving rate from 12% in the early 1980s to zero. Americans saw their houses as continually-filling piggybanks because, they believed, home price appreciation would continue indefinitely. They tapped that equity freely with home equity loans and cash-out refinancing.
Case-Shiller U.S. National House Price Index
The flip side of saving less is borrowing more, as evidenced by the leap in all consumer debt and debt service, both in relation to disposable (after-tax) income and relative to assets. In relation to GDP, the cumulative outside financing of the household as well as the financial sector leaped for three decades, measuring the immense leveraging in these two areas. Not surprising, amidst this consumer borrowing and spending binge, consumer spending's share of GDP leaped from 62% in the early 1980s to 71% at its peak in the second quarter of 2008 (Chart 4).
Consumer Spending as a % of GDP
The Tide Turns
Now, however, consumers have run out of borrowing power. As of the third quarter 2008, homeowners with mortgages had on average 25% equity in their abodes after all mortgage debt was removed and that number will probably drop to the 10%-15% range with the further decline in house prices we are forecasting (Chart 3). At that bottom, after a 37% peak-to-trough collapse, almost 25 million homeowners, or nearly half the 51 million with mortgages, will be under water, with their mortgages bigger than their house values. In total, the gap will be about $1 trillion.
The nosedive in stocks has also discouraged consumer spending as have mounting layoffs (Chart 5), maxed out credit cards and tighter lending standards and weak consumer confidence. Rising medical costs are also a drag on consumers as their co-pays and deductibles mount. For decades, credit card issuers and other lenders encouraged consumers to indulge in instant gratification. Buy now, pay later. But now, habits are changing. Debit cards are becoming popular since they deduct charges directly from the user's checking account and, therefore, don't increase indebtedness. Layaway plans are back in style after nearly disappearing.
Payroll Employment
Financially Unprepared
Between low saving levels in recent years and weak stock prices, few Americans are prepared financially for retirement. About 54% of 401(k) assets are invested in stocks, which fell 39% last year as measured by the S&P 500 index. And except for Treasurys, almost all other investments suffered huge losses in 2008. Around 50 million Americans have 401(k) plans, with $2.5 trillion in assets, and in the 12 months after the stock market peak in October 2007, over $1 trillion in stock value was wiped out in 401(k)s and other defined contribution plans. Another $1 trillion in IRAs was lost.
After 401(k)s were initiated in 1978, those containing stock assets appreciated in the long 1982-2000 bull market, which convinced many that they didn't need to save, as mentioned earlier. In 1983, 33% of working-age households were financially unprepared for retirement, but the number rose to 40% in 1998 as a result of lower saving and more borrowing, and to 44% in 2006 as the 2000-2002 bear market also depressed retirement funds. Obviously, with the subsequent collapse in house and stock prices, many more -- over 50% -- are unprepared. In 2007, in defined contribution accounts administered by Vanguard, the median account balance for 55-64 year-olds was just $60,740 and only 10% of participants contributed the maximum amount.
Economic Effects
As households increase their saving rate, their spending growth will slow, a distinct contrast from the decline of the saving rate from 12% in the early 1980s to zero recently. That decline, which averaged about a half-percentage point per year, meant that consumer spending grew an average of around a half-percentage point faster than disposable income annually. For the next decade, we're forecasting a one percentage point rise in the saving rate annually. That still would not return it to the early 1980s level of 12% even though the demographics for saving have gone from the worst to the best in the interim. Applying a 1.5 multiplier to account for the total destimulating effects as those dollars are saved, not spent, this means a reduction of about one percentage point in real GDP growth, from 3.6% per annum in the 1982-2000 years to 2.6%.
Although the stock bulls may salivate over the prospect that increased saving will mean more equity purchases, we believe that most of the money will go to debt repayment--the flip side of a saving spree. Note that if the saving rate rises one percentage point per year for 10 years, the cumulative increase in saving will total about $5.5 trillion. That will go a long way in offsetting federal deficits and debt.
So will the deflation that we'll explore later. Incomes may grow on average in real or inflation-adjusted terms, but shrink in current dollars. But debts are denominated in current dollars and therefore will grow in relation to incomes and the ability to service them. This will be the reverse of inflation, which reduced the value of debts in real terms and makes it easier to service them as incomes rise with inflation.
Foreign Effects
The effects, then, of a consumer switch from a 25-year borrowing-and-spending binge to a saving spree will be profound for the U.S. economy. Even more so for the foreign economies that have depended for growth on American consumers to buy the excess goods and services for which they have no other ready markets.
In 2007, U.S. consumers accounted for 18.2% of global GDP, and that share has jumped from 14.9% in 1980 and 16.8% in 1990. Furthermore, the shares of American consumer spending on durable and nondurable goods accounted for by imports from Central and South America and from the Pacific Rim have leaped since the early 1990s.
A clear result of the upward trend in consumers' share of GDP (Chart 4) and declining saving rate for a quarter-century has been the downtrend in the foreign trade and current account balances. We can't overemphasize the importance of the profligate U.S. consumer in fueling economic growth in the rest of the world, as we've discussed in many past Insights. We have also published our analysis of Asian exports. The intra-Asian trade was much bigger than the direct exports to the U.S., but when we accounted for the components produced in, say, Taiwan that were sent for subassembly to Thailand, then to Malaysia for final assembly with the finished product destined for the U.S., over half of Asian exports ended up in America.
Export-Dependent China
In late 2007, most forecasters disagreed with us and said China's economy would continue to grow at double-digit rates, and even support the U.S. economy if it softened. However, in "The Chinese Middle Class: 110 Million Is Not Enough" (Nov. 2007 Insight), we explained that China was not yet far enough along the road to industrialization to have a big enough middle class of free spenders to sustain economic growth if exports fell with U.S. consumer spending, as we were predicting.
As we noted in that report, in China, it takes $5,000 or more in per capita income to have meaningful discretionary spending. The 110 million who fit that category are a lot of people, but only 8% of China's population. In India, the middle and upper income classes are even smaller, 5%. In contrast, in the U.S. it takes $26,000 or more to have middle-class spending power, and 80% of Americans qualify. So we wrote in that report that all the cell phones and PCs being bought by Chinese was not the result of domestic economic strength, but merely the recycling of export revenues and direct foreign investment funds. And we went on to forecast that U.S. consumers would retrench, resulting in a nosedive in Chinese exports and a deep recessionary slump in China's growth.
Well, as they say, the rest is history. It now seems likely that China's earlier double-digit growth rates will slip to the 5%-6% range that would probably constitute a major recession, and probably lower. About 8% growth is needed to accommodate the vast numbers who continually flood from the countryside to the cities in search of work and better lives. Of those who went back to their villages to celebrate the recent lunar new year, 20 million didn't return because their factory jobs had vanished along with Chinese exports. Worker unrest us mounting and just as civil disturbances have ended many past Chinese dynasties, the Mao Dynasty's days may be numbered, as we've discussed in past Insights.
EmergInvest
No Winners
With subdued U.S. consumer spending in the years ahead and the resulting weakness in American imports, economic growth abroad will be even weaker than in the U.S. Note that in previous U.S. recessions, the current account and trade balances tend to rise as imports weaken with economic activity, but exports fall less as economic growth abroad persists. That's been true of late, even though most would prefer strengthening balances from strong U.S. exports, not weaker imports. In any event, falling economies overseas are already weakening U.S. exports (Chart 6) and subdued global growth in the years ahead will probably limit the improvement in the U.S. current account and trade balances. Notice the close link between world industrial production and merchandise exports (Chart 7).
U.S. Exports and Imports monthly
World Industrial Production and Exports
First And Last Resort
Now, with American consumers embarking on a saving spree, the U.S. will no longer be the buyer of first and last resort for the globe's excess goods and services. Furthermore, with slower global growth for years ahead, virtually every country will promote exports to spur domestic activity. Already, China has stopped allowing her yuan to rise in order to gain a bigger share of a declining pool of global exports.
Financial Deleveraging
There's no question that the financial sector is deleveraging, and its embarrassed leaders, pressured by regulators and everyone else, will no doubt continue this process for years to come. Securitization, off-balance sheet financing, derivatives and other financial vehicles that both stimulated and distorted economic activity are disappearing.
Big banks are reducing exposure to volatile proprietary trading and emphasizing safer asset management. Hence, Morgan Stanley's interest in buying Smith Barney, the brokerage unit of cash-hungry Citigroup. Furthermore, banks are cutting their financing of hedge funds by concentrating on the likely survivors in the ongoing shake-out and cutting off the rest. This will hasten the demise of many less-successful as well as smaller shops that are also at risk of investor withdrawals.
Banks are retrenching from lending to the point that corporate borrowers are turning to the bond market instead for funding. Despite government bailouts, writedowns continue to erode bank capital. Many still hold some of the leveraged loans they made to fund private equity leveraged buyouts back in the boom days. Lenders normally recover 80% on those loans when borrowers default since they rank high in the recovery pecking order. But recent bankruptcies indicate 25% recovery rates. Earlier, Japanese banks were flush with cash, but sharply lower earnings outlooks suggest they no longer will be able to provide capital to international markets.
As banks retreat to their core competencies, they're selling non-essential units. Faced with lasting fear spawned by huge losses and pressed by regulators, these institutions are retreating to basic banking 101. That's spread lending in which deposits are lent with a market-determined interest rate spread that covers costs plus a modest profit. Banks are also consolidating in response to gigantic losses and bleak outlooks. France's BNP Paribas bought the Belgium and Luxembourg assets of Fortis. Spain's Santander is acquiring full control of Sovereign Bancorp based in Wyomissing, Pa. Large consolidated financial institutions don't tend to be big risk-takers, and often lack the entrepreneurial spirit that promotes productivity and economic growth. Also, with fewer institutions, there are fewer counterparts to share risks, and that also dampens activity.
Eastern Europe
Overseas, Western banks largely financed the rapid economic growth in the former Iron Curtain countries in Europe after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. In addition, many companies in those lands financed their domestic businesses by borrowing Swiss francs, euros and other hard currencies at lower rates than in their own inflation-prone countries. Individuals entered the same carry trade to fund their home mortgages.
