Ultraguard Water Systems (fka UGRD)

[mick]

part #1 ,,, magnesium fuel cell power.

http://www.physics-talk.com/detail-5167042.html

http://www-jm.eps.s.u-tokyo.ac.jp/1999cd-rom/pdf/de/de-p002_e.pdf.
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Page 1
De-P002Room: PosterTime: June 8 17:30-19:30Evaluation of Kongsberg
Simrad magnesium seawater battery SWB 600 aimed to verylong term ocean
bottom observation# Tomoki Watanabe [1], Masashi Mochizuki [2], Hajime
Shiobara [3], Toshihiko Kanazawa [4][1] Earthquake Res. Inst., Univ.
Tokyo, [2] ERI, Univ. of Tokyo, [3] Dep. Earth Sci., Fac. Sci., Toyama
Univ., [4] ERI, TokyoUnivFor very long term ocean bottom observation
more than several years, we made evaluation of Kongsberg Simrad
ASseawater battery SWB 600(anode: magnesium, cathode: fibre glass
carbon) around Japanese Sea in December, 1998. Inpresent experiment,
we measured voltage of seawater battery directly using a digital
recorder and cement resistors. Seawaterbattery began to produce
electric power just after touch with seawater. Maximum power output of
3W(1.83V) was observed atthe beginning of deployment, and most of this
value indicated 2W(1.5V). In this experiment, we found that output
voltagefrom seawater battery was strongly influenced by
electrochemical circumstances in seawater.

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Data buoy operations safety

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Following explosion in august 2001 of a moored data buoy during
maintenance onboard a ship in the Bay of Bengal which resulted in the
death of a crew member, the Indian National Institute for Ocean
Technology (NIOT) who operated the buoy consituted an expert committee
to examine the incident. The committe included distinguished
scientists in mechanical and electrical engineering, battery
development and manufacture, forensic science and pressure vessels.
This committee had concluded that the explosion was due to the
emission of hydrogen and oxygen from overcharged batteries, ignited by
an electrical spark. The recommendations of the expert committee were
then placed before the Data Buoy Cooperation Panel and the issue was
discussed further with the buoy operator represented by Dr. Premkumar
(prem([at]niot.ernet.in), Panel Members, and manufacturers at its 17th
session in Perth, 22-26 OCtober 2001.

Report from manufacturer also suggested that likely causes of the
explosion were:

The release of hydrogen gas from the batteries inside the instrument
cylinder, resulting from their overcharging;
A temperature rise of the batteries resulting from the buoy being kept
on deck for 1.5 hours, leading to the generation of hydrogen beyond an
acceptable limit;
A spark generated in the electrical circuit.
After discussion, the panel recommended that manufacturers should
enhance buoy safety through improved design in the following areas

Batteries are to be placed in a vented compartment, eliminating voids
as far as possible, with a double venting arrangement;
Incorporation of an overcharge controller and temperature controlled
switch, to disconnect the batteries from the solar panels when
required;
Incorporation of an explosive gas sensor and temperature sensor inside
the battery compartment and instrument cylinder, with the data to be
transmitted once a day, to allow corrective action, or suitable
explosive gas testing procedures, to be undertaken on buoy retrieval
or servicing;
Incorporation of continuous monitoring of battery charge current and
voltage, to be transmitted with the buoy data;
Incorporation of a suitable purging system and procedures.
The panel requested both manufacturers and buoy operators to keep it
informed of the improvements being carried out towards buoy safety, so
that it in turn can inform all other operators of these as a part of
its technical information exchange function, in the interests of the
whole community. Information on current manufacture and maintenance
recommendations will be placed in this web page.

Buoy operators and manufactuers are urged to take above information
into account.