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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 1 De-P002Room: PosterTime: June 8 17:30-19:30Evaluation of Kongsberg Simrad magnesium seawater battery SWB 600 aimed to verylong term ocean bottom observation# Tomoki Watanabe [1], Masashi Mochizuki [2], Hajime Shiobara [3], Toshihiko Kanazawa [4][1] Earthquake Res. Inst., Univ. Tokyo, [2] ERI, Univ. of Tokyo, [3] Dep. Earth Sci., Fac. Sci., Toyama Univ., [4] ERI, TokyoUnivFor very long term ocean bottom observation more than several years, we made evaluation of Kongsberg Simrad ASseawater battery SWB 600(anode: magnesium, cathode: fibre glass carbon) around Japanese Sea in December, 1998. Inpresent experiment, we measured voltage of seawater battery directly using a digital recorder and cement resistors. Seawaterbattery began to produce electric power just after touch with seawater. Maximum power output of 3W(1.83V) was observed atthe beginning of deployment, and most of this value indicated 2W(1.5V). In this experiment, we found that output voltagefrom seawater battery was strongly influenced by electrochemical circumstances in seawater.
Following explosion in august 2001 of a moored data buoy during maintenance onboard a ship in the Bay of Bengal which resulted in the death of a crew member, the Indian National Institute for Ocean Technology (NIOT) who operated the buoy consituted an expert committee to examine the incident. The committe included distinguished scientists in mechanical and electrical engineering, battery development and manufacture, forensic science and pressure vessels. This committee had concluded that the explosion was due to the emission of hydrogen and oxygen from overcharged batteries, ignited by an electrical spark. The recommendations of the expert committee were then placed before the Data Buoy Cooperation Panel and the issue was discussed further with the buoy operator represented by Dr. Premkumar (prem([at]niot.ernet.in), Panel Members, and manufacturers at its 17th session in Perth, 22-26 OCtober 2001.
Report from manufacturer also suggested that likely causes of the explosion were:
The release of hydrogen gas from the batteries inside the instrument cylinder, resulting from their overcharging; A temperature rise of the batteries resulting from the buoy being kept on deck for 1.5 hours, leading to the generation of hydrogen beyond an acceptable limit; A spark generated in the electrical circuit. After discussion, the panel recommended that manufacturers should enhance buoy safety through improved design in the following areas
Batteries are to be placed in a vented compartment, eliminating voids as far as possible, with a double venting arrangement; Incorporation of an overcharge controller and temperature controlled switch, to disconnect the batteries from the solar panels when required; Incorporation of an explosive gas sensor and temperature sensor inside the battery compartment and instrument cylinder, with the data to be transmitted once a day, to allow corrective action, or suitable explosive gas testing procedures, to be undertaken on buoy retrieval or servicing; Incorporation of continuous monitoring of battery charge current and voltage, to be transmitted with the buoy data; Incorporation of a suitable purging system and procedures. The panel requested both manufacturers and buoy operators to keep it informed of the improvements being carried out towards buoy safety, so that it in turn can inform all other operators of these as a part of its technical information exchange function, in the interests of the whole community. Information on current manufacture and maintenance recommendations will be placed in this web page.
Buoy operators and manufactuers are urged to take above information into account.
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