Now, however, lenders are retreating as they delever. Exports to Western Europe, another important source of growth, are falling. Eastern European borrowers need to repay $400 billion owed to Western banks this year, much of it denominated in foreign currencies. Eurozone banks have outstanding loans to Central and Eastern Europe totaling $1.3 trillion. EU leaders, led by German Chancellor Merkel, recently rejected a $240 billion bailout of Eastern Europe proposed by Hungary.
Like Asia 1997-1998
The dependence of Central and Eastern Europe on foreign financing is painfully similar to that is Asia in the 1990s that led to the 1997-1998 financial and economic collapse--except it probably will be worse this time since banks are delevering this time and weren't back then. Also, these European countries were more leveraged in 2008 than their Asian counterparts a decade ago. This can be seen in their foreign debts in relation to GDP (Chart 8) and in their current account deficit/GDP (Chart 9) as well as in their currency declines.
Foreign Debts/GDP
Current Account Deficit/GDP
Asian lands reacted to the 1997-1998 crisis by cutting foreign borrowing and building foreign currency reserves. Ironically, however, they still didn't escape the current global recession and financial crisis. They're no longer as dependent on inflows of foreign capital, but this time are highly dependent on exports, which are plummeting as U.S. consumers retrench.
Commodity Crisis
The collapse of the commodity bubble will also subdue global economic growth in future years. Sure, commodity consumers benefit from lower prices as producers lose. But the share of total spending on commodity imports by consumers, especially developed lands, is tiny while they account for the bulk of exports for producers, notably developing countries.
Budget Signals
The new Obama federal budget points clearly to more government regulation and involvement in the economy. Going well beyond dealing with the deepening recession and financial crisis, the President wants $630 billion to move toward national health insurance. Businesses that emit carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases would have to purchase permits. Another $20 billion would go for clean energy technology. The government would essentially take over student loans while eliminating private lenders, and make them entitlements with no annual limits on loan totals.
Obama also plans to increase taxes in higher-income households and capital gains and estate while redistributing money to lower-income people, even those who don't pay taxes. This reflects his populist views on the campaign trail, but with considerably more edge. The President's budget document states, "Prudent investments in education, clean energy, health care and infrastructure were sacrificed for huge tax cuts for the wealthy and well-connected. In the face of these trade-offs, Washington has ignored the squeeze on middle-class families that is making it harder for them to get ahead. There's nothing wrong with making money, but there is something wrong when we allow the playing field to be tilted so far in the favor of so few." The President's budget message also attacks "a legacy of misplaced priorities...and irresponsible policy choice in Washington."
Corporations, the energy industry, hedge funds and large farmers would also pay higher taxes while families with annual incomes under $200,000 and especially the working poor would get government checks.
The budget calls for more enforcement money for the FDA to step up drug safety rules, more for the EPA to crack down on industrial polluters, additional funds to protect endangered species and land and water conservation and to protect wildlife from climate change. More money is also requested to enforce fair housing laws and better disclosure of mortgage terms and to reverse "years of erosion in funding for labor law enforcement agencies." Employers that don't offer retirement plans will be forced to open IRAs for employees. There's also additional funds requested for enforcing workplace safety rules.
Stress Tests
Major banks are being stress-tested to determine their volatility under adverse conditions. To date, Fannie and Freddie are in conservatorship and controlled by the government. The remaining major investment banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley are bank holding companies with Federal Reserve regulation. Is it a big surprise that Litton Loan Servicing, owned by Goldman, recently changed its strategy on mortgage modification to reduce borrowers' monthly payments to 31% of income from 38%, the industry standard?
Citigroup and BofA are, for all intents and purposes, wards of the state while the media and Washington spar over whether they will be formally owned by the government. Those two banks recently agreed to suspend mortgage foreclosures until the Treasury sets up its rescue program.
AIG is 85% owned by the Fed, which probably wishes it owned nothing of that bottomless money pit that has already absorbed $150 billion in government money. Recently, the government initiated its fourth plan to rescue AIG,which just reported a $62 billion loss in the fourth quarter. The firm is so troubled that Washington has completely backed away from its role as a stern lender that forced AIG to pay high interest rates on what it assumed would be short-term loans. Now the government is relaxing loan terms by wiping out interest in hopes of preserving some value for AIG. And it will be more involved as it splits AIG into two pieces and gets preferred shares in each entity.
Auto Bailout Payback
Beyond the financial sector, the ongoing bailout of U.S. auto producers is leading to more government intervention in that industry. As usual, he who pays the piper calls the tune. The government has already pumped $17.4 billion into GM and Chrysler, and they say they may need $21.6 billion more. GM also proposes a $4.5 billion credit insurance program for the auto parts makers. Furthermore, GMAC may need more than the $5 billion sunk into it by the Treasury last December.
Bonuses
Of all the signs of opulence carried over from the bubble years, corporate jets and big executive bonuses seem to bother Washington the most. BofA is selling three of its seven jets, a helicopter that was owned by Merrill Lynch and one of two of its New York corporate apartments. Obama wants firms that accept "extraordinary assistance" from the government to cap annual pay at $500,000, disclose pay to shareholders for a non-binding vote, claw back bonuses of corporate officials who provide misleading information, eliminate golden parachutes for those terminated and adopt board policies for luxuries such as entertainment and jets.
This reaction to big bonuses in firms that are taking huge writeoffs, losing big money and requiring massive government bailouts was predictable. From 2002 to 2008, the five largest Wall Street firms paid $190 billion in bonuses while earning $76 billion in profits. Last year, they had a combined net loss of $25 billion but paid bonuses of $26 billion.
The Trouble With More Regulation
Increased regulation may be the natural reaction to financial and economic woes, but it is fraught with problems. It's a reaction to crises and, therefore, comes too late to prevent them. And it often amounts to fighting the last war since the next set of problems will be outside the purview of these new regulations. That's almost guaranteed to be the case since fixed rules only invite all those well-paid bright guys and gals on Wall Street and elsewhere to figure ways around them.
Furthermore, government regulators have never, as far as we know, stopped big bubbles or caught big crooks. Consider the dot com and then the housing blowoffs, both of which occurred while the SEC, the Fed, other regulators, Congress, etc. sat on their hands. Think about Enron, WorldCom and Bernie Madoff, all of whom went on their merry ways until their self-induced collapses, completely free of regulatory interference.
Most importantly, government regulation and involvement in the economy is almost certain to prove inefficient. Risk-taking has been excessive, but government bureaucrats are likely to eliminate much of it, to the detriment of entrepreneurial activity, financial innovation and economic growth. Fannie, Freddie and government-controlled banks are now being directed by the government to modify mortgages to accommodate distressed homeowners. That may implement government policy, but leads to bad business decisions.
Confusion
Furthermore, if financial regulation changes massively, it probably will create confusion and uncertainty to the detriment of adequate financing, spending and investment. Some academics believe that the Great Depression was prolonged because the New Deal measures were so disruptive that banks and other financial firms as well as individual investors, consumers and businessmen were too scared to do anything. Recently, Tadao Noda, a Bank of Japan policy board member, said, "We are in a position where the central bank needs to interfere in financial markets, but if we do too much, the market functioning in turn may be hurt." In any event, major problems inexorably lead to greater government involvement. The Bush Administration was staunchly deregulatory in philosophy but forced to intervene in the financial crisis. The 20th century saw tremendous growth in government involvement in all aspects of the economy and financial markets as a result of three tremendous traumas--World Wars I and II and the Great Depression.
Protectionism
Recessions spawn economic nationalism, protectionism, and the deeper the slump, the stronger are those tendencies. It's ever so easy to blame foreigners for domestic woes and take actions to protect the home turf while repelling the invaders. The beneficial effects of free trade are considerable but diffuse while the loss of one's job to imports is very specific. And politicians find protectionism to be a convenient vote-getter since foreigners don't vote in domestic elections.
U.S. Leadership
Sadly, the U.S. appears to be among the leaders for protection of goods and services against foreign competition. The auto loan program last year under the Bush Administration largely excluded foreign transplants. Obama advocates a super-competitive economy, which requires highly productive workers. Yet the recent fiscal stimulus law restricted H-1B visas, granted to foreigners with advanced education and skills, for employees of firms that receive TARP (bank bailout) money.
Some in Congress worried that tax credits for renewable energy should be confined to American-produced equipment. And recall that during the presidential campaign, Obama called for renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement. Furthermore, the President's emphasis on health care, education and renewable energy turns attention inward, toward self-sufficiency and away from a global focus.
Outside the U.S., protectionism is being promoted by labor unrest. In England, workers at a French-owned oil refinery struck because Total awarded a construction contract to an Italian firm that planned to use its own staff from abroad rather than local workers. Rioters on the French Caribbean island of Guadeloupe protested high prices for food and other necessities for a month recently. High unemployment rates, especially among younger workers, have precipitated riots in Latvia, Lithuania, Greece, Russia and Bulgaria as well as France.
Competitive Devaluations
Good old-fashioned competitive devaluations to spur exports and retard imports, a mainstay of the 1930s, are making a comeback. Kazakhstan recently devalued, in part because of devaluations of her trading partners. As noted earlier, China stopped allowing her yuan to appreciate, in part because her labor costs are being undercut by countries like Vietnam and Bangladesh.
With the understanding that protectionism helped make the Great Depression "Great," country leaders still publicly espouse free trade and reject protectionism. And they express confidence that global organizations like the WTO, IMF and World Bank will forestall protectionism and economic nationalism, and they engage in endless meetings to promote free trade as well as global standards and cooperation for handling the deepening financial crisis. But almost nothing happens, as shown by the recent EU refusal to bail out Eastern Europe.
Stealth Protectionism
In any event, protectionism is returning by stealth. U.S. steelmakers plan to file anti-dumping suits against foreign producers, a strategy they have employed successfully for decades, and India recently proposed increased steel tariffs. In the first half of 2008, WTO antidumping investigations were up 30% from a year earlier. Bank bailouts have been aimed at protecting local institutions, as discussed earlier, and the Japanese government is buying stocks of Japan-based corporations to help company balance sheets, but also giving them a competitive advantage over the subsidiaries of foreign outfits.
Like America, France is aiding its own auto producers, not transplants, and has created a sovereign wealth fund to keep "national champions" out of foreign ownership. Since last November, Russia has introduced 28 import duty and export subsidies affecting steel, oil and other products as well as imposed special road tolls on trucks from the EU, Switzerland and Turkmenistan. Russia's tariff on imported cars recently rose 5 to 10 percentage points, curtailing shipments of used cars from Japan to the Russian Far East.
Meanwhile, Argentina has imposed new obstacles to imported shoes and auto parts. The EU again is giving export refunds to dairy farmers, to the detriment of New Zealand, slapped anti-dumping charges on Chinese nuts and bolts, and threatens duties on U.S. biodiesel imports in retaliation for America's export subsidies. Not to be outdone, the U.S. plans retaliatory tariffs on Italian water and French cheese in reaction to EU restrictions on U.S. chicken and beef imports in the hormones war.
Ecuador lifted tariffs across the board recently, with the levy on imported meat rising to 85.5% from 25%. Indonesia is using special import licenses to limit the inflow of clothing, shoes and electronics and also is curtailing toy imports by allowing them to enter through only a few of its ports. And there's the old standby, health and safety standards that Japan relies on consistently to keep out unwanted products.
Deflation
Long-time Insight readers know that we have been forecasting chronic deflation to start with the next major global recession. Well, that recession is here. As discussed in our Nov. 2008 Insight, deflation results when the overall supply of goods and services exceeds demand, and can result from supply leaping or from demand dropping. We've been forecasting chronic good deflation of excess supply because of today's convergence of many significant productivity-soaked technologies such as semiconductors, computers, the Internet, telecom and biotech that should hype output. Ditto for the globalization of production and the other deflationary forces we've been discussing since we wrote two books on deflation in the late 1990s, Deflation: Why it's coming, whether it's good or bad, and how it will affect your investments, business and personal affairs (1998) and Deflation: How to survive and thrive in the coming wave of deflation (1999). As a result of rapid productivity growth, fewer and fewer man-hours are needed to produce goods and services. Estimates are that 65% of jobs lost in manufacturing between 2000 and 2006 were due to productivity growth with only 35% due to outsourcing overseas.
Similar conditions held in the late 1800s when the American Industrial Revolution came into full flower after the Civil War. Value added in manufacturing leaped, and at the same time, real GNP grew 4.32% per year from 1869 to 1898, an unrivaled rate for a period that long, and consumption per consumer jumped 2.33% per year. Yet wholesale prices dropped 50% between 1870 and 1896, a 2.6% annual rate of decline. Good deflation also existed in the Roaring '20s when the driving new technologies were electrification of factories and homes and mass-produced automobiles.
The 1930s
In contrast, bad deflation reigned in the 1930s as the Great Depression pushed demand well below supply. As in the 1839-1843 depression, the money supply, prices, banks and real goods and services all nosedived. Employment dropped along with prices in the Great Depression and the unemployment rate rose to 25%. That depression was truly global.
We've consistently predicted the good deflation of excess supply, but in our two Deflation books and subsequent reports, we said clearly that the bad deflation of deficient demand could occur--due to severe and widespread financial crises or due to global protectionism. Both are clear threats, as explained earlier in this report.
Furthermore, with slower global economic growth in the years ahead due to the U.S. consumer saving spree, worldwide financial deleveragings, low commodity prices, increased government regulation and protectionism, excess global capacity will probably be a chronic problem. So deflation in the years ahead is likely to be a combination of good and bad.
Supply will be ample due to new tech, globalization and other factors we've explored over the years such as no big global wars (we hope), continual inflation worries by central bankers, continuing restructuring, and cost-cutting mass retailing. But demand will be weak, as discussed earlier. The chronic 1% to 2% deflation from excess supply that we forecast earlier still seems likely, but now we're adding 1% due to weak demand for a total of 2% to 3% annual declines in aggregate price indices for years to come.
2009 Seems Easy
For four reasons, the deflation that started several months ago (Chart 10) is quite likely to persist along with the recession, or at least until early 2010. First, the collapse in commodity prices continues and past declines are still working their way through the system. Crude oil prices have collapsed from $147 per barrel to around $40. Steel semi-finished billet prices were $1,200 a metric ton last summer but now is $350. Iron ore costs per metric ton dropped from $200 early last year to $80. It takes time for steel prices to work through to final consumer goods prices such as for washing machines.
U.S. Price Indices month/month % change
Second, producers, importers, wholesalers and retailers were caught flat-footed by the sudden nosedive in consumer spending late last year and continue to unload surplus goods by slashing prices. All the giveaway bargains at Christmas still didn't entice enough consumers to open their wallets. Spring apparel, ordered before consumer retrenchment, is clearly in excess and being marked down before it's put on the racks. Retailers from Saks on down continue to chop prices. Branded food product manufacturers are willing to promote their wares alongside the private-label goods that supermarkets shoppers increasingly favor.
Wage Cuts
Third, wages are actually being cut for the first time since the 1930s. Previously, labor costs were controlled by layoffs, which still dominate. Benefits have also been trimmed in recent years by switching from defined contribution pensions to 401(k)s and increasing employee contributions to health care costs. Most workers are less sensitive to benefits than to salaries and wages, but the deepening recession and mounting layoffs (Chart 5) are making them more amenable to wage cuts.
So is the growing use of this approach. In a recent poll, 13% of companies plan layoffs in the next 12 months, but 4% expect to reduce salaries and 8% will cut workweeks.
So it just isn't the CEO who is taking the symbolic pay cut to deal with tough times. We argued in our Deflation books that cutting pay rather than staff is more humane, better for morale and better for keeping the organization together and ready for a business rebound. Now increasing numbers of employers agree with us.
A final reason to expect deflation in coming quarters in the U.S. is the surplus of aggregate supply over demand. Notice that the supply-demand gap is an excellent forerunner of inflation six months later. And deflation this year is spreading globally. Japan is once again flirting with falling prices, Thailand's CPI in January fell year over year for the first time in a decade. In Europe, inflation rates are rapidly approaching zero.
Prices In Recovery
The real test of deflation will come when the economy recovers--in early 2010 or later, we believe. Inflation rates normally fall in recessions, but then revive when the economy resumes growth. This time, inflation rates started low, so declines into negative territory are normal, especially given the severity of the recession and the collapse in energy and other commodity prices. If we're right, however, aggregate price indices like the CPI and PPI will continue to drop in economic recovery and verify the arrival of chronic deflation.
Few agree with us. They've never seen anything but inflation in their business careers or lifetimes, so they think that's the way God made the world. Few can remember much about the 1930s, the last time deflation reigned. Furthermore, we all tend to have inflation biases. When we pay higher prices, it's because of the inflation devil, but lower prices are a result of our smart shopping and bargaining skills. Furthermore, we don't calculate the quality-adjusted price declines that result from technological improvements. This is especially true since many of those items, like TVs, are bought so infrequently that we have no idea what we paid for the last one. But we sure remember the cost of gasoline on the last fill-up a week ago.
Too Much Money?
The main reason most expect inflation to resume, however, is because of all the money that's being pumped out by the Fed and other central banks as well as the Treasury to finance the mushrooming federal deficit. When the economy revives, they fear, all this liquidity will turn into inflationary excess demand.
At present, the Fed's generosity isn't getting outside the banks into loans that create money.
When cyclical economic recovery finally does arrive in 2010 or later, it will probably be sluggish and lenders will still likely be cautious, as discussed earlier. Furthermore, any meaningful increase in loans will probably continue to be more than offset by the continual destruction of liquidity as writedowns, chargeoffs, elimination of derivatives, etc. persists for years. Derivatives represent liquidity. You can't use them at the grocery store, but at least until recently, they were interchangeable from money in many uses.
In Sum
The deepening recession and spreading financial crisis is the beginning of the unwinding of about three decades of financial leverage and spending excesses. The process will probably take many years to complete as U.S. consumers mount a decade-long saving spree, the world's financial institutions delever, commodity prices remain weak, government regulation intensifies and protectionism threatens, if not dominates. Sluggish economic growth and deflation are the likely results.
A. Gary Shilling's INSIGHT - March 2009
What will gold and silver do in a deflationary market?
Long-Term Outlook: Slow Growth And Deflation
(excerpted from the March 2009 edition of A. Gary Shilling's INSIGHT)
From 1982 until 2000, the U.S. economy enjoyed rapid growth with real GDP rising at a 3.6% average annual rate. Furthermore, this 18-year expansion, which cumulated to an 89% rise in inflation-adjusted economic activity, was interrupted by only one recession, the relatively mild 1990-1991 downturn, which depressed real GDP by only 1.3% from peak to trough.
Extended Expansion
From a fundamental standpoint, the growth spurt ended in 2000 as shown by basic measures of the economy's health. The stock market, that most fundamental measure of business fitness and sentiment, essentially reached its peak with the dot com blow-off in 2000 and has been trending down ever since (Chart 1). The same is true of employment, goods production and household net worth in relation to disposable (after-tax) income.
S&P 500 Index
Nevertheless, the gigantic policy ease in Washington in response to the stock market collapse and 9/11 gave the illusion that all was well and that the growth trend had resumed. The Fed rapidly cut its target rate from 6.5% to 1% and held it there for 12 months to provide more-than ample monetary stimulus. Meanwhile, federal tax rebates and repeated tax cuts generated oceans of fiscal stimulus.
As a result, the speculative investment climate spawned by the dot com nonsense survived. It simply shifted from stocks to housing (Chart 2), commodities, foreign currencies, emerging market equities and debt, hedge funds and private equity. Investors still believed they deserved double-digit returns each and every year, and if stocks no longer did the job, other investment vehicles would. Thus persisted what we earlier dubbed the Great Disconnect between the real world of goods and services and the speculative world of financial assets.
Real Quality-Adjusted Home Prices
Not Sustainable
Even before these final speculative binges, the forces driving the economy in its long expansion were unsustainable, as we've been stressing for years in Insight. These forces included the decline in the consumer saving rate and jump in consumer debt, the vast leveraging of the financial sector, increasingly freer trade and loose financial regulation, all of which are now being reversed.
In the 1980s and 1990s, American consumers were more than willing to cut their saving rate because they believed stock portfolios would continue to grow rapidly and take care of all their financial needs. Then, when stocks collapsed in 2000-2002, house appreciation (Chart 3) seamlessly took over to continue the push down the household saving rate from 12% in the early 1980s to zero. Americans saw their houses as continually-filling piggybanks because, they believed, home price appreciation would continue indefinitely. They tapped that equity freely with home equity loans and cash-out refinancing.
Case-Shiller U.S. National House Price Index
The flip side of saving less is borrowing more, as evidenced by the leap in all consumer debt and debt service, both in relation to disposable (after-tax) income and relative to assets. In relation to GDP, the cumulative outside financing of the household as well as the financial sector leaped for three decades, measuring the immense leveraging in these two areas. Not surprising, amidst this consumer borrowing and spending binge, consumer spending's share of GDP leaped from 62% in the early 1980s to 71% at its peak in the second quarter of 2008 (Chart 4).
Consumer Spending as a % of GDP
The Tide Turns
Now, however, consumers have run out of borrowing power. As of the third quarter 2008, homeowners with mortgages had on average 25% equity in their abodes after all mortgage debt was removed and that number will probably drop to the 10%-15% range with the further decline in house prices we are forecasting (Chart 3). At that bottom, after a 37% peak-to-trough collapse, almost 25 million homeowners, or nearly half the 51 million with mortgages, will be under water, with their mortgages bigger than their house values. In total, the gap will be about $1 trillion.
The nosedive in stocks has also discouraged consumer spending as have mounting layoffs (Chart 5), maxed out credit cards and tighter lending standards and weak consumer confidence. Rising medical costs are also a drag on consumers as their co-pays and deductibles mount. For decades, credit card issuers and other lenders encouraged consumers to indulge in instant gratification. Buy now, pay later. But now, habits are changing. Debit cards are becoming popular since they deduct charges directly from the user's checking account and, therefore, don't increase indebtedness. Layaway plans are back in style after nearly disappearing.
Payroll Employment
Financially Unprepared
Between low saving levels in recent years and weak stock prices, few Americans are prepared financially for retirement. About 54% of 401(k) assets are invested in stocks, which fell 39% last year as measured by the S&P 500 index. And except for Treasurys, almost all other investments suffered huge losses in 2008. Around 50 million Americans have 401(k) plans, with $2.5 trillion in assets, and in the 12 months after the stock market peak in October 2007, over $1 trillion in stock value was wiped out in 401(k)s and other defined contribution plans. Another $1 trillion in IRAs was lost.
After 401(k)s were initiated in 1978, those containing stock assets appreciated in the long 1982-2000 bull market, which convinced many that they didn't need to save, as mentioned earlier. In 1983, 33% of working-age households were financially unprepared for retirement, but the number rose to 40% in 1998 as a result of lower saving and more borrowing, and to 44% in 2006 as the 2000-2002 bear market also depressed retirement funds. Obviously, with the subsequent collapse in house and stock prices, many more -- over 50% -- are unprepared. In 2007, in defined contribution accounts administered by Vanguard, the median account balance for 55-64 year-olds was just $60,740 and only 10% of participants contributed the maximum amount.
Economic Effects
As households increase their saving rate, their spending growth will slow, a distinct contrast from the decline of the saving rate from 12% in the early 1980s to zero recently. That decline, which averaged about a half-percentage point per year, meant that consumer spending grew an average of around a half-percentage point faster than disposable income annually. For the next decade, we're forecasting a one percentage point rise in the saving rate annually. That still would not return it to the early 1980s level of 12% even though the demographics for saving have gone from the worst to the best in the interim. Applying a 1.5 multiplier to account for the total destimulating effects as those dollars are saved, not spent, this means a reduction of about one percentage point in real GDP growth, from 3.6% per annum in the 1982-2000 years to 2.6%.
Although the stock bulls may salivate over the prospect that increased saving will mean more equity purchases, we believe that most of the money will go to debt repayment--the flip side of a saving spree. Note that if the saving rate rises one percentage point per year for 10 years, the cumulative increase in saving will total about $5.5 trillion. That will go a long way in offsetting federal deficits and debt.
So will the deflation that we'll explore later. Incomes may grow on average in real or inflation-adjusted terms, but shrink in current dollars. But debts are denominated in current dollars and therefore will grow in relation to incomes and the ability to service them. This will be the reverse of inflation, which reduced the value of debts in real terms and makes it easier to service them as incomes rise with inflation.
Foreign Effects
The effects, then, of a consumer switch from a 25-year borrowing-and-spending binge to a saving spree will be profound for the U.S. economy. Even more so for the foreign economies that have depended for growth on American consumers to buy the excess goods and services for which they have no other ready markets.
In 2007, U.S. consumers accounted for 18.2% of global GDP, and that share has jumped from 14.9% in 1980 and 16.8% in 1990. Furthermore, the shares of American consumer spending on durable and nondurable goods accounted for by imports from Central and South America and from the Pacific Rim have leaped since the early 1990s.
A clear result of the upward trend in consumers' share of GDP (Chart 4) and declining saving rate for a quarter-century has been the downtrend in the foreign trade and current account balances. We can't overemphasize the importance of the profligate U.S. consumer in fueling economic growth in the rest of the world, as we've discussed in many past Insights. We have also published our analysis of Asian exports. The intra-Asian trade was much bigger than the direct exports to the U.S., but when we accounted for the components produced in, say, Taiwan that were sent for subassembly to Thailand, then to Malaysia for final assembly with the finished product destined for the U.S., over half of Asian exports ended up in America.
Export-Dependent China
In late 2007, most forecasters disagreed with us and said China's economy would continue to grow at double-digit rates, and even support the U.S. economy if it softened. However, in "The Chinese Middle Class: 110 Million Is Not Enough" (Nov. 2007 Insight), we explained that China was not yet far enough along the road to industrialization to have a big enough middle class of free spenders to sustain economic growth if exports fell with U.S. consumer spending, as we were predicting.
As we noted in that report, in China, it takes $5,000 or more in per capita income to have meaningful discretionary spending. The 110 million who fit that category are a lot of people, but only 8% of China's population. In India, the middle and upper income classes are even smaller, 5%. In contrast, in the U.S. it takes $26,000 or more to have middle-class spending power, and 80% of Americans qualify. So we wrote in that report that all the cell phones and PCs being bought by Chinese was not the result of domestic economic strength, but merely the recycling of export revenues and direct foreign investment funds. And we went on to forecast that U.S. consumers would retrench, resulting in a nosedive in Chinese exports and a deep recessionary slump in China's growth.
Well, as they say, the rest is history. It now seems likely that China's earlier double-digit growth rates will slip to the 5%-6% range that would probably constitute a major recession, and probably lower. About 8% growth is needed to accommodate the vast numbers who continually flood from the countryside to the cities in search of work and better lives. Of those who went back to their villages to celebrate the recent lunar new year, 20 million didn't return because their factory jobs had vanished along with Chinese exports. Worker unrest us mounting and just as civil disturbances have ended many past Chinese dynasties, the Mao Dynasty's days may be numbered, as we've discussed in past Insights.
EmergInvest
No Winners
With subdued U.S. consumer spending in the years ahead and the resulting weakness in American imports, economic growth abroad will be even weaker than in the U.S. Note that in previous U.S. recessions, the current account and trade balances tend to rise as imports weaken with economic activity, but exports fall less as economic growth abroad persists. That's been true of late, even though most would prefer strengthening balances from strong U.S. exports, not weaker imports. In any event, falling economies overseas are already weakening U.S. exports (Chart 6) and subdued global growth in the years ahead will probably limit the improvement in the U.S. current account and trade balances. Notice the close link between world industrial production and merchandise exports (Chart 7).
U.S. Exports and Imports monthly
World Industrial Production and Exports
First And Last Resort
Now, with American consumers embarking on a saving spree, the U.S. will no longer be the buyer of first and last resort for the globe's excess goods and services. Furthermore, with slower global growth for years ahead, virtually every country will promote exports to spur domestic activity. Already, China has stopped allowing her yuan to rise in order to gain a bigger share of a declining pool of global exports.
Financial Deleveraging
There's no question that the financial sector is deleveraging, and its embarrassed leaders, pressured by regulators and everyone else, will no doubt continue this process for years to come. Securitization, off-balance sheet financing, derivatives and other financial vehicles that both stimulated and distorted economic activity are disappearing.
Big banks are reducing exposure to volatile proprietary trading and emphasizing safer asset management. Hence, Morgan Stanley's interest in buying Smith Barney, the brokerage unit of cash-hungry Citigroup. Furthermore, banks are cutting their financing of hedge funds by concentrating on the likely survivors in the ongoing shake-out and cutting off the rest. This will hasten the demise of many less-successful as well as smaller shops that are also at risk of investor withdrawals.
Banks are retrenching from lending to the point that corporate borrowers are turning to the bond market instead for funding. Despite government bailouts, writedowns continue to erode bank capital. Many still hold some of the leveraged loans they made to fund private equity leveraged buyouts back in the boom days. Lenders normally recover 80% on those loans when borrowers default since they rank high in the recovery pecking order. But recent bankruptcies indicate 25% recovery rates. Earlier, Japanese banks were flush with cash, but sharply lower earnings outlooks suggest they no longer will be able to provide capital to international markets.
As banks retreat to their core competencies, they're selling non-essential units. Faced with lasting fear spawned by huge losses and pressed by regulators, these institutions are retreating to basic banking 101. That's spread lending in which deposits are lent with a market-determined interest rate spread that covers costs plus a modest profit. Banks are also consolidating in response to gigantic losses and bleak outlooks. France's BNP Paribas bought the Belgium and Luxembourg assets of Fortis. Spain's Santander is acquiring full control of Sovereign Bancorp based in Wyomissing, Pa. Large consolidated financial institutions don't tend to be big risk-takers, and often lack the entrepreneurial spirit that promotes productivity and economic growth. Also, with fewer institutions, there are fewer counterparts to share risks, and that also dampens activity.
Eastern Europe
Overseas, Western banks largely financed the rapid economic growth in the former Iron Curtain countries in Europe after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. In addition, many companies in those lands financed their domestic businesses by borrowing Swiss francs, euros and other hard currencies at lower rates than in their own inflation-prone countries. Individuals entered the same carry trade to fund their home mortgages.
Now, however, lenders are retreating as they delever. Exports to Western Europe, another important source of growth, are falling. Eastern European borrowers need to repay $400 billion owed to Western banks this year, much of it denominated in foreign currencies. Eurozone banks have outstanding loans to Central and Eastern Europe totaling $1.3 trillion. EU leaders, led by German Chancellor Merkel, recently rejected a $240 billion bailout of Eastern Europe proposed by Hungary.
Like Asia 1997-1998
The dependence of Central and Eastern Europe on foreign financing is painfully similar to that is Asia in the 1990s that led to the 1997-1998 financial and economic collapse--except it probably will be worse this time since banks are delevering this time and weren't back then. Also, these European countries were more leveraged in 2008 than their Asian counterparts a decade ago. This can be seen in their foreign debts in relation to GDP (Chart 8) and in their current account deficit/GDP (Chart 9) as well as in their currency declines.
Foreign Debts/GDP
Current Account Deficit/GDP
Asian lands reacted to the 1997-1998 crisis by cutting foreign borrowing and building foreign currency reserves. Ironically, however, they still didn't escape the current global recession and financial crisis. They're no longer as dependent on inflows of foreign capital, but this time are highly dependent on exports, which are plummeting as U.S. consumers retrench.
Commodity Crisis
The collapse of the commodity bubble will also subdue global economic growth in future years. Sure, commodity consumers benefit from lower prices as producers lose. But the share of total spending on commodity imports by consumers, especially developed lands, is tiny while they account for the bulk of exports for producers, notably developing countries.
Budget Signals
The new Obama federal budget points clearly to more government regulation and involvement in the economy. Going well beyond dealing with the deepening recession and financial crisis, the President wants $630 billion to move toward national health insurance. Businesses that emit carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases would have to purchase permits. Another $20 billion would go for clean energy technology. The government would essentially take over student loans while eliminating private lenders, and make them entitlements with no annual limits on loan totals.
Obama also plans to increase taxes in higher-income households and capital gains and estate while redistributing money to lower-income people, even those who don't pay taxes. This reflects his populist views on the campaign trail, but with considerably more edge. The President's budget document states, "Prudent investments in education, clean energy, health care and infrastructure were sacrificed for huge tax cuts for the wealthy and well-connected. In the face of these trade-offs, Washington has ignored the squeeze on middle-class families that is making it harder for them to get ahead. There's nothing wrong with making money, but there is something wrong when we allow the playing field to be tilted so far in the favor of so few." The President's budget message also attacks "a legacy of misplaced priorities...and irresponsible policy choice in Washington."
Corporations, the energy industry, hedge funds and large farmers would also pay higher taxes while families with annual incomes under $200,000 and especially the working poor would get government checks.
The budget calls for more enforcement money for the FDA to step up drug safety rules, more for the EPA to crack down on industrial polluters, additional funds to protect endangered species and land and water conservation and to protect wildlife from climate change. More money is also requested to enforce fair housing laws and better disclosure of mortgage terms and to reverse "years of erosion in funding for labor law enforcement agencies." Employers that don't offer retirement plans will be forced to open IRAs for employees. There's also additional funds requested for enforcing workplace safety rules.
Stress Tests
Major banks are being stress-tested to determine their volatility under adverse conditions. To date, Fannie and Freddie are in conservatorship and controlled by the government. The remaining major investment banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley are bank holding companies with Federal Reserve regulation. Is it a big surprise that Litton Loan Servicing, owned by Goldman, recently changed its strategy on mortgage modification to reduce borrowers' monthly payments to 31% of income from 38%, the industry standard?
Citigroup and BofA are, for all intents and purposes, wards of the state while the media and Washington spar over whether they will be formally owned by the government. Those two banks recently agreed to suspend mortgage foreclosures until the Treasury sets up its rescue program.
AIG is 85% owned by the Fed, which probably wishes it owned nothing of that bottomless money pit that has already absorbed $150 billion in government money. Recently, the government initiated its fourth plan to rescue AIG,which just reported a $62 billion loss in the fourth quarter. The firm is so troubled that Washington has completely backed away from its role as a stern lender that forced AIG to pay high interest rates on what it assumed would be short-term loans. Now the government is relaxing loan terms by wiping out interest in hopes of preserving some value for AIG. And it will be more involved as it splits AIG into two pieces and gets preferred shares in each entity.
Auto Bailout Payback
Beyond the financial sector, the ongoing bailout of U.S. auto producers is leading to more government intervention in that industry. As usual, he who pays the piper calls the tune. The government has already pumped $17.4 billion into GM and Chrysler, and they say they may need $21.6 billion more. GM also proposes a $4.5 billion credit insurance program for the auto parts makers. Furthermore, GMAC may need more than the $5 billion sunk into it by the Treasury last December.
Bonuses
Of all the signs of opulence carried over from the bubble years, corporate jets and big executive bonuses seem to bother Washington the most. BofA is selling three of its seven jets, a helicopter that was owned by Merrill Lynch and one of two of its New York corporate apartments. Obama wants firms that accept "extraordinary assistance" from the government to cap annual pay at $500,000, disclose pay to shareholders for a non-binding vote, claw back bonuses of corporate officials who provide misleading information, eliminate golden parachutes for those terminated and adopt board policies for luxuries such as entertainment and jets.
This reaction to big bonuses in firms that are taking huge writeoffs, losing big money and requiring massive government bailouts was predictable. From 2002 to 2008, the five largest Wall Street firms paid $190 billion in bonuses while earning $76 billion in profits. Last year, they had a combined net loss of $25 billion but paid bonuses of $26 billion.
The Trouble With More Regulation
Increased regulation may be the natural reaction to financial and economic woes, but it is fraught with problems. It's a reaction to crises and, therefore, comes too late to prevent them. And it often amounts to fighting the last war since the next set of problems will be outside the purview of these new regulations. That's almost guaranteed to be the case since fixed rules only invite all those well-paid bright guys and gals on Wall Street and elsewhere to figure ways around them.
Furthermore, government regulators have never, as far as we know, stopped big bubbles or caught big crooks. Consider the dot com and then the housing blowoffs, both of which occurred while the SEC, the Fed, other regulators, Congress, etc. sat on their hands. Think about Enron, WorldCom and Bernie Madoff, all of whom went on their merry ways until their self-induced collapses, completely free of regulatory interference.
Most importantly, government regulation and involvement in the economy is almost certain to prove inefficient. Risk-taking has been excessive, but government bureaucrats are likely to eliminate much of it, to the detriment of entrepreneurial activity, financial innovation and economic growth. Fannie, Freddie and government-controlled banks are now being directed by the government to modify mortgages to accommodate distressed homeowners. That may implement government policy, but leads to bad business decisions.
Confusion
Furthermore, if financial regulation changes massively, it probably will create confusion and uncertainty to the detriment of adequate financing, spending and investment. Some academics believe that the Great Depression was prolonged because the New Deal measures were so disruptive that banks and other financial firms as well as individual investors, consumers and businessmen were too scared to do anything. Recently, Tadao Noda, a Bank of Japan policy board member, said, "We are in a position where the central bank needs to interfere in financial markets, but if we do too much, the market functioning in turn may be hurt." In any event, major problems inexorably lead to greater government involvement. The Bush Administration was staunchly deregulatory in philosophy but forced to intervene in the financial crisis. The 20th century saw tremendous growth in government involvement in all aspects of the economy and financial markets as a result of three tremendous traumas--World Wars I and II and the Great Depression.
Protectionism
Recessions spawn economic nationalism, protectionism, and the deeper the slump, the stronger are those tendencies. It's ever so easy to blame foreigners for domestic woes and take actions to protect the home turf while repelling the invaders. The beneficial effects of free trade are considerable but diffuse while the loss of one's job to imports is very specific. And politicians find protectionism to be a convenient vote-getter since foreigners don't vote in domestic elections.
U.S. Leadership
Sadly, the U.S. appears to be among the leaders for protection of goods and services against foreign competition. The auto loan program last year under the Bush Administration largely excluded foreign transplants. Obama advocates a super-competitive economy, which requires highly productive workers. Yet the recent fiscal stimulus law restricted H-1B visas, granted to foreigners with advanced education and skills, for employees of firms that receive TARP (bank bailout) money.
Some in Congress worried that tax credits for renewable energy should be confined to American-produced equipment. And recall that during the presidential campaign, Obama called for renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement. Furthermore, the President's emphasis on health care, education and renewable energy turns attention inward, toward self-sufficiency and away from a global focus.
Outside the U.S., protectionism is being promoted by labor unrest. In England, workers at a French-owned oil refinery struck because Total awarded a construction contract to an Italian firm that planned to use its own staff from abroad rather than local workers. Rioters on the French Caribbean island of Guadeloupe protested high prices for food and other necessities for a month recently. High unemployment rates, especially among younger workers, have precipitated riots in Latvia, Lithuania, Greece, Russia and Bulgaria as well as France.
Competitive Devaluations
Good old-fashioned competitive devaluations to spur exports and retard imports, a mainstay of the 1930s, are making a comeback. Kazakhstan recently devalued, in part because of devaluations of her trading partners. As noted earlier, China stopped allowing her yuan to appreciate, in part because her labor costs are being undercut by countries like Vietnam and Bangladesh.
With the understanding that protectionism helped make the Great Depression "Great," country leaders still publicly espouse free trade and reject protectionism. And they express confidence that global organizations like the WTO, IMF and World Bank will forestall protectionism and economic nationalism, and they engage in endless meetings to promote free trade as well as global standards and cooperation for handling the deepening financial crisis. But almost nothing happens, as shown by the recent EU refusal to bail out Eastern Europe.
Stealth Protectionism
In any event, protectionism is returning by stealth. U.S. steelmakers plan to file anti-dumping suits against foreign producers, a strategy they have employed successfully for decades, and India recently proposed increased steel tariffs. In the first half of 2008, WTO antidumping investigations were up 30% from a year earlier. Bank bailouts have been aimed at protecting local institutions, as discussed earlier, and the Japanese government is buying stocks of Japan-based corporations to help company balance sheets, but also giving them a competitive advantage over the subsidiaries of foreign outfits.
Like America, France is aiding its own auto producers, not transplants, and has created a sovereign wealth fund to keep "national champions" out of foreign ownership. Since last November, Russia has introduced 28 import duty and export subsidies affecting steel, oil and other products as well as imposed special road tolls on trucks from the EU, Switzerland and Turkmenistan. Russia's tariff on imported cars recently rose 5 to 10 percentage points, curtailing shipments of used cars from Japan to the Russian Far East.
Meanwhile, Argentina has imposed new obstacles to imported shoes and auto parts. The EU again is giving export refunds to dairy farmers, to the detriment of New Zealand, slapped anti-dumping charges on Chinese nuts and bolts, and threatens duties on U.S. biodiesel imports in retaliation for America's export subsidies. Not to be outdone, the U.S. plans retaliatory tariffs on Italian water and French cheese in reaction to EU restrictions on U.S. chicken and beef imports in the hormones war.
Ecuador lifted tariffs across the board recently, with the levy on imported meat rising to 85.5% from 25%. Indonesia is using special import licenses to limit the inflow of clothing, shoes and electronics and also is curtailing toy imports by allowing them to enter through only a few of its ports. And there's the old standby, health and safety standards that Japan relies on consistently to keep out unwanted products.
Deflation
Long-time Insight readers know that we have been forecasting chronic deflation to start with the next major global recession. Well, that recession is here. As discussed in our Nov. 2008 Insight, deflation results when the overall supply of goods and services exceeds demand, and can result from supply leaping or from demand dropping. We've been forecasting chronic good deflation of excess supply because of today's convergence of many significant productivity-soaked technologies such as semiconductors, computers, the Internet, telecom and biotech that should hype output. Ditto for the globalization of production and the other deflationary forces we've been discussing since we wrote two books on deflation in the late 1990s, Deflation: Why it's coming, whether it's good or bad, and how it will affect your investments, business and personal affairs (1998) and Deflation: How to survive and thrive in the coming wave of deflation (1999). As a result of rapid productivity growth, fewer and fewer man-hours are needed to produce goods and services. Estimates are that 65% of jobs lost in manufacturing between 2000 and 2006 were due to productivity growth with only 35% due to outsourcing overseas.
Similar conditions held in the late 1800s when the American Industrial Revolution came into full flower after the Civil War. Value added in manufacturing leaped, and at the same time, real GNP grew 4.32% per year from 1869 to 1898, an unrivaled rate for a period that long, and consumption per consumer jumped 2.33% per year. Yet wholesale prices dropped 50% between 1870 and 1896, a 2.6% annual rate of decline. Good deflation also existed in the Roaring '20s when the driving new technologies were electrification of factories and homes and mass-produced automobiles.
The 1930s
In contrast, bad deflation reigned in the 1930s as the Great Depression pushed demand well below supply. As in the 1839-1843 depression, the money supply, prices, banks and real goods and services all nosedived. Employment dropped along with prices in the Great Depression and the unemployment rate rose to 25%. That depression was truly global.
We've consistently predicted the good deflation of excess supply, but in our two Deflation books and subsequent reports, we said clearly that the bad deflation of deficient demand could occur--due to severe and widespread financial crises or due to global protectionism. Both are clear threats, as explained earlier in this report.
Furthermore, with slower global economic growth in the years ahead due to the U.S. consumer saving spree, worldwide financial deleveragings, low commodity prices, increased government regulation and protectionism, excess global capacity will probably be a chronic problem. So deflation in the years ahead is likely to be a combination of good and bad.
Supply will be ample due to new tech, globalization and other factors we've explored over the years such as no big global wars (we hope), continual inflation worries by central bankers, continuing restructuring, and cost-cutting mass retailing. But demand will be weak, as discussed earlier. The chronic 1% to 2% deflation from excess supply that we forecast earlier still seems likely, but now we're adding 1% due to weak demand for a total of 2% to 3% annual declines in aggregate price indices for years to come.
2009 Seems Easy
For four reasons, the deflation that started several months ago (Chart 10) is quite likely to persist along with the recession, or at least until early 2010. First, the collapse in commodity prices continues and past declines are still working their way through the system. Crude oil prices have collapsed from $147 per barrel to around $40. Steel semi-finished billet prices were $1,200 a metric ton last summer but now is $350. Iron ore costs per metric ton dropped from $200 early last year to $80. It takes time for steel prices to work through to final consumer goods prices such as for washing machines.
U.S. Price Indices month/month % change
Second, producers, importers, wholesalers and retailers were caught flat-footed by the sudden nosedive in consumer spending late last year and continue to unload surplus goods by slashing prices. All the giveaway bargains at Christmas still didn't entice enough consumers to open their wallets. Spring apparel, ordered before consumer retrenchment, is clearly in excess and being marked down before it's put on the racks. Retailers from Saks on down continue to chop prices. Branded food product manufacturers are willing to promote their wares alongside the private-label goods that supermarkets shoppers increasingly favor.
Wage Cuts
Third, wages are actually being cut for the first time since the 1930s. Previously, labor costs were controlled by layoffs, which still dominate. Benefits have also been trimmed in recent years by switching from defined contribution pensions to 401(k)s and increasing employee contributions to health care costs. Most workers are less sensitive to benefits than to salaries and wages, but the deepening recession and mounting layoffs (Chart 5) are making them more amenable to wage cuts.
So is the growing use of this approach. In a recent poll, 13% of companies plan layoffs in the next 12 months, but 4% expect to reduce salaries and 8% will cut workweeks.
So it just isn't the CEO who is taking the symbolic pay cut to deal with tough times. We argued in our Deflation books that cutting pay rather than staff is more humane, better for morale and better for keeping the organization together and ready for a business rebound. Now increasing numbers of employers agree with us.
A final reason to expect deflation in coming quarters in the U.S. is the surplus of aggregate supply over demand. Notice that the supply-demand gap is an excellent forerunner of inflation six months later. And deflation this year is spreading globally. Japan is once again flirting with falling prices, Thailand's CPI in January fell year over year for the first time in a decade. In Europe, inflation rates are rapidly approaching zero.
Prices In Recovery
The real test of deflation will come when the economy recovers--in early 2010 or later, we believe. Inflation rates normally fall in recessions, but then revive when the economy resumes growth. This time, inflation rates started low, so declines into negative territory are normal, especially given the severity of the recession and the collapse in energy and other commodity prices. If we're right, however, aggregate price indices like the CPI and PPI will continue to drop in economic recovery and verify the arrival of chronic deflation.
Few agree with us. They've never seen anything but inflation in their business careers or lifetimes, so they think that's the way God made the world. Few can remember much about the 1930s, the last time deflation reigned. Furthermore, we all tend to have inflation biases. When we pay higher prices, it's because of the inflation devil, but lower prices are a result of our smart shopping and bargaining skills. Furthermore, we don't calculate the quality-adjusted price declines that result from technological improvements. This is especially true since many of those items, like TVs, are bought so infrequently that we have no idea what we paid for the last one. But we sure remember the cost of gasoline on the last fill-up a week ago.
Too Much Money?
The main reason most expect inflation to resume, however, is because of all the money that's being pumped out by the Fed and other central banks as well as the Treasury to finance the mushrooming federal deficit. When the economy revives, they fear, all this liquidity will turn into inflationary excess demand.
At present, the Fed's generosity isn't getting outside the banks into loans that create money.
When cyclical economic recovery finally does arrive in 2010 or later, it will probably be sluggish and lenders will still likely be cautious, as discussed earlier. Furthermore, any meaningful increase in loans will probably continue to be more than offset by the continual destruction of liquidity as writedowns, chargeoffs, elimination of derivatives, etc. persists for years. Derivatives represent liquidity. You can't use them at the grocery store, but at least until recently, they were interchangeable from money in many uses.
In Sum
The deepening recession and spreading financial crisis is the beginning of the unwinding of about three decades of financial leverage and spending excesses. The process will probably take many years to complete as U.S. consumers mount a decade-long saving spree, the world's financial institutions delever, commodity prices remain weak, government regulation intensifies and protectionism threatens, if not dominates. Sluggish economic growth and deflation are the likely results.
A. Gary Shilling's INSIGHT - March 2009
U.S. banks dominate the COMEX
While those of us with a long bias can take some comfort in the larger reductions of net short positioning by the commercial traders (covered in the full Got Gold Report), we need to remember that as of right now the short side of the market is literally dominated by just two big U.S. banks. When the regulators, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), consent to allow just two traders to take overly large positioning on either side of a particular market, it leads to mistrust and angst among the public and market commentators. Such overwhelmingly large positioning also provides ammunition to conspiracy-minded commentators who constantly blame price movements of silver (and gold) on deliberate action by sinister members of a secretive “cartel” intent on suppressing the price of gold and silver.
Some of the individuals advancing the notion of a conspiracy to suppress precious metals prices are bright, articulate and bring compelling evidence and research to the discussion regularly. We’ll undoubtedly have much more about that in future reports, but for now it has become increasingly difficult for the industry and regulators to ignore the so-called “conspiracy camp” and its growing legions of members.
Regardless if one believes in menacing cartel theories, and regardless of whether or not one takes the opposite view, (that most or all of the very large net short positioning of the two very large U.S. banks in silver futures are actually legitimate hedges offsetting long positions in OTC markets on behalf of the various clients of the banks), the current positioning by the two banks in COMEX silver futures is an example of an enormously concentrated futures position.
According to the latest Bank Participation in Futures and Options Markets report, as of March 3, 2009, two U.S. banks held zero long and 30,838 contracts short with silver then at $12.83 and with 93,051 COMEX 5,000-ounce contracts open. So, just two banks held net short positions equal to 33.14% of all the open contracts on the largest futures bourse in the world. The chart below shows the net positioning of the U.S. banks relative to the total number of all open contracts for silver on the COMEX, division of NYMEX.
According to CFTC COT reports, during that 3/3 reporting week all COMEX commercial traders as a group – all of them - were collectively net short a total of 38,704 contracts, so just two very large U.S. banks held a shocking 79.68% of all the commercial net short positioning on the COMEX. The graph below shows the two U.S. banks net short positioning relative to all COMEX commercials net short positioning since 2006.
One potential problem with allowing overly-large positioning by just a few players is the potential for those elite traders to get into the position of having to trade in a particular direction in order to protect their position. The incentive for a trader running 1,000 contracts to try to move the market with the weight of his own trading would certainly be much less than a trader (or two traders in this case) with 30,000 contracts of one-way exposure.
Sure, the COMEX is not the only market for silver in the world, but trading on the COMEX does indeed influence the trading for silver on all the other world markets, including the larger OTC markets based primarily in London. And sure, if silver were to be man-handled too low for too long buyers, acting in their own self interest, would step in and buy it back up to reality over time. Haven’t they already done exactly that in the real physical silver markets given the insanely high premiums for most physical silver products?
One could argue the silver market is relatively small, and therefore prone to manipulation because it doesn’t take all that much capital to move the futures markets. Perhaps over short periods of time it actually is. But, this report leans toward the idea that the silver market is global and deep enough to discourage even the larger players from messing around with it too much or too long.
On the other side of that silver coin, we also believe that the amount of physical silver available for investment by new investors is rapidly approaching a critical inflection point in the not-too-distant future. If we know it, anyone who would short the market knows it even better. We have to conclude that anyone who would consistently attempt to manipulate the silver market downward in the face of obvious and material supply constriction is either very stupid or is a phantom of coincidence.
With that in mind, in an era when regulators allowed the Bernard Madoff scam to go unchecked for many years, even though they were handed the scamster on a silver platter by others in the same business eight or nine years ago, a scam ruining hundreds or thousands of innocent investors; in a period when ANY silver product being sold on the street carries with it extremely high premiums due to overwhelming public demand; in a period when investors have had their confidence severely shaken in all markets; can the COMEX continue to allow such one-sided and concentrated trading action to continue? Perhaps more to the point, shouldn’t the COMEX explain publicly why it has allowed that very concentrated short positioning by just two U.S. banks?
Perhaps with more clarity would come more confidence.
Butler's latest on silver:
Crunch Time?
By: Theodore Butler
-- Posted 16 March, 2009 |
It is one thing to analyze on a long-term basis, and quite another to make short-term predictions. There is no doubt in my mind that silver is a rock solid long-term investment opportunity, with an absolutely spectacular risk to reward ratio and value. It’s just a matter of time before silver is priced substantially higher. As I try to point out week after week, the rise in the price of silver is inevitable. That’s all that should matter to long-term investors. Silver is the ultimate buy and hold.
Asked when this dramatic silver price rise will take place, I have always answered that the exact timing is impossible to know, even though prices have already climbed substantially over the past few years. The important point is that prices are still depressed, principally due to the manipulation, offering the long-term investor an attractive entry opportunity. Still, silver is a very interesting topic to many of us, and it is hard not to try to consider the short-term factors. That’s why, for instance, I study the COTs.
I have always been convinced that the price of silver, when it moves to true value, will make that move with a violence that will shock most observers. It will not be a "normal" market move. It will be as unprecedented as much as the true meaning of that word allows. You had better be positioned before the move commences, because it will be extremely difficult to jump on board at attractive prices once the move has begun. Those who have talked with me personally about this, will confirm that I always say that when the real move comes, they will not have to ask me if this is the real move. They will know it simply by observing the price action. It will be unmistakable. Therefore, it is natural to attempt to anticipate when such a move may begin.
The real move in silver will come when a wholesale physical shortage is at hand. When that shortage comes, no one can stop the silver price explosion. Not the silver users, not JP Morgan, not the US Government. Further, I have always thought that any signs that the wholesale shortage were at hand would likely to be subtle, as opposed to being clear for all to see. When the signs of the real move are clear to all, when the wholesale silver shortage is truly upon us, it will clearly be too late for all to capitalize on those signs. This will develop very quickly, with little time to react. All we’re likely to get are subtle signs, not personal invitations to buy. The trade-off is that subtle signs can turn out to be false readings. So we are forced to be hypersensitive to the signs of a developing wholesale shortage in silver. We can play it safe and wait for the inevitable shortage to hit and say I told you so afterward, or we can stick our necks out and point to the signs while they are still subtle and maybe false.
With that caveat, let me tell you some of the signs I see of an impending silver wholesale shortage. Some of these signs are micro, meaning very specific and detailed. Others are macro, much broader. The main micro sign that we may be entering into a wholesale silver shortage is the appearance of an inversion or backwardation on the COMEX. For the past week, the nearby current delivery month of March has closed at a premium to the next major delivery month, May. What this means is that buyers are willing to pay more to get immediate delivery of wholesale quantities of silver. It means wholesale silver is "tight."
While not completely unprecedented, this inversion in the March contract is rare enough to command attention. It’s not just the premium of the March futures contract to the May contract that is unusual, it’s also the pattern of deliveries that suggests genuine tightness. The buyers are having to wait for deliveries, where they didn’t have to wait so long in the past. Conversely, the sellers seem reluctant, or unable to make physical deliveries with the ease they demonstrated in the past.
What’s somewhat ironic is that there was a tremendous amount of discussion over the past few months about backwardation and potential delivery troubles in the past December contract. None of those threats came to fruition. Now, with very little public discussion or warning, delivery tightness and backwardation seem to have arrived.
Other micro signs include the very recent announcements of production disruptions at two of the world’s largest silver refineries, the MetMex complex of Penoles in Mexico and the La Oroya facility owned by Doe Run Peru. MetMex declared a force majeure on silver contracts due to a strike, while La Oroya ceased production due to non-payment to concentrate suppliers and a subsequent credit line cancellation. These circumstances may prove short-term in nature, but if anyone could imagine a more bullish announcement for silver than these two facilities suddenly being shut down, I’d like to hear it. That prices plummeted today on this news is so bizarre that it can only be explained by manipulation.
On the macro side, there are also very strong signs that the wholesale physical silver shortage is here. Over the past few months I have been writing about the impending decline in silver mine production as a consequence of declines in base metal production. http://www.investmentrarities.com/weeklycommentary10-27-08.html
http://www.investmentrarities.com/12-30-08.html
More than 60% of all silver mine production comes as a result of byproduct mining of three base metals, copper, zinc and lead. With the collapse of the world economy and the subsequent decline in industrial consumption of all commodities, the inventories of base metals grew dramatically. After all, it is a lot easier for an industrial consumer to quickly cut consumption than it is to shut down a mine. Therefore, in the time lag before mine production declines sufficiently to match the new lower level of industrial consumption excess metal is produced and flows into inventories. That is exactly what we’ve seen over the past six months. Inventories of copper, zinc and other base metals exploded in size. (Silver inventories grew as well, but all the excess silver was gobbled up by investors, as discussed previously).
Now there are signs that base metal mine production has fallen enough to match the lower level of demand. Those signs can be found in the recent flattening out and decline in copper, zinc and lead inventories at the London Metal Exchange. After growing non-stop for months, inventories at the LME have stopped growing in the past few weeks. This suggests a current balance between supply and demand for copper, zinc and lead. Of course, if inventories start to grow rapidly again, this flattening out in inventory growth will have been a false signal. But assuming that mine production of copper, zinc and lead has now been reduced enough to prevent inventories from growing, then the conclusion for silver is clear. Silver mine production has also been dramatically reduced. This can only add to the wholesale silver shortage, as investment demand is still surging.
Allow me to summarize what all these micro and macro signs of wholesale shortage mean to silver investors. Quite simply, it means that the price of silver should explode soon. Either that, or all these signs must reverse direction. You must remember that the manipulation is a manipulation of price. The price is the only thing wrong, or out of kilter with everything else that exists in silver. The price is the aberration. If the silver price today was $50 or $100, everyone would see the tightness in wholesale silver. But because the price is $13, very few see it.
The good news is that of all the factors that matter to silver, it is the price itself that can change quicker and more radically than any other factor. More good news is that nobody can prevent a wholesale shortage. No matter how powerful they may appear to be. This is about physical supplies, not how many paper contracts can be sold short. Additionally, if we are entering into a wholesale silver shortage, then nothing could prove that the silver market has been manipulated more than this. Let’s face it, the regulators maintain that all is well in silver and that the price is at a free and fair level. Nothing will expose that lie like a wholesale shortage.
If the short-term signs I see, both micro and macro, are true representations of what is occurring with supply and demand, then it may be crunch time in silver. If that’s the case, buckle up and get ready for the ride of your life.
Silver market stress:
Link for article with charts-
http://goldmoney.com/en/commentary/2009-03-15.html
GoldMoney Alert - 15 March 2009
Extraordinary Stress in the Silver Market
In an alert posted on August 17, 2008, I drew attention to the "huge disconnect between the paper market and the physical market" for precious metals. I went on to conclude "that this disconnect…means that gold will climb back as rapidly as it fell, creating a "V" bottom."
My timing was somewhat off because gold continued to decline in the carnage resulting from the collapse of Lehman Brothers and AIG the following month, but the "V" bottom I was expecting did thereafter form as we can see on the following chart.
Importantly, the market conditions that led to my expectation for the "V" bottom and for gold to "climb back as rapidly as it fell" still prevail. The remarkable disconnect between paper-gold and real, physical gold has not disappeared.
I concluded last August that "The extraordinary demand for coins and small bars can be viewed as an early sign that the market is moving into backwardation." Backwardation, meaning the spot month (i.e., physical metal) trades at a premium to future months (i.e., paper promises to pay metal in the future), is exceptionally bullish. It rarely appears in the precious metals, and I cautioned that "A backwardation would be unthinkable in normal times, but these are not normal times." Today the times are still anything but normal, and the precious metals have indeed moved into backwardation.
On the Comex, gold slipped into backwardation at the end of February and remained in that state briefly, reflecting the strong demand for physical gold. Silver is presently in backwardation as evidenced by the following table of Comex settlement prices. The March contract, which reflects the current spot price, is higher than all future prices up to July.
More importantly, silver is in backwardation in London, one of the major markets for trading physical silver. I first drew attention to this phenomenon in my alert on February 15, 2009, noting therein that "silver has been in backwardation since January 21st". Unbelievably, silver is still in backwardation - an incredible and to my knowledge, unprecedented 38 trading days in a row!
What's more, the backwardation is not just one or two months forward. It presently extends three months forward, but during this period silver has been in backwardation for as long as twelve months forward, which is truly phenomenal - and exceptionally bullish.
One can only reasonably conclude that there is considerable stress in the market for physical silver.
Backwardation means that people are increasingly demanding real, physical metal, and not paper promises. It also means that people are starting to doubt the promises of the silver shorts, namely, those banks that have promised to deliver silver at specified future dates. Finally, it means that these banks have made promises to deliver metal that in the aggregate are greater than the physical silver they actually hold. If that weren't true, these banks as well as other holders of physical silver would sell what they own in the spot market in exchange for a futures contract, profiting from the difference in this price disparity. In time, their transactions would eventually eliminate the backwardation. But the backwardation has not been eliminated. Thus, given that the backwardation has remained for 38 days, one can only conclude that there exists an acute shortage of physical silver.
Backwardation is an abnormal state for the precious metals, and markets do not tolerate abnormal states. Arbitrageurs step in to profit whenever markets create unusual opportunities, like the one now existing in silver. But the backwardation prevails. No one is stepping in to sell physical silver in exchange for future delivery, so there is only one possible conclusion. There is not sufficient physical silver available at current prices to meet demand. So unless the shorts can somehow come up with the physical silver they need to meet their obligations to deliver and thereby relieve the backwardation, the price of silver needs to climb higher. It needs to rise high enough to induce holders of physical silver to sell their metal, which the shorts need to buy to meet their obligations to deliver.
There is of course another alternative. The shorts will simply default. There is much precedent for this alternative. For example, in August 2006 the London Metal Exchange declared in effect a force majeure on outstanding nickel contracts, which in essence enabled the shorts to default. Its press release stated: "The London Metal Exchange announced that the Special Committee has imposed a backwardation limit...in the nickel market and that there will be a suspension...in respect of those with nickel positions. Commenting on the announcement, Simon Heale, LME Chief Executive said: 'Nickel stocks are at historically low levels and we now have a genuine material shortage.'" Evidence today suggests there is a genuine material shortage in silver.
Rumors abound in London in particular about the shorts being late in meeting deliveries. So the present backwardation is not surprising. It is in effect a confirmation of these rumors, but it also shows that promises to deliver are being increasingly doubted. In other words, people who hold physical silver are not willing to exchange their metal for some paper promise, nor should you. Hold real physical silver; do not accept any paper substitutes like certificates, pool accounts and ETFs.
There are only two ways to own physical silver. Buy it and store it yourself, or buy it and have someone store it for you like we do in GoldMoney. As of February 27th, GoldMoney was storing 14.9 million ounces of silver in addition to 12.1 tonnes of gold owned by its customers.
Beware, many of them are rip off artists. Just FYI
........al
Eternal Image trend breaker. Our little company is in the process of breaking 2 major trends on it's way up. The first is the very old and stodgy funeral industry. As some of our more astute investors that know the funeral industry well will attest, things in that industry are very resistant to change and when it happens, it is generally dinosauric in speed. In just a couple years EI has introduced innovative products to the industry, had their products accepted industrywide, and joined the fraternity so to speak. The Ks and Qs will provide the success story in the future. The second trend they are breaking is the uplisting. Since the Enron scandal and the passage of SabOx many companies from very small to very big have gone dark. IOW they have chosen to hide the pertinant facts about their company by no longer filing financials with the SEC. Here again EI has chosen to buck the trend. They have chosen to not hide their business from investors. They have chosen full open disclosure by filing audited financials with the SEC, bucking a trend of leaving the scene rather than complying with SabOx. I see all this as positive altho some would disagree, as is their right on a discussion board. Just posting a few more reasons why I am still in this for the long haul.
...........al
Demand is outstripping supply all over the world. South Africa's production has nose dived. They are no longer the world's largest producer. Physical gold and silver in small investor type quantities is getting harder to find by the week. More and more peoples and even now some central banks are buying gold mainly due to the economic uncertainty in the industrialized world. When- not if - China decides to dump their dollars to increase their gold holdings which by western standards are quite small lookout below on the dollar.
.........al
In the real world it is supply and demand. Only paper contracts are controlling the spot prices of gold and silver. In the real world attempting to buy at anywhere near spot is a fruitless venture. It's backwardation.
.........al
Just a tidbit:
In my many years I have come to a conclusion that one useless man is a shame, two is a law firm and three or more is a congress.
-- John Adams
Hey Basser- if you're looking for a 10 bagger from these levels, you're setting your sights too low.
.......al
couch- I've been playing penny stocks and microcaps for over a decade. Most that delve into this arena last less than 6 months with enormous losses. I've had winners and losers over the years. Luckily for me the winners have far outweighed the losers or else I would have left with the crowd years ago. I discovered this small company about 2 1/2 years ago. I have been buying stock in it ever since. I liked the concept. Since then I have witnessed literally $millions in free advertising. I have watched as management has done it's best, not without a few missteps, to build the company and grow. I have communicated with fellow investors- note I said investors and not traders- that have seen the products and watched them sell out at the most recent convention. I have read in papers all across the country about the growing interest in the products. I have spoken to funeral directors and all but one knew of the products- that was early last year btw. I have determined based on my own dd and reasoning that this is the best pinky stock I have ever seen coming down the pike. I just sit back, relax and sometimes chuckle at the day to day banter. 10 bagger here in the future? If you are thinking that, I do believe you are setting your sights too low. That's my opinion and input for you.
.............al
There are many good things coming from this comp[any in the future. We just have to be patient and wait.
.........al
Agreed. I don't think we have any insiders selling at all. This is coming from somewhere else. NAR in need of fresh capital? I trust them as far as I can throw a building.
..........al
Good point. Anyone not willing to look at both sides and consider opinions in contravention with their own is setting themself up for a big fall.
............al
Yes, and like yourself I watch the company on this front. As long as the insiders are still holding strong we're in good shape. Dribbles here and there are just a minor nuisance. Major dumps by insiders are a big red flag.
............al
I am just hoping the pump and dumpers leave us alone. That last one had to have come from NAR, IMHO. They are not healthy for a good company. That's a lot of manipulation right there.
..........al
Don't forget pre split this hit .008¢ with no revenues. That's equal to 16¢ post split.
.......al
With this company, I think time is relative. To someone invested for the long haul a difference in 1/2¢ means little. A trader looking for a fast buck has every reason to watch 1/10¢ moves. It's all in one's own perspective.
..........al
Rising revenues will curtail much of what you suspect. Deep pockets that play the penny stocks already know about manipulation. They also know a viable company with a good product line and rising sales will stop a large majority of manipulation in it's tracks. It just takes time.
.........al
I don't look for "major" revenues as much as "rising" revenues each Q.
...........al
Hey Lurker, I like your anticipations, but I'll keep my feet on the ground for now, LOL.
.........al
The list of worriers grows daily.eom
,......al
midrew- I for one have always appreciated your posts in the past and present. You show sound reasoning and from what you have posted, you have done some digging to support your posts. Now in answer to your latest on the pps vs. uplisting. I have to try and put a damper on your expectations. Uplisting will give a share price boost, no doubt. But don't expect a moonshot. I think many people will end up disappointed not seeing the share price rise to monumental heights after the uplist. I am not one of them. I still see a nice long term gain eventually but that will only come from the Ks and Qs. The uplist is a good thing as it will open the stock to a much broader group of investors. But don't expect the manipulation to stop. There may not be as much of it on the BB but it still exists. Manipulating a penny stock is not really that difficult. Give me 10 traders with some deep pockets and I could manipulate any microcap. It's done all the time right here on Ihub and other stock boards. The sheep with unreal expectations, little experience, and closed eyes get sheared all the time.
........al
We the taxpayer have been scammed big time. Wall street money has be sprinkled liberally over the entire political spectrum. Now they are getting their rewards. And when the unhappy ordinary poor working stiff has had enuff and starts to riot and social order breaks down, the politicians will wonder why. What we need is retribution, big time.
.......al
Hi LC, I think the financials will not be up to a lot of expectations of some. What I look for is incresing revenues on the Ks and Qs. That will make or break the company and the share price. Press releses are fine and give perspective, but those numbers will be the keys. I think everyone missed a good buying op yesterday. I'm not swing trading this. I've got a long term view.
I'll be in Fla next month for a wedding. If you have any pull with the weatherman down there, try and get some cool days mid month. My blood is too thick from the cold northeast.
.........al
Funny how the market makers seem to get info ahead of news releases.
.......al
Goo morning everyone. Looks like the bargain basement of yesterday is closed.
.......al
And thanks for what you are trying to do. Ignoring all the signs of what is going on out here could be perilous.
......al